


Subjectivalization, where it occurs, results in a neutralization of underlying case distinctions to a single form, usually called the 'nominative'. Objectivalization, where it occurs, neutralizes case distinctions to a single form which, where it is distinct from the form assigned to subjects, is traditionally termed 'accusative'. A third process which has the effect of effacing deep-structure case distinctions is the formation of nominals from sentences. The case modifications under nominalization transformations usually involve what is called the 'genitive'.


The brief mention above of situations in which there was an S embedded in the case category O suggested the ways in which case grammar must deal with verb and adjective complementation. A second source of embedded sentences is within the NP itself. The rule for NP may be stated as 97.

97. NP → N (S)


Where the N is an ordinary lexical item and the adjunct S contains a co-referential copy of the same N, the result is an NP consisting of a noun modified by a relative clause. One of the most obvious sources of 'genitive' is from relative clauses built on sentences which, by themselves, would have assumed the form *X has Y*. The N in the modified NP is the same as the N contained in the D of the adjunct sentence, and the V is empty. Thus, from 98 we get 99 by deleting the repeated noun, the tense, and the 'empty' verb and reattaching the D to the dominating NP.



grammatical theory of transformations which have semantic import (of this highly restricted kind).



A D subjoined to an NP has its case marker modified—in this case to the sibilant suffix. Note 100.



The 'true possessive' construction—resulting either in an NP of the form *X's Y* or *Y of X* in English—has as its source a sentence which by itself would have the form *X has Y*. The fact that in some languages there are instances of adnominal D not modified to the 'genitive' (*dem Vater sein Haus*, 'dative of possession') supports the view that conversion to genitive is a matter of the surface structure.

The interpretation of deverbal nouns which seems most satisfactory to me is that, except for the purely productive cases, the derivation of a noun from a verb is a matter of historical, not synchronic, fact. The synchronic reality is expressed by indicating that a given noun has a particular kind of relationship to a specific verb (or set of verbs), and that some of these nouns may, others must, appear in the NP frame [— S].

That is, instead of having a synchronic process for producing such words as Latin *amor* from its associated verb, what is needed is the classification of such a word as an abstract noun having a particular kind of relationship with the verb *amo*.<sup>50</sup> Nouns having this kind of special

<sup>50</sup>This treatment allows for the inclusion of nouns which lack etymological connections with their related verbs. We might wish to indicate for *book* a connection of the in-

relationship to specific verbs can take part in a process which introduces into the NP elements which 'originally' depended on the associated verb. The processes in question frequently have the effect of converting the form of the subsidiary NP's to the genitive.<sup>51</sup> Thus the noun *amor* when qualified by a sentence of the form *deus amat . . .* yields *amor dei*; when it is qualified by a sentence of the form *deum amat . . .* the result is again *amor dei*. The D and O forms, in other words, are equally reduced to the genitive, and when only one noun is involved, potential ambiguities result.<sup>52</sup>

4. Some Remarks on Language Typology

The view of universal grammar which is emerging is something like this: In their deep structure, the propositional nucleus of sentences in all languages consists of a V and one or more NP's, each having a separate case relationship to the P (and hence to the V). The most straightforward

tended kind with the verb *write*, thus accounting for the ambiguity of *your book* between 'the book which you own' (ordinary relative clause modification) and 'the book which you wrote'.

<sup>51</sup>Exactly what universal constraints there are, if any, on the element to be converted to genitive is not at all clear. It appears that if there is only one element that shows up in the NP, it frequently takes the genitive form. Compare the ambiguous sentence i with Sentences ii and iii.

- i. My instructions were impossible to carry out.
  - (a) so I quit.
  - (b) so he quit.
- ii. My instructions to you are to go there.
- iii. \*My your instructions are to go there.

In English it appears that if the conditions which allow the formation of the *of* genitive and the *s* genitive are satisfied by two different NP's in the associated sentence, multiple genitive constructions become possible, as in the following example borrowed from Jespersen.

- iv. Gainesborough's portrait of the duchess of Devonshire.

Japanese allows conversion to genitive in true relative clauses, as well as in the reduced relative clauses. A paraphrase of v is vi; *no* is the postposition most closely associated with functions which we would call 'genitive'.

- v. *Boku ga yonda zasshi*. 'I + subject + read - past + magazine' 'the magazines I read'
- vi. *Boku no yonda zasshi*.

<sup>52</sup>Jespersen's suggestion that the ambiguity of *amor dei* is in the verb rather than the noun—the noun unambiguously identifying the subject, the verb being ambiguously either active or passive—must be understood as the hypothesis that only those NP constituents which are capable of conversion to surface subjects (with a given verb) may appear under genitive modification as modifiers of the deverbal noun. For English this may well be true. (Jespersen, 1924, p. 170.)

deep-structure commonalities between languages are to be sought at this 'deepest' level.

The lexical insertion rule for verbs is sensitive to the particular array of cases in the P. Since no distinction is needed between 'strict sub-categorization features' and at least the highest level of 'selectional features' (because redundancy relations exist between cases and some lexical features, and because there is no 'subject' outside of a 'VP' whose features need to be dealt with separately), the lexical insertion rule for verbs can be a strictly local transformation which responds to nothing more than the cases which are co-constituents of V (with the exception, as noted above, that it must be known whether the O element is an NP or an S).

The criteria for typological classification that have suggested themselves so far in this study are these:

- I. the presence or absence of modifications on the NP's as determined by the deep-case categories
  - A. the nature of such modification (prepositional, affixal, or other)
  - B. the conditions for the choice of particular case forms (which, when stated in their simplest form, constitute what is usually formulated as the 'case system' of the language)
- II. the presence or absence of concordial modifications of the verb
  - A. the nature of the concord (number agreement, incorporation of 'traces' of case categories, feature changes on V)
  - B. the relation to subject selection (topicalization)
- III. the nature of anaphoric processes
  - A. type of process (replacement by pro form, deletion, de-stressing, replacement by unstressed variants, or other)
  - B. conditions of application
- IV. topicalization processes (where 'subject selection' may be thought of as a special case of topicalization)
  - A. formal processes (fronting, modifying the case form, or other)
  - B. the variety of topicalization processes in the same language
- V. word order possibilities
  - A. factors determining 'neutral' word order (nature of case categories, 'ranking' of noun classes, topic selection, or other)
  - B. conditions determining or constraining stylistic variations on word order

It is important to realize that all of these typological criteria are based on superficial processes, and that there are no particularly good reasons for believing a priori that there will be much coincidence in the ways in which the different criteria sort out the world's languages.

4.1 The Bases for Determining Case Forms

The forms of the NP's in a P are determined on the basis of a variety of factors, one of which is the case category of the NP. Thus an NP under an I (that is, an instrumental noun) is assigned a particular form depending in whole or in part on the fact that it is under I.

Surface case forms of NP's are most elaborately developed in the personal pronouns. The study of the 'case' aspects of pronoun systems reveals a great deal about the variety of relationships that can hold between deep and surface cases.


Sapir's typological distinctions for Amerindian pronominal systems (1917b) can be expressed in case grammar terms quite simply. If we ignore whatever complications may exist in 'passive' constructions, and if we ignore all deep-structure cases except A and O, we can imagine sentences of the following three types given in their underlying propositional form:

- (a) V + A intransitive sentences with active 'subjects'
- (b) V + O + A transitive sentences with agents
- (c) V + O intransitive sentences with inactive 'subjects'

Since the V element is constant to the formulas, we can represent these three sentence types by presenting the case frames in three lines, as follows:

101    A  
      O A  
      O


According to Sapir, then, there are languages which, like Yana, have only one form for pronouns in all four of these positions.



102


There are languages like Paiute that have a separate form for the O element in the transitive sentence, all others being the same. The two forms are traditionally called 'nominative' and 'accusative'.

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
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There are languages like Chinook which give one form to the A of transitive sentences and another to the remaining cases. The terms 'ergative' and 'nominative' are often given to a distinction made in this way.




104

There are languages like Dakota which have separate forms for A and O; here the terms are usually 'active' and 'inactive'.



105

And, lastly, there is the situation found in Takelma, which has one form for the pronominal NP of intransitive sentences, and two separate forms for the A and O of transitive sentences. Thus:



106

What these observations are intended to suggest is merely that if I correctly understand Sapir's analysis of the pronominal systems of these languages, then the case concepts I have been discussing, together with the notion of clause types which various arrays of them define, provide

the categorial and configurational information for determining the surface distinctions that are found in these languages.

4.2 Verbal Concord

There are these various ways, and possibly more, in which cases and case environments are involved in determining the case forms of NP's within a P. An additional factor is whether the given NP has been chosen as subject in languages having subjectivalization processes. Choosing subjects or topics is related to another aspect of the superficial structure of sentences, and that is verbal concord.

The choice of subject in English always has the effect of determining number concord (on those verbal and auxiliary elements capable of reflecting number concord). Apart from number concord, the choice of subject might involve modification of the verb to its passive form, or introduction of the verb *have*.

The information 'registered' in the V may have only to do with the choice of subject, as in English, or it may be more elaborate. Languages which 'incorporate' pronominal affixes into the V may do so for more than one NP at a time; or noun stems themselves from particular cases may be incorporated into the verbal expression.<sup>53</sup>

The subject selection rules discussed for English may be compared with the topicalization processes that are described for Philippine languages. The situation for Maranao has recently been described by McKaughan. One NP is chosen as topic for every sentence, and this choice is recorded in the following way: its original case preposition is replaced by *so*, and an affix is inserted into the V which indicates the case category of the chosen NP. There is apparently considerable freedom in the choice of topic. To take the verb meaning 'to butcher' (*/sombaliʔ/*), we find that when the topic noun is an original I, the verb takes on the prefix */i-/*, as shown in 108; and when the topic is an original B, the suffix */-an/* is added to the V, as seen in 109.

- 107. *somombaliʔ so mamaʔ sa karabao*  
'The man butchers the carabao.'
- 108. *isombaliʔ o mamaʔ so gelat ko karabao*  
'It is with the knife that the man butchers the carabao.'
- 109. *sombaliʔan o mamaʔ so major sa karabao*  
'It is for the mayor that the man butchers the carabao.'

<sup>53</sup> Grammatical devices for providing concord of this type have been worked out for Mohawk by Paul M. Postal (see Postal, 1963).

<sup>54</sup> McKaughan (1962). The examples and the description of the relationships are from McKaughan, but a great deal of guessing lies behind my interpretation.

The choice of sentence subjects, or 'topics', from particular cases appears to be the most satisfactory way of accounting for the many types of voice modifications of verbs such as those described as middle, pseudo-reflexive, and so forth, in the Indo-European languages.

4.3 Anaphoric Processes

Anaphoric processes are best understood from the point of view of an extended concept of sentence conjunction. That is, every language has ways of simplifying sentences connected by conjunctions or subordinations, and the processes used under these conditions seem to be exactly the same as those used in sentences connected in discourse. The grammarian's job, therefore, is to describe these processes as they work in sentences that are independently intelligible, and then to assume that utterances in connected texts or conversations can best be understood from the point of view of a shared knowledge of the language's anaphoric processes on the part of speaker and hearer.<sup>55</sup> The fact that in these anaphoric or reduced forms English uses pro-replacement under conditions that would call for deletion in some other language may thus be seen as a superficial difference between the two languages.

The point is important—and it was mentioned above in connection with 'bad' reasons for rejecting the universality of the subject/predicate division—because the absence of subjects in the final surface forms of sentences in some languages is seen by many scholars as having great typological relevance. The optional absence of NP constituents in languages with person-marker incorporation (for example, Chinook) has led scholars to claim that such languages lack the nexus relations that Europeans understand as 'subject' and 'object' but have instead what are described as 'appositional' relations between NP's and V's (see Sommerfelt, 1937). In languages without pronominal incorporation, a distinction is made by some scholars between true subject/predicate languages and those in which the so-called 'subject' is as much a 'complement' to

<sup>55</sup> In other words, the grammarian will describe the process by which *i* is converted to *ii* by noting the conditions under which repeated elements in conjoined sentences may undergo deletion and pro-replacement and under which conjoined sentences can have words like *too* and *either* added to them.

- i. Mary didn't want any candy and Mary didn't take any candy.
- ii. Mary didn't want any candy and she didn't take any either.
- iii. She didn't take any, either.

In contexts in which the information contained in the first conjunct of *i* is already understood by the addressee (by having just been spoken by him, for example), a speaker of English feels free to use the reduced form in *iii*.

There is no reason, it seems to me, to expect the grammar of a language to generate sentences like *iii* directly.

(75)

the V as is the direct object or any of the various adverbial elements. To Martinet, a subject is different from a complement only if it is 'constitutive of the minimal utterance' (1962a, pp. 61-62)—that is, only if it is obligatorily present in both full and anaphorically reduced utterances. In Japanese, the 'minimal utterance' lacks a subject, and hence, the argument goes, Japanese sentences lack the subject/predicate structure of sentences in our more familiar languages. To Martinet's disciple Saint-Jacques, this typological 'fact' about Japanese is regarded as excessively important. It is only by dint of considerable intellectual effort that the Westerner can achieve that liberation from familiar ways of thinking about language which is required for an understanding of the true character of Japanese. Or so Saint-Jacques tells us (1966, p. 36). It seems to me that language typology offers enough genuine excitement to make it possible for us to give this one up. The intellectual achievement of which M. Saint-Jacques speaks is that of knowing that when there is an 'understood' NP to deal with, some people replace it by a pronoun, others get rid of it.

#### 4.4 Topicalization


The fourth criterion has to do with topicalization processes, devices for isolating one constituent of a sentence as 'topic', of bringing one particular constituent of a sentence into some kind of 'focus'. Where topicalization is distinct from processes for 'emphasizing' a constituent, we have much the same thing as what I have been calling 'subjectivalization', but which I shall now begin calling 'primary topicalization'. Primary topicalization for English involves position and number concord; stylistic changes involving stress assignment, late word-order changes, and possibly the 'cleft-sentence construction' fall into what might be called 'secondary topicalization'. From what I understand of McKaughan's account (1962, p. 47), primary topicalization in Maranao involves replacement of the original preposition associated with a noun by *so* and introduction into the V of an associated case indicator, while secondary topicalization involves moving an NP to which *so* has been added to the front of the sentence. One might refer to Oertel's study of the disjunct use of cases in Brāhmanic prose as a study of secondary topicalization.<sup>56</sup> I would imagine that all languages possess some means of carrying out

<sup>56</sup> 1936. Oertel distinguishes 'pendent' uses of a disjunct case, where the 'topic' is in the 'nominative' even if its original role in the sentence was not that of subject (comparable, I assume, to *he* in 'he, I like him'), and 'proleptic' uses, where the topic retains the original case form, is moved to the front of the sentence, and may or may not be resumed (in the form of a demonstrative) in the remainder of the sentence (comparable to *him* in *him, I like (him)*).


'secondary topicalization', but it may be the case that some lack the process of 'primary topicalization' (subjectivalization).<sup>57</sup>

The notion 'subjectivalization' is useful only if there are sentences in a language which offer a choice of subject. Languages described as not having passives, or languages described as only capable of expressing transitive sentences passively, apparently lack the grammatical process of primary topicalization.

This question leads naturally to the problem of the so-called 'ergative' languages. Recall that in the accusative type of pronominal system, the pattern was




and that in the ergative type it was



Now when languages of the accusative type have passive versions of sentences whose propositional form is [V O A], the case forms associated with the elements in the passive version are generally 'nominative' for the O and 'agentive' (realized as ablative, instrumental, or what have you, depending on the language) for the A. If passive sentences were introduced into our three-line diagrams and their active counterparts removed, we would get the pattern

<sup>57</sup> Jeffrey Gruber's recent study (1967) of topicalization in child language suggests that ontogenetically motivated (what I am calling 'secondary') topicalization precedes the use of formal subjects in English. It may be that when one device for topicalization becomes 'habitual', it freezes into a formal requirement and the language must then call on other processes for motivated topicalization.

Kenneth Hale (correspondence, 1967) reports that for Walbiri, an 'ergative' language of aboriginal Australia, there is apparently no 'subjectivalization' process, but any constituent may be repeated to the right of the proposition, the element inside the proposition being replaced by a pro form.



which is exactly like that for the regular assignment of cases in the ergative languages. This fact, plus the use of the term 'nominative' for subject-of-intransitive-cum-object-of-transitive in these languages, has led many scholars to identify the ergative case in ergative languages with the agentive case form found in passive sentences in accusative languages, and to conclude that the ergative languages are really 'passive' languages—languages in which transitive sentences can only be expressed passively.<sup>58</sup> For both of these systems, the case that has been given the name 'nominative' is frequently described as the 'subject' in a subject/predicate construction, and the 'ergative' element in the one instance and the 'accusative' element in the other are treated as verbal complements (see Trubetzkoy, 1939). The difficulty of determining the 'subject' in ergative languages has been described by Martinet (1962b, pp. 78 f.): Some scholars identify as subject the word which would be the subject in a translation of the sentence into French—that is, the nominative in intransitive sentences and the ergative in transitive sentences. Others regard the nominative as the subject in all sentences, thus giving transitive sentences a 'passive' interpretation. Lafon gives up on transitive sentences—he uses the term 'subject' only for intransitive sentences, saying of transitive sentences that they have no subject.

Vaillant, on the other hand, spoke of the northern Caucasian languages as having three types of verbs: (a) true intransitives, with subjects in the 'nominative'; (b) 'operative pseudotransitives', with 'pseudosubject' in the 'ergative'; and (c) 'affective pseudotransitives', with 'pseudosubjects' in the 'dative' (1936, p. 93). It seems quite clear that what he is dealing with are sentences having P's of the three types—[V O], [V O A], and [V O D]—where the surface cases for O, A, and D are 'nominative', 'ergative', and 'dative', respectively. It looks very much as if that is all there is to say. For my part I would much rather say of the ergative languages that they lack subjectivalization, than say either that all transitive sentences undergo obligatory passivization, or that some of their sentences contain true subjects while others do not.

<sup>58</sup> Note that even if there is a different form for the verb in [\_\_\_\_ O] and [\_\_\_\_ O + A] case frames, this cannot be interpreted as evidence of 'passivity'. As mentioned earlier, in languages not of the ergative type there may still be systematic variation of the same verb root depending on whether it is used transitively or intransitively.

The frequent claim that the ergative languages are more primitive than the accusative languages are (see Tesnière, 1959, p. 112), together with the assumption that the ergative construction is really a passive construction, has led such scholars as Kuryłowicz, Schuchardt, and Uhlenbeck to assume that the passive construction represents a more primitive concept in the evolution of language than that of the active transitive construction. Evidence mustered for this position includes the signs that pre-Indo-European was of the ergative type, and the fact that some languages have 'invented' *have*-like verbs in relatively recent times. The invention of *have* made it possible to give active expression to certain tense or aspectual forms which had remained unaffected by the general change from passive to active expression (as is seen, for example, in the circa third century shift from expressions of the type *inimicus mihi occisus est* and *mihi illud factum est* to transitive expressions using *habeo*: *inimicum occisum habeo* and *habeo illud factum* (see van Ginneken, 1939, p. 86)).

It seems very unlikely to me that syntactic changes of the type known from the present state of our knowledge are really capable of showing an intellectual evolution of a type as potentially significant as whatever might be understood as the transition from an essentially passive to an essentially active point of view. The connection claimed by van Ginneken between ergativity and the 'feminine' character of cultures with ergative languages is another that should be questioned.<sup>59</sup>

#### 4.5 Word-Order Differences

The fifth criterion suggested for a language typology is that of word order. The variables that determine or constrain the freedom of word order in the languages of the world are very likely to have many important connections with the case structure of sentences; but this is an area which I have not examined at all.

<sup>59</sup> The following seems worth quoting in full (1939, pp. 91 f):

Nous sommes tous des hommes, et tous nous avons deux talents: les facultés plus actives de l'appétit et de la volonté, et les facultés plus passives des sensations et de l'appréhension; mais il est évident que les deux sexes de l'humanité montrent sous ce rapport une différence sensible.

L'ethnologie moderne, qui a écarté définitivement comme insuffisante la doctrine du développement uniforme, nous apprend cependant que le progrès de l'humanité a balancé presque toujours entre les cultures plus féminines ou plus masculines, dites cultures matriarcales et patriarcales. Ce sont toujours les cultures matriarcales très prononcées qui, comme le basque, ont un verbe transitif de nature passive avec comme casus rectus un patiens et comme casus obliquus un agens; mais les cultures patriarcales, comme l'indoeuropéenne ont un verbe transitif de nature active, animiste et magique, avec un sujet au casus rectus et un objet au casus obliquus. Chaque peuple a donc le verbe qu'il mérite.

## 5. The Grammar of Inalienable Possession

The preceding sections have contained an informal description of a syntactic model for language and a few demonstrations of the operations of this model of the sort that has come to be called 'restatement linguistics'. In the present section I shall attempt to show how a particular substantive modification of the rules will permit a uniform way of describing the interesting collection of grammatical facts associated with what is called 'inalienable possession'.

Every language, one can be sure, has nouns which express concepts that are inherently relational. Examples of inherently relational nouns in English are *side*, *daughter*, and *face*. One doesn't speak of a side, but of a side of something; one doesn't say of someone that she is a daughter, only that she is somebody's daughter; and although it is possible to speak of having seen a face, the word is typically used when referring to 'his face' or 'your face' or the like. The relational nouns most frequently discussed in the linguistic literature are names of body parts and names of kinsmen. My discussion here will concentrate on body parts.

## 5.1 The Data

5.1.1 Significant syntactic relationships exist between the dative and the genitive cases in all of the Indo-European languages; and in all but Armenian, according to Havers (1911, p. 317), the dative and the genitive case forms figure in paraphrase relationships of kinds that are highly comparable from language to language. The relationship is observed only when the associated noun is of a particular type. To take some of the modern German examples given by Havers, we observe that a paraphrase relation exists between 111 and 112 as well as between 113 and 114; but that of the two sentences 115 and 116, the latter is ungrammatical (as a paraphrase of 115).

111. *Die Kugel durchbohrte dem Feind das Herz.*  
 112. *Die Kugel durchbohrte das Herz des Feindes.*  
 113. *Er hat mir die Hand verwundet.*  
 114. *Er hat meine Hand verwundet.*  
 115. *Der Vater baute seinem Sohn ein Haus.*  
 116. \**Der Vater baute ein Haus seines Sohnes.*

It should be noted that *Herz* and *Hand* are the names of body parts, while *Haus* is not.

5.1.2 There are cases like the above where a given language exhibits in itself the paraphrase relationship, and there are also cases where it

appears that one language has chosen the dative expression, another the genitive. Notice the following sentences, also from Havers (1911, p. 1).

117. My heart aches: *Mir blutet das Herz.*  
 118. Tom's cheeks burned: *Tom brannten die Wangen.*  
 119. She fell on her mother's neck: *Sie fiel ihrer Mutter um den Hals.*

5.1.3 There are adnominal (possessive) uses of dative constructions, particularly, it appears, when the possessive pronoun is also used with the possessed element. Here the most readily available examples are with kinship terms (Havers, 1911, p. 283).

120. *Dem Kerl seine Mutter.*  
 121. *Sa mère à lui.*

5.1.4 Many languages have separate possessive affixes for nouns that are obligatorily possessed (inalienables) and nouns that are optionally possessed (alienables). The difference in Fijian is apparently expressed by preposing the possessive morpheme to indicate alienable possession and suffixing it to indicate inalienable possession. Since the category 'inalienable' is a category of grammar rather than a property of real world objects (since, in other words, some objects grammatically classed as inalienable can in fact be separated from their 'owners'), the distinction can be seen most clearly if both methods of expression can be used with the same noun stem. Lévy-Bruhl gives a persuasive example of this situation (1916, p. 99): Fijian *uluqu* means the head which is now firmly attached to my neck, while *kequ ulu*, also translatable as 'my head', would refer to the head which, say, I am about to eat.

Languages may have separate morphemes for indicating alienable and inalienable possession, and they may have further distinctions among these morphemes depending on the type of inalienable possession (as Nootka, for example, suffixes *-at-* to nouns representing physically inseparable entities, for example, body parts, but uses other means for kinship terms), or they may merely have a class of nouns incapable of occurring as free forms—noun stems requiring affixation of possession indicators.<sup>60</sup>

In all of these cases, it appears, the features in question are 'grammatical' rather than purely 'notional'. Discussions of inalienable possession almost always contain lists of nouns whose grammatical classifica-

<sup>60</sup>This last situation is sometimes described by saying that nouns are 'inflected for person' (see Manessy, 1964, p. 468).

The full variety of the treatment of inalienable possession in different Amerindian languages is catalogued in Sapir (1917a).

tion is the opposite of what one would notionally expect. Lévy-Bruhl (1916, p. 96) mentions a case where the word for 'left hand' functions as a body-part word grammatically, but the word for 'hand' does not. And Arapaho classifies 'louse' (or 'flea') among the inalienables (Salzmann, 1965, p. 139), a situation that invites people who like to speculate on these things to propose something or other on the Arapaho conception of 'self'.

5.1.5 Milka Ivić has recently discussed many instances of what she calls 'non-omissible determiners' (1962, 1964). Among the examples she cites are many that involve nouns of the type frequently included among the inalienables. The adjective cannot be deleted, for example, in the Serbo-Croatian expression in 122, for 123 is ungrammatical (1964, p. 477).

122. *devojka crnih očiju*, 'the girl with black eyes'  
 123. \**devojka očiju*

What is misleading about her discussion, it seems to me, is the decision to associate with the adjective the 'category of nonomissibility'. It is as if we wished to say, for the English Sentence 124, that there is something grammatically significant about the word *missing*, since its deletion results in Sentence 125 which is somewhat different in type from the original; put differently, Sentence 124 does not say the same thing that 126 does. What is genuinely important about 124 is its paraphrasability as 127 (or 128) and the fact that the construction exhibited by 124 is restricted to certain kinds of nouns. Note the ungrammaticality of 129.

124. I have a missing tooth.  
 125. I have a tooth.  
 126. I have a tooth and it is missing.  
 127. My tooth is missing.  
 128. One of my teeth is missing.  
 129. \*I have a missing five-dollar bill.

5.1.6 Note that in Sentences 124 and 127, three things are involved: (a) a possessor (an 'interested person', to use the traditional term), (b) a body part, and (c) an attribute—(a) *me*, (b) *tooth*, and (c) *missing* respectively—and that the sentences provide alternate ways of ascribing the attribute to the possessor's body part. They are two distinct superficial ways of expressing the same relationship among these three concepts.

Using P, B, and A for *a*, *b*, and *c* above, we may represent the expression as seen in 124 as 130, and that as seen in 127 as 131.

130. P<sup>nom</sup> have [A → B<sup>acc</sup>]  
 131. [P<sup>gen</sup> → B] be A

The same element, in other words, which in some of the paraphrases mentioned above appeared in either the dative or the genitive case forms now appears as the subject of the verb *have*. Bally, in fact, speaks of the invention of the word *have* as fulfilling precisely the function of allowing the *personne intéressée*, which otherwise would have to appear either in dative or genitive form, to become the subject of a sentence. Examples of all three surface appearances of a first person possessor are given by Bally (1926, p. 75) as 132–134. Sentences 133 and 134 correspond to expression types 130 and 131 respectively; the expression type exemplified by 132 is given as 135.

132. *Mihi sunt capilli nigri.*  
 133. *J'ai les cheveux noirs.*  
 134. *Mes cheveux sont noirs.*  
 135. P<sup>dat</sup> [B<sup>nom</sup> be A]

5.1.7 Henri Frei surveyed this variety of surface representations of the 'same' sentences and added a fourth type, a type intermediate, in a sense, between that suggested by Formula 135 and that of 130. His example was Sentence 136 (it also provided the title of his paper), which exemplifies the expression type we may wish to represent as 137.

136. *Sylvie est jolie des yeux.*  
 137. P<sup>nom</sup> be [A B<sup>oblique</sup>].

Frei points out that the construction seen in 136 is related to the category of inalienable possession, since while 138 and 139 are acceptable sentences, 140 and 141 are not.

138. *Elle est fine de doigts.*  
 139. *Elle est bien faite des jambes.*  
 140. \**Elle est fine d'étoffe.*  
 141. \**Elle est bien faite des vêtements.*<sup>61</sup>

<sup>61</sup>Frei (1939, p. 188). The expressions are limited to clear relational nouns, not only to body parts. Frei notes such phrases as '*des couloirs spacieux et bas de plafond*' and '*libre de moeurs*'. He beautifully demonstrates the distinctness of the sentences involving inalienable possession from overtly similar sentences of different grammatical structures with the contrast between i and ii below (p. 186).

i. *La salle est pleine de visages.*  
 ii. *La femme est pleine de visage.*