

The Belgian revolution owed its success to the union of the Roman Catholics and the Liberals; and the king had been very careful to maintain the alliance between these two parties. This continued to be the character of the Government up to 1840, but by degrees it had been becoming more and more conservative, and was giving rise to dissatisfaction. A ministry was formed on more liberal principles, but it clashed with the Catholic aristocracy, who had the majority in the Senate. Disputes arose which caused great excitement among the people, and the cabinet resigned. A new ministry was then formed, under M. Nothomb, of a unionist or mixed kind. In 1842 a new law for the organization of public primary instruction was passed, which, however, did not meet with the approval of the clergy. In 1844 a commercial treaty was concluded with the German Zollverein; and soon after similar treaties were formed with France and Holland. The Nothomb ministry retired in 1845, and for seven months M. Van de Weyer attempted to carry on affairs with a mixed ministry; but he found it impossible to maintain harmony among the different factions. A Catholic administration was then formed, which was attacked with the greatest fury by the Liberals. The latter summoned a Liberal congress to meet at Brussels (14th June 1846), composed of delegates from the different Liberal associations throughout the country. Three hundred delegates met and deliberated with the greatest calmness, drawing up an Act of Federation and a programme of Belgian Liberalism. The elections of 1847 gave a majority in favour of the Liberals; the cabinet resigned, and a Liberal administration took its place and formally announced a new policy. Hence it happened that when next year France was in revolution and her king a fugitive, Belgium remained calm and unshaken. When the news reached Brussels the king convoked a council of his ministers and offered to resign if they thought that it would avert calamity or conduce to the public welfare. The ministers replied that a constitutional monarchy was best fitted for the people, and that a republic was neither according to their wishes nor adapted to their character. The democratic societies of Brussels attempted a revolutionary movement, but met with little success. At this time a new electoral law was issued lowering the franchise to 20 florins' worth of property (33s. 4d.), by which the number of electors was at once doubled; and soon after another law reduced the qualification for municipal councils to 46 francs (36s.). These timely concessions gave general satisfaction, and completely disarmed the extreme democratic party; so that when an expedition was organized in Paris against the throne of Leopold, with the countenance and aid of certain members of the French Government, it met with no sympathy and totally failed in its object. On the night of the 24th March the conspirators, to the number of about 800 French and 100 Belgians, arrived at Quiévrain by train, but they were at once surrounded by the military and peasants and made prisoners. Alarmed at this attempt the Government strongly reinforced the frontier towns with troops, and was thus able to repulse a more formidable invasion that took place a few days later. Belgium, however, suffered severely from the shock given to commercial credit and general industry. The discounts at the bank, which in 1847 had been 160,200,000 francs, sank, in 1848, to 86,900,000 francs, and the current accounts fell from 183,000,000 francs to 96,000,000 francs. The panic soon rendered the payment of notes in cash impossible; and the Government, by a law passed 28th March 1848, suspended cash payments, and authorized the bank to issue inconvertible notes to a limited extent. By this reasonable measure public credit was restored, and industry speedily revived.

The attention of the Government was now largely

directed to the stimulating of private industry and the carrying out of public works of great practical utility, as the extension of railways and the opening up of other internal means of communication. Commercial treaties were also entered into with various countries with the view of providing additional outlets for industrial products. The king also sought as much as possible to remove from the domain of politics every irritating question, believing that a union of the different parties was most for the advantage of the state. In 1850 the question of middle class education was settled. In August of that year the whole country between Brussels and the French frontier suffered greatly from excessive rains; the country for many leagues was flooded, many lives were lost, and the destruction of property was very great. On 25th September the king laid the foundation stone of a monument in Brussels to commemorate the national congress which in 1831 had fashioned the new destinies of the country, and on 11th October the queen died. In 1852 the Liberal cabinet was overthrown, and a ministry of conciliation was formed. A bill was passed authorizing the army to be raised to 100,000 men including reserve. The elections of 1854 modified the parliamentary situation by increasing the strength of the Conservatives; the ministry resigned and a new one was formed under M. de Decker, of moderate Catholics and Progressives. At the Paris conference of 1856, which settled the peace with Russia, the French minister, Count Walewski, complained of Belgium permitting to issue from its press publications the most hostile and insulting to France and her government, in which revolt and assassination were openly advocated. The remarks caused great indignation in Belgium. In 1857 violent discussions took place between the Liberal party and the Roman Catholics on the question of the administration of charities throughout the kingdom. Since 1830 the administration of these had been vested in the secular power, and the Catholic party had long sought to get this power into their own hands. When, therefore, M. de Decker, who supported their views, became head of the ministry, the priests made every exertion, even by bribery, to influence the elections so as to obtain a majority in their favour. In April the ministry of M. de Decker brought in a bill practically abolishing the existing law on the subject. The bill met with the most violent opposition; the discussions, which extended over 27 sittings and were characterized by great animosity, revealed a growing spirit of exaction and intolerance on the part of the clergy; but eventually it was carried by a majority of 60 to 41. The result caused great excitement among the people, the Liberal deputies were cheered, and the principal Catholic speakers hooted and insulted. The agitation extended to the provinces, and the military had to be called out to restore peace. Eventually the bill was withdrawn, and the ministers gave in their resignations. The elections for the communal councils gave a great majority in all the important towns in favour of the Liberals. A new Liberal ministry was formed under M. Rogier. In 1860 the communal *octrois*, or the taxes on articles of food brought into the towns, were abolished; and in 1863 the navigation of the Scheldt was made free. This last year, also, a treaty of commerce and navigation was concluded with England. The elections of July 1864 gave a majority to the Liberals in the Chamber of Representatives, and the ministry of M. Rogier continued in office.

On the 10th December 1835 King Leopold died, after a reign of 34 years. He was greatly beloved by his people, and much respected by the other sovereigns of Europe. He was repeatedly chosen to decide in international disputes; and the grievances of hostile Governments were not unfrequently submitted to him. His well-known

honesty and integrity of purpose, his reflective and well-balanced intellect, his habit of close and accurate reasoning, his grave and serious deportment, all eminently fitted him for the office of arbiter. To him Belgium owed much. In difficult circumstances and critical times he managed its affairs with great tact and judgment; by conciliatory measures he reconciled and kept at peace opposing factions; and by his well-known devotion to the best interests of the country he secured the confidence and esteem of all classes of the people. He was succeeded by his eldest son Leopold II., who was immediately proclaimed king, and took the oath to the constitution on 17th December. In 1866 a body of English volunteers, to the number of 1100, visited Belgium by invitation, and met with a most cordial reception from the king and all classes of the people, and took part in the Tir National. The following year a body of Belgian volunteers, numbering about 2400, came over to England, where they were warmly welcomed, and engaged in the shooting contests at Wimbledon. In 1868 serious riots took place in the mining districts, which were not put down till the military had been called out; the effective army was raised from 80,000 to 100,000 men, and the yearly contingent from 10,000 to 12,000. Attempts were also made to obtain a revision of the elementary education law of 1842.

On the outbreak of the war between France and Germany in 1870, Belgium saw the difficulty and danger of her position, and lost no time in providing for contingencies. A large war credit was voted, the strength of the army was raised, and large detachments were moved to the frontier. The feeling of danger to Belgium also caused great excitement in England, particularly after the contents of the secret treaty—which revealed the aggrandising schemes of France against Belgium—became known. The British Government declared its intention to maintain the integrity of Belgium in accordance with the treaty of 1839, and it induced the two belligerent powers to sign treaties to that effect. In the event of either power violating the neutrality of Belgium, England was to co-operate with the other in such manner as might be mutually agreed upon to secure the integrity of the country. It was at first feared that Belgian territory might be violated by the necessities of one or other of the belligerents, but this was not the case. A considerable portion of the French army routed at Sedan did, indeed, take refuge in Belgian territory; but they laid down their arms according to convention, and were "interned" in the king's dominions.

In 1870 the Liberal party, who had been in power for thirteen years, was overthrown by a union of the Catholics with the Radicals or Progressionists, joined by not a few Liberals, to whom the opposition of the Government to certain reforms had given offence. A ministerial crisis followed, which was terminated by the advent to office of a Catholic cabinet, at the head of which was Baron d'Anethan. A new election took place in August 1870, which gave them a majority in both houses,—a result brought about in no small degree by the excitement consequent on the breaking out of the Franco-German war. The Baron

BELGRADE (in Servian, *Bielgorod*, or White Town), the capital of the Servian principality, situated at the confluence of the Save and the Danube, on the right bank of the latter stream, opposite the Austrian town and fortress of Semlin. Lat. 44° 47' N., long. 20° 28' E. It is built both on, and at the side of, a northern spur of the Avala heights, the rocky summit being crowned by its once famous citadel, which still remains very much as it

d'Anethan steered his course prudently, and increased the power of the Ultramontanes considerably by carrying a reform bill, which widened the basis of representation as regarded the provincial and communal councils, by introducing large masses of the Catholic lower orders to the privilege of the franchise. It added nearly one-half to the number of electors for the provincial councils, and more than a fourth to those for the communal councils. The Liberals were very much dissatisfied; and towards the end of the year the mob in Brussels took up the question, and tumults broke out which the police and civic guard had to put down by force. They demanded the dismissal of the ministers, to which the king at length consented; and a new ministry was formed under M. de Theux. The communal elections of 1872 were the occasion of a sharp struggle throughout the kingdom between the church party and the Liberals, but success remained chiefly with the latter. The elections of June 1874 resulted in a considerable reduction of the Ultramontane majority within the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, without actually converting it into a minority. In July of that year a conference of representatives of the leading powers of Europe was held in Brussels, with the view of introducing certain changes in the usages of war, but no definite result was arrived at. In May and June 1875, religious disturbances broke out in various parts, which were attended with serious consequences. At Brussels, Ghent, and other places, religious processions, which partook of the character of party demonstrations, were attacked by mobs of the populace, and many persons were injured. These disturbances were only put a stop to by energetic measures on the part of those in authority, and the infliction of severe punishments on the delinquents.

The attention of foreign states has of late been particularly directed to Belgium, in consequence of certain remonstrances addressed to it by Germany on the subject of its international relations and its duties towards foreign powers. This arose from an obscure Belgian, named Duchesne, having written to a French archbishop, offering to assassinate Prince Bismarck for a consideration. He was taken and tried by the Belgian Government, but it was found that the law had provided no punishment for the offence which he had committed. This led to a remonstrance on the part of the German Government, which was couched in such terms as to afford ground for the gravest fears, on the part of Belgium and of foreign states, as to what might be the result. The correspondence, however, was carried on in a friendly spirit on both sides, satisfactory explanations followed, and the Belgian Government passed a measure making such offences as that of Duchesne criminal.

See Alison's *History of Europe*; *The Belgic Revolution of 1830*, by C. White, 2 vols., 1835; *Belgium and the Twenty-four Articles*, by C. White, 1838; *Histoire de la Belgique*, by Theodore Juste, 2 vols. 4to, 1853; *La Révolution Belge de 1830*, by Th. Juste, 2 vols., 1872; *Memoirs of Leopold I.*, by Th. Juste, 2 vols., London, 1868; *Napoleon III et la Belgique*, by Th. Juste, 1870; *Memoirs of Van de Weyer*, by Th. Juste, 2 vols., 1871; *The Annual Register for various years*; *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique*, 1874; *Almanach Royal de Belgique*, 1875. (D. K.)

was left by Prince Eugene, except that on the E., S., and W. the glacis has been changed into a promenade. The town was formerly divided into three parts, namely, the Old Town, the Russian Town (*Sava mahala* or *Save-district*), and the Turkish town (*Dorcol*, or Cross-road). A great change has, however, taken place in the course of the present century, and the old divisions are only partially applicable, while there has to be added the

Tirazia, an important recent suburban extension along the line of the aqueduct or *Tirazi*. Since 1869 great activity has been shown in building, and the Old Town is gradually being regulated according to a definite plan. The general appearance of the place is growing more and more European; its mosques and minarets, protected from actual demolition by a Turkish treaty, are falling into ruin from neglect. As the seat of the Servian Government, and the residence of the prince and the archbishop, Belgrade possesses a royal and an episcopal palace, a foreign and a home office, and other public buildings. Its educational institutions are remarkably numerous, consisting of a high school, several normal schools, a gymnasium, a theological seminary, a military academy, an industrial school, and an upper school for girls. There is a theatre devoted to the development of the national drama; and in the same building with the high school there is preserved a valuable collection of national antiquities as well as an extensive library. Besides the mosques, the ecclesiastical buildings include a cathedral and several Greek churches, a Roman Catholic chapel in the Austrian embassy, and an evangelical church. Among places of historical interest are the ruins of Prince Eugene's palace, and the monument in the Topjidere park on the spot where Prince Michael was assassinated in 1868. The citadel has been already mentioned; a commandant's residence, barracks, and a military hospital are among its subsidiary buildings. Though its situation is highly conducive to mercantile activity, the commerce of Belgrade is not so great as would naturally be anticipated. It holds, however, direct commercial relations not only with Vienna and Constantinople but with Manchester. There are only two monetary establishments, one known as the "First Bank," and the other a bank of credit. The principal industrial products of the city are cotton-stuffs, carpets, leather, and fire-arms. Belgrade is identified with the ancient *Singidunum*, and was the station of the *Legio IV. Flavia Felix*. It has from its earliest existence been a place of military importance, and in modern times has sustained many sieges, and repeatedly passed from the hands of the Austrians to those of the Turks. It was taken by Soliman II. in 1521, and retaken by the Austrians in 1688, but again lost in 1690. In 1717 it surrendered to Prince Eugene. The imperialists retained it till 1739, when the Turks invested and reduced it. Austria again took it in 1789, but it was restored at the peace of 1791. In the year 1806 the Servian insurgents succeeded in carrying it. In 1862 it was bombarded from the citadel on account of a contest raging between the Turkish and Servian inhabitants, but five years later it was completely evacuated by the foreign forces, and the citadel received a garrison of Servian soldiers. The only mark of Turkish occupation is the banner which continues to be shown from its walls along with the national colours. Population in 1872, 26,674.

BELIEF (*πίστις, Fides, Foi, Glaube*), with its synonyms Assurance, Confidence, Conviction, Credence, Trust, Persuasion, Faith, is in popular language taken to mean the acceptance of something as true which is not known to be true, the mental attitude being a conviction that is not so strong as certainty, but is stronger than mere opinion. For the grounds of such conviction, ordinary language refers at once to probable as opposed to intuitive or demonstrative evidence. Such popular phrases do not, of course, amount to a definition of belief; but this is not to be expected from them, especially if, as may be laid down with some confidence, no logical definition of the process be possible. It may be described and marked off from similar or contrasted states, but a rigidly scientific definition of what appears to be a simple, ultimate fact is not attainable. The general explanation, however, is so far

unsatisfactory in that it throws no light upon the most interesting question with regard to belief, its province, and does not tell us what are the objects of belief as opposed to those of knowledge. To answer this it is necessary to describe somewhat more minutely the mental process under examination.

1. Unfortunately for purposes of analysis, the word belief is used in a variety of relations which seem at first sight to have but little in common. We are said to believe in what lies beyond the limits of our temporal experience, in the supersensible, in God and a future life. Again, we are said to believe in the first principles or ultimate verities from which all trains of demonstration must start; as conditions of demonstration, these are themselves indemonstrable, and are therefore objects of belief.¹ We receive by belief perceptions of single matters of fact, which from their very nature cannot be demonstrated.² We believe from memory the facts of past experience; we have expectation or belief in future events. We accept truths on the evidence of testimony; and finally, we believe that our actual consciousness of things is in harmony with reality. From this unsystematic arrangement of objects of belief it will be possible to eliminate certain classes by noting in the first instance what we are not said to believe, but to know. By knowledge may be understood generally the conviction of truth which rests on grounds valid for all intelligence, and which is expressed in propositions necessary both for our thinking and for reality. At the same time we are commonly and correctly said to know states of consciousness when they are immediately present, together with their differences, similarities, connections, and relations to self. Whatever is necessarily connected with present experience, and can be logically deduced from it, is also matter not of belief but of knowledge. Again, we know all propositions of apodictic certainty, such as those of mathematics and logic. Mathematical propositions carry us beyond mere thinking; the laws which flow from the relations of space and time are not only thought but known to be true of all objects of sensible experience, for no objects whatsoever can form part of that experience save under these quantitative conditions. It is therefore an error to say that we believe abstract mathematical laws apply to objects; we know this with absolute certainty. So also our cognizance of logical principles, such as the laws of identity and contradiction, is matter of knowledge, of insight, not of belief. It would appear, therefore, that knowledge extends to facts immediately present in consciousness, and to certain relations true of all facts of sensible experience; but in neither of these classes of cognition does there seem to be given an absolute guarantee for the existence of any fact which is not immediately before us. That one object presented to us is known seems to give no actual knowledge that another object ideally connected with it has at the same time real being. Mathematical and logical laws are absolutely true of all experience to which they apply, but this truth gives no certainty that there will be experience. If there be objects of experience at all, they must be subject to mathematical and logical law; but the question remains, is there any ground, absolutely necessary and compelling assent, for holding that there will be such experience.³ This is an old matter of debate; it lies at

¹ This has been pointed out by a long line of thinkers, from Aristotle to Jacobi and Hamilton.

² So knowledge through the senses is called *Offenbarung* by Jacobi and Lotze (*Mikrokoismus*, iii. 548).

³ Cf. Lotze, *Mik.*, iii. 547. "When one affirms that every object of thought is identical with itself, that the same under the same conditions has the same consequences, under different conditions different consequences, that a cause precedes every effect,—all these are universal truths, which tell us, indeed, what must be or take place if there should

the very root of the distinction between knowledge and philosophical belief, and leads directly into the deepest problems of metaphysical science, its solution depending upon the answer given to the doubt whether or not our thinking is merely formal, receiving materials and working them up in forms which may have no correlates in reality. Hume, who in this connection has given the impulse to all subsequent British thinking, laid his finger with unerring precision on the crucial point, and deliberately relegated all *matters of fact* to the province of belief. According to him, knowledge never passes beyond immediate intuition of ideas and their relations. Whenever we touch upon real existence, past or future, belief, not knowledge, is our instrument. An adequate discussion of the difficulty would lead beyond the limits of the present inquiry; it may suffice to indicate generally what can be said on one typical point of the debate. Is the supposition of a causal connection among phenomena merely belief, or is it a necessary condition of knowledge? If the latter, then our thinking carries us with apodictic certainty beyond present experience of facts, for every causal judgment is, *ipso facto*, universal, and therefore extends to all or any time. Now, no proof of the universality of law among phenomena can ever be given from empirical grounds, for all such attempts virtually involve the very principle in question. It is a necessary presupposition, without which knowledge would be impossible. Its contrary is certainly not self-contradictory, if by self-contradiction be meant impossibility of representation, for chaos can be pictured; but the power of imagination is surely not the criterion of truth. It is the power of knowing objects that is in question, and the non-existence of the causal relation among phenomena would render actual experience impossible. Objects cannot be known save under this supposition. A similar line of argument directed towards others of the notions involved in what Kant has called *synthetical judgments a priori*, would show that such notions are constitutive of our experience, that thought penetrates deeply into phenomena, and that phenomenal relations are but types of the forms of real cognition. It might, of course, still be maintained that all these *synthetical propositions* are only formal,—are only true if experience be given,—and that a wide field is still left for belief. Under certain conditions this may be admitted. A doubt as to the very existence of experience is hardly a valid argument, but that there should be specific connections of phenomena, permanent and constant—that, for example, the same cause should continue to have the same effects—may seem not quite a matter of knowledge. The real element of doubt in such a case is not, however, whether the same cause under the same conditions shall give the same effects, but whether in any definite instance we have attained a thorough knowledge of the cause itself, and whether the conditions will recur. The first of these doubts is overcome in the ordinary progress of knowledge; the other concerns the empirical appearance of the effects, relates therefore to what may be called the contingent, and forms the object of belief.

It follows from what has been said that we exclude from the province of belief primitive truths and facts of immediate experience, with such phenomena, past or future, as are connected causally or by rational links with facts immediately known. There is still a wide field left for belief. (a.) In the stage of knowledge which we call sensible cognition belief introduces itself; for consciousness, which unhesitatingly affirms the correspondence of its content with reality, readily exhibits its falsity when submitted to analysis. The belief, though firm, is shown to

be a case of their application, but which tell us nothing of the real existence of any case.

be erroneous,—to be merely the rapid summation of a number of signs, which themselves do not come clearly before consciousness, and are therefore accepted without examination. (b.) In memory of our own past experience belief is involved. When I remember, I have present to consciousness ideas which represent past reality. To have ideas simply is to imagine; to have ideas which we are convinced represent past experience is to have imagination *plus* belief, *i.e.*, to remember. It should be observed that we are frequently said to trust our memory, to believe that what we remember is true. This phraseology is objectionable; we cannot properly be said to *trust* our memory, we simply use it. In the very fact of remembering is involved the reference to past reality which is the essence of belief. (c.) We believe testimony, *i.e.*, we accept as true facts not in our experience, and which possibly may never be. In this case our belief is, that under certain conditions we should have the experience which from the testimony we can picture to ourselves. (d.) Expectation, so far as merely contingent elements are concerned, is a pure case of belief.

2. So far as we have yet seen, all objects of belief have been or may be objects of knowledge; and the most prominent distinction between the two is the presence in the one of an actual intuition and its absence in the other. This distinction, however, as we have pointed out, is not absolute; all thinking of reality is not belief. Belief is rather the thinking of reality which is determined by grounds not necessarily valid for all intelligence, but satisfactory for the individual thinker. The difference between imagination and the thought of some reality does not seem capable of further analysis; it expresses an ultimate fact. Attempts, however, have been made to work out a psychology of belief, and to point out the characteristics differentiating ideas believed in from mere pictures of the mind. These have been generally due to British thinkers; and, since the time of Hume, the problem has become one of considerable importance. Locke, who marked out very carefully the province of belief and considered its grounds, made no attempt to analyse the state itself. Hume,¹ however, puts the question clearly before himself and returns an unhesitating answer. "As it is certain," he says, "there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea which we conceive, it follows that it must be in the manner in which we conceive it. When we are convinced of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it along with a certain feeling, different from what attends the reveries of imagination." "This feeling is nothing but a firmer conception or a faster hold that we take of the object." "This manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses." From the last sentence to the elaborate theory of James Mill is but a short step. According to Mill, belief is a case of constant association; an idea is believed which is irresistibly called up in connection with present experience. Thus in memory, the ideas of the past experience are irresistibly associated with the idea of myself experiencing them, and this irresistibility constitutes belief. Expectation, again, is the irresistible suggestion by present experience of a consequent or train of consequents. And to memory and expectation all ordinary cases of belief may be reduced.

Both these theories are defective in the same point,—the analysis of what is meant by object in general, and, consequently, of what is involved in thinking of an object. Hume's is open to the special objection that he makes the

¹ A theory somewhat similar to that of Hume is worked out by Mr Bagehot, *Contemporary Review*, April 1871.

difference between the believed and imagined idea the same as that between impression and idea, which is an ultimate distinction, and yet holds the difference to be merely one of degree. In Mill's account of memory it may be pointed out that the ideas of *past* experience, and of myself as having had the experience, contain in themselves the very element which is supposed to be got out of their conjunction. With regard to expectation it is clear that ideas irresistibly suggested by present experience are by no means necessarily believed, and further, that many of our beliefs do not arise from any such association. J. S. Mill,¹ who subjects the association theory of belief to a searching examination, comes to the conclusion that the distinction between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture is ultimate and primordial. With his opinion later investigators, as Mr Sully,² concur.

Professor Bain, in opposition to other psychologists, holds that belief is not so much an intellectual state as a "phase of our active nature, otherwise called the will." "It is a growth or development of the will under the pursuit of intermediate ends." When, for instance, we perform certain acts as means towards a desired end with as much vigour as if we were realizing the end itself, "we are in a very peculiar situation, not implied in desire." This situation is belief, which is essentially "an anticipation of the pleasure" of attaining the end. Belief being a form of activity, our primitive state is one of complete confidence. The mind is filled with its present experience, and confidently believes that the future will resemble it. Ideas are so strongly taken up by the mind that they are accepted as real, and influence the will. The various disappointments of this primitive confidence give rise to definite avoidances of certain actions, and to pursuit of others, in order to escape pain or gain pleasure. Action directed towards these intermediate ends involves, or rather is, belief. This theory has to explain expectation and memory. With regard to the first, "we make light of the difference between the conceived future and the real present;" or in other words, "we are disposed to act in any direction where we have never been checked." Our primitive disposition to act is equivalent to full expectation. It may be pointed out that this explanation throws no light on expectation of events in which our activity could by no possibility be involved. But the theory seems to break down entirely when applied to memory. There is first to be explained the fact of memory, and then it has to be shown how reference to activity is contained in it. "In surrendering our mind to the idea still remaining, and so imparting a momentary quasi-reality, we have an experience possessing the characteristic features of present reality." "We really make no radical difference between a present and a proximate past." This, in the first place, would apply only to certain cases of memory. Secondly, imparting a quasi-reality is not an explanation of the peculiar phenomenon of an idea representing the past. It is an error, even on Professor Bain's own principles (see note to *Mill's Analysis*, i. 342; *Emotions and Will*, 2d ed. 525), to speak of belief in a present reality, while here memory is explained as a pseudo-realization of the ideas. Nor is he more successful in referring memory to activity. To identify my remembrance of having run up against a wall to avoid a carriage with the conviction that, should such a danger recur, I should again run up against the wall (see *Emotions and Will*, 2d ed., 554), is absurd. The whole theory seems but an instance of a not uncommon error in psychology,—the confusion of the test or measure of a thing with the thing itself. Belief is truly a motive to action,³ and all

¹ Notes to J. Mill's *Analysis*, i. Cf. *Dissertations*, iii.
² *Sensation and Intuition*. (On the Development of Belief.)
³ It is so defined by Bain (*Ment. and Moral Sc.*, 372), who finds

that has been said of it by Professor Bain would hold good of it in this relation; to identify the two is to run together totally distinct processes.

Modern German psychology has not approached the problem of belief from the same side as the English. Beneke alone, by his analysis of *tact* (see *Lehrbuch der Psych.*, § 158, and *System der Logik*, i. 268, *seq.*), has opened up a somewhat fresh vein of thinking. His hints have been carried out by Germar (*Die alte Streitfrage, Glauben oder Wissen*, 1856), who gives the following definition of belief: "If the consciousness (of the truth of what we think) arises from *tact*, and therefore without consciousness of the factors or grounds through which it is produced, it is called belief; it is elevated to knowledge when these factors are brought before consciousness" (p. 58).⁴ In general the example of Kant has been followed, who looked upon the question as belonging not so much to psychology as to the theory of knowledge. His own discussion of the subject and his distinction between *Meinen, Glauben*, and *Wissen* have powerfully influenced later thought. According to him, *Glaube* (belief, in the sense of *Fides* as opposed to *Crédulitas, Foi* as opposed to *Croyance*) should be confined to such propositions as rest on grounds subjectively not merely sufficient but necessary; that is to say, the propositions believed in are recognized as the demands of our moral or practical reason, and their truth can never be disproved, for such disproof would be radically inconsistent with the moral nature which we are conscious of possessing. Our confidence in their truth is unwavering and practical, *i.e.*, leading to action; for without them we could not act in conformity with our moral nature. Nevertheless, of the objects of such propositions we can never have scientific knowledge.

3. Kant's distinction of *Meinung* and *Glaube* leads us directly to the one species of belief which has not yet been considered. All objects of belief, so far as has yet appeared, might come within our temporal experience; but we are said to believe in the supersensible, which from its very definition seems to surpass experience and, consequently, knowledge. To such belief the name *faith* is properly restricted, and in its nature it differs somewhat from the belief hitherto discussed. There is not, of course, included in it the specifically theological notion of faith as *Fiducia* (*quæ est apprehensio meriti Θεωπρόπου appropriativa ad me et in individuo*); it corresponds rather to the *Notitia* and *Assensus*, which are also elements in theological faith, and may be defined as the subjective expression of man's relation to God. When understood in this sense, religious belief is by no means a mere feeling, though it contains feeling as one of the stages in its development, for mere feeling is in itself blind and valueless, whereas faith is intelligent or rational. Nor is it a blank faith which would have the same value whatever were the objects believed in, for religious belief has a definite content; it is the acceptance of certain facts and truths and the active realization of them. As its content is definite (for if it were not so, the religions of Christ and of Mahomet, of Buddha and of Zoroaster, would stand on the same level, all having subjective faith or conviction), belief of necessity involves knowledge, rational construction of the facts believed. Faith is but the lower stage of completed insight, and in its own development follows the natural order of progress in knowledge, which begins with feeling and intuition, rises through concrete representation into logical connection,

great difficulty in reconciling his theory with ordinary phraseology. Such an expression as the following has a curious ring:—"Belief is identical with the activity or active disposition, at the moment, and with reference to the thing believed."—(Note to *Analysis*, i. 395.)
⁴ With this view may be compared much of what is said by J. H. Newman, *Grammar of Assent*; see specially 73, 281

and finally culminates in rational cognition. So religious belief, which is primarily little more than a vague feeling of something over and beyond the present state of existence, combined with the dim sense of our own finite and dependent condition, gradually rises to a higher stage, and in its efforts to attain some cognizance of the supersensible, begins even to attach itself to natural objects. But as it can find in these no satisfaction, it is compelled to construct some representations of the supernatural which shall harmonize with our spiritual wants. In the formation of these religious ideas we are not left without help, nor are they to be looked upon as mere figments of the mind. The revelation which has been given in nature, both physical and moral, and in the special experience to which the name is more frequently applied, furnishes matter which is laid hold of and pressed into the service. Religious belief or faith always attaches itself to representations, intuitions, or facts; it gives what Newman has called Real as opposed to Notional Assent. But it is not the less necessary that faith should be raised to insight, and that we should construe in terms of thought what religious experience brings before us as direct intuition. There must be theology as well as religion. Nothing is believed which is not held to be so connected with the rational nature of man as irretrievably to injure that nature should its truth be overthrown. This is not to put knowledge in place of faith, if knowledge be understood to apply only to the logically necessary; nor is it to assert that what have been called truths of revelation could have been discovered by natural reason. Knowledge, however, cannot be confined to the abstract understanding; and nothing is more delusive than the total opposition of revelation and reason. "What is there in the nature of things," says Augustine, "that God has done unreasonably?" To affirm that reason does not of itself discover the truths of revelation, is simply to bring against it the reproach it may well bear, that it does not create experience. Reason has not to make new facts, but to accept given experience, and evolve from it the pure elements of thought which it contains, and in which its truth consists. Faith, therefore, precedes knowledge, as Anselm used to say; but its priority is that of time, not of authority.¹

4. There remains to be taken into account the interesting question of the grounds and motives for belief. It is, of course, necessary to distinguish between these two; the cause of a belief may not be exactly a reason for it. Belief, though natural, is not always rational, but frequently rests with happy unconsciousness on foundations utterly inadequate to its support. But if we disregard this distinction and include both causes and reasons under the title principles of belief, these may be divided into three classes—(1), Testimony; (2), Feelings, Desires, or Wishes; (3), Evidence of Reason. These are rarely dis severed in actual practice. Testimony, to the reception of which the name belief is frequently restricted, is familiar enough to require no extended notice. Our natural tendency is to accept all testimony as true; it is experience alone that teaches caution. Where from the nature of the case no such experience is to be had, credulity settles down into firm and ineradicable conviction. The majority of men would be astonished to find how much their belief depends upon the society into which they have been born and in which they live. Dogmas at first forced upon a people gradually become ingrained in the minds of those brought up in habitual contact with them. There is hardly a limit to the possibility of instilling beliefs through continued custom, and no resistance to analysis is so strong as that offered by mere customary opinion, which has imperceptibly introduced itself into the very life's blood of those who share it.

tibly introduced itself into the very life's blood of those who share it.

The feelings, though not so directly a source of convictions as testimony, exercise an extensive and complex influence on belief. It has always been a popular saying that a man believes what he wishes—that "the wish is father to the thought;" and there can be no doubt that the superior force given to an idea by the concentration on it of desire or affection, causes it to bulk so largely in consciousness as to exclude the thought of its non-realization. The very idea of a result opposed to what we earnestly desire is unpleasant enough to make us resolutely shut it out of sight. This, however, is but a partial and limited effect. We know very well that our belief is only occasionally swayed by our wishes, and that necessity too often constrains us to believe what we willingly would not. Our volition cannot directly compel belief. But the feelings play a more important part; for it is by their means primarily that we stretch beyond the field of direct knowledge and complete our limited experience with what we feel to be necessary for the harmony of our moral and religious nature. We believe that without which our nature would be dissatisfied, and this belief takes its rise in the feelings,—the blind expressions of intellectual want,—which form the first stage towards completed insight.

It is hardly necessary to do more than refer to the rational grounds for belief. Wherever our knowledge of any object or law is incomplete, belief is ready to step in and fill up the gap by some hypothesis, which is in conformity with our experience, is rationally connected with the facts to be explained, and is not yet known to be true. Great portions of our so-called scientific knowledge are nothing but rational belief,—hypotheses unverified, perhaps even unverifiable,—and the settlement of the conditions or legitimacy of such presumptions forms the principal part of inductive logic.

Besides the works already referred to, the following treat of belief in general:—Fechner, *Drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, 1863; Ulrich, *Glauben und Wissen, Spekulation und exacte Wissenschaft*, 1858; of religious belief in particular, in addition to works on dogmatic theology or philosophy of religion:—Schwarz, *Das Wesen der Religion*, 1847; Asher, *Der religiöse Glaube*, 1860; J. Küstlin, *Der Glaube*, 1860; Venn, *Hulsean Lectures for 1869*. (R. AD.)

BELISARIUS (Sclavonic, *Beli-tzar*, "White-Prince"), the greatest general of the Byzantine empire, was born about 505 A.D., at Germania, on the borders of Illyria. As a youth he served in the body-guard of Justinian, who appointed him commander of the Eastern army. He won a signal victory over the Persians in 530, and successfully conducted a campaign against them, until forced, by the rashness of his soldiers, to join battle and suffer defeat in the following year. Recalled to Constantinople, he married Antonina, a profligate, daring woman. During the sedition of the "green" and "blue" parties of the circus he did Justinian good service, effectually crushing the rebels who had proclaimed Hypatius emperor. In 533 the command of the expedition against the Vandal kingdom in Africa, a perilous office, which the rest of the imperial generals shunned, was conferred on Belisarius. With 15,000 mercenaries, whom he had to train into Roman discipline, he took Carthage, defeated Gelimer the Vandal king, and carried him captive, in 534, to grace the first triumph witnessed in Constantinople. In reward for these services Belisarius was invested with the consular dignity, and medals were struck in his honour. At this time the Ostrogothic kingdom, founded in Italy by Theodoric the Great, was shaken by internal dissensions, of which Justinian resolved to avail himself. Accordingly, Belisarius invaded Sicily; and, after storming Naples and defending Rome for a year against almost the entire strength of the Goths in Italy, he concluded the war by the capture of

See Scotus Erigena. *De Divis. Natur.*, i. 69.