

way in which we use them. Nothing is ours besides our will. And the divine law which bids us keep fast what is our own forbids us to make any claim to what is not ours; and while enjoining us to make use of whatever is given to us, it bids us not long after what has not been given. "Two maxims," he says, "we must ever bear in mind,—that apart from the will there is nothing either good or bad, and that we must not try to anticipate or direct events, but merely accept them with intelligence." We must, in short, resign ourselves to whatever fate and fortune bring to us, believing, as the first article of our creed, that there is a god, whose thought directs the universe, and that not merely in our acts, but even in our thoughts and plans, we cannot escape his eye. In the world, according to Epictetus, the true position of man is that of member of a great system, which comprehends God and men. Each human being is thus a citizen of two cities. He is in the first instance a citizen of his own nation or commonwealth in a corner of the world; but he is also a member of the great city of gods and men, whereof the city political is only a copy in miniature. All men are the sons of God, and kindred in nature with the divinity. For man though a member in the system of the world is more than a merely subservient or instrumental part; he has also within him a principle which can guide and understand the movement of all the members; he can enter into the method of divine administration, and thus can learn—and it is the acme of his learning—the will of God, which is the will of nature. Man, said the Stoic, is a rational animal; and in virtue of that rationality he is neither less nor worse than the gods, for the magnitude of reason is estimated not by length nor by height, but by its judgments. Each man has within him a guardian spirit, a god within him, who never sleeps; so that even in darkness and solitude we are never alone, because God is within, and our guardian spirit. The body which accompanies us is not strictly speaking ours; it is a poor dead thing, which belongs to the things outside us. But by reason we are the masters of those ideas and appearances which present themselves from without; we can combine them, and systematize, and can set up in ourselves an order of ideas corresponding with the order of nature.

The natural instinct of animated life, to which man also is originally subject, is self-preservation and self-interest. But men are so ordered and constituted that the individual cannot secure his own interests unless he contribute to the common welfare. We are bound up by the law of nature with the whole fabric of the world. The aim of the philosopher therefore is to reach the position of a mind which embraces the whole world in its view,—to grow into the mind of God and to make the will of nature our own. Such a sage agrees in his thought with God; he no longer blames either God or man; he fails of nothing which he purposes and falls in with no misfortune unprepared; he indulges neither in anger nor envy nor jealousy; he is leaving manhood for godhead, and in his dead body his thoughts are concerned about his fellowship with God.

The historical models to which Epictetus reverts are Diogenes and Socrates. But he frequently describes an ideal character of a missionary sage, the perfect Stoic—or, as he calls him, the Cynic. "The Cynic," he says, "is a messenger sent from God to men to show them the error of their ways about good and evil, and how they seek good and evil where they cannot be found." This missionary has neither country nor home nor land nor slave; his bed is the ground; he is without wife or child; his only mansion is the earth and sky and a shabby cloak. It must be that he suffer stripes; and being beaten, he must love those who beat him as if he were a father or a brother. He must be perfectly unembarrassed in the service of God.

not bound by the common ties of life, nor entangled by relationships, which if he transgresses he will lose the character of a man of honour, while if he upholds them he will cease to be the messenger, watchman, and herald of the gods. The perfect man thus described will not be angry with the wrong-doer; he will only pity his erring brother; for anger in such a case would only betray that he too thought the wrong-doer gained a substantial blessing by his wrongful act, instead of being, as he is, utterly ruined.

The best edition of the works of Epictetus is that by Schweighäuser in 6 vols. 8vo, 1799–1800. There are at least two English translations,—an old one by Elizabeth Carter, and a recent version by George Long. (W. W.)

EPICURUS, the founder of the Epicurean school of philosophy, was born in the end of 342 or the beginning of 341 B.C., seven years after the death of Plato. His father Neocles belonged to Gargettos, one of the small villages of Attica, but had settled in Samos, not later than 352, as one of the colonists sent out by the Athenian state after the conquest of the island by Timotheus in 366. In Samos, and also at Teos, Epicurus passed the early years of his life, probably assisting his father, who was a common schoolmaster, possibly, too, assisting his mother Archestrata in the practice of her witchcraft—if we may believe doubtful tales. At the age of 18 he went to Athens, where the Platonic school was flourishing under the lead of Xenocrates, and which Aristotle had recently quitted for Chalchis to avoid an indictment for impiety. This visit to Athens, however, was a short one, for in the next year (322) Antipater the Macedonian punished the Athenians for their incipient revolt by banishing about 12,000 of the poorer citizens to distant shores. It was in connection with this event that Epicurus joined his father, who was now located at Colophon. It seems possible that before this time he had listened to some lectures from Nausiphanes, a Democritean philosopher—perhaps also from others—but there is little reason to suppose that he was much better than a petty teacher like his father. The first awakening of the philosophic spirit was seen, it is said, when he asked his teacher, as they read together in Hesiod how chaos was the first of all things, "What then preceded chaos?" Stimulated further by the perusal of some writings of Democritus, Epicurus began to formulate a doctrine of his own; and at Mitylene and Lampsacus, where he spent several years, he gradually gathered round him several disciples who adopted his views with enthusiasm. In 307, the year in which Demetrius Poliorcetes entered Athens and restored to it an at least nominal freedom, Epicurus returned to that city, which had now for a century and a half been the recognized head-quarters of Greek philosophy. Half his life was past; for the remaining thirty-six years he continued at Athens, with the exception of one or two visits to his friends in Ionia. The scene of his philosophic life and teaching was a garden which he bought at the cost of about £300 (80 minæ). There he passed his days as the loved and venerated head of a remarkable society, such as the ancient world had never seen. Amongst the number were Metrodorus, a bosom-friend of more energetic temperament than Epicurus; during their acquaintance, which lasted till the death of Metrodorus seven years before his friend, they only parted company for the space of six months. Timocrates, a brother of Metrodorus, was another member; so were Polyænus, a fair-minded and studious man, Hermarchus, a son of poor parents, who succeeded Epicurus as chief of the school, Leonteus, and others. Nor were women absent from the philosophic coterie. Themista, the wife of Leonteus, was a friend and correspondent of Epicurus; Idomeneus, another member, had married a

sister of Metrodorus; and Metrodorus himself had as his consort Leontion, once a hetæra in Athens, but now the mother of a boy and girl, for whose welfare Epicurus made special provision in his will. That these were not the only ladies in the society is possible enough, and it is possible that the relations between the sexes—in this prototype of Rabelais's Abbey of Thelème—were not entirely what is termed Platonic. But there is on the other hand scarcely a doubt that the tales of licentiousness which ill-tempered opponents circulated regarding the society of the garden are groundless. The stories of the Stoics, who sought occasionally to refute the views of Epicurus by an appeal to his alleged antecedents and habits, were no doubt in the main, as Diogenes Laertius says, the stories of maniacs. The general charges against him which they endeavoured to substantiate by forged letters need not count for much. Even when they tried to show that he was not a citizen with full rights, that he was a plagiarist of other men's wisdom, a correspondent of ladies whom the aristocracy of the period held of dubious rank, an ignoramus, and a scandalous and abusive critic of his opponents, they only exaggerated what, if true, was not so heinous as they wished it to appear. Against them trustworthy authorities testified to his general and remarkable considerateness; they pointed to the statues which the city had raised in his honour, and above all to the numbers of his friends, who were many enough to fill whole cities.

The mode of life in his community was plain. The general drink was water, and the food barley bread; half a pint of wine was held an ample allowance. "Send me," says Epicurus to a correspondent, "send me some Cythnian cheese, so that, should I choose, I may fare sumptuously." But though they lived together, Epicurus would not let his friends throw all their property into the common stock; that, he remarked, would imply distrust of their own and others' good resolutions. The company was held in unity by the siren-like charms of his personality, and by the free sociality which he inculcated and exemplified. Though he seems to have had a warm affection for his countrymen, it was as human beings brought into contact with him, and not as members of a political body, that he preferred to regard them. He never entered public life. His kindness extended even to his slaves, one of whom, named Mouse, was a brother in philosophy.

Epicurus died of stone in 270 B.C. In a letter to a friend, he speaks of the pleasure afforded to him in his sufferings by the remembrance of lappy hours spent in reasoning on the questions of philosophy. He passed away bidding his friends keep in mind the doctrines he had taught them. By his will he left his property, consisting of the garden, a house in Melite (the south-west quarter of Athens), and apparently some funds besides, to two trustees for behoof of his society, and for the special interest of some youthful members. The garden was set apart for the use of the school; the house became the house of Hermarchus and his fellow-philosophers during his life-time. The surplus proceeds of the property were further to be applied to maintain a yearly offering in commemoration of his departed father, mother, and brothers, to pay the expenses incurred in celebrating his own birthday every year on the 7th Gamelion, and for a social gathering of the sect on the 20th of every month in honour of himself and Metrodorus. Besides similar tributes in honour of his brothers and Polyænus, he directed the trustees to be guardians of the son of Polyænus and the son of Metrodorus; whilst the daughter of the last-mentioned was to be married by the guardian to some member of the society who should be approved of by Hermarchus. His four slaves, three men and one woman, were left their freedom. His books passed on to Hermarchus.

Epicurus was a voluminous writer,—the author, it is said, of about 300 works. He had a style and vocabulary of his own. His chief aim in writing was plainness and intelligibility, but his want of order and of logical precision considerably thwarted the realization of his purpose. He pretended to have read little, and to be the original architect of his own system, and the claim was no doubt on the whole true. But he had read Democritus, and it is said Anaxagoras and Archelaus were also amongst his more favourite philosophical authors. His works, it is said, were full of repetition,—which was natural enough; and critics profess to have found in them some vulgarities of language and faults of style. But at any rate they were read and remembered, his pupils got them by heart, and to the last era of Epicureanism they continued in full authority. His chief work was a treatise on nature, in thirty-seven books, of which fragments from about nine books have been found in the rolls discovered at Herculaneum, along with considerable treatises by several of his followers, and most notably Philodemus. An epitome of his doctrine is contained in three letters preserved by Diogenes.

The Epicurean philosophy is traditionally divided into the three branches of logic, physics, and ethics. But it is only as a basis of facts and principles for his theory of life that logical and physical inquiries find a place at all. Epicurus himself had not apparently shared in any large or liberal culture, and his influence was certainly thrown on the side of those who depreciated purely scientific pursuits as one-sided and misleading. "Steer clear of all culture" was his advice to a young disciple. In this aversion to a purely or mainly intellectual training may be traced a recoil from the systematic metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. With these writers the tendency was to sacrifice the moral to the intellectual—to subordinate the practical man to the philosopher. Ethics had been based upon logic and metaphysics; more had been done to explain the formation of a right judgment in matters of morality than to explain or promote right action. But every-day experience showed that no amount of merely intellectual study is preventive of immorality, and that the systematic knowledge of truth is one thing and right action is another. It seemed to many as well as to Epicurus that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle led to an aristocracy of intellect, but not to a commonwealth of happiness and goodness. In this way a reaction set in against reasoning and speculation; people wanted to get back to common sense and the feelings of ordinary men. In the second place, Plato and Aristotle had constructed their moral theories on the assumption that a state or a city existed which both showed in the shape of its several institutions how the individual man was expected to behave, and threatened him with various penalties in case he attempted to find out a way of action for himself. They could accordingly give themselves the comparatively easy task of showing how the individual could learn to apprehend and embody in his own conduct the moral law which was exhibited in the institutions of society. But experience had in the time of Epicurus shown the temporary and artificial character of the civic form of social life. It was necessary therefore for Epicurus to go back to nature to find a more enduring and a wider foundation for ethical doctrine, and to decline the help that might be derived from a consideration of the existing form of political union. It was no less necessary to go back from words to realities, to give up reasonings and get at feelings, to test conceptions and arguments by a final reference to the only touchstone of truth—to sensation. There, and there only, one seems to find a common and a satisfactory ground, supposing always that all men's feelings give the same answer. Logic must

go, but so also must the state, as a specially-privileged and eternal order of things, as anything more than a contrivance serving certain purposes of general utility.

To the Epicureans the elaborate logic of the Stoics was a superfluity. In place of logic we find canonic, the theory of the tests of truth and reality. The only ultimate canon of reality is sensation and feeling; whatever we feel, whatever we perceive by any sense, that we know on the most certain evidence we can have to be real, and in proportion as our feeling is clear, distinct, and vivid, in that proportion are we sure of the reality of its object. The truth of anything is measured by its vivid and effective presence in consciousness. But in what that vividness consists is a question which Epicurus does not raise, and which he would no doubt have deemed superfluous quibbling over a matter sufficiently settled by common sense. Besides our sensations, we learn truth and reality by our preconceptions or ideas (*προλήψεις*). These are the fainter images produced by repeated sensations, the "ideas" resulting from previous "impressions"—sensations at second-hand as it were, which are stored up in memory, and which a general name serves to recall. These bear witness to reality, not because we feel anything now, but because we felt it once; they are sensations registered in language, and again, if need be, translatable into immediate sensations or groups of sensation. Lastly, reality is vouched for by the imaginative apprehensions of the mind (*φανταστικά επιβόλαι*), immediate feelings of which the mind is conscious as produced by some action of its own. This last canon, however, was of dubious validity. Epicureanism generally stopped by affirming that whatever we effectively feel in consciousness is real; in which sense they allow reality to the fancies of the insane, the dreams of a sleeper, and those feelings by which we imagine the existence of beings of perfect blessedness and endless life. And similarly, just because fear, hope, and remembrance add to the intensity of consciousness, can the Epicurean hold that bodily pain and pleasure is a less durable and important thing than pain and pleasure of mind. Whatever we feel to affect us does affect us, and is therefore real. Error can only arise because we mix up our opinions and suppositions with what we actually feel. The Epicurean canonic is a rejection of logic; it sticks fast to the one point that "sensation is sensation," and there is no more to be made of it. Sensation, it says, is unreasoning (*ἄλογος*); it must be accepted, and not criticised. Reasoning can only come in to put sensations together, and to point out how they severally contribute to human welfare; it does not make them, and cannot alter them.

In the Epicurean physics we have two parts,—a general metaphysic and psychology, and a special explanation of particular phenomena of nature. It is in this department that we find exemplified the method of the founder. That method consists in argument by analogy: we apply the process which we have learned in some familiar instance to explain and rationalize for our own satisfaction some obscure and distant process which we do not understand. It is an attempt to make the phenomena of nature intelligible to us by regarding them as instances on a grand scale of what we are already familiar with on a small. This is what Epicurus calls explaining what we do not see by what we do see. It supposes us to know and comprehend what we are familiar with, and assumes that to explain is to substitute a process with which we are at home for one which we cannot penetrate, but which, without contradicting any of the phenomena, may be conceived to take place in a similar way.

In physics Epicurus founded upon Democritus, and his chief object was to abolish the dualism between mind and

matter which is so essential a point in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. All that exists, says Epicurus, is corporeal (*τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ σῶμα*); the intangible is non-existent, or empty space. If a thing exists it must be felt, and to be felt it must exert resistance. But all things are not intangible which our senses are not subtle enough to detect. We must indeed accept our feelings; but we must also believe much which is not directly testified by sensation, if only it does not contravene our sensations and serves to explain phenomena. The fundamental postulates of Epicureanism are atoms and the void. We must believe, according to him, that space is infinite, and that there is an illimitable multitude of indestructible, indivisible, and absolutely compact atoms in perpetual motion in this illimitable space. These atoms, differing only in size, figure, and weight, are perpetually moving with equal velocities, but at a rate far surpassing our conceptions; as they move, they are for ever giving rise to new worlds; and these worlds are perpetually tending towards dissolution, and towards a fresh series of creations. This universe of ours is only one section out of the innumerable worlds in infinite space; other worlds may present systems very different from the arrangement of sun, moon, and stars, which we see in this. The soul of man is only a finer species of body, spread throughout the whole aggregation which we term his bodily frame. Like a warm breath, it pervades the human structure and works with it; nor could it act as it does in perception unless it were corporeal. The various processes of sense, notably vision, are explained on the principles of materialism. From the surfaces of all objects there are continually flowing thin filmy images exactly copying the solid body whence they originate; and these images by direct impact on the organism produce (we need not care to ask how) the phenomena of vision. Epicurus in this way explains vision by substituting for the apparent action of a body at a distance a direct contact of image and organ. But without following the explanation into the details in which it reveals, it may be enough to say that the whole hypothesis is but an attempt to exclude the occult conception of action at a distance, and substitute a familiar phenomenon.

This tendential character of the Epicurean physics becomes more palpable when we look at his mode of rendering particular phenomena intelligible. His purpose is to eliminate all ideas by which the grander phenomena of nature are popularly attributed to Divine interference. That there are gods Epicurus never dreams of denying; the feelings of human nature are too vivid which present to our mind's eye beings of perfect blessedness and unbroken tranquillity. But these gods have not on their shoulders the burden of upholding and governing the world. They are themselves the products of the order of nature,—a higher species than humanity, but not the rulers of man, neither the makers nor the upholders of the world. Man should worship them, but his worship is the reverence due to the ideals of perfect blessedness; it ought not to be inspired either by hope or by fear. To prevent all reference of the more potent phenomena of nature to divine action Epicurus rationalizes the processes of the cosmos. He imagines all possible plans or hypotheses, not actually contradicted by our experience of familiar events, which will represent in an intelligible way the processes of astronomy and meteorology. When two or more modes of accounting for a phenomena are equally admissible as not directly contradicted by known phenomena, it seems to Epicurus almost a return to the old mythological habit of mind when a savant asserts that the real cause is one and only one. Thus, after several hypothetical accounts of how thunder may be brought about, he adds, "Thunder may be explained in many

other ways; only let us have no myths of divine action. To assign only a single cause for these phenomena, when the facts familiar to us suggest several, is insane, and is just the absurd conduct to be expected from people who dabble in the vanities of astronomy." We need not be too curious to inquire how these celestial phenomena actually do come about; we can learn how they might have been produced, and to go further is to trench on ground beyond the limits of human knowledge.

Thus, if Epicurus objects to the doctrine of mythology, he objects no less to the doctrine of an inevitable fate, a necessary order of things unchangeable and supreme over the human will. "Better were it," he says, "to accept all the legends of the gods than to make ourselves slaves to the fate of the natural philosophers." Fatalism, which was the doctrine of the Stoics, seemed to Epicurus no less deadly a foe of man's true welfare than popular superstition. Even in the movement of the atoms he introduces a sudden change of direction, which is supposed to render their aggregation easier, and to break the even law of destiny. So, in the sphere of human action, Epicurus would allow of no absolutely controlling necessity. There is much in our circumstances that springs from mere chance, but it does not overmaster man. With a latent optimism, Epicurus asserts that, though there are evils in the world, still their domination is brief at the height, and there are many consoling circumstances; while, on the other hand, it is easy to attain the maximum of pleasure. The sphere of man's action is marked by self-determination; he need own no master. "Better," he says, "is the misfortune of the man who has planned his way wisely, than the prosperity of him who has devised foolishly." In fact, it is only when we assume for man this independence of the gods and of fatality that the Epicurean theory of life becomes possible. It assumes that man can, like the gods, withdraw himself out of reach of all external influences, and thus, as a sage, "live like a god among men, seeing that the man is in no wise like a mortal creature who lives in undying blessedness." And this present life is the only one. With one consent Epicureanism reaches that the death of the body is the end of everything for man, and hence the other world has lost all its terrors as well as all its hopes.

The attitude of Epicurus in this whole matter is antagonistic to science. The idea of a systematic enchainment of phenomena, in which each is conditioned by every other, and none can be taken in isolation and explained apart from the rest, was foreign to his mind. When that idea is embraced, then obviously the whole group of phenomena must be taken into account in determining whether any hypothesis will serve to explain a detached section. But so little was the scientific conception of the solar system familiar to Epicurus that he could reproach the astronomers, because their account of an eclipse represented things otherwise than as they appear to the senses, and could declare that the sun and stars were just as large as they seemed to us.

The moral philosophy of Epicurus is the heir of the Cyrenaic doctrine that pleasure is the good thing in life. Neither sect, it may be added, advocated sensuality pure and unfeigned,—the Epicurean least of all. By pleasure Epicurus meant both more and less than the Cyrenaics. To the Cyrenaics pleasure was of moments; to Epicurus it extended as a habit of mind through life. To the Cyrenaics pleasure was something active and positive; to Epicurus it was rather negative,—tranquillity more than vigorous enjoyment. The test of true pleasure, according to Epicurus, is the removal and absorption of all that gives pain; it implies freedom from pain of body and from trouble of mind. The happiness of the Epicurean

was, it might almost seem, a grave and solemn pleasure—a quiet unobtrusive ease of heart, but not exuberance and excitement. The Cyrenaic was a buoyant and self-reliant nature, who lived in the light of a grander day in Greece; and he plucked pleasures carelessly and lightly from the trees in the garden of life as he passed through on his journey, without anxiety for the future, or regret for the past. The sage of Epicureanism is a rational and reflective seeker for happiness, who balances the claims of each pleasure against the evils that may possibly ensue, and treads the path of enjoyment cautiously, as befits "a sober reason which inquires diligently into the grounds of acting or refraining from action, and which banishes those prejudices from which spring the chief perturbation of the soul." Prudential wisdom is therefore the only means by which a truly happy life may be attained; it is thus the chief excellence, and the foundation of all the virtues. It is, in fact, says Epicurus,—in language which contrasts strongly with that of Aristotle on the same topic—"a more precious power than philosophy." Pleasure still remains the end; but the natural instinct which prompts to take any opportunity of enjoyment is held in check by the reflection on consequences. The reason or intellect is introduced to measure pleasures—to balance possible pleasures and pains—to construct a scheme in which pleasures are the materials of a happy life. Feeling, which Epicurus declared to be the means of determining what is good, is subordinated to a reason which adjudicates between competing pleasures with the view of securing tranquillity of mind and body. But to do so is no easy task; it makes the search for pleasure almost an impossibility. Epicurus is more clearly in the right when he expatiates on the necessary interdependence of virtue and happiness: "We cannot live pleasantly without living wisely and nobly and righteously." Virtue is at least a means of happiness, though apart from that it is no good in itself, any more than mere sensual enjoyments, which are good only because they may sometimes serve to secure health of body and tranquillity of mind.

The theory of Epicurus has no direct utilitarian tone. Its aim is the happiness of the individual. But its selfishness is tempered by friendship. The only duties which Epicurus recognizes are those which have been freely accepted on rational grounds, not from the compulsion of appetite or of circumstances. Thus the ideal of Epicurean society was the friendly circle. The family and the state imposed, as he thought, obligations which lessened the independence of man, and subjected him to externals. "The sage," he says, "will not marry and beget children, nor will he take part in state affairs. Though holding but little by many conventionalities, he will not assume a cynical or stoical indifference to others; he will not form hard and fast judgments; he will not believe all sinners to be equally depraved, nor all sages equally wise." Friendship—like the state in its first origin—is based upon utility; but in it our relations are less forced; and though its motive be utility, still one must begin the good work of well-doing, even as the husbandman first bestows his labour and wealth upon the soil from which he hopes one day to receive fruit in return.

Even in the lifetime of Epicurus we hear of the vast numbers of his friends, not merely in Greece, but in Asia and Egypt. The crowds of Epicureans were a standing enigma to the adherents of less popular sects. Cicero pondered over the fact; Arcesilaus explained the secession to the Epicurean camp, compared with the fact that no Epicurean was ever known to have abandoned his school, by saying that, though it was possible for a man to be turned into a eunuch, no eunuch could ever become a man. But the phenomenon was not obscure. The doctrine has many

truths, and attracts most natures in some of its parts, especially in an age of religious scepticism. Besides, Epicureanism resembled a church more than a philosophical school. It was not very systematic, but very dogmatic. To develop it would have been to destroy it, for its great point was to hold fast to certain principles of common sense. The dogmas of Epicurus became to his followers a creed embodying the truths on which salvation depended; and they passed on from one generation to another with scarcely a change or addition.

The immediate disciples of Epicurus have been already mentioned, with the exception of Colotes. In the 2nd century B.C. Apollodorus and Zeno of Sidon taught at Athens. About 150 B.C. Epicureanism established itself at Rome. Beginning with C. Amafinius, we find the names of Phædrus and Philodemus as distinguished Epicureans in the time of Cicero. But the greatest of its Roman names was Lucretius, whose *De Rerum Natura* embodies the main teaching of Epicurus with great exactness, and with a beauty which the subject seemed scarcely to allow. Lucretius is a proof, if any were needed, that Epicureanism is compatible with nobility of soul. In the 1st century of the Christian era, the nature of the time, with its active political struggles, naturally called Stoicism more into the foreground; yet Seneca, though nominally a Stoic, draws nearly all his suavity and much of his paternal wisdom from the writings of Epicurus. The position of Epicureanism as a recognized school in the 2nd century is best seen in the fact that it was one of the four schools (the others were the Stoic, Platonist, and Peripatetic) which were placed on a footing of equal endowment when Marcus Aurelius founded chairs of philosophy at Athens. The evidence of Diogenes proves that it still subsisted as a school a century later, but its spirit lasted longer than its formal organisation as a school. A great deal of the best of the Renaissance was founded on Epicureanism.

The chief ancient account of Epicurus is to be found in the 10th book of Diogenes Laërtius, in Lucretius, and in several treatises of Cicero and Plutarch. Gassendi, in his *De Vita, Moribus, et Doctrina Epicuri* (Lyons, 1647), and his *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri*, has systematized the doctrine. The *Voluntaria Herculanensia*, the first series of which in 11 vols. fol. was published between 1793 and 1855 at Naples, and the second series of which, begun in 1861, is still going on, contain numerous fragments of treatises by Epicurus, and several members of his school. The fragments of the second and eleventh books have been edited after Rosini, by Orelli. T. Gompertz, in his *Herkulanische Studien*, and in recent contributions to the Vienna Academy (*Monatsberichte*), has tried to evolve from the fragments more approximation to modern empiricism than they seem to contain. Cf. also G. Trezza, *Epicuro e l'Epicureismo*, Florence, 1877, and Zeller's *Philosophy of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics* translated by Reichel. (W. W.)

EPIDAMNUS, an ancient city of Illyricum, was founded by a joint colony of Corcyreans and Corinthians towards the close of the 7th century B.C., and from its admirable position and the fertility of the surrounding country soon rose into very considerable importance. The dissolution of its original oligarchical government by the increasing power of the democrats was one of the causes that contributed to bring about the Peloponnesian war, in the course of which it soon sank into a secondary position, and ultimately disappeared altogether from the contest. In 312 B.C. it was seized by Glaucias, king of the Illyrians; and about the close of the war it was attacked by pirates, who were twice driven back—on the second occasion by the timely arrival of assistance from Rome. As the name Epidamnus sounded to Roman ears like an evil omen, the alternative name of Dyrrachium, which it probably received from the rugged nature of the adjoining sea-coast, came into general use. In the later history of the Roman republic Dyrrachium became famous as the place where Pompey made the last successful resistance to the rising fortunes of Cæsar, who was at length

compelled to transfer the theatre of war to another quarter. At the end of the struggle between Antony and Augustus it fell into the hands of the latter, and was by him made over to a colony of his veteran troops. Under the Lower Empire it became the capital of Epirus Nova, and attained remarkable prosperity. In 481 it was besieged by Theodoric, the king of the East Goths; and in the 10th and 11th centuries it frequently had to defend itself against the Bulgarians. The emperor Ducas bestowed it as a duchy on Bryennius. In 1082 it was stormed by the Norman Guiscard, who in the previous year had defeated the Greeks under their emperor Alexius; and in 1185 it fell into the hands of King William of Sicily. Surrendered to Venice on the division of the Byzantine kingdom, it afterwards broke loose from the republic. In 1273 it was laid in ruins by an earthquake; but it soon recovered from the disaster, and in the beginning of the next century it appears as an independent duchy under Philip of Otranto. The Turks obtained possession in 1503. See DUREZZO, vol. vii. p. 553.

EPIDAUROS, a maritime city of ancient Greece, on the eastern coast of Argolis, sometimes distinguished as ἡ ἑρὰ Ἐπίδαυρος, or Epidaurus the Holy. It stood on a small rocky peninsula with a natural harbour on the northern side and an open but serviceable bay on the southern; and from this position acquired the epithet of *διότομος*, or the two-mouthed. Its narrow but fertile territory consisted of a plain shut in on all sides except towards the sea by considerable elevations, among which the most remarkable were Mount Arachnæon (the modern Arna) and Titthion. The conterminous states were Corinth, Argos, Trœzen, and Hermione. Its proximity to Athens and the islands of the Saronic gulf, the commercial advantages of its position, and the fame of its temple of Æsculapius combined to make Epidaurus a place of no small importance. Its origin was ascribed to a Carian colony, whose memory was possibly preserved in Epicurus, the earlier name of the city; it was afterwards occupied by Ionians, and appears to have incorporated a body of Phlegyans from Thessaly. The Ionians in turn succumbed to the Dorians of Argos, who, according to the legend, were led by Deiphontes; and from that time the city continued to preserve its Dorian character. It not only colonized the neighbouring islands, and founded the city of Ægina, by which it was ultimately stripped in wealth and power, but also took part with the people of Argos and Trœzen in their settlements in the south of Asia Minor. The monarchical government introduced by Deiphontes gave way to an oligarchy, and the oligarchy degenerated into a despotism. When Procles the tyrant was carried captive by Periander of Corinth, the oligarchy was restored; and the people of Epidaurus continued ever afterwards close allies of the Spartan power. The governing body consisted of 180 members, chosen from certain influential families, and the executive was entrusted to a select committee of *artynæ*. The rural population, who had no share in the affairs of the city, were called *κονίποδες*, or dusty feet. Among the objects of interest described by Pausanias as extant in Epidaurus are the image of Athena Cissæa in the Acropolis, the temple of Dionysus and Artemis, a shrine of Aphrodite, statues of Æsculapius and his wife Epione, and a temple of Hera. The site of the last is identified with the chapel of St. Nicolas; a few portions of the outer walls of the city can be traced; and the name Epidaurus is still preserved by the little village of Nea-Epidavros, or Pidhavro. About five miles from the city stood a famous temple of Æsculapius, in a beautiful valley in the heart of the mountains; and in its neighbourhood were buildings for the accommodation and recreation of the patients who flocked thither in quest of health: so that the spot was

practically a prototype of our modern watering-places. The *ἄσος*, or inclosure, was kept sacred from birth and death; but rooms were provided in connexion with the temple for the "incubation" of ordinary sick folk. A festival in honour of Æsculapius was celebrated every fourth year, nine days after the Isthmian games at Corinth. The institution acquired great wealth from the offerings of those who received or expected benefit from the god or his priests; and though it was plundered both by Sulla and the Cilician pirates, it is evident from the character of the ruins that it recovered its prosperity in the later Roman period. Antoninus Pius is especially commemorated on account of the many buildings he restored or erected for the service of the sanctuary. The site of the temple can still be recognized; the great theatre of Polyclitus is the most perfect ruin of its kind in southern Greece; and the ground plan of the same architect's "Tholos" of white marble is still to be seen.

See *Expédition de la Morée*, ii.; Curtius, *Peloponnesus*, ii.; *Transactions of Roy. Soc. of Lit.*, 2nd series, vol. ii.; Weclawski, *De rebus Epidauriorum*, Posen, 1854.

EPIDAUROS, a city of the Peloponnesus on the east coast of Laconia, distinguished by the epithet of Limeræ, which is explained as either the Well-havened or the Hungry. It was founded by the people of Epidaurus the Holy, and its principal temples were those of Æsculapius and Aphrodite. It was abandoned during the Middle Ages; and its inhabitants took possession of the promontory of Minea, turned it into an island, and built and fortified thereon the city of Monembasia (*i.e.*, of the one entrance), which became the most flourishing of all the towns in the Morea, and gave its name, as corrupted by the people of Western Europe, to the well known Malmsey or Malvasia wine. The ruins of Epidaurus are to be seen at the place now called Old Monembasia.

A third Epidaurus was situated in Illyricum, on the site of the present Vecchia Ragusa; but it is not mentioned till the time of the civil wars of Pompey and Cæsar, and has no special interest.

EPIGONI, a Greek word denoting simply *sons* or *descendants*, but applied more particularly to certain mythical chiefs who fought against Thebes. After the terrible catastrophe which brought about the death of Iokaste (Jocasta) and the blinding of Œdipus, Eteocles and Polynices, the sons of this ill-fated pair, incurred the wrath of their father, whom they cast out from his home to fight with poverty as well as blindness. The curse of the aged king worked in the dissensions of the two brothers; and Polynices, driven into exile, made his way to Argos, where Adrastus took up his cause. The result was the enterprise which Attic tradition spoke of as the expedition of the Seven Argive Chiefs against Thebes, but which, according to the poets of the Thebais, involved as large a gathering as that of the chieftains who assembled to hunt the Calydonian boar or to recover the Golden Fleece. This strife was fatal, as the prophecies of Melampus had declared it must be, to all the chiefs engaged in it with the exception of Adrastus, the seer Amphiaraus being saved from death only by the opening of the earth, which received him alive with his chariot into her bosom. Thus ended the first assault of the Argives against Thebes, an assault which answers closely to the first ineffectual attempts of the Heraclids to recover their paternal inheritance in the Peloponnesus. As in the other tradition, with which the Theban story was parallel, it was followed by a second attack in the struggle known as the war of the Epigoni, or the children of the discomfited chiefs of the former expedition. The doom of Thebes was now come, and the Epigoni appeared, like the Heraclids, when their period of enforced idleness is at an end. The Thebans are

utterly routed by the Argives under Alcmaeon, the son of Amphiaraus; and the prophet Tiresias declares that there is no longer any hope, as the gods have abandoned them. The city is therefore surrendered, and Thersandrus, the son of Polynices, is seated on the throne of Cadmus. How far the poets of the Thebais, which treated of these wars, may have imparted to their subject the charm of our *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, the scanty fragments of the poem, which alone we possess, make it impossible to say; but there can be no doubt that there were incidents in the struggle which might be so treated as to win for it a title to the high praise bestowed upon it by Pausanias (ix. 9, 3).

EPIGRAMS. Nothing perhaps could be more hopeless than an attempt to discover or devise a definition wide enough to include the vast multitude of little poems which at one time or other have been honoured with the title of epigram, and precise enough to exclude all others. Without taking account of its evident misapplications, we find that the name has been given—first, in strict accordance with its Greek etymology from *ἐπιγράφειν*, to inscribe, to any actual inscription on monument, statue, or building; secondly, to verses never intended for such a purpose, but assuming for artistic reasons the epigraphical form; thirdly, to verses expressing with something of the terseness of an inscription a striking or beautiful thought; and fourthly, by unwarrantable restriction, to a little poem ending in a "point," especially of the satirical kind. The last of these has obtained considerable popularity from the well-known lines—

"The qualities rare in a bee that we meet
In an epigram never should fail;
The body should always be little and sweet,
And a sting should be left in its tail."

which represent the older Latin of some unknown writer—

"Omne epigramma sit instar apis: sit aculeus illi;
Sint sua mella; sit et corporis exigui."

Attempts not a few of a more elaborate kind have been made to state the essential element of the epigram, and to classify existing specimens; but, as every lover of epigrams must feel, most of them have been attended with very partial success. Scalger, in the third book of his *Poetics*, gives a fivefold division, which displays a certain ingenuity in the nomenclature but is very superficial: the first class takes its name from *mel*, or honey, and consists of adulatory specimens; the second from *fel*, or gall; the third from *acetum*, or vinegar; and the fourth from *sal*, or salt; while the fifth is styled the condensed, or multiplex. This classification is adopted by Nicolaus Mercerus in his *De conscribendo epigrammate*, Paris, 1653; but he supplemented it by another of much more scientific value, based on the figures of the ancient rhetoricians. Lessing, in the preface to his own epigrams, gives an interesting treatment of the theory, his principal doctrine being practically the same as that of several of his less eminent predecessors, that there ought to be two parts more or less clearly distinguished,—the first awakening the reader's attention in the same way as an actual monument might do, and the other satisfying his curiosity in some unexpected manner. An attempt was made by Herder to increase the comprehensiveness and precision of the theory; but as he himself confesses, his classification is rather vague—the expository, the paradigmatic, the pictorial, the impassioned, the artfully turned, the illusory, and the swift. After all, if the arrangement according to authorship be rejected, the simplest and most satisfactory is according to subjects. The epigram is one of the most catholic of literary forms, and lends itself to the expression of almost any feeling or thought. It may be an elegy, a satire, or a love-poem in miniature, an embodiment of the wisdom of the ages, a bon-mot set off with a couple of rhymes.