

With Pico, again, he holds that rightness of intention and motive is not only an indispensable condition or element of the rightness of an action, but actually the sole determinant of its moral worth; but with more philosophical penetration he draws the inference—of which the English moralist does not seem to have dreamt—that there can be no separate rational principles for determining the “material” rightness of conduct, as distinct from its “formal” rightness; and therefore that all rules of duty must admit of being deduced from the one general principle that duty ought to be done for duty’s sake. This deduction is the most original part of Kant’s doctrine. The dictates of reason, he points out, must necessarily be addressed to all rational beings as such; hence, my intention cannot be right unless I am prepared to will the principle on which I act to be a universal law. He considers that this fundamental rule or imperative “act on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal” supplies a sufficient criterion for determining particular duties in all cases. The rule excludes wrong conduct with two degrees of stringency. Some offences, such as breach of contract, we cannot even conceive universalized; as soon as every one broke promises no one would make them. Other maxims, such as that of leaving persons in distress to shift for themselves, we can easily conceive to be universal laws, but we cannot without contradiction will them to be such; for when we are ourselves in distress we cannot help desiring that others should help us.

Another important peculiarity of Kant’s doctrine is his development of the connexion between duty and free-will. He holds that it is through our moral consciousness that we know that we are free; in the cognition that I ought to do what is right because it is right and not because I like it, it is implied that this purely rational volition is possible; that my action can be determined, not “mechanically,” through the necessary operation of the natural stimuli of pleasurable and painful feelings, but in accordance with the laws of my true, reasonable self. The realization of reason, or of human wills so far as rational, thus presents itself as the absolute end of duty; and we get, as a new form of the fundamental practical rule, “act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or any other, as an end always, and never as a means only.” We may observe, too, that the notion of freedom connects ethics with jurisprudence in a simple and striking manner. The fundamental aim of jurisprudence is to realize external freedom by removing the hindrances imposed on each one’s free action through the interferences of other wills. Ethics shows how to realize internal freedom by resolutely pursuing rational ends in opposition to those of natural inclination. But what practicable ends are there which reason prescribes, and which can therefore be stated absolutely as ends at which human beings ought to aim whatever their actual desires may be? There are two such ends, Kant holds,—perfection and happiness; more precisely, what we are morally bound to seek is perfection for ourselves and happiness for others; since (1) no one can directly promote the moral perfection of others, depending as it does on free choice of right; and (2) one’s own happiness being necessarily an object of natural desire cannot also be regarded as a duty. The latter limitation contrasts strikingly with the view of Butler and Reid, that man, as a rational being, is under a “manifest obligation” to seek his own interest. The difference, however, is not really so great as it seems; since in another part of his system Kant fully recognizes the reasonableness of self-love. Though duty, in his view, excludes regard for private happiness, the *summum bonum* is not duty alone, neglect of an act of benevolence, because benevolence is judged by me to be conduct which it becomes me to adopt.

but duty and happiness combined; the demand for happiness as the reward of duty is so essentially reasonable that we must postulate a universal connexion between the two is the order of the universe; indeed, the practical necessity of this postulate is the only adequate rational ground that we have for believing in the existence of God.

Before the ethics of Kant had begun to be seriously studied in England, the rapid and remarkable development of metaphysical view and method of which the three chief stages are represented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel respectively had already taken place; and the system of the latter was occupying the most prominent position in the philosophical thought of Germany.¹ Hegel’s ethical doctrine (expounded chiefly in his *Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821) shows a close affinity, and also a striking contrast, to Kant’s. He holds, with Kant, that duty or good conduct consists in the conscious realization of the free reasonable will, which is essentially the same in all rational beings. But in Kant’s view the universal content of this will is only given in the formal condition of “only acting as one can desire all to act,” to be subjectively applied by each rational agent to his own volition; whereas Hegel conceives the universal will as objectively presented to each man in the laws, institutions, and customary morality of the community of which he is a member. Thus, in his view, not merely natural inclinations towards pleasures, or the desires for selfish happiness, require to be morally resisted; but even the prompting of the individual’s conscience, the impulse to do what seems to him right, if it comes into conflict with the common sense of his community. It is true that Hegel regards the conscious effort to realize one’s own conception of good as a higher stage of moral development than the mere conformity to the jural rules establishing property, maintaining contract, and allotting punishment to crime, in which the universal will is first expressed; since in such conformity this will is only accomplished accidentally by the outward concurrence of individual wills, and is not essentially realized in any of them. He holds, however, that this conscientious effort is self-deceived and futile, is even the very root of moral evil, except it attains its realization in harmony with the objective social relations in which the individual finds himself placed. Of these relations the first grade is constituted by the family, the second by civil society, and the third by the state, the organization of which is the highest manifestation of universal reason in the sphere of practice.

Hegelianism appears as a distinct element in English ethical thought at the present day; but the direct influence of Hegel’s system is perhaps less important than that indirectly exercised through the powerful stimulus which it has given to the study of the historical development of human thought and human society. According to Hegel, the essence of the universe is a process of thought from the abstract to the concrete; and a right understanding of this process gives the key for interpreting the evolution in time of European philosophy. So again, in his view, the history of mankind is a history of the necessary

¹ In Kantism, as we have partly seen, the most important ontological beliefs—in God, freedom, and immortality of the soul—are based on necessities of ethical thought. In Fichte’s system the connexion of ethics and metaphysics is still more intimate; indeed, we may compare it in this respect to Platonism; as Plato blends the most fundamental notions of each of these studies in the one idea of good, so Fichte blends them in the one idea free will. “Freedom,” in his view, is at once the foundation of all being and the end of all moral action. In the systems of Schelling and Hegel ethics falls again into a subordinate place; indeed, the ethical view of the former is rather suggested than completely developed. Neither Fichte nor Schelling has exercised more than the faintest and most indirect influence on ethical philosophy in England; it therefore seems best to leave the ethical doctrines of each to be explained in connexion with the rest of his system.

development of the free spirit through the different forms of political organization: the first being that of the Oriental monarchy, in which freedom belongs to the monarch only; the second, that of the Græco-Roman republics, in which a select body of free citizens is sustained on a basis of slavery; while finally in the modern societies, sprung from the Teutonic invasion of the decaying Roman empire, freedom is recognized as the natural right of all members of the community. The effect of the lectures (post-

humously edited) in which Hegel’s “Philosophy of History” and “History of Philosophy” were expounded has extended far beyond the limits of his special school; indeed, the present predominance of the historical method in all departments of the theory of practice is not a little due to their influence. What place the study of history ought to take in the systematic establishment of fundamental ethical principles or of particular moral rules is, however, still a matter of eager controversy (H. S.)

CONTENTS OF ARTICLE ETHICS.

	PAGE		PAGE
I. Definition and General View of the Subject.....	574-5	IV. Modern Ethics—continued.....	590-7
II. Greek and Græco-Roman Ethics.....	575-586	Hobbes.....	590-7
The Age of the Sophists.....	576-7	The Cambridge Moralists.....	597-8
Socrates and his Disciples.....	577-9	(Cudworth, More)	
Plato.....	579-80	Cumberland.....	598
Plato and Aristotle.....	580-1	Locke.....	598
Aristotle.....	581-3	Clarks.....	598-9
Stoicism.....	583-5	Shaftesbury.....	599-600
Hedonism (Epicurus).....	585-6	Mandeville.....	600
Later Greek and Roman Ethics.....	586-7	Butler.....	600-1
Neo-Platonism.....	587-8	Wollaston.....	601
III. Christianity and Medieval Ethics.....	588-606	Hutcheson.....	601-2
Christian and Jewish “Law of God”.....	588-9	Hume.....	602
Christian and Pagan Inwardness.....	589-90	Adam Smith.....	602-3
(Knowledge, Faith, Love, Purity)		The Intuitionist School.....	603-5
Distinctive Particulars of Christian Morality.....	590-1	(Pico, Reid, Stewart, Whewell)	
Development of Opinion in Early Christianity; Augustine, Ambrose.....	591-2	The Utilitarian School.....	605-7
Medieval Morality and Moral Philosophy.....	592-3	(Paley, Bentham, Mill)	
Thomas Aquinas.....	594-5	Association and Evolution.....	607-8
Casultry and Jesuitry.....	595	Free-Will.....	608
The Reformation; and birth of Modern Thought.....	595-6	French Influence on English Ethics.....	608-9
IV. Modern, especially English, Ethics.....	596-611	(Helvetius, Comte)	
Grotius.....	596	German Influence on English Ethics.....	609-11
		(Kant, Hegel)	

ETHIOPIA, or ÆTHIOPIA, in Greek *Aiθιοπία*, the ancient classical designation of a country and kingdom of North-eastern Africa, lying immediately to the S. of Egypt, and extending eastwards to the Red Sea, but with no definitely marked boundaries in any other direction. According to the “folk’s etymology” of the Greeks, the name was equivalent to the “land of the scorched faces,” from *αἶθερ*, to burn, and *ῥω*, the countenance, and this supposed derivation doubtless reacted on the employment of the word, and increased the vagueness of its meaning; but in all probability it was really, like the name of Egypt itself, a corruption of some Egyptian original now unknown. The knowledge of this country possessed by the earlier Greeks was extremely slight, and greatly corrupted by mythical additions. To the generation among whom the Homeric poems took their rise the Ethiopians were the remotest inhabitants of the world, and received the gods themselves as familiar guests. They are twice mentioned by Hesiod, who calls their king by the Egyptian name of Memnon. Herodotus acquired a considerable amount of information about their connexion with Egypt, and Democritus is said to have travelled as far south as Meroe, and to have written an account of its hieroglyphics; but it was not till the invasion of Ptolemy Philadelphus that the Greeks began to be familiar with the country. From Herodotus downwards we hear of a great many separate tribes, most of whom are designated by Greek epithets descriptive of some real or supposed peculiarity, as the Ichthyophagi or Fish-eaters, the Macrobii or Long-livers, the Troglodytes or Cave-dwellers. To only a few of them can their proper geographical position be assigned, and of none of them can we with certainty determine the ethnographical affinities. The name Ethiopian, indeed, must be regarded not as an ethnographical but as a politico-geographical designation. It has been applied, both in ancient and modern times, to peoples of different race who have occu-

piated the country to the south of Egypt and the southwestern part of Arabia, much in the same way as the name Englishman is used by foreigners for any native of the British Islands, whether he be of Germanic or Celtic descent; and in this respect it probably differs from the quasi-synonymous Cushite of Hebrew ethnology and the An of the Egyptian inscriptions. The inhabitants of Meroe or Southern Ethiopia were a reddish-brown people, and are so represented on the monuments; but they were surrounded by, and perhaps intermingled with, a number of dark-skinned tribes, whose effigies indicate affinity with the negro. Modern research enables us to trace the main outlines of Ethiopian history, but with the same indefiniteness of chronology which attaches to so much of the history of Egypt. Of its earlier epochs we are profoundly ignorant. The Greeks had a tradition that the Egyptians were indebted to the Ethiopians for the first impulse of their civilization; but recent investigators maintain that the relation between the two peoples must have been exactly the reverse of this, and their view is supported by the fact that as we advance up the river the monuments are evidently of later date and poorer workmanship, as if the southern builders were only second-rate imitators of their northern predecessors (cf. Brugsch, *Geschichte Ägyptens*, 1877). The Pharaohs of the XII. Egyptian Dynasty—the Usurtensens or Osortasens and Amenemhats—repulsed the encroachments of the Ethiopians and invaded their country. By Usurtesen III. a frontier fortress was erected at Semneh; and he forbade the people to the south to enter Egypt except for the purpose of trading in cattle. During the XVIII. Dynasty we find the kings of Egypt partly in friendly and partly in hostile relations with their Ethiopian neighbours. Ahmes married an Ethiopian princess, and received the assistance of her family in the expulsion of the shepherd kings. Amenhotep (Amenophis) I. his son, and Thothmes (Tuthmosis) I. his grandson, both

extended the Egyptian dominion towards the south, and the supremacy of Tuthmosis III. seems to have been widely acknowledged throughout the Ethiopian region. When Amenhotep II., as we are informed by an inscription in the Nubian temple of Amadas, brought back from his conquests the dead bodies of the kings he had slain, one of them was sent to adorn the walls of Napata, the Ethiopian city now identified with Jebel Barkal. Amenhotep III., Horemhebi, and the more warlike Rameses or Ramessu I. are all mentioned as in possession of the Ethiopian supremacy, but as engaged from time to time in wars within the region. Amenhotep III. founded at Napata a great fortress-temple for the god Amon-ra of Thebes. A general revolt took place against Ramses II. and the importance of the wars that followed is shown by the extensive sculptures and paintings in regard to them still preserved at Ipsambul (Abu-simbel) and Beit Walli. During the XXII. Egyptian Dynasty the independence and power of the principal Ethiopian potentate had increased so much that Azerch-Amen, of Napata, the Zerah of the Biblical narrative, conquered all the valley of the Nile, and advanced against Syria and Judah; the defeat, however, inflicted on him at Zephathah by King Asa was so complete that he withdrew again within his original frontiers. Piankhi Meriamen, the priest-king of Napata, whose family had an Egyptian origin, took advantage of the confusion into which Egypt had fallen during the XXIII. Dynasty, and succeeded in establishing his authority; and for several generations Ethiopian influence was predominant in Egypt. Tirhakah especially was a monarch of great power, as is attested by his monuments at Napata and elsewhere. The great Egyptian Psametik was enabled by foreign assistance to restore a native dynasty; but the excessive favour which he showed to those who had helped him to his throne so displeased the Egyptian military caste that they emigrated to Ethiopia to the number, according to Herodotus, of 240,000. At Ipsambul (Abu-simbel) there is a Greek inscription on one of the great colossi of Ramses purporting to have been engraved by the Greek mercenaries who accompanied the expedition of Psametik against his runaway subjects. The Persian invader Cambyses, who brought the Egyptian independence to a close, failed in his attack on the Ethiopian kingdom; but the change in the condition of Egypt helped to open up Ethiopia to Greek enterprise and influence. Under the Ptolemies various Greek colonies—Dire-Berenices, Adulis, Arsinoe—were established on the Ethiopian coast of the Red Sea, and Greek learning was introduced into the Ethiopian court. Ptolemy Philadelphus invaded the country, but came to terms with the king, Ergamenes or Arkamen, who is reported to have relieved the royal power from the ecclesiastical bondage under which it had long suffered, by putting the priests to death and plundering their temples. Arkamen's name occurs on the monuments at Debod or Tabet. In the reign of Augustus, C. Petronius had to defend the Egyptian frontiers against an invasion under Queen Candace: in the second campaign he extorted the submission of the country, which continued nominally Roman till the reign of Diocletian. A garrison was established at Primis or Ibrim, and a troop of German horse had its head-quarters at Pselchis. There is still a very perfect Roman camp at Mehendi, to the south of Hierasykaminos. About the 1st century of the Christian era a new kingdom seems to have grown up at Axume. The king Zoskales is mentioned by the author of the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, who also tells us that he was acquainted with Greek; he may be identified with the Za Hagalé or Hekla of the Ethiopian list of kings. In the sixth century the Christians of Yemen, being oppressed by the dynasty of Jewish proselytes who at that time held

the throne of the Himyarites, asked and obtained the assistance of the Axumite monarch; but the Ethiopian sovereignty thus established only lasted for about seventy years.

Compare Egypt, vol. vii. pp. 730-748; ABYSSINIA, vol. I., and the works of Salt, &c., there referred to; and in addition Lenormant, *Manuel de l'histoire orientale*; *Records of the Past*, vol. iv.; Vivien de Saint Martin, "Éclairc. geogr. et hist. sur l'inscription d'Adulis," in *Journal Asiatique*, 1868, published separately in 1864, and his *Le Nord de l'Afrique dans l'antiquité grecque et romaine*, 1863.

ETHIOPIAN, or Geez, is the name given in modern philology to a language of the Semitic family, which is still used in Abyssinia for literary and ecclesiastical purposes. It shows the closest affinity in grammatical structure with Arabic. The verb has ten conjugations, of which two are peculiar, and the remaining eight analogous to as many of the ten Arabic conjugations. The noun presents a greater similarity to the Hebrew noun, though at the same time it has decidedly Arabic characteristics. There is no dual form either in noun or verb. About a third of the vocables of the language have been traced to Arabic roots, while others find their counterparts and kindred in Aramaic and Hebrew. A considerable number of words have been imported from foreign tongues—some as mere exotics by translators and scholars, but many others through direct popular intercourse with foreign nations. Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek have been chiefly laid under contribution, the last especially for words technical to Christianity. Of course it is often difficult to decide in the case of Aramaic and Arabic vocables whether they are real borrowings since the differentiation of the languages, or are part of the original common stock of the Semitic. There are at least two modern languages which have sprung from the ancient Geez, distinguished in modern philology by the conventional names of Tigrina and Tigré, both derived from the native Tigrā, which is applied to either indifferently. The Tigré, spoken by the half-nomadic races on the frontiers of Nubia and Sennaar is, at least among one tribe, the Habab, extremely like the parent speech; the Tigrina, on the other hand, is corrupt both in its sounds, its inflexions, and its vocabulary, and bears evidence more especially of Amharic influence. Tigré has been very partially investigated: Merx published, in 1868, a vocabulary and grammatical sketch; Munziger's vocabulary is printed in Dillmann's *Lexicon*; and a Tigré translation of the gospel of Luke by Kugler and Isenberg exists in manuscript. The Tigrina, or rather the Adoan dialect of the Tigrina, was treated pretty fully by Dr Prætorius in his *Grammatik der Tigrina Sprache*, 1872, and he has since published, in the *Ztschr. d. Deut. Morg. Ges.*, 1874, a paper on the two dialects of Hamasén and Tanben, which differ considerably in vocabulary as well as in pronunciation, but are mutually intelligible. Another dialect mainly of Ethiopic character is spoken by the people of Harrar, who form a small Semitic enclave in the Hamitic population to the east of southern Abyssinia. Its peculiarities have been investigated by Burton, *First Footsteps in East Africa*, 1856, and by Prætorius in *Ztschr. d. Deut. Morg. Ges.*, 1869. The affinity of the Geez alphabet has given rise to no small discussion: Ludolf brought it into comparison with the Samaritan, De Lacy with the Greek and Coptic, and Lepsius with the Devanāgarī, but in the opinion of most Semitic investigators, its Semitic origin has been proved by the discovery of the cognate Himyaritic alphabet or *musnad* (cf. Renan, *Hist. des Langues Sémitiques*, p. 308).

The literature of the Ethiopian language, like that of Armenian, is almost exclusively Christian, and, indeed, with comparatively slight exceptions, theological or ecclesiastical. Only a few inscriptions have been preserved of the pre-Christian period, the most notable being those of Axum

and Adulis, but it is not improbable that light will be obtained on the earlier times from the inscriptions of Southern Arabia, which are beginning to receive special attention. The language of the Axum inscriptions is the same as that of the Bible, and contains the Amharic element. The forms of the letters vary, and the older forms are like the Himyaritic. Vowel signs are irregularly employed, and sometimes omitted, and the numeral notation is peculiar. The work which forms the standard of a classical style is the version of the Bible. According to native tradition it was made from the Arabic, either by the first bishop Frumentius (Abba Salāmā) or by the "Nine Saints" of the 5th century; but internal evidence goes to prove that it was really derived from the Greek version in use in the Alexandrian church. In the course of centuries it has undergone numberless alterations at the hands of copyists; but even its most corrupted condition leaves it clear that it must have been characterized by great fidelity to the Greek text. Among the MSS. of the Old Testament Professor Dillmann distinguishes three classes: the first, which seldom occurs, preserves in the main the original translation; the second, and most numerous, contains a text revised according to the Greek; and the third has been improved by comparison with the Hebrew. Besides the ordinary canonical books of the English Bible, and the ordinary apocryphal books, with the exception of the Maccabees, the Ethiopian canon includes a number of works of various interest and value, as the Kufale or Book of the Jubilees, the Book of Enoch, and the Ascension of Isaiah,—concerning which consult APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE, vol. ii. The books of the Maccabees were either never translated or have been lost, but their place has been supplied by spurious productions of the same name. Several apocryphal books are also incorporated with the New Testament, which is usually reckoned to contain 35 altogether. It was printed in 2 vols. at Rome, 1548, in the London Polyglot, and in 1830 by the London Bible Society, under the editorship of Th. P. Platt. Dillmann published the Octateuch, Leipsic, 1853, the four books of the Kings, Leipsic, 1861-1871, Enoch, 1851, and the book of the Jubilees, 1859; and R. Lawrence published the *Ascensio Jesaia*, 1819, and the *Apocalypse of Era*, 1820, at Oxford. (Cf. Dillmann's article on the *Äthiopische Bibelübersetzung* in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*, 2d edition, 1877.) Of the numerous works which rank as ecclesiastical authorities in the Ethiopian church, it is sufficient to mention the *Cyrrillus*, which contains, not only several dogmatic treatises of Cyril of Alexandria, but also similar productions of several others of the fathers; the *Synodus*, which includes, *inter alia*, the constitutions and statutes of the apostles, the canons of the councils of Ancyra, Neocæsarea, Sardis, Antioch, and Nicæa, an exposition of the Nicene creed, and an exposition of the Decalogue; the *Mafshafa kidān za egriena Iyasus*, or the Testament of our Lord Jesus (usually quoted as the *Kidān*), which treats of various ecclesiastical, liturgical, and eschatological matters; the *Genzat* or *Mafshafa Genzat*, and the *Mafshafa Kedr*, containing respectively the burial service and other sections of the ritual; the *Philexius*, a

monastic treatise, probably translated into Ethiopic in the 14th century, and deriving its name from Philoxenus of Manbig. Among the poetic works are a collection of hymns in honour of the saints of the Ethiopian calendar, entitled *Erziabkhan nagsa*, or "May God reign," and the *Organona Maryām*, a eulogy of the Virgin in rhythmic prose. The MSS. of the *Mavāsēt* or *Antiphonary* sometimes contain an interesting musical notation, which, according to native tradition, was introduced by a saint who lived in the 6th or 7th century. Certain works called *Savāsev* or guides are devoted to the illustration of the Ethiopian language, but they are very poor, and make no distinction between grammatical, lexicographical, and historical-scientific information, standing thus on the same level with such a work as Elyot's *Latin Dictionary*. The historical works, as for example those concerning Alexander of Macedon, are of little moment; and the real value of the lists of early kings of Ethiopia is still a matter of dispute. According to Prætorius, one of the most recent investigators (*Ztschr. d. Deut. Morg. Ges.*, 1870), all the statements made in Ethiopian literature about the earlier history of the country have been in the main derived from Arabic legends not earlier than the 14th century, and then reconstructed with the assistance of the king-lists, which alone have some degree of historic credibility. The European libraries which possess the richest collections of Ethiopian MSS. are the British Museum, the Bodleian, the Royal Library at Vienna, and the National Library at Paris. Ruppell's collections are preserved at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, and Krapff's at Tübingen and Würtemberg. The Bodleian catalogue was published by Dillmann, 1858; D'Abbadie's *Catalogue raisonné de manuscrits éthiopiens* appeared in 1859; and a list of the Magdala collection in the British Museum, consisting of upwards of 300 MSS., was contributed to the *Ztschr. d. Deut. Morg. Ges.*, 1870, by William Wright. Ewald gives a list of the Würtemberg MSS. in *Ztschr. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 1843, and of the Tübingen MSS. in *Ztschr. d. Deut. Morg. Ges.*, 1847. Dorn had already made known the few works possessed by the St Petersburg library, in the *Bull. de l'Acad.*, May and October 1837. The Vienna collection is dealt with by Fr. Müller in *Ztschr. d. Deut. Morg. Ges.*, 1862. The first scholar who turned his attention to Ethiopian was Potken of Cologne about 1513. A grammar and dictionary were published by Jacob Wemmers, a Carmelite of Antwerp in 1638; and in 1661 appeared the first edition of the great lexicon by Job Ludolf, who, in the 1702 edition, prefixed a *Dissertatio de harmonia lingue æth. cum. cæl. orient.*, and was also the author of *Comment. de Hist. æth.*

Modern works connected with the subject are:—Hupfeldt, *Exercitationes Æthiopicæ*, 1825; Dorn, *De psalterio æthiopico*, 1825; Tuch, *De Æthiop. lingue sonorum proprietatibus quibusdam*, 1854, and *De æth. lingue son. sibilantium usu*, 1854; Ewald, *Ueber des æthiop. Buch's Henokh Entstehung*, 1854; D'Abbadie, *Hermæ Pastor Æthiopicæ*, 1860; Schrader, *De Lingua Æthiopicæ indole*, 1860; Ceriani, *Monumenta sacra et profana e codicibus Bibl. Ambrosianæ*, Milan, 1861; Rodwell, *Æthiopic liturgies and prayers*, 1865; *Physiologus æthiopicæ*, 1877.

ETHNOGRAPHY AND ETHNOLOGY

I. *Definition*.—Ethnography embraces the descriptive details, and ethnology the rational exposition, of the human aggregates and organizations known as hordes, clans, tribes, and nations, especially in the earlier, the savage and barbarous, stages of their progress. Both belong to the general science of anthropology or the natural history of mankind, being related to it as parts to a whole. Ethnography and ethnology, indeed, run up into

anthropology as anthropology does into zoology, and zoology into biology. No very sharp line can be drawn between these two sciences themselves, their differences being mainly those between the particular and the general, between the orderly collection of local facts, and the principles according to which they may be grouped and interpreted. Ethnographers deal with particular tribes, and with particular institutions and particular customs