

CHAPTER LXVI.

THE EMPIRE FROM 1812 TO 1814.

Condition of Europe in 1810. — No other generation of men had ever seen what those men saw who lived from 1789 to 1811: new ideas profoundly moving the world; miseries and unparalleled grandeur; a nation of soldiers; armies more successful than the Roman legions; war marked by incomparable combinations and results; and finally, to apply these ideas, to direct these formidable forces, a man gifted with the most powerful genius that nature had ever formed. Moreover, within twenty years old Europe had been overturned, even to its foundations. The dynasty of Bourbon, but lately seated upon four thrones, now retained only one, and that tottering and menaced, in Sicily; that of Braganza was exiled to Brazil; that of Savoy banished to Sardinia; those of Orange, Hesse, Brunswick, and twenty others despoiled. The duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany; the republics of Venice, Genoa, and Holland; the States of the Church, the German Empire, no longer existed. The monarchy of Frederick the Great had been broken up; only a fragment still existed; that of Maria Theresa, humiliated by twenty defeats, was cut off from Italy and the sea. New states had come into existence. There were kings of Italy and Holland, of Westphalia, Württemberg, and Saxony; a Confederation of the Rhine to balance Prussia and Austria; a Swiss Confederation established on a better basis than the old; a grand-duchy of Warsaw.

In these new states social regeneration was carried on as well as political regeneration; Naples, Milan, Warsaw, Holland, Westphalia, and Bavaria had French constitutions, codes, and systems of administration. Sweden asked for a French king. Spain, even, adopted the principles of 1789 in her constitution of 1812. Austria granted her people local franchises, abolished serfdom, admitted civil equality, and no longer confined the rank of officer to the nobility. England herself caught the moral contagion.

Thus the French Revolution—that is to say, a new social order, founded upon justice, and not upon privilege—began “to make the tour of the world.” But such changes could not take place without causing great convulsions. The powers of the past, trodden under foot by the victorious Revolution, did not resign themselves to their defeat. So long as France seemed to conquer only to bestow upon the conquered countries juster laws and better administration, the people were on her side. But soon the struggle assumed such proportions that all was sacrificed, liberty as well as justice, to the one thought of victory. The English suppressed the freedom of the ocean; Napoleon suppressed the independence of the continent, and by the continental blockade, by the interruption of commerce, by the deprivation of colonial commodities, he imposed upon the people of Europe sacrifices which were felt even in every cottage. In vain he lavished benefits upon them, releasing Germany from its anarchical divisions, and Italy from its municipal jealousies; in vain did he endeavor to rouse Spain from the torpor in which she had for centuries been sunk: the peoples felt that national feelings and national interests had been trampled on. The present ills caused the germs of prosperity and greatness, which the conqueror had sown everywhere, to be despised. And if the peoples withdrew from him, the kings did not draw near. In the eyes of the old courts, Napoleon was always only a parvenu, and his empire only a plebeian empire. France was isolated in the midst of the nations; Napoleon isolated in the midst of sovereigns.

Condition of France. — France had now had enough of military glory and enough of conquests; peace would have been welcome to her also: victorious though she was, she suffered cruelly from this ceaseless war, which was so injurious to industry and agriculture, which developed military instincts to the detriment of peaceful habits, and tended to introduce the ways of camps into civil society. Perfect order reigned. The Corps Législatif and the Senate never interposed a protest, and the journals, strictly watched by the censors, had lost all political character. Yet in the midst of this profound stillness the people began to demand that the government should pay more attention to the rising wave of public opinion.

Ten years before, France had forgotten, or rather did not yet know, that political liberty was the safeguard of civil

liberty. But such thoughts sprang up at this time in many minds. It was to save her national interests, endangered by too feeble a government, that France had applauded the *coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire; it was to save them a second time, to restore maritime commerce, to put an end to the mourning of families bereaved by the war, and to the fears of the citizens, who felt themselves no longer under the protection of the law, that an opposition, feeble at the time, but destined to increase in strength, was formed against this government which had made itself absolute. Even in Paris the crowd began to show less enthusiasm.

Rupture between France and Russia (1812).— At Tilsit Napoleon had believed that he would find in Russia the ally he needed on the continent; but Alexander, in the war of 1809, had not given him the promised aid, had greatly resented his Austrian marriage and the enlargement of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and tried to obtain from France the declaration that the kingdom of Poland should never be re-established. The friendship of the two monarchs had been already greatly strained; the extension given to the French Empire, and the measures taken for the more certain execution of the continental blockade, gave it the final blows.

In reply to the Berlin Decree, England had threatened to confiscate all ships which should go to France or to any of the countries allied to France (January, 1807); Napoleon, in his turn, declared all ships subject to confiscation, which should enter port in England or in her colonies (Milan Decree, December, 1807), and ordered all English merchandise found in France or in the allied states to be burned. These decrees destroyed regular commerce, but could not crush the contraband trade, which was carried on upon a great scale, particularly on the coast extending from Antwerp to Hamburg. Holland thus became an emporium for England. King Louis Bonaparte, between his subjects, who desired one thing, and the Emperor, who desired another, soon found his position intolerable, and abdicated, July, 1810. Holland was immediately united to the Empire. The Scheldt, the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Ems were thus closed to the English contraband trade; but the Weser and the Elbe remained open. In December a decree announced the annexation of the Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. At the same time the Duke of Oldenburg, the

Czar's uncle, was dispossessed. Thus France, having been extended along the whole coast of the North Sea, was now touching the Baltic, and presented the strange spectacle of an empire embracing at once the Tiber and the Elbe. But it was necessary to go still farther and close the ports of Danzig, Königsberg, and St. Petersburg.

Napoleon required that Alexander should confiscate all neutral ships in his ports, as suspected of having violated the Berlin and Milan Decrees. It amounted to demanding the final ruin of Russian commerce, at the moment when, by a system of licenses, Napoleon himself was authorizing certain exchanges between France and England. Moreover, to submit to such orders was to place Russia in a position of dependence. Besides, the French Empire was becoming territorially dangerous to Russia by its gradual approaches. Yet the Czar hesitated, appalled by such a contest: Bernadotte, the new French crown-prince of Sweden, decided him; and in April, 1812, Alexander demanded the evacuation of old Prussia, the duchy of Warsaw, and of Swedish Pomerania, an equivalent for Oldenburg, and some relaxation of the measures taken against neutral commerce.

But it was to the interest of Napoleon not to precipitate matters. England seemed about to succumb from inability to export her products. A rupture between her and America was imminent. Should France be patient, the victory would be hers, for victory would surely rest with whichever of the two rivals should longest endure this terrible state of things. Moreover, the war in Spain was not ended; Masséna, Soult, Ney, the most skilful of the French generals, were succumbing to Wellington and the universal insurrection. Napoleon, with an imprudence of which formerly he would not have been guilty, left behind him, unfinished, this contest which occupied his best soldiers, and rejoined the grand army. In his gigantic projects, Moscow was to be only a halting-place: he wished to resume, in colossal proportions, his expedition to the Indies, which had failed after Aboukir. The vanquished Czar was to furnish auxiliaries, and a French and Russian army should set out from Tiflis, gathering on its way the nomadic tribes of Western Asia, for an attack on British India.

Turkey and Sweden, natural allies of France, had been alienated. Bernadotte mediated between the Porte and the Czar the peace of Bucharest (May, 1812). Russia, thus secured on her right and left, could employ all her forces in

the centre, toward which Napoleon was advancing. The French army numbered, with its auxiliaries, which comprised a third of the forces, six hundred and forty thousand men, more than sixty thousand horses, and twelve hundred cannons. The Russians were less numerous, but they were fighting in their own country for a national cause, and they were resolved to "make a Spanish war."

Russian Campaign (1812).—The commander of the principal Russian army, Barclay de Tolly, proposed, resting on the Dūna, to cover with one hundred and thirty thousand men the road to St. Petersburg; while Prince Bagration, taking up a position in front of the Dnieper, should cover that to Moscow. Napoleon proposed to pass over the watershed between the sources of the two streams. He crossed the Niemen on the 24th of June, six days after the Congress at Washington had declared war against England, drove the Russians before him, and entered Wilna, where he refused to re-establish the ancient kingdom of Poland. He halted at Wilna seventeen days, desiring to make it the centre of his commissariat. Then he took the road to Moscow, driving back detachments of the enemy, and capturing Smolensk after a bloody battle. The Russians then fell back continually, devastating the country, burning towns and villages, destroying grain and fruit-trees. Napoleon had need of a great victory, but could not obtain it. Fortunately the Czar now replaced Barclay by the old Kutusof, who determined to give battle in order to save Moscow. The action took place near Moskowa, at Borodino; two hundred and seventy thousand men, resolved on both sides to conquer, rushed into desperate combat; one thousand pieces of cannon exchanged their fire. The Russians, after a furious struggle, finally yielded. In order to make the defeat a complete rout, it would have been necessary to charge with the guard, but Napoleon would not risk his reserve: the battle was gained, but the Russian army was not destroyed. Nearly sixty thousand men had fallen in its ranks (September 7). The French also had lost severely; ten thousand had been killed and twenty thousand wounded; forty-seven generals had been wounded, two mortally.

The French army entered Moscow; but almost all the population had evacuated the city, and the Russian army had exhausted the resources of the public magazines. Fire did the rest. The flames, bursting forth from different

points, spread rapidly through a city built of wood. The conflagration lasted five days. Only the churches, the Kremlin, and a fifth part of the houses were saved. Fifteen thousand wounded, left by the Russians in Moscow, perished in the flames. The French found another Spain under the Polar sky. Napoleon waited in vain for propositions from the Czar; his own were scornfully rejected. Meanwhile the Russians were reorganizing their armies, and winter set in. On the 13th of October, the first frost gave warning that it was time to think of the retreat, which the enemy, already on the French flank, was threatening to cut off.

Leaving Mortier with ten thousand men in the Kremlin, the army quitted Moscow on the 19th of October, thirty-five days after it had entered the city. It still numbered eighty thousand fighting men and six hundred cannons, but was encumbered with camp-followers and vehicles. At Malo-Jaroslavetz a violent struggle took place on the 24th. The town was captured and recaptured seven times. It was finally left in the hands of the French. Here, however, the route changed. The road became increasingly difficult, the cold grew intense, the ground was covered with snow, and the confusion in the quartermaster's department was terrible. When the army reached Smolensk, there were only fifty thousand men in the ranks (November 9). Napoleon had taken minute precautions to provide supplies and reinforcements all along his line of retreat; but the heedlessness of his subalterns, and the difficulty of being obeyed at such distances and in such a country, rendered his foresight useless. At Smolensk, where he hoped to find provisions and supplies, everything had been squandered. Meanwhile there was not a moment to lose; Wittgenstein, with the army of the North, was coming up on the French right. Tchitchagof was occupying Minsk behind the Beresina, with the army which had just come from the banks of the Danube. Kutusof was near at hand. The three Russian armies proposed to unite and bar the Beresina, which the French were obliged to cross. The French began their march, but the cold became suddenly intense; all verdure had disappeared, and there being no food for the horses, they died by the thousand. The cavalry was forced to dismount; it became necessary to destroy or abandon a large portion of the cannon and ammunition. The enemy surrounded the French columns with a cloud of Cossacks, who captured all

stragglers. On the following days the temperature moderated. Then arose another obstacle,—the mud, which prevented the advance; and the famine was constant.

Moreover, the retreat was one continuous battle. Ney, "the bravest of the brave," accomplished prodigies of valor. At Krasnoi the Emperor himself was obliged to charge at the head of his guard. When the Beresina was reached, the army was reduced to forty thousand fighting men, of whom one-third were Poles. The Russians had burned the bridge of Borisof, and Tchitchagof, on the other shore, barred the passage. Fortunately a ford was found. The river was filled with enormous blocks of ice; General Eblé and his pontoniers, plunged in the water up to their shoulders, built and rebuilt bridges across it. Almost all the pontoniers perished of cold or were drowned. Then, while on the right of the river Ney and Oudinot held back the army of Tchitchagof, and Victor on the left that of Wittgenstein, the guard, with Napoleon, passed over. Victor, after having killed or wounded ten thousand of Wittgenstein's Russians, passed over during the night. When, in the morning, the rear-guard began to cross the bridges, a crowd of fugitives rushed upon them. They were soon filled with a confused mass of cavalry, infantry, caissons, and fugitives. The Russians came up and poured a shower of shells upon the helpless crowd. This frightful scene has ever since been famous as the passage of the Beresina. The governor of Minsk had twenty-four thousand dead bodies picked up and burned.

Napoleon conducted the retreat towards Wilna, where the French had large magazines. At Smorgoni he left the army, to repair in all haste to Paris, in order to prevent the disastrous effects of the last events, and to form another army. The army which he had left struggled on under Murat. The cold grew still more intense, and twenty thousand men perished in three days. Ney held the enemy a long time in check with desperate valor; he was the last to recross the Niemen (December 20). There the retreat ended, and with it this fatal campaign. Beyond that river the French left three hundred thousand soldiers, either dead or in captivity. And yet they had never once been defeated; it was the winter and hunger, not the enemy, which had destroyed the grand army. The Russians themselves, habituated as they were to their terrible climate, suffered

horribly; in three weeks Kutusof had lost three-quarters of his effective force.

The French armies were not more successful in Spain. The campaign of 1810 was marked by a failure of Masséna before the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras; that of 1811 by the indecisive battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, between him and Wellington. In 1812 Wellington took Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, and defeated Marmont near Salamanca.

German Campaign (1813).—The retreat from Moscow struck a mortal blow at the power of Napoleon. The king of Prussia joined the Czar, and the unfortunate French army was compelled to fall back from the Niemen to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder, from the Oder to the Elbe. A sixth coalition was formed, composed of England, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Spain. Austria prepared secretly to join them. The allied sovereigns appealed to the strongest of popular passions,—national feeling. And Germany, for six years trodden under foot by French soldiers, listened with a terrible determination to the voices of her princes and her poets. The verses of Uhland, Arndt, and Körner were sung in castles and in cottages. Thus that great patriotic movement which, in 1792, had saved France, was now turned against her.

Meanwhile Napoleon displayed his accustomed activity; and though there was not a family that did not mourn a victim to these long wars, France, silent and mourning, still delivered up to him her children. He fitted out another army of two hundred thousand men, and was ready before the allies. He drove them back beyond the Elbe by the brilliant victory of Lützen. The enemy was again defeated at Bautzen, Saxony set free, and Silesia half conquered. At this moment Napoleon halted and unwisely granted an armistice to the allies. The coalition breathed more freely and took courage. In Spain Wellington defeated Joseph at Vittoria, which led to the loss of Spain. Suchet was obliged to abandon the South. Soult took up a position behind the Nive, but the English were on the Bidassoa, and were on the point of invading the soil of France. This event created a profound sensation. Napoleon was not disturbed by it. Austria demanded of him the abandonment of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, Illyria, the Hanse towns, and the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine. These concessions would have detracted

nothing from the grandeur of France, as she would still retain the line of the Rhine and the Alps, and Holland and Italy. Unfortunately, Napoleon refused these demands. Austria then joined the allies with three hundred thousand men, and on the 16th of August hostilities commenced.

The coalition had, in front of Napoleon, five hundred thousand soldiers, fifteen hundred cannons, and a reserve of two hundred and fifty thousand men. Two Frenchmen were among them: Bernadotte, now crown-prince of Sweden; and Moreau, the conqueror of Hohenlinden, who, at the request of Alexander, had returned from America to strike a mortal blow against his country. In spite of their numbers, the allies had adopted the plan of refusing battle to their unconquerable adversary, and of accepting it from his lieutenants. The Emperor had on the Elbe and under his command only three hundred thousand men; in spite of the inequality of numbers he endeavored to threaten Berlin, Breslau, and Prague at once, which weakened him in the centre, at Dresden, where he nevertheless dealt on the 26th and 27th of August a terrible blow at the allies. In this battle Moreau was mortally wounded. But meantime severe defeats of Napoleon's lieutenants had rendered the victory useless, had lost Silesia, and had permitted Blücher to advance into Saxony, Bernadotte to occupy Wittenberg. Then, from Wittenberg to Töplitz, the allies formed an arc of three hundred thousand sabres and bayonets in front of the French, the extremities of which attempted to unite behind them and cut them off from the route to France; and Germany was rising, Bavaria entered the coalition, and Baden and Württemberg were about to follow its example. Napoleon tried again to cut this circle; he concentrated his forces at Leipzig, and there fought a general battle. That fight, which the Germans call the *battle of the nations*, was the most sanguinary contest of modern history: one hundred and ninety thousand Frenchmen sustained, for three whole days, the furious attack of three hundred thousand men. The French lost none of their positions, but the reserves of the artillery were exhausted; at the end of the third day there remained only enough ammunition for about two hours' fighting, and the number of the enemy was constantly increasing. The army was forced to fall back without having been conquered; but this voluntary retreat became disastrous; a miner blew up the

bridge over the Elster before the last part of the army, with two marshals and the commanders of the corps, had crossed it. One hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom fifty thousand were French, were left lying on the fatal field (October 16-19.)

Only one-fifth part of the French troops returned to France, and one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers were left useless in the fortresses of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, in which they were besieged and made heroic defences.

Campaign in France (1814).—To save France a unanimous awakening of the national spirit was needed; but the impulse was gone; the stream of recruitment was drying up at its source. The bourgeoisie, who had saluted Napoleon's dictatorship when that dictatorship was saving the country from disorder, repulsed it now that it was leading the country into fearful dangers; at the moment when it was necessary that the whole nation should rally around Napoleon, the liberals gave the signal for an ill-timed and unfortunate opposition. The enemies of France wisely profited by these first symptoms of weariness and approaching defection. They published the famous declaration of Frankfort, in which they declared "that they were not making war upon France, but upon the preponderance that Napoleon had too long exercised outside of the limits of his Empire." And they offered peace on condition that France should return to her natural limits. By these propositions the allies sought to separate the Emperor from the nation. They succeeded in doing so; the Corps Législatif, from whom Napoleon demanded an active co-operation, responded by complaining of his despotism and the war. It was at once adjourned *sine die*; and Napoleon prepared for a desperate struggle.

He had now only sixty thousand soldiers against the three hundred thousand who were advancing, divided into two great armies: that of Silesia, under Blücher; that of Bohemia, under Schwartzberg. The first crossed the Rhine, the Moselle, and the Meuse without resistance; the second, violating Swiss neutrality, passed through the pass of Belfort and the Jura. The two intended to maintain communication across the plateau of Langres. On the south, one hundred and sixty thousand English and Spaniards under Wellington were crossing the Pyrenees; on the southeast,

eighty thousand Austrians were approaching from the Alps; on the northeast, eighty thousand Swedes, Prussians, and Russians, under Bernadotte, were threatening Belgium; and as though this immense force was not enough, four hundred thousand soldiers were raised in the rear of the active armies. Thus more than a million of armed men were about to rush upon France.

On the 26th of January Napoleon hastened to Vitry-le-François. He failed to prevent the junction of the armies of Silesia and Bohemia. A few days after, he received the ultimatum of the allies; this time they no longer conceded the natural limits of the Rhine and the Alps, but demanded that France should return to her boundaries of 1789. The Emperor indignantly refused. The allies now separated to march simultaneously upon Paris by way of the valley of the Seine and that of the Marne. Napoleon cut the long column of the Russians in two at Champaubert, and routed both divisions separately, winning four victories in five days. While he was on the Marne, Schwartzberg advanced down the valley of the Seine; his vanguard had already passed Melun; the French army marched thirty leagues in thirty-six hours, came up with the Austrians, and drove them before them. In eight days the Austrians lost ground to the extent of fifty leagues. Unfortunately, this pursuit of the Austrians on the upper Seine left the approaches to Paris open on the northeast; Blücher, who had reinforced his army, marched thither a second time by way of the Marne. Napoleon hastened to meet him, and hurled him back in disorder. The Prussians concentrated near Laon, numbering one hundred thousand, and maintained that strong position in spite of the efforts of the Emperor to dislodge them. Napoleon then turned against the Russians and drove them out of Rheims (March 13). Schwartzberg, who during the absence of the little French army had advanced to within two days' march of Paris, was alarmed at seeing it return upon his flank: he halted and fell back.

Thus in a month Napoleon had fought fourteen battles, gained twelve victories, and defended the approaches to his capital against the three great hostile armies. But the struggle became more and more unequal. The defection of Murat gave Italy to the Austrians. Augereau opened to them the gates of Lyons; Maison evacuated Belgium; the English, under Wellington, entered Bordeaux, where

Louis XVIII. was proclaimed king (March 12); and the royalists were beginning agitation in the interior.

The Czar resolved to bring to an end this astonishing struggle. He ordered Blücher and Schwartzberg to unite their forces and march together upon Paris. Napoleon vainly endeavored at Arcis-sur-Aube to hinder this junction (March 20 and 21). Then he boldly resolved to leave open the route to Paris, and move with fifty thousand men upon the rear of the allies, cut off their communications, arouse once more the courage of the patriotic provinces, increase his army by a part of the garrisons of the fortresses of the Moselle and by irregular levies, and then return upon the enemy and strike a terrible blow. If only Paris would defend herself, not a foreigner should recross the Rhine.

But Paris did not defend herself. By utilizing all the resources which it afforded, seventy thousand fighting men could be collected and armed. Only twenty-two thousand men took part in the battle before Paris, against the eighty thousand Austrians of Schwartzberg, the one hundred thousand Prussians of Blücher (March 30). The resistance was heroic, but useless. The allies lost eighteen thousand men, almost as many as the French had in line: Marshal Marmont signed a suspension of arms and a capitulation, in order to spare the city the horrors of a capture by assault (March 31).

Abdication of the Emperor (April 6, 1814). — The foreigners, on entering the city, showed the greatest moderation. The Czar protested that the nation had only to manifest its wishes, and he would be ready to sustain them. The people evinced a gloomy resignation; but the Senate, convoked and directed by Talleyrand, appointed a provisional government, pronounced the deposition of Napoleon, adopted a new constitution, and called to the throne Louis XVIII., a brother of Louis XVI. Napoleon still had powerful forces at Fontainebleau; with the armies of Eugène, Suchet, and Soult, who had just fought with Wellington the heroic battle of Toulouse, he could collect one hundred and forty thousand experienced soldiers beyond the Loire. He thought for a moment of giving battle, but his generals were tired of war; Ney, and even Berthier, left him. Then he abdicated! Nine days after, he bade farewell to his old guard in words since celebrated, and departed for the island of

Elba. An island of a few square miles was now the whole empire of the man who for fifteen years had reigned over half of Europe. A few officers followed him into his exile, together with about four hundred men of the old guard.

Thus the deadly duel which England had fought against France was over; England had conquered. Napoleon had taken the empire of the land to fight against the masters of the ocean. For ten years he had gone on from victory to victory; and always the inaccessible enemy had escaped him. He had conceived the mad project of marching even to Moscow, when his best soldiers were in the heart of Spain, and the soil of Germany, secretly undermined, was trembling under his feet. On his return, winter killed the grand army; the nations arose; the colossus fell; in his fall he seemed to drag down the country itself. She has pardoned him, however, for she owes him glory incomparable. Victories gained by the superiority of genius, and not by that of numbers, immense works accomplished, industry awakened, agriculture encouraged, an enlightened, vigilant, and active administration, the unity of the country consolidated, and her greatness surpassing anything ever dreamed of, will always plead for him with posterity and with the heart of France.

Moreover, in spite of his court of kings, his nobility, and in certain respects in spite of himself, Napoleon remains for the French the representative, and for Europe the armed soldier, of the Revolution. He preserved its civil institutions. He carried its spirit everywhere. By crowning parvenus, by forcing kings of the old stock and emperors to bow before him, he destroyed the old prestige of the divine right of royalty. Spain, Italy, and Germany passed with ominous tremblings from under his control; and in order to overthrow him, the kings were compelled to proclaim the rights of the people. He himself always recognized his real origin even in the most glorious moments of his career. Thus, led by their instincts, the people were never deceived; they who had paid for the Emperor's victories with their blood, loved and regretted Napoleon.

Nevertheless this powerful man of war and administration, who will continue to be the greatest figure in military history, left France smaller by eighteen departments than he had found her, and drained of blood and gold. The mistakes of the politician had brought ruin upon the invincible

general. And perhaps in this marvellous and terrible epic history will find one of the most memorable examples of the expiation which always follows after great errors. Disasters fell upon two victims; but there were also two culprits: the Emperor and France; of whom the one, after ten years of revolution, re-established the old régime under new forms, and ruined himself utterly, because he would place no restraint upon either his ambition or his genius; while the other had deserved her misfortunes by throwing herself like a lost child into the arms of a young and glorious general, and to escape the burden of governing herself, had restored what she had just overthrown.