

its independence would have been accomplished within three months from their disembarkation. The brave men who have been recently raised in Ireland, by the patriotic General D'Evereux, would have been more than sufficient to have decided the destinies of Mexico. Our assertion is supported, not merely by what we have shewn was effected by Mina with his small band of foreigners, and by other facts which we have stated, but also by our personal knowledge of the general solicitude of the Mexican people to be emancipated from Spanish domination.

We admit, that the conquest of Mexico, *with the view of its being held dependent on any foreign power*, would be an impracticable undertaking; for it is their subjection to foreign rule that excites their abhorrence; and in resisting such an attempt by any other nation on earth, the Spanish government would be aided by the united exertions of all classes of Creoles and Indians; and the war would become like that in Spain against France. But if an invading army should erect the banners of freedom, and proclaim the emancipation of Mexico from all foreign dependence, they would be hailed as deliverers, and would receive the cordial support of the great mass of the Mexican population.

We have seen the difficulties which the Spanish government experienced in concentrating a sufficient force to check the operations of Mina, and to subdue the patriots under such incapable officers as Padre Torres and his subalterns. Indeed, our opinion is, that had Liñan been defeated by Mina, the royalists could not have collected another army able to withstand him. That Liñan was not defeated, is solely to be attributed to ignorance and want of energy in Padre Torres, and his jealousy of Mina. We are aware it may be said, that any other distinguished foreigner would be liable to be treated as Mina was, from the jealousy of the Creole chiefs; but one thousand foreign bayonets would place him above the influence of their jealous feeling; and besides, we hope, for the honour of the Mexican Creoles, that there are but few among them capable of acting the base part that Torres and Moreno acted towards Mina. We feel great pleasure in stating, that we have seen hundreds of Creole officers, possessing the most generous and grateful feelings towards such foreigners as had come among them, either as visitors, or with a view to their aid. Among the old Spaniards, jealousy of foreigners is a principle flowing from education and interest; it is the necessary consequence of the knowledge of their own

weakness, and has been particularly fostered by their government.

Among some of the elder Creoles likewise, some prejudices against strangers are occasionally perceptible; but among the rising generation, and particularly those who have risen from youth to manhood since the revolution, we have met with very few exceptions to the prevailing attachment to foreigners, with which the sentiment of liberty is always united. The young Creole of Mexico is perhaps the most ingenuous and generous of the human race; and, far from viewing the stranger as an intruder in his country, he lavishes on him unbounded hospitality, and appears eager only to acquire knowledge, and to form his manners from every pleasing example he sees.

We confess, that when we entered the Mexican territory, we were astonished to find the character of the Creole so different from the representations that had always been made concerning it; and when we reflected on their mode of education, their entire non-intercourse with the people of civilized nations, and their limited literature, we were the more astonished to find them so liberal in their sentiments. In truth we are perfectly convinced, that when the Mexicans shall enjoy the blessings of a free

government, and the advantages of a liberal education, they will speedily become as estimable a people as can any where be found. We likewise think it of some importance to remark, that the Creole female, whether united in marriage to an European Spaniard, or to one of her own countrymen, is secretly or openly an enemy to the Spanish government: this trait in their character we have seen frequently evinced in the most striking manner. The threats of punishment have no effect in restraining them; during the revolution they have been faithful friends of the patriots, and, on many occasions, have given proofs of their intrepid spirit. Every defeat of the revolutionists clouded their brows with sorrow; while their fine eyes would beam through tears of joy, when they heard of triumphs of the patriots over the Gachupins. The maternal songs they chant to their babes, are conceived in the spirit of liberty, and marked with hatred to the despotism of Spain. Ask a child of only five or six years old, if it is a Spaniard? and it will with indignation reply, "*No soy Gachupin, soy Americano*,"—I am not a Gachupin; I am an American.

No gift of prophecy is necessary to predict the consequences that must ensue, when mo-

thers thus inspire their children. Those consequences have already, in the short space of *nine years*, developed themselves in a manner that may well excite the fears of Spain for the preservation of her dominion over the Mexican kingdom. To protect her tottering sovereignty, she has been obliged to establish garrisons in almost every city and village in the viceroyalty. Even on the haciendas royal troops must be stationed, to keep the inhabitants in subjection.

Throughout the intendancies of Vera Cruz, La Puebla, Mexico, Guadalaxara, Zacatecas, Valladolid, Guanaxuato, and part of that of San Luis Potosi, detachments of from fifty to four hundred men are distributed and stationed within a few leagues of each other. Thus their military force is dispersed over an immense surface; so that, in the event of an invasion, the government has only this alternative, to withdraw their troops from their scattered out-posts, or expose them to be beaten in detail. Whenever their troops are withdrawn to any central point, the inhabitants will immediately break out in insurrection. The very circumstance of the troops being thus quartered in villages and on estates, betrays to the people the fears of the government, while the soldiers themselves

(being generally Creoles), by forming connexions in the districts where they are quartered, are much more likely, in the event of future insurrections, to take the side of the people, and the cause of their country, than to adhere to a government which they already dislike. We consider, in fact, *every Creole regiment at present in Mexico, under the Spanish standard, as training for the establishment of the future freedom of their country.* This assertion is founded on a knowledge of their character and feelings; and, indeed, many European Spanish officers have confessed to us their belief in this important fact.

The Creole officers in the royal regiments we pronounce, with scarcely an exception, to be royalists only in appearance; they are at heart sincere patriots, ardently desirous of seeing their country emancipated from Spain, the moment it can be accomplished in a proper manner. Repeatedly have several of these officers said to the writer, "Ah! if the insurgents had not stained the first steps of the revolution with outrageous excesses, which alarmed us all, we should have joined them, and established the independence of our country six years ago." This opinion is expressed, not only by the Creole royal officers, but by

every enlightened native with whom we have conversed; and although the viceroy Apodaca says, in his late official despatches, that tranquillity is restored throughout the kingdom, we conceive he is too well aware, that it is only a deceptive calm. It is true, that in the great intendancies of Vera Cruz, La Puebla, Oaxaca, and Mexico, the insurgents are no longer organized in hostile bodies; but the character and feelings of the inhabitants are unchanged, and they are daily becoming better acquainted with their true interests. The pardoned insurgents, in those provinces, now mingle with those who have been called royalists. They discuss among themselves their errors, their misfortunes, and their *rights*. A certain Spanish officer of distinction stated to the writer, that "although much had been said about shooting the insurgents, yet it was now useless to pursue that system; for he conceived that every Creole and Indian in the country either already was, or would shortly become, an insurgent; and because about *eighty thousand of those dangerous men*, who were before scattered in forests, are now in our towns and cities, where they are circulating their poison in the bosoms of our families; therefore," said he, "the royal indultos have only prepared the way for those

eighty thousand men to contaminate the royalists, and to organize new convulsions."

We have no doubt, that every one of those pardoned insurgents would be shot to-morrow, if their fate depended on the inclination of the Spanish government; but, at the present day, such an experiment would be too dangerous, because there is not a royal Creole who would not turn his bayonet against any authority that should dare to violate the faith which has been pledged to the insurgents. We likewise have not the least doubt, if the Spanish government could pour into Mexico myriads of European troops, so as to garrison every town and village of the kingdom, that every royal Creole would be deprived of his arms; but as Spain never can send a force capable of effecting such an object, it follows, that her sovereignty now depends, and must continue dependent, on the fidelity of the Creole troops.

The actual state of society in Mexico having been thus illustrated, it must be obvious to the reader, that the undertaking of the enterprising Mina was by no means of the desperate nature alleged in various publications. It failed from causes which we think have been amply explained; but he and his brave little band, by marching from the Mexican coast to Gua-

naxuato, have shewn what may be accomplished at a future day by some more fortunate heroes.

Two thousand foreign infantry, led by intelligent and gallant officers, would overturn the Spanish government in Mexico, in less than six months from the day of their landing, either on the coast of the Pacific ocean, or on that of the Gulf of Mexico. The moment it was known, that a respectable invading army had landed, with the avowed object of assisting the people to throw off the yoke of Spain, we repeat, that they would be joined by as many Mexicans as it would be possible to arm and organize. The government would be compelled to withdraw the royal troops from their present positions; insurrections would follow; and the fate of Mexico would, in all human probability, be speedily decided.

Along the range of coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, there is not a single spot, excepting Vera Cruz, where two thousand men would be unable to effect a landing; for, although the coast cannot be closely approached by ships drawing much water, yet every part of it will permit the landing of troops from open boats; and, by marches of three days, they could reach the Table Land of Mexico. The line of coast

is so extensive, as totally to preclude the possibility of its being guarded at all points against the invasion of a large body of troops.

The same facility for landing is offered on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, from *Guatemala* to *California*. Acapulco and San Blas are the only two places at which a landing could be resisted; and even those places might be carried by a coup de main, without much danger or loss.

The beautiful and rich intendancy of Oaxaca offers a more secure and important field for the operations of an invading army, than any other part of the kingdom. There are several fine bays along its coast on the Pacific, where an army could land, at a distance of not more than thirty-five leagues from the city of Oaxaca. The whole province abounds in all the materials essential to the subsistence of an army. The city of Oaxaca is the neatest, cleanest, and most regularly built city in the kingdom; the edifices are constructed with a green stone, which preserves its colour to perpetuity, and gives to the city an appearance of freshness, such as we have never seen in any other. The convent of San Francisco, built more than two hundred years ago, looks, at this day, as if it had just come from the hands of the architect.

Streams of the purest water flow through all the streets; and in all the squares are beautiful fountains, for the use of the inhabitants. The fruits of the torrid and temperate zones are to be seen every day in the market-place. We have seen on one side of the road trees loaded with oranges, and on the other fields of wheat. The temperature of this city is considered equal to that of any other in New Spain; the thermometer rarely falling below sixty-three, nor ranging higher than seventy-eight degrees. The inhabitants are well made, and remarkable for longevity; the women are likewise distinguished for their beauty and vivacity. Along the coast of Oaxaca the climate is destructive of health; but the greater part of the province, and particularly the mountains of the Misteca, are famed for their pure and salubrious air, and the most populous Indian villages of all New Spain are found in this province. The Indians of Tehuantepec are noted for their activity and beauty. All these Indian villages may be considered as containing true friends to the patriot cause, who would afford their cordial support to an invading army.

From the port of Guasacualco, at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, an army could march in forty-eight hours to the Table Land of Oaxaca.

We know of no part of New Spain so accessible to an invading army as this province; nor do we know of any other which presents so important a rallying point for the patriots of the provinces of Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Mexico, as this on the banks of the noble navigable river of Guasacualco. Resources for the payment of an army are also abundant in this province; it is here that the article of cochineal is most extensively raised, to the value of more than a million of dollars per annum.

All the preceding suggestions, respecting the facility of invading and emancipating Mexico, are not offered with a view of inviting the attention of desperate adventurers, but with the hope of their being useful, at no distant day, to the governments of the republics of *Colombia*, *Buenos Ayres*, and *Chili*. Although the author may not be deemed fastidious as to the means that should be employed to effect the emancipation of Mexico, yet he has no hesitation in saying, that if it ever should be accomplished by foreigners, he would wish them to be citizens of the United States. This view may, perhaps, be displeasing to many of our peaceable citizens; but as we are living in an age of revolutions, when the happiness of man is the great purpose and end of society, it is not only a

natural desire on the part of a citizen of the United States, but would be on that of every liberal mind throughout the civilized world. The New World may soon have to exert all its physical and moral resources against the ambitious and anti-social schemes of the Old World, and rescue the fairest portion of the earth from the odious debasement under which it has so long suffered. It is not extravagant to believe, if geographical position and other circumstances be considered, that, among the inhabitants of the United States and those of Mexico, there may arise a conviction, that it is *their policy and interest to form a political and commercial alliance.*

In the following chapter we shall resume the detail of the operations of the royalists against Los Remedios; and, in its sequel, it will be seen, that notwithstanding all the disasters of the patriots, subsequent to Mina's death, and the flattering statements made by the viceroy of the general pacification of the kingdom, the revolutionists maintained last year formidable parties in the provinces of Guanaxuato, Mexico, and Valladolid; and more especially on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, in the last-named province.

CHAPTER XI.

Assault of Los Remedios, on the 16th of November, and repulse of the enemy—Sortie by the garrison on the enemy's intrenchments—Cause which led to the evacuation of the fort—Los Remedios evacuated, on the night of the 1st of January, 1818—Barbarities of the royalists there—Operations of the contending parties, after the reduction of Los Remedios—Loss of Xauxilla—Detailed account of the subsequent events of the Revolution, and its actual state in the month of July, 1819—Reflections.

THE royalists, encouraged by the death of Mina, redoubled their exertions to obtain possession of the fort of Los Remedios; but they found the spirits of the besieged grew sterner as necessity pressed upon them. The forces of the enemy, relieved from those apprehensions of Mina which had before paralyzed their exertions, now came forth with confidence, denouncing the severest vengeance upon all those places which had rendered him assistance.

The patriot government appointed Colonel Don Miguel de Borja, a Mexican officer, com-