

to demolish the temple and to erect in its place two oratories, one to St John the Baptist and the other to St Martin, whose ascetic fame had travelled to Italy from the south of Gaul. Around these sacred spots gradually rose the famous monastery which was destined to carry the name of its founder through the Christian world, and to give its laws, as Milman says, "to almost the whole of Western monasticism."

Benedict survived fourteen years after he had begun this great work. His sanctity and influence grew with his years, in illustration of which it is told how the barbarian king Totila, who made himself master of Rome and Italy, sought his presence, and, prostrating himself at his feet, accepted a rebuke for his cruelties, and departed a humbler and better man. His last days were associated with the love and devotion of his sister Scolastica, who too had forsaken the world and given herself to a religious life with an enthusiasm and genius for government hardly less than his own. She had established a nunnery near Monte Cassino; but the rules of the order permitted the brother and sister to meet only once a year. He had come to pay his accustomed visit. They had spent the day in devout converse, and, in the fulness of her affection, Scolastica entreated him to remain, and "speak of the joys of heaven till the morning." Benedict was not to be prevailed upon, when his sister burst into a flood of tears, and bowed her head in prayer. Immediately the heavens became overcast; thunder was heard, and the rain fell in torrents, so that it was impossible for Benedict to depart for the night, which was spent in spiritual exercises. Three days later Benedict saw in vision the soul of his sister entering heaven, and in a few days afterwards his own summons came. He died standing, after partaking of the holy communion, and was buried by the side of his sister.

The BENEDICTINES, or followers of St Benedict, were those who submitted to the monastic rule which he instituted. This rule will be generally described in the article on MONASTICISM. It is sufficient to say here that its two main principles were labour and obedience. It was the distinction of Benedict that he not merely organized the monks into communities, but based their community-life, in a great degree, on manual labour, in contrast to the merely meditative seclusion which had hitherto been in vogue both in the East and the West. Probably, not even the founder himself foresaw all the prospective advantages of his law, which was destined not merely to make many a wilderness and solitary place to rejoice with fertility, but to expand, moreover, into a noble intellectual fruitfulness, which has been the glory of the Benedictine order. The law of obedience was absolute, but was tempered by the necessity on the part of the superior of consulting all the monks assembled in a council or chapter upon all important business. The abbot or superior was also elected by all the monks, whose liberty of choice was unrestricted. No right of endowment properly subsisted within the monastery; and the vow of *stability* once undertaken after the expiry of the year of novitiate could never be recalled. Food and clothing were of the simplest kind, and all duly regulated; and the intervals of labour were relieved by a continually recurring round of religious service from prime to evensong. The Benedictine rule spread almost universally in the West,—not in rivalry of any other rule, but as the more full and complete development of the monastic system. In France and England especially it took rapid root; and "in every rich valley, by the side of every clear and deep stream, arose a Benedictine abbey"—a centre of local good and Christian civilization. See ABBEY. (J. T.)

BENEDICT. Fourteen popes bore the name of Benedict—

BENEDICT I. (573-8) succeeded John III., and occupied

the Papal chair during the incursions of the Lombards and during the series of plagues and famines which followed these invasions. (Paul Diacon., *De Gest. Longob.*, ii. 10.)

BENEDICT II. (684-685) succeeded Leo II., but although chosen in 683 he was not ordained till 684, because the leave of the Emperor Constantine was not obtained until some months after the election. (Paul Diacon., *op. cit.* vi. 53.)

BENEDICT III. (855-858) was chosen by the clergy and people of Rome, but the election was not confirmed by the Emperor Iothair, who appointed an anti-pope, Anastasius. Benedict was at last successful, and the schism helped to weaken the hold of the emperors upon the popes. The mythical Pope Joan is usually placed between Benedict and his predecessor Leo IV.

BENEDICT IV. (900-903).

BENEDICT V. (964-965) was elected by the Romans on the death of John XII. The Emperor Otho did not approve of the choice, and carried off the pope to Hamburg, where he died.

BENEDICT VI. (972-974) was chosen with great ceremony and installed pope under the protection of the Emperor Otho the Great. On the death of the emperor the turbulent citizens of Rome renewed their outrages, and the pope himself was strangled by order of Crescentius, the son of the notorious Theodora.

BENEDICT VII. (975-983) belonged to the noble family of the counts of Tusculum, and governed Rome quietly for nearly nine years, a somewhat rare thing in those days.

BENEDICT VIII. (1012-1024), also of the family of Tusculum, was opposed by an anti-pope, Gregory, who compelled him to flee from Rome. He was restored by Henry of Saxony, whom he crowned emperor in 1014. In his pontificate the Saracens began to attack the southern coasts of Europe, and effected a settlement in Sardinia. The Normans also then began to settle in Italy.

BENEDICT IX. (1033-1056), the son of Alberic, count of Tusculum, and nephew of Benedict VIII., obtained the Papal chair by simony. He was deposed in 1044, and Sylvester was chosen in his stead. The result was a long and disgraceful schism (*cf. Mittler, De Schismate in Eccl. Rom. sub Pontif. Bened. IX.*)

BENEDICT X. (1058-9) scarcely deserves to be reckoned a pope. He reigned nine months. It is important, however, to remember that his election is one of the latest made by Roman factions, and under his successor the mode of election by the cardinals was adopted.

BENEDICT XI. (1303-1304) succeeded the famous Boniface VIII., but was unable to carry out his Ultramontane policy. He released Philip the Fair of France from the excommunication laid on him by Boniface, and practically ignored the bull *Unam Sanctam*. The popes who immediately succeeded him were completely under the influence of the kings of France, and removed the Papal seat from Rome to Avignon.

BENEDICT XII. (1334-1342) succeeded Pope John XXII., but did not carry out the policy of his predecessor. He practically made peace with the Emperor Louis, and as far as possible came to terms with the Franciscans, who were then at war with the Roman see. He was a reforming pope, and tried to curb the luxury of the monastic orders, but without much success. (Baluze, *Vita Pontif. Avenion.*, i.)

BENEDICT XIII. Two popes assumed this title—(1.) *Peter de Luna*, a Spaniard, who was chosen by the French cardinals on the death of Clement VII. in 1394. On the death of Urban V. in 1389 the Italian cardinals had chosen Boniface IX.; the election of Benedict therefore perpetuated the great schism. The greater portion of the church refused to recognize him, and in 1397 the French Church, which had supported him, withdrew from allegiance to both popes, and in 1398 Benedict was imprisoned in his own palace at

Avignon. The Council of Constance brought this state of matters to an end. Benedict abdicated in 1417, but was recognized by Scotland and Spain until his death in 1424. The name does not appear in the Italian list of popes. (*cf. Dupuy, Hist. du Schisme, 1378-1428.*) (2.) *Vincenzo Marco Orsini*, who succeeded Innocent XIII. in 1724. He at first called himself Benedict XIV., but afterwards altered the title. He was a reforming pope, and endeavoured to put down the luxury of the Italian priesthood and of the cardinalate. He died in 1730.

BENEDICT XIV. (1740-1758) belonged to a noble family of Bologna. Elected to the Papal chair in a time of great difficulties, chiefly caused by the disputes between Roman Catholic nations about the election of bishops, he managed to overcome most of them. The disputes of the Holy See with Naples, Sardinia, Spain, Venice, and Austria were settled. Perhaps the most important act of his pontificate was the promulgation of his famous laws about missions in the two bulls, *Ex quo singulari* and *Omnium sollicitudinum*. In these bulls he denounced the custom of accommodating Christian words and usages to express heathen ideas and practices, which had been extensively done by the Jesuits in their Indian and Chinese missions. The consequence of these bulls was that most of the so-called converts were lost to the church.

BENEFICE, a term first applied under the Roman empire to portions of land, the usufruct of which was granted by the emperors to their soldiers or others for life, as a reward or *beneficium* for past services, and as a retainer for future services. A list of all such *beneficia* was recorded in the *Book of Benefices (Liber Beneficiorum)*, which was kept by the principal registrar of benefices (*Primiscribius Beneficiorum*). In imitation of the practice observed under the Roman empire, the term came to be applied under the feudal system to portions of land granted by a lord to his vassal for the maintenance of the latter on condition of his rendering military service; and such grants were originally for life only, and the land reverted to the lord on the death of the vassal. In a similar manner grants of land, or of the profits of land, appear to have been made by the bishops to their clergy for life, on the ground of some extraordinary merit on the part of the grantee. The validity of such grants was first formally recognized by the Council of Orleans, 511 A.D., which forbade, however, under any circumstances, the alienation from the bishoprics of any lands so granted. The next following Council of Orleans, 533, broke in upon this principle, by declaring that a bishop could not reclaim from his clergy any grants made to them by his predecessor, excepting in cases of misconduct. This innovation on the ancient practice was confirmed by the subsequent Council of Lyons, 566, and from this period these grants ceased to be regarded as personal, and their substance became annexed to the churches,—in other words, they were henceforth enjoyed *jure tituli*, and no longer *jure personali*. How and when the term *beneficia* came to be applied to these episcopal grants is uncertain, but they are designated by that term in a canon of the Council of Mayence, 813.

The term benefice, according to the canon law, implies always an ecclesiastical office, *propter quod beneficium datur*, but it does not always imply a cure of souls. It has been defined to be the right which a clerk has to enjoy certain ecclesiastical revenues on condition of discharging certain services prescribed by the canons, or by usage, or by the conditions under which his office has been founded. These services might be those of a secular priest with cure of souls, or they might be those of a regular priest, a member of a religious order, without cure of souls; but in every case a benefice implied three things: 1. An obligation to discharge the duties of an office, which

is altogether spiritual; 2. The right to enjoy the fruits attached to that office, which is the benefice itself; 3. The fruits themselves, which are the temporalities. By keeping these distinctions in view, the right of patronage in the case of secular benefices becomes intelligible, being in fact the right, which was originally vested in the donor of the temporalities, to present to the bishop a clerk to be admitted, if found fit by the bishop, to the office to which those temporalities are annexed. Nomination or presentation on the part of the patron of the benefice is thus the first requisite in order that a clerk should become legally entitled to a benefice. The next requisite is that he should be admitted by the bishop as a fit person for the spiritual office to which the benefice is annexed, and the bishop is the judge of the sufficiency of the clerk to be so admitted. By the early constitutions of the Church of England a bishop was allowed a space of two months to inquire and inform himself of the sufficiency of every presentee, but by the ninety-fifth of the canons of 1604 that interval has been abridged to twenty-eight days, within which the bishop must admit or reject the clerk. If the bishop rejects the clerk within that time he is liable to a *duplex querela* in the ecclesiastical courts, or to a *quare impedit* in the common law courts, and the bishop must then certify the reasons of his refusal. In cases where the patron is himself a clerk in orders, and wishes to be admitted to the benefice, he must proceed by way of petition, instead of by deed of presentation, reciting that the benefice is in his own patronage, and petitioning the bishop to examine him and admit him. Upon the bishop having satisfied himself of the sufficiency of the clerk, he proceeds to institute him to the spiritual office to which the benefice is annexed, but before such institution can take place, the clerk is required to make a declaration of assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion and to the Book of Common Prayer according to a form prescribed in the Clerical Subscription Act, 28 and 29 Vict. c. 122, to make a declaration against simony in accordance with that Act, and to take and subscribe the oath of allegiance according to the form in 31 and 32 Vict. c. 72. The bishop, by the act of institution, commits to the clerk the cure of souls attached to the office to which the benefice is annexed. In cases where the bishop himself is patron of the benefice, no presentation or petition is required to be tendered by the clerk, but the bishop having satisfied himself of the sufficiency of the clerk, collates him to the benefice and office. It is not necessary that the bishop himself should personally institute or collate a clerk, he may issue a fiat to his vicar-general, or to a special commissary for that purpose. After the bishop or his commissary has instituted the presentee, he issues a mandate under seal, addressed to the archdeacon or some other neighbouring clergyman, authorizing him to induct the clerk into his benefice,—in other words, to put him into legal possession of the temporalities, which is done by some outward form, and for the most part by delivery of the bell-rope to the clerk, who thereupon tolls the bell. This form of induction is required to give the clerk a legal title to his "*beneficium*," although his admission to the office by institution is sufficient to vacate any other benefice which he may already possess.

By the Lateran Council of 1215, which was received by the Church of England, no clerk can hold two benefices with cure of souls, and if a beneficed clerk shall take a second benefice with cure of souls, he vacates *ipso facto* his first benefice. Dispensations, however, could be easily obtained from Rome, before the reformation of the Church of England, to enable a clerk to hold several ecclesiastical dignities or benefices at the same time, and by 25 Henry VIII. c. 21, the power to grant such dispensations, which had been exercised previously by the court of Rome, was

transferred to the archbishop of Canterbury, certain ecclesiastical persons having been declared by a previous statute (21 Henry VIII. c. 13) to be entitled to such dispensations. The system of pluralities carried with it, as a necessary consequence, systematic non-residence on the part of many incumbents, and delegation of their spiritual duties in respect of their cures of souls to assistant curates. The evils attendant on this system were found to be so great that in 1838 an Act of Parliament, 1 and 2 Vict. c. 106, was passed to abridge the holding of benefices in plurality, and it was enacted that no person should hold under any circumstances more than two benefices, and this privilege was made subject to the restriction that his benefices were within ten statute miles of each other. By a subsequent Act, 13 and 14 Vict. c. 98, the restriction has been further narrowed, and no spiritual person may now hold two benefices except the churches of such benefices are within three miles of each other by the nearest road, and the annual value of one of such benefices does not exceed one hundred pounds. By this statute the term benefice is defined to mean benefice with cure of souls and no other, and therein to comprehend all parishes, perpetual curacies, donatives, endowed public chapels, parochial chapels, and chapels or districts belonging or reputed to belong, or annexed or reputed to be annexed, to any church or chapel.

A benefice is avoided or vacated—1, by death; 2, by resignation, if the bishop is willing to accept the resignation; 3, by cession, upon the clerk being instituted to another benefice or some other preferment incompatible with it; 4, by deprivation and sentence of an ecclesiastical court; 5, by act of law in consequence of simony; 6, by default of the clerk in neglecting to read publicly in the church the Book of Common Prayer, and to declare his assent thereto within two months after his induction, pursuant to 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 4, § vi.

The number of benefices with or without cure of souls in the Church of England, before the first statute to abridge pluralities was passed in 1838 (1 and 2 Vict. c. 106), was about 11,000. These benefices were served by some 10,000 clergy, of whom rather more than 5000 were incumbents holding one or more livings, and some of them altogether non-resident; the remainder were assistant curates, for the most part residing in one parish and having full charge of another. The effect of the Pluralities Act in the course of about 30 years has been to produce a remarkable and most salutary change. It was computed in 1867 that the parochial benefices were 12,888 in number, and the parochial clergy 17,869, of whom 4931 only were assistant-curates. The patronage of 6403 of these benefices was in private hands, whilst the patronage of 6485 was at the disposal of the Crown, or of public bodies or public functionaries. An approximate statement of the yearly value of all the benefices in England and Wales, the number of which has undergone a considerable increase since 1867, was drawn up in 1874 by Mr J. K. Aston for a select committee of the House of Lords on Church Patronage. From this statement it appears that the yearly value of all the benefices in public patronage is about £1,825,805, whilst the value of those in private patronage is about £1,893,226; but in Mr Aston's opinion these estimates are below the actual value. (T. T.)

BENEKE, FRIEDRICH EDUARD, a distinguished German psychologist, was born at Berlin on the 17th February 1798. He was educated under Bernhardt at the Gymnasium Fredericianum, and studied at the universities of Halle and Berlin. He directed his attention in the first instance to theology, coming under the influence of Schleiermacher and De Wette, but afterwards to pure philosophy, studying particularly English writers, and the German modifiers of Kantianism, such as Jacobi, Fries, and Schopenhauer. In 1820 he published his *Theory of Knowledge*, his *Empirical Psychology as the Foundation of all Knowledge*, and his inaugural dissertation *De Veris Philosophiæ Initiiis*. In all these writings appeared very strongly his fundamental view, that philosophical speculation must be limited to the facts of inner experience, and that a true psychology, which is the basis of all knowledge, must be formed by treating these facts according to the rigid methods of physical science. His marked opposition to the philosophy of Hegel, then dominant in Berlin, came

to the front still more clearly in the short tract, *New Foundation of Metaphysics*, intended to be the programme for his lectures as *privat-docent*, and in the able treatise, *Ground-work of a Physic of Ethics*, written in direct antagonism to Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*, and attempting to deduce ethical principles from a basis of empirical feeling. In the same year (1822) his lectures were prohibited at Berlin, according to his own belief through the influence of Hegel with the Prussian authorities, who also prevented him from obtaining a chair from the Saxon Government. He retired to Göttingen, lectured there for some years, and was then allowed to return to Berlin. In 1832 he received an appointment as *Professor Extraordinarius* in the university, which he continued to hold till his death. On 1st March 1854 he disappeared from his home; and some months later his body was found in the canal near Charlottenburg. There was some suspicion that he had committed suicide in a fit of mental depression.

Beneke was a most prolific writer, and besides the works mentioned above, published large treatises in the several departments of philosophy, both pure and as applied to education and ordinary life. A complete list of his writings will be found in the appendix to Dressler's edition of the *Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft*, 1861.

The distinctive peculiarity of Beneke's system consists, first, in the firmness with which he maintained, and the consistency with which he carried out the proposition, that in empirical psychology is to be found the basis of all philosophy; and secondly, in his rigid treatment of mental phenomena by the genetic, or, as Professor Bain has called it, the natural history method. According to him, the formed or perfected mind with its defined faculties is a development from simple elements, and the first problem of philosophy is the determination of these elements and of the laws or processes by which the development takes place. In his *Neue Psychologie* (essays iii., viii., and ix.), he clearly marked out his position with regard to his predecessors and contemporaries, and both there and in the introduction to his *Lehrbuch*, signalized as the two great stages in the progress of psychology the negation of innate ideas by Locke, and of faculties, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, by Herbart. The next step was made by himself, when he insisted that psychology must be treated as one of the natural sciences. As is the case with them, its content is given by experience alone, and differs from theirs only in being the object of the internal as opposed to the external sense. But by a scientific psychology Beneke in no wise meant what is now almost invariably thought of under that designation, a psychology founded on physiology. These two sciences, in his opinion, had quite distinct provinces, and gave no mutual assistance. Just as little help is to be expected from the science of the body as from mathematics and metaphysics, both of which had been pressed by Herbart into the service of psychology. The true method of study is that applied with so much success in the physical sciences—critical examination of the given experience, and reference of it to ultimate causes, which may not be themselves perceived, but are nevertheless hypotheses necessary to account for the facts. (See on method, *Neue Psych.*, essay i.)

Beneke, therefore, starting from the two assumptions that there is nothing, or at least no formed product, innate in the mind, and that definite faculties do not originally exist, and from the fact that our minds nevertheless actually have a definite content and definite modes of action, proceeds to state somewhat dogmatically his scientifically verifiable hypotheses as to the primitive condition of the soul, and the laws according to which it develops. Originally the soul is possessed of, or is, an immense variety of powers, faculties, or forces (conceptions which Beneke, in opposition to Herbart, holds to be metaphysically justifiable), differing from one another only in tenacity, vivacity, receptivity, and grouping. These primitive immaterial forces, so closely united as to form but one being (essence), acquire definiteness or form through the action upon them of *stimuli* or excitants from the outer world. This action of external impressions which are appropriated by the internal powers, is the first fundamental process in the genesis of the completed mind. If the union of impression and faculty be sufficiently strong, consciousness (not self-consciousness) arises, and definite sensations and perceptions begin to be formed. These primitive sensations, however, are not to be identified with the sensations of the special senses, for each of these senses is a system of many powers which have grown into a definite unity, have been educated by experience. From various facts of ordinary experience it must be concluded that a second fundamental process is incessantly going on, viz., the formation of new powers of faculties, which takes place principally during sleep. The third and most important process results from the fact that the combination between stimulus and power may be weak or strong.

if weak, then the two elements are said to be movable, and they may flow over from one to another of the already formed psychical products. Any formed faculty does not cease to exist on the removal of its stimulus; in virtue of its fundamental property, *tenacity*, it sinks back as a trace (*Spur*) into unconsciousness, whence it may be recalled by the application to it of another stimulus, or by the attraction towards it of some of the movable elements or newly-formed original powers. These traces and the flowing over of the movable elements are the most important conceptions in Beneke's psychology; by means of them he gives a rationale of reproduction and association, and strives to show that all the formed faculties are simply developments from traces of earlier processes. Lastly, similar forms, according to the degree of their similarity, attract one another or tend to form closer combinations.

All psychical phenomena are explicable by the relation of impression and power, and by the flow of movable elements; the whole process of mental development is nothing but the result of the action and interaction of the above simple laws. In general this growth may be said to take the direction of rendering more and more definite by repetition and attraction of like to like the originally indefinite activities of the primary faculties. Thus the sensations of the special senses are gradually formed from the primary sensuous feelings (*Sinnliche Empfindungen*); concepts are formed from intuitions of individuals by the attraction of the common elements, and the consequent flow towards them of movable forms. Judgment is the springing into consciousness of a concept alongside of an intuition, or of a higher concept alongside of a lower. Reasoning is merely a more complex judgment. Nor are there special faculties of judging or reasoning. The understanding is simply the mass of concepts lying in the background of unconsciousness, ready to be called up and to flow with force towards anything closely connected with them. Even memory is not a special faculty; it is simply the fundamental property of tenacity possessed by the original faculties. The very distinction between the great classes, Knowledge, Feeling, and Will, may be referred to elementary differences in the original relations of faculty and impression.

To follow Beneke into the details of any one of his psychological developments would be impossible within moderate compass. It may be sufficient to say, that on nearly all questions concerning the psychical mechanism, his works contain a mass of unusually rich and instructive material. They are particularly deserving of careful comparison with the association psychology of modern British thinkers, most of whose results and processes will be found there thoroughly handled and worked into a comprehensive system.

In logic, metaphysics, and ethics, Beneke's speculations are completely dependent on the results of the psychological analysis. Thus thinking has been by him separated into analytical and synthetical. The first, which consists essentially in the subsumption of one concept under another, is the subject of elementary, pure, or formal logic, which, as an art, has to lay down the universal rules according to which such subsumption takes place. Logical reasoning, which adds nothing to our knowledge, but merely clears it up, is at bottom a substitution of one notion for another. In the elaborate theory of syllogism, founded on this principle, Beneke to some extent anticipates Hamilton's *New Analytic*. (It cannot, however, be thought that Hamilton borrowed his principle from Beneke, as the latter seems to have suspected;—see Dressler's remark, *Lehrbuch der Psy.*, 299. The two approached the matter from quite different sides, and the peculiarity of Hamilton's system, the definite, explicit, quantification of the predicate, is by no means necessarily implied in anything said by Beneke.) Synthetical thinking, on the other hand, leads to new knowledge, but in its progress it makes use of principles involving the relation of thought to existence, and which, therefore, find justification in metaphysics. In that science Beneke's fundamental proposition is that in inner experience we cognize things as they are, whereas in outer experience we only know their effects. Real being is given in our intuitions, from which we gradually form a notion of self, and then of other conscious beings like ourselves. The inference to the real existence of external things is an unconscious reasoning, involving the same elements as the inference to the existence of other conscious beings. The relations which give definiteness and universality to experience, such as substance and cause, are known directly in inner experience, in the systematic relations of the several psychical elements, and are transferred by us to outer beings. In this part of his metaphysical theory Beneke owes much to Schleiermacher.

In his ethical theory, which is worked out with great fullness, and which was, in his own opinion, his most valuable contribution to philosophy, Beneke is thoroughly empirical. The worth of an object is defined to be the degree of pleasurable feeling with which it affects us, and ethical judgments are founded on the relations of worth among the feelings with which we regard objects. There is a gradation of moral worth, because there are higher and lower faculties; and, as the mental constitutions of all men are fundamentally alike, this gradation of worth becomes a *norm* or general rule for estimating moral qualities. An estimate founded on this normal scale appears as morally necessary, or as duty.

The special value of Beneke's works, as has been already said, consists in the many specimens of acute psychological analysis scattered throughout them. As a complete explanation of psychical facts, the theory seems singularly defective. The original hypotheses, peculiar to Beneke and on which the whole depends, are hastily assumed, are never subjected to critical examination, and after all, like Locke's earlier theory, rest on a clumsy mechanical metaphor. As is the case with all empirical theories of mental development, the higher categories or notions, which are apparently shown to result from the simple elements, are really presupposed at every step. Particularly unsatisfactory is the account of consciousness, which is said to arise from the union of impression and faculty. The necessity of consciousness for any mental action whatsoever is apparently granted, but the conditions involved in it are never discussed or referred to. So too the explanation of the origin of the notions, substance and cause, always a crucial test for an empirical theory, is completely irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of the system. The same defect appears in the account of ethical judgment; no amount of empirical fact can ever yield the notion of absolute duty. It is not, perhaps, to be altogether attributed to the ideal character of German speculation, that Beneke has been almost entirely neglected, and that his results have found acceptance mainly with practical teachers. Undoubtedly, for the science of education his minute analysis of temperament and careful exposition of the means whereby the young, unformed mind may be trained are of infinite value; but the truth of many of his doctrines on these points lends no support to the fundamental hypotheses, from which indeed they might be almost entirely severed.

Among German writers, not professed followers of Beneke, but who have been largely influenced by him, may be mentioned Ueberweg (particularly in the first part of his *Logic*) and Forstlège. In England, perhaps the only writer who shows traces of acquaintance with his works is Morell (*Intro. to Mental Philosophy*). The most eminent members of the school are Dressler (whose *Beneke oder Seelenlehre als Naturwissenschaft* is an admirable exposition), Ditte, and Raue. The compendium by the last-named author has passed through four editions in Germany, and has been translated into French, Flemish, and English. The English translation, *Elements of Psychology*, 1871, gives a lucid and succinct view of the whole system. (R. AD.)

BENEVENTO, a city of Italy, the capital of a province, situated on a hill near the confluence of the Calore and the Sabato, 32 miles N.E. of Naples. The town is surrounded by walls, and was formerly defended by a castle of the 12th century, which now contains Government offices and a prison. It occupies the site of the ancient *Beneventum*, and is largely built of its ruins. Except Rome, few cities can boast of so many remains of antiquity. Of these the most beautiful and perfect is the arch of Trajan, erected in 114 A.D., 53 feet in height, and consisting of a single arch of Parian marble of the Corinthian order, highly ornamented with basso and alto rilievis, which represent various events in the reign of that emperor. It now forms one of the gates of the city (*Porta Aurea*). Of the amphitheatre the remains, now known as *Grottoni di Mappa*, are in a very ruinous condition, and the arena is occupied by houses of a mean description. Benevento is the see of a bishop, and has a cathedral of the 12th century in the Lombardo-Saracenic style, in front of which is an Egyptian obelisk of granite covered with hieroglyphics. Among its other buildings may be mentioned the town-hall, the diocesan seminary, the lyceum, which was formerly a Jesuit college, and several hospitals. The principal manufactures are leather, parchment, and plated goods. A considerable trade is carried on in grain.

Beneventum, or, as it was originally called, Maloeis or Maleventum, seems to have been of Samnite foundation. In 268 B.C. it was colonized by the Romans, who had probably been in possession of it for some time. During the second Punic war two of the most important battles were fought in the neighbourhood. It continued to be a very flourishing city till the close of the empire, and from its position on the *Via Appia*, it often comes into notice. About 545 A.D. it was sacked by Totila, but before long had recovered its prosperity. Being raised to the rank of a duchy by Alboin, king of the Lombards, it continued in possession of its own dukes till 1053, when the emperor, Henry III., who had rendered himself master of the city, exchanged it with Leo IX. for the bishopric of Bamberg. From that time it continued in Papal possession till 1806, when the Emperor Napoleon I. bestowed it, with the title of prince, on Talleyrand.