the sensualistic school of France quite as much as of this same school in England. I might multiply examples, but one is sufficient to show that the ethnographical method has the great inconvenience of destroying the natural relations of systems, their order of dependence, and thereby the most general character of European philosophy in the eighteenth century, that is, its unity. In fact, Europe is one in the eighteenth century. That which commences in England is developed in France, reacts upon England, repasses into France, returns again into England, and it is from this action and reaction, and by these perpetual counterstrokes, that the European philosophy is formed. This concatenation is the very life of history, and, at the same time, it is the light of history, for it alone teaches causes from effects and effects from causes; where this relation of cause to effect, this progressive order, this logic of events does not exist, there are many materials for history, but there is no real history.

The ethnological order does more, it objects that from history there should spring any scientific result. You commence with England, and you meet at first the father of the English school, Locke. Locke is a metaphysician. You will, in course, meet Hartley, Darwin, Priestley, who are, properly speaking, physiologists; you, therefore, lose sight of metaphysics, in order to plunge into physiology. Then you pass to Horn Tooke, who is a grammarian, and you leave physiology as you have just left metaphysics. Finally, you arrive at Bentham, who is a publicist, and you are separated at once from metaphysics, and physiology, and grammar. In going from England into France, you find Condillac, with whom you resume your metaphysical studies, soon to abandon them, and to take up your studies of politics and morals with Helvetius and Saint-Lambert. You therefore traverse the same interruptions which had at each step broken the chain of your studies in England. They await you in Germany. You continually abandon one subject for another, then this second in order to return to the first. Now, I ask, what do metaphysics gain, what do morals, æsthetics, all the parts of philosophic science gain, by studies which are begun only to be suspended, and resumed only to be abandoned again? It is impossible thus to acquire any thing else than a superficial and incomplete instruction, and the history of philosophy thus studied, entirely fails of its highest aim, which is the advancement and the formation of science.

Such are the three objections which, in my opinion, do not permit us to think of adopting the ethnographical method. We must, therefore, find a method which may be free from these objections: 1st, a method which may not be arbitrary; 2d, which shows the connection of systems; 3d, which sheds a true light upon each one of the sciences of which history is composed.

Against the peril of what is arbitrary we shall employ chronology. There is nothing less arbitrary than figures and dates. By taking successively all systems in chronological order throughout Europe, you take an order which is that of reality itself; you do not put yourselves in the place of history, you take history such as it has been made. Under this relation, the chronological method is that which we should adopt; but this alone would not suffice, and it is necessary to fertilize and elucidate the chronological order by joining to it that of the reciprocal independence of systems. As soon as a system is given with its date (and we here suppose a system capable of exercising some influence in Europe, for otherwise it would not belong to history), we ought to search out what are the effects of this system, that is, what are the systems which it directly or indirectly engenders, and which are joined to it, whether as reproducing it, or as combating it. We must not here confine ourselves to such or such a country; all Europe must be given as a theatre. Wherever the effect of a cause may appear, it must there be pursued, and this effect must be related to its cause; if the cause is in England and the effect in Germany, we must go from England to Germany in order to proceed in course, if it is necessary, from Germany to Italy, or to return to England. We have no jurisdiction over reality; and if being produced by each other from

end to end of Europe is a real character of philosophic systems in the eighteenth century, it is the duty of history to retrace this movement and this connection. In the drama of the European philosophy of the eighteenth century, unity of place is of no consequence; we must attach ourselves to the unity of action. By uniting the order of the reciprocal dependence of the systems and their chronological order, you will preserve yourselves from what is arbitrary, and thereby from what is incoherent. This is not all; it is still necessary to consider the systems by the analogy of subjects of which they treat. It would be absurd to mix metaphysicians with publicists, moralists with naturalists, historians with critics and grammarians; metaphysicians must be put with metaphysicians, moralists with moralists, grammarians with grammarians, etc.; so that the relation and the combination of all the analogous developments of a science, of metaphysics, for example, in each of the countries of Europe, may give the whole metaphysics of the sensualistic school in Europe in the eighteenth century. I might say as much for morals, for politics, for æsthetics, for grammar. It is in this manner, and in this manner alone, that history can take a scientific character, and that the history of philosophy will become what I wish it to become, a lesson of philosophy.

These three conditions are indeed excellent, provided they are possible, you will say; but can we establish and prefix the dates of these systems, their reciprocal dependence, the analogy of subjects, the chronological order, the historical order, and the scientific order?

I believe so, and an attentive examination demonstrates, in my opinion, that these three orders are intimately connected. At first, you cannot deny that one system, in order to produce another, must have preceded it. This is not all: not only every system precedes that which it produces, but it produces that which it precedes, to speak with some latitude. If we were at an epoch wherein the different nations of Europe might be isolated from each other, it would certainly be possible for a system

to appear at London without having any influence upon that which might afterwards appear at Paris. But, once more, Europe was one in the eighteenth century. Rapid and continual communications of every kind, printing and the periodical press, unite England, France, and Germany; and as soon as a system appears in such or such a point of civilized Europe, it is spread and is almost immediately known at the most distant point from that where it first saw the light. There may be thinkers so solitary, or so thoughtful of their originality, that they are ignorant of or undertake to ignore what is going on around them; they are exceptions more or less fortunate; but in general nothing is isolated in Europe in the eighteenth century, and the same year produces a discovery and spreads it from one end of the world to the other. Thus, we say that when a system appears, supposing—and remember this is always hypothesis—that this first system attracts sufficient attention, the systems which shall come afterwards must inevitably attach themselves more or less to it, and sustain with it a relation either of resemblance or opposition. The chronological order is then the condition and the principle of the historical order.

It is the same with the order of subjects. But I shall be asked whether there is an order of subjects. I answer that the different parts of philosophy, metaphysics, morals, æsthetics, grammar, history of philosophy, certainly follow an order in their development. It is impossible to suppose applications before principles. Now in philosophy metaphysics are the principle; all the rest is consequence and application. Metaphysics are evidently the foundation of morals, of æsthetics, of history, of politics. There is even in the different applications of metaphysical principles a certain order the rigor of which must not be exaggerated, but which, nevertheless, is not without reality. For example, in a school, whatever it may be, the history of philosophy can appear only so far as the metaphysics of this school and all the great moral, æsthetical, and political applications shall have been developed. Without this the school in question will

not have a measure which can be applied to all systems, and do not expect that it will produce a historian.*

This is what reason says; facts are in accordance with it.

Consult facts and you will see that this necessary order has been everywhere followed. In England, the chronological order gives Locke and metaphysics, then the applications of metaphysics, Hartley, Priestley, Bentham. Try to disarrange the terms of this series; try to put Hartley, Priestley, and Bentham before Locke; you cannot do it; therefore the order of subjects, as I have deduced it from the nature of things, is here realized in the history of English philosophy; it is equally realized in the history of philosophy in France. Do you think of Condorcet, Saint-Lambert, and Helvetius before Condillac? Facts declare, as well as reason, that Condillac came and flourished before them all. It is the same in Germany. Feder died after Herder and after Tiedemann; but Feder, who lived to the most advanced old age, taught the philosophy of Locke at Gottingen, and had formed around him an empirical school with Lossius, Tittel, etc., before Tiedemann and Herder had arrived at the complete development of their historical views. The different parts of philosophy follow in time the same order as in thought; time everywhere only manifests the nature of things: the nature of things and time, theory and history equally give us this same result, that metaphysics precede, that the moral, æsthetical, and political applications follow, and that that which terminates is the regard, the judgment which a completely established school bestows upon the past, that is, history, and particularly the history of philosophy. Therefore the chronological order and the order of subjects are the same. Now, we have seen that the chronological order contains the reciprocal dependence of systems, the historical order; therefore the chronological order, well understood, comprises the other two; thus the harmony of the three

* See the First Vol. of this Series, *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, Lecture 12.

orders which the true historian should follow, is found to be demonstrated by facts, as well as by the nature of things.

If the historian of the philosophy of the eighteenth century wishes to embrace all the phases of the numerous phenomena which come under his observation, he must consider them at first in their chronological succession; he must then consider them in their reciprocal dependence; finally, he must consider them in their relation with such or such a given subject. And these three points of view, equally necessary, are only three distinct parts of one and the same order, which is the true order, the philosophical spirit applied to history.

This chronological order is, without contradiction, the foundation of history; but employed alone or badly understood, it is not a torch, it gives only insignificant dates, various and more or less interesting expositions, but expositions without unity and without light, in a word, mere chronicles. Chronicles are excellent when they are true, in the infancy of the civilization of nations, when man, without comprehending, and without endeavoring to comprehend what takes place under his eyes, reproduces it with unsophisticated fidelity, and transmits it to future generations. But, at this time, the chronicle, as such, is a real anachronism. History can no longer be a simple literary amusement, addressed to the imagination alone; it should speak to the reason of man. It is not sufficient that it should be a picture; it must be a lesson, and it can be such only so far as it relates effects to causes, and presents facts not only in their chronological succession, but in that concatenation which explains them by each other in deducing them from each other. It is only by this that it can make certain facts, certain systems, comprehensible. Such or such a metaphysical system considered alone, resists the most penetrating attention, and remains obscure. But put this system in relation with those which follow it, and which it has produced, and the scene changes; this obscure mass is elucidated, and is converted into a luminous and fecund principle which reveals to you its nature by its effects, by the systems which are its consequences;

these consequences produce others which develop the first, until, from consequences to consequences and from systems to systems, the power of the principle or the primitive system is exhausted. If, perchance, this system is false, judge of what importance it is to follow it in all its consequences, whose extravagance exposes the view of their principle, which, taken alone, might have escaped your attention. The order of dependence can alone give you this high instruction; and the order of dependence is, doubtless, contained in the chronological order, but it is not the imagination, it is profound reason which can discover it there. Finally, it is not sufficient to show the concatenation of systems among themselves; the history of philosophy would not be true to itself, unless it were a philosophical education. What is the life of an individual, if not his continual education? What is political history, if not a social education? What can be the history of philosophy, if not the education of philosophy? But philosophical education is not accomplished by hastily running over subjects without any connection between them, and over topics that change, and are continually metamorphosed under the eye which considers them. It is necessary to dwell upon a large collection of analogous subjects, in order to draw real instruction from them. The analogous order of subjects among themselves should be joined to the order of dependence of systems, which is derived from their succession, from the chronological order, the necessary base and efficacious principle of the other two.

These three points of view will guide us in the history of the sensualistic school of the eighteenth century. I shall scrupulously follow the chronological order; but I shall interpret it by the historical order, by investigation of the filiation and genealogy of systems; and I shall take good care not to separate what the nature of things, what history and dates have brought together; I shall put all the systems of metaphysics with each other, then I shall examine all the important applications of metaphysics to morals, to æsthetics, to society, and I shall terminate as every school terminates, whatever may be its character, by their applications to general history, and to the history of philosophy, which is the crown of all.

In order to be faithful to the order which I have just designated to you, I should commence with the first series of the sensualistic school, that is, with the series of metaphysicians. Locke is at the head of the sensualistic metaphysicians of the eighteenth century; he it was who produced all the others, and who furnished for his successors the very subjects with which they were occupied. With Locke, then, it is necessary to commence. His merited glory, his genius, his immense influence of every kind, command us to study him seriously, and to make him the subject of a profound examination.