

- piny* themselves and (2) between the *juu piny* and the creator *jwok* are not defined.
- "The family shrines are *jwok*." Small village and family shrines mark places where the *juu piny* are propitiated by offerings and sacrifices.
 - "That grove of trees is *jwok*." A few places are regarded as *jwok*. These are generally quite isolated from any village, are for the most part avoided, and seem never to be the site of any community ritual.
 - "The medicine man is *jwok*."
 - "The white man is *jwok*." Any person who has special abilities (something which is regarded as true of all white men) is spoken of as *jwok*.
 - "Radios, cars, airplanes, phonographs, and electricity are *jwok*." Any object whose functioning is inexplicable in terms of the Anuak frame of reference is *jwok*.
 - "Anything startling is *jwok*." The one exception to this is the appearance of a ghost (spirit of a deceased person), which is called *tifo*.
 - "The sick man has been taken by *jwok*." In this type of context the creator *jwok* may or may not be implied.
 - "What can we do now? It all depends on *jwok*." When people give up hope, as in the case of apparent fatal illness, they insist that the outcome is up to *jwok*, but there is no evidence that they always have in mind the creator *jwok*.

COMPONENTS	CONTEXTS									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Extraordinary power	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Personality: nonhuman	+	+				-	-		±	±
human	-	-			+	+			-	-
Fear	±	+	±	±	±	±	±	+	+	±
Respect	+	±	+	+	+	+	+		±	+
Unfamiliar cause-effect sequences								+	+	+
Objects (including persons)			+	+	+	+	+			
Processes								+	+	+

Figure 24

This series of ten meanings cannot be described in traditional ways, either by finding some common denominator of meaning or by setting up a derivational "tree." The interrelationships are highly complex. For this type of situation a description which takes into consideration certain componential features culturally relevant to Anuak life can be highly instructive and can provide a unity of perspective which would otherwise be lacking (Figure 24).

Once we have plotted the distribution of certain, but not necessarily all, of the relevant cultural features in a series of meanings of a term, we are in a much better position to recognize the manner in which various meanings are related, and the degree to which there is interdependence and re-enforcement. Moreover, in the selection of culturally relevant components of meaning we almost inevitably highlight the contrasts between words in various languages. For example, it might seem strange at first glance that in the above treatment of *jwok* in Anuak we have not indicated such traditional componential contrasts as ethical vs. non-ethical and secular vs. sacred. These distinctions were specifically not introduced precisely because they are not particularly valid or important in Anuak religious beliefs at this point. It is true that the creator *jwok* is usually benevolent and the *juu piny* are for the most part malevolent; and yet the benevolent or malevolent characteristics are not primary or absolute, and they are never related to ethical or nonethical standards. Even the distinction between secular and sacred (contexts 3 and 4) is poorly defined, and, in so far as it is employed, shows no one-to-one correspondence in the various meanings of *jwok*.

One feature of componential analysis which may not be fully evident at first, but which is structurally of great significance for any overall theory of semantics, is the fact that certain basic divisions take on a plus-minus (or binary) structure. The components themselves tend to reveal the underlying tree structure of hierarchically arranged sets of contrasting categories. These components are sometimes translated into "semantic markers" (see Chapter 3 and the concluding sections of this chapter).

FIGURATIVE EXTENSIONS OF MEANING

In attempting to deal with referential meanings we are constantly troubled by problems of figurative extensions of meaning, for many words possess domains with marginal protuberances which do not seem to fit into the regular patterns. For example, it is not too difficult for us to treat the central domain of *dog*, when we are dealing merely with the different species of *canis familiaris*, but we are often rather hopelessly lost when we branch out into figurative extensions, e.g. (1) a despicable fellow (*he's a dirty dog*), (2) constellations, *the Great Dog* and *the Little Dog*, situated near Orion, (3) mechanical devices for gripping or holding something, (4) an andiron, (5) pretension (*he put on the dog*), and (6) ruin (*he went to the dogs*). Nevertheless, these various extensions of meaning are part and parcel of the semantic structure of *dog*.

Figurative extensions of meaning arise primarily from the process of selecting one or more components of the meaning of a particular term (e.g. physical appearance, psychological disposition, spatial relationships as in part-to-the-whole, or functional similarity) and extending them to cover some object which has not been within the domain of such a word. If an object comes to be included permanently within the domain of a particular word, there is no longer an active figurative extension (i.e. a

fuller expression *the fat major's wife was always promising to diet but never kept at it*.

THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS IN A SEMANTIC THEORY

In the same way that a generative grammar requires an essential inventory of morphemes and a series of projection rules to state their patterns of occurrence, so a semantic theory requires a dictionary and a set of projection rules for describing the ways in which such lexical elements combine into meaningful expressions.

A dictionary is basic for three reasons. In the first place, we must be able to distinguish what is different in expressions which are grammatically the same and semantically diverse, e.g. *the girl hit him* and *the boy hit him*. The grammar cannot distinguish between *girl* and *boy*, but the dictionary must. Moreover, we need to know about expressions which are grammatically the same and morphemically different, but more or less semantically equivalent, e.g. *the cops shot him* and *the policemen shot him*. Similarly, we must be able to analyze the relationships between




Figure 25

expressions which are grammatically and morphemically (or lexically) different, but semantically equivalent. Compare for example the paraphrastically equivalent expressions *two guests arrived late* and *two people arrived late and they were both guests*.

The dictionary which would serve for an adequate semantic theory is not, however, merely some typical exhaustive dictionary, such as is commonly published today. For one thing, a semantic theory about the synchronic functioning of a language does not require information on pronunciation, etymology, and cognate relationships to words in other languages. What is required is a listing of all the meanings (linguistic, referential, and emotive) structured in such a way as to reveal the patterns of structural contrasts which form the framework of meaning. Unfortunately, in most dictionaries descriptions of meaning consist merely of lists of diverse usages, as in Figure 25.

Such a description of the meaning of *chair* is not too satisfactory, for there are obviously various degrees of relatedness between the diverse meanings.

This is very evident when in interpreting sentences using the word *chair* we discover that there are various types of ambiguity, which are

resolved on different levels. For example, *he sat in the chair* can apply to meanings 1, 3, and 4. *He accepted the chair* may refer to 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, *he was given the chair* may apply to 1 and 2; and *he had the first chair* may involve meanings 1 and 6. If we chart all of these patterns of real and potential ambiguity and determine the types of contexts which will resolve such ambiguities, we can diagram the semantic structure of *chair* in a more meaningful way, as in Figure 26.

There are several important features in the diagram of Figure 26. 1. The semantic markers enclosed in parentheses indicate the crucial points in the semantic structure, where potentially or actually ambiguous expressions are most economically differentiated.

2. The terms used in the semantic markers are merely convenient devices for signaling certain dominant features of the contrasts which exist between the sets of meanings. They are not all-inclusive in meaning nor necessarily always the most significant differentiations for all contexts. They should however be as relevant and as diagnostic as possible for the majority of contexts. The labels for the semantic markers are, of course, not as important as the recognition of the points of structural contrast.

3. The labels for parts of speech (N for noun and V for verb) are purposely placed at those points in the "tree" where they can most economically represent a part of the "linguistic meaning." For languages such as English, in which there is a considerable lack of parallelism between form classes and semantic functioning, it is not only more economical but also more valid to classify meanings in terms of their contrasting semantic functions first and then to label the particular grammatical functions which the lexical unit may have in such a semantic context.

4. The emotive meanings are symbolically indicated by plus or minus within { }. If there were sufficient space, one should provide an explanation as to the fact that terminal meanings 4-6 are generally characterized by favorable emotive meanings involving prestige, while terminal meaning 2 involves emotive meanings of disfavor and avoidance. The use of plus and minus is only the most general form for indicating positive and negative emotive reactions. Such symbols are, however, placed on the semantic tree, since they may be related to more than one terminal meaning. There are, of course, many emotive meanings which are not merely positive and negative. A full semantic theory would need to have a number of sets of symbols to mark such emotive meanings or to identify the fact that some significant emotive values are associated with certain meanings or groups of meanings, with fuller explanations given as "foot-notes" to the tree of semantic structure.

5. The order of the terminal meanings is very important. For example, if we know from the context that the meaning of *chair* is object rather than role, then if there is no other identifying element in the context, we assume that the meaning is 1, namely, a piece of furniture. In other words, it is meaning 3 which needs to be specifically marked to indicate that it is a "chair for nonhuman use." If at the same time we know that *chair* is for human use, we assume that the meaning is number 1, unless the




Figure 26

context specifically identifies meaning 2. On the other hand, if the context points to the meaning of *chair* as being a role rather than an object, then unless there is further specification of meaning we assume that the meaning is 4, namely, "presiding," "taking the chairmanship of a meeting," etc., rather than having the post of professor in a university or a position in an orchestra. This order of meaning is structurally important and provides the clue to the problem of "central vs. peripheral" meanings, for within the semantic structure there are several different grades of priority depending upon the complexity of structure in the semantic tree, and in each case the central meaning, having priority, need not be marked, while the peripheral meanings must be marked if we are to interpret the expression correctly.

6. The terminal meanings are not designed to describe all the features of the referents, but only those which distinguish the meanings from each other and from other lexical units which may overlap on the same referential domain. Greater specificity than is provided by the terminal meanings must be indicated by attributive expressions which further particularize the referent in question: e.g. (1) *the wobbly chair with the antique cane seat*, (2) *the huge sinister chair in the special room at the end of death row*, (3) *the iron chair which cracked from heat and the pounding of the freight trains*, (4) *despite extreme reluctance he agreed to chair the meeting*, (5) *he got the chair of philosophy only because his father had endowed the department*, and (6) *he played first-chair cornet with Sousa*.

There are several important factors which must be borne in mind when dealing with these classifications of meanings. In the first place, this is not an attempt to arrange the meanings of *chair* in any logical structure, based on shape, size, historical derivation, or similarities of form or function. We are only concerned here with the manner in which the language itself structures these meanings by resolving the ambiguities which may occur. Our first cut, division, or "node" is determined by the most significant high-level distinction which is signaled by the context, and each successive level is likewise determined by the degree of particularity in the context which identifies the alternative meanings.

One can be misled to some extent by the nature of the "semantic markers" which mark each node, for they would seem to be logically derived distinctions rather than merely labels for certain types of contextual cues which are significant in identifying the meanings involved. That is to say, the distinction of "object vs. role" is not based on any *a priori* logical system, but only on the fact that the most relevant types of contexts which distinguish potential ambiguities in the use of *chair* have words which signal whether the term is to be understood as being an object or a role. In other words, the classifications involved in these "tree structures" are not based upon any philosophical presuppositions, but are merely the results of examining various sets of ambiguities and noting the manner in which the language resolves them.

One could, of course, treat meanings in quite another way. For example, it would be possible to list all the various meanings of a term and then to list alongside of each meaning those particular types of contextual

clues which help to identify the subdivisions in meanings. But to do this would inevitably involve one in a great deal of duplication. Moreover, certain cues or markers make very broad distinctions, while others are much more limited. Therefore, it seems only right that where such a hierarchical structuring exists it should be recognized, for such a method of dealing with the structure not only simplifies our understanding of the basic problems but also much more effectively explicates the relationships.

It is, however, most important to recognize at this point that speakers of a language may differ to some extent in their semantic classifications. This is not strange, for there are dialect differences on the levels of phonology and grammar, and it is therefore quite understandable that there should also be diversities of usage in semantics. A high percentage of these differences result from the fact that for a number of words many people have relatively specialized orientations. For example, some persons may not know the meaning of *chair* as a device for holding a rail. Others may make little or no use of the meaning of "first chair," "second chair," etc. In such instances we would merely have to describe the semantic structure of *chair* in a somewhat simpler way. On the other hand, one must also realize that practical circumstances as well as verbal signals may act as contextual conditioners of meaning. In a strictly academic setting, for instance, the mention of *chair* may imply a role, rather than an object, even though there is no verbal cue. In fact, when the situation of communication is highly precise, the addition of verbal cues seems unnecessary, if not pedantic. Certain of these problems of alternative structures and contextual conditioning will be even more evident in the treatment of the word *spirit*, as diagrammed in Figure 27.

Figure 27, which provides a diagrammatic sketch of the semantic structure of *spirit*, illustrates some of the more complex types of semantic relationships. Certain features of this analysis should be specially noted:

1. The diagram is purposely simplified by the elimination of the meaning of *spirit* as an event, e.g. *he spirited the corpse away*. The addition of this meaning would require a top-level distinction between object (and object-related features) vs. event. Similarly, we have omitted *spirits*, as used in the phrase *spirits of ammonia*.

2. Since all the uses of *spirit* in the diagram are nominal, the symbol N occurs at the top of the tree.

3. The same semantic marker may occur at various points in the tree, depending upon the complexity of the structure, e.g. *human vs. non-human*. It may be argued, of course, that one could employ the distinction *human vs. nonhuman* as the top-level dichotomy, since this distinction occurs in both branches. But if this is done, the resulting classifications do not reflect the most economical patterns of resolution of ambiguities. Moreover, the dichotomies *human vs. nonhuman* in these two positions in the semantic tree are not identical, for one distinguishes between objects having personality and those which do not, while the other distinguishes different types of character (in contrast with substance).

4. The order of left-hand and right-hand branching is presumed to reflect the unconditioned reaction of the average speaker. This could,




Figure 27

of course, be tested psychologically by getting informants to provide their ordered response to lexical symbols. Actually, of course, the order of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. throughout the series of terminal meanings is not what is important, except indirectly as it reflects marked and unmarked contexts higher up on the semantic tree. What is important is that without contextual evidence the average speaker is probably more likely to understand *spirit* in terms of something having personality or related to personality, rather than the opposite. Similarly, if the meaning is clearly indicative of personality, then the hearer is more likely to think of this in terms of nonhuman spirit rather than human, and so forth. Of course, some speakers of English can be so conditioned by their backgrounds and usage of their language that their semantic structuring of *spirit* may be different. For example, they may have used this word so much in contexts relating to human personality that for their speech the order of semantic contrasts is reversed, in which case the human meaning may be contextually unmarked while the nonhuman will require contextual marking. Actually, of course, in order to work out the details of this theory of semantic analysis, we would need a wide sampling of usage by the speakers of a language; and in the same way that dialectal differences are encountered on a formal level, one can expect to find equally important divergencies on a semantic level.

5. The terminal meanings in this diagram are only suggestive rather than being carefully descriptive.

6. The terminal meanings 8, 9, 10, and 11 may be illustrated by the following contexts respectively: *he really showed a lot of spirit, the college spirit was grand despite the defeat, the spirit of this law is certainly not vindictive, and a spirit lamp.*

7. The distinction *having personality vs. not having personality* applies to referents which are conceived of as possessing a separate personality or being a part of personality vs. those which are without individual personality, i.e. as a feature or characteristic of human activity or as a completely impersonal substance.

8. It is most important to note that in this treatment of the meanings of *spirit* we are not attempting to classify the referents themselves, but the concepts which speakers have about such referents and which are reflected in the uses of the term *spirit*. We are not concerned with the referents as such but with the manner in which language is used to speak about such referents.

9. It is easy to confuse the distinction between unmarked and marked order of sequence (as reflected in the left-hand and right-hand branches of the semantic tree) with differences of frequency. It is true that an unmarked meaning is often the more frequent, but our criteria for selecting the order of branching are not patterns of frequency but of contextual conditioning.

10. Some brief explanation of certain problems in the left-hand branch of this diagram below the label "nonhuman vs. human" may be relevant for our understanding of this approach to the structure of meaning. By means of the semantic marker "theological vs. nontheological" we

attempt to distinguish whether the context has serious religious content, or is on quite another level. It would have been possible to use the label "religious vs. nonreligious," but since there are so many controversies as to the meaning of "religious," it has seemed more satisfactory to use "theological," even though strictly speaking such a term would apply only to discussions of "God" and "gods."

If, however, the context indicates that the meaning is "nontheological", then the further distinction "technological vs. folk" is significant. For example, the use of the word *spirit* in speaking about machinery or airplanes can only mean a kind of "gremlin," while after a phrase such as *once upon a time* we expect to have the meaning of "fairy" or "sprite."

If the context is obviously "theological," there is a further distinction between superior power, which is marked, and an inferior power, which at this level may not be marked. Some such statements as "the Spirit which created the universe" or "the Spirit which controls the destinies of men" certainly point to a meaning of *spirit* which may be described as "God" or "gods." Even the use of capitalization is a clue to the right-hand meaning and an evidence that we feel the need of marking this meaning. On the other hand, if the term *spirit* identifies an inferior power, then there is usually some clue as to evil or good characteristics, e.g. "surrounded by protecting spirits" (i.e. angels), and "the spirits drove him mad" (i.e. demons). If, however, we know that the meaning is either "demons or angels," then it is the meaning of demons which is normally unmarked, and the meaning of "angels" which requires some contextual clue.

It is most important to realize that in this classification we are not attempting to classify demons, angels, God, gods, gremlins, fairies, etc., but only to distinguish the related meanings enclosed in brackets.

In contrast with some of the special problems of *spirit*, which involve referents for which there are so few perceptual models, a study of the word *rule* in Figure 28 provides a number of other important features.

Figure 28, which consists of a sketch of the semantic structure of *rule*, includes several features which should be specially studied:

1. The symbols V and N come at different points in the hierarchy on the basis of economy of representation. Such placements are, however, highly important for our appreciation of the relationships between formal and semantic structuring.

2. Some of the points of structural contrast, e.g. the distinction between meanings 7 and 8, are so trivial as not to require a dichotomous semantic marker. One could specify that 7 normally has a scale for measurement while 8 does not, but this is not sufficiently significant for our purposes. We may accordingly merely list both as being instruments, and let the terminal meanings specify the particular nature of the differences.

3. Semantic markers are primarily of two types: (1) those which mark positive-negative dichotomies, e.g. nonobject vs. object and verbal vs. nonverbal, and (2) descriptive contrasts, e.g. event vs. abstract, conceptual vs. behavioral, executive vs. judicial. In general there is a




Figure 28

tendency for the positive-negative dichotomies to occur on higher levels, while the descriptive contrasts are more likely to occur on lower levels, but this is by no means always the case. By arranging for a number of added "steps" it might be possible to describe semantic structures by purely positive-negative dichotomies, but these would be unduly artificial and cumbersome. Though much of experience can be and is classified in popular usage by positive-negative binary contrasts, such a system is not universal.

4. There are certain relationships in meaning which are not indicated in this semantic diagram of structural contrasts. For example, meaning 6 is referentially related to 1 and 2 and meanings 7 and 8 show a relationship to 3. With a multidimensional diagram we could undoubtedly also plot some of these additional semantic relationships, but these are not the essential elements in our theory of semantic contrasts based upon patterns of ambiguity and points of resolution of such ambiguities.

SEMANTIC MARKERS

Though in the preceding sections we have discussed a number of features of semantic markers, it is important to summarize at this point some of the salient characteristics of these indispensable elements in the description of the semantic structure:

1. *Points of occurrence.* Semantic markers occur at those points in bifurcation of meaning which are "signaled" by the manner in which such ambiguities are resolved.

2. *Types of semantic markers.* The semantic markers are basically of two types: (a) positive-negative dichotomies and (b) descriptive contrasts. The choice of the particular type of semantic markers for any point depends upon the manner in which the language resolves the ambiguity. In other words, if the ambiguity can be resolved by a simple yes-no contrast, then the marker is positive-negative, but if the solution to the ambiguity consists in describing the respective areas of signification, then the marker must incorporate these descriptive contrasts. For the most part these differences are binary or dyadic, but they may be singular or multiple (or polyadic).

3. *Order of elements in the semantic markers.* The order is determined by the unmarked and marked features of the terminal usages. That is to say, the meaning which is most likely to be understood without contextual conditioning is regarded as unmarked, while the one which requires such contextual "strengthening" is marked. There are many instances, of course, in which there is no clear-cut distinction, since both meanings seem to be equally probable.

4. *Categories in semantic markers.* The possibilities for types of distinctions in semantic markers is theoretically unlimited. However, in the high-level distinctions one often finds such contrasts as object vs. event, event vs. abstract, object vs. abstract, human vs. nonhuman, animate vs. inanimate, natural vs. supernatural. In the low-level distinctions contrasts are often based on differences in sex, age, size, shape, time, space, value, and intensity.

It is important to note that the terms *object*, *event*, and *abstract* in their use in labels of semantic markers have a significantly different meaning from their usage in labels for features of linguistic meaning (see Chapter 4). As convenient devices for describing certain functions in the transformational structure these words designate only certain syntactic distributions. As elements in the labels for semantic markers, they specify certain significant contrasts in the concepts which speakers have of the referents themselves.

For each word of a language the order and type of categories expressed by the semantic markers depend entirely upon the semantic structure of the word in question, so that a category which is a high-level marker for one word may occur as a relatively lower-level distinction in another. However, for a language as a whole certain categories tend to cluster as high-level and others appear to be predominantly low-level.

Languages quite naturally differ as to the types and frequency of various categories. For example, in many languages shape and size are very important and are often signaled by the morphological structure itself. In other languages sex differentiation plays an important role, while in many languages animate vs. inanimate is a primary semantic category.

In the history of languages some of the semantic categories which are relevant for semantic markers have become overtly marked by morphological elements and in this way are often frozen into the word structures. For example, in many of the Bantu languages, the same root may occur with quite different prefixes, which immediately mark the term as to whether the referent is one of several classes, e.g. animate, inanimate, concrete, mass, individual, or collective. In Zulu the root *-ntu* may occur as *isintu* 'Bantu characteristics, culture, language'; *ubuntu* 'human nature, humaneness'; *ubuntu* 'common people'; and *umuntu* (sing.) / *abantu* (pl.) 'person, African, Zulu tribesman'.

5. *Parallelism with formal structure.* Formal word classes and distinctions indicated by semantic markers are often parallel, as in the above data cited from Zulu and as indicated in Chapter 4, in which the formal word classes and the categories of objects, events, abstracts, and relationals were discussed. There is, however, always some lack of conformity, and often this nonconformity is very extensive. Accordingly, one is entirely unjustified in trying to force conformity upon the data, since the very lack of conformity is itself structurally significant.

It is very important not to confuse the use of similar categories on formal and semantic levels. For example, in English we may speak of sex (or gender) distinctions on a formal level by pointing out patterns of substitution for *he*, *she*, and *it* and *who* and *which*. This is, however, quite different from saying that a word such as *bachelor* generally means male, except in the meaning of "lowest of the academic degrees" (which includes no sex distinction) and that *prostitute* is female in unmarked contexts but may apply to males in marked contexts.

6. *Discovery procedures in determining semantic markers.* In general the most satisfactory discovery procedures for determining semantic

markers include the following: (1) list all the possible meanings of a word, (2) group these by setting up ambiguous contexts for the most inclusive to the least inclusive classes, (3) determine the manner in which such ambiguities are resolved, and (4) apply satisfactory labels to the points of division.

Though this discovery procedure is ideal, one can often short-circuit such a procedure by "hints" which come from (a) a componential analysis of meaning (important components may mark significant divisions), (b) grouping by context (following Joos's technique, as explained in this chapter), for the various sets of contextual conditionings almost always indicate significant groupings for semantic markers, and (c) substitution procedures (also discussed in this chapter), for differences which are discovered by comparing substitution potentialities usually coincide with important divisions in the "tree" structure.

7. *Labels for semantic markers.* As has been noted, the labels are not as important as the points of division. Moreover, the labels need not be exhaustive or determinative of the contrasts, so much as diagnostic. At times, the distinctions involved are actually too trivial (i.e. too low-level) to warrant marking. In other instances, the differences are so multidimensional (i.e. so extensive), that one must merely select one of the significant features of differentiation, rather than attempt to select some highly generic expression which will presume to include all the distinguishing features.

EMOTIVE MEANINGS

As implied in the previous discussions, emotive meanings are essentially different from referential ones, for they are not structured according to series of dichotomies or contrasts. Rather, emotive meanings consist of polar contrasts separated by a graded series with a high percentage of usages for most words clustering around the neutral position.

To measure the emotive meanings of a word we need a complex matrix for each word. The dimensions of such a matrix could include, for example, a ten-point graded series with such dimensions as good-to-bad, pleasant-to-unpleasant, favorable-to-unfavorable, happy-to-sad, lovable-to-hateful, beautiful-to-ugly, and acceptance-to-rejection. Such dimensions would change from word to word, depending upon patterns of applicability, but if we had the judgments of an adequate sampling of people's reactions to verbal symbols plotted on such a matrix we would have at least a profile of the major emotive features of such words. Obviously words such as *delicious*, *mother*, *honeymoon*, *cat*, *dog*, *whore*, *nasty*, and *bastard* would have quite different profiles.

To test the appropriateness of certain stylistic usages of these and similar words we could measure the match between the emotive values of the words and the types of discourse. For example, in so-called scientific writing we would expect a choice of words which would have a predominantly neutral or central profile. For expressive writing we would expect words which would fit the mood, e.g. *joyous* or *depressed*. For "slanted"

II. Esta noción de **campo semántico**, concebida como instrumento de análisis lingüístico en el terreno del léxico, tiene ya acepciones variadas. Todas tienen en común, sin embargo, el hecho de ser aplicaciones de la vieja idea humboldtiana de que el habla "en realidad no está compuesta por la reunión de palabras preexistentes, [sino que] por el contrario las palabras resultan de la totalidad del habla"³; y de la idea saussuriana, mejor explicitada, de que "la parte conceptual del valor [de un término] está constituida únicamente por relaciones y diferencias con los otros términos de la lengua".

Si se toma la noción en Jost Trier, que es su creador, puede ser descrita así: el campo semántico es el conjunto de palabras, no emparentadas etimológicamente en su mayoría (ni tampoco unidas entre sí por asociaciones psicológicas, individuales, arbitrarias, contingentes⁴, que, colocadas una al lado de otra como las piedras irregulares de un mosaico, recubren exactamente todo un terreno bien delimitado de significaciones, constituido ora tradicionalmente, ora científicamente, por la experiencia humana. Así, puede hablarse de campo semántico constituido por las palabras que designan el entendimiento, el ganado o los cereales, o las habitaciones; son mosaicos de palabras, lo que Trier llama *Wortdecke*. Para Trier y para los lingüistas que le siguen —y es un hecho que admiten sin discusión como un dato anterior a todo análisis lingüístico— existen en el pensamiento *campos conceptuales*, especies de mosaicos de nociones asociadas, que recubren un terreno bien delimitado que la experiencia humana aísla y constituye en unidad conceptual. Existen, a su lado, *campos lexicales*, formados, cada uno, por el

análisis, pág. 287, es presentada como la del *campo lexicológico*. En *La Sémanique*, París, P. U. F., 1959, págs. 82 y siguientes, opta por la expresión: *campo morfo-semántico*.

³ Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues*, Akad. Augsb., VII, 1-72.

⁴ Estas clases de asociaciones serán examinadas más adelante: es el problema de las *connotaciones*.

CAPÍTULO VI

LA ESTRUCTURA DEL LÉXICO Y LA TRADUCCIÓN

I. En asaltos desde tres direcciones diferentes en su origen —profundización de las nociones de *sentido*, de *visión del mundo* y de *civilización*—, la lingüística moderna, como hemos visto, ha transformado profundamente la vieja noción empírica del léxico considerado como un repertorio, un inventario, un saco de palabras. Es decir, la vieja noción de que habría, a pesar de excepciones de poca monta, una relación bi-unívoca entre cosa y palabra, *significado aislado y significante aislado*, sentido lingüístico y forma lingüística.

Esos tres esfuerzos conducían, cada cual por su parte, a sustituir la vieja noción de léxico, como nomenclatura, por la de léxico como estructura, o, más bien, como conjunto de estructuras. Es esta idea la que se expresa hoy mediante una imagen común, la de *campo semántico*: el *sprachliches Feld* de Jost Trier y de los alemanes, el *area of meaning* de los anglosajones, el campo nocional de Matoré¹, los campos lexicológicos² de Guiraud.

¹ Véase: *La Méthode en lexicologie*, págs. 63-79.

² Véase: *Les champs morpho-sémantiques*, págs. 265-288. P. Guiraud emplea la noción de *campo (champ)* como propia de la terminología corriente hoy; sin embargo, tres veces seguidas la menciona entre comillas, pág. 169; utiliza en el cuerpo y en el título de su artículo la expresión de campos *morfo-semánticos*, pero la definición en que resume su