

the slave of routine. It neither built frigates, nor cut down line-of-battle ships, capable of meeting these enormous American vessels called frigates. It sent the captains and crews of ordinary frigates to fight single-handed against such disparity of force. There were numerous fast two-deckers that might have been employed on the American stations, ready for meeting these vessels on equal terms. The Admiralty believed that a frigate was a frigate, and ought to contend with any other frigate. The government was, in truth, too busy with the European war to pay much attention to an enemy regarded with an official feeling approaching to contempt.

Seven years only had elapsed since the glories of Trafalgar, when the British navy felt degraded and humiliated by these unforeseen triumphs of an enemy with whom that generation of seamen had never measured their strength. A spirit of emulation was quickly roused. The commanders and crews of ships in the Atlantic knew that it would not be enough to make prize of merchant vessels and sweep privateers from the seas, but that the honour of the British flag would be impaired unless some achievement could restore its old prestige. There was a captain of a frigate on the Halifax station whose chivalrous feeling prompted him to some exploit in which, with an equal enemy, he might rely upon a sound ship and upon well-trained men. Captain Broke, of the Shannon, had, by careful training, brought his crew into the highest state of efficiency. He had been long watching the frigate Chesapeake in the harbour of Boston. These frigates were of nearly equal strength in their weight of metal and their number of men. Captain Broke, in his desire to fight a duel with the American frigate, had sent away his consort, the Tenedos, and had then despatched a courteous challenge to captain Lawrence of the Chesapeake, in which he says:—"I request you will do me the favour to meet the Shannon, ship to ship, to try the fortunes of our respective flags. All interruption shall be provided against." This challenge was sent on the 1st of June, and immediately afterwards the Shannon lay-to under Boston lighthouse. Captain Lawrence had not received Broke's letter when he sailed out of the harbour, followed by many seamen and other inhabitants of Boston in barges and pleasure boats, who expected that this daring demonstration of the hostile frigate would be followed by its speedy capture. At half-past five in the afternoon the American hauled up within hail of the Englishman on the starboard side, and the battle began. After two or three broadsides had been exchanged, the Chesapeake fell on board the Shannon, her mizzen chains lock-

ing in with her adversary's fore-rigging. Broke immediately ordered the two ships to be lashed together, and the select men to prepare for boarding. His own pithy narrative tells the result more effectively than any amplification. "Our gallant bands appointed to that service immediately rushed in, under their respective officers, upon the enemy's decks, driving everything before them with irresistible fury. The enemy made a desperate but disorderly resistance. The firing continued at all the gangways, and between the tops, but in two minutes' time the enemy were driven sword in hand from every post. The American flag was hauled down, and the proud old British union floated triumphant over it. In another minute they ceased firing from below, and called for quarter. The whole of this service was achieved in fifteen minutes from the commencement of the action." This single combat, fought on the anniversary of Howe's great victory, had as much effect in restoring the confidence of England in her naval arm as if an enemy's squadron had been brought captured into her ports. Captain Broke sailed off with his prize for Halifax, where captain Lawrence, who had fought his ship with real heroism, died of his wounds, and was followed to the grave by the officers of the Shannon.

The details of the campaigns in Canada would have small interest for the present generation. The vicissitudes of this warfare, the advance of the Americans one week and their retreat the next, the skirmishes, the surprises, scarcely excited the attention of the public of this country, coming close upon the stimulating narratives of the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow, or the march of Wellington from Torres Védras to Madrid. The battle of "Chrystler's Farm" could scarcely compete in interest with the victory of Salamanca. In 1813 the British were compelled to evacuate York (now Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada. The Americans there burnt the public buildings; which act was alleged as a justification for a more memorable and more disgraceful act of retaliation by the British at Washington. In an attack upon Burlington, the Americans were compelled to fall back upon Niagara, and lost a great part of their army in a series of unsuccessful actions. The British on the Detroit frontier were forced to retreat in confusion. On Lake Ontario our troops, under sir George Prevost, were repulsed in an attack upon Sackett's Harbour. On Lake Erie the superior force of the enemy destroyed our flotilla; and the Americans, obtaining the command of the lake, became masters of Upper Canada. Ten thousand men then marched from different points upon Lower Canada, where the action near Chrystler's Farm took place, and the American army, totally routed, precipitately crossed

the St. Lawrence. General Hull sustained another severe defeat on the 25th of December. In this campaign, when the American general evacuated Fort St. George, by the express orders of his government he burnt the Canadian village of Newark. The order said, "The exposed part of the frontier must be protected by destroying such of the Canadian villages in its front as would best shelter the enemy during the winter." When the British troops under colonel Murray defeated the Americans at Buffalo, that village was burnt as well as the village of Black Rock; and the Indians were let loose on the surrounding country to take vengeance for the conflagration of Newark. Sir George Prevost then issued a proclamation lamenting the necessity which had compelled these reprisals, and deprecating a continuance of so barbarous a system of warfare. His retaliation had some effect upon the Americans in putting a stop to what an officer of that government called the "new and degrading system of defence, which, by substituting the torch for the bayonet, furnished the enemy with both motive and justification for a war of retaliation."* The disgrace remained to both sides. The retaliatory spirit was strangely exhibited during this year in another form. Twenty-three prisoners of war were sent to England to be dealt with as British subjects. The American general then ordered into close confinement twenty-three British soldiers, as hostages for the safety of the twenty-three who were liable to be dealt with as traitors. Our government selected forty-six officers and non-commissioned officers—prisoners in England—to be regarded as hostages for the safety of the twenty-three prisoners in America. The affair went off with menaces; and, on an exchange of prisoners, the British who had fought against their country, and the hostages, were silently released.

The desultory, indecisive, and useless fightings in Canada had produced not the slightest effect upon the relative positions of Great Britain and America. The English, however, had learnt not to underrate the courage and enterprise of their enemy; the Americans had learnt that Canada could not be conquered in a day's march, and that a handful of disciplined troops might defend the country against numerous bands imperfectly organized. The naval successes of the United States were almost wholly at an end after the first year. Our government learnt a little caution and providence, and gave up the false confidence that any English frigate could fight a vessel whose tonnage was as three to two. The merchant service of both countries sustained severe losses; but American commerce suffered still more from the restrictive meas-

* Armstrong (American Secretary-at-War)—quoted by Alison.

ures of the American government. The interruption to the dealings of North and South with neutral states was so serious, that in March, 1814, the President proposed to Congress the repeal of the Embargo and Non-Importation Acts. The British government proclaimed a blockade of the whole Atlantic coast of the United States, nearly 2000 miles in extent, and abounding in harbours and navigable inlets. The President, on the 29th of June, proclaimed that such a blockade was not a regular or legal blockade, as defined and recognized by the law of nations, and that it formed no lawful prohibition or obstacle to friendly and neutral vessels to trade with the United States. We have shown that in 1814 the total exports of the United States had fallen to less than a million and a half in value. The government had almost wholly lost, in the excessive falling off of imports, its great source of revenue—the Customs. It resorted in 1814 to taxes on excisable articles, to licences, and to stamps. The system of loans, coupled with the issue of Treasury notes was also adopted; and the public debt was very quickly doubled. The Democratic party was depressed, and almost hopeless. Jefferson himself began to speak with bitterness of the ruin of the planters, of the weight of the taxes, of the silly boasts of the press.* The personal lot of this distinguished man was truly pitiable. He said, that as for himself this state of things would compel him to make the sacrifice of all tranquillity, of all comfort, for the rest of his days. From the total depreciation of the products which ought to procure him subsistence and independence, he should be, like Tantalus, dying of thirst, with the water up to his shoulders. The New England States began openly to complain of that preponderance of the Southern States which had forced the Union into war. Very early in the contest Massachusetts and Connecticut had refused to send their contingents to the army of the Union; and now Massachusetts proposed to confer with delegates from other New England States, "to take measures if they think proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States, to revise the Constitution"—in other words, to break up the Union. Six years later, the question of preponderance between the North and South was again agitated, upon the discussions on the admission of Missouri to the Union; in which struggle the great question was involved, whether slavery should be established in that State, or excluded by the terms of admission. The confidence of many thoughtful persons in the United States in the duration of the Union had been shaken by the divisions of Federalists and Republicans, which had reached a

* Letters of Jefferson, in the sixth volume of his Works.

climax in the war of 1812. Jefferson, one of the most foreseeing of the founders of the Republic, did not regard these divisions with alarm, because they existed in the bosom of each State. What he regarded with alarm was the coincidence of a line of demarcation, moral and political, with the geographical line. The views of a sagacious statesman are sometimes prophetic. The idea of a line of geographical demarcation involving a different system of politics and morals, once conceived, he thought could never be effaced. He believed that this idea would appear, on every occasion, renewing irritation, and kindling in the end hate so mortal, that separation would become preferable to eternal discord. He had been, he said, of those who had had the firmest confidence in the long duration of the Union; he began much to doubt it.*

On the 31st of May, 1814, two thousand four hundred gallant troops, the soldiers of Wellington in the Peninsula, were on board a fleet in the Garonne, waiting a favourable wind to sail for America. They consisted of the Forty-fourth and the Eighty-fifth regiments, and had marched from Bayonne when the white flag hoisted on the citadel had announced that the war with France was at an end. The squadron sailed for Bermuda, where they were joined by other forces. The troops, amounting to about 3500 men, were under the command of general Ross. Admiral Cockburn commanded the fleet. These officers were experienced and energetic. Their political discretion may be doubted, although their first dangerous and unjustifiable measures might have been under the positive direction of the government at home. Having taken possession of the Tangier Islands in the Bay of Chesapeake, they invited the negroes in the adjoining provinces, with a promise of emancipation, to join the British forces. Seventeen hundred men fled from their plantations, and were marshalled in the English ranks. This incitement of the negro population to revolt was a measure that the most uncompromising hostility and the nearest danger could scarcely justify. The British government had to pay a heavy fine to the owners of the slaves; the amount of which was referred at the Treaty of Ghent to the emperor of Russia. He awarded a compensation of 250,000*l.* On the 14th of August admiral Cockburn officially announced to Mr. Monroe, the American Secretary of State, that it was his purpose to employ the force under his direction "in destroying and laying waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable." He added that this was in retaliation for a wanton destruction committed by the army of the

* Works, vol. vii. quoted by De Wit. See Miss Martineau, "History of the American Compromises."

United States in Upper Canada.* The announcement was afterwards withdrawn. The spirit of it was unhappily preserved, to diminish the lustre of a brilliant attack upon the capital of the United States.†

The British squadron having ascended the river Patuxent, the army was disembarked at the village of Benedict, with the intention of co-operating with admiral Cockburn in an attack on a flotilla of gunboats. The army commenced its march on the 20th of August, and in three days had advanced to within sixteen miles of Washington. Admiral Cockburn had during this time taken and destroyed the whole of the flotilla. On the 23rd general Ross determined to make an attempt to carry Washington. He put his troops in motion on the evening of the 23rd, and on the 24th defeated the American army, amounting to between eight and nine thousand men. The catastrophe is related in few words by general Ross:—"Having halted the army for a short time, I determined to march upon Washington, and reached that city at eight o'clock that night. Judging it of consequence to complete the destruction of the public buildings with the least possible delay, so that the army might retire without loss of time, the following buildings were set fire to and consumed:—the Capitol, including the Senate-House and House of Representatives, the Arsenal, the Dockyard, Treasury, War-office, President's Palace, Rope-walk, and the great Bridge across the Potomac: in the dockyard a frigate nearly ready to be launched, and a sloop-of-war, were consumed. The object of the expedition being accomplished, I determined, before any greater force of the enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the troops, and accordingly commenced retiring on the night of the 25th."

The indignation of the American people was naturally extreme at an event which was not unjustly characterized in a proclamation issued from Washington on the 1st of September. The President therein accuses the invading force, that during their possession of the capital of the nation, though only for a single day, "they wantonly destroyed the public edifices, having no relation in their structure to operations of war, nor used at the time for military

* Alison, in quoting this announcement, makes admiral Cockburn say, that it became his duty to do this "under the new and imperative character of his orders."

† The duke of Wellington had ever scrupulously respected private property, and had spared defenceless places. When the Prince de Joinville, in 1844, suggested the bombardment of Brighton in the event of a war, the duke wrote to Mr. Raikes—"What but the inordinate desire of popularity could have induced a man in his station, a prince of the blood royal, the son of the king, of high rank and pretensions in that profession of the service, to write and publish such a production—an invitation and provocative to war, to be carried on in a manner such as has been disclaimed by the civilized portions of mankind."—(Raikes' "Correspondence," p. 366.)

annoyance; some of these edifices being also costly monuments of taste and of the arts, and others repositories of the public archives, not only precious to the nation, as the memorials of its origin and its early transactions, but interesting to all nations, as contributions to the general stock of historical instruction and political science." In England there was a general feeling that, however brilliant had been the attack upon Washington, the destruction of non-warlike buildings was something more than a mistake. It was an outrage inconsistent with civilized warfare, which was not likely to produce "on the inhabitants a deep and sensible impression of the calamities of a war in which they have been so wantonly involved." Such was the thoughtless and undignified language of the Prince Regent's speech on opening the Session of Parliament on the 8th of November. A more sober view of this demonstration of the calamities of war was taken by a high military authority at the Horse Guards. "It may tend to disunite and to spread alarm and confusion, but I incline to think that it will give eventually more power to the Congress. A nation may be overpowered and compelled to peace, but it must be a most contemptible set to be frightened into one."* Lord Grenville, with dignified earnestness, lamented a departure from a system of forbearance which had been pursued even by Napoleon during a conflict of twenty years, in whose hands nearly all the capitals of Europe had been, and in no instance, except in that of the Kremlin of Moscow, were any unarmy buildings destroyed.† We had done, said Mr. Whitbread, what the Goths had refused to do at Rome, when Belisarius represented to them that to destroy works of art was to erect a monument to the folly of the destroyers.‡ He maintained that the outrage at Washington had conciliated to the American government those parts of the United States which were before hostile to it; had put in motion battalions of militia which before were not allowed to march. It had united all. It had made determined opposition to England a common interest.§

Whether to the destruction of the public buildings of Washington may be attributed the extraordinary vigour which seemed now to be infused into the military character of the American democracy, it is certain that after that event the course of the war was one of almost unvarying success to their arms. In a battle on the 11th of September, which was the prelude to an attack upon Balti-

* Sir Willoughby Gordon, Letter to the Speaker, October 1st, 1814—Lord Colchester's "Diary," vol. ii. p. 520.

† Hansard, vol. xxix. col. 17.

‡ See Gibbon, chap. xliii., A. D. 506.

§ "Hansard, vol. xxix. col. 47.

more, general Ross was mortally wounded; and colonel Brooke who succeeded to the command, although gaining a victory, was compelled the next night to retreat to the ships which were intended to co-operate in the assault. The Americans had sunk twenty vessels in the Patapsco river, which effectually prevented the British squadron rendering any aid. But a more serious blow was inflicted upon the army in Canada. Our forces there, under sir George Prevost, had been augmented till they had reached sixteen thousand regular troops, who had arrived from the South of France, with the full conviction on the part of our government that the war would be speedily concluded by this array of veterans against undisciplined masses. Nine thousand of the soldiers of the Peninsula were to act in co-operation with a flotilla on Lake Champlain. This little fleet of a frigate, a brig, a sloop, and twelve gunboats, was ill-manned and equipped. The American squadron on the lake was very superior in strength. The troops under Prevost were to attack the redoubts of Plattsburg, whilst our flotilla was engaged with the vessels in the bay. Captain Downie led his ship the *Confiance* gallantly into action; but when a heavy fire opened from the American line, the gunboats, which had few British sailors on board, took flight like scared wild fowl. The frigate, brig, and sloop were left to bear all the brunt of the contest. The *Confiance* made a brave fight, as did the brig and sloop; but they were finally compelled to strike. Meanwhile, Prevost lingered in making the land attack; and his troops did not reach the point of assault till the fleet had surrendered. He had been thus instructed by earl Bathurst: "take care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off; and guard against whatever might commit the safety of the forces under your command." He obeyed his instructions to the letter. The command of the lake was lost; and therefore it was useless to attack Plattsburg. A violent outcry was raised against our commander of the forces in Canada. He resigned; and demanded a court-martial. Wellington thought Prevost was right to retire after the fleet was beaten.* He died before the court-martial commenced. His defence of Canada, with a small force, against repeated incursions of an enemy whose numbers were long thought by the Americans to be irresistible, ought to have saved his memory from the obloquy which has been attempted to be thrown upon it by some writers.†

On Christmas Day, 1814, general sir Edward Pakenham, one of

* "Despatches," vol. xii. p. 224.

† A writer in the "Quarterly Review," No. LIV. is amongst the bitterest of his accusers. Alison has ably and generously defended him.

the most brave and skilful of the officers who had served under Wellington in Spain, joined the army that was encamped a short distance from New Orleans, preparing for an assault upon that city. The British government had not unjustly deemed that the capture of a place situated within a hundred miles of the mouth of the Mississippi, and which therefore was the chief emporium of the commerce of the "Great Water," would be an important success, and have a material influence on the favourable conclusion of a peace. Sir Edward Pakenham, accompanied by general Gibbs, had arrived from England to take the chief command of the army, which, after the fall of general Ross, had been under the orders of general Keane. Pakenham found this army, having achieved no final success at Baltimore, now placed in a situation of considerable danger and difficulty. On that Christmas-day the officers dined together, but their festivity was not cheered by any pleasant retrospect of a past triumph which could give them confidence in an approaching victory. New Orleans was an unfortified town, then containing only about 17,000 inhabitants—one-tenth of its population in 1860. The forts on the Mississippi were too strong to enable an armament to sail up from its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico. But a hostile force having passed from Lake Borgne into Lake Pontchartrain, might land at either of two creeks. The Bayou of St. John was too well guarded to render a landing easy. The Bayou of Catiline, about ten miles from the city, was more practicable; but an army having landed would find itself planted on open swampy ground, with the Mississippi on the one side of the city, and a morass on the other side, preventing any assault except from the unfavourable ground on the bank of the lake.

On the 13th of December the troops embarked in small boats, and began to enter Lake Borgne. They had here to encounter a powerful American flotilla, which was finally defeated. A portion of the troops was now landed on a barren place called Pine Island, where it was determined that the whole army should assemble. It was the 21st before all were got on shore in this wretched desert, where, without tents, or huts, and unable to find fuel, the troops were exposed to rain by day and to frost by night. Pine Island was eighty miles distant from the creek where it was proposed to disembark. Only about one-third of the troops could be conveyed at once in the open boats, which only could navigate those shallow waters. It was necessary therefore to arrange for the landing in divisions. The advanced division, consisting of 1600 men, successfully disembarked at the Bayou of Catiline, having surprised the American sentinels. General Keane was in command of this

division. No enemy was to be seen. Deserters came in, saying that the inhabitants of New Orleans were favourably disposed towards the British. Everything appeared to promise safety, and general Keane marched into the open country without waiting, as had been arranged, for the other divisions to join him. He ordered the troops to encamp near the Mississippi. The men had eaten their supper in the belief that their rest would not be disturbed, when a large vessel dropped her anchor in the river, and furled her sails opposite the camp. A cry was at last heard, "Give them this for the honour of America!" and a broadside of grape swept down numbers of our unprepared soldiers. The night was dark as the schooner continued to fire from the river. On the land side the rattle of musketry was now heard. Our troops had found some shelter from the fire of the schooner, but now they were surrounded by a superior land force. After a severe struggle, without any possibility of forming the men, the enemy retreated. We had lost five hundred killed and wounded in this deadly strife. The second division of the army, which had embarked about twelve hours after the first division, heard the firing in the stillness of the night, as the boats were crossing the lake. By great exertion the whole army had been brought into position on the evening of the 24th. The next day Pakenham arrived to take command, and was received with such hearty cheers as manifested the confidence of the soldiers in a Peninsular commander.

The first object of the general was to construct a battery, by which, firing red-hot shot, he destroyed the schooner on the river. On the 27th he advanced his whole force to attack the American army. It was advantageously posted, being defended in front by a broad canal, and by formidable breastworks. The road by which the army marched was not only commanded by batteries, but by a flotilla on the Mississippi. The British ranks were greatly thinned by this conjoint fire. It was thought necessary to pause before further operations. All this effectual resistance had been evidently planned by some officer of high military talent. That officer was general Jackson, who became President of the United States in 1829. The British army was inactive on the 28th, 29th, and 30th. The enemy was strengthening his lines, which were so formidable, that Pakenham resolved to construct breaching batteries, mounted with heavy cannon, brought up from the vessels on the lake. During the night of the 31st six batteries had been completed, the material of which was not earth, but hogsheads of sugar taken out of the warehouses on the plantations. One of the other great products of Louisiana was employed by the Americans. Their para-

pets were constructed of earth and bags of cotton. It was soon found that our defences of sugar-hogsheads were wholly unavailing. In the first six days of January, a bold and ingenious attempt was made by the British commander to deepen a canal which ran across the neck of land lying between the Bayou of Catiline and the Mississippi, so that boats might be brought up from the lake, and a portion of the troops carried across the river to attack the battery on its right bank. The morning of the 7th was arranged for a general attack. The army had been reinforced by the arrival of two battalions under general Lambert, and its whole number was now little short of 8,000 men. A series of disasters disturbed, at the critical moment, the arrangements which appeared to have been made with a tolerable certainty of success. As the boats went up the canal, its banks crumbled in, blocked up the passage, and permitted only a few of the smaller boats to reach their point of destination. The main body of the army was to have attacked the works on the left bank at five o'clock on the morning of the 7th, simultaneously with the projected attack on the right bank. Pakenham waited till his patience was exhausted, and then determined to commence the assault without this support. The advantage of a sudden storming in the darkness of a January morning had passed away. It was broad daylight when the Americans saw the British column of three regiments marching on to the edge of the glacis. They were halted at the moment when a dash might have succeeded; for the scaling-ladders and fascines had been forgotten. A terrible fire drove them back in disorder. Pakenham, seeing that nothing but daring and endurance would carry the day, rallied his troops, and, leading them again to the attack, fell mortally wounded. General Gibbs and general Keane were also struck down. The command devolved upon general Lambert, who prudently resolved to draw off the troops. Our loss had amounted to two thousand men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. An armistice of two days was agreed upon, for the purpose of burying the dead. On the 18th of January, the retreat of the British army commenced; and was so safely effected, that the troops re-embarked on the night of the 27th, with all the artillery and stores, except eight heavy guns. An insignificant triumph, in the capture of Fort Boyer, near Mobile, closed our military operations, on the 12th of February. The news of the conclusion of peace at Ghent arrived the next day.*

* These unfortunate operations are detailed with great spirit in "A Narrative of the Campaigns at Washington and New Orleans, by an Officer who served in the Expedition" (Rev. G. R. Gleig).

The Peace of Ghent was concluded by three British commissioners, lord Gambier, Mr. Goulburn, and Mr. Adams; and by four American plenipotentiaries, Mr. John Quincy Adams, Mr. Henry Clay, Mr. J. A. Bayard, and Mr. Jonathan Russell. The objection made in October by Mr. Madison to the terms proposed by Great Britain, had led the negotiators on each side to effect a compromise. It was fortunate that it had been effected before the American people, intoxicated by the triumph at New Orleans, should have lost their anxious desire that hostilities should come to an end. The American government, by this peace, had not obtained a concession upon the two principles for which it went to war—that the flag covers the merchandise, and that the right of search for deserters is inadmissible. It was agreed that each government should use their efforts to put down the slave-trade. Difficult questions of boundary were left unsettled to give rise to future disputes. But in this war of three years the people of both countries had learnt by their commercial privations how desirable, if not indispensable, was a free intercourse between two great communities, having each so much to offer for the satisfaction of the other's wants, and both associated by natural ties of blood and language which the coldest politicians cannot wholly ignore. The mistakes in the conduct of the war were pretty equal on both sides. The defeats of the Americans in the invasion of Canada had in some degree lowered the European opinion of their military qualities. Plattsburg had shaken the confidence of the English public in the effect likely to be produced by a large employment of regular forces against imperfectly disciplined troops. The final disaster of our arms led to a more impartial estimate of what a democratic people is capable of effecting after a few years of rash and ill-understood warfare. A calm and sagacious writer has said, "The success, which was too late to affect the negotiations at Ghent, was sufficiently striking to be worth more to the American people than a good peace. It is in reality to the victory of New Orleans that a great part is due of the moral impression which has been left upon the world by the war of 1812,—a war imprudently engaged in, feebly conducted, rarely successful, very costly, perfectly sterile in diplomatic results, and, nevertheless, finally as useful to the prestige of the United States as fruitful for them in necessary lessons."*

* Cornelis de Wit, "Thomas Jefferson," p. 359.