

Don Quijote and Sancho represent two partial aspects of man which integrate each other in man.

St. John of the Cross declared his whole "oficio" to consist in loving ("en amar"). Don Quijote, symbol of all of manking, exclaimed: "y es mi oficio y ejercicio andar por el mundo enderezando entuertos y desfaciendo agravios", (Par. I, chapt 19) ("and my office and occupation consists in walking through the world, setting right what is crooked and indemnifying what has been offended.")

Ivan Turguenef once asked "what does Don Quijote represent for himself?" and gave the striking answer, "he esteems his proper life only in the measure that it can serve as a means to realise his ideal which consist in planting truth and justice on earth." The splendid "madness" of Don Quijote did not remain without results. It helped in "donquijotizing" the "Sancho-Pansastic" society. The disdain of the immediate success helped to dethrone the macchiavellistic politics of "expediency", so common in our days.

The ontological defencelessness in his toiling to reach honour and immortality on the one hand, and his hunger for subsistential plenitude on the other, made Don Quijote offer his life as a metavitall gift in order to realise the values of truth, goodness and beauty, and let him appear as an existential counterpoint, as A. Basave Fdez. del Valle has put it.<sup>17</sup>

Russian and Spanish authors called special attention to the character of renunciation that embodies the death of Don Quijote. "When in the end he renounced all," said Dostojewskij, "delivering himself from his madness and transforming himself in a reasonable person ... he did not linger to leave that world quietly and with a sad smile on his lips." Miguel de Unamuno expressed a similar idea saying, "on the summit of thy passion, covered with sneers, thou renounces not thousef, but something greater than thou: thy work. (renuncias, no a tí mismo, sino a algo más grande que tú: a tu obra). And the glory receives the forever."

<sup>17</sup> Cf. AGUSTÍN BASAVE FERNÁNDEZ DEL VALLE, "Filosofía del Quijote", México 1959, p. 37 ss and passim, and Ivo Hollhuber, "Cervantes und das Problem des Donquijotismus" in Geschichte der Philosophie in spanischer Kulturbereich, 1967, pp. 80-94, and MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA, "Il Chiscottismo Tragico di Unamuno", Milán (Ed. Marzorati) 1971.

In a similar way the mystic, in the most intimate union with the Absolute (God), renounces himself and, beyond it, renounces his work.

What does all this mean?

To drive home to everybody the close parallel between the superrational intuitionists, champions of an integral culture, genuine mystics and the way how their adepts were set in the pillory by the representatives of a narrow-minded sensate culture and a quanto-phrenetic, "expediency" —bound society on the one side, and the ideals Don Quijote fought for and the way he was sneered at and declared made by his mentally inferiors on the other side. It is necessary to remember the true nature of reality and the true nature of man, inserted as man is in his culture and society; last but not least, it is necessary to learn how to win the day at Waterloo, like Don Quijote won it, in a higher sense, in spite of his "defeats."

#### A) The true nature of Reality.

1) Strictly speaking, empiricism and the gigantic supersystem built upon it in the 19th and early 20th centuries, has become nowadays, untenable. "Empiricism, though it persists, is a relic of the past without scientific basis, and has itself proved to be, in this age of evolution, relativity and quanta, an outworn and outmoded superstition," as Errol Harris has put it sagaciously.<sup>18</sup> What counts doubly, is the fact, that this knowledge dawned not only in the heads of theologians and metaphysicists, but in the most prosaic minds of many a world-renowned physicist who declared himself unable to solve the problem of matter, materialistically. Relativity has combined space and time into a single continuum which, however, does not extend indefinitely in opposite directions, but curves in upon itself and closes up and is therefore finite in extent. The waves represent only probabilities and there are no waves of any material sort at all in nature, but only in the physico-mathematical calculations of the scientists. Matter itself, as the last remnant of classical mechanics, has been resolved into waves and the waves into mathematical formulae. Thus modern micro-physicists have out-heroded Herod! The chief reason for the collapse of empiricism however was its assumption that the world is made up entirely of particular things and the neglect of the universal element in experience and the dogmatic belief that sensations alone supply the whole furniture of human mind. Now, on the contrary, even what was hitherto

<sup>18</sup> Cf. ERROL E. HARRIS, "Nature, Mind and Modern Science", London-New York, 1954, p. 452.



thought of as matter, turned out to be something beyond the reach of physics. The sensate answer to the problem proved to be entirely false.

2) The representatives of the philosophical systems which go by the name of transcendental or objective idealism endeavoured to make a contrariwise answer plausible by asserting that the objects must conform to our thought rather than that our thought should conform to the objects and the endless conflict between "Realism" and "Idealism" sprang into being and the autonomy of metaphysics seemed to be done for, at least for centuries.

Kant's "Copernican" revolution was indeed radical, but not radical enough, in so far as it embraced a dangerous dogma surreptitiously underlying his whole philosophy, namely, the unfounded assumption that metaphysics can be a science only in the same way as mathematics or physics can, and by adopting the very same methods of verification as do the sciences. This has led to any identification of human knowledge as a whole with mathematico-physical knowledge, to which alone objective truth is awarded. Therefore, no rational demonstration of God's existence, on these unproved premises, was any more possible. Yet, on closer view, the "Critique of the Pure Reason" offered nothing but a methodology of sciences employing dogmatically the "scientific reason" as "metaphysical reason" and, by doing so, made impossible any metaphysics, limiting their object to physics. On these premises there was no possibility in avoiding religious agnosticism. Kant looked in vain for a concept of God resulting from a sensible experience analogous to a mathematico-physical concept. He knew only a conception of experience limited to the sensible domain and ignored the interior experience which offers a knowledge even deeper and more true than that gained by the "Phenomena."<sup>19</sup>

In his critique of the classical metaphysics Kant fell back in the very same error which he himself had criticized, the error of the mathematical-scientific metaphysics of the modern rationalism.

*The modern rationalism contains a fact* M. F. Sciacca laid the stress upon *since its beginning with Descartes an element of absurdity*: namely to concede rationality and truth of thinking even if God would not exist, which is contradictory.

In conformity with Kant, God is only thinkable, which does not exclude the other hypothesis "God does not exist" as equally possible and conceivable: otherwise the antinomies or "conflicts" of the Pure Reason would not be possible.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. To this whole passage: MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA, "L'interiorité Objective", Milan 1952, p. 77 ss. and IVO HOLLHUBER.

Now that it is inconceivable that God does not exist, by the very same reason are inconceivable and unthinkable the series of the antithesis. And the antinomy of the Pure Reason has come to an end.

If the hypothesis "God does not exist" lacks of sense and is not thinkable, the series of the antinomies which are founded on the validity of that hypothesis, results equally unthinkable.

Thus the "Antinomies of the Pure Reason" cease being compatible with the order of reason; only the hypothesis of the existence of God and with it the series of "the theses" comes into force.

Now, one has to distinguish gnoseology (which is concerned with the origin and formation of conceptions) from metaphysics (which is concerned with the origin and profundity of the idea of esse.) It was the mistake of "idealism" from Kant to Hegel (falling short of what Plato, St. Augustine and the genuine idealists in the full sense of the term desired to have true) to identify the whole objective knowledge with the rational discursivity, eliminating the original and superior knowledge offered by the intuition of the idea which is not only the foundation of the discursive knowledge, but (by the act of synthesis with the thinking activity) forms one of the constitutive principles of the human subject.

As was already implied in Chapter I of the essay, the idealistic illusion corresponds to the realistic illusion in so far as both points of view have as their common origin the *idola theatri* of a dogmatical identification of reality with the esse in itself and the equally dogmatic supposition that esse and cogitare oppose each other.

Therefore we can agree with Pitirim Sorokin when he repudiates the Ideational Culture and the supersystem built upon it as he repudiated the Sensate Culture and system, as long as his critique applies to modern "idealism" opposed to the empiristic and sensate culture and its modern "realistic" supersystem. It applies perfectly well to the alleged pseudo-reality and pseudo-value of all that is inferior to the Absolute and applies equally to all surrogates and sham equivalents of God, but it does not apply to the genuine idealism on the line from Plato — St. Augustine — Rosmini and to the integral theistic supersystem built upon it.

The study of the different forms of mysticism strengthens the awareness that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the "pan-enhenism" and the Vedantin monism on the one side, and the normal type of Christian mystical experience on the other side, as well as between monism and theism in general.

Therefore we may state the "idealistic" supersystem (understood in the



modern sense of the term) was dominant as a reaction against the Sensate Culture and its supersystems and flourished, frequently in common or in turn with the opposed Sensate Culture, during the XVIIIth, XIXth and early XXth centuries, whereas the genuine (not the decadent) Medieval conception of life and its holistic and theocentric systems — inclusive of those professed by St. Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz<sup>20</sup> — might well be considered as part of an Integral Culture.

3) The answer to the problem what the ultimate, true reality value would be like, given by the Integral Culture and the supersystems built upon it, has as background an Integral Philosophy. We concede that —as P. Sorokin put it— the Infinite Manifold is partly sensory, partly rational and partly supersensory and superrational and that the conception of the ultimate true reality and value in its highest apprehensions is typically mystical, but with the reserve (regarding his tolerance toward atheism), that only the theistic form of philosophy and mysticism is capable of leading us to the highest intuition possible, whereas the atheistic agnosticism refuses to think to its consequent end, stopping the thought and the apprehension at the last but one reason (offered by the sciences,) without advancing to the ultimate reason (offered by the metaphysics) of esse.

We remember that the idea of esse excludes by its own nature all adequate finite object and that man comprehends all things by the idea of esse though without comprehending the Being in itself. Thus, man in his search for an adequate object which should fully correspond to the idea of esse, thinks always —even unconsciously— of the Absolute, i.e., he thinks of God in that case even unconsciously or rather superconsciously.

This essay's thesis is in line with St. Augustine —Rosmini— Sciacca: St. Augustine is often consigned to the scrap-heap; by a considerable part of modern pundits, yet to their proper damage; Antonio Rosmini —who re-discovered the radical intuition, i.e. the original ontological synthesis— is often widely misunderstood and falsely declared to be a more or less important ontologist whilst. Michele Federico Sciacca, who is acknowledged in all countries of the Romance tongue as one of the outstanding contemporary philoso-

<sup>20</sup> Cf. OTHMAR ANDERLE, "Die Ganzheitstheorie" in "Zeitschrift für Ganzheitsforschung", Vienna 1960, p. 14-15 and the same "Die Monadologie G. W. Leibniz", ibid., pp. 149-161, and IVO HOLLHUBER, "La Filosofia Illuminista come Madrina della Sociologia Moderna" (VI Convegno Internazionale Italo-Tedesco, Merano 1965, and the same: "Svolgimenti paradossali della Filosofia nel Seicento" (VII Convegno Internazionale Italo-Tedesco, Merano 1966).

phers, has so far remained rather unknown in the United States and in the English and German speaking areas of Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the philosophy of Integralism which acknowledges different channels of cognition, such as sensory, rational, supersensory, super-rational and mystical, describes the true nature of reality as being manifold. Yet it ought not to be overlooked that other modern pioneers of an Integral Philosophy have sufficiently underlined the theotropical character of the Idea of esse, whose original intuition (as a primitive and ontological synthesis of the human intelligence and its object) is its Objective Interiority.

#### B) The true nature of Man.

Man nowadays has become the focus of philosophical, metaphysical, sociological and cultural interests. Yet the results of all the concentrated researches into man's intimate nature seem to have fallen short of the expectations placed in them. The problem, e.g. what a genuine humanism should be like, seem to make us run the risk of knowing always more and more about less and less.

In a paper presented to the XIth International Congress of Philosophy (Brussels 1953), we hinted at the ambiguity of a philosophical access to that problem equalizing philosophy with the "art to learn to be a man."<sup>22</sup> There is a double antagonism between the two fundamental positions prevailing since the days of Protagoras up to the present day: 1) the autonomous man and 2) the theotropical man.

1) The conception of the *autonomous man*, however, can be a part of three quite different ideologies:

a) In a *Sensate Culture*: Due to the prologued influence of what in the history of Literature and Philosophy goes by the name of "Enlightenment" (Siecle des Lumieres, "Aufklärung,") it has become a matter of course to view man mainly as an animal organism whose nature best should be interpreted in a proper mechanistic, physicalistic and instinctivist way. Later on, the "physicalistic-biological" interpretation of man's nature was completed and allegedly "improved" by the Freudians and by "depth-psychology." We already exposed the reasons why such an approach to the problem turns out to be a

<sup>21</sup> Cf. IVO HOLLHUBER, "Michele Federico Sciacca ein Wegweiser Abendländischen Geistes". Meisenheim-Glan (A. Hain) 1962, and the same: "Geschichte der italienischen Philosophie..." 1969, pp. 44-67 (Antonio Rosmini) and pp. 326-349 (M. F. Sciacca).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. IVO HOLLHUBER, *Philosopher c'est apprendre a etre homme* (Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, Brussels 1953, vol. XIV, p. 7 ss.).



deadend in general, and why especially the Unconscious-Gospel is unacceptable and unfit to offer a plausible concept of man's personality.

In his famous study "Accident and Necessity"<sup>23</sup> Jacques Monod tried to prove man to have been a lucky hit of Nature, a "gipsy on the brink of the Universe." Whilst F. L. Boschke in an equally well renowned volume "The Origin of Life"<sup>24</sup> stated human life to have been the result of natural evolution as necessary as e.g. the formation of basalts.

b) In a mock *Ideational Culture*: At first we have in view all the partisans of the modern trends of pseudo-idealism from Kant to Hegel and his schools. What been said against their authors in the preceding section ("The true nature of Reality") is obviously valid here too. Every one-sided theory of the nature of man, which reduces man's whole being to mere sensual or mere rational processes, succumbs to the temptation of considering man as an autonomous being.

c) In a *Pseudo-Integral Culture*: With a presentiment of the impossibility to confine man's nature to a sensuous experience or to a rational-discursive thought, many an attempt has been made to open for man the door into the realm of the supra-conscious and to make him dream the dream of self-deification.

The study of the monistic forms of mysticism shows man identifying himself with the Absolute (the individual soul being substantially and essentially imagined as identical with the unqualifiable Brahman) and accepts as final state the isolation of his soul in a "natural rest", without the slightest hope to fill its fathomless abyss with the transcendent God who alone could really fill his soul.

The highest intuitions, the flashes of enlightenment, the unique inspirations, that made geniuses create their immortal works, remain hidden in a undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and in an ego-less sphere of an anonymous substratum.

2) The phenomenology of the *theotropical man* is equally manifold:

a) In the milieu of an apparently *Sensate Culture*: Strictly speaking, under this heading there figures no genuine sensate culture any more.

What, at first sight, seems to intensify the zoologification of the *Homo Sapiens*—the evolution that in some hundred millions of years reached the cerebralisation of man—on closer view turns out to be equally theotropical, for even the noo-sphere coextensively superimposed on the biosphere, is acknow-

<sup>23</sup> Cf. F. L. BOSCHKE, "Die herkunft des lebens" (Econ. Vulag) 1970.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. F. L. BOSCHKE, "Die herkunft des lebens" (Econ. Vulag) 1970.

ledged to have been directed as well in its expansive socialisation (civilisation and individualisation) as in its compressive socialisation (totalisation and personalisation) by a point Omega (God), who is the author and consolidator of such a stupendous evolution. These and similar lucubrations of *Teilhard de Chardin* appear too maundering for a generation made of too ragged a stuff, yet time may, in certain limits, prove his audacious perspectives to be however the most important and productive "science-fiction" of his time.<sup>25</sup> It is the discontinuous (be it the sudden initial boiling of heated water, be it the sudden psychic boiling of man's bodily evolution) that the contrasts with the continuous, and forbids to consider man as only a higher developed ape, notwithstanding his "entrance in the world without any noise", and leaves plenty of room for a divine intervention in the midst of an aeonic evolution that has God as its motor and consolidator. It seems erroneous to imagine biology as being merely a sort of physics of the very complex, and noospheric brains as the organ of collective human reflexion, by reflecting the personalisation of man and his evident converging to Omega (God).<sup>26</sup>

Let us, moreover, not forget *Portman's* warning that "the idea of derivation of the higher from the lower, leads astray"<sup>27</sup> nor *W. Schmidt's* and *W. Koppers* ethnological proofs of the original theism and monogamy of the primitive peoples.<sup>28</sup>

b) In the milieu of genuine *Ideational Culture*: here we are again on the line of the genuine idealism upon which Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rosmini and others built their systems. The structure of this idealism is holistic and theotropical. Man's mind is not reduced to a mere rational thought, but embraces equally the fulness of spiritual life with its supersensory

<sup>25</sup> Whilst the theologian N. M. Wildiers (cf. the Preface to Teilhard de Chardin's "Le Phenomene Humain") and Henri de Lubac cf. "La pensee religieuse du Pere Teilhard de Chardin", Paris 1962) do not doubt about the Christian orthodoxy of the author, Philippe de la Trinite (cf. "Rome et Teilhard de Chardin", Paris 1964) and above all *Dietrich von Hildebrand* (cf. "Trojan Horse in the City of God", Chicago 1967) impute to P. Teilhard de Chardin to have deformed Christianity with a touch of naturalistic monism and even pantheism due to his evolutionary doctrine with neglect of the dignity proper to the human person.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, "Le Phenomene Humain", Paris. (Ed. du Seuil), 1955, especially pp. 14, 15, 185, 186, 189, 203, 286 ss.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. A. PORTMAN, "Biologische Fragment zu einer Lehre vom Menschen", Bale, 1949, p. 10.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. WILHELM SCHMIDT, "Der Ursprung der Gottesidee", 5 vol., Munster i.w., 1926, ss, and Wilhelm Koppers, "Der Urmensch und sein Weltbild", Vienna, 1949, p. 35, 90, 180 and passim.



and superrational flourishing of the highest creative energies all tending and concentrating towards their Maker.

Additional attention, should be paid to the fact that a precipitated identification of man with the *animal rationale* may be misunderstood, though it was widely spread in the Thomistic culture and founded on a genuine and therefore integral idealism, which makes us class its great thinkers among the representatives of the integral and theotropical culture.

Man's mind is to be identified neither with reason, not with will, nor with sentiment etc., though reason, will and sentiment etc., are the forms of his spiritual activity. The human mind is the real and living unity of all the forms of the spiritual activity of man and therefore we propose another term which should take root in "intelligence", derived from *intus legere*. In that sense it seems more precise to call man the *animal spirituale* (Siacca) instead of *animal rationale*.

c) In the milieu of an equally Genuine Integral Culture: Onesidedness, narrowness and inadequacy is usually the reproach the pioneers of a new mock integral culture make to the representatives of the pretended obsolete theistic ideational culture. The deeper tendency underlying such reproaches may become man fast by an acuter sensibility to what goes by the name of *Humanism*.

Now, Humanism, is in itself ambiguous too, and may play quite a different part for the autonomous man and for the theotropical man. Humanism may be synonymous with atheism. In that sense *Jean Paul Sartre* embraced humanism and drew the last consequences out of his atheistic existentialism.<sup>29</sup> *Leopoldo Palacios*, on the contrary, condemned humanism as an anthropocentric movement which is practically atheistic because it puts the centre of man in man himself, wherefore every humanism seemed to him to be inhuman on account of its being anthropocentric and atheistic.<sup>30</sup> Thus Sartre embraced and Palacios repudiated humanism for the same reason, i.e. for having an atheistic character. Between these two contrary cultural poles lies a whole scale of differently tinged valuations of humanism. Perhaps *Jacques Maritain* takes a just middle position by accepting humanism as the equality of all men, the conquest of liberty, the respect of the human person in an

<sup>29</sup> Cf. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, "L'existentialisme est un humanisme", Paris (ed. Nagel), 1958, p. 94: "L'existentialisme n'est pas autre chose qu'un effort pour tirer toutes les conséquences d'une position athee cohérente".

<sup>30</sup> Cf. LEOPOLDO PALACIOS, "El mito de la Nueva Cristiandad", Madrid 1952: "el humanismo es un movimiento antropocéntrico, prácticamente ateo que coloca el centro del hombre en el hombre mismo" (p. 59) "mejor sería pensar que todo humanismo es inhumano, que todo humanismo es antropocéntrico y ateo."

organic community and the expression of similar principles covered with an unequivocal theism.<sup>31</sup>

Taking into consideration these different opinions about humanism, we have no reason to be astonished that even a genuine idealistic and theistic culture runs that risk of being judged narrow, mindedly from a pseudo-integral point of view which casts suspicion on the theistic supersystem of an ideational culture supposing in it a sort of cultural lag that ought to be over-ridden by a more integral conception of the world.

There is, however, a very considerable difference between the spurious and the genuine conception of Humanism and Integration, comparable to that between the ontological theory of the Mandukya Upanishad and that of Ghazali: in the case of the Upanishad the initial dogma is "the Self is Brahman", that is to say that the individual soul is conceived as being actually identical with God, whereas the Muslim starts with the dogma that God alone is Absolute Being and that all things perish except His face. For the Muslim, man only exists at all in so far as he given existence by God; for the Hindu he is God and through God all things eternally.<sup>32</sup> We must heed the consequences: "On the premises of the Mandukya Upanishad there can be no humility or sense of awe in the face of an Absolute Being who alone really exists and is distinct from man: there can be no sense of nullity or unworthiness. There can be unity but there can be neither union nor communion. Thus the Vedantin sees himself as the Absolute, one without a second, while the Muslim sees himself as he exists essentially apart from God as pure nothingness".<sup>33</sup>

Well, does Integral Culture adopt the position of the Vedantin or of the Muslim? (We do not even refer to the Christian position, in order not to run the risk of being prejudiced). In the first case, the ideational culture and its theistic supersystem look like "narrow", but only at the price of consenting to the deification of man, i.e. at the price of his dishumanization. In the second case humility, understood as an ontological truth, opens all the doors to a wider space and leads man to always higher horizons and proves itself to be the sesame to the true integralization of man by drawing the last consequences from his ontological position.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. JACQUES MARITAIN, "Principes d'une Politique Humaniste", Paris 1945, passim and IVO HOLLHUBER "La crisis dell'ipocrisia nell'umanesimo" (IX. Convegno Internazionale Italo-Tedesco) Merano 1968.

<sup>32</sup> Here we followed closely the exposition of this confrontation in R. C. ZAEHNER, "Mysticism Sacred and Profane", Oxford 1957, p. 158.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. R. C. Zaehner, l.c. p. 158-159.