before us as the goal of an ideal psychology, to which we may approximate in so far as we can trace unity of faculty through all the differences of mental phenomena, but to which we can never attain owing to the nature of the matter with which we deal. Again, in our scientific attempts to explain our external experience, the unity of reason takes the form of an idea of the world as a completed infinite whole, which contains all the objects known to us and all other possible objects; but this cannot be realized in an experience which is conditioned by space and time, and is, therefore, ever incomplete. The idea of totality is, therefore, an *ideal*, which guides and stimulates our scientific progress, without which such a thing as science could not exist, but which at the same time can never be realized by science. Lastly, the unity of reason takes a third form in which identity and totality are combined,—as the idea of a unity in which all differences, even the difference of subject and object, are transcended,—the idea of a unity of all things with each other and with the mind that knows them. This idea also is one which science can neither surrender nor realize. It cannot surrender it without giving up that striving after unity without which science would not exist; and it cannot realize it, for the difference between the world, as it is presented to us in actual experience, and the subjective determination of our thinking consciousness cannot be overcome. We can, indeed, use the idea that the world is an organic whole, determined in relation to an end which consciousness sets for itself, as an *heuristic* principle to guide us in following the connexion of things with each other; but, as we cannot by means of any such idea anticipate what the facts of external experience will be, so we cannot prove that for a mind other than ours the unity of things which we represent in this way might not take a quite different aspect. Indeed we have reason to think it would; for, while we always think of a designing mind as using materials which have an existence and nature independent of the purposes to which they are put, the absolute mind must be conceived as creating the materials themselves by the same act whereby they are determined to an end. We must conceive it, in short, as an intuitive understanding for which end and means, objective and subjective, are one, or, in other words, as an intelligence whose consciousness of itself is or contains the existence of all that is object for it.

This new view of the things in themselves as *noumena* or ideals of reason involves a new attitude of thought towards them different from that dogmatic attitude which is provisionally adopted in the *Analytic*. Accordingly, we now find Kant speaking of them, not as things which exist independently of their being conceived, but as "problematical conceptions" of which we cannot even determine whether they correspond to any objects at all. They are "limitative" notions which have a negative value, in so far as they keep open a vacant space beyond experience, but do not enable us to fill that space with any positive realities. They are like dark lanterns which cast light upon the empirical world, and show what are its boundaries, but leave their own nature in obscurity. All that we can say of the noumenal self or subject is that it corresponds to the unity implied in all knowledge, but whether there is such a self, independent of the process of empirical synthesis and the self-consciousness which accompanies that process, we cannot tell. All that we can say of the noumenal reality of the objective world is that it corresponds to the idea of the objects of experience as a completed whole in themselves apart from the process whereby we know them, but whether there is any such real world independent of the process of experience it is impossible to say. Lastly, all that we can say of God is that He corresponds to the idea of the unity of all things with the mind that knows them,—an ideal which is involved in all knowledge,—but whether the realization of this idea in an intuitive understanding is even possible we have no means of determining, however we may suspect that understanding and sensibility are "branches springing from the same unknown root." The *Criticism of Pure Reason* ends, therefore, in a kind of seesaw between two forms of consciousness—a thinking consciousness, which transcends experience and sets before us an idea of absolute reality, but which cannot attain to any knowledge or even certitude of any object corresponding to this idea, and an empirical consciousness, which gives us true knowledge of its objects, but whose objects are determined as merely phenomenal and not absolutely real.

The equipoise thus maintained between the empirical and the intelligible world is, however, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, overbalanced in favour of the latter. What the theoretical reason could not do "in that it was weak through the flesh," through its dependence on the very empirical consciousness which it sought to transcend, is possible to the practical reason, because it is primarily determined by itself. In our moral consciousness we find ourselves under a law which calls upon us to *act* as beings who are absolutely self-determined or free, and which, therefore, assures us that our intelligible self is our real self, and conclusively determines our empirical self in contrast with it as phenomenal. Thus the moral law gives reality to the intelligible world; or, as Kant expresses it, "the idea of an intelligible world is a point of view beyond the phenomenal which the reason sees itself compelled to take up, in order to think of itself as practical." In other words, the moral law presupposes freedom or determination in the rational being as such, and makes him regard himself, not merely as a link in the chain of conditioned existences in time and space, but as the original source of his own life. The blank space beyond the phenomenal thus begins to be filled up by the idea of a free causality which again postulates a world adequate and conformable to itself. And the man who, as an empiric individuality, is obliged to regard himself merely as an individual being determined by other individual beings and things is authorized as a moral being to treat this apparent necessity as having its reality in freedom, and to look upon himself as the denizen of a spiritual world where nothing is determined for him from without which is not simply the expression of his own self-determination from within. "Thus we have found, what Aristotle could not find, a fixed point on which reason can set its lever, not in any present or future world, but in its own inner idea of freedom,—a point fixed for it by the immovable moral law, as a secure basis from which it can move the human will, even against the opposition of all the powers of nature."[1] Starting from this idea of freedom, therefore, Kant proceeds to reconstruct for *faith* the unseen world, which in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he had denied as an object of *knowledge*. Nor is he content to leave the two worlds in sharp antithesis to each other, but even in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and still more in the *Critique of Judgment*, he brings them into relation to each other, and so gives to theoretical reason a kind of authority to use for the explanation of the phenomenal world those ideas which of itself it might be inclined to regard as illusive.

In all this, however, it is difficult to avoid seeing a partial retractation of Kant's first view as to the irreconcilable opposition of the phenomenal and the noumenal. For, in the first place, the moral imperative is addressed to a self which is at one and the same time regarded in both characters, and which is called upon to subsume under the moral law acts which otherwise derive their character and meaning from the relations of the phenomenal world. That the particular nature of men as phenomenal individuals can be the means of realizing the universal law of reason is implied in all Kant's statements of the latter, and particularly in his conception of men as constituting together a "kingdom of ends"; for it is difficult to conceive this kingdom otherwise than as an organic unity of society, in which each individual, by reason of his special tendencies and capacities, has a definite office to fulfil in realizing the universal principle that binds all the members of the kingdom to each other. The *summum bonum*, again, is said to consist in the union of happiness with goodness, *i.e.*, of the empirical conditions of man's individual life as a sensible subject with the pure self-determination of the intelligible self; and God is postulated as a *Deus ex machina* to bind together these two unrelated elements,—a conception which shows the difficulty into which Kant has brought himself by defining them as unrelated. Still more obvious is the effort of Kant to get beyond the dualism of his first view of things in the *Critique of Judgment*. For in that work he maintains that the consciousness of the beautiful and the sublime is or involves a harmony of the understanding or the reason with sense; and, what is still more important, he points out that the idea of organic unity, without which we cannot explain the phenomena of life, contains in it a possibility of the reconciliation of freedom and necessity, of the intelligible and the phenomenal. This idea, he argues, we are authorized by our moral consciousness to apply to the whole course of the things in the phenomenal world, and so to regard it as a process to realize the moral ideal. No doubt he again partially retracts this view when he declares that we must treat the idea of final causality as merely a *subjective* principle of judgment, which, even in the case of living beings, is to be regarded only as necessary for us as finite intelligences. But such saving clauses, in which Kant recurs to the dualism with which he started, cannot hide from us how near he has come to the renunciation of it.

When we regard Kant in this way as asserting from one point of view an absolute limit which from another point of view he permits us to transcend, it becomes obvious that his philosophy is in an unstable equilibrium, which cannot but be disturbed by any one who attempts to develop or even to restate his ideas. Hence we need not wonder that those who take in earnest his denunciations of any attempt to transcend experience generally,—like Professor Huxley,—reject as worthless all Kant's later work; and that, on the other side, those who take in earnest his ideas of freedom, of organic unity, of an intuitive understanding, and of a *summum bonum* in which freedom and necessity meet together, are compelled to break through the arbitrary line which he drew between knowledge and belief. In favour of the former course it is easy in many places to appeal to the letter of Kant. In favour of the latter it need only be pointed out that, in Kant's view, all experience rests upon, or is in its development guided by, those ideas which yet he will not permit us to treat as sources of knowledge. Hence the principles of the *Critique* cannot legitimately be used against metaphysic, except by those who are prepared to admit the ideas of reason, up to the point to which he admits them, as ideas that limit and direct our experience,—while rejecting all use of them to cast light upon that which is beyond experience. In other words, they must maintain the possibility of a purely negative knowledge, of the knowledge of a limit by one who yet cannot go beyond it. They must show how we can have an ideal of knowledge which enables us to criticize experience without enabling us to transform it; they must show how ideas of the supersensible can so far be present to our thought as to make visible the boundaries of the prison of sense in which we are confined, without in any way enabling us to escape from it.

Is this possible? We may gather up the Kantian antithesis in the assertion that experience is the imperfect realization of an ideal of knowledge, derived from reason, with materials, derived from sense and understanding, the nature of which is such that they can never be brought into correspondence with the ideal. But this ideal, in all its three forms, as we have seen, is simply the idea of a pure unity or identity in which all differences are lost or dissolved—whether they be the differences of the inner or of the outer life, or finally the difference of inner and outer, subjective and objective, from each other. Kant's view therefore is, in effect, this, that thought carries with it the consciousness of an identity or unity, to which our actual experience in none of its forms fully corresponds. On the other hand, Kant does not hesitate equally to condemn the identity of thought as "empty" and subjective, because it does not contain in itself nor can evolve from itself the complex matter of experience. But this alternate condemnation of experience as unreal from the point of view of the ideas, and of the ideas as unreal from the point of view of experience, seems to show that *both* are unreal, as being abstract elements, which have no value save in their relation to each other, and which lose all their meaning when separated from the unity to which they belong. According to this view, ideas and experience, noumena and phenomena, if they are opposed, are also necessarily related to each other. If our empirical consciousness of the world of objects in space and time, as determined by the categories, does not correspond to the unity or identity of thought which is our ideal of knowledge, yet that idea of unity or identity is set up by thought in *relation* to experience, and cannot, therefore, be essentially irreconcilable with it. The two terms may be opposed, but their opposition cannot be absolute, seeing that they are in essential relation to each other. It is a great logical error not to discern that a negative relation is still a relation, *i.e.*, that it has a positive unity beyond it. This positive unity may not, indeed, be consciously present to us in our immediate apprehension of the relation in question, but it is necessarily implied in it. Now it is just because, in his separation of noumena and phenomena, Kant omits to note their essential relativity that he is forced to regard the former as a set of abstract identities of which nothing can be known, and the latter as the imperfect products of a synthesis which can never be completed or brought to a true unity. Yet the value of his whole treatment of the ideas of reason in relation to our intellectual and moral experience arises from the fact that in practice he does not hold to this abstract separation of the two elements. Ideas absolutely incommensurable with experience could neither stimulate nor guide our empirical synthesis; they could not even be brought into any connexion with it. When, therefore, Kant brings them into this connexion, he necessarily alters their meaning. Hence the pure abstract identity which excludes all difference is changed, in its application, into the idea of an organic unity, of which the highest type is found in self-consciousness, with its transparent difference of the subjective and objective self. It would be absurd and meaningless to say that science seeks to reduce experience to an abstract identity, in which there is no difference, unless for this were tacitly substituted what is really an entirely different proposition, that science seeks to find in the infinitely diversified world of space and time that unity in difference of which self-consciousness has in itself the pattern. It is in reference to the former kind of identity—the abstract oneness of formal logic—that Kant proves that it is impossible for experience to be made adequate to ideas. But it is only of the latter kind of identity—the oneness of self-consciousness—that it can be said that it furnishes a guiding principle to scientific investigation or an ideal of knowledge. The same confusion is still more evident in Kant's account of our moral experience, in dealing with which he directly attempts to get synthetic propositions out of the pure identity of reason, in other words, to draw definite moral laws out of the logical principle of non-contradiction. Whatever success he attains is gained by substituting for the formal principle of *self-consistency* the positive idea of *consistency with the self*, and again by conceiving this self as a concrete individual, the member of a society, and so standing in essential relation to other selves. The pure abstraction from all the external results of action and from all motives of desire, which at the beginning of the *Metaphysic of Ethics* Kant declares to be essential to morality, is modified and indeed transformed, as we go on, by the admissions that other rational beings are *not* external to us in any sense that excludes their good from being an end of our endeavour, and that the desires are *not* irrational and immoral except in so far as they are directed to the pleasures of the sensuous individual (which in a conscious being they never entirely are). Both in the speculative and in the practical sphere, therefore, the absolute opposition of the ideal or noumenal to the empirical disappears, as soon as Kant attempts to apply it. For in both the abstract identity of formal logic, which is really the meaning of the noumenon as absolutely opposed to and incommensurable with experience, gives way to the unity of self-consciousness,—a unity which is so far from being *absolutely* opposed to the difference of the empirical consciousness that it necessarily implies it. For self-consciousness presupposes the consciousness of objects; though it is opposed to that consciousness, it is essentially correlated with it, and therefore its opposition cannot be regarded as absolute, or incapable of being transcended.

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[1] Kant, i. 638 (Rosenkranz's edition).

These considerations may throw some light on the relation of the *Analytic* and *Dialectic* of Kant, and on the nature of the opposition of noumenon and phenomenon as it is presented in the latter. In the deduction of the categories, Kant pointed out the essential relation of the objective world of experience to what he called the "transcendental unity of apperception"; *i.e.*, he pointed out that the unity of consciousness is implied in all its objects. This unity, he further showed, must be conceived as "capable of self-consciousness"; but it actually becomes conscious of self only in relation, though also in opposition, to the other objects determined by it. Now it is this consciousness of itself in opposition to other objects which is the source of Kant's "ideas of reason," of the dissatisfaction of the mind with its empirical knowledge, even in its scientific form, and of the demand for a higher kind of knowledge to which experience is not adequate. That a standard is set up for experience by which it is condemned is simply a result of the further development of that unity which is implied in experience—a result of the progress of thought from consciousness to self-consciousness, and of the contrast between the former and the latter. The problem with which Kant's *Dialectic* attempts to deal, and which it treats as insoluble, is, therefore, simply the problem of *raising consciousness to the form of self-consciousness*; in other words, of attaining to a knowledge of the world of experience as not merely a "synthetic," and therefore imperfect, unity of things external to each other, but as an organic unity of transparent differences, a self-differentiating, self-integrating unity, such as seems to be presented to us in pure self-consciousness. Nor can this problem be regarded as insoluble; for the unity of self-consciousness is identical with the unity of consciousness; it is only that unity become self-conscious. Hence the point of view at which consciousness and self-consciousness seem to be absolutely opposed to each other,—the highest point of view which Kant *distinctly* reaches,—can be regarded only as a stage of transition from the point at which their relative difference and opposition is not yet developed to the point at which they are seen to be the factors or elements of a still higher unity.

The later philosophy of Germany, from Kant to Hegel, is little more than the development of the idea just stated in its twofold aspect. In the first place, it is an attempt to show what is involved in the idea of thought or self-consciousness as in itself an organic whole, a many-in-one, a unity which expresses itself in difference, yet so that the difference remains transparent, and therefore is immediately recognized as expression of the unity. In the second place, it is an attempt to bridge over the difference between thought or self-consciousness and the external world of experience, and to show that this opposition also is subordinated to a higher unity. Or, to put it more directly, the idealistic philosophy of Germany seeks, on the one hand, to develop a logic or metaphysic which bases itself, not, like formal logic, on the idea of bare identity, but on the idea of self-consciousness; and, on the other hand, to show, in a philosophy of nature and spirit, how, by means of this logic, the opposition of thought to its object, or of the *a priori* to the *a posteriori* in knowledge, may be transcended. In the third and fourth sections of this article something more will be said of the manner in which this task was fulfilled. Here only a few words are necessary to sum up the results reached, and to give more distinctness to the new ideal of knowledge which those results suggest. We have seen that Kant's critical attitude involved two things,—on the one hand, the assertion that the existence we know is necessarily existence for thought, and, on the other hand, the denial that that which exists for our thought is absolute reality, a denial which again involves the presence to our thought of an ideal of knowledge, by which our actual knowledge is condemned. This ideal, however, was falsely conceived by Kant as an identity without any difference, and, in this sense, he does not hesitate to apply it even to self-consciousness itself. For, in a remarkable passage,[1] he attempts to prove that the consciousness of self is not a knowledge of the self, by a simple reference to the duality of the self knowing and the self known, arguing that the ego "stands in its own way," just because it exists only *for itself*, *i.e.*, because in knowing itself it presupposes itself. Kant evidently thinks that to know the real self it would be necessary to apprehend it in simple identity as purely an object without reference to a subject, or purely a subject without reference to an object. Yet to this it seems sufficient to answer that such an object or subject would lose its character as object or subject and become equivalent to mere being in general, and that, as such being is a mere abstraction, to know it cannot be the ideal of knowledge. If therefore there be a unity or identity of thought which is not realized in experience, and in reference to which we can regard experience as an imperfect form of knowledge, it cannot be found in this abstract identity of being. In truth, as we have seen, it is found in that very idea of self-consciousness which Kant is criticizing. Just because we are self-conscious, and therefore oppose the unity of the conscious self to the manifoldness of the world in space and time, do we seek *in* the world of space and time for a transparent unity which we cannot at first find there. But, when this is seen, we find in Kant himself the partial solution of the difficulty

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[1] *Kritik*, p. 279 (Rosenkranz's edition), *cf.* Hegel, v. p. 258.

Self-consciousness presupposes consciousness; for, while the apprehension of objects in consciousness is possible only in relation to the unity of the self, yet it is only in relation to and distinction from these objects that we are conscious of that unity. Hence the two opposites, self and not-self, are bound together, and presuppose a unity which reveals itself in their opposition, and which, when made explicit, must reconcile them. If, therefore, self-consciousness, in its first opposition to consciousness, gives rise to an ideal of knowledge to which our empirical knowledge of objects is inadequate, this arises from the fact that not only empirical knowledge but also the ideal to which it is opposed is imperfect, or that they both point to a unity which is manifested in their difference, and which is capable of containing and resolving it. In other words, the opposition of science to its ideal, which Kant has stated in his *Antinomies*, is not an absolute opposition, but one the origin and end of which can be seen.

This opposition reaches its highest point in the contrast between the transparent unity of self-consciousness, in which the difference of knower and known is evanescent, and the essential manifoldness and self-externality of the world in space, in which the differences seem to be insoluble. We must, indeed, think of self-consciousness as having life in itself and therefore as differentiating itself from itself; but this differentiation is held within the limit of its unity, it is a separation of movements which are separated only as they are united. On the other hand, the world in space presents itself as the sphere of external determination, in which things are primarily disunited and act only as they are acted on from without, and in which this external influence never goes so far as to destroy their reciprocal externality. In this sense it is that the opposition of mind and matter was taken by Descartes, and it is a survival of the same mode of thought that leads many even now to draw absolute lines of division between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, between ideas and facts, between spiritual and natural. Kant and Fichte give a new aspect to the difficulty by showing that the difficulty is one of reconciling consciousness and self-consciousness, and that in consciousness there is already present the unity which is manifested in self-consciousness, as, on the other hand, it is only through consciousness and in opposition to it that self-consciousness is possible. And Fichte made a further step when he attempted to show that the categories and the forms of perception, time and space, which Kant had taken as inexplicable facts, are implied in this contrast of consciousness and self-consciousness. The error that clings to Fichte's speculations is, however, that he treats consciousness merely as a necessary illusion which exists simply with a view to self-consciousness, and hence is led to regard self-consciousness itself—because it is essentially related to this necessary illusion—as a schema or image of an unknowable absolute. In fact, in the end Fichte falls back upon the abstract identity in which Kant had found his noumenon, and so ends his philosophy with mysticism. Even Schelling, though he saw that the absolute unity must be one that transcends the difference of self and not-self, did not finally escape the tendency to merge all difference in absolute oneness. On the other hand, it was the endeavour of Hegel to proceed in the opposite way,—not to lose self-consciousness or subjectivity in a mere unity of substance, but rather to show that the absolute substance can be truly defined only as a self-conscious subject. And just because he did this he was prepared to take a further step, and to regard the external world, not as Fichte regarded it, as merely the opposite of spirit, nor as Schelling regarded it, as merely the repetition and co-equal of spirit, but rather as its necessary manifestation or as that in and through which alone it can realize itself. His doctrine therefore might be summed up in two propositions,—first, that the absolute substance is spiritual or self-conscious, and, secondly, that the absolute subject or spirit can be conceived as realizing itself only through that very world of externality which at first appears as its opposite. In both respects Hegel's philosophy reverses the *via negativa* of mysticism, and teaches that it is only through the exhaustion of difference that the unity of science, of which the mind contains in itself the certitude, is to be realized. For mind or spirit, viewed in itself, is conceived as a self-differentiating unity, a unity which exists only through opposition of itself to itself. And it is but a necessary result of such a conception that spirit can fully realize its unity only through a world which in the first instance must present itself as the extreme opposite of spirit. Hence the process of thought in itself, which is exhibited in the logic, ends in the opposition to thought of a world which is its negative counterpart. And the "absolute spirit" of Hegel is thus, not pure self-consciousness, but that more concrete unity of self-consciousness with itself which it attains through and by means of this world.

The effect of this view upon the relation of metaphysic to science, which we are at present considering, is noticeable. It does not, as is often supposed, supersede science by an *a priori* construction of the universe, nor does it leave the results of science unchanged and simply provide for it a deeper foundation. The latter was the point at which Kant and Fichte stopped; for, while they showed the relativity of experience to the principle of self-consciousness, they conceived that the function of metaphysic is completed in showing the phenomenal character of the objects of science, and in reserving a free space beyond the phenomenal world for "God, freedom, and immortality." Schelling, on the other hand, as he did not adopt this merely negative view of the relation of spirit to nature or of *a priori* to empirical truth, was obliged to reinterpret the latter by the former. As, however, he did not recognize any distinctions which were not merely quantitative, he was led to apply the same easy key to every lock, and to think that he had explained all the different forms of existence, organic and inorganic, when he had merely pointed out a certain analogy between them. The metaphysic of Hegel, whatever may be said of the actual philosophy of nature produced by its author, contains no necessity for any such arbitrary procedure. In his *Logic*, indeed, he attempts to give us *in abstracto* the movement of thought in itself, from its simplest determination of being as qualitative or quantitative, through the reflective categories of substance and cause, up to its full consciousness of itself in its organic unity.[1] And in so doing he of course gives us an account of the various categories which science uses in the interpretation of nature. He further attempts to show that the highest categories of science are in themselves imperfect and self-contradictory,—in other words, that they mark a stage of thought which falls short of that unity of being and knowing after which science is striving, and which is the presupposition as well as the goal of all intelligence. But, while he does this, he clearly acknowledges two things,—on the one hand that nature is essentially different from pure self-consciousness, and that therefore logic can never by direct evolution of its categories anticipate the investigations of science, and, in the second place, that the final interpretation of nature through the highest categories presupposes its interpretation by the lower categories, and cannot be directly achieved without it. In other words, science must first determine the laws of nature according to the principles of causality and reciprocity, ere philosophy can be in a position to discover the ultimate meaning of nature by the aid of higher principles. "The philosophy of nature," says Hegel, "takes up the material which physical science by direct dealing with experience has prepared for it at the point to which science has brought it, and again transforms this formed material without going back to experience to verify it. Science must, therefore, work into the hands of philosophy, in order that philosophy in its turn may translate the lower universality of the understanding realized by science into the higher universality of reason, and may show how in the light of this higher universality the intelligible world takes the aspect of a whole which has its necessity in itself. The philosophic way of looking at things is not a capricious attempt, once in a way for a change, to walk upon one's head after one has got tired of walking upon one's feet, or to transform one's work-a-day face by painting it over; but, just because the scientific manner of knowing does not satisfy the whole demand of intelligence, philosophy must supplement it by another manner of knowing."[1]

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[1] This subject—the progress of thought from lower to higher categories and methods—will be more fully discussed in the third section.

The result then may be briefly expressed thus. Kant and his successors showed the relativity of the object of knowledge to the knowing mind. He thus pointed out that the ordinary consciousness, and even science, are abstract and imperfect modes of knowing, in so far as in their determination of objects they take no account of a factor which is always present, to wit, the knowing subject. For *their* purposes, indeed, this abstraction is justifiable and necessary, for by it they are enabled within their prescribed limits to give a more complete view of these objects in their relation to each other than if the attempt had been made to regard them also in relation to the knowing subject. At the same time the scientific result so arrived at is imperfect and incomplete, and it has to be reconsidered in the light of a philosophy which retracts this provisional abstraction. For it must be remembered that the fact that science looks at things only in their relation to each other, and not to the knowing mind, narrows the points of view or categories under which it is able to regard them, or, in other words, limits the questions which the mind is able to put to nature. Just because science does not treat its objects as essentially related to the mind, it is unable to rise to what Hegel calls the point of view of reason, or of the "notion"; *i.e.*, it is obliged to treat objects and their relations merely under a set of categories, the highest of which are those of causality and reciprocity, and it is incapable of attaining to the conception of their organic unity. In other words, it is able to reach only a synthetic unity of given differences, and it cannot discover a principle of unity out of which the differences spring and to which they return. Now philosophy goes beyond science just because, along with the idea of the relativity of things to the mind, it brings in the conception of such a unity. Its highest aim is, therefore, not merely, as Kant still held, to secure a place for the supersensible beyond the region of experience, but to reinterpret experience, in the light of a unity which is presupposed in it, but which cannot be made conscious or explicit until the relation of experience to the thinking self is seen,—the unity of all things with each other and with the mind that knows them.

2. *Relation of Metaphysic to Psychology.*—It has already been shown that the doctrine that the thinking subject is presupposed in all objects of knowledge—or, in other words, that existence means existence for a conscious self—is not to be taken in a psychological sense. The idea that all science is based on psychology, and that, therefore, metaphysic and psychology are identical, cannot be retained by any one who has entered into the full meaning of the Kantian criticism. It is, however, so natural a misinterpretation of it, and it is so much favoured by the letter of the very book in which it was first decisively refuted, that it will be useful to point out more directly the fallacy involved in it, especially as this will place us in a better position to determine the true relation of the two parts of philosophy thus confounded.

The misunderstanding first took a definite form in the introduction to Locke's *Essay*, in which he proposes to provide against any undue application of the intellectual powers of man to problems which are too high for them, by first examining and measuring the powers themselves. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the proposal involves an absurdity, for we have nothing to measure with, except the very powers that are to be measured. To see round our knowledge and find its boundary, we must stand outside of it, and where is such a standing ground to be found? We cannot by knowing prescribe limits to knowledge, or, if we seem to be able to do so, it can only be because we compare our actual knowledge with some idea of knowledge which we presuppose. In this way the ancient sceptics—and modern writers like Sir W. Hamilton and Mr Spencer who have followed them—turned the duality involved in the idea of knowledge against its unity, and argued that, because we cannot know the object except as different from and related to the subject, we cannot know it as it is in itself. Obviously in this argument it is involved that in true or absolute knowledge the object must not be distinguished at all from the subject,—to which the easy answer is that *without* such distinction knowledge would be impossible. The sceptic argument, therefore, lands us in the unhappy case pictured in the German proverb: "If water chokes us, what shall we drink?" The object cannot be known if it *is* distinguished from the subject, and it cannot be known if it is *not* distinguished from the subject. Obviously the one objection is as good as the other, and both combined only show that the idea of knowledge involves distinction as well as unity, and unity as well as distinction. The sceptic insists on one of these characteristics to the exclusion of the other, and condemns our actual knowledge because it contains both. In Kant there is undoubtedly some trace of the same fallacy, in so far as the idea by contrast with which he condemns the objects of experience as phenomenal is the idea of an abstract identity without any difference; but we have seen that with him this abstract identity is on the point of passing into an altogether different idea—the idea of self-consciousness as the type of knowledge.

It appears, then, that the idea of measuring our powers before we employ them rests on a paralogism; for what is really meant is that we abstract one of the elements of the idea of knowledge, and then condemn knowledge for having other elements in it. It is possible to criticize and condemn special conceptions as not conforming to our idea of knowledge; but it is not possible to criticize the idea of knowledge itself; all we can do is to explain it. It is possible to see the limited and hypothetical character of certain of our ideas or explanations of things, because we are conscious that in developing them we have left out of account certain elements necessary to the whole truth; but this criticism itself implies, as the standard to which we appeal, a consciousness of truth and reality, a consciousness which we cannot further criticize. Here, therefore, we come upon what must seem to all who think it admissible to question the very possibility of knowledge an inevitable reasoning in a circle. We can answer objections only by means of the very idea which they dispute. But the answer is nevertheless a good one; for the objector also stands within the very circle which he seeks to break, and has no means of breaking it except itself. As soon as he speaks, he can be refuted by his own words; for his doubts also presuppose that unity of the intelligence and the intelligible world which he pretends to deny.

The error, however, cannot be fully corrected until we consider what gives it plausibility. The confusion of the metaphysical with the psychological problem is due to the fact that the being who is the subject of knowledge, for whom all exists that does exist, appears to be one, and only one, of the many objects of knowledge. When we say that existence means only an existence for a thinking self, we seem to be identifying the whole world with the feelings and ideas of men, *i.e.*, with certain phenomena that belong to the life of a class of beings which only forms a part of that world,—phenomena, moreover, that are not exactly the same in any two of that class of beings. If we are to escape this difficulty it is obvious that we must be able to separate the conscious self or subject, as it is implied in all knowledge, from the nature of man as a being who "though formally self-conscious" is yet "part of this partial world," *i.e.*, one of the objects which we know along with and in distinction from other objects, and in whom "the self-consciousness which is in itself complete, and which in its completeness includes the world as its object," is only progressively realized.[1] Metaphysic has to deal with conditions of the knowable, and hence with self-consciousness as that unity which is implied in all that is and is known. Psychology has to inquire how this self-consciousness is realized or developed in man, in whom the consciousness of self grows with the consciousness of a world in space and time, of which he individually is only a part, and to parts of which only he stands in immediate relation. In considering the former question we are considering the sphere within which all knowledge and all objects of knowledge are contained. In considering the latter we are selecting one particular object or class of objects within this sphere,—although no doubt it must make a great difference in our treatment of this object that we have to consider it as existing not only for us but for itself. If nature "becomes self-conscious in man," it is impossible to treat man *merely* as one among the other objects of nature. But it is not less true that he *is* one of those objects, and, in this point of view, the department of science and philosophy that deals with his life is as distinct from metaphysic—which deals with the conditions of all knowing and being—as is astronomy or physics. In both cases we have before us objects which we may consider in themselves apart from their relations to the conscious subject, and in both cases we must take cognizance of these relations if we would have a complete and final view of those objects. It is possible to have a purely objective anthropology or psychology—which abstracts from the relation of man to the mind that knows him—just as it is possible to have a purely objective science of nature. Such a natural science of man, however, will necessarily abstract at the same time from the fact that in man is manifested that universal principle in relation to which all things are and are known. In other words, it will omit that distinctive characteristic of man's being in virtue of which he is a subject of knowledge and a moral agent. Hence the abstraction in this case is more likely to lead to positive error, more likely to produce not only an imperfect but a distorted view of the object. Inorganic nature, if we take it *in itself*, is not untruly viewed, under the categories of causality and reciprocity, as a collection of objects externally determined by each other; the error lies only in taking it as if it could exist in itself. Even organic beings do not suffer much injustice in being brought under such categories; for, though, as living and still more as sensitive beings, they involve in themselves and in their relation to the world a kind of unity of differences to which the categories of external relation imperfectly correspond, yet they are not such unities *for themselves*, but only *for us*. In other words, the principle through which they are and are known is still external to them. Hence also they are determined by outward influences, though these influences act rather as stimuli to what we may call the self-determined movement of their own life than as mechanical or chemical forces which change it. But in man, in so far as he is self-conscious,—and it is self-consciousness that makes him man,—the unity through which all things are and are known is manifested; and therefore he is emancipated, or at least is continually emancipating himself, from the law of external influence. Nature and necessity exist for him as that from which his life starts, in relation to which he becomes conscious of himself, against which he has to assert himself, and in the complete overcoming of which lies the end of all his endeavour. Nature is the negative rather than the positive starting-point of his existence, the presupposition against which he reacts rather than that on which he proceeds; and, therefore, to treat him simply as a natural being is even more inaccurate and misleading than to forget or deny his relation to nature altogether. A true psychology must, however, avoid both errors: it must conceive man as at once spiritual and natural; it must find a reconciliation of freedom and necessity. It must face all the difficulties involved in the conception of the absolute principle of self-consciousness,—through which all things are and are known,—as manifesting itself in the life of a being like man, who "comes to himself" only by a long process of development out of the unconsciousness of a merely animal existence

This problem first presented itself in a distinct form in the discussions of the Socratic school as to the nature of knowledge, discussions which turn mainly upon the relation of the conscious to the unconscious element in thought. Socrates, by his method more than by any direct statement, drew attention to the fact that all particular judgments in morals involve or presuppose a universal principle. At the same time he pointed out that, so far from this universal principle being known to those who are continually making such judgments, they are not even conscious of its existence. They constantly use general terms whose meaning they have never even thought of defining. The beginning of a rational life for them must therefore lie in their becoming conscious of their ignorance, *i.e.*, conscious that they have been all along judging, and therefore acting, on untested and even unknown assumptions. They must bring the unconscious universal to the light of day and define it, for until that is done it is impossible to live a moral, that is, a rational life. "Virtue is knowledge," *i.e.*, it is acting, not according to opinions, or particular judgments,—whose universal is unknown, and which therefore may be regarded as expressing merely the impulses or habits of the individual,—but in view of a universal principle determined by reason.

The onesidedness of this view—which absolutely condemns as vice all virtue that is not based on conscious principle—was partly corrected by another part of the doctrine of Socrates, who taught that knowledge is something that must be evolved from within the mind, and not merely communicated to it from without. For this implies that the moral principle may be present in men's minds, and may rule their thoughts and actions, long before they become directly conscious of it. They *are* rational although they have never thought about reason, and they

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[1] Hegel. vii. p. 18.

[1] Hume. vol. i. p. 131 (Green's edition).