

a calumnious accusation. His undeviating adherence to the cause of the revolution through all its vicissitudes, his refusal of the repeated overtures of the enemy for reconciliation, and the firmness of his character, displayed on numerous trying occasions, made the accusation of Borja appear as absurd as it was unfounded. The fact, however, we understood to be, that Borja had, some weeks before this event, demanded one thousand dollars from Liceaga, which was accordingly furnished him; and, in order to avoid its repayment, as well as to get rid of a man who constantly expressed himself hostile to such lawless proceedings, he resolved on his destruction, and effectuated it in the manner we have related.

The patriots shuddered at the tale; for, although Liceaga, by his love of order and strength of character, had become obnoxious to the military chiefs, yet by the people in general he was respected.

About the time this melancholy circumstance took place, the forces under Guerrero were daily augmenting, and the political horizon in that part of the theatre of the revolution once more assumed an aspect favourable to the patriots. Three of Mina's officers, who had retired to the *Cañadas de Huango*, eleven

leagues north of the city of Valladolid, placing themselves under the orders of Brigadier Huerta, were authorized by him to organize a body of infantry and cavalry. Huerta, like most of the chiefs we have before described, had been raised, by the vicissitudes of the revolution, to a situation which he was totally unqualified to fill. He was illiterate, vicious, and jealous of his superiors; but at the same time he was daringly brave, and ready to undertake any project, however hazardous. He assumed the title of commandant-general of the province of Valladolid. We believe that he meant well to his country, but his extreme ignorance prevented him from being of much service; and, like Torres, he could not bear the sight of any man whom he thought likely to interfere with his ambition. He viewed the brilliant successes of Guerrero with a jealous eye; and although the latter was extremely anxious to obtain the co-operation of all the patriot chiefs, he could not accomplish it with Huerta.

Colonel Bradburn (one of the three officers who had retired to the *Cañadas de Huango*) was assiduously engaged in raising and organizing a body of infantry and cavalry, relying on the promises which had been made him by Huerta, of being furnished with every thing he

wanted. Bradburn and his two comrades found recruits flocking in to them from all directions. Barracks were erected; an armoury and powder manufactory were established; arrangements were made to procure clothing from the enemy's towns; and every thing went on prosperously, until the moment arrived when the new troops were to receive arms. Huerta, under various pretexts, withheld them. Bradburn was some time before he could penetrate the cause of Huerta's strange conduct; but he at length discovered that it arose from jealousy. Huerta, on seeing what he thought a body of well-trained troops under the command of Bradburn, conceived it possible that the latter would co-operate with, or enter into the views of Guerrero, and thereby diminish the authority which he himself was aiming to obtain. This was the real cause of his refusing Bradburn the necessary supplies.

Matters continued in this state for upwards of two months, in the Cañadas; and although the enemy were garrisoned in various directions within a few leagues, in any one of which posts they were far superior in effective force, yet Bradburn, with a hundred men wretchedly armed, held them in check. At length the enemy determined to destroy him, and in March,

1819, advanced with fifteen hundred men, under the command of Don Vicente Lara. Against this formidable force resistance was useless. Bradburn retreated for two days; but, being closely pursued in the mountains, his party was destroyed, with the exception of about thirty who made their escape. The prisoners were conducted to the neighbouring pueblo of Chucandiro, and there instantly shot.

Huerta could at that time have mustered four hundred cavalry; and as he had received timely advice of the movements of the enemy, could have reenforced the little party; instead of which, he quietly permitted it to be completely broken up. His subsequent conduct to Mina's officers was disgraceful, and serves to confirm what we have before stated, that during the last three years the patriot chiefs were generally ignorant, incapable, and licentious men, who studied only their separate interests, to the ruin of their country. Under such unfortunate circumstances, it is almost incredible that the royalists did not completely quell the insurrection; and that they have not been able so to do, arises from the general hostile feeling of the people, and the occasional appearance of such men as Don Vicente Guerrero.

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSITARIA
U. A. N. L.

The conduct of Huerta, and the distracted state of the patriots in Valladolid, prevented the patriot government from possessing a place of security in which to hold their sessions. The late president, Don José Pagola, and his secretary, were taken prisoners by surprise, and shot. Don José Castañeda was appointed in the place of Pagola, and the presidency devolved on Don Pedro Villaseñor. The government removed to a place called *Las Valzas*, near the village of Churumucoo, adjacent to the conflux of the Rio Grande and the Marquez. Here it considered itself secure from surprise; and confided in the vigilance and abilities of General Guerrero, with whom they now resolved to co-operate in exertions to give to the cause of the revolution a new aspect.

The enemy, in the upper parts of Valladolid, had fortified themselves at Puruandiro, at Chucandiro, and at several other places. Huerta's troops were daily abandoning him, and some of them had accepted the royal pardon. The famous El Giro had been surprised by a party of the enemy. Finding himself surrounded by numbers, and escape impossible, he disdained the calls of the enemy for him to surrender. His innate courage, lighted up by desperation,

caused a severe conflict, in which, after killing three of the enemy with his own hand, and wounding others, he fell overpowered by numbers. The royalists were therefore less annoyed, in that part of the country, than they had been for a long time previous.

The revolutionists were in no condition to carry on a series of harassing operations. Their system of defence, however, was such, that they suffered little loss: their guerilla parties were still numerous: in the rainy season, they retired to the mountains, and there recruited their horses, and repaired their arms; on the return of the dry season, they descended into the plains, and attacked the enemy with renewed vigour.

In the month of July, 1819, the revolution may be considered as having reached a lower ebb than at any previous period since the commencement of the struggle. But the royalists were very far from being in an unmolested state: they were still obliged to keep within their fortified places. The patriots still continued to possess the plains in the undermentioned parts of the country, and in fact were masters of the country up to the very walls of the fortified towns:—

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSITARIA U.A.M.

In the intendancy of Guanaxuato, there were still, under various patriot chiefs, at least	1000
In the Tierra Fria and Caliente of Valladolid	1500
Over an extensive surface in the intendancy of Mexico	2000
Bordering on Guadalajara and Valladolid, near the lake of Chapala	500
On the coast of the Pacific Ocean, in the province of Mexico, under the orders of General Guerrero and the Brigadier Mondesdeoca, all determined troops, and principally infantry	1400
Total	<hr/> 6400 <hr/>

In the foregoing statement, we conceive that the numbers are within the actual force of the patriots bearing arms; and, in the estimate, we do not include that portion of the peasantry whom circumstances have compelled to a pretended neutrality, but who are ripe for revolt, whenever they again behold the patriot cause assume a favourable aspect.

We omit making any observations relative to the state of the other intendancies, because

there the royalists have succeeded, by military occupation, in enforcing a momentary pacification. By referring the reader to what we have previously remarked on the character and feelings of the population of the great intendancies of Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Oaxaca, it is obvious that the present tranquillity is a precarious calm, liable at any moment to be succeeded by a revolutionary tempest.

Various writers, within the last seven years, have published the most gloomy and absurd stories relative to the revolutions of Mexico and South America; and on no other subject have the public been more egregiously misled. Among the books abounding in erroneous statements, none is more conspicuous than a work which was re-published in Philadelphia, in 1819, entitled, "A Descriptive, Historical, and Geographical Account of Spanish America, &c. &c. By R. H. Bonnycastle, Captain in the Corps of Royal Engineers." So long as Captain Bonnycastle exercises the office of a *plagiarist*, in faithfully copying from Humboldt, Clavigero, and other celebrated authors, he is excusable for the errors of his statements: but when he undertakes to give us a detail of the present contest in Spanish America, with his speculations and predictions, and sentiments

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSITARIA U. A. R.

upon political subjects, he must bear upon his own shoulders the charge of writing with the servility of a Spanish stipendiary, instead of the impartiality and manliness which ought to characterise a British officer—and of displaying the grossest ignorance of facts, which would scarcely have escaped the observation of any one who had paid the least attention to the affairs of Spanish America. For instance—

In page 316, he informs us, that “Mina, who had been concerned in the Caracas revolution, undertook an expedition against New Spain, where he was taken prisoner, and beheaded in Mexico.”

In page 243, after having given a confused account of the insurrection at Caracas, he states, that Miranda was taken, and beheaded.

In page 315, he eulogizes the ferocious Boves, a man whose career of horrid cruelties in Caracas makes even the royalists blush to acknowledge him for an associate or a Spaniard.

In page 317, speaking of the state of the revolution in 1816 and 1817, he tells us, that “in New Grenada, Florida, Quito, Peru, and Mexico, the insurgents have very little sway.”

In page 57, he gives the most ludicrous and false account of the situation of the insurgents

in New Spain; and gravely states, that “neither the Indians nor people of the interior take any part of the struggle.”

In page 348, speaking of Buenos Ayres and Chili, he states, that “the insurgent privateers still dare to shew their flag in the Pacific.”

In several parts of his book, he asserts that the royal authority is generally restored throughout Spanish America, and that *he* has not the least doubt of the ability of Spain to preserve her sovereignty over all those dominions.

Should his book ever pass to a second edition, we advise the captain to correct the errors we have noticed, and candidly to confess that events have occurred totally at variance with his confident predictions.

We have thus conducted our reader through some of the prominent scenes of the Mexican revolution, up to July, 1819; we have given a faithful detail of the daring achievements and misfortunes of the gallant Mina and his little band;* we have shewn what a few foreigners did actually accomplish in Mexico; and, finally, we have endeavoured to convey a correct

* The survivors of Mina's division, still in Mexico, are—Colonels Bradburn, Arago, and Don Pablo Erdozain, Captain Don Antonio Mandretta, Mr. Gerhard Hophorst, two soldiers, and two coloured boys.

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSITARIA U.A.M.

idea of the state of society in that kingdom, and to exhibit the very precarious tenure by which Spain there maintains her authority. The picture we have drawn of Padre Torres and others of the patriot chiefs, may possibly induce a belief, that it is difficult for the patriots to obtain proper leaders to guide them to victory; but the reader should bear in mind, that the men with whom Mina was unfortunately obliged to co-operate, rose to their stations during seasons of anarchy and confusion; they had been heaved to the surface of the revolution by its currents and agitated waters, and were not otherwise distinguished than by their ambition, their licentiousness, and their ignorance. Should Mexico ever be invaded by a respectable foreign force, with a view of co-operating with the people in the establishment of their independence, there will not be found any deficiency of worthy and able Creole officers, willing to lend their exertions to the cause of their country, as well from among those who have formerly headed the insurgents, as from those who have hitherto been in the royal service; and, with respect to the population in general, legions of friends to independence will be found in every province of Old Mexico.

The royalists, in the intendancies of Guanax-

uato, Valladolid, Mexico, La Puebla, and Vera Cruz, are walking among ashes still warm from the recent eruptions; they are passing a precarious existence, surrounded by volcanoes. The spirit of hostility to the Spanish government is smothered but for a season; and when the flames of resistance shall again burst forth in those provinces, an ocean of blood will not extinguish them. It will, moreover, be difficult to prevent the revolutionary fire that is now burning along the shores of the Pacific Ocean from spreading into the interior. The patriot General Guerrero and his partisans occupy a part of New Spain, from which it will be almost impossible for the royalists to dislodge them. This chieftain has his principal establishment at the *Orilla de Zacatula*, situated on the right bank of the river of that name, about a league and a half from its mouth. The river Zacatula discharges itself into the Pacific Ocean, nearly in the latitude of eighteen degrees north: it has two mouths, about a league distant from each other; both these are obstructed by bars, but the northernmost one affords an entrance for boats. About sixty miles east-south-east from this river, is the harbour of Siguatanejo, which, for beauty, spaciousness, and security, is exceeded by none

on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The Spaniards, fearful lest it should become known to foreigners, have vigorously prohibited all traffic whatever at this port. Lord Anson, we believe, was the first and only foreigner that ever entered it. About fifteen miles north from Zacatula, there is likewise an excellent bay (*ensanada*), called *Petacalco*. The anchorage therein is convenient and safe, and the water is smooth throughout the greater part of the year. The sea-breeze sets in regularly at eight o'clock in the morning, and continues until sun-set, when it is succeeded by a land-breeze, which usually blows until six or seven o'clock next morning. The whole line of this coast, from Zacatula down to Siguatanejo, is at present under the control of Guerrero. The positions he has chosen are not only secure from surprise by the enemy, but that at Orilla is even capable of sustaining a formidable siege. It is defended on the south-east by a deep, wide, and rapid river; and between it and a place called *Colima*, is a wilderness, impassable by an army. From *Tierra Fria*, it can only be approached by a road on the right bank of the river, which road passes over mountains for nearly thirty leagues, every mile of which offers defiles, where one hundred resolute men could arrest the march

of one thousand. In fact, the country occupied by Guerrero is one of the most favourable parts of New Spain for defensive operations; and, so long as this experienced chief remains on the defensive, it will be almost impracticable for his enemies to subdue him. His advanced posts extend to *Las Valzas*. The country, being thinly settled, affords not the means of subsistence for an army of royalists; while the patriots, inured to privations, have a sufficiency. Guerrero has adopted the plan of collecting the cattle into a herd, so that, on the approach of an enemy, he has only to drive them to the rear, thus cutting off the means of subsistence from his opponents. The latter must, therefore, receive their supplies from a great distance, which almost precludes the possibility of attempting a formal siege of Guerrero's strong hold, the only manner in which he can be dislodged.

The people of all that part of the province of Mexico are remarkable for their hatred to the Spaniards; and, in the adjoining provinces of *La Puebla* and *Oaxaca*, the whole of the population along the coast of the Pacific Ocean are ready to co-operate with Guerrero. The inhabitants of the mountains of the *Misteca* are particularly attached to him; and should he

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSITARIA U. A. N. O.

make his future advances in that direction, he would be cordially supported. It is probable, however, that Guerrero will remain at his present position on the river Zacatula, until some favourable circumstances occur in the other provinces, or until he receives a supply of arms and munitions of war.

Should the cruizers of Buenos Ayres and Chili direct their attention to that part of the coast of the Pacific Ocean within the jurisdiction of Guerrero's command, they could, with the aid of the latter, fortify Siguatanejo, and make it a place of rendezvous, of high importance to themselves, and of very serious annoyance to the enemy. By the adoption of such a measure, the whole commerce of the coast from Guaquil to Acapulco and San Blas could be annihilated, and the trade between Manilla and Acapulco obstructed or destroyed. We presume the reason why such an attempt has not yet been made, must arise from a want of information in the governments of Buenos Ayres and Chili, with regard to the position occupied by Guerrero, and the character of the population of the whole range of the coast.

Two thousand troops, with an extra supply of ten thousand musquets, landing on the coast near Guerrero's position, and uniting with that

chieftain, would decide the fate of Mexico in less than six months; and, should those troops be Creoles of *Chili*, of *Buenos Ayres*, or of the republic of *Columbia*, they would be received with joy and gratitude by the Mexicans, and would, moreover, be their fittest auxiliaries.

These observations, combined with the facts which we have related in the preceding chapters, will make it obvious to the reader, that the sovereignty of Spain over Mexico is suspended by a fragile thread; and that the emancipation of the latter from Spanish thralldom must take place at no distant day.

We shall close our Memoirs of the Revolution in the following chapter, by briefly noticing the cruelties committed by the Spanish authorities in Mexico and South America during the last nine years,

BIBLIOTECA UNIVERSITARIA
U. A. R.