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MEMOIRS

OF THE

MEXICAN REVOLUTION.

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MEMOIRS

OF THE

MEXICAN REVOLUTION;

INCLUDING

A NARRATIVE OF THE EXPEDITION

OF

GENERAL XAVIER MINA.

To which are annexed

Some Observations

ON THE PRACTICABILITY OF OPENING A COMMERCE

BETWEEN

THE PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC OCEANS,

THROUGH THE MEXICAN ISTHMUS, IN THE PROVINCE OF OAXACA, AND AT THE LAKE OF NICARAGUA;

AND

ON THE VAST IMPORTANCE OF SUCH COMMERCE TO

THE CIVILIZED WORLD.

BY WILLIAM DAVIS ROBINSON.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER VIII.

Situation of the city of Mexico, and the measures of the Viceroy—Failure of the Expedition of Mina against the Villa de Leon—Arrival of the army under Don Pasqual Liñan before Sombrero—Forms his line of circumvallation—Situation of the Fort—Commencement of active operations—Detail of events—Sortie on the encampment of Don Pedro Celestino Negrete—Sally of General Mina—Detail of events—Gallant defence of the Fort, on the 18th of August—Evacuation of the Fort—Massacre of the fugitives, of the wounded, and of the prisoners—Memoir of Don Pasqual Linan..... ..... page 1

CHAPTER IX.

General Mina proceeds to the fort of Los Remedios—Arrival of some of the fugitives there from Sombrero—Description of the fort of Los Remedios, or San Gregorio—Advance of Liñan against the fort—Mina marches out, with nine hundred men—Description of these troops—Meeting of the General with the remnant of his division, near the Tlachiquera—Siege laid to Los Remedios—Mina advances against, and takes Biscocho—Execution of the garrison—Advance against, and capture of San

Luis de la Paz—Clemency of Mina towards the garrison—Attack on San Miguel—Retreat therefrom, and arrival at the Valle de Santiago—A description of it—Continuation of events connected with Mina's movements—Disgraceful conduct of Padre Torres—Continuation of events at the fort—Repulse of the enemy—Sortie on one of his batteries—Mina's operations continued—Flight of the Patriots from the field at La Caxa—Mina visits Xauxilla, and thence proceeds to the Valle de Santiago—Skirmish with Orrantia, and Mina's arrival at La Caxa 37

CHAPTER X.

Mina advances against Guanaxuato—Description of that city—He attacks it—Failure—He proceeds with an escort to the rancho del Venadito—Movements of Orrantia—Mina made prisoner—Brutal conduct of Orrantia towards him—Death of Mina—Reflections—State of Society in Mexico—Remarks on the present state of the royal forces, and the facility with which the country could be invaded, and its emancipation accomplished..... 95

CHAPTER XI.

Assault of Los Remedios, on the 16th of November, and repulse of the enemy—Sortie by the garrison on the enemy's intrenchments—Cause which led to the evacuation of the fort—Los Remedios evacuated, on the night of the 1st of January, 1818—*Barbarities of the royalists there—Operations of the contending parties, after the reduction of Los Remedios—Loss of Xauxilla—Detailed account of the subsequent events of the Revolution, and its actual state in the month of July,* 1819—*Reflections*..... 155

CHAPTER XII.

Cruelty a predominant feature in Spanish history; exemplified by a brief view of the conduct of Spain in Europe, and by the horrors committed, by her authorities, in Mexico and South America, since the year 1810—*Reflections*..... 212

CHAPTER XIII.

Examination of the different routes to the Pacific Ocean—Doubts respecting a passage to the north-west—The communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at the province of Chocó, examined—Observations upon the routes by the Isthmus of Darien or Panamá; by the Isthmus of Costa Rica; and by that of Oaxaca—General observations on the importance of this passage to the civilized world.... 263

APPENDIX.

Statement of the Claims of W. D. Robinson upon the Spanish government..... 333

MEMOIRS

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CHAPTER VIII.

Situation of the city of Mexico, and the measures of the vice-roy—Failure of the expedition of Mina against the Villa de Leon—Arrival of the army under Don Pasqual Linan before Sombrero—Forms his line of circumvallation—Situation of the Fort—Commencement of active operations—Detail of events—Sortie on the encampment of Don Pedro Celestino Negrete—Sally of General Mina—Detail of events—Gallant defence of the Fort, on the 18th of August—Evacuation of the Fort—Massacre of the fugitives, of the wounded, and of the prisoners—Memoir of Don Pasqual Linan.

WHILST Mina was making his arrangements in Sombrero, opening a correspondence with the royal towns, and adopting the best measures in his power for future military operations, the royalists were likewise more than commonly active. The government of Spain had early

sent orders to the viceroy, to abandon, if necessary, every other object, and to direct all his exertions to the crushing of Mina. The viceroy had calculated, that after the measures which had been previously adopted, the large force collected in the internal provinces was sufficient to overwhelm Mina. But when the news of the rencounter at Peotillos reached Mexico, it aroused him at once to a sense of his danger. The state of the capital was also such as to aggravate his fears: for the city of Mexico had long abounded in men of republican principles; but as the revolution unfortunately began among the most ignorant and wretched population of the country, nearly all the intelligent part of society, for the reasons which have already been set forth, rallied around the royal standard; awaiting the moment when the revolutionary paroxysms among the lower orders should subside, or some leader of more consequence than had hitherto appeared, should spring up. They would then have thrown their exertions into the scale of their country on the first favourable occasion. In Mina they at length beheld the man on whom they could rely. To him they looked, as the individual who should plant the banners of liberty on the Mexican capital. Nor was this feeling confined to the Creoles. Many

European Spaniards were enthusiastically attached to Mina, and the only cause of regret was, that he had not brought a sufficient number of foreign troops to inspire confidence; for although his name alone struck terror into the royal authorities, and a party in his favour was daily augmenting, yet it was not in his power to hold out a certainty of personal protection. And since, under a vigilant and despotic government, time and caution were absolutely requisite to form a combination; many individuals were restrained from abandoning their families to the horrors which they knew must result from their premature espousal of the cause of liberty. These considerations operated as a check on the patriotic inhabitants of the capital and other royal towns, but they secretly panted for his advance, and were prepared to join him at the first auspicious moment.

So much encouraged were his partisans by his extraordinary successes, that they met in coffee-houses in the city of Mexico, discussed the news of the day, and betrayed their hopes and fears so openly, that it could not escape the knowledge of the government. Coercive measures were adopted against some distinguished citizens, but still the ferment in the capital did not subside.

After the defeat of the royal troops at Peotillos, the viceroy saw that the invasion was assuming a formidable aspect, and that if Mina was not immediately checked, all would be lost. Roused, therefore, by this critical state of affairs, he withdrew as many of the European troops as could be spared, or seasonably procured, from the numerous royal cantonments, and united them with some native infantry and his best Creole cavalry. But, great as was the emergency, he could concentrate only about five thousand men. Upon this army depended the fate the government; and if it had been destroyed, which would have been the case had Padre Torres acted as he ought to have done, no similar force could have been raised. Our reasons for this assertion will be adduced in their proper place.

The command of the army destined for the overthrow of Mina, was conferred on *Don Pasqual Liñan*, a mariscal de campo. He held likewise the distinguished rank of inspector general of Mexico, the officer next in military rank to the viceroy. Liñan, by rapid marches, arrived in the province of Guanaxuato, in the middle of July. Mina was accurately and regularly advised of the movements of the enemy, from their own towns; but, placing a firm reliance on the arrival of the supply of provisions, ammunition, and men, which he hourly expected, according to the promises of Padre Torres, and having no doubt, likewise, that the latter, as well as the other patriot chiefs, would concentrate their forces to assist him, as had been arranged, he determined to await the arrival of Liñan at the fort of Sombrero. Mina's force in the fort, at that time, had been augmented to five hundred rank and file.

At the close of the month, information was brought to Mina, that the troops composing the garrison of the Villa de Leon had that morning marched from the town, leaving only a small detachment for its defence. Conceiving that this afforded him a good opportunity to try the character of his recruits, and strike a blow against the enemy, he determined to attack the place. The Villa de Leon is an extensive, populous, and wealthy town, situated in a plain, abounding with wheat fields. After Mina's arrival at Sombrero, the enemy, anticipating an attack on Leon, strengthened its works. Its garrison was likewise augmented to seven hundred men, who were under the command of Brigadier *Don Pedro Celestino Negrete*, a man famous in the annals of the revolution for acts of depravity and cruelty. The

streets leading to the principal square of the town were defended by a traverse composed of a wall, with a ditch on the outside. This work inclosed the buildings, consisting of lofty churches and heavy mansions. The place had hitherto been considered impregnable, having baffled all the efforts of the patriots to take it. From their massive architecture, every house and church was in itself a fortification.

Mina, on the evening he received the information, after having taken every precaution to prevent intelligence of his design being conveyed to the enemy, marched from the fort with his division and some Creole cavalry, in all about five hundred men, and a piece of artillery. His intention was to take the enemy by surprise, in the night. On arriving within half a mile of the town, a picquet of the enemy was unexpectedly encountered; it fled, and alarmed the garrison, which, it afterwards appeared, had been strongly reinforced by a division of Liñan's army; a circumstance of which Mina was totally ignorant. On arriving near the square, his troops were received by a heavy fire of artillery, and musquetry from the tops of the houses. The attack was made with vigour, but all attempts to carry it failed, the storming parties being overpowered by numbers. The Guard of Honour and regiment of the Union, succeeded, however, in dislodging the enemy from a strong barrack, and took a few prisoners; but they could not force their way any farther. At dawn, the general, finding it impracticable to carry the place, drew off his troops, and fell back upon the fort. So well satisfied were the enemy to get rid of him, that they made no attempt to harass him on his retreat. This was the first reverse experienced by the arms of Mina; it was severe: the killed and wounded were nearly one hundred, and among them were several foreigners. Some of the wounded, who could not be brought off, fell into the hands of the enemy, and were immediately put to death; while, on the contrary, the prisoners that Mina had taken were liberated.

On the morning of the 30th of July, intelligence was received, that the enemy were in the plain before the fort; and, soon after, the army of Liñan was seen ascending the heights. It consisted, according to their own official statements, of the following troops:—

European	regiment of	Zaragoza . .	617
Creole	do.	Toluca . . .	250
European	do.	Navarra . .	463
		Amount carried forward	1330

Amount brought forward	1330
Cavalry—Fieles de San Luis, San Carlos, Queretaro, Nueva Galicia, Colima, Sierra Gorda, and Realistas de Apan	1211
A division under the command of Colonel Don Juan Rafol	1000
	3541

Ten pieces of artillery, and two howitzers.

This statement we believe to be under-rated; but, even admitting it to be correct, it was a formidable force for the garrison to contend against. Imposing, however, as appeared the strength of the enemy, Mina felt so confident of repulsing them, that he ordered a red flag to be displayed from the battery which crowned the conical hill within the fort.

The situation of the fortress has already been described. On the eminence, in advance of the main entrance into the fort, the enemy placed in battery seven pieces of artillery, from four to twelve pounders, and two howitzers. There Liñan fixed his head-quarters, with the first division of his army, composed of the regiment of Zaragoza, and four hundred and forty-eight cavalry, under the command of Brigadier

Loaces. The second division, consisting of the regiment of Toluca, and three hundred and eighty-four cavalry, under Brigadier Negrete, were entrenched on the southernmost of two ridges, projecting from the south end of the fort. In advance of his encampment, upon a small knoll, he threw up a redoubt of one gun, about long musquet-shot from the fort. The third division, comprising the regiment of Navarra, and three hundred and seventy-nine cavalry, under Colonel Don José Ruiz, were stationed at the watering place: and the section under Don Juan Rafol, was employed as a corps of observation, to watch the movements of Padre Torres, between Leon and Guanaxuato. These dispositions were unquestionably skilful, and well calculated to cause Mina and his garrison to view seriously the coming attack; but the patriots were strangers to apprehension or despondency.

The fort was not calculated to sustain either a formal siege or a vigorous assault. Padre Torres had not sent any of the expected provisions; and a supply for ten days was all that the fort contained. The ammunition also was deficient, but twenty-five boxes remaining. But the most serious evil was, that the third division of the enemy was so posted as to cut off all

communication between the garrison and the water in the ravine. It was, however, hoped that this evil would not be seriously felt, as the rainy season had commenced. The only succour which the garrison received from Padre Torres, came about two days previous to the arrival of the enemy, and consisted of sixty cavalry, under the command of Don Miguel de Borja. The whole force of the garrison, including these and a party of the cavalry of Don Encarnacion Ortiz, did not exceed six hundred and fifty. When to these were added the peasantry, who were employed in working parties, and the women and children, the whole number of souls in the fort was about nine hundred.

At day-break of the 31st, the enemy opened a heavy fire of shot and shells, which continued incessantly till dark; their fire being occasionally returned by the fort. This cannonading continued, with little intermission, during the whole of the siege; and on some days, the besiegers discharged from their battery on the hill, as many as six hundred shot and shells. To the besieged, this appeared a useless expenditure of ammunition, unless it was intended to display the great resources and indefatigable exertions of the enemy; for, as the principal buildings were under cover of the conical hill,

and the others were in such positions as to be protected by the rocks, and as no one moved from his covert, unless compelled by duty, the fire of the enemy was ineffectual, their shot falling harmless among the rocks, or flying entirely over the fort. Indeed, their artillery was so unskilfully served, that it annoyed their own works on the south side. This random firing continued for several days, without any casualty occurring, except among the horses which were roaming about the fort.

The enemy undoubtedly flattered himself with the hope of making an easy conquest of the fort, expecting that the first assault would produce a surrender. At two o'clock A. M. on the 5th of August, a spirited attack was made upon the fort, at three points, which were considered assailable: but it failed, and the enemy were compelled to retire, with some loss. In this affair, the general, who commanded in person at the main entrance, displayed his usual intrepidity. With a lance in his hand, he was foremost in withstanding the enemy, and received a slight wound.

But now another circumstance created more serious uneasiness than the assaults of the enemy. The communication with the ravine, on which the garrison was entirely dependent

for water, had been totally cut off, by the third division of the enemy, who had intrenched themselves in an impregnable position close to the watering-place, and who at night posted a chain of videttes along the ravine. Mina, as well as Moreno, had calculated that it was practicable to cover the watering parties from the fort; and to have anticipated this disaster, by preserving water within the fort, was impossible, as there was but one small tank, capable of holding no more than was sufficient for a few hours' supply. As the rainy season had commenced, it had been supposed that the garrison would not suffer for want of water. All these expectations were disappointed; for the watering parties, which were sent out nightly, generally returned without having succeeded in their attempt, or with such a partial supply as was of no adequate use; and although it constantly rained around, yet none fell in the fort. The watering parties were obliged to descend the declivity of a very deep barranca, which rendered it impossible to conduct these sallies with any degree of order, and the enemy were therefore always apprised of their approach to the rivulet, and of course prepared to resist them. Hence no supplies of any consequence could be obtained. Those who have

not seen the Mexican barrancas, can scarcely form an idea of the difficulties they present at every step; abounding in immense rocks, precipices, and thick bushes, it is impossible to conduct any military enterprise in them with compactness and order.

The small quantity of water which each individual collected on the first appearance of the enemy, had been soon expended. The only well in the fort, which was at the house of Don Pedro Moreno, had never contained water. All the stagnant water in the crevices around the fort, was consumed; and the horrors of thirst became dreadful. Recourse was had to some wild celery, which luckily grew around the fort: it was plucked at the risk of life; but these were only partial alleviations, for some of the people were four days without tasting a drop of water.

The situation of the garrison was fast approaching to a crisis. The troops at their posts were hourly becoming less capable of exertion, from the severity of their sufferings. Horses and cattle were wandering about, in the greatest distress. The cries of children, calling on their unhappy mothers for water, gave to the scene of suffering peculiar horror. The countenance of the general shewed how deeply he sympa-

thized in the sufferings of his associates: but he cheered them with the hope that the God of nature would not abandon them; he pointed to the heavy clouds with which the atmosphere was loaded, as the source from whence relief would speedily be obtained; and such was the effect Mina's example and consoling observations inspired, that each individual strove to distinguish himself by his superior fortitude under the severity of the general distress. With anxious expectation, they marked the approach of the heavily charged clouds, hoping that the predictions of a supply from them would soon be verified. Every vessel was ready to receive the grateful shower. The women brought out the images of their saints, supplicating their intervention for that relief which Heaven only could bestow. The clouds covered the fort: no sound was heard amid the general anxiety of the wretched garrison, save the thunder of the enemy's artillery, whose troops, with savage exultation, looked down on the besieged from their position on the hill. The flattering clouds passed slowly over the fort,—the moment was anxiously looked for, which was to ease their sufferings;—a few drops fell;—anxiety was wrought up to the highest pitch;—but the clouds passed, and burst at a short distance

from them! Language is inadequate to describe the emotions of despair which at that moment were depicted on every countenance in the fort. For several days the clouds continued thus to pass, without discharging a single drop on the parched garrison, who had the cruel mortification of seeing their enemies frequently drenched with rain, and the large lake of Lagos constantly in view. Such were the trials experienced at this ill-fated spot. At length, after a lapse of four days, a slight shower fell. Every article capable of containing the desired fluid was in readiness, and in spite of the incessant fire of the enemy, a supply was collected, sufficient to yield a temporary relief to the suffering garrison. A small supply was also collected in reserve.

The bread, which it had been impossible to use for want of water, now became serviceable; and the troops were invigorated. Many of the Creole recruits, during the late scene of distress, had made their escape, which had considerably diminished the numbers of the garrison.

During this time, Padre Torres had marched from Remedios with a body of troops, and a small supply of provisions; but advancing with his accustomed carelessness, he fell into an ambush, laid by the enemy near Silao. His troops

made scarcely any opposition, and were soon dispersed; every one fleeing to his home. The Padre made his way back to Remedios. The provisions were at some distance in the rear, and escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. No further attempts were made by the Padre to succour the fort, although he knew that it must inevitably fall, if not speedily relieved. All his promises to Mina were thus forgotten, or deliberately violated. The enemy, notwithstanding their vast superiority, had met with such an unexpected repulse in their late assault, that they declined making another attempt, and directed all their attention to reduce the fort by famine; well knowing that without water or provisions, it could not hold out long. To prevent the introduction of supplies, as well as the retreat of the garrison, they stationed picquets of cavalry, in all directions about the fort. Nevertheless, some resolute men did bring in a few articles every night, but they were supplies not very essential to the garrison. The enemy still kept up an incessant fire from the hill, and by stationing some light troops among the rocks, considerably annoyed the besieged; but very little loss resulted, for the reasons already mentioned. The posts could only be relieved at night, and even then the danger was great,

from occasional random discharges of grape-shot from the hill. The ammunition of the besieged was fast diminishing, and could only afford occasional discharges; but as the foreigners, particularly the American citizens, were far superior marksmen to those of the enemy, many skirmishers of the latter were killed.

In the mean time, the enemy occasionally held conferences with the garrison. Some of the Spanish officers, who had been intimate with Mina in Spain, advanced to the walls of the fort to see him. They used every possible argument to induce Mina to accept the royal amnesty. They urged, in support of it, his forlorn situation, and the impossibility that relief could be given him. Mina answered them with frankness, and explained the motives which had induced him to espouse the cause, and concluded by informing them, that his determination was taken to conquer or die. They parted on the most friendly terms; the officers expressing their regret at his inflexibility. A momentary cessation of hostilities having taken place, upon the return of the officers to their posts, the contest was renewed.

Three nights after the attempt by the enemy to enter the fort, Mina, with two hundred and

forty men, made a sortie on the encampment of Negrete. The remains of the Guard of Honour and regiment of the Union, thirty in number, all Americans, with the general at their head, surprised and carried the redoubt thrown up on the knoll. The main body of the enemy, which was encamped at a greater distance in the rear, was alarmed, and on the alert before the Americans could reach them. Had the latter been properly supported by their Creole companions, something important might have been accomplished. But the Creoles would not advance; thus leaving the Americans to sustain a sharp conflict, until, overpowered by numbers, they were obliged to retreat to the fort. This was effected under a heavy fire from the enemy, which killed and wounded several; among them, were eleven of the little band of foreigners. Some of the wounded could not be brought off, and therefore fell into the hands of the enemy. It will scarcely be thought possible, but such was the fact, that the atrocious commanding officer, having ordered those wounded men to be carried in full view of the fort, caused them to be strangled in the sight of their commiserating and enraged comrades, whose attention had been cruelly attracted to the scene. Their bodies, stripped of

their clothes, were thrown down the precipice of the barranca, to become the food of vultures.

The general now saw, that unless some speedy external relief was afforded, the fall of the fort was inevitable; and finding that Torres fulfilled none of the promises he had made, nor was making any diversion in his favour, he formed the bold determination of going in person, to endeavour to procure the necessary assistance, which he still flattered himself would be furnished by Torres. Accordingly, the night after the sortie on Negrete, he left the fort, accompanied by only three companions; his aid-de-camp, Don Miguel de Borja, and Don Encarnacion Ortiz; leaving Colonel Young in command of the garrison. They eluded, but with difficulty, the vigilance of the enemy. Mina, in a short time, made attempts to throw some supplies of water and provisions into the fort; but having with him only a few cavalry of Ortiz, he was defeated in his object by the number and vigilance of the enemy.

Mina had likewise the deep mortification of ascertaining, that all the statements of Torres, about the troops he could concentrate, were a mere fiction; or rather, that he had made no effort to effect the concentration which he easi-

ly could have done. All hopes of succour from Torres were vain. Under these circumstances, the general sent an order to Colonel Young to draw off the garrison.

Meanwhile, the enemy prosecuted the siege with vigour. The cannonading was incessant by day, and continued occasionally at night. A few of the besieged were killed, and several wounded. The stock of water collected from the last shower was exhausted, and the sufferings of the garrison, as well from hunger as thirst, again became intolerable. Several days had again elapsed without water. The children were expiring from thirst; many of the adults had become delirious, and had resorted to the last and most disgusting of all human expedients, to allay for a moment the torments of thirst; while some few, driven to madness, would steal down at night to the rivulet, and flying from the death of thirst, receive it at the hands of their enemies. At this juncture, a generous trait was manifested by the enemy. They were moved to pity by the dreadful situation of the women, and allowed them to descend and drink the water, but would not permit them to carry any up to the fort. This solitary act of humanity proved however but a "*ruse de guerre*," as the enemy obtained from

the women correct information of the state of things in the fort, and finally, on one occasion observing a large number of them at the watering-place, with characteristic perfidy they seized them, and sent them prisoners to the town of Leon.

The besieged were suffering not only the extremity of thirst, but their provisions were nearly all consumed. Every juicy weed around the fort was plucked, and some of the men imagined they found relief from thirst by chewing lead. The soldiers were compelled to subsist partially on the flesh of horses, asses, and dogs.

The stench of the animals which had died for want of food, or from the enemy's shot, and of the dead bodies of the enemy which were suffered to lie unburied, was almost insupportable. Large flocks of vultures, attracted by the dismal scene, were constantly hovering over the fort, and fortunately diminished an evil, which otherwise could not have been borne.

Their sufferings having become intolerable, many of the troops deserted, so that not more than a hundred and fifty effective men remained. The ammunition was so far expended as only to admit of occasional firing. The guns had been for some time served with the enemy's

shot; which, dug out at night from the rubbish outside of the fort, was fired back to them in the morning.

The unutterable sufferings of the garrison induced some of the officers to entreat Colonel Young to send a flag of truce to know what terms of capitulation the enemy would enter into. The colonel was decidedly opposed to the measure, but was so much importuned by the garrison, that he unwillingly consented to it; telling them to remember that the act was at variance with his judgment.

The flag of truce returned with the answer of Liñan, that the foreigners must surrender at discretion, and that the natives should receive the benefit of the royal amnesty. When this answer was reported to Colonel Young, he said, it was no more than he expected, and that he hoped that none of the garrison would thenceforth speak to him about capitulating with an enemy, from whom neither mercy nor honour was to be expected.

The enemy, among other operations, had latterly directed their fire against the front wall; and as it was built of unburnt bricks and loose stones, the shells that entered it buried themselves, and exploding, did irreparable damage to the work. The wall was thus destroyed, and

its rubbish so filled up the ditch, as to form a fair, broad passage into the fort. The breaches hitherto made in the wall had been repaired at night; but it was now so completely battered down, that any further attempts to repair it were useless. A work was therefore thrown up within it. In fact, the fort, as well from that cause, as the want of ammunition, the reduced strength of the garrison, and the wretched condition of its defenders, exhausted as they were by toil, hunger, and thirst, was no longer tenable, and Colonel Young determined upon its evacuation. While arrangements for that purpose were making on the evening of the 17th, the colonel repaired to the quarters of Don Pedro Moreno, to concert the plan of the sally. There he found Don Pedro, with several of his Creole officers, and Major Mauro, who then commanded the cavalry of the division. They told the colonel, that the fort could yet be defended, and that they would do it themselves, without the aid of the Americans. Colonel Young, piqued at the ridiculous conduct of Major Mauro, resolved to defer the evacuation.

The conduct of Don Pedro, during the siege, had been base in the extreme. He did not take an active part in the defence; and, while the garrison was suffering from hunger and thirst,

he was living in comparative luxury, upon stores he had hoarded in his house. Some trifling supplies, as we before observed, had been brought into the fort: he monopolized such part of them as he thought proper, and the residue only he permitted the importers to vend. He would not even allow the swine that he had about his house to be killed, for the use of the men who were defending his country, himself, and his family. During their severe privations, he retailed, at an exorbitant price, pork, lard, sugar, cigars, and even some water which he had collected in the shower. It was, therefore, a general opinion, that the aversion of this man to the sally, at the time it was proposed, was merely feigned, to gain time to steal away with his money. With such chiefs as this man, and Padre Torres, were Mina and his brave officers and men compelled to act, at this critical juncture!

Colonel Young having determined to defend the fort to the last, declared that he would be the last man to leave it; and to this resolution he fell a sacrifice.

On the 18th, the sound of the enemy's bugles echoed through the barranca, and announced some movement of the besiegers. Their infantry at the watering place, and on

the south of the fort, were observed to be forming, and it was supposed an assault was impending. Preparations for defence were made by the besieged, who, although greatly diminished in numbers, and emaciated by severe privations, yet resolved to prevent the entrance of the enemy, or die in the breach. Colonel Young, ever on the alert, made the most of his handful of troops. Sixty men were placed for the defence of the front wall; and the remaining few were so arranged as to be prepared to meet the assailants at the several points at which an entrance might be gained. Some of the few females who still remained, aware of the horrors to which they would be exposed, should the enemy succeed, cheerfully flew to reinforce the several positions, armed with missile weapons.

At one o'clock the enemy sounded the advance from his head-quarters, which was repeated by his respective divisions. Soon after, a strong column appeared on the hill, marching down; at the same time, the division at the watering place ascended the hill, threatening the east side; while the other division, on the southern ridge, marched up the hill, carrying scaling-ladders. The enemy boldly advanced along the causeway to the breach, under cover

of a heavy fire from their battery on the hill, and in face of the galling fire of the garrison from the two flanking works. When within a few paces, the heavy fire they encountered compelled them to halt: unavailing were the endeavours of their officers to get them up to the breach; they retreated in the utmost disorder. At the other points of attack they were equally unsuccessful. At the south end, the hill being very steep, they ascended with difficulty, and soon became exhausted; and, as they approached, a destructive fire was opened upon them, while the women rolled down huge masses of stone. No longer able to withstand so vigorous and unexpected an opposition, they withdrew their forces, having sustained a severe loss.

At that moment a copious shower of rain fell: it was the first which had refreshed the garrison for many days. The enemy conceived that this was a propitious moment to renew the assault, presuming that as the fire-arms would be rendered unserviceable from the rain, their superior numbers would enable them to force their way into the fort. Again their martial instruments sounded the advance. The column again moved forward, and approached the breach with a scaling ladder, displaying a

black flag, as a symbol of the fate which awaited the besieged. Fire-arms could not now be used on either side. The enemy continued to press on, and were opposed only by missile weapons. Fortunately, at this moment, the rain ceased. The defenders of the works were invigorated by the shower, and, when the fire-arms could be used, again commenced a well-directed fire. The bearers of the scaling ladder were killed. The soldiers of the enemy, urged on by their officers, still continued to advance; but, within a few yards of the breach, they received such a galling discharge, that they again broke, flying for shelter among the rocks and bushes, where they remained until night enabled them to retire.

In this affair the garrison suffered a severe loss, but particularly in the death of the gallant Colonel Young, who gloriously fell in the moment of victory. On the enemy's last retreat, the colonel, anxious to observe all their movements, fearlessly exposed his person, by stepping on a large stone on the ramparts; and, while conversing with Dr. Hennessey, on the successes of the day, and on the dastardly conduct of the enemy, the last shot that was fired from their battery, carried off his head. Colonel Young was an officer whom, next to Mina, the

American part of the division had been accustomed to respect and admire. In every action he had been conspicuous for his daring courage and skill. Mina reposed unbounded confidence in him. In the hour of danger he was collected, gave his orders with precision, and, sword in hand, was always in the hottest of the combat; honour and firmness marked all his actions. He was generous in the extreme, and endured privations with a cheerfulness superior to that of any other officer in the division. He had been in the United States' service, as lieutenant-colonel of the twenty-uinth regiment of infantry. His body was interred, by the few Americans who could be spared from duty, with every possible mark of honour and respect; and the general gloom which pervaded the division on this occasion, was the sincerest tribute that could be offered by them to the memory of their brave chief.

The command of the division devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Bradburn. Hopes were now indulged that the enemy, finding they could not carry the place by storm, would raise the siege; but they were too well aware of the miserable state of the garrison, to allow such a prize as Mina's officers to escape them. They had likewise found, by the extraordinary

defence of the fort, that it contained a body of men highly dangerous to the royal cause; and it was supposed that if Mina could be deprived of his foreign troops, he would then be incapable of giving the royalists further serious annoyance.

The enemy, on the following day, evinced not the least indication of raising the siege; and the provisions and ammunition being entirely exhausted, it became impossible to hold possession of the fort any longer. It was, therefore, decided to abandon it; and, every preparation having been made, it was determined that it should take place on the night of the 19th.

On examining the military chest, it was found that there remained in it only about eighteen thousand dollars. The funds had been reduced to this comparatively small amount, by advances made to Torres for provisions, disbursements for clothing, payments to Don Pedro Moreno; a quantity of doubloons having been taken out by the general for the purpose of procuring provisions, and a sum intrusted to Don Pedro, on the night of the 17th, when arrangements had been made for an evacuation, and which was carried out by the peasantry. What thus remained of the specie,

together with some spare arms and artillery, was buried. The limbers of the latter were burned, and shot rammed tightly into the guns.

Every thing being in readiness, the garrison prepared to evacuate the fort. A distressing scene then took place. The necessity of abandoning the unfortunate wounded, whom, from the nature of the barranca over which it was necessary to pass, it was impossible to carry out, was imperious. The hospital was filled with these victims, the majority of whom were the officers and men who had accompanied Mina from Soto la Marina: they were incapable of bodily exertion, the limbs of most of them being broken. Parting with such men, who had fought so bravely, and who were so devoted to the cause they had espoused, filled every breast with unutterable agony. Some anticipated the fate that awaited them, and entreated their friends to terminate their existence; some indulged hopes of mercy from the Spaniards; while others, overwhelmed with grief and despair, covered their faces, and were unable to bid what they considered a final adieu.

At eleven o'clock at night, Colonel Bradburn proceeded with the division to the appointed

spot, whence the sally was to be made. The route chosen was through the barranca before described, the only direction by which there was any chance of escape. On arriving at the rendezvous, Colonel Bradburn was surprised to find that Don Pedro, who had reached there first, had imprudently permitted the women and children to precede the march. They soon got into confusion, and by their screams alarmed the enemy, and thus apprised them of what was in agitation. From the difficulties which the barranca presented, it was impracticable for the troops to remain formed in their march; and hence, in the darkness of the night, they soon dispersed, every one exploring his path, and endeavouring to take care of himself.

In the bottom of the barranca, the picquets and sentries of the enemy were encountered; with whom a continual skirmishing prevailed. Many of the fugitives dropped down from weakness; others were shot by the random fire of the enemy. The screams of the women, the reports of the enemy's musquets, the cries of those who fell, the groans of the wounded, and the intense darkness which reigned around, gave to the scene indescribable horror. Some few, particularly of the females, were so dismayed, that they returned to the fort; preferring

the chance of a pardon to the risk of that destruction which then seemed inevitable. The greater part, however, by the dawn, had gained the opposite summit of the barranca. Here, many of them flattered themselves, the danger was over; but the foreigners, being ignorant of the topography of the place, were uncertain which way to direct their course, fearing that every step might place them in the power of the enemy. They marched on as chance directed them, in parties of two, three, or six. Soon after day-light, they were beset by parties of the enemy's cavalry, who had been ordered along the summit of the barranca, as soon as it was known that the garrison had evacuated the fort. Another scene of horror began:—the enemy's cavalry rushed in among the flying and kneeling individuals. No quarter was given. Cut to pieces by the sword, or transfixed with lances, the greater part of the fugitives were destroyed. The few who escaped, among whom was Don Pedro Moreno, owed their preservation to the dense and foggy state of the atmosphere. The clothes and money found on the victims, were looked upon as prizes by the cavalry soldiers, who for that reason preferred killing to making prisoners of them; for if they had spared their lives, and conducted them as

prisoners to head-quarters, the booty would not have been so great, as in that case they might have lost the clothes.

The next morning, the enemy entered the deserted fort in triumph. Then ensued a tragedy, by order of the infuriated Liñan, which it is in vain to attempt to depict in colours sufficiently strong.

The hospital, as we have before observed, was filled with wounded, a large majority of whom were foreigners, principally Americans. Those who could hobble to the square, a few paces distant, were made to do so, while others, whose fractured limbs would not permit them to move, were inhumanly *dragged along the ground* to the fatal spot. There stood the ferocious Liñan, feasting on the spectacle; regardless of their miserable situation, of their former gallant conduct, of the clemency and respect which they had shewn to royalist prisoners—unmindful of all these considerations, he ordered them to be stripped of all their clothes, and shot down, one by one.

Liñan occupied three days in compelling the other prisoners that were found in the fort, to demolish the works; which being effected, he ordered them to be brought to the square, and there shot. One of the prisoners, immediately

before being shot, discovered the place where the treasure and other articles were buried, but even this information did not save his life.

Thus terminated the siege of Sombrero: out of the two hundred and sixty-nine men who had entered the fort with Mina, only fifty escaped.

Liñan, after having completed the destruction of the fort, returned to Villa de Leon, exulting in the exploits which he had performed. It may not be amiss to give a short sketch of his origin and career, founded on information derived from respectable sources—from some Spanish European officers. Pasqual Liñan, at the time that Ferdinand entered France, was a soldier in the ranks. He followed the king in the capacity of a servant, and remained with him till his return to Spain. Ferdinand became much attached to him; and, desirous of displaying his generosity to Liñan, for the services he had rendered, requested him to name the manner in which he could best requite his fidelity. "Make me a mariscal de campo," said Liñan. The king, although perhaps surprised at such a request, was at the same time so much pleased with the manner in which Liñan had made it, that he said, "*Muy bien.*" Accordingly, to the astonishment of the Spanish

officers, Pasqual Liñan was created a mariscal de campo, and sent to Mexico as inspector-general. He is deficient in education, and although his personal appearance is imposing, his manners are so coarse, and his conversation so illiterate, that he disgusts those of both sexes who have any intercourse with him. He is hated and despised by his subaltern officers, and although they allow he has personal courage, yet they can discover in him no other than this, almost the least, requisite for a commander-in-chief. During the siege of Sombrero, he never moved from his head-quarters: he trusted to other officers, entirely, for the planning and execution of all the operations.

It would be neither just nor generous to infer from the conduct of Liñan, that his officers approved of his sanguinary measures; nor do we wish that conclusions should be drawn against the Spanish character generally, because many of the agents of its barbarous and vindictive government have acted like the monster Liñan. We have seen many Spanish officers, whose humane, generous, and noble feelings, would have done honour to any country.

Some of those attached to the European regiments under Liñan's orders, particularly interfered to stop his cruel proceedings. They

begged him to defer the execution of the prisoners, until he consulted the viceroy. Although they found him inexorable, they continued urging the point to the last moment, openly expressing their abhorrence of his savage acts. We afterwards understood, that a pardon for the prisoners did actually arrive from Mexico; but it was too late, for their blood had already satiated the vengeance of the brutal Liñan. Upon his head therefore rests the wanton slaughter of the gallant foreigners and others, who fell into his hands; and to him do we impute the horrors which marked the conquest of Sombrero.

The Spanish officers speak in terms of the strongest indignation and disgust of the dreadful enormities perpetrated by this man, and even those of his own politics, who have had any public transactions with him, hold him in fear and abhorrence. He is at present, we believe, in the city of Vera Cruz, of which province he is governor. His conduct there has been so base, and so scandalous, as to cover him with the odium, not only of the inhabitants generally, but even of his own countrymen.

CHAPTER IX.

General Mina proceeds to the fort of Los Remedios—Arrival of some of the fugitives there from Sombrero—Description of the fort of Los Remedios, or San Gregorio—Advance of Liñan against the fort—Mina marches out, with nine hundred men—Description of these troops—Meeting of the general with the remnant of his division, near the Tlachiquera—Siege laid to Los Remedios—Mina advances against, and takes Biscocho—Execution of the garrison—Advance against, and capture of San Luis de la Paz—Clemency of Mina towards the garrison—Attack on San Miguel—Retreat therefrom, and arrival at the Valle de Santiago—A description of it—Continuation of events connected with Mina's movements—Disgraceful conduct of Padre Torres—Continuation of events at the fort—Repulse of the enemy—Sortie on one of his batteries—Mina's operations continued—Flight of the patriots from the field at La Caxa—Mina visits Xauxilla, and thence proceeds to the Valle de Santiago—Skirmish with Orrantia, and Mina's arrival at La Caxa.

BAFFLED in every effort to succour Sombrero, Mina remained for several days in the mountains in its neighbourhood, with a small body of cavalry. Having sent several messages to Padre

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Torres, to urge him to order up troops for the relief of the fort, or to cover the movements of its garrison, but receiving only trifling and evasive answers, he resolved to repair to the head-quarters of Torres, and there personally incite that chieftain to the performance of his engagements. Taking with him, therefore, an escort of one hundred of the cavalry of Ortiz, he proceeded to Los Remedios, on the 17th, two days prior to the evacuation and fall of Sombrero. The road lay across the plain of Silao. While crossing it, between the town of that name and the Villa de Leon, he encountered a body of two hundred of the enemy's cavalry. Mina, with his usual gallantry and skill, led his men into action, and in a few minutes put the enemy to flight, with some loss. They lost their commander, who was dragged off his horse by a *lazo*,* and killed.

* Lazo is the name of the rope, in the use of which the Spanish Americans are so justly celebrated. In rustic life, it is usually applied to the purpose of catching the various kinds of stock belonging to a farm. A child of five or six years old commences his experiments with a piece of packthread, and exercises his ingenuity on the poultry about the house; he afterwards attacks the pigs; and, as he grows up, ventures to throw his lazo upon calves and colts; and thus, by the time he arrives at manhood, he has learned to use it with astonishing precision. It is a well-made rope, of about an inch in circumference, and from ten to fifteen yards in length.

Wild cattle are caught by peasants, mounted on horses, trained for that express purpose; and, to be broken and trained to it, is one of the important requisites of a Mexican horse. Since the revolution, the lazo has been often resorted to, among a flying enemy. An expert thrower will strike his object, almost to a certainty, at a distance of from eight to ten yards. The instant a horse trained to this service, finds that the rope has taken, he will suddenly stop, although at full speed; then wheeling on his haunches, he will set off in a full gallop in an opposite direction. The effect is irresistible. The man is instantly brought to the ground. If it be upon cattle that the lazo is thrown, the flight of the animal is instantly arrested; and he is obliged to follow the horse, or choak. With the greatest ease, a peasant will throw the lazo round the horns or legs of a bull, and thus keep the wildest and most vicious animal in subjection, without losing his seat. The constant use of the lazo, from early infancy, can alone account for the extraordinary dexterity which the native American displays in casting it.

Mina, upon his arrival at Los Remedios, found Padre Torres assiduously engaged in strengthening his position, in victualling it, and making every preparation against the siege which he anticipated would be laid to it, after the reduction of Sombrero; but he had taken none of the steps he had promised, and which he ought to have taken, to afford assistance to

Sombrero. Under the direction of Mina, the aid he could have given might have prevented the accomplishment of the plans of the enemy, and might probably have led to their destruction. At the pressing solicitations of Mina, Torres issued an order to some of his commandants to repair as soon as possible with their troops to Los Remedios: but, alas! this order was issued too late to be of use to Sombrero; for, while they were collecting, advices of the disaster of the fort reached Los Remedios. This event affected the general deeply. It was difficult for him to conceal his conflicting emotions of sorrow, for many of his brave companions, who he presumed had fallen in the struggle; and of indignation at the shameful neglect of Torres, in not having made seasonable exertions in favour of Sombrero. He preserved, however, his usual serenity, well knowing, that either reproaches or despondency must produce bad effects at that juncture of affairs.

A few of Mina's officers and men reached Los Remedios, and from them he obtained details of the disaster that had befallen them; but of the extent of the loss he was still uninformed. He despatched several persons to seek out the foreigners, and conduct them to him.

Thirty-one only reached the fort; but, nevertheless, Mina still indulged the hope, that as the sally had been effected at night by the barranca, the rest of the troops might have gained the mountains near Sombrero, where they would be taken care of by the cavalry of Ortiz.

Advices also reached the fort, that Liñan, flushed with his late success, was advancing with reinforcements against Los Remedios. This movement was anticipated, and it was likewise supposed that it would be the close of his career; which opinion was founded upon the strength of the fort, and the arrangements made for harassing and resisting the enemy.

The fort of Los Remedios, or, as it is called by the royalists, *San Gregorio*, was situated on a lofty, though not extensive range of mountains, rising abruptly out of the delightful plains of Penjamo and Silao, in the province of Guanaxuato; being distant from the city of that name south-south-west about twelve leagues, from Sombrero south about eighteen, and from Penjamo east-north-east four leagues. From the plain the road wound up the declivities of the mountain (and in some places it was remarkably steep) by a ridge, for a distance of nearly two miles, to the highest elevation of the fort, called Tepeaca. From that point the

hill again descended, widening a considerable distance into the heart of the mountain, to the extremity of the fort, which was denominated Pansacola. The ascent was not fortified either by nature or art, until arriving at a place called *La Cueva*, at about one-third of its height from the plain; whence the road continued, by a difficult, narrow, and, in places, very steep ridge, up to Tepeaca. On the left of La Cueva, the ridge was skirted by a tremendous precipice of from one to two hundred feet perpendicular height; which continued on that side of the fort, with little variation, to Pansacola. On the right of La Cueva, the ridge was likewise bounded by a precipice, to within a few paces of a small work called Santa Rosalia. From the termination of this precipice, a wall of three feet in thickness, extended up to Tepeaca. Between these two points the ascent of the barranca was easy, and from thence to Pansacola, it was naturally defended by a continuation of bold, elevated, and broken ground. At this latter place there was a small passage into the fort, but the precipices made the access to it very dangerous. In short, the whole of the fort, with the exception of the small entrance at Pansacola, and that part on the right of the road ascending to Tepeaca, in the vicinity of the work of Santa Rosalia, was surrounded by a chain of awful precipices, forming barrancas immensely deep, and from one to three hundred yards in width; and it was at these places only, or at the gate at La Cueva that an entrance could possibly be gained into the fort. At La Cueva, where the ridge ascending into the fort was only thirty feet in breadth, a traverse wall was thrown up, on which were mounted two guns. The work next above La Cueva was a small half-moon battery, of one gun, called Santa Rosalia, which raked the wall up to the next battery, called La Libertad. This was a work of two guns, which enfiladed the space down to Santa Rosalia. Above La Libertad was a small one-gun battery, and above it Santa Barbara, a battery of two guns, which commanded the others; while Tepeaca, mounting two guns, crowned the whole, commanding the barranca, and the heights on its opposite side; but, from its great elevation, it did not command the works of the fort. Across the only weak part of Pansacola a breastwork was thrown up, merely to cover infantry, as the difficulties of its approach rendered it secure, if defended by a few steady troops.

One height, in front of Pansacola, commanded that part of the fort, and there was

also a hill, much higher than, and opposite to Tepeaca; but, from the difficulty of ascending this latter hill, owing to its extraordinary steepness, Torres, and Colonel Noboa who had examined it, considered it impossible to transport artillery to its summit. In fact, the strength of this fort, whose natural advantages were so much improved by art, seemed to warrant the opinion, that, protected by a garrison of resolute men, it would be impregnable.

Within the fort, near Pansacola, was a well, affording a constant supply of water, that had never yet been found deficient, even in seasons of drought; there was likewise a large rivulet, which ran through the barranca on the left of the fort, and washed the feet of the precipices. This stream, during the rainy season, and for two or three months afterwards, yielded abundance of water. It was, therefore, deemed impracticable to deprive the garrison of a supply of water. The fort was victualled with *twenty thousand fanegas* (about one and a half bushel English measure to the fanega) of *Indian corn*, *ten thousand of wheat*, a large quantity of flour, *six hundred head of cattle*, *two thousand sheep or goats*, and *three hundred large hogs*. The supply of ammunition was considerable, besides a quantity of nitre, sulphur, iron, copper, and lead. The garrison of the fort consisted of about fifteen hundred troops, of whom three hundred had been trained for infantry by Colonel Noboa, and were under tolerable discipline. The rest of the troops formed a motley groupe, undisciplined, but brave.

When Mina arrived at the fort, its works were in many parts defective; but, by the exertions of his officers, and fourteen hundred peasantry, who were kept there for that duty, they were placed in a more perfect order. The whole number of persons in the fort, including the peasantry, women, and children, was about three thousand.

As the enemy could not succeed in their attempts to carry Sombrero by assault, it was presumable they could never so take the fort of Los Remedios, since the latter presented so many more obstacles to such an endeavour than the former. To attempt to reduce it by famine, was considered as preposterous, as it would consume much more time than the enemy could devote to such an operation. In short, the fort was deemed capable of withstanding a siege of at least twelve months.

We have been thus particular in describing the fort of Los Remedios, in order to shew that if Torres had been a man possessing even true

patriotism, without military discernment, and had acted with zeal and good faith towards Mina, he would at first have advised the latter to repair, with all his officers and men, to Los Remedios, there to concentrate their forces, and form their plan of future operations. Instead of doing this, Torres induced Mina to remain at Sombrero, by deluding him with hollow promises of supplies of provisions and troops, until his prospects were blasted by the destruction of his division. It is impossible, therefore, for us not to accuse Torres of treachery or ignorance, and in fact of both, in all his conduct towards Mina.—But let us resume our narrative.

It was concluded between Torres and Mina, that while the former should remain in defence of the fort, the latter should take the command of a body of cavalry, for the purpose of harassing the enemy, by infesting the roads, and preventing supplies from reaching them. Meanwhile, Liñan was enabled, in consequence of the severe blow which he had struck at Sombrero, to advance, with a strong reinforcement, against Los Remedios; and on the 27th, a division of his army made its appearance before that place.

Mina thereon withdrew from the fort with

nine hundred cavalry, with the view already stated. He wished to take with him all his officers; but, at the earnest solicitation of Torres, who considered them of the highest importance, he left the whole behind him, with the exception of his aid-de-camp. It is true, that these officers were of essential consequence for the defence of the fort; but the loss to Mina was most serious; for had he taken them with him, there would have been more likelihood of his accomplishing his views, than when he was dependent upon men among the patriot officers, whose characters and abilities he had yet to ascertain. Perhaps there is no circumstance in Mina's career, that displays more clearly his generous and magnanimous disposition, than his thus yielding to the importunities of Torres, after the shameful manner in which the latter had neglected him at Sombrero. He was now to take the field with a body of irregular troops, without even the semblance of discipline, and without confidence either in him, or in each other, and to enter on an active campaign, which peculiarly required the aid of experienced officers. However, to do his best was all that was left to him; and he consoled himself with the reflection, that his officers would essentially contribute to baffle the enemy's designs upon Los Remedios.

The general marched to the *Tlachiquera*, an hacienda near the cantonment of Ortiz, on the heights of Guanaxuato, ten leagues north of the city, by the route of the mountains. He had ordered Don Encarnacion Ortiz to meet him at the hacienda, and there he expected to have found the greater part of the officers and men of his own division, who, he still flattered himself, had survived the disasters of Sombrero.

We have before noticed the loose financial and military regulations prevailing among the patriots, under the command of Padre Torres; but it is now necessary to describe particularly the troops arrayed under the orders of Mina, to demonstrate the great disadvantages the latter had to contend against.

In the early stages of the revolution, it will have been perceived by our previous statements, that there were periods at which several divisions had attained to a considerable degree of discipline and regularity, under Morelos, Matamoros, the Raÿons, Teran, Victoria, and other distinguished patriot officers; but, from the want of a cordial understanding among those chiefs, the cause of the republic had retrograded.

In the latter stages of the revolution, capable and experienced men were rare; there was no

opportunity for selection; the commandants were not only illiterate men, but unfortunately men who entered into the cause of their country, as into an adventure or speculation, and who regarded their own convenience or personal views more than the success of the revolution, or the interests of their country.

The funds which ought to have been appropriated to the pay and equipment of their troops, were absorbed and squandered by the commandants and their satellites. With no check upon their cupidity, they enriched themselves with impunity. The troops were allowed to live at their respective homes, and were never called together but on a pressing emergency. When they did assemble, each man was clothed as suited his particular taste or circumstances. The soldier received no pay, unless in active service, and then it was only two reals per day, out of which he supported himself. On Sundays they would assemble at a pueblo, for the double purpose of hearing mass, and of receiving, when the commanders *chose* to be in funds to supply them, a hat, or shirt, and sometimes a dollar or two, not on the score of pay, of which no rolls were kept, but as a gracious donation. Beyond this they were seldom supplied; in short, they were generally to be seen

in their shirt sleeves, with a mangas or a blanket thrown loosely over the shoulders. The only exception to this description were the *escoltas* (escorts) of the commandants, consisting of from ten to fifty men, according to the means and consequence of the commandants. These were picked men, who had distinguished themselves for courage. They were well dressed, according to the taste of the commandant; were mounted on excellent horses, and generally well armed: they acted as a body guard to the commandant, with whom they fled when it became necessary.

The whole of the troops, with the exception of those in the forts, were cavalry, a horse being given to each man, which he was obliged to protect from the enemy. Living at their respective houses, they were constantly on the alert; and on the approach of the enemy, instead of uniting for common defence, each man was provident of his own safety. The commandants of the districts asserted, that this was the only way to save their men, as the incursions of the enemy would not permit them to be embodied in troops or squadrons. This system, it is true, had in some degree become necessary; but it was a fatal necessity, created by the vicious character of the commandants themselves, who amassed and dissipated the resources of the country, for their own personal gratifications, instead of devoting them to the clothing and subsisting a respectable body of troops.

Whenever their soldiers were to be collected, it was usually accomplished, by despatching persons around the country, with orders for them to repair to an appointed rendezvous, which they obeyed at their pleasure. The men generally selected all their own officers, except the commandant of the district; and it was not uncommon to see captains, majors, colonels, and brigadiers, who had once been field labourers, major-domos, or arrieros (muleteers). Few of them could read or write, and none had any pretensions to military knowledge of any kind. They had been chosen by their companions for personal intrepidity and activity—qualities, in their estimation, of primary importance, and which most of them possessed in an eminent degree. It is hence obvious, that no discipline nor military arrangements could exist among such troops and such officers. Incapable of forming in line with precision, unaccustomed to any sort of uniformity in the language of command, or the prac-

tice of even reducing or forming column, they were no more than a disorderly mob, equally ignorant of the methods of attaining, and insensible to the importance of compactness and unity of action. The confidence which a disciplined soldier places in the support of his companions, and the result of a simultaneous motion at command, were unknown to them. But, notwithstanding all these defects, their natural bravery enabled them occasionally to perform most daring exploits. They charged desperately, in loose and broken masses; and, if they once succeeded in piercing the enemy's line, made great havoc: but if checked, they broke; and it was in vain to attempt to rally them. Like Scythians, they came down in a hail-storm, and retired in a cloud, each man seeking his safety in flight—not like disciplined troops when broken, to rally and form at some convenient position, but to save themselves altogether. In these scenes, the flying soldiers, and particularly the officers, frequently gave proofs of great personal valour and presence of mind.

The Mexican, mounted on his horse, on whose speed and activity he can rely, places the most unbounded confidence in him. Neither showers of balls, nor the numbers of his

opponents, dismay him. The officers dash in among the enemy, and, perfectly regardless how their men act, seem only intent on setting them an example of courage. When compelled to retreat before superior numbers, the Mexican, instead of jading his favourite horse, proportions his flight to the speed of his pursuers; and if he perceive one or two of the enemy detached from their main body, he will face round and give them battle in presence of the rest. In short, we know, from frequent personal observation, that no men possess more innate courage than the Mexican Creole; he has every quality necessary to form the soldier; and, as an individual, seated on his usually high-spirited horse, with his sword and lance, is as formidable an opponent as any in the world. But, for want of discipline and military regulation, the Creoles are of little use when embodied, and can easily be put to the rout. Hence the royalists, whose troops are composed of artillery and trained infantry, as well as cavalry, have been enabled to gain advantages over them; and more especially at the period of which we are now speaking, when the destinies of the republic were in the hands of such men as Padre Torres and his commandants.

This description of the Creoles is not peculiar to those of Mexico; but may, with a little modification, be considered, we think, as a correct portraiture of those of all the Spanish settlements on the American continent. The natural excellencies of this race, their intrepidity, their capacity to endure hardships and privations, their sobriety, their self-possession, and their abstemiousness, are qualities so well calculated for military enterprise, that the intelligent reader will at once perceive that discipline alone is necessary to render them, in their own country and climate, the most formidable and effective soldiers.

Shall this fine race of people become free and and independent; allies of the republic of the United States? or are they like the Asiatics, in circumstances nearly similar, to become the subjugators of their own country under European discipline, and the terror and scourge of adjacent countries? Who can foresee what might be accomplished by two hundred thousand Mexican Creoles, versed in the tactics of this day, with ambitious European leaders? This is a subject which opens a wide field for reflection, and particularly merits the regard of the American statesman.

The equipments of the patriots have already

been briefly noticed. Their ammunition was in general of their own manufacture. The physical resources of the country are superabundant; with any common management; for Mexico abounds with salt petre, the craters of her volcanoes yield sulphur, while the forests afford charcoal. Thus, although the manufacture be rude, they can make any quantity of powder. Flints are found in the rivulets of the mountains; and from the bowels of the latter are extracted lead, copper, and iron, as well as gold and silver. They have therefore the means within themselves of carrying on war; but the want of artists and mechanics renders the productions of their country of but little use to them.

The body of nine hundred cavalry, which was placed under Mina's command, was composed of men such as we have described, who may be properly styled Mexican Cossacks. Hosts of officers were among them: a corps of two hundred and fifty men would be commanded by brigadiers, or colonels; colonels again would command a body of fifty men. The subalterns were numerous: in one body of two hundred and fifty men, commanded by a brigadier, there were *more than eighteen captains.* Different kinds of arms were found in the same company;

and a just subordination was unknown among them.

With such troops was Mina now destined to act. Almost any other man would have been filled with desponding apprehensions, under such circumstances. But, although he was aware of their want of discipline, yet as he had seen troops of the same description behave well in the affair of San Juan de los Llanos, and as in the recent attack on the enemy's cavalry between Leon and Silao, he had been an eye-witness of their valour, he imagined that by perseverance he should be able to remedy all their deficiencies.

The general, with great pains and patience, formed his nine hundred men into three squadrons: the carabineers formed the vanguard; the centre was composed of lancers, and the rear guard of carabineers. He assigned commanding officers to each division; and contemplated establishing a Guard of Honour from his supernumerary officers, on the model of his old guard, but he did not accomplish it.

The captain-general Don José Maria Liceaga, whom we have before mentioned, had joined Mina. His advice and information were of great importance. The patriots, however, viewed

Liceaga with a jealous eye. He had become unpopular, by endeavouring to adhere to a system of strict discipline, as is always the case where discipline is neither established nor its advantages appreciated.

On the morning of the 30th, Mina was near the Tlachiquera; there he met Ortiz, with nineteen of the division, who had escaped from Sombrero. There were six officers among these nineteen men. The moment the general saw them, he put spurs to his horse, and flew to receive them. He cordially gave them a soldier's embrace, and with great eagerness asked, "Where are the rest?" He was answered, "We are all that are left." The blow was severe: his countenance depicted the anguish of his heart; and placing his leg across the pummel of his saddle, he reclined his head on his hand. His fine eye glistened with the warrior's tear of sensibility; but quickly recovering himself, his countenance resumed its accustomed serenity. The general retained four officers and six soldiers of the nineteen, and ordered the rest to take commands under Ortiz.

In the mean time the army of Liñan had invested the fort, and the formal siege of Los Remedios commenced on the 31st of August. The barrancas and precipices which encircled

the fort, were alike important to defend the besiegers against sallies, and the besieged against assaults. The former posted their infantry on positions, with one exception, inaccessible to assault, on the opposite side of the barrancas, and in front of the works of the fort.

The enemy, not satisfied with occupying holds naturally impregnable, intrenched themselves wherever they planted their batteries. Their front was protected against the assaults of the besieged by insurmountable precipices, and their rear was secure from the movements of Mina, as it was impossible for cavalry to ascend those heights. The grand encampment of the enemy was formed in the plain, immediately at the foot of the ascent to the entrance of the fort. From this position, they could more easily reinforce their works around the fort; thence they could cover them from Mina's attacks, and besides prevent the escape of the garrison by that passage. The only possible way left for escape, was by Pansacola. The head-quarters of Liñan were placed on the summit of the opposite side of the barranca, directly facing Tepeaca. After the enemy had broken ground in front, they had, with incredible labour, drawn up cannon, and planted on this summit a battery of three guns and two

howitzers; which, being within a short range of Tepeaca, severely annoyed that position, but, from its great elevation, could not fire into the other works. This was an annoyance not anticipated by the besieged, as they had believed it impracticable to raise cannon to that spot. The enemy, however, after some time, made an excavation in the side of the precipice, below the battery, sufficient to admit one gun, which effectually raked the works of the fort, from Tepeaca down to Santa Rosalia. On the side of the barranca, fronting Santa Rosalia and La Libertad, the enemy had erected two batteries, the one commanding the other, which threw shot into the works of the besieged, from the distance of half-musquet-shot. In the first, the enemy planted three pieces of heavy artillery; in the second, two pieces. In the rear of the latter, on a small table land, that was naturally well defended, was an intrenched camp, with one piece of artillery. On a commanding height, in the rear of the whole, were planted a twelve-pound battering gun and a howitzer. From this position, the whole of that part of Los Remedios, from La Cueva up to Tepeaca, was much annoyed. Opposite the weak part of Pansacola, another encampment was formed, and a battery of two pieces of artillery and two

howitzers was there opened. On the left of La Cueva, three pieces of artillery and two howitzers were subsequently planted in battery, which fired into the rear of that work. Between their several positions also, on every place where escape was in any way practicable, were posted intrenched picquets, with the view of cutting off from the fort all possible external communication. A corps of eight hundred well-equipped infantry and cavalry, under the command of Don Francisco de Orrantia, was ordered to observe the movements of Mina.

Thus had the enemy, with extraordinary trouble and skill, completed a line of attack, which effectually hemmed in the garrison, and menaced the works of Los Remedios. We have already described the defences of the fort; and although, at the time the siege was commenced, they were in many parts defective, yet, by the labour of the peasantry, and the skill and activity of Mina's officers, they were daily improved and strengthened.

Mina advanced from the Tlachiquera to the cantonment of Don Encarnacion Ortiz, where he augmented his force with two hundred and fifty of the cavalry of that officer, and marched the same evening. His first great object was to interrupt the enemy's line of communication

between the city of Mexico and the northern provinces. By destroying their fortifications in that direction, their convoys would be deprived of their strong places of depôt, and consequently would be exposed to the incursions of the patriots of *Xalpa*, who were in formidable bodies about Queretaro, and on that road. Thus, also, supplies for the besieging army at Remedios would be rendered precarious.

Mina advanced rapidly the first night of his march; and, at sun-rise next morning, came up to a fortified hacienda, called *Biscocho*. Its defences were insignificant. The garrison took possession of the church, and from the roof and steeple fired on the assailants. Mina sent a summons, demanding their immediate surrender. A refusal having been returned, the place was attacked, and, after a short conflict, carried. The garrison were made prisoners, with the exception of the commandant, who had prudently decamped on the first appearance of Mina's troops. The recollection of the dreadful massacre at Sombrero, the clamours of Mina's surviving companions, and the rage of his whole division, now operated on his feelings; and, for the first time, he listened to the cries of revenge. Thirty-one of the garrison

were taken out, and shot. The mere mention, a few weeks before, of such a sacrifice of prisoners, would have filled the general, as well as his troops, with horror; but the wanton barbarity of the royalists rendered it necessary to repress the feelings of humanity. The extension of mercy to an enemy who spurned at every principle of civilized warfare, had become impolitic and preposterous; and it was now necessary to repel acts of barbarism, by measures of just retaliation. The remains of Mina's division vowed to sacrifice every royalist taken in arms, until they had expiated the blood of their murdered companions, or until the enemy should refrain from immolating their prisoners in cold blood. It was not, however, Mina's intention to cherish these views of retaliation. On the occasion in question, he permitted the principle to be acted upon; but it is the only act, bearing the apparent impress of cruelty or severity, with which his name can be charged.

After ordering the hacienda to be burned, to prevent its being immediately re-occupied by the enemy, and driving off the cattle, the general, next morning, continued his march towards *San Luis de la Paz*, a pueblo of some importance, situated about fourteen leagues to the eastward of Guanaxuato. San Luis de la

Paz had suffered much during the revolution, and many of its principal edifices were in ruins. It was occupied by a detachment of the enemy, consisting of one hundred infantry, aided by some of the male population of the place. On Mina's approach, the enemy had ordered them to repair to the fortifications, and had made preparations for resistance. The church, the parsonage-house which joined it, and the cemetery, were the chief places of defence. The former was in itself a strong hold; while the latter was surrounded by a wall pierced with loop-holes, outside of which was a dry ditch, crossed by a drawbridge, affording the only approach to the church. Its garrison, sheltered by the wall, gave great annoyance through the loop-holes; and every place around their little work was commanded by infantry posted on the top of the church and in the belfry, the openings of which had been filled up with bricks, sufficient to protect the men.

The garrison, supposing that Mina would be repulsed with the same ease with which the attacks of other patriot commanders had always been foiled, had been careless in supplying the place with provisions; but they procured water from a fountain at the parsonage-house. Against organized troops this place could not have

been defended; and if Mina had then had with him his former little band of foreigners, he would have carried it in a few minutes by storm. But he now found that the patriot troops, whom he had beheld in combats in plains against the enemy's cavalry and infantry acting with the greatest gallantry, when brought to scale walls, or to oppose infantry posted within a fortified place, were totally ineffective.

The general summoned the commander of the garrison to surrender. A refusal having been returned, Mina surrounded the place, so as effectually to prevent the escape of the garrison. He determined on making an experiment to carry it by assault, particularly as some ruins of houses stood within twenty paces of the drawbridge. He made the necessary dispositions, but soon perceived that it was difficult to draw his soldiers from their coverts among the ruined houses. In vain he tried to make them advance in a compact body. They scattered and fell back before the fire of the infantry of the garrison. Some intrepid officers and men of the storming parties boldly advanced; but, not being properly supported, their lives were sacrificed to their gallantry. The general was deeply mortified: he resolved, however, to reduce the place by famine, in case

he could not otherwise effect it. The patriots at times would seem anxious to renew the attack, and the general, enlivened at this display of zeal, would again lead them on: but vain were these attempts; they invariably shrunk back, at the very critical moment when firmness was most necessary. Various plans were now devised to destroy the drawbridge, but none of the troops could be prevailed upon to carry them into execution. Bundles of faggots were prepared to be thrown into the ditch to burn it down: but the few bundles, which some spirited volunteers carried to the spot, were not sufficient to accomplish the object. The drawbridge was suspended only by strong leathern thongs; to cut these, was one plan; and several bold attempts were ineffectually made to reach them. On one of those occasions of fitful animation among his troops, Mina ordered one of his officers, Captain Perrier, to head the storming party. This brave man found no difficulty in scaling the wall, and, supposing his troops would follow him, leaped in among the enemy; but, on turning round, he found himself alone,—abandoned at a moment when an easy victory might have been gained. The gallant captain, with great

exertions, made his escape back, but was severely wounded.

Mina, after spending four days in these abortive attempts at assault, resorted to sapping and running a covered way from the ruins of the houses to the drawbridge; which he accomplished, and the bridge was then cut down. The garrison at once surrendered, without further opposition, and called for quarter. The scenes of Sombrero were still fresh in the recollection of his troops; they demanded revenge, and reminded the general of their recent oath not to spare a royalist taken in arms. But the merciful disposition of Mina now displayed itself: he interposed between the conquerors and the vanquished, and succeeded in preventing an indiscriminate slaughter of the prisoners; but, to appease the patriots, he consented to make an example of three persons—the commander of the place; that of Biscocho, who was found here; and an European soldier: these were shot. The greater part of the prisoners expressed a desire to join Mina's banners; and the remainder were set at liberty.

The fortifications of San Luis were demolished, as it was impossible to attempt to hold it against a regular siege. Colonel Gonzales, in whose district it lay, a celebrated warrior of

the troops of Xalpa, was left in command of the place, to watch the movements of the enemy. Mina then advanced against *San Miguel el Grande*, a town of considerable importance, fourteen leagues south-east of Guanaxuato. While making preparations for its capture, which, from its position, he had every reason to calculate upon, he received advice that a very strong body of the enemy were advancing for its defence; he therefore considered it prudent to draw off his troops, and retreat. He now saw the misfortune of having occupied so much time in the reduction of San Luis de la Paz. If he had proceeded to San Miguel el Grande three days sooner, he could have taken the place. Resources of every kind would have been acquired there; he would have completed his plan of cutting off the enemy's chain of communications; and the war might have assumed a new character. But to fail, where success was justly anticipated, is an event incident to the species of warfare in which he was then engaged; yet it is ever to be regretted that he was frustrated in the prosecution of this plan.

Mina being thus under the necessity of abandoning his design upon San Miguel, proceeded to the Valle de Santiago, a place of some im-

portance, situated on the south side of the river of that name, sixteen leagues south of Guanaxuato. The Valle de Santiago, whose destruction by Torres has been before noticed, was one of the few towns which remained in the possession of the patriots. When Mina entered it, he found it in ruins; the churches alone remaining uninjured. A considerable population, among whom were some very respectable families, still dwelt amidst this scene of desolation, in huts erected on the sites of their former handsome edifices. The inhabitants of the Valle de Santiago, animated by their hostility to Spanish authority, scarcely appeared to regret that their comforts had been sacrificed at the shrine of liberty. Enthusiastically devoted to the cause of their country, they had always rejected with scorn every overture of the royalists to seduce them. Most tenderly did they cherish the thought of the independence of their country; most faithfully did they cling to her through the dark night of her misfortunes; and, finally, sealed their attachment to her, by deserting the place of their nativity, when it subsequently fell into the hands of the enemy.

The district in which it is situated, though not extensive, is yet valuable from its soil, which is more productive, perhaps, than that of

any other part of the kingdom. It enjoyed, at that time, a great commerce; the annual revenue of the comandancia being one hundred and twenty thousand dollars. *Don Lucas Flores*, the commandant, was a hardy, intrepid man; and, as a guerilla chief, had been distinguished by his enterprise. Being so destitute of education as to be unable to write his own name, the regulation of the finances was committed to a treasurer, whose principal care was directed to the enrichment of himself; so that the revenue of this important district disappeared, and the public coffers were kept empty.

Don Lucas was one of the confederated commandants under Padre Torres. Operated upon by the bad example of his chief, he became dissipated and inactive, and lost his popularity by the commission of arbitrary and vexatious acts. It was in the power of Don Lucas, by cordially co-operating with Mina, to have rendered the most essential service to the common cause. He had secreted upwards of fifteen hundred stand of excellent arms, which he had taken from the enemy in different actions; these, with the resources of his comandancia, properly applied, would have been all-important at that juncture. We believe that he was sincerely

attached to his country, but from his great regard for Torres, or from pride, ignorance, or some other motive, his conduct towards Mina was characterized by reserve. Don Lucas commanded a body of brave troops, than whom none had displayed more gallantry in irregular conflicts with the enemy's cavalry; but, as was usual, the escort of the commandant was the only portion of them properly equipped. Gaming, and disorderly conduct of every kind, predominated among them, as unfortunately they did among all the revolutionary troops.

Mina had selected the Valle de Santiago for his head-quarters, on account of its position, its abundant resources for the supply of his troops, and the confidence he reposed in the patriotism of its inhabitants. On entering the town, the respectable inhabitants received him in the most affectionate and enthusiastic manner, conducting him to the church amidst a concourse of people. A *Te Deum* was chaunted, and every eye beamed with satisfaction at beholding Mina. The troops encamped near the town; where provisions and pay were furnished them by the comandancia, or by patriotic individuals.

During his stay in the Valle de Santiago, Mina attempted to remedy the want of discipline among his troops. But the officers were so illiterate, and so entirely strangers to military subordination, that he could accomplish but little in the short time he was among them. A total change of system, and much time, were requisite to eradicate their pernicious habits, and establish discipline. To change or instruct the officers, to regulate anew the finances, to repress the excesses of anarchy, and establish order and subordination, were objects to be executed only by degrees. Besides, had Mina attempted to introduce the change at once, his measures would have been viewed as harsh and despotic, and he would have created enemies among those whose good-will at that crisis it was so important for him to gain. Under these circumstances, there remained no alternative for him, but to make the best use of the means which were presented to him, and to adopt such a system of tactics as was best suited to troops undisciplined, and unacquainted with the importance of military subjection, until time and events should enable him gradually to effect a change; and he flattered himself that this would be more speedily accomplished, could he only succeed in raising the siege of Los Remedios.

While waiting for reenforcements, he advanced with a select corps to attack a fortified

hacienda, called La Sanja, a few leagues distant from the Valle de Santiago. This position is strong, and being in a low situation near the lake of Jurida, the country around it is capable of being inundated at pleasure; it is likewise encompassed by broad and deep ditches. These difficulties were not to be surmounted by inexperienced troops, and the attempt to take it by storm proved abortive; he therefore returned to the Valle de Santiago.

After his return, he issued orders to the surrounding commandants, urging them to direct all their exertions to cut up the intercourse by the roads to Los Remedios; pointing that out, as the most effectual measure to defeat the views of the enemy. Having received a small reenforcement of troops, he marched, with nearly one thousand cavalry, to the vicinity of the fort, for the purpose of attacking the enemy, upon the first favourable opportunity; and with this view he proceeded to the hacienda of La Hoya.

The enemy, when apprised of his approach, despatched a strong division under the command of Don Francisco de Orrantia, to attack him. The general made his dispositions for battle; but finding, on reconnoitring, that the force consisted of a body of infantry and cavalry

against which it would be imprudent to contend, he ordered a retreat. The enemy pursued him to the foot of the mountains near Guanaxuato, where the patriots adopted their usual mode of eluding the enemy, by separating into small detachments, each one following the route to its own comandancia. The general, with a small party, hung on the rear of the enemy, skirmishing with them, until they entered the town of Irapuato. He then proceeded to the Valle de Santiago, and issued orders to the commandants to reassemble their troops as early as possible. The junction of their forces being accomplished, he marched to the plain of Silao, between the place of that name and Los Remedios, where he was reenforced by other divisions of patriots; with one of which came Don Pedro Moreno, the çi-devant commandant of Sombrero. The general's force then amounted to about eleven hundred men, a great proportion of whom were miserably equipped. He menaced the enemy's fortified towns, and, by his rapid and unexpected movements, kept the Baxio in a state of constant alarm, thereby preventing supplies from reaching the besieging army at Los Remedios; while Orrantia, with a division of picked troops, followed the movements of Mina, but did not attempt to attack him.

The royalists generally bivouacked in the same positions which Mina had occupied on the preceding night.

Mina was in close correspondence with some of the leading inhabitants of the enemy's towns; and, as he found that the enemy at Los Remedios drew their principal supplies from the city of Guanaxuato, he considered its capture as the most effectual means of cutting them off, and thus raising the siege of the fort. Mina well knew the strength of Liñan's position at Los Remedios. He was aware of the deficiency of discipline among the patriot troops; and that the numerical force of the enemy was nearly seven times greater than his own, and, besides, consisted principally of European veterans, with their best cavalry, which was adapted to the nature and circumstances of the country. To attack the encampment of Liñan, therefore, in the plain at the foot of the hill of Los Remedios, under such circumstances, would have been to disregard all military principles; it would have been rashness in the extreme; and, much as Mina liked dashing operations, he was too prudent to attempt to perform them, with such troops as those then under his command. To attack the enemy's intrenchments around the fort, was impracticable. Besides, could he have

ascended the heights with cavalry, he had seen enough to convince him that the patriot troops were not capable of assaulting by escalade. These considerations united in confirming his purpose; and, having received the most flattering assurances of support from some of the most respectable citizens of Guanaxuato, he decided on the attack of that city.

Mina communicated these intentions to Padre Torres, by couriers. But this man, either from ignorance, or from apprehension of the consequences that would arise in favour of Mina, if the latter should take Guanaxuato, opposed the plan; insisting that the only possible mode of relieving the fort was by attacking the besiegers. In vain did the general represent to him the advantages that must arise from the capture of Guanaxuato, and the disadvantages attendant upon attacking the besiegers, from the relative strength and composition of the adverse forces; and that therefore the only effective blow which could be struck against the enemy, would be the capture of Guanaxuato. Torres at length threw off all reserve; he not only disapproved of Mina's plan, but resorted to the disgraceful step of sending an order to Don Lucas Flores, and to others of the commandants, to put their *best troops under Mina's command only in the*

event of his attacking the enemy at the fort; otherwise, that they must afford him only partial succours of the worst of their troops. This was an unexpected blow to Mina. He could scarcely repress his indignation at the baseness of Torres; but it was not the moment to indulge in expressions of displeasure, and he therefore strove to accommodate himself to circumstances, which it was not in his power to resist or to modify.

Mina continued his operations by a system of guerilla warfare in the Baxio, and actually reduced the enemy to so great a degree of want, that desertions from their ranks commenced. A sergeant and two men, of the European regiment of Fernando VII. presented themselves to Mina in the hacienda de Burras, five leagues from Gaunaxuato. From these men he learned that the enemy had been compelled to subsist chiefly upon the green corn, which their cavalry brought in from the neighbouring ranchos; that their troops received no pay; and that discontent was becoming general. They also stated, that he might expect soon to be joined by a number of deserters; that many soldiers, before that time, would have passed over to the patriot standard, had it not been from an apprehension of being put to death by some

roving band of patriots, before they could reach Mina.

During these operations of Mina in the Baxio, the enemy was carrying on the siege of Los Remedios with vigour. They had already been employed twenty days in throwing up intrenchments, to protect themselves from the assaults which they feared Mina might attempt to make on them; and the lines of approach, for the reduction of the fort, were thus becoming daily more formidable.

The garrison, in the mean time, was not inactive. Under the direction of Mina's officers, the curtain, if it may be so termed, and the works extending from Santa Rosalia to Tepeaca, had been nearly completed; and to their unintermitted exertions was Padre Torres wholly indebted for the fort's being placed in a state capable of making so gallant a resistance against an enemy so much more numerous, and so far superior in the character of his troops, and in artillery.

From the opposite heights, which were within musquet-shot, the enemy frequently held conversations with the besieged, and vauntingly expressed their confidence of gaining possession of the fort by storm, on the very first attempt. Accordingly, about the 20th of September, they

advanced in three columns, and assaulted the fort at the points of Pansacola and Tepeaca, directing their principal efforts against a part of the curtain which was then unfinished. The battery of La Libertad, which had been planned by Mina, and which his officers had laboured to complete, was also unfinished. They advanced against each point simultaneously, and upon the opening in the curtain, in admirable order; but they were received in a manner which they had not expected. After an inveterate conflict of three hours, finding their attempts to enter the fort abortive, they were compelled to retire, after suffering very severely. Liñan, being thus disappointed in carrying Los Remedios on the first assault, determined to open a mine under the work at Tepeaca. In this effort he also failed; twice was he disappointed in his attempts to destroy the battery by explosion. Had he accomplished that object, the fort must have fallen into his possession, as Tepeaca was the key to the position. But the engineers of Liñan must have been deficient in skill; for, on springing the mine, the explosion each time issued by the mouth of the gallery, killing and wounding many of the miners. This, conjoined with the frequent sorties from the fort on the mining parties, at length com-

pelled the enemy to abandon the project of undermining it.

Meanwhile they had erected batteries in front of La Libertad. From these they opened a heavy fire, which seriously injured the curtain and works generally. As Liñan had been foiled in his attempts to blow up Tepeaca, he determined, once more, to resort to open assault. Having succeeded in making a breach in the curtain, below Santa Rosalia, the enemy prepared to storm it, making, at the same time, judicious diversions on Pansacola and Tepeaca. The design of the enemy being soon perceived, the gun from Santa Rosalia was carried down and planted in the breach, supported by infantry, and peasantry armed with missile weapons. A strong column of European infantry moving up to the breach, under cover of a fire from their works, advanced intrepidly to within a few paces of it, when they were received with so much spirit, that they soon fell back. They rallied and returned to the attack, but, on approaching the fatal breach, were again repulsed. At the other points of assault they were received with the same gallantry; and, after having suffered a severe loss in each attack, the enemy beat the retreat, and retired within their intrenchments.

The garrison, animated by their recent exploits, determined to become the assailants. The batteries opposite to La Libertad had seriously annoyed the besieged; for the superior artillery of the enemy, placed there within short range of the works, did them great injury. The damage committed thereby during the day was repaired by night with stones and sand bags. But, wearied with the great and repeated fatigue, the garrison resolved to attempt the destruction of the enemy's first battery, on which were mounted three heavy pieces of artillery. This enterprise was to be performed against European troops, strongly intrenched.

A party of two hundred and fifty men was selected for this daring operation, commanded by Captains Crocker and Ramsay, and Lieutenant Wolfe, three officers of Mina. Lieutenant Wolfe, with a detachment of fifty men, was ordered to gain the rear of the enemy's first work, by a circuitous route, and act simultaneously with the remainder of the party, which was to advance in front. Favoured by the obscurity of the night, the parties gained their positions unobserved by the enemy. Lieutenant Wolfe opened a fire from the rear; and scarcely had the enemy directed their attention to that point, when the party in front gallantly rushed

forward. The enemy, being in a state of continual alarm of Mina, and not expecting an assault from the besieged, finding themselves attacked in front and rear at the same instant, supposed that the attack in front was in cooperation with that of Mina in the rear. Under this impression, we presume, they discharged a couple of guns, loaded with grape-shot, at the party in front, but without any effect; and, struck with a panic, exclaiming, *Mina! Mina!* they leaped their works in confusion, and fled to their second battery. The two heaviest guns were spiked, and their limbers destroyed; the work was levelled, and the party retired without the loss or injury of a man. They brought off the third gun from the enemy's works, but could not carry it further than the foot of the barranca, where it was rendered unserviceable and abandoned.

Thus was executed an enterprise entirely unexpected on the part of the enemy, the effect of which must have been very considerable on their minds, however unimportant it may be viewed in relation to the force on either side. The enemy, however, shortly after replaced their artillery, and thenceforward limited their operations to a cannonading and blockade. The damage which their artillery effected on the

works of the fort, was speedily repaired by the ordinary means of war. The siege did not excite much uneasiness; for, in despite of the enemy's vigilance, some of the brave peasants found their way into the fort almost every night, with powder and other articles. Provisions were abundant in the magazines. The finest fresh bread was daily served out; meat was plentiful; and in fact the garrison had not only necessaries, but luxuries.

The enemy's situation presented a striking contrast. They had scarcely any other subsistence than unripe corn, as before mentioned; for Mina had effectually cut off their supplies. All the country, for several miles around Los Remedios, had been deserted by the inhabitants, who had likewise driven off their cattle. The situation of the enemy was soon known to the garrison; and, in order to shew them the hopelessness of an attempt to obtain Los Remedios by famine, presents of fresh-baked bread, meat, brandy, and even fruit, were frequently placed at about half way between the hostile works.

The general was still pursuing his guerilla warfare, harassing the enemy incessantly, and cutting off their supplies of provisions, with an effect which every day made their situation more critical.

While Mina was marching through the hacienda of La Caxa, on the 10th of October, a peasant brought him the intelligence, that Orrantia was approaching, and was but a short distance in the rear.

Having had some opportunities of instilling a little more confidence in his troops, Mina thought the present a fit occasion to try them in the field, and therefore determined to give battle to Orrantia.

The experiment recently made in attacking fortifications, had convinced him that they could not be relied upon for such operations; but, as his force was then numerically superior to the enemy's, he entertained expectations that they would feel a confidence in themselves, and that amidst the fortuitous occurrences of an engagement, his experience might enable him to seize upon some advantageous moment to decide the conflict. To succeed in destroying this enemy would be in effect to raise the siege of Los Remedios, as Liñan could not detach from his force such another body of infantry and cavalry, as that of Orrantia's; and Mina would thereby be enabled to prosecute other plans against the enemy with facility, in which he had been hitherto frustrated by the position of Orrantia's division. Mina, it must be acknowledged, was

not very sanguine of the result of the battle; but as in war, under such circumstances, delay itself is disadvantageous, and as he hoped, at all events, to occasion a severe loss to the enemy, as well as to give the patriot troops an opportunity to distinguish themselves, he therefore determined to await the attack. The hacienda of La Caxa is situated on elevated ground, in a pass between two hills, distant from the enemy's town of Irapuato three leagues. The buildings of the hacienda were strongly fenced in. In front of them extended large plantations of Indian corn, which at that time was in full growth. The whole was enclosed by a very strong wall, with a small gate in one side, through which lay the road to the hacienda through the corn-fields. Immediately contiguous to this wall, on both sides, the ground was lying fallow.

Mina had with him, at this time, about eleven hundred men; but their character as soldiers must be borne in mind; for, in consequence of the disgraceful order issued by Torres, these troops were composed of the most ordinary men of the different comandancias, and many of them only armed with lazos and machetes. Desertion, as might be expected from such troops, was frequent, and, from the deficiency of all ideas of discipline, it was practised with an impunity the most pernicious, because irremediable. Whenever they were wearied with service, or were anxious to return to their families, they retired in pairs or dozens; and sometimes, at a critical moment, when an action was about taking place, they went off in still more considerable numbers. Mina, at length, finding it indispensable to interpose a check to this practice, even at the risk of losing his popularity, issued an order denouncing the penalty of death on all deserters. He sentenced to be shot two deserters, one of whom held the rank of a colonel. This act of firmness on the part of Mina, at least put a temporary check on desertion. Another evil had considerably injured the troops; it was a custom they had adopted of permitting females to accompany their expeditions. At the time we are speaking of, Ortiz had reinforced Mina with some cavalry; and many of the officers had brought with them their wives. Whether this was from anticipating an attack on the city of Guanaxuato, where the females would expect to come in for a share of the spoil, or from some other cause, is immaterial; but it was the first time that Mina had been encumbered with such auxiliaries, and they were of very serious disadvantage to him on this occasion.

The general, under all these embarrassing circumstances, made his dispositions for action. He posted a picquet at the gate of the enclosure, and, at some distance in the rear, on an elevated position, established his advanced guard, composed of two hundred and fifty men, such as he thought the best adapted for that duty, under the command of an enterprising Creole nicknamed "*El Giro*." In the corn-field, in front of the hacienda, on each side of the road, he posted the main body, resting obliquely upon it as a centre; and within the fence of the hacienda, was the rear-guard of two hundred men, with the women, ammunition, &c.

These dispositions were scarcely made, when the enemy were descried in motion upon the fallow ground before-mentioned, outside the fence, where they halted for a considerable time, apparently undecided how to act. Mina, thereupon, having given his instructions to the commander of the main body, proceeded to the advanced post, whence he could better reconnoitre the enemy, and seize upon any opportunity for a favourable movement. At length the enemy attacked and drove in the picquet, and passed within the fence, and again halted on the clear space within it, in close order.

Apprehensive of an ambuscade, the enemy threw out some light troops among the corn; but these were soon recalled, and whether or not they were afraid to advance by the high road, we cannot say; but, after a considerable time spent in preparation, they filed off to the right, thereby appearing to menace the left of Mina, and turn his flank. In executing this movement, their infantry fell into disorder; and Mina, supposing that he could reach them before they could form anew, made a charge with the advanced guard. It was executed with spirit; but his distance from the enemy was so great, that they had time to form, and thereby save themselves. Mina, with only two hundred and fifty men, now found himself engaged with the enemy's whole force. In the height of the action, a party of thirty of the enemy's cavalry, having made a circuit, approached the hacienda where the women were placed, who became alarmed, and fled. This created a panic in the rear-guard, who took to flight. The main body, seeing the flight of the rear-guard, without knowing the cause, likewise broke and dispersed, while Mina, with his little corps, was left to sustain the whole brunt of the action. The enemy's cavalry, seeing the confusion, pursued the fugitives, and the rout became general.

Upon this unexpected disaster, no other resource was left to Mina, than to cut his way through the enemy, which he most gallantly effected, after sustaining some loss. Orrantia then proceeded to the hacienda, where he shot some of the peasantry, for having remained in the place during the action: their houses he gave up to pillage. Mina, with the brave little party, who had supported him so well, bivouacked near the scene of action, while Orrantia passed the night at the hacienda, without venturing upon another attack. Next morning Mina proceeded to a small place, about four leagues distant, called *Pueblo Nuevo*, where he found some of the fugitives; but the greater number had crossed the river, on whose banks the place stands, and had returned to their respective homes.

In the late affair the general again expeperienced the lamentable evil of the want of discipline among the patriot troops, and of the fatal consequences of allowing females to accompany them. But he was so highly pleased with the valour and conduct of the advanced party, under his immediate command, that he felt a renewed conviction that he should be able to produce a considerable reformation among the patriot forces, by their example and

success. He was convinced, that if the unlooked-for panic-terror we have mentioned had not taken place, and that if his main body had been once closely engaged, the defeat of Orrantia would have been certain, or, at the least, that he must have been seriously crippled, and compelled to retire.

Despondency under any circumstances formed no part of Mina's character. His first care was, therefore, to adopt measures the best calculated to remedy the evils by which he was encompassed; and, as he knew that it would take a considerable time to re-assemble the scattered troops, he resolved, in the interval, to visit Xauxilla, the seat of the patriot government, with which he wished to consult, as to his future operations. With this view he selected an escort of twenty men, and dismissed the rest, after despatching orders to the different commandants, to assemble with their troops on a certain day at La Caxa. He proceeded in the evening for Xauxilla, and arrived there the next day.

Xauxilla was a small mud fort, the construction of which displayed the exercise of some military science. It was situated on an island just large enough to contain it, in the lake of Zacapo, a short distance from the vil-

lage of that name, in the intendancy of Valladolid, about twenty leagues south-west of the Valle de Santiago, and eighteen north-west of the city of Valladolid. It was surrounded by a swamp or pond, containing from five to six feet of water in depth, and could only be reached by canoes. Its garrison was composed of one hundred tolerably well-disciplined infantry. At this place the Republican Gazette was printed. There was, likewise, within the fort an extensive manufactory of powder, whence supplies had been sent to Los Remedios. The members of the government (if it may be so called) received Mina with cordiality. He frankly unfolded to them his plans, particularly that of attacking Guanaxuato; but this plan did not meet with their approbation. They did not believe that it could be accomplished with such troops as could then be placed under Mina's command. They were aware, that with undisciplined men, nothing could be effected, that would shed a lustre on Mina, or be of essential benefit to their country. They strongly recommended to the general to withdraw his remaining officers and men from the fort of Los Remedios, the place being impregnable, and well stored with provisions; and there being consequently no apprehensions of its

falling into the hands of the enemy, there was no absolute necessity that called for the presence of Mina's officers.

The members of the government endeavoured to impress upon Mina's mind the importance of organizing a body of troops, before he should undertake any momentous enterprise; and that, for the accomplishment of that purpose, the country between Xauxilla and the shores of the Pacific Ocean was the most proper place, as the enemy were there less numerous than in the Baxio, and the people were universally earnest in the patriot cause; besides, that the fertility of the country yielded ample supplies, and its natural positions afforded complete security. They made use of the most cogent arguments to persuade Mina to adopt this plan; but, after giving them all the consideration to which they were entitled, he remained unconvinced of its feasibility. His primary object was to relieve Los Remedios. Knowing the critical situation to which the enemy were reduced, by the failure of their supplies of provisions, and believing that if the design of compelling Liñan to withdraw from the siege of that fort, by the extremity of hunger, was abandoned, such another opportunity might not again occur; he flattered himself that if he

could effect this his favourite object, the affairs of the revolution would then assume a different aspect. He was, it is true, sensible that full reliance could not be placed upon the troops he commanded; but he thought, if he could obtain fifty infantry from Xauxilla, to be added to a like number from among the prisoners of San Luis de la Paz, whom Ortiz had undertaken to train, that with these, and an overwhelming force of cavalry, he should be able to capture the city of Guanaxuato. Mina likewise informed his counsellors, that his honour was implicated in relieving the fort of Remedios, and that he had also pledged himself to attack Guanaxuato.

The government, on finding his resolution taken, ordered fifty infantry of the fort to march to his place of rendezvous. Although the members of the government much regretted Mina's determination, yet they all admired the generous sentiments by which he was actuated in vindicating his plan, and earnestly wished him full success.

The general marched from Xauxilla, taking, on his return, a circuitous route through *Puruandiro*, formerly a considerable and rich town, but which, by the mandates of Torres, had been reduced to a heap of ruins, with the

usual exception of the churches. It lies about sixteen leagues north of the city of Valladolid, and was at that time in possession of the patriots, who hailed the arrival of Mina among them by illuminations and other public demonstrations of joy. After remaining there two days, for the purpose of procuring some pecuniary aid, to carry into effect his intended object, he proceeded to the Valle de Santiago. He there found a small party of the patriot troops from Xalpa, awaiting his arrival. But he had been in the town only a few minutes, when the approach of a strong body of the enemy was announced from the look-out posts on the heights. It was the division of Orrantia. Mina, who entertained the most sovereign contempt for Orrantia, as a military man, could not endure the thought of making a passive retreat, although he knew the enemy's superior numbers. He therefore placed his few men in ambush, in the corn that was growing in the vicinity of the place, and close to the road by which he presumed the enemy would pursue him; intending, if their cavalry only advanced in pursuit of him, to draw them into the ambuscade, in which case the destruction of a portion of them was certain. Orrantia, having entered the town, and receiving information that Mina,

with some troops, was hovering about the place, halted his troops. After a considerable lapse of time, he again advanced from it, but so cautiously, that Mina, finding it impossible to succeed in his designs, withdrew his men from their ambuscade, covering their retreat in person, with a few men. By taking a circuitous route through the heights, he decended in the rear of the enemy, and proceeded to La Caxa, passing through Pueblo Nuevo. A Spanish officer, whose name honour forbids us to mention, there presented himself as a deserter to Mina. He obtained the confidence of the general; and, after having been furnished by him with some money, was despatched upon a secret mission. A sergeant and two soldiers of the regiment of Zaragoza likewise there deserted to him. They confirmed the accounts which had been previously received, of the enemy's famished condition; of the discontent which prevailed among their troops generally; and of the numerous desertions which took place every night, especially among the Creoles. But the spirit of desertion which Mina's operations had begun to excite in the enemy's ranks, was at once checked by the unexpected and disastrous events we are about to narrate in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER X.

Mina advances against Guanaxuato—Description of that city—He attacks it—Failure—He proceeds with an escort to the rancho del Venadito—Movements of Orrantia—Mina made prisoner—Brutal conduct of Orrantia towards him—Death of Mina—Reflections—State of Society in Mexico—Remarks on the present state of the royal forces, and the facility with which the country could be invaded, and its emancipation accomplished.

At the hacienda of La Caxa, Mina assembled about eleven hundred troops, with which he advanced to the hacienda of Burras. In the night of the 23d, avoiding the high roads, and having made a circuit through the cultivated grounds, he passed along the heights immediately over the city of Guanaxuato, and gained, by day-light, an unfrequented spot called *La Mina de la Luz*, in the mountains, about four leagues therefrom. He halted there during the day, awaiting the arrival of some reenforcements of infantry and cavalry despatched by Don Encarnacion Ortiz. They joined him in the afternoon; and his force, thus augmented,

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amounted to nearly fourteen hundred men, of whom ninety only were infantry.

Before relating the disastrous attack on the city of Guanaxuato, it will be proper to present the reader with a brief view of this celebrated town, because, in point of wealth and natural advantages, it holds the next rank in importance to the capital of New Spain; and indeed, as respects its physical resources, is equal, if not superior, to any city in Spanish America. These circumstances alone were such as to render its capture an enterprise worthy of the gallant Mina, and of the greatest importance to the revolutionary cause.

Guanaxuato, the capital of the intendancy of that name, is situated amidst the rich metalliferous mountains, which border upon the plains of Silao, Salamanca, &c. on the east. Those plains (usually called by the inhabitants the Baxio) are the most beautiful and fertile to be found in all New Spain. The glowing description given by the Baron de Humboldt, of the beauty and agricultural richness of this region, is not, in any respect, exaggerated; indeed it is impossible for the traveller to pass through that highly favoured country, without experiencing emotions of admiration and delight. The softness and purity of the atmosphere are soothing and invigorating; and the effect on the vision is such, that in no place have we ever beheld a verdure so vivid, as that of the vegetable productions of those plains.

The mountains in its vicinity are abrupt, lofty, and rugged, like all those which abound in minerals. They are intersected by deep barrancas, many of them from two to three hundred yards wide; and the awful precipices with which these barrancas abound, strike the stranger with surprise. The highly cultivated plains, and the chains of mountains, present the most sublime scenery, mingling the extremes of light and shade in the most striking and exquisite contrast; equalling the most celebrated of European scenery in grandeur and magnitude, and rivalling the softest landscapes of Lausanne or Italy.

Along the windings of one of these barrancas is situated the city of Guanaxuato. It is so completely embosomed among surrounding mountains, that it can only be seen after ascending the heights around it, when the novelty of its situation strikes the stranger with astonishment. In some places, the city spreads out like a broad amphitheatre; at others, it stretches along a narrow ridge; while the ranges of the

habitations, accommodated to the sinuosities of the ground, present the most fantastic, but perhaps the most varied and elegant groups of dwellings. Prior to the revolution, its population was estimated at seventy thousand souls; but at present that number has experienced a great diminution.

During the rainy season, it is exposed to injury from the violent torrents that rush from the mountains down the barranca in which the city stands, in their passage to the plain of Silao. Large sums have been expended on works to restrain these torrents within a channel; but, nevertheless, accidents happen to the city from them almost every year.

The finest silver mines of America are in its immediate vicinity, particularly the famous one of Valenciana, which, previous to the revolution, yielded to its proprietor the clear annual revenue of half a million of dollars.

The mines of the Mexican kingdom, and particularly those of Guanaxuato, form an important and interesting exception to the remark, that death reigns in the mines of America. The mines of Peru, as well as those of New Granada, are in general situated in uncongenial regions, or those of perpetual snow; vegetation is not seen for many leagues around them, and provisions must necessarily be brought to them from a great distance. The miner has to undergo the transition from extreme heat to that of cold; to quit delightful valleys, blessed with a fine temperature, to inhabit a frigid region, where everlasting sterility prevails. He is forced, by the law of the *Mita*, to abandon his family; or, if they accompany him, it is only to partake of his hardships and his sorrows. Widely different is the lot of the Mexican miner. At an elevation of from six to seven thousand feet above the ocean, he enjoys all the blessings of the temperate zone. In Mexico, we see the highest cultivation in the vicinity of mining stations. The intendancy of Guanaxuato is the smallest, and contains a more dense population than any other in Mexico. According to M. de Humboldt, it is fifty-two leagues in length, and thirty-one in breadth; covering a surface equal to nine hundred and eleven square leagues, which, in 1803, contained a population of five hundred and seventeen thousand three hundred souls, or five hundred and sixty-eight to each square league. The beautiful plains of Guanaxuato, extending in length thirty leagues, from Celaya to the Villa de Leon, and immediately around the mines, are in the highest state of cultivation, studded with three cities,

four towns, thirty-seven pueblos, and four hundred and forty-eight haciendas. The mountains abound with fine forests; and provisions and luxuries are abundant in all directions around these mines.

Hundreds of the miners of Guanaxuato came under our observation, and a more robust race of people we beheld not in Mexico. Thus, from personal observation, we were led to adopt the opinion, that the labour incident to their course of life was not so deleterious as we should otherwise have thought.

In the mine of Valenciana, for example, previous to the revolution, (for since that period, it has, in a great measure, become filled with water,) it was the constant business of a large portion of the labourers to carry on their backs burthens of minerals, averaging three hundred pounds, from the bottom to the mouth of the mine, by an ascent of eighteen hundred steps, passing too through a temperature varying from forty-five to ninety-three degrees. Nevertheless, the miner enjoys perfect health; and the proportion of births to deaths, as given by M. de Humboldt, at once demonstrates, although a large proportion of the inhabitants are Indians, the salubrity of the mining station. In the city of Guanaxuato, the average number

of births for five years exceeds that of the deaths by two hundred for one hundred; and in the adjoining mines of Santa Ana and Marfil a hundred and ninety-five to a hundred.

That the labour in the mines may have been pernicious in former years, when it was compulsory, and when the barbarous law of the *Mita* was in force, when the pits and galleries were charged with impure air, and less attention was bestowed on the accommodation of the miner, we cannot deny; but the improvements which have been made within the last twenty-five years by the school of mines established in the city of Mexico, have lessened these evils, and introduced a system by which the mines are ventilated, and the air purified. The wages of the miner are more liberal; and, his labour being voluntary, when he feels dissatisfied, he consequently retires, and his place is supplied from the superabundant population of the adjacent fertile country. No doubt can be entertained, that when foreign arts and sciences are introduced into Mexico, where so spacious and favourable a field for their culture is at present fenced round by Spanish policy, human labour in the mines will be greatly diminished; and, instead of the tedious and laborious occupations, now resorted to from neces-

sity, machinery will, in a great measure, effect these objects, diminish human suffering, and diffuse happiness over those delightful regions. It is there that the power of steam remains yet to be successfully applied.

Historians and travellers have been so much accustomed to copy each other in depicting the horrors of the unfortunate miner, that the galley slaves of Europe have been considered happy, when compared with the individual who descends into the mines of Spanish America; and, although some of these poetical descriptions of Raynal, Pauw, and the Scottish historian Robertson, may have been in past times applicable to the mines of Potosi, and others among the Andes of Peru, we feel satisfied that such descriptions will not apply to the condition of the miner in Mexico. It has likewise been a vulgar opinion throughout the civilized world, that an immense proportion of the Indian population were employed in the mines. Leaving the consideration of what occurs in South America to the future observer, we confine ourselves to Mexico, when we state, that in the year 1807, according to the returns transmitted to the school of mines, the whole number of persons employed in all the mines of New Spain was thirty-two thousand three hundred

and forty. So that, when we reflect that the population of New Spain is between six and seven millions, we at once perceive how small, to the general population of the country, is the proportion of persons engaged in this species of labour. But, since the present revolution commenced, some of the mines have been abandoned, others have become choked up with water, and therefore the above number must necessarily be considerably reduced. Should our hopes be realized, that a liberal government may at no distant day be established in New Spain, it is plain that the introduction of machinery will not only lessen the number of men hitherto employed in those works, but will augment the produce of these mines far beyond what they have yet yielded, so as to keep pace with the necessary demands of an augmenting population, and the additional calls of the world in its career of improvement.

It is not, however, the mines of Guanaxuato which constitute the real wealth of that important intendancy of New Spain. Its riches are founded on a more durable basis. The benignity of the climate, the fertility of the soil, and the hardy race of men, susceptible of every polish and refinement, and with genius calculated to pursue every intellectual enterprise with ar-

dour and success, are treasures which will exist, should even the silver of its piled-up mountains be exhausted.

All the nutritious grains necessary for human enjoyment and support, find a congenial soil and climate in the intendancy of Guanaxuato; and the adjoining intendancies are equally blessed. No part of the earth yields a more abundant product to the labours of the agriculturist, nor do we believe there is any climate so favourable to longevity, or a territory which would sustain a more dense population on each square mile, than the climate and territory of the intendancy of Guanaxuato. Not only its fertile plains, but its loftiest summits, appear destined for the abodes of rural felicity.

The future race of Mexicans which is to flourish in this favoured part of New Spain, is not destined to depend on the caprices of artificial policy, nor the casualties of foreign commerce, for the supply of either necessaries or luxuries. The inhabitants of this intendancy, as well as of Mexico generally, are sure of the jealousy of selfish or less favoured nations; and it is, perhaps, fortunate for them, because they will the more readily apply the energy of their genius, and their industry, to procure from their own resources those commodities,

the supply of which, if drawn from other nations, might enable the latter to interfere with their prosperity, and subject them to the deleterious system, which has already made South America suffer three centuries of wretchedness, and has not spared any part of the world from its vexation. As we have before observed, whatever foreign productions of the temperate zone may hereafter be introduced into this intendancy, will there flourish; while its indigenous productions, and the few of foreign origin at present introduced, are alone amply sufficient for human comfort and subsistence. Although the agriculture of Mexico is a century behind that of Europe or the United States, still its products are astonishingly great. As wheat is sown in the dry season, it is raised by irrigation. M. de Humboldt makes the average produce of Mexico from twenty-two to twenty-five for one. But it varies in different situations from eighteen and twenty to seventy and eighty for one fanega sown;—its average thus exceeding four or five times the mean produce of France. Indian corn grows variously; in some parts of the Baxio it yields the astonishing increase of eight hundred for one fanega sown; in some parts, the harvest is considered bad at one hundred and fifty for one. The mean pro-

duce of the equinoctial region of Mexico is taken by M. de Humboldt at one hundred and fifty for one.

The fruits, whether indigenous or exotic, grow to great perfection in Guanaxuato; and in the markets are exhibited, in the same basket, the products of the temperate as well as of the torrid zone. There, in the highest state of perfection, are offered for sale, pine-apples, grapes, oranges, bananas, peaches, apples, pears, &c. gathered within a few leagues of each other. The animals of Guanaxuato are of a superior kind; the sheep which browse on the mountains afford a delicious meat, and yield a remarkably fine wool; and the horses, in point of beauty, form, muscle, bone, and high mettle, can no where be surpassed.

In no part of New Spain is there a finer race of men than in Guanaxuato, and the character is common to Indians and Creoles. Robust in their limbs, comely, and athletic, with an eye denoting extraordinary acuteness, these men create emotions in a stranger rarely excited at first sight: and whenever the blessings of a liberal government shall be obtained by them, and the advantages of an extended and liberal education be diffused among them, we predict that the province of Guanaxuato will occupy

a distinguished place among the Mexican provinces.—But let us resume the operations against the city.

It is evident from the description we have given of Guanaxuato, that artillery, placed on the heights which encompass it, would soon compel it to surrender. However, as the enemy entertained no apprehensions of formidable attacks from the patriots, they had neglected to fortify the passes of the mountains leading to the city, and relied for their defence on a castle, or strong barracks, which stood in a central position.

Mina was not provided with the necessary artillery to occupy the heights, and as Orrantia was following him, he resolved to carry the city by a coup de main. His intention was communicated to the troops, who manifested an anxiety to be led on. Pleased with their enthusiasm, and flattering himself that he was about to strike a blow which would give a decisive turn to the revolution, he made his arrangements accordingly. Filled with these presages, he appeared more than usually animated, and, as the darkness of the night approached, advanced upon the city. At eleven o'clock the advanced guard arrived in the suburbs. A considerable halt was there made, to enable the

division to close up, as the defiles through which the place had been approached were very narrow; in some places not affording a passage for more than a single file of men. The troops at length re-united; and although the sentinels were proclaiming within a short distance their "All's well!" yet such had been the silence and good order on the part of Mina's troops, that the enemy were not apprised of his approach until after midnight, when they received the first intimation of it, by the surprise and capture of one of their outposts. The alarm of the enemy became general, and a firing commenced from the castle. But habits of discipline were again found wanting; and scenes even more disgraceful than those we have formerly described as having occurred at San Luis de la Paz, were here re-acted, at the critical moment when order and obedience were most required. Mina found himself surrounded by a military mob. In vain did he employ persuasion or threats; his mildness won them not; his orders were not obeyed; and although the enemy's fire had slackened for some time, thereby offering an opportunity for the assault, all his attempts were fruitless—he could not induce them to move forward. Until near dawn did the general fruitlessly exert himself to restore some order, and prevail on the troops to advance;

but finding it impossible, and knowing that Orrantia was approaching, he was compelled to abandon the assault, and to commence a retreat. With such troops as these, after the failure of an enterprise, a retreat must be synonymous with flight. Insensible that they could pass with more celerity and safety by preserving a regular order of march, they crowded to the defile by which they had entered, each one endeavouring to precede the other; they soon therefore choked up the pass, and a tumult ensued. A few of the enemy perceiving the retreat, ventured from their position, and fired some random shots. The confusion augmented the alarm of the fugitives, lest they should be overtaken by the enemy, as they were thus huddled together. At length the general, with infinite difficulty, succeeded in allaying their apprehensions, and restored some little order among them. During this disastrous scene, Don Francisco Ortiz, one of the patriot officers, had, with part of his troops, gained the height on which stand the works of the Valenciana mine, and most wantonly set fire to them. This act highly incensed Mina, as he had uniformly given the most positive orders against the destruction of private property.

The troops were at length extricated from the

defile, and, a little after sunrise, reached La Mina de la Luz, where a halt was made. The general could no longer conceal his deep mortification, nor restrain his exasperated feelings. To a body of patriot officers, who were assembled around him, he observed, that they were unworthy any man of character should espouse their cause. "Had you done your duty," said he, "your men would have done their's, and Guanaxuato would have been our's." The order of the day passed a censure on those who deserved it, and commended a few who had merited his applause by their good conduct.

Having thus failed in his favourite enterprise against Guanaxuato, and having now no immediate object in view to employ the troops, in order to deceive the royalists as to his own movements, he dismissed them to their respective comandancias, where he believed they might be useful in harassing the enemy, until he again required their services; thereby, at the same time, preserving his men and horses from the marches and countermarches to which they would have been subject, from the pursuit of Orrantia, and recruiting them for his next attempt. He strictly enjoined those commandants, whose stations were around Guanaxuato, not to allow supplies of any kind to enter the

city; still fondly persuading himself that he should be able to renew the attack upon it with more effect. Retaining with him forty infantry and thirty cavalry, the general determined to proceed to the residence of his friend *Don Mariano Herrera*, at a neighbouring rancho called *El Venadito*. Accordingly, on the same evening, after having dismissed the troops, he took up his march for that place, but passed the night at a short distance from La Mina de la Luz.

The rancho del Venadito was composed of a few houses on the lands of the Tlachiquera, about one league distant from the hacienda, and eight from the town of Silao. Its owner, Don Mariano Herrera, was a native of Guanaxuato; a man of high respectability, and of a mind well cultivated. He had suffered severely from the royalists: Orrantia had laid waste the hacienda, burned the buildings, and pillaged the church, converting it into a stable. The unfortunate Don Mariano had fallen a prisoner into his hands, and had been carried off by him, together with all the property that could be collected. After being thus despoiled, and his fine estate destroyed, he was compelled to ransom his life by paying twenty thousand dollars. Upon being set at liberty, he returned

to his estate, and there employed himself in the pursuits of agriculture. His mansion and buildings being burned, his crops destroyed, his cattle and moveables taken away, and his funds exhausted, he was unable to restore his estate to its pristine condition; and it became a place only for his personal subsistence and safety. Indeed, had he possessed the means of recalling its former comforts and beauties, it would only have exposed him anew to the depredations of an insatiable rapacity. He therefore constructed only a small house; and as his dependents were devoted to him, he hoped, from the peculiar situation of the Venadito to enjoy a secure retreat.

The Venadito was placed in a small circular barranca, in front of which was a small plain. The barranca was more or less covered with a copse, among which were interspersed large masses of rock. Through these wound the only path to the high grounds surrounding,—a spacious table land, bounded at its extremities by barrancas. The road from Guanaxuato and Silao, running through a long, narrow, and intricate barranca, in which dwelt a numerous peasantry, warmly attached to the cause of liberty, and devoted to Don Mariano, was supposed to afford complete protection from a

surprise by the enemy in that direction, as their approach could be communicated to Don Mariano in sufficient time to enable him and his attendants to take refuge among the barrancas in the rear of the Venadito. On the other side there were no royalist posts for a considerable distance, and as the patriot troops under Ortiz ranged unmolested in that direction, no danger was thence apprehended.

The Venadito was, therefore, deemed perfectly secure from a surprise by day, and at night it was the custom of Don Mariano to take refuge in the mountains; so that although living in constant apprehension, yet he considered his person in safety. In this solitary spot Don Mariano passed his time, solaced by the attentions of a beloved sister, who had torn herself from her friends in Guanaxuato, to partake of her brother's fortune.

Mina and Herrera had formed for each other a warm friendship; the former gave to the latter his entire confidence, of which he was in every respect deserving. Mina arrived the next day, about noon, at the Venadito, where he was most cordially received by his friend. He understood that Orrantia was in Irapuato, at a loss to discover what direction he had taken; and he knew that he would be more confounded

when he heard of the dispersion of the patriot troops. From these circumstances, and the position of the Venadito, Mina thought himself perfectly secure. He therefore determined to pass the night at the rancho with his friend, and ordered the horses of the cavalry out to pasture. During the afternoon Don Pedro Moreno, who resided in the neighbourhood, visited Mina, and remained with him. The troops encamped in advance of the house; videttes were posted; and the general was so satisfied of his security, that, contrary to his usual custom, he retired to rest on the floor in the house. We mention these circumstances, because the sequel will shew, that the general, in this rare instance of a departure from his usual habit of sleeping with his men, committed a most unfortunate error.

Among the pernicious and impolitic practices of the patriots, was that of permitting priests to come out of the enemy's towns to perform mass among them. Many of these men were spies and agents of the royalists, who never failed to collect every possible information for the advantage of their masters. The road by which Mina had that morning passed, lay through a small pueblo to which a padre repaired weekly from Silao. It was Sunday when

the general passed through it. The padre waited on him to pay his respects, conducting himself with all that humility and sycophancy which his fraternity so well know how to use, when a point is to be gained. Mina treated him, as he always did persons of his description, with attention and respect, but, at the same time, with caution. The padre either was informed of, or conjectured Mina's destination; but be that as it may, he was so very anxious to carry the gratifying intelligence to the royalists, that, the instant Mina departed from the pueblo, without waiting for his dinner, he mounted his mule, and set out for Silao, distant about five or six leagues.

Mina's suppositions of Orrantia's incertitude of the course of his proceedings were well founded; for the latter was totally at a loss where to look for him, and had marched to Silao in that state of uncertainty. The dispersion of Mina's troops increased the perplexity of Orrantia; but while he was in this state of confusion (as he expressed himself in his dispatches to the viceroy), he received from the priest the unexpected, but important information, that Mina had gone to the Venadito. Had not Orrantia by accident arrived in Silao that very evening, the padre's in-

tentions and information must have been of no avail, because it was the determination of Mina to have marched from the Venadito the ensuing morning. A concurrence of unfortunate circumstances, however, seems to have led to that catastrophe which we are about to narrate. Orrantia, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, lost not a moment in putting them in motion, and having gained a position suitable to his design, placed them in ambush near the Venadito, intending, as soon as day-light should enable him to discern objects, to fall upon Mina's party.

At dawn of the morning of the 27th, Orrantia's cavalry sallied from the ambush, and advanced at full speed on Mina's encampment. The alarm was given; the troopers of Mina, finding themselves cut off from their horses at pasture, mingled with the infantry, whose first impulse was to save themselves by flight. If thirty infantry only had united at that juncture, such was the situation of the ground, that they could have repelled the whole force of Orrantia, or at least could have held him in check, and made good their retreat. But officers and soldiers thought of nothing but their own safety; in the utmost disorder they rushed forward to gain the summit of

the hills, and thence escape by the barrancas in the rear. Mina, awakened by the noise and tumult of his flying troops, started from the floor, and rushed out of the house in the same apparel in which he had passed the night, without coat, hat, or even his sword. Regardless of his person, the first object was to attempt the rallying of his flying troops; but all his exertions were unavailing, for he soon found himself alone. He beheld the enemy pursuing and cutting down his flying comrades, and attempted, when too late, to secure his own safety: but the enemy were upon him. In the act of hallooing to the fugitives to halt and form, he was seized by a dragoon, and having no arms whatever, resistance was perfectly useless.

If Mina, on first leaving the house, had attempted to escape, he might have succeeded with as much ease as many others; but such a thought, we believe, never entered his mind. His favourite servant, a coloured boy of New Orleans, after the general left the house, saddled his best horse, and went in pursuit of his master, carrying likewise his sword and pistols; but unfortunately he found him not.

The dragoon who captured Mina was ignorant of the rank of his prisoner, until informed of it by the general himself. He was then

pinioned, and conducted into the presence of Orrantia, who, in the most arrogant manner, began to reproach him for having taken up arms against his sovereign, and interrogated him concerning his motives in thus becoming a traitor, insulting him, and lavishing upon him the bitterest criminations. Mina, who on the most trying occasions never lost his presence of mind and characteristic firmness, replied to these interrogatories in so sarcastic a strain, and with such strong expressions of contempt and indignation manifested in his countenance, that the brutal Orrantia started from his seat, and *beat with the flat of his sword his disarmed and pinioned prisoner*. Mina, motionless as a statue, endured this indignity; and then, with a crest brightened by conscious greatness, and an eye glowing with the fires of an elevated spirit, looked down upon his conqueror, and said, " I regret being made a prisoner; but to fall into the hands of one regardless of the character of a Spaniard and a soldier, renders my misfortune doubly keen." The magnanimity of Mina filled every man present with admiration, and even Orrantia stood confounded with the severity of his rebuke.

The capture of Mina was considered by the

Spanish government as an event of such high importance, that they have honoured the present viceroy, Don Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, with the title of *Conde del Venadito*; Liñan and Orrantia have been presented with military crosses; and to the dragoon who actually took Mina, a yearly stipend has been assigned, accompanied by promotion to the rank of a corporal.

A letter, purporting to be written by Mina to Liñan, on the 3rd of November, after his capture, has appeared in the Mexican Gazette, which, although it contains nothing but what might be expected from a man whose mind was soured by the conduct of such men as Padre Torres, is yet couched in a style that renders it a suspicious document; besides that the whole tenor of Mina's conduct, from the moment of his capture to that of his execution, forbids the belief of his having written the letter in question. We further know, that, subsequent to his capture, he wrote a letter to his countryman, Don Pablo Erdozain, who commanded at the work of Tepeaca; in which letter, written in the provincial dialect of Navarre, he gives some instructions about his own private affairs, and concludes by wishing Erdozain success, and exhorting him to pursue a conduct marked

by honour and consistency. We have thought proper to mention these circumstances, in order to counteract any erroneous impression that may have been made by the publication before alluded to in the Mexican Gazette. We have, on other occasions, noticed the recantations and penitential documents published in that Gazette, relative to Hidalgo, Morelos, and other patriot chiefs, all of which are now well known to have been forgeries of the royalists, for the purpose of deceiving the people.

Five of the officers of Mina's division, and some few of the soldiers, escaped from the Venadito: Don José Maria Liceaga succeeded in his flight on horseback. The Creole troops in general began their flight so early in the alarm, that they had time to conceal themselves in the broken ground. Of the division, four men were killed. Don Pedro Moreno, who had fled up the side of the barranca, was overtaken, and killed, and his head severed from his body: this trophy was afterwards stuck on a pole. Don Mariano Herrera, and about fourteen of the troops, were made prisoners: these, with the exception of Don Mariano,* were executed.

* The fate of this generous friend of Mina is marked by so many singular circumstances, that it would be unpardonable to pass it over without notice. Don Mariano was conducted to Irapuato, and there thrown into prison. His affectionate sister accompanied him. Her exertions were unremitting to save her brother's life. On her knees, she implored in his behalf the mercy of the leaders of the royalists. Her intercession at length prevailed. After he had been sentenced to death, and was blindfolded, he was reprieved at the place of execution. Unexpectedly snatched from the threshold of the grave, he was bereft of reason: and in the close confinement in which he was subsequently placed, became permanently deranged. His only and constant employment was twisting his beard, which had grown very long. He became unconscious even of the presence of his sister; and his few incoherent expressions were lamentations for the fate of his friend Mina. The exertions of the sister to alleviate the situation of her wretched brother, were unceasing.

The last account we have received of Don Mariano and his estimable sister, was in September, 1818; at which period the latter was in the hacienda de Burras, on her return to Irapuato from Guanaxuato, whither she had repaired to obtain from the royal authorities permission to adopt some means for the relief of her brother. She had so far succeeded as to procure permission from Linares, the commandant-general, to remove him (on giving two securities, each under heavy penalties, that he should return to his prison in Irapuato, in the event of his being restored to his reason) to his hacienda of the Tlachiquera, where she hoped, by the change of scene, to calm his imagination. How far she had succeeded in her pious intentions, we regret that we cannot ascertain.

Orrantia, after the disgraceful scene we have already noticed, inquired the force of the patriots in his neighbourhood; Mina informed

him; when, conceiving perhaps that a desperate effort might be made to rescue the general, he immediately retreated upon Silao with his prisoner, who was treated with every indignity. This ungenerous treatment was borne by Mina with his characteristic fortitude; the situation of his companions engrossed his reflections, and while on the road, his endeavours to cheer them up were constant.

On reaching Silao, he was put into irons by his savage conductor. Thence he was removed to Irapuato, and finally to Liñan's head-quarters in front of Tepeaca at Los Remedios, where he was committed to the care of the regiment of Navarra. His treatment there was such as a brave man deserved; every humane attention being shewn him, and his situation made as comfortable as circumstances would admit.

We have understood, that, among the few papers which fell into the hands of the enemy, were some in cipher. To obtain an explanation of these was a matter of great consequence, because they would develope the names of certain patriots who resided within their walls, and who had held correspondence with Mina. Fortunately for the writers, Mina had been accustomed, on receiving any communication of importance, to copy it, and destroy the original. All his answers to their inquiries breathed

fidelity to a cause in which he had been so shamefully treated, and thus displayed in a new light the nobleness of his character. We have conversed with some royal officers who were present at these conversations; and they have assured us, that such was the admiration excited by his conduct, that there were few officers in Liñan's army who did not sympathize in Mina's misfortune, and were much more disposed to liberate than to sacrifice him.

Upon the arrival at Mexico of the express which had been despatched to announce the capture of Mina, couriers were sent by the viceroy to every part of the kingdom, to convey the cheering intelligence. Te Deums were chanted in the churches; salutes of artillery, illuminations, and rejoicings, took place in every town in the possession of the royalists; and such was the general joy among them, that they hailed the capture of Mina as the termination of the revolution. These demonstrations on the part of the government and its adherents, are in themselves no common eulogium on the character of Mina.

In the city of Mexico, a great anxiety prevailed to behold Mina, and had he reached that place, much interest would have been made to save his life; but the viceroy, fearing the

consequences that might ensue should he be brought thither, and being in constant dread lest he should escape, despatched an order to Liñan for the immediate execution of his prisoner.

When this order was communicated to Mina, he received it without any visible emotion. He continued to resist all overtures, for the purpose of drawing information from him, but regretted that he had not landed in Mexico one year sooner, when his services would have been more effective. He likewise regretted quitting life so deeply indebted to certain individuals, who had generously aided his enterprise.

On the 11th of November (as well as we can now recollect) he was conducted under a military escort to the fatal ground, attended by a file of the Caçadores of the regiment of Zaragoza. In this last scene of his life was the hero of Navarre not unmindful of his character; with a firm step he advanced to the fatal spot, and with his usual serenity told the soldiers to take good aim, "*Y no me hagais sufrir*," (and don't let me suffer.) The officer commanding gave the accustomed signal; the soldiers fired; and that spirit fled from earth, which, for all the and qualities which constitute the hero and the patriot, seemed to have been born for the good of mankind.

So anxious was the government that his death should be confirmed, that Liñan was instructed to detach a surgeon from each European regiment, and the captain of each company, to attend the execution, who should certify that Mina was dead, and moreover describe the manner in which the balls entered his body, and note the one that caused his death. This was done, and the singular document was afterwards published in the Gazette of Mexico.

Thus perished this gallant youth, in the twenty-eighth year of his age. His short but brilliant career entitles him to a distinguished place on the list of those heroes who have shed their blood in bold and generous exertions to break the tyrant's sceptre, and to extend the blessings of freedom among the human race.

No man was ever better calculated to execute an enterprise of hazard than Xavier Mina. His person was slight, but well formed, and about five feet seven inches in height. His physical he structure was well adapted for action. His moral qualities were great; and personal valour possessed in an eminent degree. Serene in the hour of danger, he was always prepared to seize upon any advantages that were offered by the conjuncture of events. At the head of his men, he infused into them his own spirit. In

his diet, he was frugal in the extreme; no privations nor hardships seemed to affect him. He always preferred the simplest beverage. His cloak and saddle were his usual bed; even in the worst of weather, when every accommodation could have been afforded him, he encamped with his troops. He was affable, generous, and candid; his moderation and humanity were alike conspicuous; and to all the qualities of the soldier he united the manners and accomplishments of the gentleman.

To fail in great undertakings has been the lot of many a gallant man, as well as Mina, and the world is ever ready to point out the measures which would have averted such failures. Inexperience may be excused for liberties of this nature, because they are generally the expression of wishes, rather than of judgments, as to what might have been done.

We think that the facts developed in the course of this work unequivocally demonstrate that Mina was sacrificed to ignorance, to jealousy, and to a combination of unfortunate circumstances, which no foresight could have anticipated, and which led to the melancholy termination of a career, as full of lustre as any of the same duration, recorded in the historic

page. Mina, at his outset in this undertaking, had to depend on the liberality of the mercantile world. The support he received, as well in London as at Baltimore, was limited to a few generous individuals; he was in hopes that their example would inspire others, but he was disappointed at a time when liberal succours were most wanted.

We have, in the early part of this work, noticed, that at New Orleans a proposal was made to him, to attack and take Pensacola; an operation perfectly accordant with Mina's views, because Pensacola would have been to him a centre, where he might have collected troops, and have organized his expedition against Mexico in a suitable manner; but the parties at New Orleans were not only niggardly as to the resources they offered, but so ungenerous in the terms upon which they would assist the expedition, that he found it incompatible with his dignity and ulterior plans to undertake it. It is not necessary to go into a detail of all the disappointments of the general, such as from an examination of his papers they appear to have been, because we should wound the feelings, or excite the ill-will of certain individuals, who, perhaps, may not be so much to blame as we infer from the perusal of the

papers in question: but of this point we are certain, that if Mina had been in possession of funds, he could, with the greatest facility, have taken Pensacola, have there raised two thousand men, and have decided the fate of Mexico in a few months. Indeed, with one thousand foreigners, he might have beaten all the royalists under the command of Arredondo, and could then have penetrated into the interior provinces of Mexico, or have moved towards the capital, if circumstances had justified it; or he would have had his choice of a route through Old Mexico, where he would have been joined by as many thousand natives as his situation required.

When Mina formed his plans in London, for the emancipation of Mexico, and even after his arrival in the United States, there did not exist any positive laws, either of Great Britain or of the United States, to interfere with his enterprise. Besides, the royal forces receiving at that time succours of arms and ships from the private enterprise of both countries, the laws of neutrality, which require that both belligerents should be treated alike, necessarily entitled the patriots to the same privileges. The occasion was therefore favourable for his undertaking; but, as we have before said, funds were

not forthcoming, and Mina had no alternative, but either to abandon it entirely, or pursue it under all the straitened and unfortunate circumstances which surrounded him. That spirit of enterprise which once distinguished the mercantile body in the United States, splendid, adventurous, and successful, has become more narrow and personal than in former times. This change, from broad and comprehensive adventures to partial and separate undertakings, had a most pernicious effect on the expedition under Mina. The few merchants, who generously afforded aid, suffered; the majority of their countrymen who embarked in the sacred cause, together with their leader, perished; and, instead of a field of commercial enterprise being laid open, embracing the richest regions of North America, the whole expedition was lost. It is not now practicable to estimate accurately the extent of the commerce that would have been opened, the amount of wealth that would have been acquired, or the number of ships and seamen that would have been employed, had the cause of Mexico been suitably sustained.

We have heard much of the assistance which the Mexican patriots have received from individuals in the United States; and indeed if we were to believe the one-tenth part of what the

Chevalier Onis has stated on this subject, we might suppose that the American merchants had been liberal in the extreme to the Mexican people; but the real fact is, that a single house in London has supplied a larger amount of arms and clothing to Venezuela, than has been contributed by all the merchants of the United States to Mexico; at the same time that the royal armies were fed, and furnished with ammunition, ships, and every species of supply, from our principal sea-ports.

The resources which Mina obtained at Baltimore were small, although Don Onis magnified his expedition so greatly. In his terrified imagination, it was converted into a formidable army, a vast train of artillery, and moreover, a large body of the imperial guard. This exaggeration served the minister's purposes; and the impressions made by his romantic tales excited such an alarm in the Holy Alliance, as to produce orders for a diplomatic attack on the government of the United States; the further notice of which does not properly belong to these memoirs. It was in vain that Mina endeavoured to convince some merchants of the United States of the advantages they would derive from the political and commercial emancipation of Mexico; it was in vain that he

offered the most flattering terms for ample supplies; while the influence of the Spanish agents, through the contracts which they were enabled to bestow, produced such an influence on the monied men, and the monied institutions of some of our principal cities, as to interfere materially with the necessities of Mina, and the emancipation of Mexico.

The want of proper support from the mercantile world, was the *first* great obstacle which Mina had to contend against. The *second*, and most serious impediment to his enterprise, was the jealousy of Padre Torres. When Mina, with his little band of three hundred men, scarcely two-thirds of whom were foreigners, had fought his way into the interior of the kingdom, after a march of more than six hundred miles, gaining successive battles, confounding the royalists by his chivalrous exploits, and at length effecting his junction with the patriots, in the intendancy of Guanaxuato, eighty leagues only from the seat of government, we find that he had to encounter a perfidious enemy in the very man who ought to have been his firm and cordial friend. The proofs we have furnished of the jealousy and hatred of Mina which Padre Torres nourished, leave not a shadow of doubt that the sacrifice of

the latter, as well as the failure of his undertaking, is to be attributed in an especial measure to this vindictive priest; even after the capture of the heroic Mina, Torres gave further proofs of the jealous and rancorous feelings which actuated his conduct.

We have already stated, that Mina had been conducted to the head-quarters of Liñan, in front of Tepeaca, and there retained a prisoner. This was known to the garrison in Los Remedios, and also that his fate was suspended till the return of a courier from the viceroy. During this interval, several of the foreign officers of the division, as well as some gallant Creoles, proposed forming a select corps of *two hundred* determined men, to storm the enemy's works, and rescue the general at every hazard. The design was as bold and feasible, as it was noble and practicable: every officer in the fort belonging to Mina's division was willing to have perished, rather than not to have succeeded in the attempt. It would have cost some lives, perhaps those of one-half of the adventurers; but there can scarcely be a doubt that the plan would have succeeded, as the enemy, confiding in the natural strength of their position, were lulled into entire security. Doctor Hennessey was deputed to lay the proposal before Padre Torres.

His urgent requests were discountenanced by that unfeeling monster, whose uniform excuse was, that *it would require too great a sacrifice of lives.* The destruction of Mina was his darling wish; he well knew the injuries he had already done the general, and that if the latter survived, such was his popularity, it was probable he would become the leading chief of the revolution. In fine, Torres refused permission for a single man to leave the fort, and denounced the enterprise as an act of rashness; and he was supported in this opinion by Colonel Noboa, the second in command in the fort. We deem it necessary, in justice to Mina, to state some facts relative to Noboa. He was a Spaniard; and, in the expedition, Mina had appointed him chief of the staff. He possessed some theoretic knowledge, was conversant in the smaller details, and was an excellent drill officer; but whenever he ventured beyond the duties of that station, his deficiencies became manifest. In his manners he was arrogant and supercilious. In such service as that in Mexico, these defects might have been overlooked, but his conduct in the action at Peotillos, at Pinos, and at San Juan de los Llanos, had been such as to exclude him from all necessary confidence. At the Jaral, his negligence was the

cause of the marquis's escape; and on that occasion he likewise committed such a disgraceful excess, that Mina ordered his aid-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Arago, to communicate to him a severe reprimand. For this act he never forgave Mina, and thus became his secret enemy. His conduct during the siege of Los Remedios was by no means equal to that of his comrades, and badly suited the important command he held in it. He rarely left his quarters during day-light, occasionally visited the batteries at night, but on no occasion displayed either zeal, activity, or energy. He became, in fact, the creature of Torres, and consequently the enemy of Mina. For this reason, he disapproved of the daring scheme for the rescue of the unfortunate prisoner.

We have thus touched on the prominent causes which led to the failure of Mina's undertaking, and to his own death. It will likewise have been seen, from what we have before remarked of the state of the revolution at the time of his landing on the Mexican coast, that the moment was unpropitious for the execution of his enterprise, and that he was prevented by untoward circumstances from uniting his small force with that of either Victoria or Teran. It is true, that both of those generals, at the time

Mina was at Soto la Marina, had experienced serious reverses, yet neither of them was entirely overcome; and as Mina had with him a considerable quantity of arms, if fortune had not frowned, he could have raised, either in the intendancy of Vera Cruz, or at Tehuacan in that of La Puebla, any number of men that might have been required; for we know from personal observation, that in either of the two last-named intendancies, as well as in the populous one of Oaxaca, Mina would have been cordially received by nearly all classes of the inhabitants. It is also true, that in the Mexican Gazette of that epoch, the insurrection is stated to have been nearly quelled; that is, the revolutionists had then no armies that deserved the name. But the spirit of the people was unsubdued, and their feelings of hatred to the Spanish government was unchanged. The document of the bishop of Mechoacan, which was published about that time, gave a history of the state of Mexico, which could not have been suspected of exaggeration, since it was addressed to the monarch of Spain by one of the few of his adherents who dared to speak the truth. There had no doubt been many disasters, and there was that kind of calm which succeeds all storms; but a spark would then have lighted up a new

flame, and *would now*, in every section of the viceroyalty. That hatred of Spain, and a desire to be free from her controul, are the predominant feelings of the Mexicans, no one acquainted with their real character can deny; and that they will again develope their irrevocable alienation from the Spanish government, on the first favourable occasion that may offer, is beyond a doubt.

Although it might be more in place to introduce the ensuing observations as the concluding portion of our narrative, yet to ward off from that gallant youth, whose career we have just been tracing, the charge of rashness in invading Mexico, we think proper here to introduce our views of the practicability of expelling the Spaniard from the throne of that kingdom; evincing thereby the truth of the remark we have so often urged upon the reader, that Mina's disasters were altogether owing to the intervention of causes which prudence could not have anticipated, nor wisdom have remedied.

The whole number of European Spaniards in the viceroyalty does not exceed *sixty thousand*. Even the fidelity of many of these to the royal government is very equivocal. We have frequently heard them utter sentiments as strong and as ardent in favour of the emancipation of

Mexico, as we have ever heard from any Creole. The Spanish troops, we know, have become weary of, and alarmed at, the warfare practised in Mexico. The European soldiers at present there, as well as those who may in future be sent from Spain, will be found reluctant combatants, in the event of further military operations in those parts of the viceroyalty that are at present tranquil. Privations, and death in the most horrible shapes, stare the Spanish soldier in the face, in whatever part of the New World he sets his foot under the royal banner: freedom, wealth, and independence, are at his choice, whenever he thinks proper to forsake it. Officers and soldiers, on departing from Spain for America, take a final leave of their families and friends. The sailing of an expedition from Cadiz has become almost a funeral ceremony; indeed, it may be strictly so called, because, within the last ten years, Spanish America has become either the adopted country or the sepulchre of almost every officer and soldier who has left the Peninsula. The diseases incident to the coasts of Spanish America, and the barbarous warfare carried on in its interior, would not only destroy all the armies of Spain, but those of any other European nation, not even excepting those of the

empire of the Russias. The whole number of Spanish European troops, at the period of the latest advices, in all the viceroyalty of Mexico, was short of *four thousand eight hundred*. This force, or even five times the number, would be insufficient to maintain the sovereignty of Spain over Mexico a single week. It is on the *Creole royal troops* that the government of Spain has had to depend for several years, and on them still rests the preservation of the viceroyalty. Of these last-mentioned troops, a great proportion are men who at some period of the revolution have been in the patriot service, but, for reasons which have been assigned in the course of this work, are at present in the service of the crown.

Prior to the revolution, the Spanish government had been very careful to prohibit from the mass of the people the use of fire-arms, and indeed of all other military weapons. The present struggles have compelled the Spanish government to place arms in the hands of the Creole population, and to conciliate them by means never before employed or permitted; so that these, as well as those who have been in the service of the patriots, are familiarized to the use of arms, and now feel an importance in society, which they can never relinquish nor

be divested of, and which must bring to their minds a constant comparison of the present, with their condition ten or twelve years ago; so that if the Spanish government were now to attempt disarming these royal Creoles, their authority would not be long-lived.

The interchange of sentiments between that portion of the Creoles who have been insurgents and those who have continued faithful to the royal cause, has already produced effects which fill the authorities in Mexico with great alarm; and there is scarcely any abatement of those effects, since the period when the eloquent bishop of Mechoacan so forcibly represented them. Indeed, political rights and personal wrongs now constitute the private and perpetual theme of conversation between the royal and patriot Creole. Among the latter, not one in ten thousand will ever be a sincerely faithful subject of the Spanish government, while the transition from a royalist to a revolutionist is easy, without danger or peril, and congenial to the feelings of nearly every Mexican Creole.

The present viceroy, who has conducted himself with extraordinary address in a critical situation, has stated in his despatches to the court of Spain, that he has reduced all the for-

tifications, and pacified nearly all the parts of the country in which there were bodies of patriots; that he has captured such a party; that another has capitulated; and that more than eighty thousand of the deluded wretches have received the royal pardon, and adhered to their oath of allegiance to their legitimate sovereign. He assures the Spanish cabinet, that only some small bodies of banditti remain, which he *hopes soon to exterminate*. He states, that since the capture and execution of Mina, all hopes of success on the part of the insurgents in Mexico have been abandoned; and he even carries his consolatory assurances so far as to say, that no more European troops need at present be sent from Spain to Mexico, as he has the firmest reliance on the fidelity of the Creole royalists. These flattering accounts are received at Madrid with the same credulity as were the advices of Mina's embarkation with a splendid train of artillery at Baltimore; they have been published in the Gazette of Madrid, and circulated over Spain and the rest of Europe. The facts already noticed, and others which we have yet to state, will probably remove the veil of deception which has hitherto been thrown over the affairs of Mexico by the artifices and influence of the Spanish agents; and to every impartial

reader present a view of the actual state of society in that country. We say, that the royal forces at present in Mexico consist of but few European troops, the main body of them being composed of *pardoned insurgents* and *disaffected Creoles*. We have stated that these forces are only royalists by accident or necessity, and that nine-tenths of them are impatient to abandon the Spanish standard. On the first occasion that they find a rallying point, in a moderate force of disciplined foreign troops, with judicious leaders, they will use the opportunity to effect the independence of Mexico.

We have already depicted the conduct of the royal troops, in their different marches, sieges, and battles with Mina; and we have seen the exploits that this youth performed, with a mere handful of only three hundred men, of which, as we have before observed, less than two-thirds were foreigners. A general opinion prevails, as well in Europe as in the United States, that to make Mexico independent will be a very difficult undertaking. Taught by experience, we are of the contrary opinion; and have no hesitation in saying, that if a number of foreign troops, equal to that which within the last three years has been raised in *Great Britain, and conveyed to Venezuela*, had landed in Mexico,

its independence would have been accomplished within three months from their disembarkation. The brave men who have been recently raised in Ireland, by the patriotic General D'Evereux, would have been more than sufficient to have decided the destinies of Mexico. Our assertion is supported, not merely by what we have shewn was effected by Mina with his small band of foreigners, and by other facts which we have stated, but also by our personal knowledge of the general solicitude of the Mexican people to be emancipated from Spanish domination.

We admit, that the conquest of Mexico, *with the view of its being held dependent on any foreign power*, would be an impracticable undertaking; for it is their subjection to foreign rule that excites their abhorrence; and in resisting such an attempt by any other nation on earth, the Spanish government would be aided by the united exertions of all classes of Creoles and Indians; and the war would become like that in Spain against France. But if an invading army should erect the banners of freedom, and proclaim the emancipation of Mexico from all foreign dependence, they would be hailed as deliverers, and would receive the cordial support of the great mass of the Mexican population.

We have seen the difficulties which the Spanish government experienced in concentrating a sufficient force to check the operations of Mina, and to subdue the patriots under such incapable officers as Padre Torres and his subalterns. Indeed, our opinion is, that had Liñan been defeated by Mina, the royalists could not have collected another army able to withstand him. That Liñan was not defeated, is solely to be attributed to ignorance and want of energy in Padre Torres, and his jealousy of Mina. We are aware it may be said, that any other distinguished foreigner would be liable to be treated as Mina was, from the jealousy of the Creole chiefs; but one thousand foreign bayonets would place him above the influence of their jealous feeling; and besides, we hope, for the honour of the Mexican Creoles, that there are but few among them capable of acting the base part that Torres and Moreno acted towards Mina. We feel great pleasure in stating, that we have seen hundreds of Creole officers, possessing the most generous and grateful feelings towards such foreigners as had come among them, either as visitors, or with a view to their aid. Among the old Spaniards, jealousy of foreigners is a principle flowing from education and interest; it is the necessary consequence of the knowledge of their own

weakness, and has been particularly fostered by their government.

Among some of the elder Creoles likewise, some prejudices against strangers are occasionally perceptible; but among the rising generation, and particularly those who have risen from youth to manhood since the revolution, we have met with very few exceptions to the prevailing attachment to foreigners, with which the sentiment of liberty is always united. The young Creole of Mexico is perhaps the most ingenuous and generous of the human race; and, far from viewing the stranger as an intruder in his country, he lavishes on him unbounded hospitality, and appears eager only to acquire knowledge, and to form his manners from every pleasing example he sees.

We confess, that when we entered the Mexican territory, we were astonished to find the character of the Creole so different from the representations that had always been made concerning it; and when we reflected on their mode of education, their entire non-intercourse with the people of civilized nations, and their limited literature, we were the more astonished to find them so liberal in their sentiments. In truth we are perfectly convinced, that when the Mexicans shall enjoy the blessings of a free

government, and the advantages of a liberal education, they will speedily become as estimable a people as can any where be found. We likewise think it of some importance to remark, that the Creole female, whether united in marriage to an European Spaniard, or to one of her own countrymen, is secretly or openly an enemy to the Spanish government: this trait in their character we have seen frequently evinced in the most striking manner. The threats of punishment have no effect in restraining them; during the revolution they have been faithful friends of the patriots, and, on many occasions, have given proofs of their intrepid spirit. Every defeat of the revolutionists clouded their brows with sorrow; while their fine eyes would beam through tears of joy, when they heard of triumphs of the patriots over the Gachupins. The maternal songs they chant to their babes, are conceived in the spirit of liberty, and marked with hatred to the despotism of Spain. Ask a child of only five or six years old, if it is a Spaniard? and it will with indignation reply, "*No soy Gachupin, soy Americano*,"—I am not a Gachupin; I am an American.

No gift of prophecy is necessary to predict the consequences that must ensue, when mo-

thers thus inspire their children. Those consequences have already, in the short space of *nine years*, developed themselves in a manner that may well excite the fears of Spain for the preservation of her dominion over the Mexican kingdom. To protect her tottering sovereignty, she has been obliged to establish garrisons in almost every city and village in the vice-royalty. Even on the haciendas royal troops must be stationed, to keep the inhabitants in subjection.

Throughout the intendancies of Vera Cruz, La Puebla, Mexico, Guadalaxara, Zacatecas, Valladolid, Guanaxuato, and part of that of San Luis Potosi, detachments of from fifty to four hundred men are distributed and stationed within a few leagues of each other. Thus their military force is dispersed over an immense surface; so that, in the event of an invasion, the government has only this alternative, to withdraw their troops from their scattered out-posts, or expose them to be beaten in detail. Whenever their troops are withdrawn to any central point, the inhabitants will immediately break out in insurrection. The very circumstance of the troops being thus quartered in villages and on estates, betrays to the people the fears of the government, while the soldiers themselves

(being generally Creoles), by forming connexions in the districts where they are quartered, are much more likely, in the event of future insurrections, to take the side of the people, and the cause of their country, than to adhere to a government which they already dislike. We consider, in fact, *every Creole regiment at present in Mexico, under the Spanish standard, as training for the establishment of the future freedom of their country*. This assertion is founded on a knowledge of their character and feelings; and, indeed, many European Spanish officers have confessed to us their belief in this important fact.

The Creole officers in the royal regiments we pronounce, with scarcely an exception, to be royalists only in appearance; they are at heart sincere patriots, ardently desirous of seeing their country emancipated from Spain, the moment it can be accomplished in a proper manner. Repeatedly have several of these officers said to the writer, "Ah! if the insurgents had not stained the first steps of the revolution with outrageous excesses, which alarmed us all, we should have joined them, and established the independence of our country six years ago." This opinion is expressed, not only by the Creole royal officers, but by

every enlightened native with whom we have conversed; and although the viceroy Apodaca says, in his late official despatches, that tranquillity is restored throughout the kingdom, we conceive he is too well aware, that it is only a deceptive calm. It is true, that in the great intendancies of Vera Cruz, La Puebla, Oaxaca, and Mexico, the insurgents are no longer organized in hostile bodies; but the character and feelings of the inhabitants are unchanged, and they are daily becoming better acquainted with their true interests. The pardoned insurgents, in those provinces, now mingle with those who have been called royalists. They discuss among themselves their errors, their misfortunes, and their *rights*. A certain Spanish officer of distinction stated to the writer, that "although much had been said about shooting the insurgents, yet it was now useless to pursue that system; for he conceived that every Creole and Indian in the country either already was, or would shortly become, an insurgent; and because about *eighty thousand of those dangerous men*, who were before scattered in forests, are now in our towns and cities, where they are circulating their poison in the bosoms of our families; therefore," said he, "the royal indultos have only prepared the way for those

eighty thousand men to contaminate the royalists, and to organize new convulsions."

We have no doubt, that every one of those pardoned insurgents would be shot to-morrow, if their fate depended on the inclination of the Spanish government; but, at the present day, such an experiment would be too dangerous, because there is not a royal Creole who would not turn his bayonet against any authority that should dare to violate the faith which has been pledged to the insurgents. We likewise have not the least doubt, if the Spanish government could pour into Mexico myriads of European troops, so as to garrison every town and village of the kingdom, that every royal Creole would be deprived of his arms; but as Spain never can send a force capable of effecting such an object, it follows, that her sovereignty now depends, and must continue dependent, on the fidelity of the Creole troops.

The actual state of society in Mexico having been thus illustrated, it must be obvious to the reader, that the undertaking of the enterprising Mina was by no means of the desperate nature alleged in various publications. It failed from causes which we think have been amply explained; but he and his brave little band, by marching from the Mexican coast to Gua-

naxuato, have shewn what may be accomplished at a future day by some more fortunate heroes.

Two thousand foreign infantry, led by intelligent and gallant officers, would overturn the Spanish government in Mexico, in less than six months from the day of their landing, either on the coast of the Pacific ocean, or on that of the Gulf of Mexico. The moment it was known, that a respectable invading army had landed, with the avowed object of assisting the people to throw off the yoke of Spain, we repeat, that they would be joined by as many Mexicans as it would be possible to arm and organize. The government would be compelled to withdraw the royal troops from their present positions; insurrections would follow; and the fate of Mexico would, in all human probability, be speedily decided.

Along the range of coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, there is not a single spot, excepting Vera Cruz, where two thousand men would be unable to effect a landing; for, although the coast cannot be closely approached by ships drawing much water, yet every part of it will permit the landing of troops from open boats; and, by marches of three days, they could reach the Table Land of Mexico. The line of coast

is so extensive, as totally to preclude the possibility of its being guarded at all points against the invasion of a large body of troops.

The same facility for landing is offered on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, from *Guatimala* to *California*. Acapulco and San Blas are the only two places at which a landing could be resisted; and even those places might be carried by a coup de main, without much danger or loss.

The beautiful and rich intendancy of Oaxaca offers a more secure and important field for the operations of an invading army, than any other part of the kingdom. There are several fine bays along its coast on the Pacific, where an army could land, at a distance of not more than thirty-five leagues from the city of Oaxaca. The whole province abounds in all the materials essential to the subsistence of an army. The city of Oaxaca is the neatest, cleanest, and most regularly built city in the kingdom; the edifices are constructed with a green stone, which preserves its colour to perpetuity, and gives to the city an appearance of freshness, such as we have never seen in any other. The convent of San Francisco, built more than two hundred years ago, looks, at this day, as if it had just come from the hands of the architect.

Streams of the purest water flow through all the streets; and in all the squares are beautiful fountains, for the use of the inhabitants. The fruits of the torrid and temperate zones are to be seen every day in the market-place. We have seen on one side of the road trees loaded with oranges, and on the other fields of wheat. The temperature of this city is considered equal to that of any other in New Spain; the thermometer rarely falling below sixty-three, nor ranging higher than seventy-eight degrees. The inhabitants are well made, and remarkable for longevity; the women are likewise distinguished for their beauty and vivacity. Along the coast of Oaxaca the climate is destructive of health; but the greater part of the province, and particularly the mountains of the Misteca, are famed for their pure and salubrious air, and the most populous Indian villages of all New Spain are found in this province. The Indians of Tehuantepec are noted for their activity and beauty. All these Indian villages may be considered as containing true friends to the patriot cause, who would afford their cordial support to an invading army.

From the port of Guasacualco, at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, an army could march in forty-eight hours to the Table Land of Oaxaca.

We know of no part of New Spain so accessible to an invading army as this province; nor do we know of any other which presents so important a rallying point for the patriots of the provinces of Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Mexico, as this on the banks of the noble navigable river of Guasacualco. Resources for the payment of an army are also abundant in this province; it is here that the article of cochineal is most extensively raised, to the value of more than a million of dollars per annum.

All the preceding suggestions, respecting the facility of invading and emancipating Mexico, are not offered with a view of inviting the attention of desperate adventurers, but with the hope of their being useful, at no distant day, to the governments of the republics of *Colombia*, *Buenos Ayres*, and *Chili*. Although the author may not be deemed fastidious as to the means that should be employed to effect the emancipation of Mexico, yet he has no hesitation in saying, that if it ever should be accomplished by foreigners, he would wish them to be citizens of the United States. This view may, perhaps, be displeasing to many of our peaceable citizens; but as we are living in an age of revolutions, when the happiness of man is the great purpose and end of society, it is not only a

natural desire on the part of a citizen of the United States, but would be on that of every liberal mind throughout the civilized world. The New World may soon have to exert all its physical and moral resources against the ambitious and anti-social schemes of the Old World, and rescue the fairest portion of the earth from the odious debasement under which it has so long suffered. It is not extravagant to believe, if geographical position and other circumstances be considered, that, among the inhabitants of the United States and those of Mexico, there may arise a conviction, that it is *their policy and interest to form a political and commercial alliance.*

In the following chapter we shall resume the detail of the operations of the royalists against Los Remedios; and, in its sequel, it will be seen, that notwithstanding all the disasters of the patriots, subsequent to Mina's death, and the flattering statements made by the viceroy of the general pacification of the kingdom, the revolutionists maintained last year formidable parties in the provinces of Guanaxuato, Mexico, and Valladolid; and more especially on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, in the last-named province.

CHAPTER XI.

Assault of Los Remedios, on the 16th of November, and repulse of the enemy—Sortie by the garrison on the enemy's intrenchments—Cause which led to the evacuation of the fort—Los Remedios evacuated, on the night of the 1st of January, 1818—Barbarities of the royalists there—Operations of the contending parties, after the reduction of Los Remedios—Loss of Xauxilla—Detailed account of the subsequent events of the Revolution, and its actual state in the month of July, 1819—Reflections.

The royalists, encouraged by the death of Mina, redoubled their exertions to obtain possession of the fort of Los Remedios; but they found the spirits of the besieged grew sterner as necessity pressed upon them. The forces of the enemy, relieved from those apprehensions of Mina which had before paralyzed their exertions, now came forth with confidence, denouncing the severest vengeance upon all those places which had rendered him assistance.

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mander of the troops in the field; and Colonel Arago, aid-de-camp to the late general, second in command. But some of the patriot chiefs, jealous of being commanded by one of their own number, carried on an independent partisan warfare against the besiegers, without paying much attention to the orders of the government or its officers.

The enemy, in the interval since the affair at Los Remedios, mentioned in Chapter IX. had kept up a brisk cannonade, which considerably damaged the works of the besieged; the battery of Santa Rosalia having been thereby rendered untenable. As soon as Mina was shot, they made an exulting and menacing communication of the event to the garrison, recommending them to *confess themselves*, as it was intended to carry the fort by storm, when every individual within it should be put to the sword. Immediately afterwards, as if determined to put this threat into execution, they concentrated their fire upon the curtain, between the batteries of Santa Rosalia and La Libertad; and, on the morning of the 16th of November, succeeded in making a practicable breach there. In the afternoon, the enemy were observed to be making preparations for the assault. About two o'clock their bugles sounded the

advance, and the columns moved up, at the same time, to La Cueva, and towards the breach; other detachments also advanced upon Tepeaca and Pansacola; but it was soon ascertained that the latter movements were feints, and that the real attack would be directed against the breach. Accordingly, the necessary preparations to receive them were made: the women, and even grown children, who on these occasions vied with the men in point of daring, soon flocked with the peasants to the threatened point, to bear their share in the danger and glory of the day.

The enemy advanced very steadily to the breach, under cover of a fire from their works, bearing before them the symbol of extermination. They moved up with great resolution, though exposed to a galling fire of musquetry and grape-shot, and showers of missile weapons discharged by the peasants and women, the latter of whom, regardless of danger, mounted the ramparts, with their aprons and baskets filled with stones, and hurled them at the astonished assailants. The enemy, nevertheless, preserved their order of close column, until within about twenty paces of the breach, when they suddenly halted; some few determined men precipitated themselves from the head of

the column, actually entered the breach, and there perished; among these was the officer who bore the black flag: but the rest of the assailing column remained as if petrified,—their dismay had completely mastered them; which being observed by the defenders of the breach, they sallied forth, made a vigorous attack, and compelled the enemy to give way, and fly in the utmost disorder, leaving the side of the barranca covered with their killed and wounded. An irregular fire was maintained, from different points, for some time; when the enemy, relinquishing the attack, retired within their intrenchments, having suffered severely.* The loss of the garrison was considerable, the survivors of Mina's division bearing a large proportion of it.

Liñan after this discomfiture, directed his attention to the re-construction of the mine under the work at Tepeaca; and, having succeeded in his approach by means of a covered way, effected the dislodgement of the besieged

* The official despatch of the royal commander acknowledges his loss, in this affair, to be forty-four killed, including seven officers; one hundred and seventy-seven wounded, including twenty-three officers; and one hundred and thirty-six bruised by missile weapons, including eleven officers:—total, three hundred and fifty-seven.

from a breastwork which had been thrown up in front of the gallery to prevent any further attempts of the enemy by mining. In this operation, and in a vigorous cannonade, the enemy dissipated the remainder of the month of November, and the whole of December; but their repeated efforts failed to blow up Tepeaca.

We have before mentioned, that considerable quantities of charcoal, saltpetre, and sulphur, were in the fort, from which a sufficiency of powder should have been made: but, either through the bad management of the chiefs, or a dependence upon supplies from Xauxilla, only one man had been employed in the composition of this indispensable article. The operation was performed by the patriots in a very tedious manner, by means of *metates*: by this stone the ingredients are ground, and afterwards grained in sieves. This process is so slow, that a man cannot manufacture more in a day than an expert artificer would make in an hour. Being manufactured without art, or a scientific knowledge of the necessary proportions of component materials, its grain is bad, it frequently hangs fire, and can seldom be relied upon. Bad, however, as would have been the quality of the powder, a sufficient quantity might have been made if proper mea-

sures had been timely employed: but, from the defects in this point, and the length of time that the garrison had maintained the cannonade, it was discovered, in November, that the magazine was nearly exhausted.

To remedy the want of ammunition, which the partial succours from Xauxilla were insufficient to supply, it was determined to make a sortie on the enemy's intrenchments, whence it was hoped that a supply might be obtained. Accordingly, the enemy's works, opposite to La Libertad were selected as the point of attack, it being, indeed, the only position fairly open to such an enterprise. Three hundred men were detached for this service, and the command was given to captains Crocker and Ramsay, the two intrepid youths who distinguished themselves, on a former occasion, against the same position.

Preparations were made: at night, the party sallied; and, gaining the rear of the enemy's first battery, stormed the second line, under the expectation that the enemy would abandon the first, and that possession would thus be gained of both. In this they were deceived: the second line was carried; when the enemy retired within their third intrenchment, whence a brisk cannonade and fire of musquetry pre-

vailed, which seriously annoyed the assailants. The gallant party, however, having succeeded in obtaining a small quantity of ammunition, spiked the artillery, dismantled and rolled the guns down the barranca, and then retired; but not without the loss of twenty-seven killed, and several wounded.

Towards the last of December, the ammunition became entirely expended; and, as Xauxilla, whence the fort had been hitherto supplied, had in the mean time been closely invested, it was impossible to obtain further supplies from that place. The garrison was thus reduced to the alternative of either evacuating the fort, or awaiting another assault from the enemy. This last course would have been highly imprudent; for the want of ammunition would have exposed them to the ultimate discretion of the enemy. The evacuation of the fort was therefore resolved upon. The only two points by which this could be effected were La Cueva and Pansacola. If made from La Cueva, it would be necessary to descend into the plain, and encounter the main force of the enemy, which would have been certain destruction. The only remaining expedient was to proceed by Pansacola. The enemy were weakest at that point; but great obstacles to the attempt

also existed there, arising from the ruggédness of the route by which it must be effected; for the way ran through the barrancas, in which it was impossible to move in compact order; besides, they were so much hemmed in by precipices, as to render it extremely difficult to ascend to the elevated ground opposite to Pansacola; and even there the enemy had thrown up a chain of intrenchments. The prospects of the garrison were therefore more discouraging than those of the defenders of Sombrero, when reduced to a like extremity; but a hope was indulged, that the mountains might be gained before the enemy could reenforce their posts, or despatch parties from the grand encampment in pursuit. Pansacola, therefore, was the point determined upon, as affording the best, and indeed the only possible means of retreat; and the night of the 1st of January, 1818, was fixed upon for the evacuation of the fort.

It had been the custom in the fort for the sentinels to pass the watch-word during the night: but as soon as the evacuation was determined upon, Colonel Noboa ordered the discontinuance of this practice. This, in the event, was a fatal measure, because it indicated to the enemy that the garrison was about to

undertake some movement, which they naturally supposed must be the evacuation of the fort. They therefore made every preparation to cut off the retreat, and to intercept as many of the fugitives as possible. Within the fort, the greatest secrecy had been observed; not even Mina's officers were informed of the proposed evacuation, until the moment it was about to be carried into execution; but they, as well as the enemy, had anticipated the event, from the change that had taken place in the practice of the sentries.

At the appointed hour, on the night of the first of January, the whole of the garrison—the troops, peasantry, women and children—assembled at Pansacola. Scenes of distress then took place, which exceeded even those of Sombrero. The abandonment of the wounded, whom it was impossible to remove; the certainty of their falling into the power of a remorseless enemy; the recollection of the fate of those who had remained in a like situation at Sombrero,—were circumstances that imparted to the final separation of companions and relatives unutterable horror.

Every thing being arranged, the advanced guard, with which marched Padre Torres, descended into the barranca. The other divi-

sions of the troops followed; but, owing to the peculiar difficulties of the pass, their progress was so slow, that before half the garrison was out of the fort, the advanced guard encountered an enemy's post. The sharp skirmishing that took place between the parties, breaking upon the dead stillness of this midnight retreat, roused the enemy, and put them on the alert. From their head-quarters, a column entered the fort by Tepeaca; finding it deserted, they communicated the information to their comrades in front of Pansacola, that the garrison was sallying from that point. Immediately large fires blazed up in every direction, which, throwing a strong glare of light into the barrancas, and over the summits of the contiguous hills, pointed out the direction taken by the fugitives. The enemy's troops, who had entered by Tepeaca, now descended in pursuit of those who were waiting to pass out of the fort. Then, horror and confusion put to flight the death-like silence which had been maintained on the part of the fugitives. The air was rent with the shouts of the men, the screams of the women and children, and the jeers and hallooing of the enemy, united with the discharges of musquetry. Numbers, attempting to fly from the bayonets which threatened momentary annihilation in the rear, rushed in crowds to the fatal pass, which being too narrow to contain them all, they tumbled over each other down the precipices, where they met instantaneous death, or had their limbs dreadfully fractured and mangled: those who came last were more fortunate than their comrades; for, rolling over the dead, dying, and wounded, who had preceded them, and had reduced the fall by their number, many of them escaped with life. Sounds of woe re-echoed through the barrancas, and were answered by the scoffs of a vindictive enemy. As soon as the alarm had been given, the enemy so posted their infantry as completely to guard every practicable pass to the hill-tops: many, nevertheless, did succeed in forcing a passage to them; while others concealed themselves in the barrancas. At length, the dawn broke upon this dreadful night, and enabled the enemy to adopt new precautions to secure the fugitives. Every cleft and bush was then explored by the enemy's infantry; and numbers of both sexes, found there, met with instant death. Don Cruz Arroÿo, dragged from his concealment, met his death beneath the bayonets of the soldiers. Being recognised by them, they inflicted upon his lifeless body the most shocking barbarities, in

revenge for the destruction which the spirit that once animated it had showered upon them. They cut off his head, tore out his entrails and his heart, and delighted their worse than savage eyes with the sight of his yet quivering limbs. The cavalry scoured the plains, and took or killed many, who, having escaped the horrors of the night, had proceeded on their way, rejoicing that they had so far, and, as they hoped, altogether, eluded the enemy.

Among those who escaped were Padre Torres and twelve of Mina's division. The rest of that band were killed during the siege, or fell in the darkness of the night in the barrancas. Among the latter were the brave Captain Crocker and Doctor Hennessey. Among the prisoners were Colonel Noboa, the only one of the division who fell into the enemy's hands, and the two brothers of Padre Torres. Numbers of women were made prisoners, with the details of whose treatment delicacy forbids us to pollute our pages. It is impossible to depict all the barbarous excesses of the brutal soldiery; the acts committed at Sombrero, though savage in the extreme, do not approximate in atrocity to those at Los Remedios. The sick and wounded in the hospital calmly anticipated death, but not in the dreadful shape in which

they were destined to meet it. The building in which these hapless victims were crowded was fired; and when any of the unfortunate wretches, who had strength enough left to attempt to crawl out of the flames, made their appearance, they were thrust back or bayoneted, and in less than an hour their cries were succeeded by the silence of death—their ashes alone remained. This is one of those infernal exploits, of which any notice would of course be excluded from the columns of the Mexican Gazette: but its authenticity does not depend on such authority; it has been related by those who were at that moment prisoners of Liñan, and by Spanish officers, who shuddered while they told the melancholy tale. Denials of these acts of savage barbarity might be listened to, or excuses for their commission might be of some avail, upon the plea of the uncontrouled frenzy of a few individuals, had not similar enormities been continually perpetrated by the royalists during this revolution: a few of them we have already noticed, and the black list will be swelled by a detail of others in the following chapter.

The majority of the combatants, who were taken prisoners, did not long remain in doubt as to their fate. Liñan, ever anxious to render

more distressing the situation of his unfortunate prisoners, and not content with the prospect of the fate which awaited them, was unceasing in heaping acts of indignity upon them. He compelled them to labour in the demolition of the works, and immediately afterwards shot them. Among those who thus suffered death was Colonel Noboa, who, in his last moments, displayed great fortitude, and died exclaiming "*Viva la Republica.*"

Of the females who were made prisoners, those belonging to the families of the chiefs were sent to the enemy's towns. In this number were two sisters of Padre Torres, one a most amiable and interesting young lady, and the whole of the female part of the family of Don Miguel de Borja. The women of the lower orders were set at liberty, after having their heads shaved bare.

The enemy found a considerable supply of grain in the magazine of the fort, but nothing else; although Liñan boasts, in his despatch, of having found a quantity of ammunition—a pitiful fabrication, of the same stamp with many others which have characterized the official accounts of the royal commandants.

Thus fell the fort of Los Remedios, having withstood, for four months, the attempts of an

enemy vastly superior in numerical force, in artillery, in ammunition, and in the superior experience and discipline of their troops, a large proportion of them having belonged to the royal armies in the campaigns of the Peninsula.

The death of Mina, and the fall of Los Remedios, enabled the royalists to take active measures to dispossess the patriots of their remaining strong hold. They flattered themselves, that when this was effected, the long-protracted insurrection would soon be terminated. They do not appear to have been fully aware of the fact, that the patriots were animated by a spirit of hatred which could not be subdued, and that if driven out of forts, they would retire to the mountains and barrancas, and instead of acceding to terms, would suffer every possible privation, and eventually become (what they are generally called) a body of banditti.

In the brief view we have taken, in the course of this work, of the military operations of the patriots, we have exhibited their alternate successes and defeats, and have shewn that the latter arose from ignorance, want of organization and discipline, a deficiency of musquets, and especially from the want of combination among the patriot chiefs. To the two last-men-

tioned circumstances, more than to any others, may be ascribed the success of the royalists; for there does not exist the least doubt in our minds, that, during the years 1814, 1815, 1816, and 1817, a union of the patriot forces, and a supply of eight or ten thousand foreign musquets, would have decided the struggle in favour of the revolutionists in a very few months. It is not now necessary to give a minute account of the series of disasters and confusion which took place among the patriots subsequent to the death of Mina, except so far as may tend to shew the unconquerable spirit of hostility to the Spanish government, which predominates in the people in arms in the intendancies of Guanaxuato, Valladolid, and Mexico.

We have made mention of the little fortress of Xauxilla, the place where the members of the patriot government held their sittings. During the month of December, the royalists of the intendancy of Valladolid had raised a force of one thousand men, for the reduction of it. The direction of this operation was given to Don Matias Martin y Aguirre, commandant-general of the province of Valladolid, in which province Xauxilla was situated. Don Matias, a distant relation of the unfortunate Mina, was a most able and active officer. His exertions con-

tributed much to preserve the jewel of Mexico in the diadem of Spain. Unlike his contemporaries, he never wantonly died his hands in human blood: he obeyed with reluctance many of the cruel mandates of his governnent, but at the same time mercy influenced all his conduct, and tempered his sword with clemency. On account of his distinguished services, he was appointed commander of the regiment of dragoons, called the *Fieles de San Luis*, which, although composed of wretched troops, was among the best appointed, best organized, and finest cavalry in the royal service. He enjoyed, at the period of which we are now speaking, the confidence of the viceroy; and warmly seconded his exertions to attain the object of their government with as little effusion of blood as circumstances would permit. He enjoined upon all the officers within the sphere of his command to act with mercy; an injunction obeyed by some of them, while others, freed from his immediate controul, continued to give loose to their long-indulged spirit of cruelty. His conduct to the prisoners that fell into his hands, was not merely merciful, but generous; and on several occasions he took upon himself the responsibility of disobeying superior orders, rather than deprive them of their lives. We

feel great pleasure in thus offering our faint tribute of respect to one whose sentiments present so great a contrast to those of the major part of the Spanish chiefs. Some of the officers of Mina's expedition, who fell into the hands of Don Matias, were most humanely treated; and the soldiers who were made captives, were liberated on condition that they should serve two years in the royal armies. One of them, an American, through his intercession, was pardoned, liberated, and sent to the United States. Not one of Mina's associates suffered death at his hands; and although some of them were sent to Europe by orders of the government, it was contrary to the wishes of Don Matias. Some of Mina's officers, now in the United States, owe their lives to the humane Aguirre.

Don Matias, on investing Xauxilla, found, that from its strength, and its peculiar situation, it was capable of making a formidable resistance. The fort was commanded by a man of the name of Lopez de Lara, supported by two officers of Mina's division, Captains *Lawrence Christie* and *James Devers*, both Americans. A few days after the siege commenced, the members of the government retired to the Tierra Caliente of Valladolid.

Don Matias, prior to the commencement of

hostilities, sent a flag of truce, offering terms of capitulation to the garrison, which were immediately rejected. Approaches were then made, and after several ineffectual attempts to carry it by storm, the enemy were compelled to await its reduction by famine.

While these operations were going on at Xauxilla, Padre Torres escaped from Los Remedios, and retired to the pueblo of Penjamo. The plains and mountains in its vicinity afforded him a temporary refuge. The pueblo of Penjamo is situated, as before observed, about four leagues from the fort of Los Remedios, upon a declivity near the foot of the range of hills in which the fort was erected, overlooking a fine plain, highly cultivated with Indian corn, and forming an amphitheatre with the surrounding hills. The inhabitants of the plain of Penjamo were, generally speaking, in easy circumstances, and many of them, prior to the revolution, had possessed considerable wealth. The pueblo of Penjamo was the general residence of those farmers, who were distinguished for urbanity and hospitality. Exclusive of their agricultural pursuits, they carried on an extensive trade in provisions, particularly in live hogs, which were sent to the city of Guanaxuato.

The inhabitants of the pueblo, and indeed

of all the plain, had been conspicuous, during the whole of the revolution, for their enthusiasm in favour of the patriots; and it was in this place that Torres had commenced his military career. He was at that time the curate of a little village near Penjamo, called *Cuitzeo de las Naranjas*. Subsequently becoming commandant of the place, at the time when Mina penetrated into the province of Guanaxuato, Penjamo formed his immediate comandancia. Notwithstanding the despotic sway which he exercised over his friends from his head-quarters at Los Remedios, a great portion of the people still remained attached to him. Amidst the general destruction of towns and villages, Penjamo had not escaped. Its handsome buildings had all been razed to the ground, and on their sites had been erected a few huts. It was here that Padre Torres established his nominal head-quarters, after the evacuation of Los Remedios: we say his nominal head-quarters, because the circumstances of his situation effectually prevented him from remaining permanently in any one spot, even had his coward nature permitted him; for the enemy covered the plain with their troops in pursuit of him, and strained every nerve to overtake him. But his activity being excited by his fears, he never

slept two successive nights in the same place or on the same mountain. During this period of pursuit and danger, which continued nearly a month, Torres retained with him a small escort of cavalry; and, without leaving the plain and mountains of Penjamo, was enabled to elude the vigilance of his pursuers. Had he displayed the same activity, when it would have preserved the troops under his orders, or infested the enemy, he would have deserved and received commendation. Aware of his inability to cope with his pursuers, he was compelled to use unremitting personal exertions to guard against a surprise. Whenever it became dark, he invariably conducted his escort, through by-paths and circuitous routes, to secret places in the mountains, always distant from the place where he had passed the preceding night. He laid down with fear and trembling, with a servant near him, to give the alarm in case of danger, and a horse ready saddled and bridled, not with a view of acting on the defensive with his troops, but of securing his personal safety by instant flight. He possessed some of the fleetest horses in the kingdom, was an expert rider, and always kept near him three or four horses ready to be mounted. In the occasional actions which his troops had with the enemy, he inva-

riably acted in a manner ill becoming a soldier and a commander, always taking post in a commanding situation in the rear, instead of animating his soldiers by his presence in the fight; and, on discovering among his men the least appearance of confusion or dismay, he would put spurs to his horse, and leave them to shift for themselves.

The enemy, in the mean time, were not idle; their light divisions scoured the country in every direction. Neither Torres nor his subaltern officers opposed any resistance to their progress, each individual being occupied in providing for his own safety. They passed the night in the mountains, *sub dio*, regardless of the inclemency of the weather; and, in the day-time, a watch was kept from the steeple of a church, or some commanding height, to guard against a surprise from the enemy. Such was then, and is now, the manner of life of these unfortunate people; and nothing can more forcibly illustrate their abhorrence of the royal government, than that they should submit to such privations, rather than accept the protection of the royal amnesty.

The enemy soon fortified themselves in the Valle de Santiago, thereby depriving the patriots of the resources of that district. They

also occupied the hacienda of Queramaro, about a league from the foot of the hill which ascended to the late fort, which prevented its being re-occupied by the patriots, and deprived Torres of a valuable portion of his comandancia. In the Tierra Caliente of Valladolid, they were equally active. Over the whole country the patriots seemed panic-struck; and such was the want of unity in their operations, that even skirmishes with the enemy at length became of rare occurrence.

Torres, finding that the enemy relaxed the vigour of their pursuit, made a faint exertion to relieve the garrison of Xauxilla, the siege of which place had been vigorously prosecuted by Aguirre. When arrived within a league and a half of the enemy, he despatched Don Pablo Erdozain, an excellent cavalry officer, (of whom we have before made mention), with a party of three hundred men, to lay in wait for a party of the enemy, of about the same number, who left their camp every morning for the purpose of foraging. The measures of Don Pablo were judiciously taken: placing his troops in ambush, he anxiously awaited the approach of the enemy, who were soon descried advancing; and every thing promised a successful result: they entered the ambush

unsuspectingly, and without order: at that favourable moment Don Pablo ordered the charge; but, to his inexpressible mortification and astonishment, the troops, instead of obeying his orders, after wavering for a moment, turned their backs upon the enemy, and fled: they were immediately pursued, and the gallant Erdozain with difficulty effected his escape.

A rencounter with a party of the enemy occurred about the same time, at an hacienda called *Surumuato*, situated a few leagues from Penjamo, which terminated as fruitlessly as the action we have just related: for, although the royalists were actually defeated, and might have been totally destroyed; yet they finally came off victorious, in consequence of the flight of the patriots at a critical moment.

Padre Torres, instead of being humbled by his recent misfortunes, became every day more capricious and despotic; and at length committed an act which caused his subalterns to tremble for their personal safety, and drew down upon him their odium. Don Lucas Flores, the commandant of the Valle de Santiago, who had been one of the firmest and most useful friends of Torres, was, upon some frivolous pretext, arrested; and, without a trial or a hearing being allowed him, was conducted

to the mountains, and there privately shot. The manner of his arrest displays the treacherous and barbarous character of Torres: he sent an order to Don Lucas, to meet him at a certain place; the order was obeyed, and Torres, with his staff, met him there. The customary embraces passed between them, a social intercourse followed, and cards were introduced. Don Lucas lost all his money, of which the padre won a considerable portion; they dined with their usual cordiality, and after dinner Flores was arrested, without the least previous explanation. His personal effects were immediately shared by the staff, Torres himself taking the best horse. With savage indifference, Torres turned to Flores, and ordered him to retire. This unfortunate officer was conducted, as before observed, to some secret place in the mountains, above Penjamo, and there shot.

While Torres was committing these excesses, and flying about the country to elude the enemy, the siege of Xauxilla was steadily persevered in by Aguirre. It had held out three months; but the commandant, Lopez de Lara, and some of his officers, became alarmed. Foreseeing that the fort would be eventually reduced by starvation, and presuming that the same fate would attend the garrison that had befallen

the patriots at the other forts, Lara thought it best to take measures in due season, for the safety of himself and his party. He concealed his intentions from Captains Christie and Devers, as he well knew that they would never consent to surrender the fort, as long as it was tenable. Accordingly, he sent a secret overture to Aguirre, offering to deliver up the fort and *the two Anglo-Americans*. The overture was of course readily accepted. Lara and his associates then seized the persons of Mina's officers, and delivered them, with the fort, into the hands of the enemy. Aguirre displayed the magnanimity of his character, by adopting a line of conduct directly the reverse of that pursued by the barbarous Liñan and other Spanish chiefs. Disgusted with the perfidy of Lara, he upbraided him in the severest terms, for his unmanly and dishonourable conduct to his allies, the two Anglo-Americans, whom he immediately ordered to be treated with as much indulgence as was consistent with their safe keeping; and, instead of shooting the troops that thus fell into his hands, he disarmed and set them at liberty.

Aguirre, after destroying the fort, and leaving a garrison in the village of Zacapo, to prevent its being re-occupied, returned to Valladolid,

taking with him his two American prisoners. They were put into close confinement, and orders from the viceroy were received to put them to death. The generous Aguirre resisted the repeated commands of the viceroy to that effect; and finally, by persevering in their behalf, prevailed on the government to spare their lives. But, notwithstanding all his exertions to have them liberated, and sent to the United States, they were removed to the capital, and subsequently transported to Europe.

The infuriated Torres was still pursuing his mad career, wandering about the country, arbitrarily seizing on every man's property, and burning towns and haciendas, under the pretext of depriving the enemy of the means of fortifying themselves in their progress through the country. The unfortunate town of Puruandiro underwent a second conflagration. Penjamo shared the same fate. Only one church in each was spared; and the inhabitants were forbidden to live among the ruins. In fine, this man's tyranny and excesses became so great, that the people in his comandancia at length hated and feared him more than they did the enemy.

The revolutionary government, in the mean time, had experienced several vicissitudes. After its seat had been removed from Xauxilla,

it was established in the Tierra Caliente of Valladolid, where the enemy were not quite so numerous as in the Baxio, and where, from the natural advantages of the country, it could occupy positions that would be secure, or at least favourable for escape, in the event of a surprise. Three of its members, either from disgust, or a conviction that their services could no longer be of any use to their country, signed and sent in an instrument of their resignation. These were—*Ajala*, the president; *Loxero*, the secretary; and *Tercera*. Doctor San Martin proceeded to a small place called Zaratè, where *Don Antonio Cumplido*, *Don Pedro Villaseñor*, and *Don Pedro Bermeo*, were appointed *governantes*, in lieu of the others; and San Martin became president by reason of seniority.

The new government was encompassed with difficulties, which it was almost impossible to overcome; and, however great may have been its zeal to restore order, and give a new impulse to the cause of the revolution, an event occurred that prevented it from displaying its exertions: for, in the month of February, 1818, its members were surprised by a party of the enemy, who entered Zaratè, and took prisoner the president, San Martin; the infirmities of the old gentleman preventing him from escaping with his

coadjutors. Cumplido resigned his place, under the impression that matters were in so desperate a state, as to render nugatory the establishment of any regular government. Nevertheless, a form of civil authority was still kept up; and *Don José Pagola*, a worthy and intelligent patriot, and *Don Mariano Sanchez de Ariola*, were appointed to fill the places of San Martin and Cumplido. The two new members, with Don Pedro Villaseñor and Bermeo, therefore constituted the government; and Villaseñor was elected president.

The first subject that occupied the attention of the new government, was a dissension between Padre Torres and two of his officers, Don Andres Delgado and the Brigadier Huerta. Both these officers commanded strong bodies of patriots. Delgado was at the head of the troops lately under the command of the murdered chief Flores. The conduct of Torres had become so insupportably outrageous and tyrannical, that Delgado and Huerta refused longer to submit to his authority, and called a council of the patriot chiefs, in the month of April, at Puruandiro, (at which Torres attended) for the purpose of nominating a new commander-in-chief. Colonel Don Juan Arago was named to fill the place of Torres. The

padre sullenly retired from the meeting, accompanied by a few of the least respectable of the chiefs. He had the address to induce them to sign a petition to the government in his behalf, in which they declared their satisfaction with his conduct, and prayed that he might retain his station. The government, however, ratified the nomination of Arago, and appointed him commandant-general of the province of Guanaxuato; permitting Torres to retire with all his honours, and to draw the pay corresponding with his rank. The appointment of Colonel Arago was a most mortifying circumstance to the padre, who had always regarded him with envy.

The restless and ambitious priest was not, however, disposed to submit, without an effort to re-establish himself in the supreme command. On the 28th of April, having with him nearly fifteen hundred troops, including infantry, he received intelligence that a light division of the enemy, four hundred strong, under Colonel Bustamante, was in the rancho *de los Frijoles*. As a means of regaining his popularity, he determined to attack the enemy. He took them completely by surprise; yet, notwithstanding, the action was most disgracefully lost, in consequence of his injudicious dispositions, and his

own personal bad conduct. Scarcely had the engagement commenced, when the cavalry, from one of those unaccountable terrors with which they were occasionally seized, without entering into action, fled. Torres, who was some distance in the rear, seeing the confusion, instead of attempting to rally, outstripped them in the flight. The infantry, thus abandoned, and left to contend, without even a hope of success, against overpowering odds, regarding their situation as desperate, formed under some trees, and, with determined valour, defended themselves, until every individual but one was killed. The head of their commander, Lieutenant Wolfe, was struck off, carried to Irapuato, and there elevated upon a pole.

As soon as Arago received his appointment from the government, he communicated the information to Torres; who answered, that the appointment was illegal, and would be resisted. Among the chiefs who had been instrumental in depriving Torres of his command, was Don Andres Delgado, well known to the Gachupins by the name of "El Giro." He was an Indian, and, though destitute of education, was particularly acute, and admirably calculated for partisan warfare. His courage was impetuous, and his activity astonished the enemy. He was

only twenty-five years of age, and in his short military career had received twenty-two wounds. The dragoons of the Valle de Santiago, the finest and most efficient body of patriots in Mexico, were under his command. Few of the royal troops were equal to them in the field,—none exceeded them in courage. They were mounted on the finest horses the country could produce; and, unlike other bodies of patriots, were constantly in operation against the enemy, keeping that part of the Baxio about Salamanca and Zelaÿa in a state of continual alarm. El Giro, and his whole troop, hated and despised Torres; and they anxiously awaited an order to force him into obedience: but Arago was aware of the evil consequences attendant upon dissention, and therefore determined to try pacific measures, before he resorted to force.

Torres was attended by the ex-president, Don Ignacio Aÿala, a man full of duplicity and cunning, by whose advice he had opposed the recent changes. The force that Torres had under his immediate command was about one hundred and twenty men; but he was privately upheld by Don Encarnacion Ortiz and Don Miguel de Borja.

Mina's division was now nearly annihilated, *nine officers* and *four soldiers* only surviving.

Those who had been with Torres, neglected and ill-treated, had, with one exception, left him: and that solitary individual, as soon as Arago received his preferment, abandoned the padre, and rejoined his comrades.

Arago, finding that all his attempts to bring Torres to an acknowledgment of his authority proved abortive, reluctantly had recourse to arms. Torres, unable to cope with the forces of Arago, fled to his friends, Borja and Ortiz. Conceiving that with their aid it was still possible for him to regain his lost power, he issued an arrogant and absurd proclamation, declaring the establishment of the government in the Tierra Caliente to be illegal, commanding obedience to Don Ignacio Aÿala as the only legitimate head of the civil authority, and calling on all true Americans to aid him in the vindication of his title. From Burras, the padre set out, with about three hundred men, furnished him by Borja and Ortiz, for Penjamo, of which place, Arago, as successor to the comandancia, had taken possession, in the month of July. Arago soon received a communication from these friends of Torres, stating, that a desire to arrange matters amicably, and not an intention of acting with hostility, had induced them to afford the padre an escort, and to accompany

him themselves. After some correspondence, it was agreed, that at Surumuato, on the bank of the Rio Grande, with the river between the parties, the differences should be discussed. Arago, as well to avoid the effusion of blood, as to avert the fatal consequences which must arise to the cause of their country from these dissentions, and which had hitherto been its destruction, deemed it expedient to assent to the conference, although he was perfectly aware of the perfidious intentions of Torres and his partisans.

With two hundred men, he therefore repaired to Surumuato: but, soon after the discussion was opened, it became obvious that nothing short of reinstating the padre in his former power, and acknowledging the acts of the government to be illegal, would settle the dispute. Arago, after spending two days in fruitless attempts at pacification, perceiving that his opponents were only amusing him in order to gain time and receive reenforcements of troops, broke up the conference, by giving them a certain number of hours finally to make up their minds whether they would or would not obey the orders of the government. No answer being returned within the time, Arago immediately adopted measures to reduce the refractory padre and his partisans by force of arms. Accordingly, El Giro, with only a few of his brave Santiago dragoons, soon decided the matter; gallantly swimming the river, about twenty of his men attacked their opponents, and routed them. Torres was saved from capture only by the speed of his horse; he fled to the mountains of Penjamo, where he collected some of the fugitives. His friends, finding that disaster only would attend the struggle, finally sent in their adherence to the government. Various skirmishes took place between the contending parties, in which Torres invariably came off with disgrace; but, notwithstanding all the exertions of Arago to obtain possession of his person, the wily priest eluded him, as he had formerly done the royalists. This contest between Arago and Torres was terminated by the advance of a division of royalists, in September, under the command of Colonel Marquez Donallo, to Penjamo. A post was established in that pueblo, which cut off Torres from his places of retreat in the mountains and plains. The padre thenceforth found his situation daily becoming more desperate; and at length, in utter despair, he disbanded his few remaining troops, and, with his adviser Aÿala and a few domestics, threw him-

self on the protection of the brothers Ortiz. They intereeded with the government in his behalf; and, notwithstanding his previous infamous and treacherous conduct merited severe punishment, yet he was allowed to remain unmolested in that part of the country, on the express condition that he should neither directly nor indirectly interfere in the public affairs. This condition was guaranteed by Ortiz; and thus terminated the disgraceful career of this ambitious priest. In the month of June, last year, he was wandering among the mountains within the range of Don Encarnacion Ortiz, in the vicinity of San Felipe, eluding the pursuit of the royalists, and trembling for his safety even among his former friends. It was fortunate for him that he did not fall into the hands of El Giro: for such was the conviction of Mina's officers of his treachery towards their deceased general, and so exasperated were they at his shameful conduct with regard to themselves, that they certainly would have permitted him to fall a sacrifice to the vengeance of that chieftain and his men.

The situation of the patriots in the province of Guanaxuato was daily becoming more critical; but, although every pueblo of any importance was occupied by the royalists, still the

patriots carried on an irregular warfare. They roamed among the mountains and through the plains, occasionally skirmishing with the enemy; but neither observing order among themselves, nor aiming at a combined plan of operations. With the exception of El Giro and his troop, they at length merited an appellation little better than that of banditti, so generally applied to them by the royalists.

In the western Tierra Caliente, the cause of the patriots assumed a brighter aspect. The enemy had there steadily pursued the system adopted in Guanaxuato, of throwing bodies of troops into every pueblo: by which means, they had so far subdued opposition, as to flatter themselves that the pacification of the western part of the province of Valladolid would soon be accomplished, the more especially as they had compelled the patriots under the command of Lieutenant-General *Don Vicente Guerrero* to retire into the mountains near the shores of the Pacific ocean. This officer is one of those extraordinary men whom revolutions bring into notice. During the life, and after the death of General Morelos, Guerrero had distinguished himself by his intrepidity and activity. On one occasion, in the mountains of the Misteca, with only about one hundred and forty Misteca

Indians under his orders, whose only weapons consisted of clubs and slings, he particularly signalized himself by a brilliant achievement.

The royalists were frequently careless in their encampments at night, and particularly in the Misteca, where they knew that Guerrero had not an armed force to attack them. A party of three hundred royalists having encamped a few miles from where Guerrero was stationed with his Indians, he proposed to his men to make an attack on the enemy during a rainy and stormy night. The plan was agreed on, and executed with such silence and celerity, that Guerrero was in the midst of the encampment before the enemy were aware of his approach. The royalists were panic-struck, and attempted to fly: many of them were killed, and the whole of their arms, baggage, &c, &c. fell into the hands of Guerrero. This, and other similar exploits, had made him renowned among the patriots of the Misteca; but towards the latter part of 1817, he had been so severely pressed by superior numbers of the royalists, that he was obliged to retire from the Misteca, and, with a servant, passing through the lines of the enemy, reached the Tierra Caliente of Valladolid; where, after encountering many vicissitudes in the autumn of the following

year, he with eighty men surprised a strong party of four hundred of the enemy, destroying nearly the whole of them. This exploit threw some arms into his power, with which he lighted up a flame that rapidly spread over the Tierra Caliente; and, before the enemy could recover from the surprise which this new antagonist created, he attacked their different posts, beat them in detail, and roused the drooping spirits of the patriots in the western parts of Mexico, as well as of Valladolid. The viceroy, alarmed at this rapid and unexpected progress of the patriots, transmitted orders to adopt the most vigorous measures against Guerrero: accordingly, Brigadier Negrete was ordered to advance with a strong division to the Tierra Caliente, threatening at once to annihilate Guerrero and his party. In conformity with his orders, Negrete proceeded to the village of *Churumucoo*, situated on the right bank of a river which flows from the east, and unites with the Marquez a few leagues from the village,—the junction of which rivers forms the *Zacatula*. He found the patriot chief posted on the opposite side of the river; but, not deeming it prudent to attack him, finding that he could not long maintain his own position for want of provisions and fearing the destructive in-

fluence of the climate, he made a retrograde movement, and, much to the vexation of the royalist subjects, returned to Valladolid without achieving any thing.

At this period, Don Miguel de Borja was chosen by some part of the troops of Xalpa, for their commander in chief; to accept of which station it was necessary for him to give up his comandancia of Burras.

The occupation of Penjamo by the enemy had deprived Arago of those pecuniary resources from which he had calculated to raise and equip his forces; and, believing that by good management ample means might be obtained at Burras, and that great advantages would result from the communication he could establish with the patriotic inhabitants of Guanaxuato, from the vicinity of that city to Burras, he took the command of that district. Arago's expectations, however, were at the outset frustrated; for, on investigation, he found that his predecessor had levied so many contributions on the unfortunate farmers, that they had little left, and as he was averse to the system of exactions which Torres, Borja, and others, had pursued, he was compelled to depend on a few individuals for the urgent supplies of his few troops. A short time before Borja gave up the command

of Burras, he had received from the inhabitants twelve months' revenue in anticipation; which circumstance, united with those already mentioned, rendered it absolutely impracticable for Arago to realize any of the plans he had previously contemplated.

Before Borja left Burras, an event occurred, which filled with sorrow the breast of every true patriot. Don José Maria Liceaga, whom we have before mentioned as a distinguished and staunch defender of his country's rights, was treacherously murdered. Strong grounds exist for believing that Borja was the principal instigator of this murder. Liceaga had retired from public life, and resided on his hacienda (La Gabia), in the district of Burras. Journeying along the high road, he met a party of Borja's men, headed by one of his captains. Without any previous explanation, they furiously attacked him: he attempted to save himself by flight, but a shot from Borja's officer brought him to the ground, and he was instantly put to death. Borja has endeavoured to vindicate this horrid deed, by alleging, that Liceaga was proceeding to the town of Irapuato, to deliver himself up to the enemy, and to accept the royal pardon.

All who knew Liceaga pronounced this to be

a calumnious accusation. His undeviating adherence to the cause of the revolution through all its vicissitudes, his refusal of the repeated overtures of the enemy for reconciliation, and the firmness of his character, displayed on numerous trying occasions, made the accusation of Borja appear as absurd as it was unfounded. The fact, however, we understood to be, that Borja had, some weeks before this event, demanded one thousand dollars from Liceaga, which was accordingly furnished him; and, in order to avoid its repayment, as well as to get rid of a man who constantly expressed himself hostile to such lawless proceedings, he resolved on his destruction, and effectuated it in the manner we have related.

The patriots shuddered at the tale; for, although Liceaga, by his love of order and strength of character, had become obnoxious to the military chiefs, yet by the people in general he was respected.

About the time this melancholy circumstance took place, the forces under Guerrero were daily augmenting, and the political horizon in that part of the theatre of the revolution once more assumed an aspect favourable to the patriots. Three of Mina's officers, who had retired to the *Cañadas de Huango*, eleven

leagues north of the city of Valladolid, placing themselves under the orders of Brigadier Huerta, were authorized by him to organize a body of infantry and cavalry. Huerta, like most of the chiefs we have before described, had been raised, by the vicissitudes of the revolution, to a situation which he was totally unqualified to fill. He was illiterate, vicious, and jealous of his superiors; but at the same time he was daringly brave, and ready to undertake any project, however hazardous. He assumed the title of commandant-general of the province of Valladolid. We believe that he meant well to his country, but his extreme ignorance prevented him from being of much service; and, like Torres, he could not bear the sight of any man whom he thought likely to interfere with his ambition. He viewed the brilliant successes of Guerrero with a jealous eye; and although the latter was extremely anxious to obtain the co-operation of all the patriot chiefs, he could not accomplish it with Huerta.

Colonel Bradburn (one of the three officers who had retired to the Cañadas de Huango) was assiduously engaged in raising and organizing a body of infantry and cavalry, relying on the promises which had been made him by Huerta, of being furnished with every thing he

wanted. Bradburn and his two comrades found recruits flocking in to them from all directions. Barracks were erected; an armoury and powder manufactory were established; arrangements were made to procure clothing from the enemy's towns; and every thing went on prosperously, until the moment arrived when the new troops were to receive arms. Huerta, under various pretexts, withheld them. Bradburn was some time before he could penetrate the cause of Huerta's strange conduct; but he at length discovered that it arose from jealousy. Huerta, on seeing what he thought a body of well-trained troops under the command of Bradburn, conceived it possible that the latter would co-operate with, or enter into the views of Guerrero, and thereby diminish the authority which he himself was aiming to obtain. This was the real cause of his refusing Bradburn the necessary supplies.

Matters continued in this state for upwards of two months, in the Cañadas; and although the enemy were garrisoned in various directions within a few leagues, in any one of which posts they were far superior in effective force, yet Bradburn, with a hundred men wretchedly armed, held them in check. At length the enemy determined to destroy him, and in March,

1819, advanced with fifteen hundred men, under the command of Don Vicente Lara. Against this formidable force resistance was useless. Bradburn retreated for two days; but, being closely pursued in the mountains, his party was destroyed, with the exception of about thirty who made their escape. The prisoners were conducted to the neighbouring pueblo of Chucandiro, and there instantly shot.

Huerta could at that time have mustered four hundred cavalry; and as he had received timely advice of the movements of the enemy, could have reenforced the little party; instead of which, he quietly permitted it to be completely broken up. His subsequent conduct to Mina's officers was disgraceful, and serves to confirm what we have before stated, that during the last three years the patriot chiefs were generally ignorant, incapable, and licentious men, who studied only their separate interests, to the ruin of their country. Under such unfortunate circumstances, it is almost incredible that the royalists did not completely quell the insurrection; and that they have not been able so to do, arises from the general hostile feeling of the people, and the occasional appearance of such men as Don Vicente Guerrero.

The conduct of Huerta, and the distracted state of the patriots in Valladolid, prevented the patriot government from possessing a place of security in which to hold their sessions. The late president, Don José Pagola, and his secretary, were taken prisoners by surprise, and shot. Don José Castañeda was appointed in the place of Pagola, and the presidency devolved on Don Pedro Villaseñor. The government removed to a place called *Las Valzas*, near the village of Churumucoo, adjacent to the conflux of the Rio Grande and the Marquez. Here it considered itself secure from surprise; and confided in the vigilance and abilities of General Guerrero, with whom they now resolved to co-operate in exertions to give to the cause of the revolution a new aspect.

The enemy, in the upper parts of Valladolid, had fortified themselves at Puruandiro, at Chucandiro, and at several other places. Huerta's troops were daily abandoning him, and some of them had accepted the royal pardon. The famous El Giro had been surprised by a party of the enemy. Finding himself surrounded by numbers, and escape impossible, he disdained the calls of the enemy for him to surrender. His innate courage, lighted up by desperation,

caused a sévere conflict, in which, after killing three of the enemy with his own hand, and wounding others, he fell overpowered by numbers. The royalists were therefore less annoyed, in that part of the country, than they had been for a long time previous.

The revolutionists were in no condition to carry on a series of harassing operations. Their system of defence, however, was such, that they suffered little loss: their guerilla parties were still numerous: in the rainy season, they retired to the mountains, and there recruited their horses, and repaired their arms; on the return of the dry season, they descended into the plains, and attacked the enemy with renewed vigour.

In the month of July, 1819, the revolution may be considered as having reached a lower ebb than at any previous period since the commencement of the struggle. But the royalists were very far from being in an unmolested state: they were still obliged to keep within their fortified places. The patriots still continued to possess the plains in the undermentioned parts of the country, and in fact were masters of the country up to the very walls of the fortified towns:—

	Men.
In the intendancy of Guanaxuato, there were still, under various patriot chiefs, at least	1000
In the Tierra Fria and Caliente of Valladolid	1500
Over an extensive surface in the intendancy of Mexico	2000
Bordering on Guadalaxara and Valladolid, near the lake of Chapala	500
On the coast of the Pacific Ocean, in the province of Mexico, under the orders of General Guerrero and the Brigadier Mondesdeoca, all determined troops, and principally infantry	1400
Total	6400

In the foregoing statement, we conceive that the numbers are within the actual force of the patriots bearing arms; and, in the estimate, we do not include that portion of the peasantry whom circumstances have compelled to a pretended neutrality, but who are ripe for revolt, whenever they again behold the patriot cause assume a favourable aspect.

We omit making any observations relative to the state of the other intendancies, because

there the royalists have succeeded, by military occupation, in enforcing a momentary pacification. By referring the reader to what we have previously remarked on the character and feelings of the population of the great intendancies of Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Oaxaca, it is obvious that the present tranquillity is a precarious calm, liable at any moment to be succeeded by a revolutionary tempest.

Various writers, within the last seven years, have published the most gloomy and absurd stories relative to the revolutions of Mexico and South America; and on no other subject have the public been more egregiously misled. Among the books abounding in erroneous statements, none is more conspicuous than a work which was re-published in Philadelphia, in 1819, entitled, " A Descriptive, Historical, and Geographical Account of Spanish America, &c. &c. By R. H. Bonnycastle, Captain in the Corps of Royal Engineers." So long as Captain Bonnycastle exercises the office of a *plagiarist*, in faithfully copying from Humboldt, Clavigero, and other celebrated authors, he is excusable for the errors of his statements: but when he undertakes to give us a detail of the present contest in Spanish America, with his speculations and predictions, and sentiments

upon political subjects, he must bear upon his own shoulders the charge of writing with the servility of a Spanish stipendiary, instead of the impartiality and manliness which ought to characterise a British officer—and of displaying the grossest ignorance of facts, which would scarcely have escaped the observation of any one who had paid the least attention to the affairs of Spanish America. For instance—

In page 316, he informs us, that "Mina, *who had been concerned in the Caracas revolution*, undertook an expedition against New Spain, where he was taken prisoner, and *beheaded in Mexico.*"

In page 243, after having given a confused account of the insurrection at Caracas, he states, that Miranda was taken, and *beheaded.*

In page 315, he eulogizes the ferocious *Boves*, a man whose career of horrid cruelties in Caracas makes even the royalists blush to acknowledge him for an associate or a Spaniard.

In page 317, speaking of the state of the revolution in 1816 and 1817, he tells us, that "in *New Grenada*, *Florida*, *Quito*, *Peru*, and *Mexico*, *the insurgents have very little sway.*"

In page 57, he gives the most ludicrous and false account of the situation of the insurgents

in New Spain; and gravely states, that "*neither the Indians nor people of the interior take any part of the struggle.*"

In page 348, speaking of Buenos Ayres and Chili, he states, that "the insurgent privateers still *dare to shew their flag in the Pacific.*"

In several parts of his book, he asserts that the royal authority is generally restored throughout Spanish America, and that *he* has not the least doubt of the ability of Spain to preserve her sovereignty over all those dominions.

Should his book ever pass to a second edition, we advise the captain to correct the errors we have noticed, and candidly to confess that events have occurred totally at variance with his confident predictions.

We have thus conducted our reader through some of the prominent scenes of the Mexican revolution, up to July, 1819; we have given a faithful detail of the daring achievements and misfortunes of the gallant Mina and his little band;* we have shewn what a few foreigners did actually accomplish in Mexico; and, finally, we have endeavoured to convey a correct

* The survivors of Mina's division, still in Mexico, are—Colonels Bradburn, Arago, and Don Pablo Erdozain, Captain Don Antonio Mandretta, Mr. Gerhard Honhorst, two soldiers, and two coloured boys.

idea of the state of society in that kingdom, and to exhibit the very precarious tenure by which Spain there maintains her authority. The picture we have drawn of Padre Torres and others of the patriot chiefs, may possibly induce a belief, that it is difficult for the patriots to obtain proper leaders to guide them to victory; but the reader should bear in mind, that the men with whom Mina was unfortunately obliged to co-operate, rose to their stations during seasons of anarchy and confusion; they had been heaved to the surface of the revolution by its currents and agitated waters, and were not otherwise distinguished than by their ambition, their licentiousness, and their ignorance. Should Mexico ever be invaded by a respectable foreign force, with a view of co-operating with the people in the establishment of their independence, there will not be found any deficiency of worthy and able Creole officers, willing to lend their exertions to the cause of their country, as well from among those who have formerly headed the insurgents, as from those who have hitherto been in the royal service; and, with respect to the population in general, legions of friends to independence will be found in every province of Old Mexico.

The royalists, in the intendancies of Guanax-

uato, Valladolid, Mexico, La Puebla, and Vera Cruz, are walking among ashes still warm from the recent eruptions; they are passing a precarious existence, surrounded by volcanoes. The spirit of hostility to the Spanish government is smothered but for a season; and when the flames of resistance shall again burst forth in those provinces, an ocean of blood will not extinguish them. It will, moreover, be difficult to prevent the revolutionary fire that is now burning along the shores of the Pacific Ocean from spreading into the interior. The patriot General Guerrero and his partisans occupy a part of New Spain, from which it will be almost impossible for the royalists to dislodge them. This chieftain has his principal establishment at the *Orilla de Zacatula*, situated on the right bank of the river of that name, about a league and a half from its mouths. The river Zacatula discharges itself into the Pacific Ocean, nearly in the latitude of eighteen degrees north: it has two mouths, about a league distant from each other; both these are obstructed by bars, but the northernmost one affords an entrance for boats. About sixty miles east-south-east from this river, is the harbour of Siguatanejo, which, for beauty, spaciousness, and security, is exceeded by none

on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The Spaniards, fearful lest it should become known to foreigners, have vigorously prohibited all traffic whatever at this port. Lord Anson, we believe, was the first and only foreigner that ever entered it. About fifteen miles north from Zacatula, there is likewise an excellent bay (*ensanada*), called *Petacalco*. The anchorage therein is convenient and safe, and the water is smooth throughout the greater part of the year. The sea-breeze sets in regularly at eight o'clock in the morning, and continues until sun-set, when it is succeeded by a land-breeze, which usually blows until six or seven o'clock next morning. The whole line of this coast, from Zacatula down to Siguatanejo, is at present under the control of Guerrero. The positions he has chosen are not only secure from surprise by the enemy, but that at Orilla is even capable of sustaining a formidable siege. It is defended on the south-east by a deep, wide, and rapid river; and between it and a place called *Colima*, is a wilderness, impassable by an army. From Tierra Fria, it can only be approached by a road on the right bank of the river, which road passes over mountains for nearly thirty leagues, every mile of which offers defiles, where one hundred resolute men could arrest the march

of one thousand. In fact, the country occupied by Guerrero is one of the most favourable parts of New Spain for defensive operations; and, so long as this experienced chief remains on the defensive, it will be almost impracticable for his enemies to subdue him. His advanced posts extend to Las Valzas. The country, being thinly settled, affords not the means of subsistence for an army of royalists; while the patriots, inured to privations, have a sufficiency. Guerrero has adopted the plan of collecting the cattle into a herd, so that, on the approach of an enemy, he has only to drive them to the rear, thus cutting off the means of subsistence from his opponents. The latter must, therefore, receive their supplies from a great distance, which almost precludes the possibility of attempting a formal siege of Guerrero's strong hold, the only manner in which he can be dislodged.

The people of all that part of the province of Mexico are remarkable for their hatred to the Spaniards; and, in the adjoining provinces of La Puebla and Oaxaca, the whole of the population along the coast of the Pacific Ocean are ready to co-operate with Guerrero. The inhabitants of the mountains of the Misteca are particularly attached to him; and should he

make his future advances in that direction, he would be cordially supported. It is probable, however, that Guerrero will remain at his present position on the river Zacatula, until some favourable circumstances occur in the other provinces, or until he receives a supply of arms and munitions of war.

Should the cruizers of Buenos Ayres and Chili direct their attention to that part of the coast of the Pacific Ocean within the jurisdiction of Guerrero's command, they could, with the aid of the latter, fortify Siguatanejo, and make it a place of rendezvous, of high importance to themselves, and of very serious annoyance to the enemy. By the adoption of such a measure, the whole commerce of the coast from Guaquil to Acapulco and San Blas could be annihilated, and the trade between Manilla and Acapulco obstructed or destroyed. We presume the reason why such an attempt has not yet been made, must arise from a want of information in the governments of Buenos Ayres and Chili, with regard to the position occupied by Guerrero, and the character of the population of the whole range of the coast.

Two thousand troops, with an extra supply of ten thousand musquets, landing on the coast near Guerrero's position, and uniting with that

chieftain, would decide the fate of Mexico in less than six months; and, should those troops be Creoles of *Chili*, of *Buenos Ayres*, or of the republic of *Columbia*, they would be received with joy and gratitude by the Mexicans, and would, moreover, be their fittest auxiliaries.

These observations, combined with the facts which we have related in the preceding chapters, will make it obvious to the reader, that the sovereignty of Spain over Mexico is suspended by a fragile thread; and that the emancipation of the latter from Spanish thraldom must take place at no distant day.

We shall close our Memoirs of the Revolution in the following chapter, by briefly noticing the cruelties committed by the Spanish authorities in Mexico and South America during the last nine years.

CHAPTER XII.

Cruelty a predominant feature in Spanish history; exemplified by a brief view of the conduct of Spain in Europe, and by the horrors committed, by her authorities, in Mexico and South America, since the year 1810—*Reflections.*

The deeds of cruelty which we have related in the course of our Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, may startle some of our readers, and incline them to doubt the correctness of our statements. We therefore deem it necessary to state, that in almost every instance which we have noticed of the atrocities perpetrated by the royalists, we have derived our information from the records of facts, either acknowledged or never denied by the Spanish government, and have generally obtained it from Spanish official documents, published in Spanish America, and in the Madrid Gazette. In the early years of the present revolutions in Spanish America, the viceroys, captains-general, and nearly all the royal officers, appear to have

emulated each other in defaming the American character, and in boasting of the inhuman deeds they had performed. They appear to have been regardless of the opinions of the civilized world, and exulting in that which should have caused the deepest shame, have placed on record the bloody deeds performed by their orders. But while they have thus set at defiance the judgment of the present generation, they have created a tribunal in the posterity of Spanish America, which will pass upon them a severe but righteous condemnation.

An inquiry into the causes which have operated to distinguish Spain among the nations of Europe for inhumanity, may deserve the attention of the future philosopher and statesman. The chivalrous exploits of the ancient Castilians, the generosity and nobleness which characterized the Spaniard of the olden time, have been the theme of admiration for many centuries; but an attentive examination of their history will convince us, that even in the era of their brightest glory, *cruelty* was a prominent trait in their character. In vain have they styled themselves the most Christian nation on earth—in vain have they called themselves the favoured people of God—in vain have they crowded their cities, towns, and villages, with

temples dedicated to religion, and spread legions of priests over their territories—in vain do they perpetually ring in our ears their pre-eminent piety, when all these advantages have been insufficient to check their propensities to the odious vice of cruelty, which, even in Savages and Pagans, excites our abhorrence and reprobation. Does this arise from physical causes, or does it originate in that vindictive and relentless spirit which has ever characterized ecclesiastical despotism, whether existing among Christians or Pagans?

In all the wars on the European continent in which Spain has taken a part, her officers and soldiers have been distinguished for their ferocity and cruelty, but more particularly in those of the reign of Philip III. It was in that monarch's reign, that Spain prosecuted a war in the Netherlands, accompanied by such scenes of licentiousness and barbarity, as cause her name, even to this day, to be execrated by the Dutch people; and it was during his reign, about the year 1609, that unparalleled deeds of horror were committed, in the expulsion of the Moors from Spain. These people had lived in the country eight hundred years, and were distinguished from the Spaniards by their language, religion, character, and manners. After a series

of bloody wars, the Spaniards at length overcame and reduced them to a state of vassalage, when the greater part of them submitted to receive Christian baptism. They were an industrious and frugal race; and while the Spanish villages all over Castile and Andalusia were falling into decay, those of the Moors increased and flourished. In consequence of this, their numbers rapidly augmented; and the Spaniards entertained fears, that if some remedy was not speedily applied, the Moors might regain their former ascendancy. The two schemes presented to the Christian cabinet of Philip III. were, *to put the whole of them to the sword*, or *to transport them to foreign parts*. There were numerous advocates for the indiscriminate slaughter of these unfortunate people; but it was apprehended that such a deed would fill all Europe with indignation, and therefore it was resolved to expel the Moors from the kingdom.

Among the ecclesiastics of those days, who bore a distinguished part in this act of violence and injustice, was *Don Juan de Ribera*, patriarch of Antioch and archbishop of Valentia, an aged prelate, highly venerated for his *piety* and learning, and eulogized by Spanish and Italian historians as one of the brightest ornaments that ever adorned the Christian church. The me-

morial addressed to the king, on this occasion, by that so much lauded patriarch, breathes in every line the darkest spirit of fanaticism, and is the most outrageous violation of the principles of humanity and Christianity that was ever penned. According to the bishop's doctrine, even the Moors who had been baptized and converted to Christianity, were still to be considered as "dangerous heretics." He carried his intolerance and blasphemy to such an extravagant length, as to say in his memorial, "In baptizing the Moresco children, therefore, our consciences are greatly disturbed with the apprehension that we are guilty of violating the commandment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has prohibited the giving of holy things to dogs, and the casting of pearls before swine."

It was finally determined by Philip, with the advice of all his counsellors spiritual and temporal, that the Moors were to be considered as obstinate heretics, and apostates from the faith, whom the king, if he thought fit, might justly punish with *death*; that therefore there could be no room to doubt the lawfulness of the milder punishment of *banishment*; and, accordingly, it was resolved that they should be immediately expelled the kingdom.

The manner in which this unfeeling sentence was carried into execution, is calculated to make the heart freeze with horror: we shall content ourselves with exhibiting a brief outline of the enormities which ensued.

By the edict of expulsion, all the men, women, and children, were commanded, under pain of death, to be ready, within *three days*, to repair to the sea-ports for embarkation. All their effects were confiscated; and death was pronounced against those who should attempt to conceal any part thereof. The numbers that were massacred on their route to the coast, and that perished on their voyage to Barbary, have been variously represented by different historians, not one of whom makes the total less than *one hundred thousand* men, women, and children. They were barbarously murdered at sea, by the officers and crews of the ships which they had freighted. There are instances recorded of inhuman cruelties exercised on this injured and defenceless people, surpassing in atrocity whatever is related in sacred or profane history. Men were butchered in presence of their wives and children, and the latter afterwards thrown alive into the sea. Some of the females, on account of their beauty, were preserved alive for a short time, to glut the brutal lust of the murderers of their husbands

or brothers, and then either slaughtered or committed to the waves. Such were the deeds of horror which were revealed, upon the trials to which some of these inhuman barbarians were brought, in consequence of their quarrels concerning the division of the spoil.

The fate of those who reached the coast of Barbary was not less deplorable. They were furiously attacked by the Bedouin Arabs, a wild banditti, who subsist by plunder. Of six thousand Moors, who set out together from Conastal, a town in the neighbourhood of Oran, with an intention of going to Algiers, only one person survived to reach that place.

Had these unfortunate people been exterminated by the sword, as was at first proposed, it would have been an act of mercy, compared with the fate to which they were actually doomed; but their sufferings, so far from exciting commiseration in the authors of their calamities, were made a subject of exultation; and the act was pronounced by the Catholic clergy to be acceptable in the sight of God, and a signal instance of divine judgment against heresy.

In some parts of Spain, where the Moors either resisted the order for expulsion, or could not comply with it under the peremptory terms prescribed, they were butchered in the most

horrible manner. No favour was shewn to age or sex; while rolling in the dust, imploring mercy of their savage conquerors, they were indiscriminately slain. Some had sheltered themselves among the woods and rocks; but Philip fixed a price upon their heads, and soldiers were sent to hunt them as beasts of prey. Scarcely an individual escaped. Those who were taken alive in the mountains of Valentia, were conducted to the city; and, after suffering every species of mockery and insult, were put to death by excruciating tortures. Such of our readers as wish to examine the details of these dreadful transactions, are referred to Watson's History of the Reign of Philip III. and to contemporary historians.

A government that could sanction such atrocities, and a people who could rejoice in the barbarous spectacles of an *auto de fé*, and in the other horrors of the tribunal of the Inquisition, were of course prepared for the perpetration of all those inhuman acts which have taken place in the New World since the epoch of its discovery, and more especially of those enormities which have occurred during the present revolution in Spanish America, which it has become our duty to notice in the present chapter.

We shall first recapitulate the cruelties that have been exercised in Mexico. The proclamations and decrees of viceroy Venegas outrage every principle of humanity and civilized warfare; and his despatches to the court of Madrid, which have been published in the Gazette of that city, contain little else than an account of the number of insurgents he has slain in battle, or *murdered after he had taken them prisoners.* Commandant *Revollo*, in his official despatch to the viceroy, *recommends the promotion of a serjeant, for having slain his nephew* among the insurgents. Commandant *Bustamante* recommends in like manner *a dragoon, for having killed his kneeling brother.* General *Truxillo* boasts of *having murdered the bearers of a flag of truce.* General *Calleja*, on several occasions, writes in the most exulting style, of *the thousands he had butchered, while on their knees imploring his mercy.* In the action of Zamora, the royal commander states, that *all the prisoners were deliberately despatched.* General *Cruz*, in almost every despatch to the viceroy, boasts of *the number of prisoners he had shot*, and of *the towns and villages he had reduced to ashes.* Captain *Blanco* says, that *his troops, eager for blood, destroyed persons of every age and sex, until no more victims could be found. Don*

Caetano Quintero, in his despatch of the 29th of August, 1811, says, that in the attack of Amoladeras, which continued two hours, *no quarter was given.* Commandant *Villaescusa* describes the manner in which *he entrapped the bearer of a flag of truce, and subsequently murdered him.* General *Calleja* issues proclamations and edicts of the most sanguinary nature, and carries into execution all his threats. The burning of towns, the butchery of prisoners, and the annihilation of a defenceless population, are the perpetual themes of this monster, in his official despatches. Yet, as we have before stated, for these eminent proofs of his loyalty to his beloved monarch, he was promoted to the rank of mariscal de campo, made viceroy of Mexico, decorated with the cross of Charles III. and was last year nominated to the command of that expedition which was intended for new scenes of butchery in America, but which the influence of justice and regeneration has suppressed.

It must be understood, that the preceding outline of atrocities committed in Mexico by the royalists, is only a very small part of the tragic scenes already brought to light: they are merely a part of those which have been confessed in public documents even by the royal-

ists, and which we have casually met with, in various writers, prior to the year 1814.

While we were in Mexico, we carefully examined the official papers, respecting the cruelties referred to in the work of William Walton, Esq. published in London in 1814, entitled "An Exposé of the Dissensions of Spanish America;" and we found that they corresponded with Mr. Walton's statements. But when we reflect on the vast number of dreadful acts which were related to us by individuals who were witnesses of the transactions, and of which not the least account has yet been published, we feel justified in asserting, that not one-eighth of the long catalogue of cruelties committed by the royalists in Mexico, has yet been exhibited to public notice.

We perused a manuscript History of the Mexican Revolution up to 1816, written by a distinguished Creole (whose name honour and prudence forbid us to disclose), which contained a minute detail of the royal massacres and devastations. The enormities that were there related have no parallel on the page of history. The writer of that manuscript, trembling for his life in case such a document should fall into the hands of the royalists, committed it to the flames: fortunate was it for him that he did so;

for, a few days afterwards, he was under the necessity of delivering up his person to the royalists. He still lives, and we hope will yet have an opportunity of exhibiting to the world a faithful history of the revolution; for, until such a work shall appear, civilized nations will not be able to form a complete opinion of the sufferings which the Mexican people have experienced, during their struggle for freedom.

Having thus noticed the bloody scenes acted by Spanish policy in Mexico, let us take a cursory view of those which have taken place in other parts of Spanish America.

Venezuela, New Grenada, and Quito, at present constituting the republic of Colombia, have been the theatres of greater horrors, if possible, than those which have abounded in Mexico. The reader, overcome with disgust, would turn from the page that contained the recital of but a thousandth part of the executions which have taken place at *Carthagena*, *Mompos*, *Santa Fé de Bogotá*, *Popayan*, *Quito*, *Caracas*, *Barcelona*, *Cumana*, *La Guayra*, *Puerto Cavello*, *Valencia*, and other cities of those countries. Of the extent of those barbarities, some idea may be formed, when we state, that, *within the last nine years*, it appears, *from Spanish official documents*, that *there have*

been sacrificed in cold blood, by hanging, shooting, and other modes of execution, eighty thousand prisoners, in those three provinces. We must bear in mind, that in these eighty thousand victims are not included many thousand others who were put to death by a brutal soldiery, whenever they visited a village, the sentiments of whose inhabitants they suspected to be favourable to the insurgents. How many inoffensive men, women, and children, have been slaughtered, of whose fate no further notice has been taken, in the official despatches of the royal commanders, than in the following words: "*The town or pueblo of* ———, *with all its inhabitants, has disappeared from the face of the earth!!!*"

In June, 1816, the Spanish General Morillo entered the city of Santa Fé de Bogotá, then called the capital of New Grenada. In one of his despatches from thence, which was intercepted in its passage to Spain, he boldly describes the measures which he had pursued, in the following words: "*Every person, of either sex, capable of reading or writing, were treated as rebels.*" "*By thus cutting off all who could read or write, he hoped effectually to arrest the spirit of revolution.*" The authenticity of such an extraordinary official communication might

admit of some doubt, if the monster who penned it had not in reality executed the savage deeds therein announced. All persons in Santa Fé and in Carthagena, who had been distinguished by their learning, or eminence in science, or who had held stations in the provincial administrations, and in the congress, with their *wives and daughters*, were thrown into loathsome dungeons. Six hundred of them were hanged or shot, and their bodies exhibited on gibbets. All the *females* who were accomplished in literature, of which there were many, suffered the same fate. The learned and benevolent Mutis, of whom Humboldt has spoken in terms of admiration, Lozano and Caldos, who were his disciples in philosophy, a distinguished chemist, and several other men of science, who had not borne arms, nor held any public trust, were put to death by order of Morillo. Some of the females were indebted for the preservation of their lives merely to the fatigue of the executioners: these women were afterwards exiled. Nearly the whole population of Santa Fé supplicated Morillo to spare the life of the venerable Mutis; but the savage was inexorable, openly avowing, *that learned Creoles were more dangerous enemies than the insurgents in arms.* Yet, after having

committed such acts of vindictive cruelty, "this Spanish apostle of pacification—this practical and preventative philanthropist—this monster of inhumanity—this pillar of the Spanish constitution"—this very same Morillo, issues a proclamation from his head-quarters in Caracas, the 12th of June last, addressed to the emigrants from Costa Firme, in which, after reminding them of his *incessant efforts* for the *pacification* of that country, since his arrival in 1815, he assures them that his *sole object has been*, and continues to be, that of *rendering them happy!* In apprizing them of his determination to return to his native country, he expresses his ardent desire, that, before his departure, he may be enabled to give them a *fraternal embrace;* and, for that purpose, conjures them earnestly to hasten their arrival at Venezuela, that he may not be deprived of that great satisfaction, it being the only consolation remaining to him, on the eve of this *cruel separation!*

To what emigrants, it may be asked, can this pacific overture be addressed? Few are they indeed, unless those be included, "who, under the *special passport* of Morillo, have emigrated to another world, but whose spirits are heard around their tombs.

We are still more astonished in beholding

this same Don Pablo Morillo, who for five years has lavished upon the people of the Costa Firme the grossest epithets and execrations, suddenly addressing, for the first time, on the 17th of the same month, a letter to the Congress of Colombia, on the subject of his proclamation, and styling them, with the most consummate hypocrisy and adulation, "Their *High Mightinesses*, the Congress assembled at Guayana." In this letter, after beginning with "*High and Mighty Lords*," he dares to insult them by advancing the gross falsehood, that the present constitution of Spain was adopted by the universal suffrage of the *representatives of both hemispheres;* and informs them, that he had received "positive orders, from *the constitutional monarch of the Spains*, to enter into a just and generous accommodation, which shall re-unite all the family, in order to enjoy the advantages of their political regeneration, and to put an end to the fatal effects of a division, generated by a desire to be free from oppression, that, by a false calculation, had been considered peculiar to those countries, notwithstanding that it had been transcendental to all the empire."

The brief view we have taken of the murders of unfortunate Creoles, in the three provinces before mentioned, we are well convinced, em-

braces but a small part of the numbers which have perished; and were we to say, that *one hundred and fifty thousand*, instead of *eighty thousand*, have been deliberately slaughtered by the royalists, we conceive that we should still be short of the actual number of victims.

Similar scenes of carnage have taken place in the provinces of La Plata and Chili; and although we have no recent accounts of such events, yet we find enough to make us shudder, on perusing the eloquent manifesto, addressed to all nations, by the Congress of the provinces of Rio de la Plata, dated at Buenos Ayres, the 25th of October, 1816, from which we make the following extracts:—

"The town of Cochabamba was taken, and delivered up to plunder for three hours. The commandant of the royal troops, Goyeneche, entering, with one-half of his cavalry, the gate of the principal church, the host being exposed, killed with a stroke of his sword the fiscal Lopez Andreu, who presented it, trembling with terror. He ordered the respectable governor intendant, Antesana, to be shot; and, observing with complacency from the balcony of his house this iniquitous assassination, ferociously cried out to his troops, not to shoot the victim in the head, as it was wanted to be stuck upon a pike,

When it was severed from the body by his command, the headless trunk was dragged through the streets, while at the same time the brutal soldiers were permitted to dispose at pleasure of the lives and properties of the inhabitants, during many successive days. Wherever this Nero went, death and devastation marked his path. A gesture, a clouded visage, an indiscreet word, or a tear stealing down the cheek, was a crime of state. The royalists have adopted the dreadful system of putting men to death indiscriminately, for no other purpose than to diminish our numbers; and, on entering our towns, have been known to massacre even the unfortunate market-people, driving them to the public square in groups, and shooting them down with cold-blooded, wanton cruelty. The villages of Chuquisaca and Cochabamba have more than once been theatres of this shocking barbarity.

"They have compelled our soldiers, taken prisoners, to serve against their wills in the ranks of their armies, carrying the officers in irons to distant outposts, where it was impossible for them to preserve health for a single year, while others have been starved to death in dungeons, and many have been forced to labour on the public works. They have wantonly shot the bearers of flags of truce, and have inflicted the

most unjustifiable outrages upon chiefs after their surrender, and other principal personages, notwithstanding the humanity that had been shewn by us to those prisoners who fell into our hands. In proof of this assertion, we need only mention the deputy Matos of Potosi, Captain-General Pumacagua, General Angulo, and his brother, the commandant Muñecas, and other partisan chiefs, shot in cold blood, many days after they had surrendered themselves prisoners.

"In the district of Valle Grande, they indulged themselves in the brutal sport of cutting off the ears of the natives, and transmitting a pannier full of them to head-quarters. They afterwards destroyed the town by fire; burnt about forty populous villages of Peru; and took a hellish pleasure in shutting up the inhabitants in their houses before setting them on fire, in order that their unhappy victims might be burnt alive.

"They had not only shewn themselves implacable in murdering our countrymen, but they have thrown aside all decency and morality, parading old men of the religious profession, and women, in the public places, made fast to a cannon, and their bodies exposed to shame.

"They have established an inquisitorial system for all these punishments; they have dragged out peaceful inhabitants from their houses, and transported them across the ocean, to be tried for pretended offences, and have executed, without trial, a multitude of citizens.

"They have attacked our sea-coasts, and murdered defenceless inhabitants, without sparing clergymen and those in extreme old age. By the order of General Puzuela, they burnt the town of Puna; and, meeting with no others, they put to the sword old men, women, and children. They have compelled our brothers and sons to take up arms against us, and have forced them, under the command of Spanish officers, to fight against our troops. They have excited domestic insurrections, corrupting with money, and every species of seduction, the pacific inhabitants of the country, in order to involve us in a frightful anarchy, and to enable them to attack us weakened and divided. They have displayed a new invention of horror, by poisoning fountains and food at La Paz; and, in recompense for the kind treatment they received when obliged to surrender at discretion at that place, they blew up one hundred and fifty patriots, in the barracks which had been previously mined for that purpose.

" They have abused the sacred privilege of flags of truce, tampered with our governors and generals, and they have repeatedly written letters inciting to treason. They have declared that the laws of war, recognised by civilized nations, ought not to be observed towards us; and, with contemptuous indifference, replied to General Belgrano, that treaties could not be entered into nor kept with insurgents.

" It is in the name of Ferdinand of Bourbon, that the heads of captured officers have been stuck up on the highways; that a distinguished partisan leader has been actually impaled; and that the monster Centano, after having murdered Colonel Gamargo in the same horrid manner, cut off his head, and sent it as a present to General Puzuela, informing him that it was a miracle of the Virgin del Carmen.

" It is Ferdinand of Bourbon, who has sent his generals with decrees of pardon, which they caused to be published, with no other view than to deceive the simple and ignorant, in order to facilitate their entrance into cities and towns; but giving, at the same time, private instructions, authorizing and commanding them, after having thus obtained possession, to hang, burn, confiscate, assassinate, and inflict every possible suffering on those who had

availed themselves of such suppositious pardons.

" What could America expect from a king, actuated, at the very moment of seating himself on the throne, by sentiments so inhuman?—of a king, who has no other rewards but chains and gibbets, for the immense sacrifices of his Spanish subjects in releasing him from captivity—of subjects, who, at the expense of their blood, and of every privation, have redeemed him from a prison, in order to adorn his temples with a crown? If these men, to whom he owed so much, received death, were doomed to perpetual imprisonment, or to base slavery, for no other cause than that of having framed a constitution, what might we not expect to be reserved for us? To hope for a benign treatment from him, and from his bloody ministers, would have been to seek among tigers for the mildness of the dove. Then, indeed, would have been repeated towards us the ensanguined scenes of Caracas, Carthagena, and Quito. We should then have spurned the ashes of the *eighty thousand* persons who have fallen victims to the fury of the enemy, and whose illustrious manes justly call for revenge; and we should have merited the execrations of every succeeding generation of our posterity, con-

demned to serve a master always disposed to tyrannize over them, while, by his nullity on the sea, he has become unable to protect them from foreign invasion."

The Madrid Gazette has published the following, among many of the blood-stained despatches from America:—

"*Battle of Santa Helena, in Peru, April* 3, 1816.

"I can assure your excellency, that I never saw rage or energy equal to that of our enemies. They throw themselves on our musquets, as if they had nothing to fear from them: our soldiers were mixed with them; they grasped our men by the body, and endeavoured to wrench the arms out of their hands. A shower of stones fell upon us: we were obliged to fight with the bayonet. The wretch Lamargo died by my hand: I did not cease striking him with my sabre, until his sword fell from his hand. I send it to you, together with his head. More than six hundred men were despatched with the bayonet, or shot by the soldiers. I intend that the celebrated Pedro Villarubia shall be beheaded in the public square. He is about to be conveyed to Pesit, accompanied by two sergeants, who deserted from the regiment of Lima. They will be shot, together with all the other prisoners."

Where is the citizen of the United States, where is the lover of liberty, or where is the man possessing even a spark of humanity, whose bosom does not throb with indignation against a policy such as that of Spain, after perusing this eloquent and dignified manifesto, and the relation we have given of the horrors that have taken place in Mexico, New Grenada, Quito, and Venezuela? What ought to be the feelings excited in the breast of every citizen of the United States, at the mention of the *inhuman treatment*, and the *cold-blooded murder of their fellow-citizens*, whom accident or the chance of war placed in the hands of the Spaniards in Mexico, and who were cruelly put to death, not to afford an example which might deter other foreigners from aiding the patriots (for the cruelties exercised towards them have not yet been told to the world by the perpetrators), but to satiate that thirst for revenge which has always formed a component part of the Spanish character? Although Mina's comrades acted in contravention to the existing laws of their own country, that circumstance cannot possibly palliate the inhumanity they experienced—inhumanity the more outrageous, as the conduct of the victims had been marked by honour, justice, and clemency—

inhumanity which can only be equalled by the wild and savage inhabitants of unexplored countries—a degree of inhumanity which adds its mite to the load of infamy with which the annals of Spanish history are already burthened. The recollection of the scenes which occurred at the abandonment of Sombrero, and in the dungeons of San Juan de Ulua, cannot be easily effaced; and we hope, nay, we feel confident, that there does not exist an American citizen, whose breast burns not with indignation against a nation which in the present day can sanction deeds of so appalling a nature.

If the causes which arrayed the colonies of North America in opposition to the authority of Great Britain, have been proclaimed by the world to be just; with how much greater reason may the colonists of Spanish America appeal to the universe for approbation and support, during their present struggles for emancipation from Spanish thraldom! Yet, strange and incredible as it may appear, there are in free North America many who, far from sympathizing with their southern brethren, or even wishing success to a cause in which they themselves have contended successfully, condemn the exertions of those who are imitating

their example, in striving to obtain the blessings of freedom, support Spain with all the weight of argument, and are almost brought to deprecate the independence of Spanish America. Every trifling opportunity which presents itself is seized with avidity by many, to misrepresent and falsify the efforts of the ill-fated Spanish Americans. Their victories are burlesqued, their reverses are magnified, and their sufferings are derided, by those who, enjoying the blessings of security and plenty, know not, except by hearsay, the toils, the dangers, and the hardships, endured by this oppressed people. Incapable of appreciating their exertions, they are callous to the appeals, and even withhold their applause from the perseverance and intrepidity which they have displayed against the tyranny of the Old World. Because the union, energy, and wisdom, which accomplished the independence of the United States, have not directed the operations of a people who are only now emerging from a state of the most complex slavery, and involuntary ignorance, under which colonies ever groaned, they are shamefully disregarded as unworthy of protection, and the voice of humanity is suffered to waste itself in vain. Such principles should be found only in the satellites of crowned

heads. That misrepresentation and falsehood on this subject should be propagated by Spanish agents and foreigners, who come into our country imbued with monarchical and aristocratical principles, cannot excite surprise; but can we refrain from expressing our regret and indignation, when we behold some of our own citizens espousing the cause of Spain, with as much zeal as if their very existence depended upon the continuance of her wide-extended dominion in the western hemisphere?

In the course of this work, we have merely glanced at some of the grievances which America has endured for the space of three hundred years. Ponderous volumes would be filled with a detail of them. They are, however, so far known, as to supersede the necessity of our enlarging farther upon the subject. It must, nevertheless, be remarked, that we did not observe in the former Cortes of Spain any disposition to relax the iniquitous system so long maintained in Spanish America; but, on the contrary, that body, in unison with the Cadiz monopolists, exhibited more rancorous hostility to the Spanish Americans than had been displayed during any period since the conquest. We have already noticed the infamous decree of the Cortes, of the 10th of April, 1813, wherein

they declared, that it was "*derogatory to the majesty and dignity of the national congress, to confirm a capitulation made with malignant insurgents.* On examining the decrees of the Cortes, of the regency, and of the different juntas who exercised the functions of the Spanish government during the late war in the Peninsula, we do not find a single instance of paternal and generous conduct towards the Americas. But a few years ago, the Consulado, or board of trade of Mexico, composed of *European members*, in its solemn deliberations, manifested to the Cortes, that *the Americans were a race of monkeys filled with vice and ignorance,—automata, unworthy of being represented, or representing.* This silly and singular communication, instead of being treated with scorn, and its authors severely reprehended, gave rise to serious debates, in which the Americans were most abusively slandered, as may be seen by examining the proceedings of the Cortes for September, 1811.

The representation of America, as well in the former as in the present Cortes, is the greatest farce, or rather the most outrageous insult that was ever offered to a body of rational beings. Spain, with a population of *nine or ten millions*, elects *one hundred and fifty* representa-

tives to that body; while America, with a population of *eighteen millions*, has *thirty* representatives, that is, one for every six hundred thousand souls. But the most extravagant peculiarity of the farce is, that *an electorate junta assembled at Madrid, in May last, and there named the thirty representatives who are to represent Spanish America in the Cortes.* To say that the decrees of *such* a Cortes are binding, even on that portion of Spanish America at present under the royal authority, would be an assertion rather difficult to maintain: but to suppose that the people of *Chili*, of *Buenos Ayres*, of *Venezuela*, and of *New Grenada*, are represented by men nominated at Madrid, and bound by the acts of a Cortes thus constituted, is indeed an absurdity that has no parallel in the annals of legislation. In fact, the orders issued by the late Cortes to the royal commanders in America, were more barbarous and imperious than those issued by Ferdinand, after his return to the Spanish throne; and we have seen how faithfully those orders were executed by the Spanish officers.

Every revolving hour, since the present revolution commenced in Spanish America, has been marked by new injuries towards its inhabitants; and, considering the extent and nature

of those injuries, we are astonished that there exists a Creole, from Cape Horn to the Floridas, who does not execrate the Spanish name.

If, during the revolutionary contest of the North American colonies, any attempt on the part of the mother country to refuse the rebels, as they were then called, the rights of civilized warfare, caused general indignation—if, in the case of a single citizen put to death contrary to the usages of war, the whole nation took a common interest in the murder, and adopted immediate measures of retaliation,—what ought to be the feelings and conduct of the South Americans towards a government which has acted as Spain has done during the present contest? If an Indian alliance was reprobated by many of the most enlightened members of a British parliament, during the struggles of North America for independence, what language should now be used towards a nation that has ordered and sanctioned such excesses as those we have related? Let us recall to the recollection of our readers the speech made by the venerable Earl of Chatham, at the time when Lord Suffolk, then British secretary of state, contended in the British House of Peers for the employment of Indians in the war against America. The secretary undertook to main-

tain, that, "*besides its policy, the measure was also allowable on principle, for that it was perfectly justifiable to use all the means that God and Nature put into our hands.*"

Earl Chatham replied, in a burst of eloquence, not surpassed for strength, beauty, and effect, by any thing history has recorded :—

"I am astonished," exclaimed the dignified statesman,—"SHOCKED, to hear such principles confessed; to hear them avowed in this house, or even in this country. My lords, I did not intend to have encroached again on your attention; but I cannot repress my indignation—I feel myself IMPELLED to speak. My lords, we are called upon, as members of this house, as men, as Christians, to protest against such horrible barbarity. 'That God and Nature put into our hands!' What idea of God and Nature that noble lord may entertain, I know not; but I know that such detestable principles are equally abhorrent to religion and humanity. What! to attribute the sacred sanction of God and Nature to the massacres of the Indian scalping knife! to the cannibal savage, torturing, murdering, devouring, drinking the blood of his mangled victims! Such notions shock every precept of morality, every feeling of humanity, every sentiment of honour. These

abominable principles, and this more abominable avowal of them, demand the most decisive indignation. I call upon that reverend, and this most learned bench, to vindicate the religion of their God; to support the justice of their country. I call upon the bishops to interpose the unsullied sanctity of their lawn; upon the judges to interpose the purity of their ermine; to save us from this pollution. I call upon the honour of your lordships to reverence the dignity of your ancestors, and to maintain your own. I call upon the spirit and humanity of my country, to vindicate the national character. I invoke the genius of the constitution. From the tapestry that adorns these walls, the immortal ancestor of this noble lord frowns with indignation at the disgrace of his country. In vain did he defend the liberty, and establish the religion of Britain against the tyranny of Rome, if these worse than popish cruelties and inquisitorial practices are endured among us. To send forth the merciless cannibal, thirsting for blood! Against whom? Your Protestant brethren! To lay waste their country, to desolate their dwellings, and extirpate their race and name, by the aid and instrumentality of these horrid *hell-hounds of war!* Spain can no longer boast pre-eminence in barbarity. She armed

herself with blood-hounds to extirpate the wretched natives of Mexico; but we, more ruthless, loose the *dogs of war* against our countrymen in America, endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify humanity. My lords, I solemnly call upon your lordships, and upon every order of men in the state, to stamp upon this infamous procedure the indelible stigma of public abhorrence. More particularly I call upon the holy prelates of our religion to do away this iniquity; let them perform a lustration, to purify their country from this deep and deadly sin. My lords, I am old and weak, and at present unable to say more; but my feelings and indignation were too strong to say less. I could not have slept this night in my bed, nor have reposed my head upon my pillow, without giving this vent to my eternal abhorrence of such enormous and preposterous principles."

What would the patriotic and high-minded Earl of Chatham have said, had he lived in the present times, and heard of the barbarities of Spain towards *her* colonists?

When the Russians put to the sword thirty thousand Turks at the capture of Ismail, all Europe shuddered. When it was said that Bonaparte had put to death his sick in Egypt, all Europe was shocked. When Indian savages

are taken as the allies of Great Britain in modern warfare, the British people, as well as the whole civilized world, condemn the barbarous alliance. When the city of Washington was entered by the British—when the public edifices which had been erected there for civil purposes, and the national library, were set fire to, Europe frowned on the destroyers, and registered the transaction in her records as an act of Vandalism, disgraceful to the exalted nation whose officers directed it, and dishonourable to the age in which it was committed. What, then, should be the denunciation which the conduct of Spain to her transatlantic brethren has merited?—a nation, which, hugging itself in the cloak of religion, branding every other, that differed from her in tenets, with the stigma of heresy, proclaiming herself through the world as the champion of Christianity, and boasting of her peculiar adherence to its doctrines, orders and sanctions a system of atrocities, unknown in the darkest ages of society, and rewards with honours and distinctions those who shew themselves to be animated with the spirit of her sanguinary edicts! Will it be believed by posterity, that the rest of the world looked on this tragic scene, without making one single effort to

staunch the bleeding wounds of eighteen millions of people? By this sanguinary course of conduct, more than a million of human beings have perished in Spanish America, since the year 1810; and no small proportion of these victims have perished, not on the field of battle, but by death, inflicted in all its most hideous forms, by the hand of cold-blooded cruelty. "Have not sufficient victims been already immolated on the altars of vengeance? have not sufficient families been ruined? have not sufficient cities and towns been plundered and destroyed?" "Is it not time to put an end to such a vast and fruitless effusion of human blood, and to staunch the horrors of so destructive and protracted a war?" "Are not the enormities we have related sufficient to fill the heart of every friend of his own species with alarm, and chill every feeling of humanity?"

The horrors we have noticed are not such as are inseparable from a state of warfare; they have been engendered by a spirit of revenge, and executed with a barbarity, unpractised even in the darkest ages of Paganism. The stipulations of society, in all Christian states, have meliorated the afflictions of war by certain usages generally held sacred; but on the American continent, Spain has given to the ravages

of war, every infernal atrocity which the malice of a demon could suggest.

Is there no generous or eloquent Spaniard to be found in the present Spanish Cortes, who will raise his voice in that body, and, emulating the renown of Chatham, step forward to stigmatize the dreadful system which Spain has pursued, and is still pursuing, towards America?

If no European Spaniard can be found capable of divesting himself of his natural (*orgullo*) pride, or of elevating his mind above the prejudices of his education, are there no natives of America, in the present Cortes, who, like *Mexia*, *Lardizabal*, *Arispe*, *Teran*, *Calatrava*, *Palacios*, *Couto*, and *Ribera*, members of the former Cortes, will stand forth in behalf of America, at the present crisis, and raise their voices against the inhuman practices of this frightful and extraordinary contest? If no such generous statesmen appear in the saloon of the present Cortes, or if Spain pursues the system that has hitherto prevailed in her councils, humanity may still have to deplore, for a few years longer, scenes of carnage and desolation; but the arm of dreadful retribution cannot be long stayed; it will fall with accumulated weight on the head of every European

Spaniard now in America, or who may hereafter dare to set foot on its soil.

Nations, like individuals, when excited by powerful passions, soon pass to extremes in their conduct. The affection of a slave to a master is in some few instances strong and steady, but in general it is weak and precarious. The ties between a colony and a mother country, bear a much closer analogy to those between the master and slave, than between the parent and offspring.

Is it not an abuse of reason, as well as a violation of every natural law, to suppose that the *parent state* (as it is called), situated at a distance of two thousand leagues, should dictate to, and control an empire vastly superior in extent of territory and population? Can any thing account for the submission of colonies, under such circumstances, but an absolute ignorance of their physical and moral strength. Will not every attempt made by the parent state to keep those colonies in subjection, after the latter have discovered their *rights* and their *strength*, tend to destroy the little affection that may still linger in the bosoms of the colonists towards their former *madre patria?* Will not such outrages as Spain has been in the habit of exercising towards the Spanish Americans for upwards

of three centuries, and more especially during the last ten years, not only destroy every principle of attachment, but give birth to an inextinguishable hatred? Is it possible that the wise Europeans of the Peninsula have not yet discovered the inutility of all their menaces and savage edicts, and of all their murders, to effect the pacification of America? Are they so infatuated or blinded by pride and prejudice, as not to see, that the *constitution*, which would have been received some years ago with joy and gratitude by the Americans, will now be rejected with disdain; or if received by any portion, that it will be for no other purpose than a temporary expedient, to enable them with more ease and certainty to accomplish their ulterior views in favour of the independence of their country?

We entertain very little expectation that the present Cortes will adopt a more liberal system of policy towards America than the last. It remains, however, yet to be seen, whether the lessons of experience will dissipate the mists in which the former Cortes were involved, and whether some of the members of the present body have become regenerated by adversity. We shall gratefully acknowledge our mistake, should the Cortes generously come forward

and prove themselves just and wise, by respecting the rights of mankind in America, and by magnanimously confessing that the inhabitants of America, as well by reason as by the laws of nature, are entitled to the privileges and blessings of self-government.

Should any enlightened Spaniard peruse these remarks, we pray that he will bear in mind, that they have been penned by a citizen of the United States, not with a view to wound the feelings of a Spaniard, but to shew the dreadful effects of ecclesiastical and civil despotism on the human character. We know not any natural causes to make the natives of the Peninsula of Spain more sanguinary than the rest of the human race. The greater portion of the Spanish Peninsula enjoys as fine a climate as any in Europe; its soil is capable of yielding every thing necessary for human subsistence; and Christianity has shed its rays in every corner of the kingdom: but, nevertheless, there is a vindictive spirit in the Spaniard, there is *hauteur* in his deportment, cruelty in his conduct in war, and a jealousy the most absurd and constant, against the people of all other nations. These are characteristics of the Spaniard, attested by the page of history, and by almost every traveller who has visited Spain.

The exceptions to this general character are more rare among Spaniards than among any other people of the earth. It is possible their character may be changed by a new course of education. Bigots always have been, and ever will be cruel; but when we see civil despotism blended with religious intolerance, we may cease to wonder, that the Spaniard, in his individual as well as national character, is proud and vindictive.

These traits have, in a most striking manner, been exemplified in the conduct of Spain and of Spaniards towards America: and, with a view to illustrate the subject, we shall close our Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution with the following paraphrase of the sentiments of a celebrated modern writer:—

"Humanity hath lifted up her voice, and is invoking every heart of generous sentiments to frown upon the execrable scenes that are acting in America, and which, under names the most specious and venerated, are covering her with crimes of the deepest dye. The men who tread the soil of that unhappy country have lost their natures. The eye there sees none but ferocious enemies, bent on mutual slaughter. Every thing is devastated—every thing is consumed by the sword and the flames. The Spanish soldier, made savage by his ideal wrongs, has

proclaimed extermination to be the only law of those vast regions. How long shall we unmoved contemplate these horrors, which strip the human character of its noblest attributes, and degrade man to the level of the ferocious beasts of the forest? Shall havoc still elevate her ensanguined brow in the New World, within the eye-shot of the Old? and after so much has been done to ameliorate the intercourse between Europe and Africa, shall nothing be done for America?

"A king of Syracuse imposed no other law on conquered Carthage than the abolition of human sacrifices. The Catholic religion had cast down the blood-stained altars of Mexico; but Spain has rebuilt the fearful shrines, and now, armies of inhuman priests offer up prostrate America, at her command, as a victim to appease the irritated manes of her rejected crown! Will Europe never cease to be the curse of the inhabitants of those climes, and to force from them their gold by their blood, and shed their blood by armies paid with that gold?

"The senate of Rome once listened with submission to a savage, and rewarded the ingenuous frankness of his words by suspending the exactions of his country. Ah! how nobly was Rome then represented by her senate! and

how much more glorious would Europe appear, should she, in the name of humanity, interpose her august judgment to stem the tide of woe which overwhelms America, and should she, placing herself between these fierce combatants, exact a truce of their rage! When, then, America and Spain should present themselves before this Areopagus, what emotions would not the former excite, and how speechless would the latter be, if America, discovering her wounds, and shewing her opened and almost bloodless veins, should exclaim—'Cruel Spain! did Heaven form me for thyself alone? In tranquillity and happiness I passed the peaceful ages, that preceded the fatal hour, when the hand of thy Columbus tore aside the veil, which from creation's dawn had hid me from thine eyes. But I learned to know thee by my tearful eyes, and by my lavished blood. For, soon as thy soldiers had landed on my shores, they poured among my unoffending children an unknown and appalling fire, and thy fiery coursers smote them with their mailed hoofs. Thou destroyedst my thrones, and the altars erected by my gratitude to that great luminary, whose rays fertilize my soil, ripen the juices of my peerless vegetables, and beautify, with splendid hues, my flowers and my fruits, the inhabit-

ants of my groves and of my wide-spread plains. The bowels of my lofty mountains give thee riches; the freshness and medicinal virtues of my plants give thee health; and the only acknowledgment that I have yet received from thee has been death, and death alone!

"'From the time that thou deliveredst to the flames the last scion of my Incas, and transportedst to another hemisphere the race which occupied my throne of Mexico, hast thou forborne one instant to heap outrage upon outrage, and to add ruins to ruins?

"'With extended arms I receive thee in my territory, and thou instantly declarest me a *slave;* and, to arrogate to thyself the right of subjecting me, thou placest the widest and most unnatural distinctions between thy children and mine, condemning mine to form the *last* link in the chain of being.

"'It was necessary that Rome should command thee to view in them human beings, and thy obedience to her orders was for once without reproach. But, thenceforth, thou didst entrust to chains and to the knife the duty of maintaining that distinction thou hadst placed between mine and thine. Surely, beings so inferior to the cherished sons of thy bosom merited extermination, and *they have disappeared.* Then, at least, thou wast not a parricide; but now, is it not thine own blood that thou art shedding? Have those who sprung from thy loins, my adopted sons, lost in thine eyes all traces of their origin? Dost thou not acknowledge them as brothers? In the first tempest of thy wrath, thy vengeance fell on strangers; but now thou hast risen up against Spaniards—thou warrest against thine own family. No longer do strange and different forms of worship divide us. My voice now utters the sounds of that majestic language which thou hast diffused throughout the vast extent of my dominions. O Spain! how canst thou assume the tender name of mother? A mother studies the happiness of her offspring—their felicity constitutes her delight. But hast thou ever attempted to soothe my sufferings, or enlighten my mind? Speak, and inform me, in which of thy acts or sentiments can I recognize thy fostering care?

"'From the commencement of thy reign over me, thou hast trembled for the preservation of thy power. The extent of my territory fills thee with alarm, when compared with thy straitened limits in one corner of Europe. My wealth makes thee blush for thy poverty; my fertility, for the idleness of thy soil. The popu-

lation which my vast regions are destined by the God of nature to subsist, frightens by anticipation thy unpeopled cities and deserted plains; and, to quiet thy jealous fears, thou repressest the principles of strength and felicity within me, and withdrawest from my soil its exuberant fruitfulness, that the tree may bear no more fruit than thy own hand can pluck. Like the Dutch, who, traverse the fruitful Moluccas, and extirpate the luxurious shoots, lest their superabundance should interfere with the value of the produce to which avarice has limited those isles, thou hast commanded nature, prodigal of her favours to me, to become sterile; thou hast forbidden the olive to yield its oil to me—the mulberry tree, to nourish the insect whose industry would yield me robes of comfort and splendour—the vine, to beautify my hills, or allay my thirst with its juice. To extract for thee the gold from my mountains, is all that thou permittest me to do. Thou hast debarred me from communication with the rest of the world; and if I am known to it, it is yet undiscovered to me. The products of human industry, the embellishments of art, and the advantages of science, thou withholdest from my enjoyment. My noble rivers flow through solitary forests and unpeopled regions. My ports

are capable of containing all the ships of the world; but thy iron laws condemn them to a solitude that is never broken, but by some meanly freighted vessel despatched by the avarice of thy ministers, or by the intrigues of thy courtiers.

" 'To whom hast thou committed thy authority over me? To ungrateful strangers. By whom have they been succeeded? By men equally unknown and ungrateful, whose rapacity has long since ceased to excite my surprise, and whose forbearance I have never known. Behold what thy reign has cost me: and add to this, thy wars that interest me not, which blockade my ports, ravage my coasts, and convert the vast circumference of my territory into the barrier of a prison.

" 'But the endurance of these wrongs has reached its height. For a long time, thou hast ceased to exist in relation to me. Events, over which I had not the slightest influence, have occasioned this separation, and established new relations between us. Other views have burst upon my enraptured sight, and have created for me a new existence. Shall I renounce that existence for thy sake, and become again a hewer of wood and a drawer of water? Leave oh, leave me, to pursue in peace that path

which is fitting to my age, and which the march of mind has formed for me. Deceive not thyself, nor think that it is I who have burst asunder the bonds that united us: it was Nature herself—it was that world from which thou hast excluded me, to which I now belong, and from which I must never again be parted.

"'Tell me, did thy king alone reign over me? No; every Spaniard, every factory, every workshop, in the Peninsula, considered me its subject and its slave. Trembling under the load of multiplied wrongs, my groans were punished with stripes and death; and when I spoke of civil rights, thy sword was unsheathed, and the fire of extermination was lighted. Blood and ashes smoke on every side; and the lion of Castile, emulating in ferocity the monarch of my own forests, is preparing to reign, like him, in deserts.

"'When the Supreme Being created man, was it that he should be a vassal? Has his neck been only formed to bear the yoke? Is the exercise of his reasoning powers to be denied him? Is the act of reflecting and comparing criminal? Does he merit extermination, for daring to resist oppression? Dost thou not know, that it is the oppressor who makes the rebel? Is it not a law of nature, for manhood

to feel and assert the rights belonging to that stage of existence? Do not children separate from their parents after a certain age, and hast thou never seen them become parents in their turn? Is it a crime, then, for me to throw off my swaddling clothes, when they no longer correspond with my growth? When every thing within reminds me of my maturity—when every thing without is enlightened, is in motion, still advancing to perfection, must I be held in leading-strings, and live in that darkness in which thou wouldst retain me? Where are thy means to effect it? Whence are thy treasures, but from the bowels of my mountains? Whence are thy ships, but from my woods? Whence thy revenue, but from the harvests that thou art now destroying, and from the plains that thou art now laying waste? Whence are thy soldiers? Alas! thou draggest them to dye their hands in the blood of brothers. Dost thou rely on their support? Will it not fail thee, if once they rivet their glance upon the fascinating ore, that I can pour into their hands, instead of the miserable pittance that thou givest them?—if once they taste the fruits which I can offer them, instead of a subsistence measured by avarice, and diminished by fraud?—or if once they behold the brides to whom I can unite

them, instead of that gloomy celibacy to which thou wouldst doom their youth, and by which thou wouldst extinguish their race? May not those very soldiers, under circumstances so new and unexpected to them, become my friends, and thy enemies? Forget not, that the barbarians who invaded Greece refused to quit it, when they had once tasted its delicious fruits, and caught a glimpse of those beauties who had served as models to the chisel and to the pencil of the artists, whose works have since filled a world with admiration. But suppose that these soldiers, with whom thou threatenest me, should not prove faithless to thee; sent for my destruction, they will find their graves on my shores, and their tombs will be seen in my mountains. Dost thou for a moment believe that the sight of them will intimidate me? The days of Cortez and of Pizarro have past away for ever. My sons and thy sons descend from them. No longer do thy arms and thy horses create surprise; and if for an age thy sons were believed immortal, for an age has that illusion been dispelled. Receive from me the oft-times salutary advice of an enemy. Abjure an empire thou canst no longer control; and confess that the period has arrived, when America, by the decrees of the God of heaven, must be separated

from thy unnatural sway. Know, that the day is fast approaching, when all nations will learn that their true interests consist in cultivating amity and intercourse with each other, instead of struggling for the crown of domination. Anticipate my future prosperity, and behold in it the real source of thine own happiness and regeneration. Get rid of thy watchfulness and thy remorse. Come and settle on my soil, as brothers and as friends. Participate in those harvests which all-bountiful nature, in my favoured climes, yields to industry. Let us interchange with each other our respective productions: let us terminate the murderous struggle between our own kindred. Imbrue thy hands no longer in the blood of my sons. Let the powers of youthful America no longer remain dormant, but let her dispute the prize of improvement with Spain. Cultivate thy fields, and re-animate the languishing industry of thy people. With the riches of my mines will I pay for the produce of thy industry. But look to obtain them no more by the sword. Remember, too, that riches are the wages of industry; nor will this decree of nature be changed for thee. If my entreaties, thus founded in justice, reason, and fraternal sentiments, should fail to soften thy heart—if, deaf to the

voice of my sufferings, nothing will content thee but the return of my neck to the yoke—if thou fearest not that America may one day deny to Spain, what Spain now refuses to America—if thou wilt draw thy vengeful steel, and strive to enforce thy will at the point of the sword,—then be it so: my sons shall answer thee with their's; and thou wilt find engraved upon their blades, *My* ULTIMATUM!'"

ROUTE

TO

THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

CHAPTER XIII.

Examination of the different routes to the Pacific Ocean—Doubts respecting a passage to the north-west—The communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at the province of Chocó, examined—Observations upon the routes by the Isthmus of Darien or Panamá; by the Isthmus of Costa Rica; and by that of Oaxaca—General observations on the importance of this passage to the civilized world.

HAVING thus far occupied the attention of our readers with an account of the civil wars of Mexico, we turn with satisfaction from those tragic scenes, to an object of the highest importance to the whole civilized world, and which we deem particularly interesting to the citizens of the United States, as well as to the present and future generations of the whole continent of America.

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To shorten the navigation between the eastern and western parts of our globe, either by discovering a passage in the high northern latitudes, or by cutting canals and opening routes through some parts of the American continent, so as to afford either a navigable or rapid communication between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, is most certainly an object which all the nations of the earth ought to rejoice in seeing accomplished.

For the last two centuries large sums have been expended in attempting the discovery of a north-west passage to the Pacific Ocean; and even at the present day, expeditions for that purpose are annually fitted out, either by the European governments, or by enterprising private companies. To say that no such passage exists, and that for several degrees around the pole there is an impenetrable and eternal congelation, would be controverting the opinions of many enlightened men: but we believe they will all agree with us, that if ever such a passage should be discovered, it will be in latitudes encumbered with floating ice the greater part of the year, perpetually exposed to tempestuous weather, in a region where vegetation is scarcely visible, and where no supplies could be obtained by the unfortunate mariner, in the event

of detention or shipwreck. These dangers may be encountered, and in part surmounted, by human courage and enterprise; but the time that would be required to perform a voyage in that direction, would always be uncertain. It would, at least, occupy as many months as the present circuitous route to the western shores of the Pacific Ocean. It is, therefore, our opinion, that should such a north-west passage eventually be discovered, its utility to the commercial world would be very trivial. Waiving, then, any further consideration of this point, we will proceed to examine the different sections of the continent, where nature requires but little aid from art, in order to effect the great object of a communication between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

The Spanish and British governments have at various times received the most flattering statements respecting the feasibility of opening this communication, either entirely by water in some places, or by land and water in others.

Nine different routes have been proposed: but we shall confine our examination to those places where we think the project of cutting a canal may be successfully undertaken; and where a land and water communication appears to be perfectly within the compass of human exertion to accomplish.

More than two centuries ago, the Spanish government knew, that in the province of *Chocó*, in New Grenada the cutting of a canal of a few leagues would effect a navigable communication between the two oceans; and that, during the rainy season, when the valleys of Chocó were overflowed, *canoes passed with produce from one sea to the other*. But they prohibited, under pain of death to those concerned, all communication whatever by that route. A monk (the curate of Novilla), ignorant of the interdiction, or pretending to be so, assembled all the Indians of his parish, and in a short time cut a canal between the rivers *Atrato* and *San Juan*, since called the canal of the *Raspadura*. Large canoes *(bongos)*, loaded with cocoa, actually passed through it. This communication was speedily stopped, by order of the government, and the unlucky curate with great difficulty obtained a pardon.

In the year 1813, the author of this work conversed with some intelligent Spaniards and Creoles, at Carthagena, respecting the Raspadura canal; and they stated, that although it was at present choked up with sand and bushes, yet it might soon be cleared. They also stated, that there were several places between the sources of the rivers Atrato and San Juan,

where a canal might be cut by a shorter route than the one which had been opened by the curate of Novilla. The distance between the navigable waters of Atrato and San Juan is only *thirteen leagues;* and from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, following the course of the ravines, is only *eighty leagues.* No doubt, therefore, can exist, that a water communication between the two oceans might be accomplished, in the province of Chocó, by either opening the former canal of Raspadura, or by cutting a new one between the two rivers we have mentioned. This communication would certainly not admit the passage of vessels of large burthen, owing to impediments in the two rivers, and to the shallowness of the water on the bars, at their mouths; but as the ordinary purposes of commerce could be answered by the use of large flat-bottomed boats, this route merits great consideration; and it will, doubtless, at some future period, be the channel of an important commerce.

Besides this route, there is, in the same province, another, and, as we were informed, a preferable one, by the river *Naipi*, which empties itself into the Atrato, of which indeed it is only a branch. From the port of *Cupica*, on the Pacific Ocean, to the head of the navi-

gable waters of the Naipi, is only *twenty-four miles*, and the country between the two places is a dead level. A canal might, therefore, be cut there without difficulty. The course of the Naipi is stated to be very circuitous, and makes the distance of the navigation a few leagues longer than by the route of the Raspadura; but the circumstance of the waters of the Naipi being so near the port of Cupica, gives to this route an important advantage. The want of correct topographical knowledge prevents us from forming an opinion upon the merits of these two routes; but there cannot exist a doubt that by either of them a communication between the two oceans may be established *for the navigation of boats;* and it is possible, that at some future period, when population becomes dense, and a free trade shall be permitted between the inhabitants of the Atlantic and Pacific shores, that the province of Chocó may then afford a channel for the navigation of large vessels.

Secondly, The *Isthmus of Darien*, or, as it is usually called, of Panamá, is the section of the American continent most celebrated among geographers, authors, and projectors, as the point at which the two oceans may be united, by means of a canal, with greater facility than at any other place. The Spanish government

have, at different times, endeavoured to obtain accurate surveys of this Isthmus; and, for that purpose, engineers of eminence and capacity have been employed. Some of the reports that were officially made on this subject, contain the most extravagant statements—such as, that by cutting a canal of about *twelve leagues*, following the course of the ravines at the foot of the mountains, a passage may be opened as wide as the *Gut of Gibraltar*, from the bay of Panamá to the navigable waters of *Cruces* or *Chagre*. Other reporters have stated, that such water communication cannot be accomplished but by locks and tunnels, passing over an elevation of at least *four hundred feet*. In one point, however, all these statements accord, *viz.* that by a good road from Panamá to the place of embarkation on the river Cruces, property of any description or weight might be conveyed in carriages; and, as the distance is only about *twenty-three miles*, this place would, undoubtedly, afford a more rapid and shorter route between the two oceans than any yet pointed out.

During the administration of William Pitt, various projects were presented to him, tending to show the feasibility of cutting a canal through the Isthmus, sufficiently wide and deep to admit

vessels of the largest size; and it is well known that this statesman frequently, among his friends, spoke with rapture on the subject, and that it constituted one of the great considerations in his mind when forming his plans for the emancipation of Spanish America.

So late as the year 1810, the Edinburgh Reviewers appear to have entertained the same opinion; for we find, in the number for January of that year, the following observations:—"*In enumerating, however, the advantages of a commercial nature which would assuredly spring from the emancipation of South America, we have not yet noticed the greatest, perhaps, of all—the mightiest event, probably, in favour of the peaceful intercourse of nations, which the physical circumstances of the globe present to the enterprise of man,—I mean, the formation of a navigable passage across the Isthmus of Panamá—the junction of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It is remarkable, that this magnificent undertaking, pregnant with consequences so important to mankind, and about which so little is known in this country, is so far from being a romantic and chimerical project, that it is not only practicable but easy.*" The writer proceeds to point out the means by which this great work can be effected; and then launches forth into a detail

of the advantages which would result to the commercial and civilized world, by thus bringing Asia nearer to Europe, &c.

It is with diffidence we venture to combat opinions emanating from such respectable sources; but all details, tending to disembarrass this important and interesting question must be acceptable.

Our information on this subject has been obtained from respectable individuals at *Carthagena* and *Jamaica*, who visited the Isthmus from commercial views, or for the express purpose of a personal examination of the facilities or difficulties of cutting the so-much-talked-of navigable canal. It is therefore presumable, that intelligence from such sources is correct. We have likewise carefully examined the observations of William Walton, Esq. of London, on this subject, published in the fifth and sixth numbers of the Colonial Journal for March and June, 1817; and as Mr. Walton's remarks have likewise been founded on personal investigation, during a visit made to Panamá, we think his opinions worthy of great attention, more especially as all his works on South America are characterized by liberality, and bear the impress of an ardent attachment to the cause of rational liberty, and a consequent desire to promote

and extend the commercial intercourse between the Old and New World.

The river Chagre empties itself into the Atlantic ocean about the latitude of 9° 18′ north, and 80° 35′ west longitude; it is navigable for boats (or large bongos) about twenty leagues, to the town of *Cruces:* the bar, at the entrance of the river, will not admit a vessel drawing more water than ten feet. The current in the river, at certain seasons, is extremely rapid, so that boats are sometimes fifteen or twenty days getting to Cruces; but this disadvantage could be remedied by *steam vessels.*

A chain of mountains, which Humboldt considers a prolongation of the Andes of New Grenada, runs through the Isthmus, following the curvature of the coast, and flanked by other lofty hills, rising on both sides. The road from Cruces to Panamá winds round the sides of those hills, or rather along their central base. Supposing a canal to be cut at the foot of these hills, pursuing the sinuosities of the ravines, it would nevertheless be necessary for the engineer to make use of arches in some places, and subterraneous passages at others, in order to obtain a level; and he would likewise have to carry the canal over an elevation of some hundred feet. But, even admitting that human

ingenuity and labour should surmount the physical obstacles, and that a canal should be completed from Cruces to Panamá, we nevertheless encounter at the latter an impediment that we firmly believe to be insuperable.

The water along the coast, in the bay of Panamá, is so shallow, that none but flat-bottomed boats, of one or two feet in draught, can approach the shore. The city of Panamá is situated at the head of the gulf of that name, on a peninsula washed by the waters of the Pacific ocean. A marine gate faces the port, which by the Spaniards is called "*El Puerto de las Piraguas.*" from its being the place of resort of the boats so called. On the other side, facing the Isthmus, is another gate, called "*La Puerta de la Tierra,*" or land gate. To the south, the town is surrounded and defended by a range of small islands. The anchorage place for all vessels of large size is at two small islands, called *Perico* and *Flaminco*, distant about seven miles from the city. The lading and unlading of vessels is therefore tedious and expensive; and in fact the bay of Panamá is nothing more than an open roadstead.

The extreme shallowness of the water near the beach, not only in the bay, but along the whole coast, opposite to those places where the

projectors of the canal have contemplated cutting a passage, seems, as we have before observed, to present a most serious obstacle to its execution. Supposing that, by locks and tunnels, and excavations, the Isthmus should be perforated from Cruces to the shores of the bay of Panamá, the canal must then be continued *seven miles into the ocean*, to admit the navigation of large vessels. We conceive it *possible* to make such a channel into the ocean, but it appears to us to be an Herculean task. Besides, a channel there would be liable to the operation of the same causes that have thrown up the sand along the shore of the bay, and would consequently be perpetually filling up. But even admitting that all these impediments could be overcome, and that a passage should be opened sufficient to allow vessels drawing eighteen or twenty feet of water to proceed as far as Cruces, they would not then find a sufficiency of water to descend the Chagre, and to pass the bar at its mouth: it would be necessary therefore to continue the canal by another route, through the entire Isthmus, before it could be used as a passage for the navigation of large vessels.

We shall rejoice if future surveys of the Isthmus prove that the obstacles we have suggested either do not exist, or that they may be

surmounted. For we readily confess, that there is not a point where it would be more desirable to carry this design into execution, than the Isthmus of Panamá, both on account of its central position, and of the short distance there between the two oceans.

Some writers have suggested, that the cutting of a canal at this Isthmus would produce a serious physical revolution in the adjacent country, arising from a supposed difference in the height of the waters on the Pacific and Atlantic shores. Some have gone so far as to say, that the whole Isthmus would be inundated, and the present course of the Gulf Stream be entirely changed. But we consider that Humboldt and other *sçavans* of the age have completely refuted the theory of a difference in the elevation of the waters of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The only difficulty, in our estimation, is, to find out a *practicable* route for a canal capable of admitting large vessels to pass from one ocean to another; but although such a route cannot be discovered, and the obstacles we have suggested cannot be surmounted, yet the Isthmus of Panamá must be viewed as a place which from its geographical position and other advantages, appears destined to enjoy a considerable future trade, but never to become a great commercial emporium.

Thirdly—We now come to treat of a section of the American continent, where the magnificent scheme of cutting a navigable canal, between the two oceans, appears unincumbered with any natural obstacles.

The province of *Costa Rica*, or, as it is named by some geographers, *Nicaragua*, has occupied but the very cursory notice of either Spanish or other writers; they have all, however, stated, that a communication could be opened by the lake of Nicaragua, between the two seas, but no accurate description of the country has ever been published; and indeed so completely has the mind of the public been turned towards the Isthmus of Panamá, as the favoured spot where the canal should be cut, that Costa Rica has been disregarded.

In looking over the excellent maps of Melish and Doctor Robinson, recently published, we perceive that the river called *San Juan* discharges its waters into the *Atlantic Ocean*, in the *province of Costa Rica*, about the latitude of 10° 45′ north. This noble river has its source in the *lake of Nicaragua*. The bar at its mouth has been generally described as not having more than *twelve feet* water on it. About sixteen years ago, an enterprising Englishman, who casually visited the river, examined the

different passages over the bar, and discovered one, which although narrow, would admit a vessel drawing *twenty-five feet*. It is said that some of the traders to that coast from Honduras, are likewise acquainted with the passage just mentioned, but it has never been laid down on any map; and if the Spanish government had been informed of it, they would, conformably to their usual policy, have studiously concealed it. After the bar of the *San Juan* is crossed, there is excellent and safe anchorage in four and six fathoms of water. It is stated that there are no obstructions to the navigation of the river, but what may be easily removed; and at present large brigs and schooners sail up the river into the lake. This important fact has been communicated to us by several traders. The waters of the lake, throughout its whole extent, are from three to eight fathoms in depth.

In the lake are some beautiful islands, which, with the country around its borders, form a romantic and most enchanting scenery. At its western extremity is a small river, which communicates with the lake of *Leon*, distant about eight leagues. From the latter, as well as from Nicaragua, there are some small rivers which flow into the Pacific ocean. The distance from the lake of Leon to the ocean is about *thirteen miles*; and from *Nicaragua* to the gulf of *Papagayo*, in the

Pacific ocean, is *twenty-one miles.* The ground between the two lakes and the sea is a dead level. The only inequalities seen are some isolated conical hills, of volcanic origin. There are two places where a canal could be cut with the greatest facility: the one, from the coast of *Nicoya* (or, as it is called in some of the maps, *Caldera*) to the lake of Leon, a distance of *thirteen* or *fifteen miles;* the other, from the gulf of Papagayo to the lake of Nicaragua, a distance of about *twenty-one* or *twenty-five miles.* The coast of *Nicoya* and the gulf of Papagayo are free from rocks and shoals, particularly in the gulf, the shore of which is so bold that a frigate may anchor within a few yards of the beach. Some navigators have represented the coasts of Costa Rica, as well on the Pacific as on the Atlantic side, as being subject to severe tempests; and hence these storms have been called *Papagayos:* but we have conversed with several mariners who have experienced them, and have been assured that they are trifling, when compared with the dreadful hurricanes experienced among the Antilles, in the months of August, September, and October. The Papagayos are merely strong north-east gales, which last about the same time, during the winter season, as the northern gales in the gulf of Mexico. For more than half the year, the seasons are perfectly

tranquil, and more especially on the coast of the Pacific ocean. We have conversed with persons, residents of the city of Leon, who assured us, that for twenty years past they had not experienced any thing deserving the name of a hurricane.

The climate of Costa Rica has none of the deleterious qualities of the province of Chocó and the Isthmus of Panamá. The sea breezes from the Pacific as well as Atlantic set in steadily every morning, and diffuse over the whole Isthmus of Costa Rica a perpetual freshness. We think it is not hazarding too much to say, that this part of the American continent is the most salubrious of all the tropical regions. The most finely formed and robust race of Indians of the American continent, are found here. The soil is peculiarly fertile, particularly in the vicinity of the river San Juan, and around the borders of the lakes Nicaragua and Leon.

From the preceding outline it will be perceived, that nature has already provided a water conveyance through this Isthmus, to within a few leagues of the Pacific Ocean; but, supposing that the route we have mentioned, up the river San Juan, and through the lake of Nicaragua, should, when accurately surveyed,

discover obstructions (which we do not anticipate) to the navigation of large vessels, where would exist the difficulty, in such case, of cutting a canal through the entire Isthmus? The whole distance is only *one hundred and ninety*, or at most *two hundred miles* from the Atlantic Ocean to the gulf of Papagayo. There is scarcely ten miles of the distance but what passes over a plain; and, by digging the canal near the banks of the river San Juan, and the margin of the lake of Nicaragua, an abundant supply of water could be procured for a canal of any depth or width. Surely the magnitude of such an undertaking would not be a material objection, in the present age of enterprise and improvement, especially when we look at what has been accomplished in Europe, and at the splendid canal now cutting in our own country, in the state of New York. It may be said, that the present poverty of the country, and its thin population, are powerful obstacles to the execution of the project. If Costa Rica were in the possession of a liberal government, willing to lend its encouragement to this important object, capital in abundance would speedily be forthcoming, either from Great Britain or from the United States. Enterprising companies would soon be formed; and we hazard little in

predicting, that the *canal stock* of such an association would yield a profit far greater than that of any other company in the world. With regard to the difficulty of procuring labourers in the present state of the population of the country, it could soon be obviated. The Indians of *Guatimala* and *Yucatan* would flock to the Isthmus of Costa Rica in thousands, provided the banners of freedom were hoisted there, under any government capable of affording them protection, and rewarding them for their labour. The present condition of those unfortunate people is wretched beyond conception, particularly of those in the interior of Yucatan. We have seen them attending mass, and accompanying religious processions, in hundreds and thousands, almost in a state of nudity. Adults had a covering over their loins, and sometimes a shirt and a pair of drawers; but children of both sexes, under ten and twelve years of age, were literally naked. The fruits of their labour are absorbed by the exactions of their civil, military, and ecclesiastical despots: they feel no stimulus to industry, who are debarred from enjoying or inheriting its fruits: they pass a life of ignorance and apathy, and die in misery. Unfold to these unfortunate beings a new and rational mode of existence,

offer them moderate wages and comfortable clothing, give them personal protection, and allow them the advantages of a free external and internal commerce, and they would soon display a different character. Offer to the view of the Indians these blessings, and multitudes would repair to the proposed point, from all the adjacent countries. Under such circumstances, we do not entertain any doubt that *twenty*, *thirty*, or even *fifty thousand* Indians could be procured for the work in question, who would give their labour with gratitude for a moderate compensation. Every Indian among the natives of Costa Rica would rejoice at the prospect of being employed and paid for his labour,—and more especially in the execution of an undertaking, which even to his untutored mind, would present such obvious advantages to his country and to his posterity.

We feel great pleasure in stating, that many of these ideas are derived from an interesting and able Memoir, written by the late Bryan Edwards, the celebrated historian of the West Indies. We perused it, several years since, at Jamaica; and, although we have not seen it among any of the published works of that distinguished writer, we believe the Memoir to have been laid before the British government. Bryan

Edwards was perfectly aware of the importance of Costa Rica to the British nation, and of the practicability of forming a communication between the two seas in the manner we have suggested; and he made use of the most cogent and eloquent reasoning, to induce his government to *seize the Isthmus of Costa Rica by conquest in war, or to obtain it by negotiation in peace.* We presume the British government have not lost sight of those representations, nor of other interesting communications on the same subject which have been made to them by several intelligent individuals who had resided in the bay of Honduras. The Isthmus of Costa Rica may, hereafter, become to the New, what the Isthmus of Suez was to the Old World, prior to the discovery of the route to Asia by the Cape of Good Hope.

Should a canal be cut through Costa Rica, of sufficient dimensions to admit the passage of the largest vessels, and ports of free commerce to all nations be established at the mouths of this canal on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, there cannot be a doubt that, in less than a century, this Isthmus would become the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world. Let the reader cast his eye upon the map, and behold its important geographical position. Nearly

central, as respects the distance between Cape Horn and the north-west coast of America,—in the vicinity of the two great oceans, superseding the necessity of the circuitous and perilous navigation round Cape Horn; it appears to be the favoured spot, destined by nature to be the heart of the commerce of the world.

The most ardent imagination would fail in an attempt to pourtray all the important and beneficial consequences that would result from the execution of this work, the magnitude and grandeur of which are worthy the profound attention of every commercial nation. It is, indeed, a subject so deeply and generally interesting, that the powerful nations of the Old and those of the New World should discard from its examination all selfish or ambitious considerations. Should the work be undertaken, let it be executed on a magnificent scale; and, when completed, let it become, like the Ocean, a highway of nations, the enjoyment of which shall be guaranteed by them all, and which shall be exempt from the caprice or regulations of any one kingdom or state. This idea may, at first view, appear as extravagant as it is novel; but we cannot perceive any thing in it that is not in unison with the liberal and enterprising spirit of the present age; and we

feel perfectly assured, that if it receives the encouragement and support of the nations of the Old World, those who will hereafter govern in the New, will not hesitate to relinquish a few leagues of territory on the American continent, for the general benefit of mankind; and more especially when America herself must derive permanent and incalculable advantages from being the great channel of communication between the Oriental and Western World.

Fourthly—Having thus attempted to elucidate the extraordinary and peculiar advantages which Costa Rica possesses for the establishment of a navigable intercourse between the two seas, we will now proceed to examine another position, which, although it is deficient in some of the natural advantages of Costa Rica, still possesses others of so important a character as to render it almost doubtful with us at which of the two places the desired communication ought first to be opened. Were we to consult the present and future interests of *Mexico*, and of the republic of the *United States*, we should say that the Mexican Isthmus (or, as it is more properly designated, the *Isthmus of Tehuantepec*) is the section before all others on the American continent, where the communication between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans should be made.

But, as we are desirous of seeing the blessings of commerce extensively diffused, for the benefit of the human race generally, and not of any nation in particular, we should rejoice to see the communication between the two seas simultaneously opened at every place where it is practicable, whether by land or water, or by the latter solely, thereby exciting emulation, and widening the range of commercial enterprise. We do not advocate a system of commercial aggrandizement, which seeks to raise itself by the oppression and ruin of other nations, nor a system of restrictions at variance with the laws of nature, and the happiness of mankind. We wish to see the two great oceans of our globe brought nearer to each other by canals and high roads, at such places as the God of nature has evidently destined for channels of communication; and that they should no longer remain dark and dreary deserts, such as they have been for ages, under the anti-social principles of the Spanish government.

The *Isthmus of Tehuantepec* is comprised in a tract of territory embracing the intendancy of Oaxaca and part of that of Vera Cruz. On the coast of the Pacific ocean, it extends from a place called *Tonala*, on the borders of Guatimala, to the province of La Puebla. On the Atlantic

coast, or rather in the great bend of the Mexican Gulf, it extends from the bay of Alvarado to Yucatan, including the province of Tabasco. The greatest breadth of the Isthmus, within those limits, is about one hundred and twenty-five miles. The narrowest part is between the port of Guasacualco in the Gulf, and the bay of Tehuantepec on the Pacific ocean. The latitude of the former is about 18° 30′, and of the latter about 16° 30′. From the summit of a mountain called Chillilo, or La Gineta, on a clear day, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans can be distinctly seen. We have conversed with many persons in the city of Oaxaca, who had visited the mountain for the sole purpose of enjoying this interesting spectacle; and they speak in the most rapturous strains of the sublimity of the surrounding scenery, as well as of the beauty and grandeur which the view of the two oceans presents. A chain of mountains, which may be termed a continuation of the Andes, runs through the centre of this Isthmus, the elevation of which above the ocean varies from five or six thousand to three or four hundred feet. From some extraordinary convulsion of nature, vast chasms or ravines have been formed among these mountains, which we shall hereafter speak of; as it is by means of those

fissures that nature appears to point out to man the practicability of forming a water communication between the two seas. During the rainy season, these chasms contain a vast body of water, which seeks its discharge by rivers flowing into the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The Indians of the Isthmus, particularly those of Tabasco and Tehuantepec, assert that they pass with their canoes entirely through the Isthmus. We endeavoured, while at Oaxaca, to ascertain this fact; and we are convinced that when the waters are at their height during the rainy season, a canoe may pass, by the sinuosities of the ravines, from the river *Guasacualco* to the rivers *Chimalapa* and *Tehuantepec*. There is no part of the Mexican kingdom watered by such noble rivers as this Isthmus. We shall merely notice a few of the most considerable. *Guaspala*, *Tustepec*, *Cañas*, and several others with whose names we are unacquainted, discharge their waters in the bay of Alvarado, a few leagues to the south-east of the city of Vera Cruz. The *St. Pierre* and *Tabasco* disembogue near each other on the coast of Tabasco. Those rivers have their sources in the mountains of Oaxaca, Vera Cruz, and Chiapa. They flow through a country as fertile as any in New Spain, abounding in forests

of the most valuable timber; and are navigable at all seasons for large boats (*bongos*), and during the floods have water sufficient for the largest vessels. On these rivers, at some future time, *steam navigation* may be made to afford similar benefits to those it now yields on the Mississippi and Ohio. On the western side of the mountains, there are several important streams descending into the Pacific Ocean. *Chimalapa* and *Tehuantepec* discharge into the bay bearing the name of the latter. The majestic river *Guasacualco* empties into the bay of the same name, in the Mexican Gulf. The sources of the three last-named rivers are within five leagues of each other; but, as we have before mentioned, when the ravines of the mountains are filled with water, canoes may pass from the rivers Chimalapa and Tehuantepec to Guasacualco. We will not positively assert that a navigable canal may be formed, so as to unite the waters of these three rivers, but we believe it practicable. The point will be decided, when the Isthmus shall hereafter be properly surveyed; in the mean time, we will examine the importance of the Isthmus, as a means of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, even should a canal never be formed.

At the mouth of the river Guasacualco, is the most spacious and secure harbour of any on the Atlantic coast of Mexico. It is the only port in the Mexican Gulf, where vessels of war, and others of a large size, can enter; and is far superior either to Pensacola or Espiritu Santo. There are, at all seasons, on the bar at the mouth of the port, *twenty-two feet* water; and it is said, that, during the flood of the river, the bar occasionally shifts, and affords passages in *five and six fathoms* water. Some years ago, a Spanish ship of the line, called the Asia, crossed the bar of Guasacualco, and anchored in the port. We have heard of some ports to the northward of Vera Cruz, capable of admitting vessels of a large size; of these, *Matagorda* has been stated to have *twenty feet* water on the bar at the mouth of the harbour: it is in latitude 28° 30′, about half-way between the rivers Sabine and Del Norte. But from recent information which we have obtained from the officers of the United States' navy, who have been cruising in that vicinity, we are induced to believe that there is not a single safe port in the whole range of the coast in the Gulf, with the exception of *Guasacualco*. Vera Cruz is little more than an open roadstead; and, during the northern gales, vessels are frequently driven

ashore in that port. Ships of war, and other large vessels, are moored by cables made fast to rings in the walls of the castle of San Juan de Ulua, situated on a small island in the centre of the harbour; but, during heavy gales, they are even here exposed to the danger of foundering.

The river *Guasacualco* is navigable, for vessels of the largest size, to within *twelve leagues* of the navigable waters of *Chimalapa* and *Tehuantepec*. The latter river admits from the Pacific Ocean, vessels drawing twenty feet water. It was on this river that the celebrated Cortez constructed ships, when he sent Pedro de Alvarado to conquer Guatimala. No doubt therefore exists, that the Isthmus of Tehuantepec can be entered on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, by the rivers before mentioned, and that a *good carriage road* might be made, of from *twelve* to *fourteen leagues*, along the sides of the mountains, by which all species of merchandise could be transported with ease, *in a few hours*, from the navigable waters of Chimalapa and Tehuantepec, to those of Guasacualco.

There is no part of New Spain where such a road could be made with so much facility; and indeed, if on a topographical survey of the

Isthmus, it shall be found practicable to cut a canal, there is no place where such an undertaking could be accomplished with such ease as in the province of Oaxaca.

It is proper that we should here present the reader with a brief description of this intendancy, in order to give him some idea of its present and probable future importance.

The intendancy of Oaxaca is bounded on the north and north-east by that of Vera Cruz, by the captaincy-general of Guatimala on the south-east, by the intendancy of La Puebla on the west and north-west, and by the Pacific Ocean on the south. In its boundaries are comprehended a great part of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, as before described. It is about one hundred and twenty-five leagues in length, from east to west, and its greatest breadth about ninety leagues. Notwithstanding the contracted limits of this province, and although not one-eighth of it is yet cultivated, it has a population, in proportion to its surface, far greater than any other province in New Spain. According to a census taken in 1808, it contained *six hundred thousand* inhabitants. The number of cities, towns, and villages, exceeds *eight hundred*. We have visited several villages, containing six and seven thousand inhabitants.

The city of Oaxaca (or Antequera) contains about thirty-eight thousand inhabitants; and, as we have observed in a former chapter, this city equals, if it does not surpass, the capital of the Mexican kingdom, in its beautiful streets and squares, as well as in the splendour of its edifices. Its salubrity is unequalled on the American continent; even its shores on the Pacific Ocean appear exempted from the usual diseases which afflict the inhabitants of the Atlantic and South-Sea coasts.

The population of *Tehuantepec*, which is situated on the river, only *six leagues* from the ocean, and about the latitude of 16° 30′, are among the most active and healthy race of Indians we have ever seen. The Indian females of Tehuantepec may be properly called the Circassians of Southern America. Their piercing eyes give to their countenance an extraordinary animation; their long black hair is neatly plaited, and adorned with combs, made of gold or tortoise-shell; while the celerity and grace of their movements strike a stranger with astonishment. They are very industrious, and manufacture nearly all their own clothing. They are remarkable for their cleanliness, and are fond of bathing. The Spanish government, during the present revolution, have looked upon

these Indians with a jealous eye, in consequence of their known predilection for the insurgents. The vicinity of the town to the sea-coast, and its being situated on a navigable river, are circumstances that give the government much uneasiness, because they are aware, that if a foreign enemy should land on the coast of Oaxaca, they would be received with open arms by the Indians of Tehuantepec, and, indeed, by the greater part of the population of the whole province, as we have suggested in a former part of this volume. The intendancy of Oaxaca, therefore, not only at present possesses an immense population, but is of the highest importance for its valuable productions. It is the region of New Spain that appears the most favourable to the production of the important article of cochineal. In no other part of Mexico does the *nopal* (on which tree the cochineal insect subsists) flourish so well. Its propagation has been unsuccessfully attempted in various other provinces; but not only do the climate and soil appear peculiarly adapted to this plant in Oaxaca, but the Indians have, by a long course of practice, acquired so much experience in the manner of cultivating the nopal, and collecting the insects, as to preclude all rivalship in any of the other provinces. In

some years there have been produced, in Oaxaca, four hundred thousand pounds weight of cochineal: this is worth in Europe, even during peace, about one million six hundred thousand dollars. During war, it has frequently sold in England at twenty-five shillings sterling per pound. The poor Indian who collects this precious commodity, barters it for manufactured goods to the Spanish shop-keepers in the villages. The extortion of these men, together with the exactions of the government and priesthood, leave to the Indian a miserable return for his care and industry; but we have no doubt, that if these unjust and unnatural restrictions on the labour of the natives were removed, the intendancy of Oaxaca would, in a very few years, produce above a million of pounds of cochineal per annum.

The mountains of this intendancy, particularly those of the Misteca, are likewise peculiarly adapted to the growth of the mulberry tree. Many years ago, the experiment was made, and it succeeded so well, that it awakened the jealousy of the European Spaniards; and they created so many obstacles to the manufacturing of silk in Oaxaca, that the Indians became exasperated, and *in one night* destroyed every mulberry tree in the intendancy; since

which time no attempts have been made to renew its culture.

The indigo, of the district of Tehuantepec, is superior in quality to that of Guatimala; but as there are no ports open to foreign commerce along the coast of the Pacific Ocean, in the vicinity of Tehuantepec, nor, indeed, on any part of the coast of Oaxaca, the inhabitants have not been stimulated either to the culture of that, or of the cotton plant, or of the sugar cane, except so far as is absolutely necessary to supply their own immediate consumption.

In all the mountainous districts of Oaxaca, and more especially in the spacious valleys which are situated from twenty-five hundred to six thousand feet above the level of the sea, we find a soil and climate at least equal, if not superior, to any on the globe. There is not a single article raised in the temperate zone, that would not here find a congenial region. Wheat, and all kinds of grain, yield a return to the cultivator equal to that of the most fertile parts of Europe. The fruits and vegetables of Oaxaca are unrivalled for luxuriance and delicacy. Peaches, pears, apricots, and strawberries, are here to be found of a size and flavour superior to those of the south of France; and the variety and excellence of the grape

point out the valleys of Oaxaca as the great future vineyards of New Spain. Asparagus, artichokes, turnips, cabbages, and all the various productions of horticulture, grow to a size and perfection we have never beheld elsewhere.

To all these important natural advantages of this favoured country, must be added that of its mineral productions. Some of the most valuable gold mines of New Spain are in this province; but they have not yet been extensively worked, inasmuch as the attention of the directors of the mining establishments in Mexico has been principally directed to the mines of Guanaxuato, and of other provinces, silver mines being considered more profitable than those of gold. The Indians of the Upper and Lower Misteca, as well as those of the district of Tehuantepec, collect grains of gold in the beds of the rivulets that flow through the mountains; and larger masses of gold have been found in Oaxaca, than in any other part of New Spain. Indications of silver ore are, likewise, discoverable in all the mountainous districts; but as yet scarcely any attention has been paid to them. In fact, there cannot be a doubt that this province abounds in all the precious minerals; and when the use of machinery shall be introduced, and the restrictions

on human industry and enterprise be removed, this province will yield as much gold and silver as any other in America. It is worthy of remark, likewise, that copper and iron ore have been found in different parts of Oaxaca. In the village of *Yanhuitlan*, there is a large piece of metal, which the blacksmiths of the place use as an anvil. It was found on the summit of a hill near the village, and is of an extraordinary weight for its dimensions. Various attempts have been made to fuse it, but it has resisted the most intense heat.*

From the preceding outline of the great resources of this province, including its dense population, it will be evident to the reader, that to make a carriage road of fourteen, or even (should it be necessary) of twenty leagues, over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, so as to form

* We feel great hesitation in adding, that this mass of metal is *platina*, although it is so named in some manuscript notes upon the intendancy of Oaxaca, at present in our possession, by Teran and Bustamante, names with which our readers are familiar. Beside their being men of general information, it may not be improper to add, that Bustamante was at one time connected with the School of Mines in Mexico. We at least learn, from their so terming it, that it is a very general belief that the mass is platina. The mineralogists will, of course, immediately pronounce it to be impossible,—and we are content.

a rapid communication from the navigable waters of the Chimalapa and Tehuantepec to the Guasacualco, or to cut a canal through such parts of the Isthmus as an accurate survey shall shew to be fittest for the purpose, are operations which could be performed with the greatest facility by the inhabitants of Oaxaca.

The idea of such an undertaking has long been familiar to several enlightened men of Oaxaca. So early as the year 1745, a memorial was presented to the viceroy of Mexico, signed by several distinguished Creoles, praying him to represent to the court of Spain the immense benefits that would arise to the kingdom, from making Guasacualco a port of entry, and the great depôt of commerce, instead of the port and city of Vera Cruz. A copy of this interesting document was put into our hands, while in the city of Oaxaca, in the year 1816, and we were forcibly struck with the importance of the facts noticed therein. It displays an intelligence, a foresight, and a spirit of liberality, such as could scarcely have been expected, in those days, from men reared in that political and commercial darkness in which Spain enveloped her dominions. After giving a topographical description of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and expatiating on the fertility

and beauty of the country, the memorialists explicitly declare, that a canal can be cut, so as to unite the waters of the rivers before mentioned; and they likewise state, that should political reasons prevent the formation of the proposed canal, at all events a great road might be made across the ridge, by means of which property could be transported in carriages at a moderate expense. The memorialists then proceed to unfold the great advantages that would result to the kingdom of Mexico, by opening a traffic between Manilla and the coast of Oaxaca, instead of the trade being restricted (as it still is) to the port of Acapulco. The superior advantages of the port and harbour of Guasacualco over that of Vera Cruz, and the number of valuable ports on the coast of Oaxaca, are then noticed; and, of the latter, they particularly mention *Tehuantepec*, *San Diego*, *Santa Cruz de Guatulco*, *Cacalutla*, *San Augustin*, *Puerto de los Angeles*, *Escondido* (hidden port), and the ensanada or bay of *Mazuntla*. The port of Escondido has a narrow, but excellent entrance, which is only discovered on a very near approach to the coast; but it is as spacious as Acapulco, and would afford perfectly secure moorings for hundreds of vessels. It could easily be fortified

so as to render it impregnable to external attacks. The port of Santa Cruz de Guatulco is, likewise, equal to any on the Pacific shore, and is situated only thirty-five leagues south of the city of Oaxaca.

The whole of the Memoir alluded to is full of interesting information and luminous argument, and would have excited the profound attention of any other government than that of Spain. The merchants of Vera Cruz no sooner heard of the Memorial, than they adopted every possible measure to prevent its even reaching Madrid; but, nevertheless, it was transmitted to the court. The Cadiz monopolists, and the Philippine company, viewed with great alarm a project that threatened to divert the trade out of its ordinary channels. The mercantile establishments they had already fixed at Acapulco and Vera Cruz, and the expensive edifices they had erected at those places, would become valueless in proportion as this should be effected. These parties, therefore, and their agents in Vera Cruz and Acapulco, put in action every engine of intrigue, in order to defeat the wishes of the Oaxaca memorialists. The Memorial was placed among the secret royal archives at Madrid, that is, it was laid on the shelf of oblivion; and the

only notice that was ever bestowed on it, was by an order from the court, *prohibiting the parties from ever again reviving the subject, under pain of the royal displeasure;* and severely reprimanding, or stigmatizing, the Oaxaca memorialists, as *audacious innovators of the established regulations and commerce of the kingdom.*

The only viceroys who have displayed liberal sentiments, or shewn the least regard for the internal improvement of New Spain, and the establishment, on liberal principles, of the internal and external commerce of the country, were the Count of *Revillagigedo* and *Don José Iturrigaray.* Both of those viceroys were men of enlarged minds, who viewed with disgust the unnatural and impolitic regulations imposed by Spain upon her colonies. During their administration, they made some important improvements in Mexico. The formation of a canal to unite the waters of Guasacualco with those of Chimalapa and Tehuantepec, was a favourite project with both; and, convinced of its practicability, they made urgent representations to the court of Madrid, to induce it to sanction the undertaking. Their applications were of no avail; and, in the end, they both incurred the displeasure of the cabinet

of Madrid. The character and fate of the noble-minded Iturrigaray have been noticed in our first chapter of the Memoirs of the Revolution.

Having shewn the practicability and facility of opening a communication, either by a navigable canal or by a land and water conveyance, at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, we will now proceed to draw an outline of the great advantages to the commercial world in general, and particularly to the inhabitants of *Mexico*, *Guatimala*, and the *United States*, that will flow from such a communication. It is necessary to remark, that the following observations are founded upon our conviction, that New Spain will become independent of European control. At what period this great event will be accomplished, we will not venture to predict; but we may express a belief, that it will take place in a very few years.

In viewing the map of the American continent, we perceive that the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and the Isthmus of Costa Rica, are the two great points at which to concentrate the commerce of the New World, and to facilitate the intercourse between it and the Old World. It is immaterial at which of those two points

the communication be first opened; it matters not which of them will become the more important. If both communications be simultaneously opened, we conceive there will be no want of commerce to render the districts through which they will pass flourishing in the highest degree.

The Isthmus of Costa Rica will be the proper and natural route for part of the commerce of Guatimala, Peru, and Chili. The Isthmus of Tehuantepec will be the route for the commerce of the vast range of coast on the Pacific ocean, stretching from Guatimala to the north-western extremities of the American continent. The advantages which this last-named Isthmus enjoys, by being in the heart of a thickly settled, rich, and healthy country, have been already described; and its proximity to the United States renders it, in our estimation, the most important spot at which to perfect the first communication between the two oceans.

Tehuantepec on the Pacific ocean, and Guasacualco on the Atlantic, ought to be declared *free ports* for the commerce of all nations. Property passing by this route should pay only a small toll or trifling duty, for the purpose of keeping the canal or the road in a constant state of good order. We have stated, that large vessels

can enter the rivers Tehuantepec and Guasacualco, and ascend the same to within about fourteen leagues of each other. We have shewn that a good carriage road could be promptly made, so as to transport property of every kind to and from the respective rivers. Making, therefore, large allowances for unexpected obstacles, we think that by this route cargoes of all kinds of merchandise could be transported from one ocean to the other, *in less than six days*. The productions of Guatimala, of Oaxaca, of La Puebla, of Mexico, of Valladolid, and of Guadalaxara, instead of being conveyed, as they are at present, an immense distance by land to Vera Cruz, would be carried to the ports of those provinces on the Pacific coast, and embarked for Tehuantepec, thence pass over to Guasacualco, and from the latter be embarked for Europe, the United States, or elsewhere. The future products of the great province of Sinaloa, of Old and New California, and of all the north-west regions of America, could be brought to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The fabrics of Europe and of the United States could be carried to Guasacualco, passed over to Tehuantepec, and thence be circulated through the vast regions we have just mentioned. The products of China

and of the East Indies would likewise be brought to this Isthmus, dispersed over Guatimala, Oaxaca, and all the eastern sections of the Mexican empire adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico; and be carried with rapidity to the river Mississippi, to Florida, and indeed to all parts of the United States, and to Europe.

The intercourse between the United States and its territory on the north-west coast of America, would be carried on with safety and rapidity by the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, instead of by the present tedious and perilous route round Cape Horn: and *steam navigation* might be introduced in the Pacific ocean, so as to effect an entire revolution in the present commerce of the whole Southern Sea. It is not only along the vast coast of the Pacific ocean, from Valparaiso to Columbia river, that steam vessels could be used, so as to triumph over the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the navigation of those seas, but we perceive no difficulty to the traversing of the whole Southern ocean in steam vessels. The voyage from Manilla to Acapulco has frequently been made, by dull-sailing Spanish ships, in *seventy-five days*: and at certain seasons of the year, it has been performed by vessels whose top-gallant sails were not once taken in during the voyage. Violent

storms are seldom experienced in the Pacific ocean, excepting in the vicinity of Cape Horn and in the high latitudes to the north-west. Such a vessel as the steam-ship Fulton could perform a voyage between Oaxaca and China, with infinitely less sea-risk than attends the voyages she is now performing between New York, Havana, and New Orleans. A steam vessel could perform the voyage from Tehuantepec to China, in *from fifty to sixty days*; and indeed, were we to calculate on the favourable winds at certain seasons of the year, united to the power of steam, it can be proved that it is practicable to perform the voyage between Oaxaca and Canton, in *less than fifty days*. We forbear dilating on the importance of this invaluable art to the commerce of the Southern ocean, lest some of our readers should deem our sketch an enthusiastic flight of fancy; but to those who are conversant with steam navigation, who are acquainted with the wonders it has already performed in the internal navigation of our country, who have examined the structure of the steam-ship Fulton, and who have marked the improvements that are yearly adding strength to the power of steam, our expectations will not appear too sanguine.

From the river Mississippi, a steam vessel

could with ease perform a voyage to the port of Guasacualco in *six* days. Allowing *seven* days for the transportation of property across the Isthmus, and *fifty* for the voyage to China, it will be seen that by steam navigation a voyage could be performed from the United States to China in *sixty-three days*. This will be more clearly evinced, by the following actual computation of the distances:—

	Statute miles.
The *ordinary route* from Philadelphia to Canton	16,150
By *steam-boat navigation* and conveyance through the Isthmus of Oaxaca, from and to the same places:—	
From Philadelphia to Guasacualco	2,100
Passage over to Tehuantepec, by land and water	120
From Tehuantepec, by the islands lying nearly in the direct course to Canton—	
To the Sandwich islands	3,835
Ladrone do	3,900
Canton	2,080
	9,815
	12,035
Actual distance saved	4,115
From Philadelphia to Columbia river, by the *usual route* of Cape Horn	18,261
From the same to the same, by the *proposed route*:—	
To Guasacualco, and overland	2,220
From Tehuantepec to the Columbia	2,760
	4,980
Actual distance saved	13,281

[*The preceding calculations were furnished by Mr. Melish.*]

We calculate, likewise, that steam vessels could perform the voyage from Columbia river to Tehuantepec, in *from eighteen to twenty-four* days, more especially by taking advantage of the proper seasons. Along the whole range of the Mexican and Californian coasts, there are safe and convenient harbours, which would afford refreshments, and shelter from storms. It is true that this immense extent of territory is at present but thinly settled, and that the wretched inhabitants, by the barbarous policy of the Spanish government, have been excluded from all intercourse with the civilized world. The whole of the country adjacent to the Pacific ocean, with its noble rivers and fertile soil, is nearly in the same state as at the period of its first discovery by the Spaniards. The only ports on the Mexican coast that have been permitted to enjoy any trade, are San Blas and Acapulco; but even this trade was so complete a monopoly, and encumbered by so many restrictions, that it scarcely deserved the name of commerce, and was comparatively of little utility to the inhabitants in general. The western sections of Mexico have been supplied almost exclusively with articles carried by land from Vera Cruz. The impost charges at that place, the enormous expense of land carriage over such a vast extent of territory, and the numberless ex-

actions on the route, increased the price of foreign merchandise to four or five times its original cost; whereas, had the articles been landed at Guasacualco, conveyed across the Isthmus, and thence transported by water to the fine bays and rivers along the coast, the expense would have been trifling, and the route performed in one-third of the time that was occupied in transporting them by land.

When those restrictions shall be removed, under which the Mexican people have so long suffered, that is, when their country shall no longer be subject to the control of Spain,—when human industry shall be allowed the scope which reason and nature dictate,—and when the inhabitants of Mexico shall be permitted to enjoy an unshackled traffic with all nations, how extraordinary will be the change in their condition! Not only will the beautiful intendancies of Guadalaxara, Valladolid, La Puebla, Mexico, Oaxaca, and Vera Cruz, become the regions of comfort and opulence, but all the internal provinces, and even Old and New California, will soon become flourishing and populous countries. Let the reader cast his eye upon the map, and behold the position of the great provinces of *Sonora*, *Sinaloa*, and *Biscay*, adjacent to the Gulf of California; let him trace the route of the river *Colorado*, from

its source to its discharge in the Californian Gulf, and view the noble rivers of *Tinpanogos*, *Buenaventura*, and *Felipe*, discharging their waters on the coast of New California; let him then anticipate the future importance of this country, when a government made by and for the people shall there be established. The country through which those rivers flow, and the coasts of both the Californias, have remained a desert, not because the soil and climate are, as some writers have represented, unfavourable to the residence of man, but because the Spanish government had studiously barred the door to their settlement and improvement.

We have perused some interesting manuscripts respecting the Californias, and the provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora; one in particular, written by *Padre Garcia*, who travelled from the mouth of the Colorado to its source, a distance of more than six hundred miles. We have read others, written by the friars who resided at the different Missionary establishments on the coast of California. They represent a very small part of the peninsula of Old California as being a rocky and sterile country: but all New California, nearly up to the Columbia river, and all the interior of the pro-

vince of Sonora, they extol for its fertility of soil and purity of climate.

It may not be amiss here to remark, that about eight years since, we met with a Russian gentleman, who had visited Monterey, on the coast of California, and who was in possession of a great stock of valuable information respecting those countries. He spoke in the most favourable terms of the climate, and represented the soil to be excellent. We have little doubt but that the journal of this Russian was laid before his government; and it may have given rise to those projects of the Russian cabinet which have been recently spoken of. It has been rumoured, that a secret treaty was actually entered into between Ferdinand VII. and the Emperor of Russia, by which the former transferred to the latter a considerable part of New California; but, owing to the remonstrances of the government of Great Britain, upon receiving intimation of such treaty, the court of Madrid has never openly avowed it, or carried it into effect. Whatever credence may be given to this report, we know that the Russians, in pursuance of their system of advancing their power wherever a foot-hold can be gained, have planted their banners on several parts of the American continent. Their settlements commence at the island of Kodia, in 57½° north latitude, and 152½° west longitude. They occupy an important position in Norfolk Sound, in 57° north latitude, and 135° west longitude, where they have a strong fort, mounting upwards of one hundred pieces of heavy cannon; and in the year 1813, they had descended as far south as 38½° north latitude, and settled at Badoga, distant about thirty miles from the northernmost Spanish settlement in California. Let the Russian imperial flag be planted on the American continent, by force or by negotiation, it will be better for mankind than that the country should remain a desert under the dominion of Spain. Whether Russians, citizens of the United States, or Mexicans, shall predominate among the settlers along the northwest coast of America, is a point that can only be determined by time; but in proportion as the whole coast shall become thickly settled, will the importance of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec be augmented, because it must eventually be the great channel of communication between Europe, the United States, and the northwest coast of America.

The fine rivers we have before mentioned have their sources on the confines, and some of them within the limits of the United States,

The whole of the region lying west of the Rocky Mountains, or Northern Andes, abounds in excellent streams, which discharge themselves into the Pacific, along the coast, or in the Gulf of California; and consequently, in proportion as the interior of that vast country shall become settled, so will its intercourse with the civilized world, by the route of Tehuantepec, gradually become more important. In fact, it is impossible for the imagination to form any proper conception of the magnitude of the commerce that will pass through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, when Mexico and South America shall enjoy the blessings of liberal governments.

The Mexican dominions alone are capable of yielding subsistence and comfort to more than treble the present population of all Spanish America. The rapid progress of the United States may serve as an example of the growth of population in new countries blessed by liberal governments. The calculations of Franklin and Jefferson have been fully realized. We more than double our population every twenty-two years; an increase which, regulated by the laws of population, will continue, until the surface of our territory shall become as generally cultivated, and as thickly inhabited, as that of Europe and Asia. Give to Mexico the

advantages of a good government, open her ports to the commerce of the globe, encourage emigration from all parts of the world, and, in fine, let her pursue the course marked out for her by reason and nature, and she will soon become as flourishing as any part of the New World. We have before remarked the great physical advantages possessed by Mexico, as respects the climate and soil; and we do not believe that there is any part of our globe capable of sustaining a greater population upon the same space of territory. We therefore do not doubt, that from the day that Mexico takes her rank among the nations of the earth as an independent power, governed by wise and liberal institutions, she will continue to double her numbers every twenty-two years, until the whole of her vast regions be covered with inhabitants. Let us calculate her probable population a century hence. Fixing on the year 1825, as the epoch of the commencement of her independence, and supposing her population at that time to be 7,000,000

In 1847 it will be		14,000,000
1869	—	28,000,000
1891	—	56,000,000
1913	—	112,000,000

We are aware that such calculations would

have been deemed visionary, thirty or forty years ago; and that even at present their accuracy may be doubted by many of our readers: but in the minds of those who have noted the increase of population in our own country, and have reflected on the happy and important influence of liberal civil institutions, we feel assured, our estimates will neither excite surprise or incredulity. Several enlightened writers of the present day, and, among others, the Abbé de Pradt, admit the correctness of this rate of increase.

Every successive census of the United States displays an increase greater than the calculation alluded to. If, then, by this ratio, our country, a century hence, shall contain *one hundred and forty millions*, and Mexico *one hundred and twelve millions*, of persons, how deeply important will the *Isthmus of Tehuantepec* become to those two nations! To Mexico, in particular, this Isthmus is the great bridge that unites her northern and southern with her eastern and western sections. To the United States, it is not only of high importance as respects the possessions of the republic on the north-west coast, and the great share of the carrying trade that will be secured to our citizens by their enterprise and the superior advantages derived

from their proximity to the Mexican Gulf, but because *the maritime superiority of the New World appears destined to remain with the United States.* The vast extent of our coast from Passamaquoddy to the river Sabine, the immense internal navigation of our great rivers, and our fisheries, will ere long employ a greater number of individuals than are engaged in the pursuits of navigation in all Europe. In the event of the United States being engaged in any future war, that is popular (and in no other do we hope they will ever be engaged), there can be procured a sufficient number of seamen, from the great sources just mentioned, to man a fleet equal to that of any nation in Europe. We shall therefore not only be capable of protecting our future commerce along our coasts, but also of extending that protection to whatever place our enterprise and interests may carry our flag. At a distant period, it is not improbable that some of the great states in South America may possess a respectable marine, but none that will ever vie in strength with the navies of the United States. Mexico can never become a great maritime power. Although her rivers are numerous, and several of them flow through an immense extent of territory, yet, from the great elevation of more

than four-fifths of the country, these rivers are not navigable, except for boats of small burthen, to any great distance from the ocean, and consequently the internal navigation will never employ a considerable number of people. On the coast of the Pacific Ocean, Mexico has some excellent harbours, and it is possible that at some future period she may have a naval force of some importance in those seas. But along the coast in the Mexican Gulf, the port of Guasacualco is the only one suitable for naval arsenals, or that would afford security to vessels of war. We have before noticed the objections to the port of Vera Cruz; and all the others, from Alvarado to the Sabine, are difficult of entrance, and obstructed by bars. The whole coast of Yucatan is likewise without a single port capable of admitting large vessels. It is therefore obvious, from these important obstacles, that Mexico can never become a maritime rival of the United States in the Mexican Gulf; but, on the contrary, the whole of her future commerce therein must be under the protection and control of the latter; and consequently, it must always be of deep importance to Mexico, to cultivate the amity of, and to seek a political alliance with the United States. The expediency of this friendly and political

bond will be further evident, on viewing the map of the two countries. In examining the delineation of the widest part of the continent, from Monterey, on the coast of New California, to the town of St. Louis, at the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri, a distance of about eighteen hundred miles in a direct line, we are struck with admiration at the peculiar manner in which nature has provided, by means of water communication in every direction, for the intercourse of the future inhabitants of those vast regions.

Our topographical knowledge of that section of America is yet imperfect; but we know sufficient to enable us to form some idea of the great advantages that must be reciprocally enjoyed by the inhabitants of Mexico and the United States, when an unrestrained intercourse shall be permitted between them, and when the productions of industry shall be interchanged, through the medium of *internal navigation*, between the two nations. The important river *Del Norte* has its sources in New Mexico, not far distant from the heads of the rivers which flow to the Pacific ocean; and empties into the Mexican Gulf, about 25° 50′ north latitude. Descending through a mountainous country, it is in many places extremely rapid, and hence

it is usually called *El Rio Bravo;* but it is nevertheless navigable for boats from its mouth nearly to its source. The *Red River* and the *Arkansa*, have their heads near the source of Del Norte. In the course of these rivers to the Mississippi, they receive the tribute of innumerable smaller streams. *The Kanzas*, and the *Platte*, which empty into the Missouri, have their origin in the same mountains that give birth to Del Norte. Throughout the whole of this country, whether among its lofty mountains or extensive prairies, the traveller can scarcely proceed five leagues, without meeting a stream capable of boat navigation. The navigation of the Mexican rivers, for the reasons we have before assigned, will never employ large vessels: they will, however, greatly facilitate the intercourse between the respective interior provinces. But the great rivers that discharge themselves into the Missouri and Mississippi, some of which we have named, are destined to afford employment to many hundred thousands of persons, in vessels of all sizes.

When we reflect that the great country we have thus briefly glanced at, is throughout its whole extent susceptible of high cultivation, the greater part of it enjoying a climate equal

to any on earth, it is not within the reach of the most ardent fancy to draw a sketch of its future importance; nor can we form an estimate, with strict accuracy, of the millions of human beings which at some future day may find subsistence and comfort in those regions. The population of the United States is rapidly rolling towards the Mexican settlements. Already have the banks of the Red River, the Arkansa, and the Missouri, become the residence of American citizens. The arts, the sciences, and (if we may use the expression) the blessings of rational liberty, are spreading in that direction. Territorial limits present but feeble barriers against the diffusion of light and knowledge. Their progress cannot be impeded by edicts of the present or of any future government in Mexico. The Mexican on one bank of a river, living in wretchedness and smarting under oppression, cannot long remain blind and insensible to the advantages and happiness of the citizens of the United States on the opposite bank.

From this brief outline of the topography of Mexico and the adjoining territory of the United States, some faint idea may be formed of the vast internal commerce that must take place between the two nations, as population shall in-

crease, and restrictions upon their intercourse be removed. How many articles will be raised from the soil of the two countries, that are at present scarcely thought of! How many manufactories will be established, in regions calculated to produce all the raw materials for the mechanic and artist! Is it because the two countries may cultivate the same products, and establish the same kind of manufactories, that some writers have maintained the opinion, that the future commerce between the United States and Mexico will be unimportant? Might they not as well argue, that because wheat is raised in Kentucky, it is injurious to the culture of that article in Pennsylvania? or that because certain manufactories are established at Pittsburg, they are rivals to those of the same class at Boston? Do we not see, that in proportion as population spreads over a country, the consumption of the products of the soil is augmented? and that human industry receives a new stimulus from a thousand artificial wants, that are created in society, as they increase in numbers and opulence?

Is it possible, that, in the nineteenth century, we have heard the ambassador of a civilized nation stating, in a formal diplomatic communication to the government of the United States,

that they ought to oppose the extension of the blessings of freedom and commerce to Mexico, because wheat, and other staples of the United States, could be raised with greater facility in that country, and because its superior climate would invite the emigration of our citizens, and thereby diminish our strength? These were the sentiments, openly and officially avowed, of the Chevalier Onis. He did not scruple to recommend these abominable and anti-social principles to the serious consideration of our cabinet; and, what is still more extraordinary and disgraceful, the same doctrine has found abettors in some American writers, who have endeavoured to prove that *the independence of Mexico would be injurious to the commercial interests of the United States.*

We humbly conceive that the sketch we have given of the advantages which our country will derive from Mexico being under a liberal government, is a mode of refutation to the principles advanced by the Chevalier Onis and his partisans, as unanswerable as it must be grateful to every American citizen, who feels, as we do, the absurdity and iniquity of sacrificing the happiness of millions of the human race at the shrine of political ambition and mercantile calculation. We conceive, that the indepen-

dence of Mexico will be an event next in importance, to the whole civilized world, to that of the declaration of the independence of the United States, on the 4th of July, 1776; and to promote such an event, by every fair and honourable means, is in unison with the wishes and interests of all classes of our fellow-citizens.

It is possible that Spain may, for a few years longer, endeavour to preserve her tottering sovereignty over Mexico; but even admitting that her sway should continue longer than we anticipate, it will be of little or no use to her, because her moral as well as physical supremacy is no longer felt, nor can ever again be exercised over her former subjects in that kingdom. She can no more expect to find obedience and respect among the Mexican Creoles and Indians, than she can compel the waves of the ocean to subside, when agitated by the winds; but even admitting that it is still possible for Spain to re-subjugate the Mexicans, may we not ask, how is she to preserve her empire there, in the event of a war with Great Britain, the United States, or any other maritime nation? Have we not proved, that on the fidelity of her American subjects she can no longer place any reliance, even for a moment? Where are her

fleets to protect her commerce with Mexico, or to prevent its being invaded by an enemy in every direction, as well on the Atlantic as on the Pacific coast? If, then, during peace with all nations, Spain finds it difficult to preserve Mexico, and to repress the revolutionary spirit of the people—if, during war, she is exposed to have Mexico torn from her by conquest, where is the policy of exhausting the blood and treasure of the inhabitants of Spain, to maintain a sovereignty over an empire liable every instant to break from her grasp? If these observations are applicable to the relative situation of Spain with Mexico, and indeed with all her possessions on the American continent, do they not apply with still greater force to the islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines? Will the most prejudiced Spaniard undertake to say, that those great islands can be held by a nation without a maritime force? Of what use are their vast fortifications and garrisons, against a rigorous blockade? Let us examine the present state of the important island of Cuba, in order to demonstrate the precarious tenure of Spanish sovereignty in that island.

The port of Havana has been very justly called the principal maritime key of the West Indies, inasmuch as its position gives it a con-

trol, not only over tl e immense commerce at present existing, but of all the indefinite future trade of the vast countries lying between the Isthmus of Panamá and Florida; for, by the laws of nature, the whole of such trade must pass from those regions by the route between the Cuba and Florida shores. Fast-sailing vessels, it is true, may occasionally beat up from Jamaica, and from the Isthmus of Panamá, so as to pass between Cuba and St. Domingo; but rapid currents, and the trade winds, will compel the great body of commerce to be carried on by the passage through the Gulf; it is, therefore, undeniable, that Havana is a key of the highest maritime consequence in the Western World—a key that can lock and unlock at pleasure the commerce alluded to, and more especially that of Mexico. Indeed it is not saying too much, to assert that the political and commercial destinies of the Mexican empire, must be very materially influenced by the conduct of that power which holds the port of Havana. How long the island of Cuba will continue under Spanish banners, whether it will be seized by Great Britain by force, or be obtained by her through negotiation, or whether the people of Cuba will declare their independence, are all-important questions to

the civilized world, and, to the United States, most deeply interesting.

Within a few years past, the British Journals have teemed with essays, tending to prove, not merely the great commercial benefits that will arise to Great Britain from possessing Cuba, but also that its possession is absolutely necessary, as well for the security of the British West India commerce, as to repress the growing power of the United States. However extravagant many of the opinions contained in those essays may be, and however marked with illiberal and hostile features towards the United States, yet they are so flattering to the domineering spirit of the British nation, that we should not be surprised to see them realized by the British cabinet, on the first favourable occasion.

Should Great Britain gain possession of the island of Cuba, it would, no doubt, be in her power to retain it for a long time; and, by the establishment of extensive arsenals at the port of Havana, she would, likewise, be able to keep there an immense fleet; so that, in the event of a war with the United States, the vast commerce of the river Mississippi, and that of all the Mexican Gulf, would be seriously annoyed, and, perhaps, entirely suspended. All

this we admit; but, nevertheless, we do not hesitate to predict, that in less than half a century hence, when the United States shall have a population exceeding *forty millions*, and a naval force, such as the extent of their maritime resources will then enable them to maintain, the island of Cuba, as well as all the Antilles, and the commerce of the Mexican Gulf, will be under the control of the republic. This idea does not spring from any ill-will towards other nations, but is merely a hint to the governments of the Old World, that their establishments in the New are limited to a short duration; and that every new attempt, whether on the part of Great Britain or any other nation, to oppose the natural and inevitable progress of the United States, by planting *rival posts*, either on the continent or islands adjacent, will only tend to an earlier developement of our resources; and, consequently, accelerate the epoch, when the power of our republic will be felt and acknowledged over the western hemisphere.

East and West Florida must be incorporated in our federative states, either by *treaty* or *conquest*. We have already experienced the fatal consequences of permitting that section of the continent to be held by nations hostile to our interests, and jealous of our prosperity.

Our citizens on the frontiers of Georgia and Louisiana, must no longer be exposed to invasion and massacre, in consequence of the impotence and dispositions of a neutral power in the Floridas. The security of the vast commerce of the Mississippi, and the prosperity of our great western states, must not be jeopardized by allowing any foreign nation to possess the important maritime keys of East and West Florida.

If Great Britain should hoist her royal banners at Havana, and make it the depôt of her navy, and the Gibraltar of the West Indies, we must then make *Pensacola* and *Espiritu Santo* our two great *southern arsenals;* and if we are to become rivals for supremacy on the western shores of the Atlantic, then be it so.

Before we close our remarks on this important subject, we deem it necessary to say a few words on the probability that Cuba will not remain long under any foreign flag, but will become an independent power, under the protection of the United States. We know that this is the *wish*, and we are likewise certain it is the *interest* of the people of that island. It has not escaped the penetration of all the enlightened inhabitants of Cuba, that Spain cannot protect them during war; and, consequently, they know that every war in which

she may in future be engaged, exposes them, not only to have their commerce destroyed, but to invasion and conquest. Under these circumstances, independent of all political enmity to the government of Spain, the inhabitants of Cuba have no common interests with her. The products of the island are valuable, in proportion as they can, without restriction, be sent to every part of the world; and the articles necessary for the subsistence and comfort of the inhabitants cannot be supplied from Spain, and therefore must be furnished by other nations.

The city of Havana and its environs, at this day, consume more flour and provisions, of the growth of the United States, than Jamaica, or any other island in the West Indies. *One hundred and twenty thousand barrels of flour, besides an immense quantity of other provisions*, are now annually carried to Havana from the United States.

The enormous influx of negroes into the island of Cuba, within the last few years, and the inattention of the planters to the culture of provisions, have rendered the island completely dependent on foreign supplies, for the subsistence of the inhabitants. Suspend all commerce with Havana, by a strict blockade of its port, for only four or five months, and the city, with all its famous fortifications, would be compelled to surrender, without firing a gun.

The United States at present have a greater tonnage employed in the trade to the island of Cuba, than to all the rest of the West India islands. From our proximity, as well as the enterprise of our citizens, and more especially from our being the great source from whence must be derived flour and other provisions, we must always enjoy a considerable portion of its commerce. If it become independent, we shall be perfectly satisfied with such portion of the trade, as will fall to our lot, from the circumstances just suggested; and we shall feel pleasure in beholding the island in the enjoyment of an intercourse with all nations, giving to none any exclusive privileges.

We do not hesitate to declare our wishes for the independence of Cuba; because, as we know that Spain cannot possibly long retain it, without a navy, we certainly would rather see the island under a self-constituted government, than behold it under the domination of an European power, jealous of our prosperity, and capable of seriously annoying the commerce of our coasts.

But it is to Mexico that we turn, and turn again, with fond delight. We implore the reader to ponder what we have written of her present situation, of her capacity for future greatness, and of the career she has yet to com-

mence and run. For ourselves, we disguise not our admiration of her; we conceal not our affection for her. We have visited her, and we have found her sons our friends, our admirers, our disciples. We look towards her, and we see the day-spring of a glorious national existence arising within her bounds; and vain will be the effort to obscure its light. It *will* lead her in the path of success. If cast down, Antæus like, she will rise again—if overpowered, her throes and struggles will convulse her territory. Mexico will—she must be free: for the seeds of independence have already been scattered there upon the mountain and in the vale; they are now germinating; they *will* strike deep roots into the earth, for they are watered with the tears of oppressed millions;—they *will* flourish, till their strength shall laugh to scorn the fiercest blast of opposition; and then, beneath the serene and cloudless sky of liberty, they will grow a beauteous grove, whose shade shall refresh no heads but those of FREEMEN.

APPENDIX.

STATEMENT

OF THE

CLAIMS OF W. D. ROBINSON

UPON

THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.

IN the year 1799, I visited the city of Caracas as a merchant, and presented letters of introduction to *Don Manuel Guevara de Vazconcelos*, captain-general of Venezuela, and to *Don Estevan Fernandez de Leon*, intendant thereof. They received me in the most friendly manner, and each offered me his assistance and protection so long as it suited my convenience to remain in the country.

At that period, the province of Venezuela was in a most deplorable condition. War existed between Great Britain and Spain; British cruizers blockaded all the ports; and intercourse with the mother country was almost wholly suspended. The inhabitants were deficient in clothing, and in many of the necessaries of life; the products of agriculture were rotting in the

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At that period, the province of Venezuela was in a most deplorable condition. War existed between Great Britain and Spain; British cruizers blockaded all the ports; and intercourse with the mother country was almost wholly suspended. The inhabitants were deficient in clothing, and in many of the necessaries of life; the products of agriculture were rotting in the

warehouses; in fine, the want of external commerce had spread wretchedness and discontent through the province.

The intendant, knowing that I was a citizen of the United States, and judging, from the respectable manner in which I had been introduced to him, that I might be able to suggest some plan, by which, through the medium of neutral commerce, the evils that so seriously oppressed the province, might be remedied, treated me with particular confidence; and, after various conferences, proposed to sell me *forty thousand quintals of Varinas tobacco, belonging to the crown of Spain,* then deposited, as he stated, in the royal stores in various parts of the province. Many advantageous privileges, and flattering inducements to make the purchase, were held out to me by the intendant, provided I would engage to introduce into Venezuela, in a short time, certain articles which were then indispensably necessary for its welfare.

The magnitude of the undertaking, and the difficulty of executing it during the war then existing between England and Spain, were deliberately weighed; but, as I had commercial connexions, upon whose assistance I could confidently depend, I resolved on embarking in the speculation; and, accordingly, after several verbal and written discussions between myself and the intendant, all the essential and preparatory points being settled, on the 5th of September, 1799, *a contract was signed, by which the intendant, in the name, and by virtue of the special authority of his Catholic Majesty, sold me the whole of the Varinas tobacco then in the province, as well as the crops of the three following*

years. On my part, I was bound to pay for, and export, this tobacco within three years, in the mode prescribed by the stipulations of the contract. I was likewise bound to procure the house of the American consul at Curacoa, trading under the firm of *Phillips and Corser,* to become my securities for the due execution of the contract. This security was duly given, and the said house of Phillips and Corser likewise became parties interested in the contract.

The privileges secured to me, by the stipulated terms, were more ample than any that had ever before been conceded to a foreigner. The jealousy of the Spanish merchants at Caracas was, therefore, excited. Although these men were absolutely incapable of relieving the wants of the province, or his Catholic Majesty's treasury, yet their selfish and contracted dispositions would not allow them to view, without discontent, the probability that a foreigner might reap advantage from so extensive a commercial speculation. They adopted every possible expedient, through their agents at Cadiz, to prevent the contract from receiving the royal sanction. But their exertions were ineffectual; for, in a few months, the ratification of the contract by his Catholic Majesty was transmitted to the intendant; who was directed, at the same time, to afford me every possible facility in the execution of the same.

Another obstacle to the completion of the contract was created by the Marquis *Caso Yrujo,* then ambassador of Spain in the United States. The marquis had received letters, a long time previous to the formation of the contract into which I entered, from the intendant of Caracas, requesting him to take *pre-*

liminary measures with the merchants in the United States, relative to the disposal of the aforesaid tobacco; but reserving the ratification of those measures until they should receive his approbation. The marquis, in his zeal to promote the interests of his Catholic Majesty, entered into *absolute contracts* with the houses of John Craig of Philadelphia, and James Barry of Baltimore, in the month of July, 1799; and with the house of John Juhel and Co. of New York, in the month of August of the same year; whereby the tobacco was to be taken from Caracas to the United States, and thence to Holland and Hamburgh, *on account of the Spanish government, but to be covered as American property.* The correspondence on that subject between the Marquis Casa Yrujo and the intendant of Caracas, and the contracts formed by the marquis with the houses before-mentioned, were furnished me at Caracas, and I now possess authentic copies of all those singular documents. Without troubling the reader with a detailed account of these papers, I deem it necessary to observe, that, from the conditions of the contracts, his Catholic Majesty would have received *far less than one hundred thousand dollars* neat proceeds from the same quantity of tobacco, for which I have paid *upwards of eight hundred thousand dollars* into his treasury. This will not appear extraordinary to the mercantile world, when I state, that, according to the marquis's contracts, the houses before-mentioned were to receive as high as *twelve dollars*, and in no instance less than *ten and a half dollars* freight per barrel, for carrying this tobacco from Caracas to Europe. Insurance was to be effected on the property, and charged to the account

of his Catholic Majesty. Commissions were likewise to be allowed these houses, on the arrival of the tobacco in the United States; and commissions were to be paid to the agents sent out to Caracas to receive the tobacco. Certain privileges were also to be granted to the vessels employed in this business; and, in short, *the whole of his Catholic Majesty's tobacco would scarcely have sufficed to pay the freight and other charges which the marquis had generously guaranteed in his contracts!*

In virtue of these strange arrangements, the beforementioned American houses actually despatched several ships and brigs to La Guayra, where they arrived just as I had concluded the contract with the intendant. Although the intendant at once perceived the very great difference, in favour of the royal treasury, between the engagements he had entered into with me, and those which the marquis had formed,—notwithstanding that personage had undertaken to make positive engagements without waiting for the intendant's approbation; yet it was with difficulty that I could persuade him to declare the whole of the marquis's contracts to be null and void. I understand that the marquis made loud complaints to his court, accompanied by heavy demands on the part of the individuals with whom he had contracted.

Having surmounted these obstacles, which had arisen in the early stages of the business, and having delivered to the intendant, in the latter part of the year 1799, and in the beginning of 1800, a considerable amount in those articles most needed by the province, I proceeded to the United States, and thence to London, Hamburgh, and Amsterdam, in order to make the

necessary arrangements for the speedy fulfilment of my engagements.

Having introductory letters to some respectable capitalists of those cities, and as the contract itself was a document calculated to command particular attention, from the circumstance of the good faith of the Spanish government being solemnly pledged to its faithful execution, I found no difficulty in obtaining the necessary capital. The house of John and Abram Atkins, of London, furnished two ships, with valuable cargoes, on the faith of the contract. Other houses, at Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and Embden, likewise furnished cargoes to a great amount. Several houses in the United States also entered into similar arrangements with me.

The whole of this property was faithfully delivered, in the course of three or four years, to the royal treasury at Caracas, to the amount of nearly *nine hundred thousand dollars*, as is proved by the account current rendered to me by the ministers of the tobacco department in 1803, and by other official documents now in my possession. The merchandise thus delivered, consisted of the choicest articles that had ever been introduced into Spanish America: and the prices stipulated in the contract, for the said merchandise, were so moderate, as to enable the intendant to sell them to the inhabitants of the province at an immense profit. For the sale of these goods, the intendant appointed administrators, auditors, treasurers, &c.; in fact, he created a new department, under his sole patronage. But, notwithstanding that all the individuals employed therein did not lose sight of their own interests, yet the ultimate profit accruing to the royal treasury was very great.

While the revenue was thus in the receipt of above a million of dollars, and while the intendant was laying a foundation at court for future promotion and honours, in recompense for the great services he had rendered his Catholic Majesty's treasury, the tobacco contractors, and the foreign merchants who had so liberally supported them, became victims to his rapacity, ambition, and bad faith. Were the various instances of exaction and injustice practised by this man to be related, they would scarcely be deemed credible; but as I have all the documents necessary to establish the facts, I shall, at some future time, publish the extraordinary detail, in order that the mercantile world may see what acts of baseness can be perpetrated by the royal authorities in Spanish America, when foreign property unfortunately falls within their grasp.

There is, however, one circumstance in this business so peculiarly stamped with iniquity, that I must here briefly state it. It was mentioned in the contract, that *some* part of the forty thousand quintals of tobacco was partially injured by worms, but nevertheless I was to receive it, provided it was in a *merchantable state.* It was, however, expressly stipulated that the whole of the tobacco should be of *good quality* (buena calidad); and it was with that view that I procured an article to be inserted, which required that I should be furnished with the crops of the three years following the date of the contract, so as to complete the quantity of forty thousand quintals of "buena calidad." Indeed, when forming the contract, the idea never presented itself to my mind, that in a solemn engagement, for the performance of which the good faith and honour of a na-

tion were pledged, *rotten tobacco* would be offered to me in payment for so large an amount of money furnished to the royal treasury: but, to my utter astonishment, and to the ruin of myself and associates, such was the disgraceful fact: for when my agents at Puerto Cavello, at La Guayra, at Cumana, and at Guyana, received the tobacco, they found more than *four-fifths* of it, not in a state of partial deterioration, but *absolutely rotten and unmerchantable.* As soon as I was made acquainted with this fact, I entered a legal protest, and resisted the receipt of the worthless commodity. I remonstrated in strong terms with the intendant, and prayed he would pay me in some other produce of the country. My remonstrances were either disregarded, or, if answered, it was to inform me that *my language was too strong*; that his Catholic Majesty's authorities must be addressed by *supplication!* and, finally, I was informed, that *it was not convenient for the royal treasury to pay me in any other commodity than in the tobacco then existing, and that I must receive the whole of it, in whatever condition it might be found.* If my previous remonstrances were deemed too strong, they were now called *insulting*, because, unable longer to restrain my indignation at such outrageous injustice, I did not hesitate to accuse the intendant of conduct most palpably fraudulent. He continued to menace me, while I persevered in my accusations, until finally I commenced against him and his government a judicial process, under all the disadvantages and obstacles naturally attendant upon the claim of a foreigner placed in such a dilemma in Spanish America.

While this law-suit was in progress, I endeavoured to

prevail on the supercargoes, captains, and agents, not to receive any of the rotten tobacco, but to return to England and to the United States with the contract vessels in ballast. In some instances, my wishes were acceded to, and the vessels departed without any lading, after making the proper protests; but, generally, the parties preferred taking cargoes of the tobacco, in the hope that some portion of it would be saleable in Europe. The result was (as I had anticipated) that several of those cargoes sold at Hamburgh and Amsterdam for less than was sufficient to defray the expenses of freight and other incidental charges. The original capital furnished by the parties in Europe was not only all lost, but in some cases that loss was increased by the expenses amounting to more than the proceeds of the tobacco.

Thus were my associates and myself sacrificed: my credit was destroyed, my prospects in life blasted, and those who had confided in the honour of the Spanish government, and in my representations, seriously injured or entirely ruined, by the bad faith and iniquitous conduct of Don Estevan Fernandez de Leon, superintendant-general of his Catholic Majesty's province of Venezuela.

It is not easy to estimate the extent of such injuries, not merely as they affect the immediate interests of individuals, but as they regard the irreparable detriment they inflict on mercantile character; and it is in this latter point of view that the parties concerned can receive no adequate redress, even should the Spanish government refund every dollar of principal and interest which it has so unjustly and shamefully withheld for eighteen years.

To the preceding outline of the injuries received by me from the Spanish government up to the period at which I commenced legal proceedings against the Intendant, I have now to add a detail of outrages of a more flagrant nature, exercised towards my person as well as my interests.

In prosecuting the law-suit, I was impeded at every step by obstacles almost insurmountable. To those who are unacquainted with the formalities attending a Spanish law-suit, the arbitrary character of Spanish tribunals, and the enormous expenses of Spanish litigation, it is scarcely possible to convey an adequate idea of the difficulty of the task I had undertaken. It was necessary not only to contend against the intendant and the officers in the tobacco department, but against the whole phalanx of individuals within the sphere of their influence. My rightful demands were not only opposed by sophistry and falsehood, but I was even threatened with expulsion from the country, if I persisted in urging them. These threats were treated with scorn; and indeed, as I had been ruined in my interests, I was indifferent to personal outrage; more especially as I knew that the execution of such menaces would strengthen my case, when it should become necessary for me to implore the protection and interference of my government. I was perfectly aware, that by the treaty then existing between Spain and the United States, my rights were under its guardianship; and had I not produced a copy of that treaty, and insisted on the benefit of those stipulations whereby the courts of the respective nations were thrown open to the subjects of each in all cases of debt, demand, &c. I should certainly have been ordered out of the country. But the intendant thenceforth became more cautious; and although at first he denied the existence of the treaty, alleging that the copy I presented was not genuine, yet he subsequently admitted its authenticity, and I was permitted to proceed with my suit against the royal treasury.

But the most important difficulty I had to contend against was a decree of the intendant, whereby he refused to admit in evidence any memorial or document relating to my demands, unless it was sanctioned by the signature of some respectable lawyer of the city. Some of those professional men declined affixing their names to my representations, because the arguments therein used, and the documents annexed, contained truths *fatal to the honour and reputation of the intendant, and injurious to the interests of the royal revenue.* They in general trembled at the idea of incurring the intendant's displeasure. But at length I succeeded in inducing some of the most distinguished lawyers in Caracas to examine my papers and to espouse my cause, particularly *Doctor Don José Mora*, a man renowned for his talents. My principal memorial in this affair, which was drawn up by Doctor Mora with great ability, and accompanied by all the proper documents, cost me the sum of *one thousand dollars* for his signature, as is proved by examining his charges at the foot of the memorial.

The representation in question was presented, with every legal requisite, to the intendant, on the 17th of January, 1804. The amount of my claims, for the violation of the contract, against the royal treasury, thus legally stated by Doctor Mora, was *five hundred and sixty-four thousand three hundred and twenty-seven dollars.* In my own statement, which I had previously

presented, on the 24th of September, 1803, to the intendant, my demand for balance of account and losses amounted to four hundred and sixty-four thousand two hundred dollars; but Doctor Mora augmented the sum by charging interest and damages, which I had omitted, and which, indeed, I would even then have very cheerfully relinquished, could I have been reimbursed the principal.

The reimbursement of a sum of such magnitude was not to be expected without a serious contest, more especially as it would have been an acknowledgment, on the part of the Spanish authorities, of their previous fraudulent conduct; but, nevertheless, neither the tribunal of the intendancy, the director-general of the tobacco rents, nor the administrators of that department, ever attempted legally to invalidate a single item in the account presented, annexed to Doctor Mora's memorial. All they had to say, consisted in denouncing vengeance against the doctor, for having dared to sustain the demands of a stranger against the interests of the crown, and threatening me with expulsion from the country if I persisted in the law-suit. I persevered however, with an obstinacy which excited their alarm as well as displeasure, because I was gradually obtaining new proofs to sustain my original demands.

In the course of the year 1803, there arrived at Caracas a new intendant, to take the place of Don Estevan Fernandez de Leon, who was called to Madrid. This was a fortunate circumstance for me, because, had De Leon remained in office, I never could have obtained either originals or copies of various documents, which were important for the establishment of my claims; but

the new intendant, with a liberality (which I now feel great pleasure in stating) rarely to be met with among the Spanish authorities in America, gave an attentive ear to my remonstrances, and furnished me with authentic copies, from the archives of the intendancy, of such papers as I solicited. He did not attempt to defend the conduct of his predecessor; but, on the contrary, so well convinced was he of the force and equity of my demands, and so sensible of the injuries I had received in my various transactions with his government, that while I was prosecuting my law-suit he shewed every disposition to render me justice, consistent with his duty to defend the interests of his sovereign.

Thus has the reader been presented with an account of but part of the accumulated and aggravated injuries which I received from the Spanish authorities in Venezuela. The recital ends not here. Indeed it would seem, that to enter into engagements with the Spanish government, was, as far as concerned myself, to become the victim of its perfidiousness and injustice. For, during the period when I was carrying on the operations of the tobacco contract, I was appointed by Edward Barry and Company, of the island of Trinidad, their sole agent in the management of certain important privileges which had been granted to them by the crown of Spain. This agency was of high importance to me, inasmuch as I became a partner with the said Barry and Company; and having suffered so seriously by the tobacco contract, and being uncertain as to the species of redress that would be ultimately afforded by his Catholic Majesty for the losses and injuries I had sustained, I was anxious to adopt any new operations in commerce that afforded a prospect of lessening my misfortunes.

Previous to the arrival of the intendant Arce, the government had recognised me as the agent of Barry and Company, and I was in a fair way of speedily retrieving some part of my recent losses. But between the captain-general and intendant there arose conflicting opinions about my residence in the country, and whether or not, as a stranger, I could enjoy the privileges which the king had granted to Edward Barry and Company. The result of the disputes between the two officers, was a suspension of Barry and Company's contract, until his Catholic Majesty should be consulted; of course all the arrangements I had made to carry the said contract into effect, were suddenly interrupted, thereby creating serious losses, and affording me new grounds of demand against the government, in addition to those which were pending on account of the tobacco contract.

On the 19th of September, 1803, I presented a memorial to the intendant, setting forth the injuries that would inevitably result to my interests and character, by the unjust and extraordinary decrees of the captain-general, as well as those of the intendancy; and I demanded the immediate revocation of those decrees, or an indemnification for the losses I had sustained. The intendant and his assessor (legal adviser) were so well satisfied of the correctness of the facts set forth in the memorial just mentioned, and being desirous not to give me any new motives of complaint, that they promptly determined to grant me a liberal indemnity; and accordingly, on the 9th of November, 1803, the intendant passed a decree granting me some highly important privileges, particularly specifying that such privileges were granted me as an *indemnification* for the injuries

I had sustained by the suspension of Barry and Company's contract. This indemnity had no relation to my pending demands on account of the tobacco contract; but, as I feared it might hereafter be interpreted as a relinquishment of my claims, I requested and obtained from the intendant an express declaration to the contrary.

The most important point in this indemnity was, that the intendant agreed to sell me a large quantity of tobacco, at *five dollars per quintal*, in consequence of its being of *inferior quality*. This tobacco was exactly of the *same quality* as that which the intendant De Leon had compelled me to receive on account of the tobacco contract, at the rate of *seventeen, nineteen*, and *twenty dollars per quintal*, and indeed a large portion of that very tobacco which I had rejected, constituted a part of the present sale. I had then an indisputable and solemn *official acknowledgment of its deteriorated condition*, by its being valued by the royal authorities, and re-sold to me at *five dollars* per quintal.

This act of the new intendant was in itself of more value to me than all the privileges conceded to me in the indemnity in question, because it furnished me with an unequivocal and irresistible proof of *the extent of the fraud* which had been practised upon me by the intendant Leon, in having insisted on my receiving *worm-eaten tobacco*, at *seventeen, nineteen*, and *twenty dollars*, which was afterwards valued by the tobacco administration at *five dollars* per quintal. This circumstance, united with other considerations, induced me to be highly satisfied with the indemnity, inasmuch as it gave me a hope of not only repairing some of my losses, but of

proving to his Catholic Majesty and the superior tribunals at Madrid, the services I had rendered to the royal treasury, and the injuries I had suffered by my contract with De Leon.

The captain-general made some difficulties about granting his assent to the indemnity, but at length acquiesced, and transmitted the necessary orders to all the commandants of the different ports in Venezuela, to throw no impediment in my way; at the same time that he informed the intendant and myself, that he should communicate his objections to his Catholic Majesty against allowing any stranger to enjoy such privileges as had been conceded to me by the intendant. As I had suffered severely from the collision of opinion in the Spanish authorities, and as I knew that every species of intrigue would be employed in Caracas, and perhaps in Cadiz, to prevent my enjoying the fruits of the indemnity, I resolved on acting with caution in my mercantile arrangements, until I ascertained whether his Catholic Majesty sanctioned or rejected the arrangement which the intendant had made.

On the 25th of August, 1804, the indemnity in question received the royal approbation, and the minister Soler, under that date, transmitted the *royal order* to the intendant. On the arrival of this important document at Caracas, it was immediately communicated to me officially, by the intendant. I was thus inspired with new confidence, and made my arrangements accordingly.

Scarcely had I begun to carry into effect this flattering indemnity, when I again became a victim to new outrages, not only against my interests, but my person.

On the 29th of August, 1805, the captain-general communicated his determination to the intendant, not to permit the execution of the indemnity which had been conceded to me, alleging that he had (*ordenes reservados*) *secret orders* from his court, which justified this extraordinary determination. The intendant, in a firm and indignant manner, opposed this resolution, and stated to the captain-general the serious consequences that would follow to the injury of a stranger, who had rendered important services to the Spanish government, and already had heavy pending claims upon the royal treasury: and he urged the consideration, that as his Catholic Majesty had given express orders for the strict fulfilment of the indemnity conceded to me, it would endanger the honour and good faith of the king, to violate engagements which had been thus solemnly entered into. In vain the intendant protested against the arbitrary conduct of the captain-general, and in vain I implored the latter, at least to permit me to pursue my operations under the indemnity, until we heard further from his Catholic Majesty. To all these just remonstrances and petitions he was deaf, and in fact issued orders to the commandants of the ports not to permit a single vessel to enter under my contract. Thus far the captain-general's arbitrary and unjust measures affected only my interests; but on the 7th of January, 1806, he issued a decree commanding me to leave the province immediately. On receiving notice of this decree, I waited on his excellency, and requested him to state to me his reasons for thus precipitately expelling me from the country. He replied, that he did not feel himself at liberty to state any reasons, further than his having

received orders from the Prince of Peace to send away every foreigner, without any exception, from the Spanish dominions under his control. I asked him, if he had any special orders respecting me? He replied, No; but that he conceived me to be included in the general instructions he had received. He permitted me to enter into a friendly expostulation with him, wherein I endeavoured to convince him, that it was impossible that his Catholic Majesty could have intended to comprehend me in the orders which had been transmitted by the Prince of Peace, more especially as my residence in Caracas had been specially sanctioned by his Majesty's approbation. I urged upon his attention all the services I had rendered his government, and the serious claims I then had pending. He replied, with great urbanity, that he was perfectly sensible of the force of all I said, and professed to be sincerely sorry for the peculiar hardships of my case, but that if I suffered in my interests, the door was always open for me to obtain redress, through the honour and justice of his sovereign; and, whatever might be the consequences, he had made up his mind to compel me to depart from the country, and, particularly as he had reason to doubt *whether I was a citizen of the United States or not.* On his making this remark, I replied, that it was in my power to furnish him with undeniable evidence of my being a native of the United States; that, in particular, in all the public documents, since the year 1799, when I first entered the province, I had been recognised as a citizen of the United States; and that, in virtue of being such, the intendant De Leon had entered into a contract with me, during the late war between Great Britain and

Spain. He then replied, with a good deal of petulance, "*Well, it may be so; but, as you cannot pursue your commercial operations but by an intercourse with English subjects, it is dangerous to his Catholic Majesty's interests that you should remain here, therefore you must depart.*" I attempted to repel this ungenerous and unfounded suspicion, by shewing that the disputes with Spain and Great Britain ought not to endanger my interests and personal rights as a citizen of the United States; and I further stated, that even if a war were declared between Spain and my own country, there was *a special provision in a treaty existing between the two nations, whereby the respective subjects and citizens of each should be allowed one year from the date of a declaration of war, to remove their persons and effects from the respective dominions of either power*; and of course that it was cruel to place me in a worse predicament, in consequence of hostilities with Great Britain, than I should have been in even in the event of a war between Spain and the United States. To all these arguments and expostulations his excellency finally answered, "You must depart; and if you do not immediately acquiesce, you shall be expelled the country by force."

I then requested, as a favour, that I might be permitted to present a memorial to him, which should embrace the same arguments I had verbally stated, as I wished to possess some documents to prove that I had in due season represented for his consideration what I deemed necessary in defence of my interests and personal rights; and I likewise desired, that should he decree any thing with respect to the said memorial, that

he would furnish me with an authentic copy of such decree. His excellency hesitated for a few minutes, but at length said that he would comply with my wishes, provided the memorial were presented the next day. Availing myself of this permission, I delayed presenting my representation until I should again hear from his excellency, hoping to collect all my papers together in the mean time, and to make the best arrangements in my power preparatory to my expulsion from the country.

On the 18th of January, 1806, I laid my memorial before the captain-general, which caused him to hesitate for several days before he finally determined to use forcible means to compel my departure, as I had solemnly declared that nothing but force should induce me to abandon my interests. He consulted the tribunal of the *real audiencia*, and some of the most distinguished lawyers of Caracas, on the subject. Some of them advised him to take no decisive steps until he should receive further instructions from Madrid; others counselled him to expel me without hesitation; while some of the merchants in Caracas, who had always been hostile to my views, endeavoured to persuade him that my mercantile connexions with British subjects were dangerous to the safety of the province.

On the 16th of February, the captain-general sent his adjutant to inform me, that I must depart for La Guayra, and embark in the first vessel that should leave that port. I requested the adjutant to inform his excellency, that I still adhered to my resolution of remaining in the country until compulsion should force me to quit it. A few hours subsequently, I called on the captain-general, who received me with his usual urbanity. With great good humour, the old gentleman shook me by the hand, wished me a pleasant voyage, and informed me that a military escort was then at the door, with orders to conduct me to La Guayra. I requested permission to return with his adjutant to my place of residence, in order that I might procure my clothes and papers; which he granted. After having collected my papers, the adjutant insisted that I should return with him to the captain-general, in order to submit them to his inspection. I complied accordingly; but his excellency declined making such examination, and censured his officer for having suggested the idea. The last words he said to me were, "I regret, Sir, that the orders which I have received from the Prince of Peace have compelled me to expel you from the province under my command; but I thank you, in the name of my sovereign, for the services you have rendered to our government, and the inhabitants of Venezuela, during the time you have been among us." I bade his excellency adieu, and proceeded to La Guayra, accompanied by the adjutant and a guard.

On the 21st of February, the commandant of La Guayra sent a notary to acquaint me, that a Danish schooner, called the Maria, was to sail the next day for St. Thomas's, and that if I did not voluntarily embark in the said vessel, he had orders from the captain-general to adopt compulsory measures. I answered, that I would not embark in the schooner, nor in any other vessel, but by compulsion. Accordingly, on the following day (February 22, 1806), I was conducted to the wharf by a military guard, attended by notaries, and a cavalcade of officers and inhabitants. The officer ordered me into

the boat, and continued with me until he saw me on board the schooner, and the vessel under sail.

Thus was I forcibly expelled from his Catholic Majesty's province of Venezuela, after having rendered the services to the royal treasury and to the country, before stated. And thus was the suit, then pending, for the violation of my tobacco contract, at once cut short; while the indemnity itself, granted for injuries done to me, became of no effect.

A few hours previous to my embarkation, I entered a solemn protest against the proceedings of the captain-general, his government, and all those who were in any way concerned in these outrages on my interests and person.

The papers which I succeeded in taking away with me were as follows:—*Copy of the Protest at La Guayra—Original Contracts respecting the Varinas tobacco—My Correspondence with the Intendant, and with the Captain-general—Notarial Copies of the Proceedings in the suit against the royal treasury—Indemnity granted me by the Intendant—Royal Order of his Catholic Majesty, approving of that indemnity—Powers of Attorney from, and Agreement with Edward Barry and Company, of the island of Trinidad—Decrees of the Captain-general and Intendant, authorizing me to execute the privileges granted by his Catholic Majesty to the said Edward Barry and Company—Subsequent Decrees of the Captain-general, suspending and violating his previous decrees—Proofs of the amount of property delivered by me to the royal treasury, on the faith of my first contract for forty thousand quintals of tobacco—Unquestionable Proofs that the Intendant De Leon, at the time he made the*

contract (September 5, 1799), well knew that the whole of the said tobacco was deteriorated and rotten, thereby committing an enormous and deliberate fraud, compromising the honour of his Catholic Majesty, and wantonly ruining those who had unfortunately relied on the good faith of the Spanish government. All these important documents are now in my possession.

Upon my arrival at St. Thomas's, I wrote to the ambassador of the United States at Madrid, transmitting through him a memorial to his Catholic Majesty, setting forth the wrongs I had suffered, accompanied by a notarial copy of the protest I made at La Guayra, on the 21st of February, 1806. I have reason to believe that the memorial was duly presented to the king; and I received information, toward the end of the year 1807, that his Catholic Majesty had been pleased to pass a royal order, reprimanding the captain-general for his precipitate and unjust conduct towards me; and commanding the intendant, in case I should return to Caracas, to permit me to carry into effect the indemnity which had been granted me.

At the period when this intelligence reached me, my mercantile affairs were so much embarrassed, and my credit had received so severe a shock from the unfortunate issue of my previous transactions with the Spanish government, that it was impossible for me to make any further use of the indemnity in question, and, in addition to this, I was so disgusted at the recollection of the perfidy and injury I had already experienced from the Spanish authorities at Caracas, that I felt a repugnance to place my person or interests a second time within the sphere of their power. Under these circum-

stances, the information respecting the royal order was a matter of indifference to me; and I resolved to proceed to Spain, and lay my case before the superior tribunals at Madrid. But while I was making arrangements for that purpose, the revolution of 1808 broke out in Spain; and the unsettled state of the government for several subsequent years, rendered it unadvisable to make any attempts to prosecute my claims, until the affairs of the kingdom should assume some degree of order and stability. I therefore concluded to let them "remain *in statu quo*," until the period might arrive, when the intervention of my own government should make it expedient to revive the claims.

It is not for me to say, in what manner, if at all, our government ought to interfere; but it is believed, it is not hazarding much to say, that, in the long catalogue of injuries received by American citizens from the Spanish government, there does not exist a single case, either in point of magnitude or outrage, a parallel to the one just detailed, or which, in the humble opinion of the writer, more loudly calls for the protection and investigation of the government of the United States.

It will be clearly perceived, from the foregoing statement, that all my commercial transactions in Venezuela directly emanated from the highest Spanish authorities; that the contracts were made on account of the Spanish government, and, together with the privileges and indemnities conceded to me, were sanctioned by the approval of his Catholic Majesty; that all the injuries my interests received, and the outrages exercised against my person, were directly caused by the acts of the Spanish

authorities; and, finally, that my forcible expulsion from Caracas, by the despotic conduct of the captain-general was *a manifest infraction of the treaty then existing between Spain and the United States.* An infraction of the treaty! Can an American citizen seek redress from Spain for such a wrong?—or must he not rather look to that benignant power, which, like a kind parent, encircles all its objects within its arms, feeling any outrage committed upon them as thrilling its own heart's blood? To my government do I look with confidence; for is it possible that I can obtain reparation from a government that has acted as that of Spain has invariably acted towards all our citizens, who for the last twenty-five years have had any claims against it? Has there been a solitary instance, within that time, of compensation being afforded for injury, excepting in the case of our fellow-citizen, Richard W. Meade, Esq.? And, even in his case, do we not know that the energetic interference of the American government alone prevented new outrages against his person and interests? These are important facts, known to every one who has paid the least attention to the conduct of the Spanish government towards our citizens, ever since the period of the violation of the right of trading on the river Mississippi.

Until, therefore, my case shall be honoured with the notice and protection of our government, I cannot hope to obtain reparation for my wrongs. The principal circumstances of the case have long since been made known to the executive of the United States, and to the American minister at Madrid; but, as it is only within a

few months past that I obtained possession of the papers and documents before mentioned (which have been in keeping, in the island of St. Croix, for the last thirteen years), I have never, until the present moment, been enabled to state the facts with precise accuracy, or to make a representation to our government with due formality, and supported by the proper proofs. Such a representation will now be made; and I flatter myself with the belief, that it will be found worthy of the attention and interposition of the government of the United States.

INDEX.

Abisbal, Condé de, the Author's letter to, I. xlii.
Acapulco, taken after a fifteen months' siege, by the Patriot General Morelos, I. 48. Almost the only place at which the landing of an invading force could be resisted, II. 151.
Aculco, bloody battle at, between Hidalgo and Calleja, I. 36.
Adams, Mr. late president of the United States—extraordinary proposal from the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis de Casa Yrujo, to save the life of Mr. Adams's grandson, supposed to have been taken prisoner by the Spaniards, on the failure of Miranda's expedition, I. 126.
Aguirre, Don Matias Martin y, a Spanish royalist officer, distantly related to Mina—an able, active, and humane man—invests the fortress of Xauxilla, II. 170. Just tribute to his character, 171.
Allende gives battle to Calleja at Marfil, but is defeated, I. 37. Is taken with Hidalgo, and suffers death, 43.
American government of the United States, intercedes for the liberation of the author from the dungeons of San Juan de Ulua, I. xxx. Author's appeal to, against the oppression of the Spanish government. II. 357.
Anson, Lord, is believed to be the only foreigner whom the fears of the Spaniards have permitted to enter the river Zacatula, II. 207.
Apodaca, Don Juan Ruiz de, Viceroy of Mexico, displays a character the reverse of his sanguinary predecessor Calleja, I. 63. Despatches an army to invest Tehuacan, 231.

few months past that I obtained possession of the papers and documents before mentioned (which have been in keeping, in the island of St. Croix, for the last thirteen years), I have never, until the present moment, been enabled to state the facts with precise accuracy, or to make a representation to our government with due formality, and supported by the proper proofs. Such a representation will now be made; and I flatter myself with the belief, that it will be found worthy of the attention and interposition of the government of the United States.

INDEX.

Abisbal, Condé de, the Author's letter to, I. xlii.
Acapulco, taken after a fifteen months' siege, by the Patriot General Morelos, I. 48. Almost the only place at which the landing of an invading force could be resisted, II. 151.
Aculco, bloody battle at, between Hidalgo and Calleja, I. 36.
Adams, Mr. late president of the United States—extraordinary proposal from the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis de Casa Yrujo, to save the life of Mr. Adams's grandson, supposed to have been taken prisoner by the Spaniards, on the failure of Miranda's expedition, I. 126.
Aguirre, Don Matias Martin y, a Spanish royalist officer, distantly related to Mina—an able, active, and humane man—invests the fortress of Xauxilla, II. 170. Just tribute to his character, 171.
Allende gives battle to Calleja at Marfil, but is defeated, I. 37. Is taken with Hidalgo, and suffers death, 43.
American government of the United States, intercedes for the liberation of the author from the dungeons of San Juan de Ulua, I. xxx. Author's appeal to, against the oppression of the Spanish government. II. 357.
Anson, Lord, is believed to be the only foreigner whom the fears of the Spaniards have permitted to enter the river Zacatula, II. 207.
Apodaca, Don Juan Ruiz de, Viceroy of Mexico, displays a character the reverse of his sanguinary predecessor Calleja, I. 63. Despatches an army to invest Tehuacan, 231.

Is created Condé del Venadito, in consequence of the capture of Mina at that place, II. 119. His erroneous view of the present security of Mexico, 148.

Arago, Col. Don Juan, appointed to succeed Padre Torres as commander-in-chief of the Patriots, II. 184. Is opposed by Torres, 187. Conference at Surumuato, to settle their differences, fails; and Torres is subdued by force, 189.

Arminan, General, pursues Mina from Altamira, I. 171. Is defeated by the patriots at Peotillos, 176. His false and absurd account of the battle as published in the Gazette of Mexico, 184.

Arredondo, Don Joaquin, is the royal commandant of the Eastern provinces of Mexico upon Mina's landing, I. 150. Lays siege to Soto la Marina, which surrenders after defeating three assaults, 304.

Arroyo, Don Cruz, killed at Los Remedios, and his remains barbarously treated by the Spaniards, II. 166.

Atkins, Messrs. I. & A. of London, the Author's connection with, II. 338.

Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the junction of, easy to be accomplished, and a joint stock company holding out the highest advantages, II. 281. Would be the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, 283.

Atrato, river of, its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, II. 267.

Atonilco, our Lord of, a temple devoted to, founded by the bandit Lohra, I. 118.

Aury, Commodore, a patriot naval commander, I. 101. Does not cordially unite with Mina, 107. Dissentions with, 132.

Author, the, authentic sources from whence the materials of this work are derived, I. xii. His frequent visits to Mexico enable him to afford the information here given, xv. Injuries from the bad faith of the Spanish government, by whom he is imprisoned two years and a half, xvii. Visits Spanish America for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Patriots, xviii. Lands at Boquilla de Piedra, and is kindly treated by General Victoria, xix. And by General Teran at Tehuacan, xx. Is unfortunately mistaken for Dr. John Hamilton Robinson, a brigadier-general in

the service of the Mexican Patriots, and very obnoxious to the Spanish government, xx. Accompanies General Teran towards Guasacualco, is present at the affair of Playa Vicente, and undergoes great hardships previous to surrendering himself to Ortega, xxii. Accepts the royal indulto, which is afterwards broken by the Spanish general, who marches him under a strong escort to Oaxaca, xxvi. There confined as a prisoner, but is kindly treated by the inhabitants, xxvii. Is sent under a strong guard to Mexico, but is ordered back on the fourth day's march, and conveyed to Vera Cruz, where he is confined in the dungeon of the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, and undergoes the most cruel treatment, xxviii. Is visited by Lieutenant Porter, of the American brig Boxer, who in vain endeavours to procure his release, xxx. Discovers it to be the intention of the Viceroy of Mexico to send him to Spain, with a recommendation that he should be there confined for life, lest he should publish the important information he possessed relative to Mexico, xxxii. Is embarked for Spain in a frigate, and shipwrecked, xxxiii. Imprisoned five months at Campeachy, and thence taken to Havana, xxxiv. Confined for six months in the Moro Castle, and at length embarks for Cadiz, xxxv. His favourable reception there from the Governor-General O'Donnel, *ibid.* Is again imprisoned, and threatened with a rigorous confinement at Ceuta, xxxvi. An interview with General O'Donnel, xxxvii. Letter from the American minister at Madrid, xxxviii. Receives secret intimation of the intention of Spain to confine him in the citadal at Ceuta, and therefore projects an escape, xl. Arrives at Gibraltar, xli. Addresses letters from thence to the American Minister, to the Condé de Abisbal, and to the Marquis Casa Yrujo, offering to return and meet an investigation of his conduct, provided security for his person is guaranteed, *ibid.* Evasion of this offer, and advised by the American Minister not to place confidence in the proposition held out by the Spanish Minister, xlix. Does not mean by his suggestions to excite the attention

of desperate adventurers, but would wish the emancipation of Mexico to be accomplished by citizens of the United States in preference to any other foreigners, II. 152. His claims upon the Spanish government, 333. His visit to Caracas, and introduction to the Captain-general of Venezuela, *ibid.* Treats for the purchase of all the tobacco belonging to the crown of Spain, 334. Contract signed for the same, 335. Obstacles he has to contend against, 337. Proceeds to the United States, to London, Hamburg, and Amsterdam, to make arrangements for the sale of the tobacco, 338. Fulfils his part of the contract, but is requited with fraud and duplicity, 339. Remonstrates, 340. Commences law proceedings, *ibid.* Is ruined by confiding in the honour of the Spanish government, 341. Appointed agent to Messrs. Barry & Co. of Trinidad, 345. An indemnity for his losses awarded, 348. Not carried into effect, 349. Commanded to leave the province, *ibid.* Remonstrates, 350. Is compelled to depart, 351. Sails for La Guayra, 352. Is forced from thence, and expelled from the province of Venezuela, 354. Again remonstrates, *ibid.* Appeals to his own government, 356.

Barry and Co. Messrs. of Trinidad, the Author's connection with, II. 345.

Bolivar offers to give up his prisoners in exchange for those taken by the Royalists: his offers rejected, and every indignity and cruelty heaped upon the Patriots; at which he becomes so incensed, that, finding retaliation the only alternative, he orders thirteen hundred Spanish prisoners to be shot, and their bodies burned, I. 326.

Bonnycastle, Captain, various instances of gross ignorance of facts displayed in his History of Spanish America, II. 204.

Borja, Don Miguel, chosen commander of the troops of Xalpa, II. 194. His doubtful conduct relative to the murder of Liceaga, 196.

Bradburn, Colonel, one of Mina's officers, organizes a body of troops, II. 197. But is thwarted by the jealousy of Huerta, 199. Is subdued by superior forces, *ibid.*

Bread, singular process of making it in Mexico, I. 163.

Britain, her desire to possess the Island of Cuba, important reflections upon, II. 327. Her attempts to oppose the progress of the United States must end in their aggrandizement, 329. If she should make Havana the Gibraltar of the West Indies, the United States must make arsenals of Pensacola and Espiritu Santo, *ibid.*

British Consul at Baltimore joins that of Spain in endeavouring to frustrate Mina's expedition, I. 97.

British government, plans submitted to, for uniting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, II. 282.

Brush, Mr. James, accompanies Mina from England, affords assistance to the present work, I. xiii.

Buonaparte, Napoleon, Mina a chief instrument in frustrating his designs against Spain, I. 74. Pours fresh troops into that country, 77. Arrests all the members of Mina's family, and sends them into France, 80. Imprisons Mina in the Castle of Vincennes, at Paris, 84. Not released till the final abdication of Napoleon, *ibid.*

Bustamante, an officer formerly attached to Hidalgo, treacherously gives up Hidalgo, who is shot at Chihuahua, I. 42. Recommends for promotion a dragoon for killing his kneeling brother. II. 220.

Calderon, bloody battle at the bridge of, between Hidalgo and Calleja, I. 41.

Calleja defeats Hidalgo, with immense slaughter, at Aculco, I. 36. Defeats Allende at Marfil, 37. Enters Guanaxuato as a conqueror, and there exhibits the horrid cruelty of his disposition, *ibid.* Murders all his prisoners, and butchers fourteen thousand of the inhabitants, 38. These acts approved by the Regency at Cadiz, who appoint him to succeed Venegas in the vice-regal power, 39. Created Count of Calderon, *ibid.* Defeats Hidalgo at the Bridge of Calderon, and renews his sanguinary excesses, 41. Other instances of his inhumanity, 62. Is rewarded by the viceroyship, II. 220.

Canal, to unite the Pacific with the Atlantic Oceans, project of, II. 265.

Capsicum, its great utility and value in Mexico, I. 262.
Casa Yrujo, Marquis, Spanish Minister, is appealed to for the release of the Author, I. xxxviii. Author's letter to, in justification of his conduct, xlv. The Marquis's answer, addressed to the American Minister, xlvii. His singular letter to Colonel Smith, relating to the disposal of some Americans taken prisoners upon the failure of Miranda's expedition, 126.
Castanon, the Royalist commander, his activity and cruelty, I. 253. Defeated by Mina, and killed in action at Llanos, 256.
Cavalry, Mexican, described, II. 53.
Chapels, splendid, description of two, near San Miguel el Grande, I. 117.
Chatham, Lord, his eloquent speech against the encouragement of Indian warfare, and the cruelties it entails, II. 242.
Chihuahua, in Durango, Hidalgo and his officers shot there, I. 42.
Chillilo, a mountain, from whose summit the interesting spectacle of a sight of the two oceans may be obtained, II. 287.
China to the United States, the voyage might be accomplished in sixty-three days, II. 308.
Chocho, the province of, best adapted for opening a communication between the two seas, II. 268.
Clergy of Mexico, their immense revenue, derived from tithes, I. 90. Confined to the priests of Old Spain, *ibid.* Not averse to the cause of liberty. Their influence and conduct, *ibid.*
Cochineal, its abundance in the province of Oaxaca, II. 294.
Colombia, republic of, cruelties committed there, II. 223. 80,000 prisoners have been put to death there, 224.
Comanja, or Fort Sombrero described, I. 209.
Commerce, unnatural restrictions on, I. 13.
Commercial advantages to be derived from the junction of the two oceans, II. 295. *ibid.* 303. Ill effects of the present restrictions on, 309.
Congress formed by Morelos at Apatzingan, Liceaga placed at its head, I. 51. It discusses the plans of the general, and, by delays and animosities, defeats his objects, 66. Hold their sessions at Ario, but remove with Morelos to Tehuacan, 67. Dissensions take place, 71. The members are seized, and put under arrest, by the Patriot General Teran, 72. Never after succeeded in forming any effective civil government, 213.
Contrast between the feelings excited in the contest between the North American colonies and their mother country, and those of Spain and her colonies, II. 241.
Copero, a fort in the province of Valladolid, surrenders to the Royalists, I. 235.
Correa, his treacherous conduct towards his friend and patron, Mina, I. 121. Excites to mutiny the troops of Aury, 122. Abandons the expedition, and retires to New Orleans, 123. Escapes to Pensacola, and afterwards to Havana, where his perfidy is rewarded by the Spanish government, which appoints him to a situation in the revenue department, 124.
Costa Rica, or Nicaragua, the spot best adapted for effecting the grand scheme of connecting the two oceans, II. 276. Its importance to the British nation, 283.
Cortes sails from Cuba, lands at San Juan de Ulua, captures Mexico (Nov. 8, 1519), imprisons Montezuma, I. 3. Reverses of, 4. Retakes Mexico, after nearly destroying that beautiful city, 5. Horrid barbarities committed by Cortes, *ibid.*
Cortez of Spain decree that no capitulation with insurgents shall be valid, I. 121. Inimical to the freedom of South America, II. 238. America, the farce of its pretended representation in, by thirty members named in Madrid, 240. Has no reason to hope amelioration from the present Cortez, 250.
Creoles, the, adhere to the Viceroy, I. 31. Not permitted to enjoy lucrative situations in the church, 188. Up-

wards of 1500 are chained in pairs, and confined in the dungeons of La Guayra and Puerto Cavello, where they perish, 323. Of the American continent, their qualifications for soldiers if disciplined, II. 54. Danger to Spain apprehended by their being now armed, 138. Converse freely on political rights and personal wrongs, 139. Few of them are so base as Torres and Moreno, 143. Character of the present race of, 144. Every Creole regiment may be now considered as training for the emancipation of the country, 147.

Cruelties of the Spaniards during the Revolution preclude the possibility of any cordial union hereafter with the Mexicans, I. 325. The detail drawn from the most authentic sources, II. 212.

Cruz, Spanish general, boasts of his barbarity, II. 220.

Cuba, importance of the island of, II. 325. Desire of Britain to possess it, 327. The probability of its becoming an independent state, under the protection of the United States, 329.

Darian, isthmus of, project of connecting the two seas there, II. 268.

Davila, Don José, governor of Vera Cruz, confines the Author in the dungeons of the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, I. xxviii.

D'Evereux, and the brave men he raised in Ireland, would have decided the destinies of Mexico, II. 142.

Dollars fired by the Royalists from their artillery in the Battle of Llanos, for want of other shot, I. 259.

Dungeon of San Juan de Ulua at Vera Cruz, horrid description of, I. 312.

Edinburgh Reviewers, their opinion on the practicability of a junction of the two oceans, II. 270.

Edwards, Bryan, Esq. his opinion as to the Route to the Pacific Ocean, I. xiv. An unpublished Memoir on the subject is in existence, II. 282.

Eguia, minister of war to Ferdinand VII. his instructions to the governor of Cadiz for the treatment of prisoners taken from Mina, I. 317.

El Valle de Maiz, in the province of Potosi, Mina defeats the Spaniards at, I. 167. Description of the town, 170.

El Giro, a partisan Indian chief of great bravery, II. 186. Subdues Padre Torres, 189. Is surprised by a party of the enemy, and killed, after performing prodigies of valour, 201.

Erdozain, Don Pablo, an excellent cavalry patriot officer, II. 177. His narrow escape, 178.

Errors of Raynal, Pauw, Robertson, and other historians and travellers, as to the state and condition of the miners of Mexico II. 102.

Erving, G.W. minister of the United States, intercedes with the Spanish government for the liberation of the Author, I. xxxviii. His letter to the Author, xlix.

Ferdinand VII. loyalty of his American subjects on the breaking out of the war with France, I. 16. His base conduct upon his return to Spain, 84. His ungrateful treatment of the two Minas, 86. Use made of his name in the perpetration of the most horrid acts, II. 232.

Flores, Don Lucas, commandant of Santiago, II. 69. Loses all his money at cards, and then is treacherously shot by Padre Torres, the winner of it, 129.

Floridas, both East and West, must be incorporated with the United States, II. 328.

Fulton, the steam vessel, might perform a voyage from Oaxaca to Canton in less than fifty days. II. 307.

Gachupin, a term of contempt applied by the Mexicans to their Spanish oppressors, I. 25. Its true meaning, *ibid.*

Galvezton, in the island of San Luis, Mina's arrival at, I. 104.

Godoy, Prince of Peace, his conduct towards South America, I. 11.

Gomez, Vicente, an officer serving under Osourno, guilty of the most horrid acts of cruelty, I. 234. Is, in consequence, gained over to the Royalist cause, 235.

Gonzales, a celebrated warrior of the troops of Xalpa, left in command at San Luis, II. 66.

Guanaxuato, city of, in the vicinity of which are the richest gold and silver mines, I. 27. Taken by the Patriots,

and its immense wealth falls into their hands, 28. The city described, II. 96. The fertility and beauty of the country around it, *ibid.* Its hardy race of inhabitants, 103. Interesting reflections on the probable future importance of this part of New Spain, 104. Failure of Mina's attack upon, 109.

Guasacualco, to Oaxaca, an invading army could march in forty-eight hours, II. 153. Importance of its river to the project of connecting the two oceans, 290.

Guerrero, a patriot leader, I. 215. Various acts of heroism, II. 192. His successes alarm the viceroy, who orders Brigadier Negrete to advance against him, 193. His principal establishment is at Zacatula, 207. His system of warfare, 209. With his aid the cruisers of Buenos Ayres and Chili might annihilate the commerce from Guaquil to Acapulco, 210.

Gunpowder, bad mode of manufacturing it in Mexico, II. 159.

Havana, city of, its immense trade with the United States, II. 330. Their facilities of blockading it, *ibid.*

Hennessy, Dr, his great skill and humanity as physician to Mina's expedition, I. 103. Proposes to rescue Mina, but is prevented by Padre Torres, II. 132. Is killed at Los Remedios, 166.

Heroism of a Mexican female in the fort of Soto La Marina, I. 300.

Herrera, Don José, resides at New Orleans, as ambassador from the Mexican Republic to the United States, I. 107. His character, 108.

Herrera, Don Mariano, the friend of Mina, his character, II. 111. Mina's visit to, *ibid.* Made prisoner at the Venadito, with Mina and others, 120. Interesting history of, *ibid.* Becomes insane, 121. Removed to Tlaquichera, *ibid.*

Hidalgo, Dr. Rector of Dolores, heads the people against Venegas, 22. Character of, 23. Appointed captain-general, *ibid.* Marches to Zelaya, *ibid.* His great and irremediable error at the very outset of the Revolution, 26.

Marches upon Guanaxuato with an heterogeneous mass of 20,000 Patriots, 27. Captures and sacks that city; its immense wealth, 28. Advances towards Mexico, by Valladolid, with 110,000 men, 30. Defeats the Royalists under Truxillo, at Las Cruces, 33. Fatal error in judgment, after remaining two days in sight of Mexico, retreats without any attempt to take that city, 36. Retreats on Guanaxuato, 37. His rear-guard under Allende, defeated at Marfel, by Calleja, *ibid.* Having lost 30,000 men in these actions, he concentrates his remaining force of 80,000, excites his troops by energetic harangues, and awaits the approach of Calleja, 40. Is again defeated, at the Bridge of Calderon, 41. Attempts to escape to the United States, but is seized at Acatila de Bajan, and treacherously given up by Bustamante, an officer in whom he had placed great confidence, 42. Taken to Chihuahua, in Durango, and there shot, *ibid.* Is said in the Mexican Gazette to have recanted his sentiments a few hours before his death, but his friends declare him to have died supplicating Heaven to favour the independence of his country, 43.

Howard, H. Esq. of Baltimore, furnishes the biographical sketch of Mina, given in this work. I. xiv.

Huerta, a Patriot chief, II. 197. His character, *ibid.* Disgraceful conduct, 199.

Humanity, invocation to, for the cause of the Spanish Americans, and for a just retribution upon the Spaniards for the enormities they have committed. II. 251.

Humboldt, his error as to the state of education in Mexico, I. 13. Faithful description of the province of Guanaxuato, II. 96. Remarks on the fertility of the country examined, 105. Refutes the theory of a difference of elevation between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, 275.

Important document, shewing the fears of the Spanish Mexican government, lest the Author should publish the information he possesses relative to that country, I. xxxii.

Indians, South American, described; the difference between them and the Indians of North America, I. 25. Their

horrid excesses, 27. Desperate valour of, and slaughter at the battle of Aculco, 36. Fifty thousand could be obtained, so to open the country as to accomplish the important plan of uniting the two oceans, II. 282.

Independence of South America, reflections on what might be accomplished by 200,000 Mexican Creoles, with European leaders, II. 54. Next in importance to the independence of the United States, 324.

Indulto, the royal, shamefully broken in the case of the Author, I. xxv.

Iturrigaray, Don José, Viceroy of Mexico, proposes the establishment of a provisional government, to save the kingdom from the horrors of anarchy and French intrigue, I. 19. Arrested and sent to Spain, 20. His liberal sentiments, II. 302.

Jaral, Marquis, his immense treasures, I. 262. His opposition to the Patriots, 266. His wealth falls into the hands of Mina, 270. Escapes to Potosi, 271. His erroneous statement of his losses corrected, 273.

La Caxa, battle of, II. 86.

La Gaza opposed to Mina upon his landing in Mexico, I. 145.

La Guayra, Spanish prisoners shot there, I. 327.

La Mar, an extraordinary female patriot at Soto la Marina, intrepidity of her conduct, I. 315.

La Sala, Captain, deserts to the Royalists, and give such information as leads to the fall of Soto la Marina, I. 298.

Lara, Lopes de, treacherously gives up two of Mina's officers and the fort of Xauxilla to Don Aguirre, II. 180.

Las Casas remonstrates with Charles V. against the barbarities of the Spaniards, I. 6. His predictions have already been fulfilled, 92.

Las Cruces, battle at, between Hidalgo and Truxillo, I. 33.

Lazo, a loop rope, used in war by the Spanish Americans with great skill and effect, II. 39.

Leon, failure of Mina's attack on, II. 7.

Liberty enjoyed by the citizens of the United States must soon communicate its influence to the inhabitants of Mexico. II. 321.

Liceaga, Don José Maria, elected President of the first Patriot Congress, I. 51. Loses his influence, and is proscribed by the infamous Padre Torres, but prefers seeking an abode in the forest to accepting the royal pardon, 248. Joins Mina at Tlachiquera, II. 57. Escapes from the Venadito at the time of Mina's capture, 120. Retires from public life, and is treacherously murdered by a party of Borja's troops, 194. His character, 196.

Linan, Don Pasqual, takes the command of the army destined to overthrow Mina, II. 4. Commences the siege of Sombrero, 7. His diabolical cruelties on taking Fort Sombrero, 33. His character, 34. His sudden elevation by Ferdinand VII. from a servant to a Mariscal de Campo, *ibid.* Spanish officers disgusted at his enormities, 36. At present at Vera Cruz, of which province he is governor, *ibid.* Appears before Los Remedios, 46. Commences the siege of, 57. Activity and skill of the besiegers, 59. His brutal conduct to Mina upon his capture, 123. And to the prisoners taken at Los Remedios, 168.

Literature excluded from Mexico by the Spaniards, I. 12. But one public journal allowed there, 93. Change within these ten years, *ibid.*

Lohra, a bandit who had acquired great wealth, founds a splendid temple, which he dedicates to our Lord of Atonilco, I. 118. His singular history, 119.

Los Remedios, the head-quarters of the tyrant Torres, I. 241. It is called by the Royalists San Gregorio, II. 41. Description of, *ibid.* Its defences and means of withstanding a long siege, 44. Besieged by Linan, 46. Progress of the siege, 77. Assault repulsed, 78. Second attempt at storming fails, 79. Successful sortie of the besieged, 80. Desperate assault after the death of Mina, repulsed, 156. Sortie, 160. Evacuation decided on, in consequence of the ammunition being expended, 161. Horrible picture of the evacuation, 163.

Madrid Gazette, extract from, shewing the cruelty of the Spaniards, II. 234.

Manifesto, eloquent, addressed to all nations by the Congress

of Rio de la Plata, detailing the enormities of the Spaniards, II. 228.
Manufactures and commerce—the advantages that will result from the emancipation of South America, II. 322.
Matamoros, second in command to Morelos, a priest, displays great valour and military talent, defeats the Royalists at Pururan, I. 66. Is taken by the Royalists, and shot, 67.
Maylefer, Major, a gallant officer under Mina, killed in the battle of Llanos, I. 258.
Mexico, conquest of, by Cortes, I. 2. Laws relating to, 7. Its commerce restricted, 13. Civil war of, commences, 23. Xavier Mina draws his sword in favour of, 89. Failure, in consequence of the ignorance, ambition, inactivity, and want of principle, of many of the leaders with whom he was compelled to act, 212. After the year 1817 the leaders became men in low stations of life and of the most licentious and cruel habits, 236. Its conquest now can only be achieved by a proffer of an independent government, II. 142. Can never be the maritime rival of the United States; its policy must, therefore, be to cultivate an alliance with, 318. General reflections upon her capacity for greatness, 331. She WILL—she MUST BE free, 332.
———, Gazette of, no dependence to be placed in its veracity, I. 184. In it General Victoria was slain more than twenty times, 232. Castanon's savage acts described, 254. More false statements in, 276. *Ibid.* II. 119. Singular attestation of Mina's death in, 125.
———, Clergy of, not averse to the cause of liberty, I. 188. Just reasons for, *ibid.* Their immense revenues arising from tythes, 190. Reflections on their influence and conduct, 191.
———, Viceroy of, recommends the Spanish authorities to confine the Author for life, lest he should publish the important information he possesses of the real state of Mexico, I. xxvii. His erroneous description of the security of the country since the destruction of Mina, II. 140.
———, Government of, alarmed at the junction of Mina with

the other Patriot forces, I. 207. Their whole efforts directed to crush him, II. 2.
Mexicans, their sufferings, I. 5. Excluded from the privileges of the laws, and from offices of trust, 10. Kept in ignorance, 12. Their loyalty, on the declaration of war against France in 1808, 16. The regency of Cadiz declare war against Caracas, 18. Conspiracy of, against the government of Venegas, 21. Superstition, exemplified by the story of the apparition of the Virgin of Guadalupe, 110. Wretched state of the poor, 264. Considered as a military power; bravery of their troops, but want of officers and discipline, II. 52. Anxiety of, to behold Mina after his capture, 123. Their hatred of Spain, and desire for freedom, will again shew themselves upon any favourable occasion, 136. Disadvantages under which they labour, and misrepresentations they endure, 237.
Mechoacan, Bishop of, addresses to the King of Spain a document on the statement of Mexico, II. 135.
Melish, Mr. his calculations of distances between America and China, II. 308.
Memorial to the Viceroy of Mexico, that Guasacualco might be the depôt of commerce instead of Vera Cruz, II. 299. Is full of interesting information and luminous argument, 301. Subject prohibited to be renewed, 302.
Mina, Don Xavier, memoirs of; born in Navarre, December, 1789, educated at Pampeluna and Zaragoza, I. 76. Joins the Spanish army, as a volunteer, at the age of eighteen, at the commencement of the resistance of the Spaniards to the French, *ibid.* In the battles of Alcornes, Maria, and Belchite, *ibid.* Undertakes a most difficult and gallant enterprise; by opening a communication with the provinces of France adjacent to the Pyrenees, establishes a very important secret communication, 77. Passes through the lines of the French position, and originates that plan of Guerilla warfare which was destructive to the French, and became eventually the principal means of delivering Spain from her invaders, 78. His chivalrous exploits, 79. The French, in revenge, arrest upwards of thirty persons of his

family, and send them prisoners into France, 80. Eludes, with the most consummate skill, every attempt to destroy him, *ibid.* Organizes bands of Guerillas throughout the country, 81. The Junta of Seville appoint him command-ant-general of Navarre, 82. The Junta of Arragon create him commanding-general of that province. *ibid.* Spanish government direct him to destroy the French iron-foundry at Pampeluna; in this hazardous and unfortunate enterprise he is opposed by two strong corps of French troops, and, after a most obstinate and bloody battle, falls, pierced with wounds, a prisoner in the hands of the French, 83. His uncle Espoz is chosen, by the brave mountaineers, chief in his stead, *ibid.* Xavier first gave system to this irregular species of valour, which Espoz continued to practise till the termination of the war, *ibid.* When taken prisoner, he had not attained his twenty-first year, 84. Is carried to Paris, and closely confined in the Castle of Vincennes; his sufferings there; not liberated till the general peace, upon the abdication of Napoleon, *ibid.* Ungrateful conduct of Ferdinand towards him upon his return to Spain, 86. Is offered the chief military command in Mexico, which he declines, and retires to Navarre, *ibid.* Raises the standard of the Cortes, in conjunction with his uncle Espoz, *ibid.* Romantic boldness of their first attempt against Pampeluna; causes of its failure, 87. Retires into France, where he is arrested, and imprisoned near Bayonne, 88. Passes over to England, and receives a liberal pension from the British government, 89. Receives the most flattering attentions from the English, and is introduced by a distinguished nobleman to the American General Scott, *ibid.* Is furnished with a ship, arms and stores, and sails, on an enterprise against Mexico, in the hope of striking a severe blow against the tyranny of Ferdinand, *ibid.* Had he landed in Mexico with 1500 men instead of 270, he would have overturned the Spanish government almost without a struggle, 94. Sails from England for the Chesapeake, 95. Proceeds to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, *ibid.* Volunteers join him,

ibid. His plans made known to the Spanish Minister Onis, 96. Purity of his motives, 89. First part of the expedition sails under the direction of Count de Ruuth; dangers and misfortunes it experienced from a gale, 99. Mina sails from Baltimore, and arrives at Port au Prince, 101. Noble declaration of his sentiments, *ibid.* Gains the esteem of the inhabitants of Baltimore, *ibid.* Sails from Port au Prince; the yellow fever destroys a large portion of the expedition, 103. Arrives at San Luis, and meets Commodore Aury, *ibid.* Organizes his troops, 106. Fails in opening a communication with the Patriot General Victoria; ill consequence of this failure, 109. Sails to New Orleans, to concert relative to a projected attack on Pensacola, 120. Danger of assassination from one of his associates named Correa, 121. Dissensions among Commodore Aury's troops; which end in a portion of them, under Colonel Perry, joining Mina, 133. Returns from New Orleans to Galveston, *ibid.* The expedition sails, 135. Arrives at Soto la Marina, on the river Santander, 138. Publishes an address to his army, 139. Takes possession of Soto la Marina, which is evacuated by the Spanish commander La Garza, 143. Establishes a printing press, and issues wise and temperate proclamations to the inhabitants, 143. Fortifies Soto la Marina; in which place he leaves his stores, and prepares to march with his chief force into the interior, 151. Is deserted by the American Colonel Perry and some valuable men, 160. Leaves a small garrison under Major Sardà, and commences his march, 161. Dangers and hardships upon this rapid and secret march, 164. Captures a large quantity of horses near Horcasitas, 165. Gallant defeat of a Spanish division at El Valle de Maiz, 167. Arminan pursues Mina from Altamira, 171. Great fatigue supported by Mina and his troops, 172. Preparations for the battle of Peotillos—great skill and valour displayed by Mina and his troops—total defeat of 1700 Spaniards under Arminan, by Mina's cavalry, 172 in number—enthusiasm of the troops for their leader, Mina, 176. Advance, after this

battle, upon Hideonda, 187. To Espiritu Santo, the inhabitants of which are surprised at the good conduct of Mina's troops, 191. Proceed by a forced march to Pinos, 192. Which is taken in a very gallant manner by storm, 194. Punishes with death all attempts at despoiling churches, 195. Evacuates Pinos, 196. Pursues his march through a dreary country, encountering great hardships, but at length joins another division of the Patriots under Don Christoval Naba, 198. Arrives at Sombrero with a mere handful of men, after a harassing march of thirty days, over two hundred and twenty leagues of country, occupied in every direction by strong divisions of Royalist troops, 203. On entering Sombrero, lays his services at the feet of the Patriot government, and writes to the commanding-general Padre Torres, 208. Low state of the Patriots, upon his arrival at Sombrero, 248. His chagrin at discovering the depraved character of those with whom he was destined to co-operate, 249. Marches to San Juan de los Llanos, and attacks Castanon, an officer of great skill and enterprise in the service of the Royalists, 252. A desperate battle, in which Castanon is killed, and his army totally defeated, 258. Enthusiasm of the people in favour of Mina after this exploit, 260. Successful enterprise against the Jaral, 262. Immense treasure falls into his hands, 270. Returns to Sombrero, and there meets Torres, who pretends to have come to congratulate him, 272. His patriotic address to the Republican chiefs, 278. Humanity to his prisoners contrasted with that of the Royalists, 283. Prisoners taken in the battle of Llanos join his standard, 284. Anticipated march to the capital of Mexico, 286. Waits the attack of Linan at Sombrero, in full reliance of the promised support from Padre Torres, II. 5. Attacks the Villa of Leon, which fails from the strength of its garrison, 7. Is besieged in Fort Sombrero, *ibid.* His sympathy for the garrison, which suffers severely for want of water, 14. Quits the fort, in order to procure supplies from Torres, 19. Finding that Torres would make no effort, directs Colonel

Young to draw off the garrison, 20. Seeks Torres at Los Remedios, but gains no assistance from him, 38. Is deeply affected at the fate of Sombrero, and at the evasive conduct of Torres, *ibid.* Defeats a body of cavalry at Silao, *ibid.* Assists in strengthening the defence of Los Remedios, 45. Leaves there all his officers to assist Linan—the magnanimity of his conduct in so doing, 47. Marches with 900 cavalry, or Mexican cossacks, to Tlachiquera, to meet Ortiz, 55. Is joined by the Captain-general Liceaga, 56. Interesting interview between Mina and the few brave men who escaped from Sombrero, 57. Takes Biscocho, orders thirty-one of the garrison to be shot—the only instance of severity he had recourse to, and which was deemed necessary, to deter the Royalists from their continued acts of cruelty, 63. Attacks San Luis de la Paz, *ibid.* Which, after many difficulties, surrenders, 66. Abandons his design against San Miguel el Grande, 67. Fixes his head-quarters at Santiago, 70. Attempt against La Sanja, which fails, 72. Proceeds to La Hoya, declines a combat with Orrantia, and returns to Santiago, 73. Concentrates his forces, marches to the plains of Silao, and harasses the enemy in the Baxio by his rapid and unexpected movements, 73. Resolves upon the attack of the city of Guanaxuato, 75. But is thwarted by Padre Torres, 76. Successful Guerilla warfare, 82. Waits the attack of Orrantia at La Caxa, 84. Severe measures to check desertion among the troops, and other steps to enforce discipline, 85. Disaster at La Caxa, 88. Proceeds to Xauxilla to concert measures with the Patriot government, 89. They in vain endeavour to dissuade him from any attempt against Guanaxuato, 92. Advances against Guanaxuato, 95. Attacks that place, 108. Confusion among his troops, compels him to retreat, 109. His deep mortification, 110. Dismisses his troops, and proceeds to El Venadito, the abode of his friend Don Mariano Herrara, 111. His concealment betrayed by a priest, 115. Surprised in the night by a party of Orrantia's cavalry, and taken prisoner, 116. Brutal conduct of Orrantia on

his being brought before him, 118. Magnanimity of Mina, *ibid.* Indignities heaped upon him, 122. Conveyed to Linan's head quarters at Los Remedios, 123. Order arrives for his excution, 124. Last scene of his life, 124. His death, 125. His character, *ibid.* Reflections on the causes of his failure, 126. His enterprise, legal at the time he undertook it, 128. Project for his rescue, discountenanced by Padre Torres, 132. The survivors of Mina's division still in Mexico are, Colonels Bradburn, Arago, and Erdozain, Captain Mandretta, Mr. G. Honderst, two soldiers, and two coloured boys, 205.

Mina, Espoz, chosen chief of the Guerillas, after the capture of his nephew Xavier, I. 83. Pursues the same course of dauntless valour to the end of the war, and chases the last Frenchman out of Spain, *ibid.* King Ferdinand, upon his return, deprives him of his command, 86. Raises the standard of the Cortes, in conjunction with his nephew Xavier, *ibid.*

Mier, Dr. despatched by Mina to open a communication with General Victoria, previous to the sailing of the expedition from Baltimore, I. 108. Unfortunately fails in this mission, 109. His singular character, 110. Is loaded with irons, sent to the city of Mexico, and confined in the dungeons of the Inquisition, 309.

Mines, the finest in America, are in the vicinity of Guanaxuato, II. 98. The advantage of those of Mexico over those of Peru, 99. How they may be still further improved, 101.

Miners of Guanaxuato, their personal strength and improved situation, II. 101.

Miranda, his expedition against Caracas, which fails, I. 126. Fate of the Americans attached to his service, *ibid.* Baseness of Monteverde, in breaking the capitulation Miranda had formed with him, 322.

Mita, the barbarous law of, relating to the miner, II. 99.

Money, practice of burying it during the Revolution of Mexico, I. 266. Immense wealth still so interred, *ibid.*

Montezuma, imprisonment and death of, I. 3.

Monteverde, the Spanish general, breaks the capitulation he had granted to Miranda, I. 321. Horrid cruelties he inflicts upon the Mexicans, 322.

Moors, conduct of Spain towards the, a proof of her innate cruelty and oppression, II. 215. 100,000 of these unoffending victims murdered at sea, 217. Subsequent instances of unparalleled barbarity, 218.

Mora, Dr. advocate for the Author in his suit against the Spanish government, II. 343.

Moreno, Don Pedro, commandant of Sombrero, invites Mina to that fortress, I. 202. Has a command under Mina, in the action of Llanos, 254. His meanness and avarice, 286. Additional instances of it at Sombrero, II. 23. Visits Mina at the Venadito, 114. Killed at the Venadito, 120.

Morelos, Don José Maria, succeeds Hidalgo in the military command of the Patriots, I. 47. With a small force he captures Oaxaca and its immense wealth, 48. Reduces Acapulco, after a siege of fifteen months, *ibid.* Had then the means of emancipating his country, but he neglected them, through an error in judgment, 50. Forms the first civil government for the Patriots, and places Don José Maria Liceaga at its head, 51. Neglects the discipline of his army, 65. His plans discussed by the Mexican Congress, and rendered ineffectual by delays and animosities, 66. Attempts to retake Valladolid, but is compelled to retreat on account of the severity of the climate, *ibid.* After many disasters, resolves to transfer his head-quarters to Tehuacan, taking with him the members of Congress, 68. Separates from the main body of his army with a small division of cavalry, is overtaken by the Royalists, and defeated at Tepecuacuilco, taken prisoner, conveyed to Mexico, and delivered over to the Inquisition, who, declaring him to be a heretic, transfer him to a military tribunal, which condemns him to be shot, at San Christoval, 69. He died in the most heroic manner: the documents published stating his recantation, are forgeries by the Royalists, 70. His

character, *ibid.* His death raises the courage of the Royalists, and greatly depresses that of the Patriots, 71.

Morillo, Spanish general, when he captures Carthagena, seizes the British and other merchants, and threatens them with death, which the interference of the British admiral prevents, I. xvi. Boasts of destroying every one, in New Granada, who could read or write, II. 224. His perfidious proclamations, 226.

Mutis, a learned and benevolent man, put to death by order of Morillo, II. 225.

Naba, Don Christoval, a Patriot chief, joined by Mina, I. 197. Whimsical description of his grotesque appearance, 198.

Negrete, Brigadier, is ordered to advance against the Patriot leader Guerrero, II. 193.

Nicaragua, lake of, the important place where the two oceans could be united with the greatest facility, II. 276. Beauty of the adjacent country, which is quite level, 278.

Noboa, Colonel, second in command at Los Remedios, his character, II. 133. The creature of Torres, and the enemy of Mina, 134. Is killed at the evacuation of Los Remedios, 166.

North-West passage, trivial importance of, compared with the junction of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, II. 264.

Oaxaca, city of, and its immense wealth, falls into the hands of the Patriot General Morelos, I. 48. Beauty of the city described, II. 151.

———, intendancy of, its facilities for the operations of an invading army, II. 151. Description of, as affording means of effecting the project of a union of the two oceans, 292.

Obesa, Spanish General Don, his treatment of the Author, I. xxxi.

O'Donnel, General, governor of Cadiz, his treatment of the Author, I. xxxv.

Onis, Don Luis de, Spanish Minister to the United States, becomes acquainted with Mina's views against Mexico, and endeavours to circumvent them, I. 96. His mysterious conduct with regard to Correa, who was employed to assassinate Mina, 124. His exaggerated statement of the assistance afforded to the Patriots from the United States, II. 130. Political purposes of, *ibid.* His narrow policy refuted, 323.

Orrantia, Don Francisco de, a Royalist officer, is directed to prevent the junction of Mina with other bodies of the Patriots, I. 200. His failure, 201. Declines an action, from fear of Mina's skill, 202. His sanguinary enormities, *ibid.* Offers battle to Mina near La Hoya, which Mina declines in consequence of the great disparity of his force, II. 70. Surprises Mina at the Venadito, 117.

Ortega, Spanish General, his action with Teran at Playa Vicente, and treatment of the Author, whom he there takes prisoner, I. xxiii.

Ortiz, Don Encarnacion, commander of the Patriot cavalry in the vicinity of Sombrero, I. 209 Description of their grotesque appearance, and valorous exploits, 255. Privately upholds Torres against the orders of the Patriot government, II. 186.

Osourno, a Patriot chief, spreads terror throughout the province of Mexico, I. 48. His force in cavalry, 234. Indulges in every species of luxury and plunder; his force destroyed or dispersed, and he and his principal officers accept the royal pardon, *ibid.*

Pagola, Don José, President of the Patriot Government, is taken prisoner and shot, II. 200.

Patriot cause extended through the provinces of Mexico, I. 49. Form a code of civil government, swear to support their new constitution, and issue their first manifesto, addressed to their European brethren—an important document, 52. Cause of the Patriots must prevail at no distant period, 94. Patriot cause falls into the hands of illiterate, licentious and cruel men, 236. Become a mere Guerilla warfare, little better in reality than that of banditti when Mina arrives at Sombrero, 247. Causes why the Patriots were able to procure supplies from the royal towns, 288. Its ill effects to the former, 289. Defective organization of the Patriot troops described, II. 49.

Compelled to act upon the defensive, 200. Forces consist of 6400 men in July, 1819, 202.
Panama, Isthmus of, project of connecting the two seas by, II. 268. Reasons for not preferring that spot, 273.
Pampeluna, the bold attempt against, by Mina, I. 87.
Penjama described, Padre Torres retires there after the fall of Los Remedios, II. 173.
Peotillos, fifteen leagues from the city of Potosi, brilliant victory at, by Mina over Arminan, I. 176.
Petion, General, affords assistance to Mina's expedition on its touching at Port au Prince, I. 101.
Perry, Colonel, one of Mina's officers, gains a slight advantage over the Spanish General La Garza, I. 147. Separates from Mina, and sets out upon his return to the United States with fifty-one of his division, 158. Encounters various detachments of the enemy, by whom every man is annihilated, and Perry destroys himself, 159. His character, 160.
Phillips and Corser, Messrs. become security for the Author's due fulfilment of his contract with the Spanish Government, II. 335.
Pinos, a town in the intendancy of Zacatecas, taken by storm, I. 194. Great treasures found there, 195.
Pitt, the British Minister, the uniting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans a favourite project with him, as well as other plans for the emancipation of Spanish America, II. 270.
Platina said to be found in the province of Oaxaca, where metals of all kinds abound, II. 298.
Poor of the city of Mexico, about one-third of the population, I. 264.
Porter, Lieutenant, of the American brig Boxer, visits the Author at San Juan de Ulua, and in vain endeavours to procure his release from prison, I. xxx.
Population of New Spain estimated at between six and seven millions, II. 103. Its immense probable increase, 315.
———— of the United States, II. 316.
Pradt, his calculation of the increase of population, II. 316.
Rayon, a Patriot chief in the province of Valladolid, I. 214.

Resists the royalist force for eighteen months, but is at length compelled to capitulate in the fort of Copera, 235.
Raspadura, in the province of Chocó, canal of, cut by a monk, but the using it interdicted by order of the Spanish government, II. 266.
Revollo, a Spanish officer, recommends a serjeant for promotion for having killed his nephew, II. 220.
Revolution must have succeeded, had a leader of talent and consequence, like Mina, risen up in its earlier stages, II. 2. Reached its lowest ebb in July, 1819, 201.
Ribera, Don Juan, patriarch of Antioch, his memorial to the king relative to the Moors, a most blasphemous production, II. 216.
Robinson, Doctor John Hamilton, in the service of the Mexican Patriots, is very obnoxious to the Spanish Government, I. xx.
Roscio, Dr. secretary of state under Miranda, cruel treatment he experiences from the Royalist General Monteverde, I. 322.
Route to the Pacific Ocean, various plans of; importance to the whole civilized world, II. 264.
Royalists, the, despoil churches on various occasions, I. 196. Desertions and murmurings among their troops, 250. Their dangerous situation at present, II. 207.
Rubio, Colonel, leaves the Spanish cause, and joins Mina, I. 144.
Ruuth, Colonel Count, embarks on Mina's expedition, I. 99. Resigns his command, 143.
San Juan de Ulua, description of the horrible prison there, and of the Author's sufferings during his confinement therein, I. xxix.
San Juan, river of, its proximity to the Pacific Ocean, II. 267.
San Luis, Mina's expedition arrives at, I, 103.
San Luis de la Paz surrenders to Mina, after a severe contest, II. 66.
San Miguel el Grande, Mina advances against, but abandons the design, II. 67.
Sardá, Major Don José, left by Mina in the command of

Soto la Marina, I. 161. His gallant resistance of the forces of Arredondo, 296. Defeats three assaults of the enemy, 302.

Sailing of an expedition from Cadiz to South America is looked upon as quite a funeral ceremony, II. 137.

Santiago, Valle de, described, II. 69. Fortified by the Spaniards, 176.

Scott, American General, allows the Author to peruse Mina's correspondence with various distinguished individuals in Europe, I. xiv. Is introduced to Mina by an English nobleman, I. 89.

Smith, Colonel, of New York, his dignified answer to a letter from the Marquis de Casa Yrujo, relative to the terms of his intercession for the lives of certain prisoners taken by the Spaniards, upon the failure of Miranda's expedition, I. 127.

Sombrero, Fort, near Guanaxuato, Mina's arrival at, I. 203. Its situation and defences, 210. Linan, with 3500 men, commences the siege of, July 30th, II. 7. Force of the besieged 650 men, very inadequately provided with ammunition and provision, 9. Enemy is defeated in their first assault, 11. Communication with the water is cut off, 12. Sufferings of the garrison in consequence, 13. Absolute despair from hunger and thirst, 21. Desertions of the troops, *ibid.* The enemy repulsed in an assault, 26. Again repulsed, 27. Death of the gallant Colonel Young, *ibid.* Ammunition and provision being entirely exhausted, it was determined to evacuate the fort, 29. Distressing scene, from abandoning the wounded, 30. Horrible misfortunes attending the evacuation, 31. The few who escape are pursued by the enemy, who give no quarter, 32. Dreadful cruelties of Linan, upon entering the place, 34. Only thirty-one of the garrison rejoin Mina, 41.

Soto la Marina, on the river Santander, Mina's expedition arrives at, I. 138. Is fortified, 151. Compelled to capitulate after a gallant defence, 294. Articles of capitulation, 304. Violated by the Spaniards, 307. Horrible barbarities inflicted on this brave little band of Patriots, 311. Who are confined in the dungeons of San Juan de Ulua, near Vera Cruz, 312. From thence sent to Old Spain, afterwards to Africa and other settlements, where they are treated as the vilest malefactors, 318.

Spain, her slender pretensions to the dominion of the New World, I. 90. Government of her colonies is the worst recorded in the page of history, 92. Various views of the practicability of expelling her from the throne of Mexico, II. 136. Its sovereignty is suspended by a fragile thread, 211. Cruelty always a prominent trait in her character, 213. Her conduct towards her colonies merits general reprobation, 245. General reflections on the probable issue of the contest, 248. Her supremacy no longer felt, 324.

Spaniards, dastardly conduct of their seamen in their attack of the Patriot vessels left at Soto la Marina, I. 155. Their boasted valour upon their return to Vera Cruz, *ibid.* Barbarous treatment of their prisoners, 312. Their jealousy of foreigners, II. 144. Opinion of a certain officer on the probable destiny of Mexico, 148. Barbarity at the capture of Los Remedios exceeds that at Sombrero, 166. Their vindictive and jealous character, 250.

Spanish government, bad faith towards the Author of this work, I. xxxvi. Breach of faith to their prisoners, 319.

——— military prowess, decrease of, exemplified in Mexico, as well as in their battles with Napoleon in the Peninsula, I. 183.

——— soldiers, their repugnance to embark for America, and their fidelity when arrived there very doubtful, II. 137. Number of troops in the viceroyalty of Mexico does not exceed 4800, 138. Are divided among the different provinces in small detachments, consequences of, 146.

——— government would be overturned by the landing of 2000 troops, 150.

Steam navigation might be successfully employed on the Pacific Ocean, II. 306. Various calculations of distances to be traversed by, 308.

Teran, Don Manuel Mier y, a Patriot chief, commences operations in the province of Puebla, I. 48. Commander-in-chief at Tehuacan, 72. The Congress intending to deprive him of his command, he seizes their persons and dissolves their sittings, *ibid.* Afterwards sets them at liberty, 73. This act was a fatal event for the Patriots, as the military commanders not being under any control from that time, assumed the character of independent chiefs, *ibid.* His force, 214. Jealousy of the other chiefs prevents their cordial co-operation, 215. His advice to form a united attack on the capital of Mexico, *ibid.* His exalted character and extraordinary talents, 216. Opposed in his plan to seize upon some port to the north of Vera Cruz, with a view of opening a communication with the United States, 218. Marches from Tehuacan upon a bold but hazardous attempt against the ports of Guasacualeo and Tehuantepec, *ibid.* Successes during the first five days of his march, 221. His progress stopped at Tustepec by violent rain, which inundates the whole country, *ibid.* Advances to Amistan, after displaying the most extraordinary abilities in making roads through the swamps, constructing floating bridges, &c. 223. Makes a bold attempt upon Playa Vicente, but is defeated, 225. Attacked by the Royalist General Topete with an overwhelming force, but defeats his adversary, from the most consummate skill and bravery, 230. Succeeds in regaining his position at Tehuacan, the inundation having frustrated his grand design against Guasacualco, *ibid.* The viceroy Apodoca sends an army against him, to whom he is compelled to surrender, 231. Is said by the Royalists to have been slain, but that fact is uncertain, 233. His project upon Vera Cruz frustrated by the jealousy of Victoria and Osourno, 292.

Tehuacan, city of, occupied by the gallant Patriot General Teran, I. 216.

Tehuantepec, project of uniting the two oceans at the Isthmus of, II. 286.

Tithes, in Mexico, their immense amount, I. 190.

Tobacco, the cultivation of, restrained to the district of Orizaba; enormous duties on; monopoly of, by the king of Spain, I. 15. The Author's contract with the Spanish government for, II. 334.

Topete, a Royalist general, defeated by Teran, I. 230.

Torres, Padre, a Patriot general, I. 209. Is appointed commander-in-chief, 237. His cruel and rapacious character, *ibid.* Appoints no officers who will not be subservient to his tyrannic will, 239. His dreadful excesses at Los Remedios, 241. Destroys several beautiful and populous places, 243. Orders the inhabitants of Guanimaro to be shot, 244. Envies the success of Mina, thwarts his measures, and thereby prevents the emancipation of his country, 261. The duplicity of his visit to Mina, 277. Secretly resolves to destroy him, *ibid.* Promises Mina a reenforcement of 6000 men, which he never supplies, 279. Fails to succour fort Sombrero either with men or provisions, II. 16. His treachery towards Mina, 46. Opposes Mina's plan of attacking Guanaxuato, 75. Additional proofs of his jealousy, 132. Escape, at the evacuation of Los Remedios, 166. Retires to Penjamo, 174. His cowardice, *ibid.* Conduct to Don Lucas Flores, 178. His infuriated career, 181. Dissensions between him and his officers terminate in his dismissal by the government, 183. His subsequent bad conduct in action at Frijoles, 184. Opposes the appointment of his successor, but is at length subdued, 189. His present discarded state, a just reward for his perfidy towards Mina, 192.

Truxillo, Spanish general, boasts of his barbarity, II. 220.

Tustepec, inundation at, impedes the progress of the gallant Patriot General Teran, I. 222.

United States, policy and interest of, forming a political and commercial alliance with the Mexicans, II. 154. Opinion of its inhabitants at the conduct of the Spaniards, 235. Voyage from thence to China might be accomplished in sixty-three days, 303. Maritime superiority of the New World must remain with, 317. Nature points out the reciprocal advantages to be derived from

an amity with Mexico, 319. Probably destined to control the island of Cuba, as well as all the Antilles, 328.
Valenciana, the silver mines of, described, II. 100.
Valladolid, precluded from receiving supplies, being closely blockaded by the Patriots, I. 290.
Venedito, on the roads from Guanaxuato and Silao, the abode of Don Mariano Herrera, Mina's visit to, after the failure of his attack upon Guanaxuato, II. 111.
Venegas succeeds Iturrigaray as viceroy of Mexico, I. 20. His measures to resist the Patriots under Hidalgo, 32. Opposes Truxillo to Hidalgo at Las Cruces, where the former is defeated, 33. Directs Calleja to attack the Patriots, who are defeated in a bloody battle at Aculco, 36. And at Marfil, 37. His decrees and proclamations outrage humanity, II. 220.
Vera Cruz, Teran's project for taking the city of, I. 291.
Victoria, Don Guadalupe, a Patriot chief of great bravery and activity, secures the strong holds of the province of Vera Cruz, I. 48. Fortifies Boquilla de Piedras, 96. His force and daring exploits, 233. From 10 to 15,000 men would have joined his standard, could he have supplied them with arms, 233.
Virgin of Guadalupe, apparition of, an extraordinary story, indicating the superstition of the American Spaniards, I. 110.
Walton, W. Esq. of London, his important information relative to the Pacific Ocean, I. xiv. His narrative of the cruelties against the Spanish Americans proved to be correct, II. 222. His observations on the union of the two oceans entitled to great attention, 271.
Washington, British attack on that city reprobated, II. 245.
Xauxilla, the seat of the Patriot government, Mina proceeds to, II. 89. Invested by Don Matias Aguirre, 170. Its commander, Lopez de Lara, gives it up, 180.
Young, Colonel, a distinguished American officer, appointed to a command by Mina, I. 106. His gallantry in the battle of Llanos, 257. Foretells the insincerity of Padre Torres towards Mina, 279. His gallant defence of fort

Sombrero, II. 22. Is killed in an assault of the enemy, 27. His death a great loss to the Patriots; his character, 28.
Yrujo, Marquis Caso, his endeavours to thwart the Author in his transactions with the Spanish government, II. 336.
Zacatula, description of the noble river of, II. 208. And of the strength of Guerrero's position there, *ibid.*
Zelaya, the inhabitants of that city throng round the standard of revolt raised by Hidalgo, I. 23.

THE END.

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