

triumph by the senate, and while he added to the riches of the state, was careful to render his own fortune more secure. He was a candidate for the consulship in the following year, and would gladly have conducted his canvass by proxy, while he kept his army outside the gates in readiness for his promised triumph. But Cato and the senate would not permit this violation of the law. Cæsar at once obeyed, surrendered his triumph, and obtained the consulship. He formed at this time an alliance with Pompeius and Crassus, which is generally known as the first triumvirate. It was merely a political union for common purposes, and was not, like the second triumvirate, an organized form of government. Pompeius and Crassus had been enemies, and were now reconciled by Cæsar. Cato, the champion of the senate, could not be included in this alliance, and Cicero was too vacillating in his policy and too weak in character to command the confidence of either of his former friends. The objects of the coalition were not so much to secure the personal aggrandizement of its members, as to form a strong and united front against those who wished to maintain a form of government which had become impossible, and was therefore hurtful to the state. It is possible that both Pompeius and Cæsar foresaw that under a new constitution Rome would be subject to a single head, while Crassus was not reluctant to join himself to two men, one of whom must be the ruler of the future. The democracy which raised Cæsar to power wished to obtain for its favourite the command of an army which would ensure the preponderance of his counsel in coming changes. Cæsar himself, conscious of the pressing need of important measures, and the inability of the senate to provide them, was ready with the frankest generosity to work with any one whose ideas were on this point coincident with his own. The alliance was cemented by the marriage of Pompeius to Julia, Cæsar's daughter, while Cæsar married Calpurnia, the daughter of Piso.

Cæsar's colleague in the consulship was M. Bibulus, the devoted servant of the senate, who both as *ædile* and *prætor* had submitted as a foil to set off the greatness of his companion. He offered a vain opposition to Cæsar's measures, and when he found that he could not prevent their being carried by the use of the political machinery in his power, he retired to his house and announced his intention of "observing the heavens" during the rest of his consulship, a process which ought technically to have rendered invalid all acts passed during that time. We do not possess a full account of the laws carried by Cæsar while he stood at the head of the state, but we know enough to show us that he used his opportunities to enforce the same political principles which he had always consistently professed. He ordered the proceedings of the senate to be published, and so rendered its deliberations amenable to public opinion. He passed an agrarian law similar to that of Rullus, but without the defects which had procured its rejection. He carried a measure of just relief for the *equites* or capitalists, not so much with a view of gaining their support as to make a fair concession to an important class of the community. He declared Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and Ariovistus, the German, friends of the Roman people. He made regulations for the better government of the provinces, and remedied the worst abuses under which the provinces groaned. He was the author of a great measure for the suppression of bribery and corruption amongst public functionaries, which were at that time a stigma on the state. Other resources of a similar tendency were carried by his subordinates. The senate had intended that Cæsar, on laying down his office, should be rendered as harmless as possible, and for that reason had assigned to the consuls the charge of woods and forests in Italy. The people, however, were able to

protest successfully against the injustice. The tribune Vatinius obtained the passing of a law which gave to Cæsar the province of Cisalpine Gaul or Northern Italy for five years, with three legions; and the senate of its own accord added the charge of Gaul and the Alps with an additional legion. Cæsar thus obtained a field of action worthy of his genius. He stayed near the city just long enough to secure the election of his friends as consuls, and to provide against the repeal of the measures which he had passed, and then set out for the country which has ever since been identified with his name.

It is not our object to describe in detail the marvellous work which occupied Cæsar for the next eight years. No part of his life has been written with greater fullness, nor is there any for which we possess more abundant material. It must suffice to give a short sketch of the masterly campaigns by which a free and chivalrous people were reduced to absolute obedience, new countries were opened up to the knowledge and enterprize of Rome, and a form was given to the development of the civilization of France, of which she has preserved the main features to the present day. In his first campaign (58 B.C.) Cæsar gained two important victories. He defeated at Autun the Helvetii who were leaving Switzerland with the intention of settling themselves on the fertile seaboard of the Atlantic, and forced the greater number of them to return to the homes which they had left. He attacked a nobler foe in the Germans under Ariovistus, the friend of the Roman people, and in the neighbourhood of Mûhlhausen cut them to pieces, and drove the few survivors across the Rhine. This mighty stream now became the boundary of the Roman empire. All central Gaul was quelled by his bold attack, and the Germans were cowed into quietude, but the Belgæ, a mixed race of warlike qualities, remained unsubdued. In the next year (57 B.C.) Cæsar marched against them, and scattered their confederacy to the winds. The Nervii made a better stand, and Cæsar was forced to expose his life, and to fight like a common soldier. But they, too, sustained a crushing defeat, and the submission of the Veneti and the coast cantons to Publius Crassus left only the northern tribes, such as the Morini and Menapii, independent of the Roman rule. The work of Crassus had been imperfectly performed, and in the following year (56 B.C.) the Veneti threw off the yoke. The whole coast from the Loire to the Rhine joined the insurrection. Cæsar hurried from Italy, and taking measures for the security of the north and south, prepared to attack the Veneti by sea. Victorious by sea as by land by new and skilful devices, he disabled their powerful fleet, and sold the defeated captives into slavery to a man. The Morini and Menapii alone remained unconquered, protected more than any thing else by the natural strength of their country. Cæsar marched against them, but was forced to desist from the attack. With this exception, the whole of Gaul had been reduced to obedience in three campaigns. Cæsar now turned his arms against the Germans. He cut to pieces the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had crossed the lower Rhine, after treacherously depriving them of their leaders, who had come of their own free will into his camp. There is no excuse for this violation of international law, which was very properly rebuked by Cato in the senate; but Cæsar might have replied that the precedents of Roman history had not inculcated a spirit of fairness or forbearance towards alien enemies. He built a bridge across the Rhine, and remained eighteen days on the other bank. The same year (55 B.C.) witnessed his first expedition to Britain, whither he was led partly from curiosity, and partly by a desire to detach from the Celtic confederacy a land which was the sure asylum of political refugees. The islanders made a brave resistance, and Cæsar was compelled to retreat. He

was so much dissatisfied with the result of the campaign, that he made great preparations for renewing the attack in 54 B.C. On this occasion he penetrated further into the interior and crossed the Thames, but Cassivellaunus, to whom the defence of his country had been entrusted, followed the Roman army with his war chariots, and successfully impeded their operations. Cæsar, before he left, imposed a tribute and demanded hostages, but it was difficult to conceal that he retired discomfited from a land which he had to all appearance seriously intended to subdue. The next two years witnessed the final struggle of the Gauls to regain their freedom. Inspired by the resistance of the Germans and the Britons, and inflamed by the death of Dumnorix, they determined to make a simultaneous attack on the Roman garrisons, which this winter were scattered more widely than usual. Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurelius Cotta were the first assailed. Deceived by Ambiorix, king of the Eburones, their whole division was annihilated. A similar attack was made upon Q. Cicero in the territory of the Nervii, but Cæsar was near enough to bring assistance. The insurrection was checked and a terrible vengeance exacted from the Eburones. Acco, prince of the Carnutes, was executed by the victors. His death spurred his tribesmen to greater exertions. In the winter of 53-52 B.C. they roused the spirit of their countrymen. The post of honour was held by the Arverni, under their prince Vercingetorix, an heroic leader, whose name casts lustre on this last vigorous but hopeless struggle. A new plan of defence was adopted. Instead of defending every town against the Romans, it was determined to burn those places which could not be held, and to concentrate their forces in those strong positions which gave a good hope of success. Thus the campaign clusters round the names of Avaricum, Gergovia, and Alesia. The first of these towns (Bourges) was taken in the spring of 52 B.C. The second, the capital of the Arverni, was attacked by Cæsar in vain, and an attempt to remedy the disaster led to a more decisive defeat. The star of Cæsar began to pale. The Hædui, who had before hesitated to join the insurrection, now avowed their hostility, and the whole nation rose like one man to cast off the yoke of the invader. The final struggle was concentrated round the hill-town of Alesia. Vercingetorix, faithful to his tactics, took refuge here with 80,000 infantry and 25,000 horse. Cæsar had been able to join his forces with Labienus, and invested the hill on every side. The mighty masses of the Gallic landsturm crowded from all quarters to release their champion. Cæsar was at once besieger and besieged. In this supreme crisis his genius triumphed. The provisions of Alesia were exhausted. Cæsar repulsed the double attack on both his lines, and Vercingetorix, disdaining to fly, delivered himself into the power of his conqueror. Had the result been otherwise, it is possible that Cæsar might have been driven from Gaul, and the floods of barbarians pouring down over Italy would have anticipated history by five hundred years. The following year (51 B.C.) saw the final pacification of the country. In eight years Cæsar had done his work most thoroughly. Gaul never afterwards attempted to revolt, but remained a rich and contented member of the Roman empire. On no subject-country was impressed more completely the language, laws, and civilization of its masters. If it had been possible so gradually to extend the bounds of Roman dominion as to convert dangerous hordes of undisciplined tribes into contented allies, Cæsar shows us how it might have been done. Even the patriotism of an emperor of the French cannot but admit that it was better for his country that Cæsar should conquer than Vercingetorix.

Whilst Cæsar had been engaged in the conquest of Gaul, the bands which held the triumvirate together had gradually become loosened. The three members of the coalition had

met at Lucca in 56 B.C., and had arranged that Cæsar's command in Gaul should be continued for another five years; that Pompeius and Crassus should be elected consuls for 55 B.C.; and that on the expiration of their office Crassus should have Syria for his province and Pompeius the two Spains. These arrangements were carried out, but in September 54 B.C. Julia, the daughter of Cæsar and the wife of Pompeius, died. A project for a double alliance of a similar kind was rejected by Pompeius. In 53 B.C. Crassus was slain in Parthia. In 52 B.C. it became clear that Pompeius was asserting his independence, was drawing nearer to Cato as an ally, and was becoming more disposed to act as the champion of the senate. From this time till the outbreak of the civil war, it was more and more evident that a collision between the two great rivals was inevitable, although Cæsar did his best to avert the catastrophe. The details of the final quarrel are complicated and difficult to understand. By the law of Vatinius Cæsar's command expired in 54 B.C., by that of Trebonius it was continued till 49 B.C. It is comparatively unimportant whether his *imperium* would determine at the end of February or the end of December in that year. It had been arranged among the triumvirs that Cæsar should be consul in 48 B.C. According to strict Roman law he must announce himself personally as a candidate, which he could not do whilst he was still in command of an army. Pompeius had, in 52 B.C., secured to Cæsar exemption from the restriction by a tribunician law, but there was some doubt whether this had not been rendered invalid by a subsequent enactment. In the same year it had been decreed that no one should hold a governorship until five years had elapsed from his laying down the office of consul or senator. In 51 B.C. the question of appointing a successor to Cæsar came before the senate, and it was finally determined that his command should come to an end on the Ides of November, 49 B.C. The object of the senate was that some interval should elapse between Cæsar's consulship and proconsulship. Cæsar knew that he could not trust himself to the power of his enemies, but he displayed his usual moderation. He gave up the two legions which were demanded from him for the Parthian war, and by means of Curio, whom he had won over to his side, he proposed to the senate that Pompeius and himself should simultaneously disarm. To the surprise of the aristocratic party the motion was carried. Marcellus refused to accept the decision on the plea that Cæsar was bringing his army into Northern Italy. He called on Pompeius to put himself at the head of the legion in Campania, and declare war against the invader. Cæsar made one more ineffectual attempt at compromise. The propositions brought by Curio to the new consuls on January 1, 49 B.C., were contemptuously rejected, and Cæsar was peremptorily ordered to resign his command. Although he had only one legion with him at Ravenna he could not hesitate. He crossed the frontier of Italy, and arrived at Ariminum.

Cæsar crossed the Rubicon in the middle of January, 49 B.C., and he was murdered on the Ides of March, 44 B.C. During this space of a little over five years he crushed in every part of Europe the armies of his enemies, and laid deep and strong the foundations of the imperial power of his successors. He spent barely fifteen months of this time in Rome. He did not now, as his enemies had expected, march at once upon the capital. He observed that a surer way lay open to him of securing the possession of Italy by seizing the central heart of the peninsula, which in ancient as in modern times has held out delusive hopes to patriot people and rebellious kings of taming the proud tyranny of the Tiber city. Here the solitary church of St. Pelino marks the site of Corfinium, once the destined home

of Latin independence, and the city of Aquila languishes under the snows of the Gran Sasso d'Italia, a monument of the vain but chivalrous struggle of the emperors against the popes. Into these upland valleys, lying midway between the two seas, Caesar dashed with irresistible force; and town after town fell before him and his lieutenants. Pompeius moved slowly towards Brundisium, whither he was followed by the conqueror. Caesar was unable to prevent the embarkation of his troops for Greece, but when by the end of March he reached Rome he was already the undisputed master of Italy.

In his next operations Caesar displayed a marvellous degree of his ability and resources, and showed how the success of his projects depended entirely upon his personal exertions. His lieutenants were seldom fortunate; but, like Napoleon, his presence was worth an army, and, like Frederick the Great, he knew how to spring at once from the deepest embarrassments to the triumph of victory. At Ilerda his army was cooped up between two rivers, and all communication with Rome cut off. By a clever stratagem he surrounded Afranius and Petreius, and compelled them to surrender. At Dyrrachium he was in a worse position, encamped on a barren ridge, encompassed by a far superior army on the land side, and cut off from the sea, which was in the power of his enemies. Even when he had received his reinforcements he could not hold his own against greater numbers. Yet he was able to take advantage of the first mistake of Pompeius, and the victory of Pharsalus was crushing and complete. At Alexandria, where his stay is difficult to account for even by the attractions of Cleopatra, he nearly fell a victim to a popular tumult, yet he was no sooner extricated from his difficulties than he marched into Asia, saw and conquered the son of the great Mithridates, and placed the affairs of the East on a basis of security. In Africa he had allowed the Pompeians to attain a dangerous efficiency of organization by his delay at Alexandria, and it was only through the extremest caution that he was enabled to assemble his tardy forces. But the battle of Thapsus deprived the senate of their last and noblest champion, and left Caesar the master of the Roman world. The capitulation of Ilerda took place in August 49 B.C., the winter of 49-48 B.C. was passed on the coast of Illyria, the battle of Pharsalus was fought on August 9, 48 B.C., and Pharnaces was defeated at Zela on August 2, 47 B.C. Caesar's stay at Rome was chequered by the mutiny of the legions in Campania, and the difficulty of assembling his troops; yet he was able to land in Africa before the end of 47 B.C., and he won the victory of Thapsus on April 6, 46 B.C. In July of that year he entered Rome as conqueror, and could now find leisure to govern the world which he had subdued.

During four separate days he celebrated four triumphs over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and Africa. Vercingetorix, who struggled in vain to save his country, Arsinoë the sister of Cleopatra, and the son of Juba, king of Mauretania, followed his triumphal car. The citizens were publicly feasted at the dictator's expense, a distribution of money was made to the poor and the strange magnificence of the games celebrated in memory of his daughter Julia fulfilled the promise of the splendour of his sedition. One more struggle was necessary before peace was finally secured. The sons of Pompeius, Cnæus and Sextus, had collected a large army in Spain, which had always been the stronghold of their cause. The battle of Munda, fought on March 17, 45 B.C., resulted in their entire defeat, but Caesar was compelled to be absent from the capital from the end of 46 B.C. till September 45 B.C.

It may be questioned whether Caesar was himself anxious to receive the title of king, which his admirers were without doubt desirous to force upon him. Such a title would

have added but little to his real power over every department of the state. After the expulsion of the kings the Roman constitution came eventually into such a form that, while every interest was represented, the whole power could never come into the hands of one individual. The two consuls were a check upon each other, and they were themselves subordinate to the senate. The tribunes occupied an entirely different position to the other magistrates, and defended the interests of the mass of the citizens. The senate itself was controlled by the censor, and the working of the political machine was so ordered that a single magistrate could, either by his personal objection, or by a skilful use of divine sanctions, obstruct any measure of a rash or unusual character. The chief officers of the state were occasionally suspended by the appointment of a dictator for extraordinary emergencies, but it had probably never occurred to any statesman that the whole of these well-balanced and often conflicting authorities might come to be concentrated in the person of one man. Yet it was by these means that the republic became a monarchy, and that Caesar became emperor. He was five times consul and four times dictator, and at his death was dictator elect for life. He had the tribunician power conferred upon him, which, among other advantages, rendered his person inviolable. Instead of the censorship he was invested with the new office of *praefectus morum*, which he used to curb the luxury and extravagance induced by the influx of conquered wealth. His opinion was, as *princeps senatus*, asked first in the senate; his effigy was struck upon the coins. The exaggerated and half-divine honours which the servility of the senate invested added but little to his power, but the title of *imperator*, with which many a successful general had been saluted on the field of battle, was now *praefixed* to his name as a permanent addition, and has remained, together with the family name of him who first bore it, as the title of highest sovereignty throughout the civilized world.

The complex of authorities thus placed in his hands he used in a manner to justify the confidence of those who entrusted them to him. It is difficult to give an accurate account of his administration. Mommsen, in the brilliant chapter which at present closes his history of Rome, has scarcely distinguished with sufficient care between Caesar's intentions and his acts, and between his measures and those of his successors. Yet we have ample evidence that much was done and much more conceived. If we follow the authority of Suetonius we find that he reformed the calendar by intercalating three months in the year 46, and making arrangements for the future, which lasted unchanged till the 16th century. He increased the number of the senate to nine hundred, and made it more thoroughly representative of all classes and all parts of the empire. He increased the number of the magistrates, did his best to heal the wounds left by the civil war, and reformed the courts of justice. He confined donations of corn to the poorer citizens, and while by the rebuilding of Carthage and Corinth he found a refuge for many who would have starved at home, he did his best to prohibit absenteeism, and to discourage the tillage of the soil of Italy by slaves. He gave the rights of citizenship to men of science and to professors of liberal arts, enforced the laws without favour, and attempted with little success to restrain the luxury of the age. He prepared the way for the work of his successor, who found Rome of brick and left it of marble. He intended to codify the law, and to provide public libraries of Greek and Latin works, the care of which he entrusted to Varro, the most learned of the Romans. He is credited with the design of draining the Pontine marshes, a work yet to be performed; of converting the Fucine lake into a fertile plain, an enterprise begun by Claudius and completed by Prince Torlonia; of

piercing the isthmus of Corinth; of making a road from the Adriatic to the Tiber; and further, of subduing the Parthians, and returning through Scythia and Germany into Italy, after extending the limits of the empire to the stream of the ocean.

However this may be, it is certain that at the time of his death he was preparing an expedition against the Parthians. It is useless to speculate whether his absence from the city would have been short or long. There is evidence that he did not feel at his ease in the capital, that he considered his personal work to be accomplished, and that his plans could be better carried out by his successor. Yet nothing can excuse the shortsighted wickedness and folly of those who murdered him. We need not repeat the well-known story, how in the Ides of March, 44 B.C., Caesar was murdered in a meeting of the senate, and fell at the feet of the statue of Pompeius, pierced with wounds from head to foot, only one of which was fatal. There is no reason to believe that the conspiracy had been long in preparation, or that it was motivated on the one hand by a desire for personal aggrandizement, or still less, on the other, by a devoted patriotism. It began in spite, and continued in folly. A very slight degree of political foresight might have convinced those who assented to the plot that the people would not be on their side, and that they would precipitate the very conclusion which they desired to avert. Those who defied Brutus in the French Revolution knew but little of Roman history, or confounded him with the expeller of the Tarquins. Dante is a better judge, whose ardent love of liberty did not blind him to the necessity of a strong and united government for his native land. The divine poet relates to us with an appalling realism, that in the centre of the earth, in the bottom of the pit of hell, Lucifer holds in his three mouths the three greatest malefactors the world has ever seen,—Brutus and Cassius, who betrayed their sovereign and their country, and Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Master with a kiss.

Under different circumstances Caesar might have won as great a reputation as a man of letters as he has acquired as a general and a statesman. He was fully aware that a change in the literary language of his countrymen was as necessary as in their government and constitution. The rude though vigorous dialect of Plautus, or even of Varro, was not suited to be the organ of civilization throughout a subject world. A widespread knowledge of Greek had made the Romans aware of their own deficiencies, and the united efforts of all men of culture to give form and refinement to the Latin tongue culminated in the glories of the Augustan age. Cicero and Livy, Virgil and Horace, have remained as examples of Latin style during the whole of the Christian era. The language in which they wrote must have differed widely from anything which was spoken by their most cultivated contemporaries. It is not unreasonable to feel some regret that the cultivated language did not follow a course of development more suited to its inherent character, and that Lucretius and Caesar were not adopted by the rhetoricians of the empire as models for precept and imitation. The excellence of the Latin language lies in its solidity and precision; its defects lie in a want of lightness and flexibility. Lucretius found it sufficient to express with admirable clearness very complex philosophical reasoning, and Caesar exhibited its excellencies in their purest and chastest form. It is a misfortune that the *Commentaries* are not more often studied as a masterpiece of literature, but are relegated by the irony of fortune to the lower forms of schools. Their style is faultless, not a word is thrown away or used with a doubtful meaning, every expression is in its place, and each touch serves to enhance the effect of

the whole. Had Caesar been writing history instead of military memoirs, he might have allowed himself greater freedom of ornament. We know, from his treatise on grammar (*De Analogia*), often quoted by grammarians, that his success in literature was the result of careful study and meditation. As an orator he was acknowledged to be second to Cicero alone, and he is one of the few men in history who have quelled a rebellion by a speech.

In this sketch of Caesar's life we have found but little to blame, and have been able to add few shadows to the picture. The stories which the jealousy of contemporaries have preserved against him are too frivolous to be recorded, while the dignity, sweetness, and nobleness of his character cannot be concealed. We have preferred rather to attempt to construct from very imperfect materials some faint resemblance of the marvellous personality of him whom the genius of Shakespeare rightly recognized as "the foremost man of all this world."

The principal ancient authorities for the life of Caesar are the biographies of Plutarch and Suetonius, the letters and orations of Cicero, and the *Commentaries* on the Gallic and Civil Wars written by or ascribed to Caesar himself. To these may be added Appian's *Civil War*, Dion Cassius, Velleius Paterculus, Sallust's *Callina*, the *Epitomes* of Livy, and Lucan's *Pharsalia*. His life has been perpetually narrated in ancient and modern times, and has been the battle-field of imperialists and republicans. For English readers, the account given by Merivale, both in his *History of the Romans under the Empire*, and in the *Fall of the Roman Republic*, is readable and adequate; the fullest and fairest examination of the original authorities is in Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, vols. iii.-v. The article in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary* is excellent, but by far the most brilliant picture of Caesar's character and work is to be found in Mommsen's *History of Rome* (published 1856, translated into English 1866). Mommsen is extremely favourable to Caesar, but unfair to his opponents. The *Histoire de César* of Napoleon III., which extends only to the outbreak of the civil war, is especially valuable from the maps and plans which accompany it. The German student will find a full and satisfactory repertory of all that is known about the subject in Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*. (O. B.)

CÆSAR, SIR JULIUS (1557-1636), a learned civilian, descended by the female line from the Dukes de' Cesarini in Italy, was born near Tottenham in Middlesex. He was educated at Oxford, and afterwards studied at the university of Paris, where in the year 1581 he was created doctor of the civil law. Two years later he was admitted to the same degree at Oxford, and also became doctor of the canon law. He held many high offices during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I., and for the last twenty years of his life was master of the rolls. He was so remarkable for his bounty and charity to all persons of worth, that it was said of him that he seemed to be the almoner-general of the nation. His manuscripts, many of which are now in the British Museum, were sold by auction in 1757 for upwards of £500. See E. Lodge, *Life of Sir Julius Caesar*, 1810.

CÆSAREA, the name of two towns in Palestine:—

I. CÆSAREA PALESTINA, now Kaisaryah, the Roman metropolis of Palestine, 30 miles north of Joppa, and about the same distance north-west of Jerusalem. It was built about 22 B.C. by Herod, on the site of an earlier town called Turris Stratonis. Vast sums of money were spent in the erection of its more important buildings, among which were a temple dedicated to Caesar, a theatre, and an amphitheatre. The most stupendous work, however, was the semicircular mole, constructed of immense blocks of stone brought from a great distance, and sunk to the depth of twenty fathoms in the sea. It protected the port on the south and west, leaving only a sufficient opening for vessels to enter from the north, so that within the enclosed space (which, according to Lieutenant Conder, measures 300 yards across) a fleet might ride in all weathers in perfect security. The site of the city is now marked by an extensive mass of ruins, among which may still be traced the substructions of all the above-mentioned buildings, as well as those of