

as old, and even of the same covey as those of the Greeks. His narrations were gems of elegant simplicity, and their success caused them to be followed by many similar productions, which were enjoyed as light literature, their scientific import being little suspected; until the brothers Grimm collected the *Deutsche Hausmärchen*, one of the most popular books published in this century. These savants opened a most fertile field of investigation by their discovery that many German popular tales had for their substratum German mythology. Adalbert Kühne's *Herabkunft des Feuers* marked a new step. He showed most clearly that our tales have the same relation with the old Vedan mythology as our languages with the Sanskrit. Benfey proved by other considerations the same thesis. Following them, M. Bréal gave in his *Mythe de Cacus* a model of science made clear and pleasant. A host of diligent searchers, mostly Germans, for the Germans have taken the lead in this department, devoted themselves to collecting, translating, commenting upon popular tales, songs, and mythology. Folklore now constitutes quite a special literature. We have already legends from all five parts of the world, legends from nearly every important country, and in some countries from almost every province. The immense task of sifting and reconstructing prehistoric mythology has next to be commenced.

IX. *Justice and Morals.*—Law is anterior to justice. The lower races, says Lubbock, are deficient in any idea of right, though quite familiar with that of law. In fact, civil law, in its origin, is a custom and nothing else,—a custom meeting some particular want. Therefore laws will not last if they be arbitrary, if they be founded on the caprice of a legislator, and do not subserve the interests of the majority. True laws are the expression of the people's will; legislature and magistracy are delegations of the people's authority. In primitive communities such delegation is often uncalled for; the community acts directly as judge and law-giver, its resolutions being guided not by abstract principles of justice, but by self-interest and a desire for self-preservation,—seldom, if ever, by unselfish considerations. "*Salus populi suprema lex.*" As the community enlarges this feeling widens and becomes generalized; by degrees the idea of justice is evolved out of common convenience. Absorbed by their petty local interests, early tribes could scarcely realize the idea of absolute justice, which is inseparable from the idea of mankind at large. Both ideas are of a recent origin; they seem contemporaneous with the rise of the Roman empire, when it strove to take possession of the whole world, and when the positive principles of jurisprudence were set forth with a logic, a vigour, and a lucidity not surpassed, not even equalled since. Our civilized countries have enriched themselves with a ponderous apparatus of written laws, which are, or are affirmed to be, the outgrowth of customary laws, and an accepted fiction sets forth that every citizen knows and understands perfectly that immense miscellany of rules and statutes.

Criminal law has a similar origin; it is the part of justice evolved out of vengeance, which, from being with some animals and the lowest tribes a boundless passion, was by degrees restrained, acquired a definite form, and became the law of retaliation,—“an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” From that principle men were sure to infer, “Do not to others what thou wouldst not like to be done to thyself,”—the negative side of a principle which was far sooner understood than its positive side, “Do unto others as ye would that men should do unto you.” The abandonment of *vendetta* is one of the steps which lead from semi-civilization towards civilization. But its adoption by primitive communities had in its time heralded an improved state of things. Its prin-

ciple is that all the members of a gens are bound to avenge the death or the hurt of any individual member. Thereby the gentiles were involved in continual troubles. By degrees they came to find out that the surest way to minimize the troubles arising out of vendetta was to avoid its causes. This led to the softening of manners. The next step was for the gens to impose upon its affiliates the obligation to resort directly to its tribunal in case of offences. Thus by degrees redress came to be substituted for revenge, and justice taken at one's own hand to be regarded as fit only for barbarians.

Like the tribe, the gens was for its members an enlarged self, and its motto was—One for all, all for one,—an ideal motto among brothers in a brotherhood, but one fit also to promote strifes of brotherhood against brotherhood. Friendship, honesty, justice, and even self-sacrifice within the circle of kinship; cunning, violence, murder, ruthless brutality outside. The gentile stood by the gentile for weal or woe, for wrong or right. Men's minds and hearts are now so far enlarged that they can embrace the idea of a whole country, their own. But have we gone really much further?

X. *Progress.*—Ethnology, in its actual state, centres upon the theory of progress. It has not only to prove the existence of progress, it has to demonstrate how it operates, and to measure the amount of its work in the different periods. Progress, put in question in all the branches of human development, is nowhere more fiercely discussed than in its relation to justice and morals. This is the most important, the most interesting, and also the most perplexing theme. It is the easiest to discourse upon, as there are no external standards by which to measure internal phenomena, no fixed canon by which to compute the ever-shifting correlations between the two great principles of social order and individual liberty—custom and progress, which, far from working harmoniously together, clash so often one against the other. This question is not merely a theoretical one; it has very practical bearings, now that our civilization is about to take possession of all the world,—now that representatives of our culture invade in so many places the soil occupied by less advanced communities. Before the last remainders of ancient ages be destroyed, it is certainly worth while to pause and to consider, Are we right in doing away with them, and will the world at large be a gainer by it? The United States, the colonial administrations, are constantly called on to deal with native reserves, native wars, and, alas! with native extermination. We cannot forget that the landing of Columbus at Guanahani cost the lives of many millions of American and African aborigines, and that the last Tasmanian, the last Guanche, the last Beothuk, have been “improved” off the face of earth. We can hardly regard with unmixed feelings the prospect that the whole of the African continent will soon be open to “European enterprise.”

We will give an epitome of the debates which are carried on, striking off many arguments for the sake of brevity. It will be but fair to give the first word to a friend of the attacked and (must we say?) the doomed races.

Mr Wallace, after having given a charming picture of some Malay communities which he had visited, tells us: “It is very remarkable that among people in a very low stage of civilization we find some approach to such a perfect social state. Each man scrupulously respects the rights of his fellow, and any infraction of these rights rarely or never takes place. In such community all are nearly equal. There are none of these wide distinctions, of education and ignorance, wealth and poverty, master and servant, which are the product of our civilization; there is not that severe competition and struggle for existence or for wealth which the dense population of civilized countries inevitably creates. It is not too much to say that the mass of our populations have not at all advanced beyond the savage code of morals, and have in many cases sunk below it.”

Such pictures as that drawn by Mr Wallace are not unfrequent, and we might have transcribed many pleasant descriptions of the peace, concord, and fraternity reigning among the Todas, Aleutians, and some other primitive communities.

Now comes the indictment by Lubbock, Tylor, and others. It is a heavy one.

“The Veddahs of Ceylon are of opinion that it signifies little whether they do right or wrong” (Davies). “To Australians the words good and bad had reference to taste or bodily comfort, and did not convey any idea of right or wrong. . . . The whole tendency of their system is to give every thing to the strong, to the tendency of the young, and more particularly to the detriment of women” (Lang). . . . “To believe,” says Sir George Grey, “that man in a savage state is endowed with freedom, either of thought or action, is erroneous in the highest degree. . . . Offences, in Fijian estimation, are light or grave according to the rank of the offender. . . . In Tahiti the missionaries considered that no less than two-thirds of the children were murdered by their parents.” . . . “Conscience does not exist in Eastern Africa. Repentance expresses regret for missed opportunities of mortal crime. Robbery constitutes an honourable man. Murder—the more atrocious the midnight crime the better—makes the hero” (Burton).

And is civilization any thing else? reply the others. Is it not the same struggle for existence, but here on a gigantic scale? Is not our incessant battle for life little short of wholesale murder? Is it not accompanied with the same envy, with the same remorseless hatred, but under a thicker veil of perfidy and hypocrisy? The Anthropological Society in London was told by the late Winwood Reade that among the savages of Africa he had not seen anything as bad as the pauperism, as the mass of misery and degradation to be found in our large cities. The Anthropological Society of Paris was told by Mr Coudercau that in our modern Europe the moral and intellectual development of the multitude is not superior to that of the Dahomians. It was said by Mr Lavrof: “Between our peasants and the primitive savages there is little difference. The religions and the most advanced philosophies, which hold so large a place in the history of mankind have never been taken up in reality except by a minority numerically insignificant. Were they professed to the majority? No, they enriched it with new amulets, new magical signs, new forms of divination. And when practical results of science, such as the electric telegraph, enter into common use, their real signification is as little understood by our country folks as it would be by the Marquesas Islanders.”

Although there may have been some exaggeration in the expression, the facts which have been alleged on both sides are true; none is to be explained or trifled away.

Thus it is evident that among civilized men all is not satisfactory, while among uncivilized all is not unsatisfactory. We are led to infer that civilization amplifies and intensifies its elements. We had already occasion to note that among ourselves the extremes are wider apart than among the barbarians. We can say that we are at once materially much better and much worse off, and morally much better and much worse than savages. And as to man himself it can be said that of all ferocious brutes he is the most cruel, and of all gentle animals the most affectionate.

Can material progress be disputed? An increased production of food has enabled greater numbers of men to live; their daily ration of eatables and drinkables has been increased; the quality of their vestments has been improved; most people do not dwell in damp holes dug in the earth; they do not any longer roost in the branches of trees. Not to speak of other comforts, the invention of lucifer matches and of candles have been splendid achievements in their day. That the intellectual progress has been prodigious from the time when our forefathers were unable to count their own fingers, even of one hand, as Spix and Martius tell of the Brazilian Wood Indians, to the transformation of mathematics into a powerful scientific engine, to the calculations of Newton and Laplace, to the wonders of spectral analysis, is a position nobody dares to impugn.

Material and intellectual development being satisfactorily settled, we touch upon the vexed question of moral progress. Mr Wallace says—“While civilized communities

have increased vastly beyond the savage state in intellectual achievements, we have not advanced equally in morals.” It may be said with equal truth that this progress has been immense, and that it has been ridiculously small,—immense, if we consider that there is an infinite distance between nothing and something; very small indeed, if we gauge the precise amount of that something. But that actual something will appear larger if we trace it to its original state, of which we do not find the like among the present savages. Their abject condition, abject as it has been depicted, is yet vastly superior to that of the supposed primeval man. Everything tends to prove that mankind, far from being born with a vivid sense of right and wrong, as the common doctrine will have it, had to evolve a moral sense by a long process. Through ages man must have collected sensations of a peculiar sort, which at first were slightly perceptible, and which, when accumulated, became that positive perception, the most to be cared for of our inherited abilities. “The world is very young,” said Mrs Mill, “and has only just begun to cast off injustice.” And we hold, to be survivals of antecedent ages the instances which show among civilized and uncivilized an utter absence of morality, the lack of all fairness and generosity. But in our times these instances are exceptions. On the average, we know better than the Bechwana, who, being asked what it meant “to be good,” was much puzzled, but finally answered, “To be good it is to possess a wife and cows, and to steal one neighbour's wife and cows;” or than the Pawnee, who said, “He is a good man who is a hunter sly, crafty as a fox, daring and strong as a wolf.”

A last question arises—If moral progress be a positive fact, how could it be denied by intelligent observers? First, progress is far from being always evident. Its course runs not incessantly onwards in a straight line at a uniform speed; it proceeds by irregular motions and sometimes by curved, by broken, or even by spiral lines. Then we are apt to underrate a progress which has become a habit. The pleasure which an improvement gives us does not last longer than its novelty. Very soon we become used to it—and then we become conscious that some evil, which we had till then borne patiently, has grown insufferable, and must be quickly done away with. We feel to the quick injustices and iniquities which ages ago we would have submitted to without complaint,—of which we would have been participants. Till mankind reaches some goal yet unknown to us, its motto seems to be, Never to rest, never to be thankful.

Thus ethnology may be considered as the science which builds up the history of material and intellectual progress, which retraces the evolution of that attribute, precious and delicate, of which Dr Maudsley has finely said, “Morality, the last acquired faculty of man, is the first which he is liable to lose.”

XI. The *Bibliography* of ethnology may be regarded either as very extensive or unimportant, according as we include all books in which ethnological subjects are treated, or as we exclude all books which have not ethnology for their primary object. Although possessed of immense territories in copartnership with the sister sciences, ethnology holds but a limited province of its own. This remark disposes of the largest mass of ethnographical bibliography, in a work which contains bibliographies of other sciences.

Works which take up the new science as a whole, and bring its various problems together, cannot as yet be very numerous, especially if the demarcation between ethnology and anthropology is maintained. In the preceding pages the titles of most current books which are acknowledged as authoritative have been mentioned, and for brevity's sake will not be repeated. One of the most important publications, the object of which is to set the science on a solid foundation, is in progress. The *Descriptive Sociology* commenced in 1867 by Mr Herbert Spencer, devised, classified, and arranged by him, is compiled and abstracted by Messrs James Collier, Richard Scheppegg, and David Duncan. “The digests of materials, thus brought together, will supply the student of social science with data, standing towards his conclusions in a relation like that of



