3d, a relation of the movement to the voluntary act. And what is this relation? Evidently it is not a simple relation of succession. Repeat in yourselves the phenomenon of effort, and you will recognize that you all attribute, with a perfect conviction, the production of the movement of which you are conscious, to the anterior voluntary operation, of which you are also conscious. For you the will is not only a mere act without efficiency, it is a productive energy, it is a cause.

Moreover, this movement of which you are conscious, which you all refer as an effect to the anterior operation of the will as a producing operation, as a cause, I ask you, do you refer this movement to another will than your own? Do you consider this will, could you consider it, as the will of another, as the will of your neighbor, as the will of Alexander, or of Cæsar, or of some foreign or superior power? For you is it not your own? Do you not impute to yourself every voluntary act? In a word, is it not from the consciousness of will, in so far as your own, that you derive the idea of your personality, the idea of yourself? The peculiar merit of M. de Biran is in having established that the will is the constituent character of our personality. He went farther, too far perhaps. As Locke had confounded consciousness and memory with personality and the identity of the *me*, M. de Biran went so far as to confound the will with the personality itself; it is at least its eminent character; so that the idea of cause, which is given to us in the consciousness of the producing will, is for the same reason given to us in the consciousness of our personality, and that we are the first cause of which we have any knowledge.

In fine, this cause which we are, is implied in every fact of consciousness. The necessary condition of every phenomenon perceived by the consciousness, is, that attention be given to it. If we do not pay attention to it, the phenomenon may still exist; but the consciousness not applying itself to it, not taking cognizance of it, it is for us as if it did not exist. Attention is then the condition of every apperception of consciousness. Now, attention is the will; I have proved it more than once. Therefore the condition of every phenomenon of consciousness, and consequently of the first phenomenon as of all the others, is the will; and as the will is a causative power, it follows that in the first act of consciousness, and in order that this first act may take place, it is necessary that there be an apperception of our personal causality in our will; whence it follows again, that the idea of cause is the primary idea, that the apperception of the voluntary cause, which we are, is the primary apperception and the condition of all others.

Such is the theory to which M. de Biran* has elevated that of Locke. I adopt it; I believe that it gives a perfect account of the origin of the idea of cause; but it remains to know whether the idea of cause which proceeds from this origin, and from the sentiment of voluntary and personal activity, is sufficient to explain the idea that all men have of exterior causes, and to render an account of the principle of causality. For Locke, who treats of the idea of cause, and never of the principle of causality, the problem does not even exist. M. de Biran, who scarcely lays it down, resolves it too soon, and arrives immediately at a result, the only one which the theory of Locke and his own permit, but which a sound psychology, and a sound logic, cannot adopt.

According to M. de Biran, after having drawn the idea of cause from the sentiment of our voluntary and personal activity, from the phenomenon of the effort of which we are conscious, we transport this idea outwardly, we project it into the exterior world, by virtue of an operation which he, as well as M. Royer-Collard, has called a natural induction.† Let us understand this. If by that M. de Biran merely means, that before knowing exterior causes, whatever they may be, we first obtain the idea of cause from ourselves, I agree with him; but I deny that the knowledge

* See particularly in the Works of M. de Biran, Vol. i., the *Examination* of the Lectures of M. Laromiguière, Chap. VIII.

† *Ibid.*, article *Leibnitz*. See also Lectures of M. Royer-Collard, Works o Reid, Vols. iii. and iv.

which we have of external causes, and the idea which we form of these causes, are an importation, a projection, an induction of ours.* In fact, this induction could take place only on conditions which are in manifest contradiction with facts and reason. I here invoke all your attention.

According to Locke and M. de Biran, it is reflection, consciousness which gives us the idea of cause. But what idea of cause does it give us? Observe that it does not give us the idea of a general and abstract cause, but the idea of the *me* which wills, and which, willing, produces, and is thereby a cause. The idea of cause which consciousness gives us is, then, an idea, entirely particular, individual, determinate, since to us it is entirely personal. All that we know of cause by consciousness is concentrated in personality. It is this personality, and in this personality it is the will, the will alone, and nothing more, which is the power, which is the cause that consciousness gives us. This being settled, let us see what are the conditions of the induction of this cause. Induction is the supposition that, in certain circumstances, a certain phenomenon, a certain law, being given to us, under analogous circumstances, the same phenomenon, the same law, will take place. Induction supposes then, 1st, analogous cases; 2d, a phenomenon which must remain the same. Induction is the process of the mind which, having thus far perceived a phenomenon only in certain cases, transports this phenomenon, this phenomenon I say, and not another, into different cases, and different necessarily, since they are only analogous and similar, and since they cannot be absolutely identical. The peculiar character of induction is precisely in the contrast of the identity of the phenomenon, or of the law, and of the diversity of the circumstances from which it is first borrowed, and then transported. If, then, the knowledge of external causes is only an induction from our personal cause, it is strictly our cause, the voluntary and free cause which we are, that induction should transport into the exterior world; that is, that wherever any movement or change whatever shall begin to appear in time and in space, then we must suppose, what? a cause in general? No; for remember we have not yet the general idea of cause, we have simply the idea of our personal causality; we can suppose only that which we already have, otherwise it would no longer be the proper and legitimate process of induction; we must then suppose, not the general and abstract idea of cause, but the particular and determinate idea of the particular and determinate cause that we are; whence it follows that it is our causality which we must suppose wherever any phenomenon begins to appear: that is, that all causes which we can farther conceive, are and can be merely our own personality, the only cause of all the effects, accidents, or events which begin to appear. And observe that the belief in the world and in exterior causes is universal and necessary. All men have it, all men cannot avoid having it. If, then, induction explains all our conception of exterior causes, this induction must be universal and necessary; it must be a necessary and universal fact that we believe ourselves the cause of all the events, movements, and changes which happen and can happen.

Yes, strictly speaking, the induction, the transferring of our causality without ourselves, is nothing less than the substitution of our personal causality for all the causes of this world, the substitution of human liberty for destiny and nature. M. de Biran would have doubtless repelled this consequence as overstrained; but here is one which he almost accepted. If external causes are only an induction from our own, and if, nevertheless, we are unwilling to admit them to be identical with our own, they must, at least, be similar to our own, that is, endowed with consciousness, free, animated, living. In fact, without pretending that this is our whole conception of exterior causes, M. de Biran contends that such is the conception which we at first form of them. In proof of it, he says that children and savages, that is, infant peo-

* A sketch of this discussion will be found 1st Series, Vol. 2, Lectures 2–4, p. 58, etc., and a summary in the Introduction to the Works of M. de Biran, p. xxxv.

ples, conceive all external causes on the model of their own; that thus the child revolts against the stone that strikes him, as if it had had the intention of striking him, and that the savage personifies and deifies the causes of natural phenomena.

To this I reply: let us not forget that the belief in the world and in external causes is universal and necessary, and that the fact which explains it must itself be a universal and necessary fact: if, then, our belief in the world and in exterior causes resolves itself into the assimilation of these causes to our own, this assimilation must be a universal and necessary fact. Now here I look to psychology; I expect that it will prove that all intellectual and moral beings conceive external causes by reason of their own, as endowed with consciousness, and animated; I look to it to prove that this opinion of children and of savages is not only a frequent fact, but a universal fact, and that there is not a child, not a savage who does not thus begin. And when it shall have proved that this fact is universal, it must necessarily go still farther: it must necessarily prove that this fact is not only universal, but that it is necessary. But the character of a necessary fact is, that it must unavoidably exist; and the necessity of an idea, of a law, implies the domination of that idea, of that law, in the whole extent of its duration, and so long as the human mind subsists. Although I should grant that all children, and all infant peoples, begin by believing that external causes are animated, living, free, personal, it would not be enough to establish a necessary fact; it would be necessary that all men, without any distinction, should have this belief, as they believe every thing, without distinction, in the principle of causality. Far from this, we do not in the least admit such an opinion, and it is our honor not to admit it. That which would be a necessary truth, reproduced invariably from century to century, is simply, in our eyes, an extravagance which endured for a longer or shorter period, and which now has forever passed away. For the reason that induction has languished a single day, and for this reason alone, we must conclude that this induction is not a universal and necessary law of the human mind, and that it does not explain the universal and necessary belief in the existence of the world, and of external causes.

We all have the perfect conviction that this world exists, that there are external causes; and these causes we believe to be neither personal nor voluntary. This is the belief of the human race; it belongs to philosophy to explain it, without destroying it, without altering it. But if this belief is universal and necessary, the judgment which contains it, and which gives it, must have a principle which is itself universal and necessary; and this principle is none other than the principle of causality, the principle which logic and grammar now present under this form: every phenomenon, every movement which begins to appear has a cause. Suppress this principle and leave the simple consciousness of our personal causality, and we should never have the least idea of external causes and of the world. Let a phenomenon appear of which we are not the cause, take away the empire of the principle of causality, and no longer does any reason exist for demanding the cause of this phenomenon, we should not seek its cause; it would be for us without cause: for observe that, even for the induction of which we speak, even in order to fall into this absurdity of giving to sensation as its cause, either ourselves or something similar to ourselves, we must be under the necessity of assigning causes to every phenomenon, and in order to do it universally and necessarily, this necessity must be universal and necessary, that is, it must have the principle of causality. Thus, without the principle of causality, every phenomenon is for us as if it had no cause, and we cannot even attribute to it an extravagant cause. On the contrary, suppose the principle of causality, and as soon as a phenomenon of sensation begins to appear upon the theatre of consciousness, immediately the principle of causality marks it with the character that it cannot avoid having a cause. Now, as consciousness attests that this cause is not our own, and that, nevertheless, this phenomenon must have a cause, it follows that it has a cause, and a cause other than our-

selves, which is neither personal nor voluntary, and which, nevertheless, is a cause, that is, a simple efficient cause. This is precisely the idea which all men form of external causes; they consider them as causes capable of producing the movements which they refer to them, but not as intentional and personal causes.* The universal and necessary principle of causality is the only principle that can give us such causes; it is, then, the veritable and legitimate process of the human mind in the acquisition of the idea of the world and of external causes.

After having demonstrated that our belief in exterior causes is not an induction from the consciousness of our personal cause, but a legitimate application of the principle of causality, it is necessary to show how we proceed from the consciousness of our particular personality to the conception of the general principle of causality.

I admit and I firmly believe that the consciousness of our own causality precedes all conception of the principle of causality, consequently all application of this principle, all knowledge of exterior causality; and behold, in my opinion, how in the depths of the intelligence the passage is made from the first fact, from the fact of consciousness to the ulterior fact of the conception of the principle. I wish to move my arm, and I move it. We have seen that this fact, being analyzed, contains three elements: 1st, Consciousness of a volition which is mine, which is personal; 2d, Movement produced; 3d, Finally, a relation of this movement to my will, which relation is, as we have seen, a relation of production, of causation; a relation which I no more question than the other two terms; a relation which is given me with these two terms, which is not given to me without the two terms, and without which the two terms are not given to me; so that the three terms are given to me in a single and even indivisible

* On the reality of causes, natural, efficient, and not voluntary, see in Vol. 4 of the 1st Series, pp. 542–564, the Examination of the Essay of Reid on the *Active power*.

fact, which is the consciousness of my personal causality. Now, what is the character of this fact? The character of this fact is that of being particular, individual, determinate, for the very simple reason that this fact is entirely personal. This productive will is my own, consequently it is a particular and determinate will; this movement which I produce is mine, consequently it is particular and determinate. And, again, the character of all that is particular is that of being susceptible of more or less. I myself, a voluntary cause, have at such a moment more or less energy, which gives to the movement produced by me more or less force. But does the most feeble movement belong to me less than the most energetic movement? Is there between the two terms, between the cause *me* and the effect movement, a less relation in one case than in the other? No, the two terms may vary and continually vary in intensity; the relation does not vary at all. Still farther: not only do the two terms vary, but they might be totally different; they might even not exist; they are merely accidental; but the relation between these two determinate, variable, contingent terms, is itself neither variable nor contingent; it is universal and necessary. At the same time that the consciousness seizes the two terms, the reason seizes their relation, and, by an immediate abstraction which has no need of relying on a number of similar facts, it disengages in a single fact the invariable and necessary element of its variable and contingent elements. Does it strive to put in question the truth of this relation; it cannot do it: intelligence in vain makes the attempt, it cannot be done. Whence it follows that this truth is a necessary and universal truth. Reason is then under the empire of this truth; it is impossible for it not to suppose a cause wherever the senses or the consciousness present any phenomenon whatever. This impossibility for the reason not to suppose a cause where the senses or the consciousness present any phenomenon whatever, is what is called the principle of causality, not in its actual logical formula, but in its internal, primitive energy. If it be asked how the universal and the necessary are in the relative and

the contingent, and may be perceived in them, I reply that the reason also is in us with the will and the senses, and that it is, at the same time, developed with them.*

What I have just said of the principle of causality may be said of all the other principles. It is a fact which must not be forgotten, and which is much too often forgotten, that our judgments are at first particular and determinate judgments, and that it is under the form of a particular and determinate judgment, that all universal and necessary truths, all universal and necessary principles make their first appearance. Thus the senses attest to me the existence of a body, and at once I judge that this body is in space, not in general space, in mere space, but in a certain space; it is a certain body that the senses attest to me, and it is in a certain space that the reason places it. Then when we consider the relation which exists between this particular body and this particular space, we find that this relation is not itself particular, but that it is universal and necessary; and when we try to conceive a body without any space whatever, we cannot do it. It is the same in regard to time: when the consciousness or the senses give us a succession of events or of thoughts, we at once judge that this succession of events takes place in a determinate time. Every thing is determinate in time and succession, such as they are primitively given to us. The question is concerning such or such a succession, of an hour, of a day, or of a year, etc.; but that which is not determinate and particular, is the relation which we place between this succession and this time. We vary the two terms, we vary the succession and the time which embraces the succession, but the relation of succession to time does not vary. Thus it is again that the principle of substance is given to us. When a phenomenon occurs in my consciousness, this phenomenon is a particular and determinate phenomenon, and not any phenomenon whatever; and then I judge that under this particular phenomenon, is a being which is its subject, not a general and abstract being, but real and determinate, *me*. All our primitive judgments are personal and determinate, and nevertheless in the depths of these personal and determinate judgments, are already relations, truths, principles which are not personal and determinate, although they determine and individualize themselves in the determination and in the individuality of their terms. Such is the first form of the truths of geometry and of arithmetic. Behold for example* two objects and two objects; here all is determinate; these quantities to be added are concrete and not discrete. You judge that these two objects and these two objects make four objects. Well, what is there in this? Once more, every thing is here contingent and variable, except the relation. You may vary the objects, put stones instead of these books, hats instead of these stones, and the relation does not vary. Still farther: why have you judged that these two determinate objects added to two other determinate objects make four determinate objects? Think of it; it is by virtue of this truth that two and two make four. Now, this truth of relation is entirely abstract and independent of the nature of the two terms, whatever they may be. It is then the abstract truth which makes us decide that two concrete objects and two concrete objects, different or similar, make four objects. The abstract is given to us in the concrete, the invariable and the necessary in the relative and the contingent, reason in the senses and the consciousness. It is the senses that attest to you the existence of concrete quantities and bodies; it is the consciousness that attests to you the presence of a succession of thoughts and that of all the phenomena under which is your personal identity. At the same time reason intervenes and decides that the relations of the quantities in question are abstract, universal, and necessary rela-

* On this delicate point, the formation of our actual conception of the universal and necessary relation of cause and effect, and in general on the formation of the rational principles, see 1st Series, Vol. 1. Course of 1817, *programme*, pp. 216–218; and Vol. 2, Course of 1818, *programme*, p. 24, Lectures 2–4, pp. 47–58; and Lecture 11, p. 134.

* See this same example, Vol. 1st of this same Series, Lecture 8.

tions; as the reason decides that the relation of body to space is a necessary relation; that the relation between succession and time is a necessary relation; that the relation between the phenomenal plurality which our thoughts form in the consciousness, and the identical and one being which is their subject is also a necessary relation. In the infancy of knowledge, the action of the senses and of the consciousness are mingled together with that of the reason. The senses and consciousness give external and internal phenomena, the variable, the contingent; reason discovers to us universal and necessary truths mingled with accidental and contingent truths which result from the apperception of internal or external phenomena; and these universal and necessary truths constitute universal and necessary principles. It is with the principle of causality as with other principles; the human mind would never conceive it in its universality and its necessity, if at first, a particular fact of causation were not given to us; and this primitive particular fact is that of our own personal causality manifested to the consciousness in effort or voluntary action. But this fact is not itself alone sufficient to explain the knowledge of external causes, because then external causes would necessarily be an induction from our own, that is, it would be necessary to resolve the belief of the human race, its universal and necessary belief, into an absurdity, and into a transitory absurdity, which experience contradicts, and which is now abandoned: this explanation is then inadmissible. It is necessary to conceive that in the contingent and determinate fact, I wish to move my arm and I move it, is a relation of the movement as effect to the will as cause, which relation, disengaged from its two terms, is seized by reason as a universal and necessary truth. Hence the principle of causality, by the aid of which we can reach external causes, because this principle surpasses the reach of our consciousness, and because with it we may judge universally and necessarily that every phenomenon, whatever it may be, has a cause. Thus armed, so to speak, let a new phenomenon present itself, and we refer it universally and necessarily to

a cause; and this cause not being ourselves, according to the infallible testimony of our consciousness, we do not the less judge universally and necessarily that this cause exists; only we judge that it is other than ourselves, that it is foreign to us: here again is the idea of exteriority and the basis of our conviction of the existence of the exterior causes of the world; a universal and necessary conviction, because the principle of the judgment which gives it to us is itself universal and necessary.

Without doubt, at the same time that we conceive causes, exterior, foreign to us, other than ourselves, not intentional, not voluntary, causes such as the application of the general principle of causality can give us, the child, the savage, the human race in its infancy adds sometimes, very often even, to this idea of exteriority, of purely efficient cause, the idea of a will, of a personality similar to our own. But because this second fact sometimes accompanies the first, it does not follow that it must be confounded with it: in order to be attached to a universal and necessary fact, this new fact is not thereby necessary and universal, as I have demonstrated; it gives nothing but error and temporary superstitions, instead of the permanent and inviolable truth which the principle of causality engenders. But in short the fact is real, the errors which it produces are incontestable although local and temporary; it must then be explained; and the explanation is very simple As the principle of causality, although universal and necessary, arises in us from the consciousness of our own causality, it preserves, in its first applications, the trace of its origin, and the belief in the exterior world is accompanied with some vague assimilation of exterior causes to our own. Add that here as in all things, it is truth which serves as a support to error; for the arbitrary and senseless personification of exterior causes presupposes their existence. Induction then misleads the principle of causation; but it does not constitute it.

It is thus that a sound psychology, determined never to abandon the natural conceptions of the human mind, ascends

little by little to their veritable origin; while the systematic psychology of Locke, plunging into the question of the origin of our ideas and of our principles, before having determined with precision the characters by which they are actually marked, and admitting no other origin than sensation or reflection, believes that it can find the origin of the idea of cause in sensation; then forced to abandon this origin, it goes from sensation to reflection; but this origin which can give us the idea of voluntary personal cause, can give only this idea, and not the principle of causality, and consequently cannot explain the knowledge of purely efficient external causes. If then we wish to stop at this narrow origin, what must be done? With this universal and necessary result, that we conceive causes out of ourselves which are not ourselves, it is necessary to confound this other purely accidental fact, that we sometimes conceive these causes, as personal causes; so as to explain the knowledge of exterior causes by simple induction from our own causality, and the principle of causality by reflection, that is, by one of the two adopted origins of all knowledge. But again the conception of exterior causes, as personal and endowed with consciousness, is but an error of the infancy of human reason, and not a law of this reason: we cannot draw from it an explanation of the legitimate, universal, and necessary belief of the human race.

In closing, I must ask pardon for the length of this lecture; but I owed this discussion, though very imperfect, both to the importance of the subject and to the memory of the great metaphysician, who by his very sagacity and his profoundness was led astray by following Locke. Endowed with an admirable psychological acuteness, M. de Biran penetrated so far into the intimacy of the fact of consciousness which gives us the idea of cause, the idea of the voluntary and personal cause which we are, that he scarcely went out from this fact and from this idea, and neglected too much the principle of causality, confounding thus, like Locke, the antecedent of the principle with the principle itself; or when he tried to explain the principle of

causality, explaining it by *a natural induction* which transports into the external world consciousness, the will, and all the peculiar attributes of its model, taking a particular, transient, and erroneous application of the principle of causality for this principle, in itself true, universal, and necessary; that is, confounding by a single error, no more the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent. The theory of M. de Biran is the development of that of Locke; it reproduces it with more extent and profoundness, and exhausts at once its merits and its defects.