

persistently controverted by writers of the intuitional school, who (unlike Hartley) have usually thought that this derivation of moral sentiments from more primitive feelings would be detrimental to the authority of the former. The chief argument against this theory has been based on the early period at which these sentiments are manifested by children, which hardly allows time for association to produce the effects ascribed to it. This argument has been met in recent times by the application to mind of the physiological theory of heredity, according to which changes produced in the mind (brain) of a parent, by association of ideas or otherwise, tend to be inherited by his offspring; so that the development of the moral sense or any other faculty or susceptibility of existing man may be hypothetically carried back into the prehistoric life of the human race, without any change in the manner of derivation supposed. At present, however, the theory of heredity is usually held in conjunction with Darwin's theory of natural selection; according to which different kinds of living things in the course of a series of generations come gradually to be endowed with organs, faculties, and habits tending to the preservation of the individual or species under the conditions of life in which it is placed. Thus we have a new zoological factor in the history of the moral sentiments; which, though in no way opposed to the older psychological theory of their formation through coalescence of more primitive feelings, must yet be conceived as controlling and modifying the effects of the law of association by preventing the formation of sentiments other than those tending to the preservation of human life. The influence of the Darwinian theory, moreover, has extended from historical psychology to ethics, tending to substitute "preservation of the race under its conditions of existence" for "happiness" as the ultimate end and standard of virtue.

Before concluding this sketch of the development of English ethical thought from Hobbes to the present time, it will be well to notice briefly the views held by different moralists on the question of free-will,—so far, that is, as they have been put forward as ethically important. We must first distinguish three meanings in which "freedom" is attributed to the will or "inner self" of a human being, viz., (1) the general power of choosing among different alternatives of action without a motive, or against the resultant force of conflicting motives; (2) the power of choice between the promptings of reason and those of appetites (or other non-rational impulses) when the latter conflict with reason; (3) merely the quality of acting rationally in spite of conflicting impulses, however strong, the *non posse peccare* of the mediæval theologians.¹ It is obvious that "freedom" in this third sense is in no way incompatible with complete determination; and, indeed, is rather an ideal state after which the moral agent ought to aspire than a property which the human will can be said to possess. In the first sense, again, as distinct from the second, the assertion of "freedom" has no ethical significance, except in so far as it introduces a general uncertainty into all our inferences respecting human conduct. Even in the second sense it hardly seems that the freedom of a man's will can be an element to be considered in examining what it is right or best for him to do (though of course the clearest convictions of duty will be fruitless if a man has not sufficient self-control to enable him to act on them); it is rather when we ask whether it is just to punish him for wrong doing that it seems important to know whether he could have done otherwise. But in spite of the strong interest taken in the theological aspect of

¹ It may be observed that in the view of Kant and others (2) and (3) are somewhat confusingly blended.

this question by the Protestant divines of the 17th century, it does not appear that English moralists from Hobbes to Hume laid any stress on the relation of free-will either to duty generally or to justice in particular. Neither the doctrine of Hobbes, that deliberation is a mere alternation of competing desires, voluntary action immediately following the "last appetite," nor the hardly less decided Determinism of Locke, who held that the will is always moved by the greatest present uneasiness, appeared to either author to require any reconciliation with the belief in human responsibility. Even in Clarke's system, where Indeterminism is no doubt a cardinal notion, its importance is metaphysical rather than ethical; Clarke's view being that the apparently arbitrary particularity in the constitution of the cosmos is really only explicable by reference to creative free-will. In the ethical discussion of Shaftesbury and sentimental moralists generally this question drops naturally out of sight; and the cautious Butler tries to exclude its perplexities as far as possible from the philosophy of practice. But since the reaction, led by Price and Reid, against the manner of philosophizing that had culminated in Hume, free-will has been generally maintained by the intuitional school to be an essential point of ethics; and, in fact, it is naturally connected with the judgment of good and ill desert which these writers give as an essential element in their analysis of the moral consciousness. An irresistible motive, it is forcibly said, palliates or takes away guilt; no one can blame himself for yielding to necessity, and no one can properly be punished for what he could not have prevented. In answer to this argument some necessarians have admitted that punishment can only be legitimate if it be beneficial to the person punished; others, again, have held that the lawful use of force is to restrain lawless force; but most of those who reject free-will defend punishment on the ground of its utility in deterring others from crime, as well as in correcting or restraining the criminal on whom it falls.

In the preceding sketch we have traced the course of English ethical speculation without bringing it into relation with contemporary European thought on the same subject. And in fact almost all the systems described, from Hobbes downward, have been of essentially native growth, showing hardly any traces of foreign influence. We may observe that ethics is the only department in which this result appears. The physics and psychology of Descartes were much studied in England, and his metaphysical system was certainly the most important antecedent of Locke's; but Descartes hardly touched ethics proper. So again the controversy that Clarke conducted with Spinoza, and afterwards with Leibnitz, was entirely confined to the metaphysical region. Catholic France was a school for Englishmen in many subjects, but not in morality; the great struggle between Jansenists and Jesuits had a very remote interest for us. It was not till near the close of the 18th century that the impress of the French revolutionary philosophy begins to manifest itself on this side the channel; and even then its influence is mostly political rather than ethical. It is striking to observe how even in the case of writers such as Godwin, who were most powerfully affected by the French political movement, the moral basis, on which the new social order of rational and equal freedom is constructed, is almost entirely of native origin; even when the tone and spirit are French, the forms of thought and manner of reasoning are still purely English. In the derivation of Benthamism alone—which, it may be observed, first became widely known in the French paraphrase of Dumont—an important element is supplied by the works of a French writer, Helvetius; as Bentham himself was fully conscious. It was from Helvetius that he learnt that, men being

universally and solely governed by self-love, the so-called moral judgments are really the common judgments of any society as to its common interests; that it is therefore futile on the one hand to propose any standard of virtue, except that of conduciveness to general happiness, and on the other hand useless merely to lecture men on duty and scold them for vice; that the moralist's proper function is rather to exhibit the coincidence of virtue with private happiness; that, accordingly, though nature has bound men's interests together in many ways, and education by developing sympathy and the habit of mutual help may much extend the connexion, still the most effective moralist is the legislator, who by acting on self-love through legal sanctions may mould human conduct as he chooses. These few simple doctrines give the ground plan of Bentham's indefatigable and life-long labours.

So again, in the modified Benthamism which the persuasive exposition of J. S. Mill recently made popular in England, the influence of a French thinker, Auguste Comte (*Philosophie Positive*, 1829-42, and *Système de Politique Positive*, 1851-4) appears as the chief modifying element. This influence, so far as it has affected moral as distinct from political speculation, has been exercised primarily through the general conception of human progress; which, in Comte's view, consists in the ever-growing preponderance of the distinctively human attributes over the purely animal, social feelings being ranked highest among human attributes, and highest of all the most universalized phase of human affection, the devotion to humanity as a whole. Accordingly, it is the development of benevolence in man, and of the habit of "living for others," which Comte takes as the ultimate aim and standard of practice, rather than the mere increase of happiness. He holds, indeed, that the two are inseparable, and that the more altruistic any man's sentiments and habits of action can be made, the greater will be the happiness enjoyed by himself as well as by others. But he does not seriously trouble himself to argue with egoism, or to weigh carefully the amount of happiness that might be generally attained by the satisfaction of egoistic propensities duly regulated; a supreme unquestioning self-devotion, in which all personal calculations are suppressed, is an essential feature of his moral ideal. Such a view is almost diametrically opposed to Bentham's conception of normal human existence; the newer utilitarianism of Mill represents an endeavour to find the right middle path between the two extremes.

It is to be observed that, in Comte's view, devotion to humanity is the principle not merely of morality but of religion; i.e., it should not merely be practically predominant, but should be manifested and sustained by regular and partly symbolical forms of expression, private and public. This side of Comte's system, however, and the details of his ideal reconstruction of society, in which this religion plays an important part, have had but little influence either in England or elsewhere. It is more important to notice the general effect of his philosophy on the method of determining the particulars of morality as well as of law (as it ought to be). In the utilitarianism of Paley and Bentham the proper rules of conduct, moral and legal, are determined by comparing the imaginary consequences of different modes of regulation on men and women, conceived as specimens of a substantially uniform and unchanging type. It is true that Bentham expressly recognizes the varying influences of climate, race, religion, government, as considerations which it is important for the legislator to take into account; but his own work of social construction was almost entirely independent of such considerations, and his school generally appear to have been, convinced of their competence to solve all important ethical and political questions for human beings of all ages

and countries, without regard to their specific differences. But in the Comtian conception of social science, of which ethics and politics are the practical application, the knowledge of the laws of the evolution of society is of fundamental and continually increasing importance; humanity is regarded as having passed through a series of stages, in each of which a somewhat different set of laws and institutions, customs and habits, is normal and appropriate. Thus present man is a being that can only be understood through a knowledge of his past history; and any effort to construct for him a moral and political ideal, by a purely abstract and unhistorical method, must be necessarily futile; whatever modifications may at any time be desirable in positive law and morality can only be determined by the aid of "social dynamics." This view extends far beyond the limits of Comte's special school or sect, and, indeed, seems to be very widely accepted among educated persons at the present day.

When we turn from French philosophy to German, we find the influence of the latter on English ethical thought almost insignificant until a very recent period. In the 17th century, indeed, the treatise of Puffendorf on the *Law of Nature*, in which the general view of Grotius was restated with modifications, partly designed to effect a compromise with the new doctrine of Hobbes, seems to have been a good deal read at Oxford and elsewhere. Locke includes it among the books necessary to the complete education of a gentleman. But the subsequent development of the theory of conduct in Germany dropped almost entirely out of the cognizance of Englishmen; even the long dominant system of Wolff (1754), imposing in its elaborate and complete construction, was hardly known to our best informed writers. Nor did the greater fame and more commanding genius of Kant (1724-1804) procure him any English disciples of note, or even lead to the serious study of his ethical system by English moralists, until the second quarter of the present century. We find, however, distinct traces of Kantian influence in Whewell and other recent writers of the intuitional school; and the continually increasing interest in the products of the German mind which Englishmen have shown during the last 40 years has caused the works of Kant to be so widely known that it would hardly be fit to close the present article without some account of his ethical doctrines.

The English moralist with whom Kant has most affinity is Price; in fact, Kantism, in the ethical thought of modern Europe, holds a place somewhat analogous to that occupied by the teaching of Price and Reid among ourselves. Kant, like Price and Reid, holds that the reason declares the immediate obligation of certain kinds of conduct, or (to use his phrase) issues "categorical imperatives." Like Price he holds that an action is not good unless done from a good motive, and that this motive must be essentially different from natural inclination of any kind; duty, to be duty, must be done for duty's sake; and he argues, with more subtlety than Price or Reid, that though a virtuous act is no doubt pleasant to the virtuous agent, and any violation of duty painful, this moral pleasure (or pain) cannot strictly be the motive to the act, because it follows instead of preceding the recognition of our obligation to do it.¹

¹ Singularly enough, the English writer who approaches most nearly to Kant on this point is the utilitarian Godwin, in his *Political Justice*. In Godwin's view, reason is the proper motive to acts conducive to general happiness: reason shows me that the happiness of a number of other men is of more value than my own; and the perception of this truth affords me at least some inducement to prefer the former to the latter. And supposing it to be replied that the motive is really the moral uneasiness involved in choosing the selfish alternative, Godwin answers that this uneasiness, though a "constant step" in the process of volition, is a merely "accidental" step.—"I feel pain in the

With Pico, again, he holds that rightness of intention and motive is not only an indispensable condition or element of the rightness of an action, but actually the sole determinant of its moral worth; but with more philosophical penetration he draws the inference—of which the English moralist does not seem to have dreamt—that there can be no separate rational principles for determining the “material” rightness of conduct, as distinct from its “formal” rightness; and therefore that all rules of duty must admit of being deduced from the one general principle that duty ought to be done for duty’s sake. This deduction is the most original part of Kant’s doctrine. The dictates of reason, he points out, must necessarily be addressed to all rational beings as such; hence, my intention cannot be right unless I am prepared to will the principle on which I act to be a universal law. He considers that this fundamental rule or imperative “act on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal” supplies a sufficient criterion for determining particular duties in all cases. The rule excludes wrong conduct with two degrees of stringency. Some offences, such as breach of contract, we cannot even conceive universalized; as soon as every one broke promises no one would make them. Other maxims, such as that of leaving persons in distress to shift for themselves, we can easily conceive to be universal laws, but we cannot without contradiction will them to be such; for when we are ourselves in distress we cannot help desiring that others should help us.

Another important peculiarity of Kant’s doctrine is his development of the connexion between duty and free-will. He holds that it is through our moral consciousness that we know that we are free; in the cognition that I ought to do what is right because it is right and not because I like it, it is implied that this purely rational volition is possible; that my action can be determined, not “mechanically,” through the necessary operation of the natural stimuli of pleasurable and painful feelings, but in accordance with the laws of my true, reasonable self. The realization of reason, or of human wills so far as rational, thus presents itself as the absolute end of duty; and we get, as a new form of the fundamental practical rule, “act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or any other, as an end always, and never as a means only.” We may observe, too, that the notion of freedom connects ethics with jurisprudence in a simple and striking manner. The fundamental aim of jurisprudence is to realize external freedom by removing the hindrances imposed on each one’s free action through the interferences of other wills. Ethics shows how to realize internal freedom by resolutely pursuing rational ends in opposition to those of natural inclination. But what practicable ends are there which reason prescribes, and which can therefore be stated absolutely as ends at which human beings ought to aim whatever their actual desires may be? There are two such ends, Kant holds,—perfection and happiness; more precisely, what we are morally bound to seek is perfection for ourselves and happiness for others; since (1) no one can directly promote the moral perfection of others, depending as it does on free choice of right; and (2) one’s own happiness being necessarily an object of natural desire cannot also be regarded as a duty. The latter limitation contrasts strikingly with the view of Butler and Reid, that man, as a rational being, is under a “manifest obligation” to seek his own interest. The difference, however, is not really so great as it seems; since in another part of his system Kant fully recognizes the reasonableness of self-love. Though duty, in his view, excludes regard for private happiness, the *summum bonum* is not duty alone, neglect of an act of benevolence, because benevolence is judged by me to be conduct which it becomes me to adopt.

but duty and happiness combined; the demand for happiness as the reward of duty is so essentially reasonable that we must postulate a universal connexion between the two is the order of the universe; indeed, the practical necessity of this postulate is the only adequate rational ground that we have for believing in the existence of God.

Before the ethics of Kant had begun to be seriously studied in England, the rapid and remarkable development of metaphysical view and method of which the three chief stages are represented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel respectively had already taken place; and the system of the latter was occupying the most prominent position in the philosophical thought of Germany.¹ Hegel’s ethical doctrine (expounded chiefly in his *Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821) shows a close affinity, and also a striking contrast, to Kant’s. He holds, with Kant, that duty or good conduct consists in the conscious realization of the free reasonable will, which is essentially the same in all rational beings. But in Kant’s view the universal content of this will is only given in the formal condition of “only acting as one can desire all to act,” to be subjectively applied by each rational agent to his own volition; whereas Hegel conceives the universal will as objectively presented to each man in the laws, institutions, and customary morality of the community of which he is a member. Thus, in his view, not merely natural inclinations towards pleasures, or the desires for selfish happiness, require to be morally resisted; but even the prompting of the individual’s conscience, the impulse to do what seems to him right, if it comes into conflict with the common sense of his community. It is true that Hegel regards the conscious effort to realize one’s own conception of good as a higher stage of moral development than the mere conformity to the jural rules establishing property, maintaining contract, and allotting punishment to crime, in which the universal will is first expressed; since in such conformity this will is only accomplished accidentally by the outward concurrence of individual wills, and is not essentially realized in any of them. He holds, however, that this conscientious effort is self-deceived and futile, is even the very root of moral evil, except it attains its realization in harmony with the objective social relations in which the individual finds himself placed. Of these relations the first grade is constituted by the family, the second by civil society, and the third by the state, the organization of which is the highest manifestation of universal reason in the sphere of practice.

Hegelianism appears as a distinct element in English ethical thought at the present day; but the direct influence of Hegel’s system is perhaps less important than that indirectly exercised through the powerful stimulus which it has given to the study of the historical development of human thought and human society. According to Hegel, the essence of the universe is a process of thought from the abstract to the concrete; and a right understanding of this process gives the key for interpreting the evolution in time of European philosophy. So again, in his view, the history of mankind is a history of the necessary

¹ In Kantism, as we have partly seen, the most important ontological beliefs—in God, freedom, and immortality of the soul—are based on necessities of ethical thought. In Fichte’s system the connexion of ethics and metaphysics is still more intimate; indeed, we may compare it in this respect to Platonism; as Plato blends the most fundamental notions of each of these studies in the one idea of good, so Fichte blends them in the one idea free will. “Freedom,” in his view, is at once the foundation of all being and the end of all moral action. In the systems of Schelling and Hegel ethics falls again into a subordinate place; indeed, the ethical view of the former is rather suggested than completely developed. Neither Fichte nor Schelling has exercised more than the faintest and most indirect influence on ethical philosophy in England; it therefore seems best to leave the ethical doctrines of each to be explained in connexion with the rest of his system.

development of the free spirit through the different forms of political organization: the first being that of the Oriental monarchy, in which freedom belongs to the monarch only; the second, that of the Græco-Roman republics, in which a select body of free citizens is sustained on a basis of slavery; while finally in the modern societies, sprung from the Teutonic invasion of the decaying Roman empire, freedom is recognized as the natural right of all members of the community. The effect of the lectures (post-

humously edited) in which Hegel’s “Philosophy of History” and “History of Philosophy” were expounded has extended far beyond the limits of his special school; indeed, the present predominance of the historical method in all departments of the theory of practice is not a little due to their influence. What place the study of history ought to take in the systematic establishment of fundamental ethical principles or of particular moral rules is, however, still a matter of eager controversy (H. S.)

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ETHIOPIA, or ÆTHIOPIA, in Greek *Aiθιοπία*, the ancient classical designation of a country and kingdom of North-eastern Africa, lying immediately to the S. of Egypt, and extending eastwards to the Red Sea, but with no definitely marked boundaries in any other direction. According to the “folk’s etymology” of the Greeks, the name was equivalent to the “land of the scorched faces,” from *αἶθερ*, to burn, and *ῥῆ*, the countenance, and this supposed derivation doubtless reacted on the employment of the word, and increased the vagueness of its meaning; but in all probability it was really, like the name of Egypt itself, a corruption of some Egyptian original now unknown. The knowledge of this country possessed by the earlier Greeks was extremely slight, and greatly corrupted by mythical additions. To the generation among whom the Homeric poems took their rise the Ethiopians were the remotest inhabitants of the world, and received the gods themselves as familiar guests. They are twice mentioned by Hesiod, who calls their king by the Egyptian name of Memnon. Herodotus acquired a considerable amount of information about their connexion with Egypt, and Democritus is said to have travelled as far south as Meroe, and to have written an account of its hieroglyphics; but it was not till the invasion of Ptolemy Philadelphus that the Greeks began to be familiar with the country. From Herodotus downwards we hear of a great many separate tribes, most of whom are designated by Greek epithets descriptive of some real or supposed peculiarity, as the Ichthyophagi or Fish-eaters, the Macrobii or Long-livers, the Troglodytes or Cave-dwellers. To only a few of them can their proper geographical position be assigned, and of none of them can we with certainty determine the ethnographical affinities. The name Ethiopian, indeed, must be regarded not as an ethnographical but as a politico-geographical designation. It has been applied, both in ancient and modern times, to peoples of different race who have occu-

piated the country to the south of Egypt and the south-western part of Arabia, much in the same way as the name Englishman is used by foreigners for any native of the British Islands, whether he be of Germanic or Celtic descent; and in this respect it probably differs from the quasi-synonymous Cushite of Hebrew ethnology and the An of the Egyptian inscriptions. The inhabitants of Meroe or Southern Ethiopia were a reddish-brown people, and are so represented on the monuments; but they were surrounded by, and perhaps intermingled with, a number of dark-skinned tribes, whose effigies indicate affinity with the negro. Modern research enables us to trace the main outlines of Ethiopian history, but with the same indefiniteness of chronology which attaches to so much of the history of Egypt. Of its earlier epochs we are profoundly ignorant. The Greeks had a tradition that the Egyptians were indebted to the Ethiopians for the first impulse of their civilization; but recent investigators maintain that the relation between the two peoples must have been exactly the reverse of this, and their view is supported by the fact that as we advance up the river the monuments are evidently of later date and poorer workmanship, as if the southern builders were only second-rate imitators of their northern predecessors (cf. Brugsch, *Geschichte Ägyptens*, 1877). The Pharaohs of the XII. Egyptian Dynasty—the Usurtensens or Osortasens and Amenemhats—repulsed the encroachments of the Ethiopians and invaded their country. By Usurtesen III. a frontier fortress was erected at Semneh; and he forbade the people to the south to enter Egypt except for the purpose of trading in cattle. During the XVIII. Dynasty we find the kings of Egypt partly in friendly and partly in hostile relations with their Ethiopian neighbours. Ahmes married an Ethiopian princess, and received the assistance of her family in the expulsion of the shepherd kings. Amenhotep (Amenophis) I. his son, and Thothmes (Tuthmosis) I. his grandson, both