

object only as it relates itself to the subject. It is this tension against each other of elements which yet are correlated and indissolubly united, this self-surrender to each other of elements which yet are maintained in their distinction, which constitutes the organic unity of thought in itself, and separates it from the mere abstract unity of mysticism. When, however, the concrete or self-differentiating character of the unity of self-consciousness is apprehended in this way,—so that it is impossible to confuse its indivisible unity with the simplicity of that which is one merely because it has no differences in it,—the problem of the relation of pure self-consciousness to the world in space and time ceases to be insoluble. Thought, as it is seen to have difference in itself, is no longer irreconcilable with the world of difference; nor is it necessary to introduce a foreign *ἄλλο* to make their connexion intelligible. For, as thought is a principle of difference as well as of unity, of analysis as well as of synthesis, and as it cannot realize itself in its unity except through the utmost development of difference, abstract self-consciousness, with its transparent or merely ideal difference, cannot be its ultimate form. On the contrary, the consciousness of self is possible only in distinction from, and in relation to, a world of objects. In other words, the unity of the thinking subject presupposes, not merely the opposition of the subjective and the objective self, but also the opposition of the self in its pure self-identity to a world of externality and difference. The pure intelligence, which is the *præ* of all things, must not, therefore, be regarded—as Aristotle regarded it—as merely theoretical, but also as practical. It must be conceived as a living principle, a principle which only in self-manifestation can be conscious of itself, and to the very nature of which, therefore, self-manifestation is essential. In this way Hegel—just because he grasped the concrete character of the unity of thought in itself—was enabled to understand the necessary unity of thought or self-consciousness with the world, and to heal the division of physics from metaphysics, which Aristotle had admitted.

Schelling and others who have raised objections to the Hegelian method have specially directed their criticisms against this transition from logic to the philosophy of nature, from pure self-consciousness to the external world in space and time. In doing so, they have practically fallen back upon the Aristotelian theory, with its opposition of God, as pure form, to the finite world. But this in effect is to deny that "the real is the rational" or intelligible, and to introduce into the world, as the ground of its distinction from reason, a purely irrational or contingent element. A modern follower of Schelling's later positive philosophy only draws the necessary consequence from this view when he teaches the pessimist creed that the highest good is the negation or extinction of the finite. Nor can we wonder that the same writer who denies that the absolute self-consciousness is essentially related to or manifested in the world should proceed to reduce this self-consciousness to a mystic identity which comes out of itself and becomes self-conscious only by an inscrutable act of will. The fact, indeed, that those who deny the possibility of a rational transition from self-consciousness to the world are forced by the logic of their position to reduce self-consciousness to an abstract identity may be regarded as a kind of indirect proof that the principle of self-consciousness, truly conceived, does involve that transition. Another step in the same direction may be made if we consider how the Cartesian philosophy treated the same opposition, which it also regarded as absolute. By Descartes mind and matter, thought and extension, are defined as abstract opposites, every quality of each finding its contradictory counterpart in a quality of the other. Mind is a pure self-determined unity, which is as it knows

itself and knows itself as it is, which has no discretion of parts or capacity of division or determination from without. Matter is essentially discrete or infinitely divided; it is a pure passivity; and all its determination comes to it from without. The world is therefore, as it were, "cut in two with a hatchet," divided into two unrelated existences, which are held together only by the will of God. Spinoza cuts the knot, and avoids the arbitrariness of this solution, by treating extension and thought as two attributes separated only in respect of our intelligence, but each expressing fully the absolute substance. And something like the same view has been revived in recent times, by writers like Lewes and Mr Spencer, who speak of feelings and motions as two opposite "aspects" of the same fact. When we ask, however, for whom these attributes or aspects are a unity, it becomes clear that the intelligence which is regarded as standing on one side of the dualism must also be taken as transcending it, and relating the two sides to each other. Moreover, the correspondence of the two attributes upon which Spinoza insists and their contrariety upon which Descartes insists, when taken together, give us the idea of a correlative opposition, *i.e.*, of an opposition of elements which yet are necessary to each other. If, therefore, they cannot be simply identified as Spinoza identifies them, yet they need no external bond such as Descartes introduces to combine them; for they cannot exist apart from each other. Their opposition is held within the limits of their unity, and is no absolute contradiction, but rather an opposition which exists only as it is transcended. In other words, it is an abstract opposition, *i.e.*, it is an opposition of elements which seem to be irreconcilable till it is observed that they are correlative, that each exists or has a meaning only as it relates itself to, or passes out of itself into, the other, and that each, held in its abstraction and separation from the other, loses all the meaning that it seemed to have. For, as in an organic body each member or organ lives only in tension against the others, yet only as continually relating itself to the others, so the utmost opposition of mind to matter, of the intelligence to the intelligible world, presupposes their unity, and is only the realization of it.

There is here, however, something more than an ordinary case of correlation, for in this unity of opposites mind appears twice, once as one of the opposites, and again as the unity which transcends the opposition. This ambiguity becomes most obvious in theories like that of Mr Spencer, who speaks of "two consciousnesses," which cannot be resolved into each other, but yet which strangely form inseparable parts of one and the same consciousness. What, however, is really involved in such a statement is that the external world, which in the first instance presents itself as absolutely opposed in nature to the subject whose object it is, is yet one with that subject, and that therefore the antagonism of mind to its object is only the last differentiation through which it realizes its unity with itself. In Hegel's language, that which presents itself as other than mind is its other—"an other which is not another," whose difference and opposition to itself it overreaches and overcomes. We must, therefore, regard the independence and externality of nature, its indifference, and even, as it seems, opposition, to the development of the moral and intellectual life of man, as merely apparent. For man, in this point of view, is not merely one natural being among others, but the being in whom nature is at once completed and transcended. If, therefore, at first he appears to stand in merely accidental and external relations to the other existences among which he finds himself, yet the whole process of his life—the process by which he comes to know the external world, and by which, reacting upon it, he makes it the means to the realization of individual and

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social life of his own—is the negation of this contingency and externality. In all this process he is showing himself to be a being who can only know himself as he knows the objective world, and who can only realize himself as he makes himself the agent of a Divine purpose, to which all things are contributing.

Such an idea of man's relation to the world is necessarily involved in any theory that goes beyond that subjective idealism or sensationalism which denies to him every object of knowledge except his own states of feeling, and every end of action except his own pleasures and pains. Recent speculation, indeed, has suggested a compromise by which this dilemma is supposed to be evaded, and mankind are represented as forming an organic unity in themselves, though they are still conceived as standing in an external and accidental relation to nature, the forces of which by their knowledge and skill they have subdued and are more and more subduing to their service. Such a compromise we find in the philosophy of Comte, the first writer who, starting from an apparently empirical basis, was able to break through the individualistic prejudices of the school of Locke. In the latter volumes of his *Positive Philosophy*, still more in his *Positive Politics*, Comte so far transcends individualism as to deny the externality of men to each other, and to declare that "the individual, as such, is an abstraction," and that in reality he cannot be separated from the social organism, which is thus not merely an extraneous condition of his development, but essential to his very existence as man. Thus individual men exist only through the universal—through the spirit of the family, of the nation, of humanity, which manifests itself in them as a principle of life and development. Yet this organic unity, according to Comte, is in contact with a world which in relation to it is external and contingent. Nature has not its final cause in man, but on the contrary is, at first, rather his enemy; and it is to humanity itself that the praise is due if to a certain extent the enemy has been turned into a servant. The unity of life which manifests itself in humanity cannot therefore be considered as a universal principle, as the principle of the whole universe, but simply as the principle of the limited existence of man, which is hemmed in on every side by external and, in the main, unknown conditions. If humanity therefore is an organism, it is an organism existing in a medium which has no reference to it is inorganic, *i.e.*, in a medium which has no essential relation to the life which animates man.

It is obvious, however, that this theory is an illogical attempt to find a standing ground between two opposite philosophies,—between the philosophy which treats man merely as a natural individual, placed among other individual beings and things, and which therefore regards his relation to them as something accidental and external, and the philosophy which treats him as a spiritual subject, a conscious and self-conscious being, and regards him therefore as having no merely external relations either to other men or to nature. Comte shrinks from regarding the world without us as the manifestation of that spiritual principle which is also within us, which constitutes our very nature as individual men, and therefore connects us with the world at the same time that it separates us from it. Yet he recognizes the existence in us of a principle which is so far universal that it constitutes a community between all men. He thinks that the individual can transcend himself, so far as to see all things, not indeed from a Divine point of view, *sub specie æternitatis*, but from the point of view of universal humanity, and that in conformity with this theoretical consciousness, he can live a practical life of altruism, *i.e.*, a life in which he identifies his own good with the good of humanity. But the philosophy that has gone so far must logically go further. It is impossible to treat humanity as

an organism without extending the organic idea to the conditions under which the social life of humanity is developed. The medium by aid of which, or in reacting against which, the organized being maintains itself is an essential part of its life; it remains organic only in so far as it can mould itself to its conditions, and its conditions to itself. This is true even of the animal organism in relation to its small circle of conditions, which, however, is part of a larger circle to which the animal has no relation. But a conscious being is a *universal* centre of relations; there is nothing which it, as conscious, cannot make part of its own life. Hence the application of the organic idea to it involves its application to the whole world. And, if the recognition of a universal principle manifested in humanity naturally led Comte to the idea of the worship of humanity, the recognition of a universal principle manifested in man and nature alike must lead to the idea of the worship of God.

The rationality of religion, then, rests on the possibility of an ultimate synthesis in which man and nature are regarded as the manifestation of one spiritual principle. For religion involves a faith that, in our efforts to realize the good of humanity, we are not merely straining after an ideal beyond us, which may or may not be realized, but are animated by a principle which within us and without us is necessarily realizing itself, because it is the ultimate principle by which all things are, and are known. This absolute certitude that we work effectually because all the universe is working with us, or, in other words, because God is working in us, can find its explanation and defence only in a philosophy for which "the real is the rational," and the rational is the real." And such a philosophy, beginning with the Kantian doctrine that existence means existence for a spiritual or thinking subject, must go on to prove that that only can exist for such a subject which is the manifestation of thought or spirit; and, conversely, that spirit or intelligence is essentially self-manifesting, or, in other words, that it cannot be conceived except as standing in essential relation to an external and material world. Finally, if nature be thus regarded as a necessary manifestation of spirit, it can be opposed to spirit only in so far as spirit in its realization becomes opposed to itself. In other words, nature must be regarded as, from a higher point of view, included in spirit. Nature exists that it may show itself to be spiritual in and to man, who transcends it yet implies it, who finds in it the necessary basis of his thought and action, but only that he may build upon it a higher spiritual life.

Nature is made better by no mean  
But nature makes that mean: so over the art  
Which, you say, adds to nature is an art  
Which nature makes."

Only the order of precedence suggested by these words must be inverted. For, as nature only is for spirit, so the spiritual energy which reacts upon nature is that which manifests for the first time what nature in reality is. It is the consciousness of this—*i.e.*, of the identity of that which is realizing itself within and without us,—the consciousness that the necessity which is the precondition of our freedom is the manifestation of the same spirit which makes us free—which turns morality into religion. For it is this alone which enables us to regard the realization of the highest ends of human life as no mere happy accident, or as a conquest to be won by the cunning of man from an unfriendly or indifferent destiny, but as the result towards which all things are working.

In this philosophy, which finds its most adequate expression in the works of Hegel, there are two things which may be distinguished—the general idealistic view of the world, and the dialectical movement of thought in

which Hegel develops and expresses it. And there are perhaps many at the present time who are prepared to accept the former, but who yet suspect, or even reject, the latter. And no doubt there is much in Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of Spirit*, and still more in his *Philosophy of Nature*, which there is reason to regard with distrust. In clever hands that are not checked by a sufficient consciousness of the whole, the Hegelian dialectic may be made into the means of producing a seeming proof of anything. Nor is it always easy to determine how far Hegel himself was tempted by an impatient consciousness of the universality of his method to employ it in cases where the conditions of its successful application were wanting. Sometimes he seems to forget, what he himself teaches, that science must first have generalized experience and determined it by its finite categories, ere it is possible for philosophy to give its final interpretation. Yet, when we realize the nature of that interpretation, and of the transformation of science which philosophy by means of it proposes to effect, it becomes clear that the dialectic of Hegel is no extraneous addition to his idealism, but is part and parcel of the same movement of thought. For this dialectic rests on the idea that thought or self-consciousness finds in its own organic unity the ultimate key to all difficulties in regard to the objects of thought and their relations to each other and to the mind. Self-consciousness, as has been already shown, is implicitly the whole web of categories which it throws over the world, and by aid of which it makes the world intelligible. All these it contains in itself; and, as it proceeds to determine the meaning of things, it simply produces its store, and exhausts itself on the object. Now, if it be idealism, in the strict sense of the word, to make thought or self-consciousness the principle and ultimate explanation of all that exists, it is obvious that we cannot separate idealism from such a dialectic as this, which is nothing more than the mind's consciousness of its own movement or process of self-affirmation. If to find thought in things be more than an empty word, then the movement or process which thought is must explain at once the transition from thought to what in opposition to it we call "things," and must give us the means of reconciling that opposition. In other words, the same movement by which thought determines itself as self-conscious, *i.e.*, as a unity realized through difference, must also be conceived as the explanation of the difference between pure thought and the world, and as the solution of that difference in the idea of absolute spirit.

Such idealism has a close relation to Christianity; it may be even said to be but Christianity theorized. It has often been asserted that Hegel's philosophy of religion is but an artificial accommodation to Christian doctrine of a philosophy which has no inherent relation to Christianity. If, however, we regard the actual development of that philosophy it would be truer to say that it was the study of Christian ideas which first produced it. What delivered Hegel from the mysticism in which the later philosophies of Fichte and Schelling tended to lose themselves, and led him, in his own language, to regard the absolute "not merely as substance but as subject,"—what made him recognize with Fichte that the absolute principle is spiritual, and yet enabled him with Schelling to see in nature, as the opposite of spirit, the very means of its realization,—was his thorough appreciation of the ethical and religious meaning of Christianity. In the great Christian aphorism that "he who loseth his life alone can save it" he found a key to the difficulties of ethics, a reconciliation of hedonism and asceticism. For what this saying implies is that a spiritual or self-conscious being is one who is in contradiction with himself when he makes his individual self his end. In opposing his own interest to that of

others, he is preventing their interests from becoming his; all things are his, and his only, who has died to himself. But if this be the truth of morality, it is something more, for "morality is the nature of things." We cannot separate the law of the life of man from the law of the world in which he lives. And, if it is the nature of things, as it is the nature of spirit, that he who loseth his life shall save it, the world must be referred to a spiritual principle, and the Christian doctrine of the nature of God is only the converse of the Christian law of ethics. To Hegel, starting from this point, a new light was thrown on the Fichtean treatment of the idea of self, and the Fichtean proof that the consciousness of self implies a relation to an object which is opposed to the self, and which yet from another point of view—since an object exists only for a subject—cannot be anything but an element of its own life. It was seen that this movement of thought is no mere fluctuation between contradictory positions, to be terminated finally by an *ipse dixit* of faith, but that the unity of the opposite elements is apprehensible by the intelligence, and that indeed it is its presence to the intelligence which makes the consciousness of opposition possible. It was in this sense that Hegel could say that that unity of opposites which had been called unintelligible by previous writers was just the very nature of the intelligence, and that only a view of the world guided by this idea could be properly intelligible, while every other view must contain in it an unsolved contradiction, an element that remains permanently impervious to thought.

The great objection to a metaphysic like this, at least an objection which weighs much in the minds of many, is that which springs from the contrast between the claim of absolute knowledge which it seems to involve and the actual limitations which our intelligence encounters in every direction. If the theory were true, it is felt we ought to be nearer the solution of the problems of our life, practical and speculative, than we are; the riddle of the painful earth ought to vex us less; we ought to find our way more easily through the entanglement of facts, and to be able to deal with practical difficulties in a less tentative manner. Yet there is really no antagonism between such a doctrine and a consciousness of the limitation of our faculties; nay rather, it is only on such a theory that a rational distrust of ourselves can be based. When Aristotle meets the warning that we should think finite and human things since we are finite and human with the answer that we ought rather, so far as in us lies, to rise to what is immortal and divine, he is not denying the limits of man's knowledge and power; on the contrary, he is rather pointing to the very principle which makes us conscious of those limits; for it is just because there is in man a principle of infinity that he knows his finitude, and, conversely, it is just in the consciousness of this finitude that he rises above it. A rational humility is possible only to one who has in himself the measure of his own weakness, and who, if he "trembles like a guilty thing surprised," is yet conscious that he is trembling before himself. This truth is often expressed by Kant with special relation to the moral consciousness, as where he contrasts the limitation of man, as a sensible being, occupying an infinitesimal space in the boundless world of sense, with his freedom from all limitation as a personal self, a member of the truly infinite world of intelligence. But it is not necessary to adopt Kant's abstract division of the sensible from the intelligible world to see that the consciousness of the greatness of the problem which has to be solved in human life and thought is deepened and widened by that very idea of philosophy which yet gives us the assurance that the problem is not insoluble, and even that, in principle, it is already solved.

(E. C.)

METAPONTUM, or METAPONTIUM (the first form is that generally found in Latin writers, but Thucydides, Strabo, and other Greek authors employ the latter form), was a city of Magna Græcia situated on the Gulf of Tarentum, near the mouth of the river Bradanus, and distant about 24 miles from Tarentum and 14 from Heraclea. It was founded by an Achæan colony about 700 B.C., though various traditions existed which assigned it an earlier origin. But according to the only historical account it was a joint foundation from Sybaris and Crotona, to which, as usual in similar cases, was joined a body of fresh settlers from the mother country, under the command of a leader named Leucippus. The object of its establishment was without doubt to strengthen the Achæan element in Magna Græcia, as opposed to the increasing power of the Tarentines, but at the same time to occupy a territory which was remarkable for its fertility. It was to this cause that Metapontum owed the great prosperity to which it attained at an early period, and appears to have continued to enjoy for several centuries, though it never assumed a prominent place in history. It was, however, one of the cities that played a conspicuous part in the political troubles arising from the introduction of the Pythagorean principles into the cities of Magna Græcia, and it was there that the philosopher himself ended his days. His tomb was still shown there in the time of Cicero.

At the time of the Athenian expedition to Sicily (415 B.C.) Metapontum appears to have been an opulent and powerful city, whose alliance was courted by the Athenians; but they contented themselves with a very trifling support. In 332 B.C., at the time of the expedition of Alexander, king of Epirus, into Italy, it was one of the first cities to espouse his cause, and enter into an alliance with him; and they appear to have in like manner lent an active support to Pyrrhus at a later period. Down to this time, therefore, Metapontum seems to have retained its position as one of the principal cities of Magna Græcia, and there is no evidence of its having suffered materially from the establishment of the Lucanians in its immediate neighbourhood. Nor have we any account of the precise period at which it passed under the dominion of Rome, or the conditions under which it became subject to the great republic. But it was the Second Punic War which gave the fatal blow to its prosperity. After the battle of Cannæ in 216 B.C. it was among the first cities in the south of Italy to declare in favour of Hannibal, and after the fall of Tarentum in 212 B.C. it not only received a Carthaginian garrison, but became for some years the headquarters of Hannibal. Hence, when the defeat of Hasdrubal at the Metaurus (207 B.C.) compelled him to abandon this part of Italy, and withdraw into the fastnesses of Bruttium, the whole mass of the inhabitants of Metapontum abandoned their city, and followed him in his retreat.

From this time Metapontum sunk into a poor and inconsiderable town; though it was still existing as such in the days of Cicero, it soon fell into complete decay, and Pausanias tells us that in his time nothing remained of it but a theatre and the circuit of the walls. All remains of these have since disappeared, but the site is still marked by the ruins of a temple, which occupy a slight elevation on the right bank of the river Bradanus, about 2 miles from its mouth. The surrounding plain, so celebrated in ancient times for its fertility, is now desolated by malaria, and almost uninhabited; and the remains of the city itself, between the site of the temple and the sea, are in great part buried in the alluvial deposits of the neighbouring rivers.

Some excavations were carried on upon the spot by the Duc de Luynes in 1828, and the results of his researches were published by him in a special work (*Métaponte*, fol., Paris, 1833).

METASTASIO (1698–1782). Pietro Trapassi, the Italian poet who is better known by his assumed name of Metastasio, was born in Rome, January 6, 1698. His father, Felice Trapassi, a native of Assisi, came to Rome and took service in what was termed the Corsican regiment of the papal forces. He subsequently married a Bolognese woman called Francesca Galasti, and established himself in business as a sort of grocer in the Via dei Cappellari. Two sons and two daughters were the fruit of this marriage. The eldest son, Leopoldo, must be mentioned, since he played a part of some importance in the poet's life. Pietro, while quite a child, showed an extraordinary talent for improvisation, and often held a crowd attentive in the streets while he recited impromptu verses on a given subject. It so happened that, while he was thus engaged one evening in the year 1709, two men of high distinction in Roman society passed by and stopped to listen to his declamation. These were Gian Vincenzo Gravina, famous for legal and literary erudition, famous no less for his dictatorship of the Arcadian Academy, and Lorenzini, a critic of some note. Gravina was at once attracted by the boy's poetical talent and by his charm of person; for little Pietro was gifted with agreeable manners and considerable beauty. The great man interested himself in the genius he had accidentally discovered, made Pietro his protégé, and in the course of a few weeks adopted him. Felice Trapassi was glad enough to give his son the chance of a good education and introduction into the world under auspices so favourable. Gravina, following a fashion for which we may find precedents so illustrious as that of Melanchthon, Hebenized the boy's name Trapassi into Metastasio; and this name remained with him for life. Gravina intended his adopted son to be a jurist like himself. He therefore made the boy learn Latin and begin the study of law. At the same time he cultivated his literary gifts, and displayed the youthful prodigy both at his own house and in the Roman coteries. Metastasio soon found himself competing with the most celebrated improvisatori of his time in Italy. Days spent in severe studies, evenings devoted to the task of improvising eighty stanzas at a single session, were fast ruining Pietro's health and overstraining his poetic faculty. At this juncture Gravina had to journey into Calabria on business. He took Metastasio with him, exhibited him in the literary circles of Naples, and then placed him under the care of his kinsman Gregorio Caroprese at a little place called Scalà. In country air and the quiet of the southern sea-shore Metastasio's health revived. It was decreed by the excellent Gravina that he should never improvise a line again. His great facility should be reserved for nobler efforts, when, having completed his education, he might enter into competition with poets who had bequeathed masterpieces to the world.

Metastasio responded with the docility of a pliant nature to his patron's wishes. At the age of twelve, while attending to classical and legal studies, he translated the *Iliad* into octave stanzas; and two years later he composed a tragedy in the manner of Seneca upon a subject chosen from Trissino's *Italia Liberata*—Gravina's favourite epic. It was called *Giustino*. Gravina had it printed in 1713; but the play is lifeless; and forty-two years afterwards we find Metastasio writing to his publisher, Calsabigi, that he would willingly suppress it. Caroprese died in 1714, leaving Gravina his heir; and in 1718 Gravina also died. Metastasio inherited from the good old man a property, consisting of house, plate, furniture, and money, which amounted to 15,000 scudi, or about £4000. At a meeting of the Arcadian Academy, amid the tears and plaudits of that learned audience, he recited an elegy on the patron who had been to him so true a foster-father, and then settled down, not it seems without real sorrow for his loss, to enjoy what was no inconsiderable