Zinc-methyl is a colourless liquid of 1·386 specific gravity at 10°·5, which boils at 46° C.; in contact with air it takes fire. Water decomposes it at once into hydrate of oxide of zinc and marsh gas, $Zn(CH_3)_2 = Zn(OH)_2 + 2CH_3H$. Of other reactions the following may be named. (1) When digested with sodium, it yields a precipitate of metallic zinc, and a double compound of itself and sodium-methyl. This latter unites readily with carbonic acid into acetate of soda, $NaCH_3 + CO_2 = CH_3—CO—ONa$ (Wanklyn). (2) With chloride of acetyl it forms acetone, $Zn(CH_3)_2 + 2CH_3.CO.Cl = ZnCl_2 + 2CO(CH_3)_2$ (Freund). (3) Under somewhat different conditions, including the presence of an excess of $Zn(CH_3)_2$, a compound is produced which with water, yields tertiary butyl-alcohol (Boutlerow):



$$CO(CH_3)_2 + Zn(CH_3)_2 = C(CH_3)_3.O.ZnCH_3 = A;$$
$$A + 2H.OH = Zn(OH)_2 + CH_4 + \underset{\text{Tertiary alcohol.}}{C(CH_3)_3 - OH}.$$

(W. D.)

METRONOME, an instrument for denoting the speed at which a musical composition is to be performed. Its invention is generally, but falsely, ascribed to Johann Nepomuk Maelzel, a native of Ratisbon (1772–1838). It consists of a pendulum swung on a pivot; below the pivot is a fixed weight, and above it is a sliding weight that regulates the velocity of the oscillations by the greater or less distance from the pivot to which it is adjusted. The silent metronome is impelled by the touch, and ceases to beat when this impulse dies; it has a scale of numbers marked on the pendulum, and the upper part of the sliding weight is placed under that number which is to indicate the quickness of a stated note, as M.M. (Maelzel's Metronome) 𝅗𝅥 = 60, or ♩ = 72 or ♪ = 108, or the like. The number 60 implies a second of time for each single oscillation of the pendulum,—numbers lower than this denoting slower, and higher numbers quicker beats. The scale at first extended from 50 to 160, but now ranges from 40 to 208. A more complicated metronome is impelled by clock-work, makes a ticking sound at each beat, and continues its action till the works run down; a still more intricate machine has also a bell which is struck at the first of any number of beats willed by the person who regulates it, and so signifies the accent as well as the time.

The earliest instrument of the kind, a weighted pendulum of variable length, is described in a paper by Étienne Loulié (Paris, 1696; Amsterdam, 1698). Attempts were also made by Enbrayg (1732) and Gabory (1771). Harrison, who gained the prize awarded by the English Government for his chronometer, published a description of an instrument for the purpose in 1775. Davaux (1784), Pelletier, Abel Burja (1790), and Weiske (also 1790) described their various experiments for measuring musical time. In 1813 Gottfried Weber, the composer, theorist, and essayist, proposed a weighted ribbon graduated by inches or smaller divisions, which might be held or otherwise fixed at any desired length, and would infallibly oscillate at the same speed so long as the impulse lasted; this, the simplest, is also the surest, the most enduring, the most portable, and the cheapest invention that has come before the world, and one can but wonder that it has not been universally accepted. Stöckel and Zmeskall produced each an instrument; and Maelzel made some slight modification of that by the former, about the end of 1812, which he announced as a new invention of his own, and exhibited from city to city on the Continent. It was, as nearly as can be ascertained, in 1812 that Winkel, a mechanician of Amsterdam, devised a plan for reducing the inconvenient length of all existing instruments, on the principle of the double pendulum, rocking on both sides of a centre and balanced by a fixed and a variable weight. He spent three years in completing it, and it is described and commended in the *Report of the Netherlands Academy of Sciences*, August 14, 1815. Maelzel thereupon went to Amsterdam, saw Winkel and inspected his invention, and, recognizing its great superiority to what he called his own, offered to buy all right and title to it. Winkel refused, and so Maelzel constructed a copy of the instrument, to which he added nothing but the scale of numbers, took this copy to Paris, obtained a patent for it, and in 1816 established there, in his own name, a manufactory for metronomes. When the impostor revisited Amsterdam, the inventor instituted proceedings against him for his piracy, and the Academy of Sciences decided in Winkel's favour, declaring that the graduated scale was the only point in which the instrument of Maelzel differed from his. Maelzel's scale was needlessly and arbitrarily complicated, proceeding by twos from 40 to 60, by threes from 60 to 72, by fours from 72 to 120, by sixes from 120 to 144, and by eights from 144 to 208. Dr Crotch constructed a time-measurer, and Henry Smart (the violinist, and father of the composer of the same name) made another in 1821, both before that received as Maelzel's was known in England. In 1882 James Mitchell, a Scotsman, made an ingenious amplification of the Maelzel clock-work, reducing to mechanical demonstration what formerly rested wholly on the feeling of the performer. Although "Maelzel's metronome" has universal acceptance, the silent metronome and still more Weber's graduated ribbon are greatly to be preferred, for the clock-work of the other is liable to be out of order, and needs a nicety of regulation which is almost impossible; for instance, when Sir George Smart had to mark the traditional times of the several pieces in the Dettingen Te Deum, he tested them by twelve metronomes, no two of which beat together. The value of the machine is exaggerated, for no living performer could execute a piece in unvaried time throughout, and no student could practise under the tyranny of its beat; and conductors of music, nay, composers themselves, will give the same piece slightly slower or quicker on different occasions, according to the circumstances of performance.

METSU, Gabriel, a Dutch painter of celebrity (born in 1630, died after 1667), is one of the few artists of renown in Holland whose life has remained obscure. Houbraken, who eagerly collected anecdotes of painters in the 18th century, was unable to gather more from the gossip of his contemporaries than that, as early as 1658, Metsu, at the age of forty-three, submitted to a dangerous surgical operation. The inference drawn by superficial readers from this statement has been that death immediately ensued. A more careful perusal would have shown that Houbraken knew that Metsu had given lessons to De Musscher in 1665. Local records now reveal that Gabriel was the son of Jacques Metsu, who lived most of his days at Leyden, where he was three times married. The last of these marriages was celebrated in 1625, and Jacomma Garnijers, herself the widow of a painter, gave birth to Gabriel in 1630. Connected by both his parents with art, Metsu was probably taught first by his father and then by Gerard Dow. He probably finished his training under Rembrandt. So far back as 1648, but a few days earlier than Jan Steen, who is said to have painted his portrait, Metsu was registered in the painters' corporation at Leyden; and the books of the guild also tell us that he remained a member in 1649. In 1650 he ceased to subscribe, and works bearing his name and the date of 1653 give countenance to the belief that he had then settled at Amsterdam, where he continued his studies under Rembrandt. His companions at the time would naturally be De Hooch and Van der Meer, whose example he soon followed when it came to his turn to select the class of subjects for which his genius fitted him. Under the influence of Rembrandt he produced the Woman Taken in Adultery, a large picture with the date of 1653, in the Louvre, in which no one would suspect the painter of high life or taverns were it not that his name is written at full length on the canvas. The artist who thus repeated the gospel subjects familiar to

Flinck and Eeckhout was also acquainted with the Oriental wardrobe of Rembrandt, and ready to use it, like all his contemporaries. But he probably observed that sacred art was ill suited to his temper, or he found the field too strongly occupied, and happily for himself, as well as for his admirers, he turned to other subjects for which he was better fitted. We may doubt whether he tried the style of allegory as illustrated in a picture of Justice Protecting Virtue and Chastising Vice in the gallery of the Hague. There is every reason to think that this rough and frosty composition was wrought by quite another master. What Metsu undertook and carried out from the first with surprising success was the low life of the market and tavern, contrasted with wonderful versatility by incidents of high life and the drawing-room. In each of these spheres he combined humour with expression, a keen appreciation of nature with feeling, and breadth with delicacy of touch, unsurpassed by any of his contemporaries. In no single instance do the artistic lessons of Rembrandt appear to have been lost upon him. The same principles of light and shade which had marked his school-work in the Woman Taken in Adultery were applied to subjects of quite a different kind. A group in a drawing-room, a series of groups in the market-place, a single figure in the gloom of a tavern or parlour, was treated with the utmost felicity by fit concentration and gradation of light, a warm flush of tone pervaded every part, and, with that, the study of texture in stuffs was carried as far as it had been by Terburg or Dow, if not with the finish or the *brio* of De Hooch. Metsu's pictures are all in such admirable keeping, and so warm and harmonious in his middle or so cool and harmonious in his closing time, that they always make a pleasing impression. They are more subtle in modulation than Dow's, more spirited and forcible in touch than Terburg's; and, if Terburg may of right claim to have first painted the true satin robe, he never painted it more softly or with more judgment as to colour than Metsu.

That Metsu married and became a citizen of Amsterdam in 1659 would only prove that his residence in the commercial capital of the Netherlands was later than historians have generally assumed. But there is no reason to think that Metsu claimed his citizenship at once. The privileges of a burgess were given in exchange for a payment of dues, and these painters had various ways of avoiding unless they married. One of the best pictures of Metsu's manhood is the Market-place of Amsterdam, at the Louvre, respecting which it is difficult to distribute praise in fair proportions, so excellent are the various parts, the characteristic movement and action of the *dramatis personæ*, the selection of faces, the expression and the gesture, and the texture of the things depicted. A tin can in the arm of a cook is a marvel of imitation, but the cook's face is also a marvel of expression. Equally fine, though earlier, are the Sportsman (dated 1661) and the Tavern (also 1661) at the Hague and Dresden Museums, and the Game-Dealer's Shop, also at Dresden, with the painter's signature and 1662.

Metsu is one of the painters of whose skill Holland still preserves examples, yet whose best pictures are either in England or in France or in the galleries of Germany. The value of his works is large, and at the Pommersfelden sale in 1867 the Jealous Husband Dictating his Wife's Letters, though but one of several replicas, was bought by Lord Hertford for little short of £2000, while for the Ride of the Prince of Orange, in the Gsell collection at Vienna, £3000 was paid by Baron Rothschild in 1873. (J. A. C.)

METTERNICH, Clemens Wenzeslaus, Prince (1773–1859), first minister of Austria from 1809 to 1848, was the son of a Rhenish nobleman employed in high office by the Austrian court. He was born at Coblentz in 1773. At the age of fifteen he entered the university of Strasburg. The French Revolution was then beginning. Everywhere the spirit of hope gave to men's language an exaltation and a confidence hardly known at any other epoch. But the darker reality soon came into view. Metternich was a witness of the riot in which the town-hall of Strasburg was pillaged by a drunken mob; his tutor subsequently became a member of the revolutionary tribunal in Alsace. If we are to trust to Metternich's own account of the formation of his opinions, the hatred of innovation, which was the ruling principle of his later life, arose from his experience of the terrible results which followed at this time from the victory of so-called liberal ideas. But in reality Metternich was an aristocrat and a conservative by birth and nature. His sentiment in things political was that of a member of a refined and exclusive society which trusts to no intelligence but its own, and hardly sympathizes with larger interests. The aggressions and violence of the Revolution from 1789 to 1799 gave Metternich an historical basis for his political theories, but the instinctive preferences of his own mind were the same from first to last. He began life as a young man of fashion and gallantry. His marriage in 1795 with the Princess Kaunitz, a granddaughter of the famous minister, fixed him in the highest circle of Austrian nobility. His first contact with the great political world was at the congress of Rastadt in 1798, where, under the auspices of the victorious French republic, arrangements were made for compensating the German princes and nobles whose possessions on the left bank of the Rhine had been ceded to France by the peace of Campo Formio. Metternich was the accredited agent of a group of Westphalian nobles; his private letters give a vivid picture of the rough and uncourtly diplomatists who had succeeded to the polished servants of the old French monarchy. In 1801 Metternich was appointed Austrian ambassador at Dresden, and in 1803 he was promoted to Berlin; but he had hardly become as yet a prominent man in Europe. His stay at Berlin was the turning-point of his life. The war of the third coalition was impending. Austria united with England and Russia against Napoleon, and the task of the youthful ambassador was to win over the court of Berlin to the cause of the allies. Metternich seems to have done all that it was possible for him to do; but Prussia persisted in its neutrality. The earnestness with which Metternich had worked against France did not prevent him from remaining on the friendliest terms with M. Laforest, the French ambassador at Berlin; and so agreeable an account of him was transmitted to Paris by his rival that, at the close of the conflict, Napoleon himself requested that Metternich might henceforward represent Austria at the Tuileries. Metternich was accordingly sent to Paris in 1806. This was the beginning of the period when Austria, humbled but not exhausted by the blow of Austerlitz and by the losses accompanying the peace of Pressburg, determined, under the leadership of Count Stadion, to prepare for another war on a greater scale. But the sudden overthrow of Prussia, and the alliance between France and Russia which was made at Tilsit in 1807, added immeasurably to the difficulties of the court of Vienna. It became clear that Napoleon was intending to dismember Turkey, and to gain for himself some part of the spoils of the Ottoman empire. Metternich's advice was that Austria should endeavour to detach the czar from the French alliance, and by this means frustrate the plan of partition; but, should Russia hold fast to Napoleon, that Austria itself should unite with the two aggressors, and secure its share of Turkey. Oriental affairs, however, fell into the background, and in the summer of 1808 Metternich was convinced that Napoleon was intending to attack Austria, though not immediately. He warmly supported Count Stadion's policy in raising the forces of Austria to the highest strength; and, although he did not share the minister's hopes in a

general rising throughout Germany, he expressed in his despatches no distrust of the power of Austria to cope with Napoleon. This is the more singular because, after the disastrous issue of the campaign of 1809, Metternich seems to have taken credit for having opposed the policy of war. Napoleon again captured Vienna; the battle of Wagram was lost; and after a long negotiation Austria had to purchase peace by the cession of part of Austrian Poland and of its Illyrian provinces. Metternich, who had virtually taken Count Stadion's place immediately after the battle of Wagram, was now installed as minister of foreign affairs. The first striking event that took place under his administration was the marriage of Marie Louise, daughter of the emperor Francis, to his conqueror Napoleon. To do justice to Metternich's policy it must be remembered that the alliance of Tilsit between France and Russia was still in existence, and that Austria was quite as much threatened by the czar's designs upon Turkey as by Napoleon's own aggressions. Metternich himself seems, in spite of his denials, to have been the real author of the family union between the houses of Hapsburg and Bonaparte,—a most politic, if not a high-spirited measure, which guaranteed Austria against danger from the east, at the same time that it gave it at least some prospect of security from attack by Napoleon, and enabled Metternich to mature his plans for the contingency of an ultimate breach between France and Russia. In 1812 this event occurred. Metternich, in nominal alliance with Napoleon, sent a small army into southern Russia, allowing it to be understood by the czar that the attack was not serious. Then followed the annihilation of the French invaders. While Prussia, led by its patriots, declared war against Napoleon, Metternich, with rare and provoking coolness, held his hand, merely stating that Austria would no longer regard itself as a subordinate ally, but would act with all its force on one side or the other. The result of this reserve was that Metternich could impose what terms he pleased on Russia and Prussia as the price of his support. The armies of these two powers, advancing into central Germany, proved no match for the forces with which Napoleon took the field in the spring of 1813; and the hard-fought battles of Lützen and Bautzen resulted in the retreat of the allies. After the combatants had made an armistice, Metternich tendered Austria's armed mediation, requiring Prussia to content itself with the restoration of its territory east of the Elbe, and leaving Napoleon's ascendency in Germany almost untouched. Napoleon, after a celebrated interview with Metternich, madly rejected terms so favourable that every Prussian writer has denounced Metternich's proposal of them as an act of bitter enmity to Prussia. On the night of the 10th of August the congress of Prague, at which Austria, as armed mediator, laid down conditions of peace, was dissolved. Metternich himself gave orders for the lighting of the watch-fires which signalled to the armies in Silesia that Austria had declared war against Napoleon. The battle of Leipsic and the campaign of 1814 in France followed, Metternich steadily pursuing the policy of offering the most favourable terms possible to Napoleon, and retarding the advance of the allied armies upon the French capital. Metternich had nothing of that personal hatred towards the great conqueror which was dominant both in Prussia and in England; on the contrary, though he saw with perfect clearness that, until Napoleon's resources were much diminished, no one could be safe in Europe, he held it possible to keep him in check without destroying him, and looked for the security of Austria in the establishment of a balance of power in which neither Russia nor France should preponderate, while Prussia should be strictly confined within its own limits in northern Germany. The assistance of the Austrian army, which was no doubt necessary to the allies, had, so far as related to Prussia, been dearly purchased. When, at the beginning of 1813, Prussia struck for the freedom of Germany, its leading statesmen and patriots had hoped that the result of the war of liberation would be the establishment of German unity, and that the minor German princes, who had been Napoleon's vassals since 1806, would be forced to surrender part of their rights as sovereigns, and submit to a central authority. This dream, however, vanished as soon as Austria entered the field as an ally. It was no part of Metternich's policy to allow anything so revolutionary as German unity to be established, least of all under the influence of Prussian innovators. He made treaties with the king of Bavaria and Napoleon's other German vassals, guaranteeing them, in return for their support against France, separate independence and sovereignty when Germany should be reconstructed. Accordingly, though the war resulted, through Napoleon's obstinate refusal of the terms successively offered to him, in the limitation of France to its earlier boundaries and in a large extension of Prussia's territory, the settlement of Germany outside Prussia proceeded upon the lines laid down by Metternich, and the hopes of unity raised in 1813 were disappointed. A German confederation was formed, in which the minor sovereigns retained supreme power within their own states, while the central authority, the federal diet, represented, not the German nation, but the host of governments under which the nation was divided. Metternich even advised the emperor Francis of Austria to decline the old title of German emperor, disliking any open embodiment of the idea of German unity, and preferring to maintain the ascendency of Austria by a gentle pressure at the minor courts rather than by the avowed exercise of imperial rights. In this unprogressive German policy Metternich was completely successful. His great opponent, Stein, the champion of German unity and of constitutional systems, abandoned his work in despair, and refused the useless post of president of the diet, which Metternich, with a kind of gentle irony, offered to him.

The second branch of Metternich's policy in 1813–14 was that which related to Italy. Following the old maxims of Austrian statesmanship, Metternich aimed not only at securing a large territory beyond the Alps but at making the influence of Austria predominant throughout the Italian peninsula. The promises of national independence which had been made to the Italians when they were called upon to rise against Napoleon were disregarded. In the secret clauses of the first treaty of Paris the annexation of both Lombardy and Venetia was guaranteed to Austria, and the rest of Italy was divided into small states as of old. Napoleon's return from Elba led to the downfall of Murat, who had been allowed to retain the kingdom of Naples, and to the reunion of this country with Sicily, under the Bourbon Ferdinand. After the second overthrow of Napoleon, Metternich endeavoured to make every Italian sovereign enter into a league under Austria's presidency. Ferdinand of Naples accepted the position of vassal, but the pope and the king of Sardinia successfully maintained their independence. With the construction of the German federation, and the partial construction of an Italian federation, both under Austria's guidance, the first part of Metternich's career closes. He had guarded Austria's interests with great skill during the crisis of 1813 and 1814. It was not his own fault, but the fault of ages, that Austria's interests were in antagonism to those of German and of Italian nationality. He thought as an Austrian, and as nothing else; his task was to serve the house of Hapsburg, and this he did with signal ability and success. To denounce Metternich as a kind of criminal, according to the practice

of Prussian writers, because he did not work for German unity, is to ignore the existence of such a thing as state-policy. Judged by the ordinary standards of practical statesmanship, not by the philosophy of history, Metternich's action in 1813 and 1814 was that of a very superior man; and the qualities of calmness and dexterity which he displayed would have given an infinitely greater effectiveness to the life of his great rival Stein, who in patriotic and moral enthusiasm was so far above him.

The second part of Metternich's career, which extends from 1815 to 1848, is that of a leader of European conservatism. It is difficult to describe his attitude towards almost all the great questions which were now arising as any but one of absolute blindness and infatuation. He acknowledged that exceptional circumstances in the past had made it possible for England to exist under a constitution; he knew that France would not surrender the *Charta* given to it by King Louis XVIII.; but in all other great states he maintained that there were no alternatives but absolute monarchical government and moral anarchy. His denunciations of liberals and reformers everywhere and at all times are perfectly childish; and in many instances his hatred of change led him into errors of judgment not surpassed in the annals of political folly. When Napoleon fell, there was a prospect of the introduction of constitutional government throughout a great part of Europe. King Frederick William, stimulating the efforts of the Prussian people against France by the hopes of liberty, had definitely promised them a constitution and a general assembly. The czar had determined to introduce parliamentary life into the kingdom of Poland, and even hoped to extend it, after some interval, to Russia. The Federal Act drawn up for Germany at the congress of Vienna declared that in every state within the German league a constitution should be established. Against this liberal movement of the age Metternich resolutely set his face. Though wide general causes were at work, the personal influence of the Austrian statesman had no small share in prolonging the existence of autocratic government, and in developing that antagonism between the peoples and their rulers which culminated in the revolutions of 1848. The nature of the Austrian state, composed of so many heterogeneous provinces and nationalities, no doubt made it natural for its representative to defend and exalt the principle of personal sovereignty, on which alone the unity of Austria was based; the relation of Austria to Italy rendered the growth of the sentiment of nationality a real source of danger to the house of Hapsburg; but Metternich's abhorrence of constitutional and popular ideas was more than the outcome of a calculating policy. He was not a man of much faith, but one belief he held with all the force of religious conviction,—namely, the belief that his own task and mission in the world was to uphold established authority. All efforts to alter the form or to broaden the basis of government he classed under the same head, as works of the spirit of revolution; and in one of his most earnest writings he places side by side, as instances of evil sought for its own sake, the action of the secret societies in Germany, the Carbonaria of Italy, and the attempts of the English to carry the Reform Bill. Working on principles like these, and without the shadow of a doubt in his own wisdom, Metternich naturally proved a great power at a time when the sovereigns who had inclined to constitutional ideas began to feel the difficulties in the way of putting them into practice. Metternich's advice, tendered with every grace of manner and with the most winning and persuasive art, was indeed not hard for rulers to accept, for he simply recommended them to give up nothing that they had got. It was at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) that the retrograde tendency, which was now succeeding to the hopes of 1815, first gained expression. An agitation among the students at the German universities had caused some scandal in the previous year, and secret societies had just been discovered in Russia. Metternich plied the king of Prussia with arguments for withholding the national representation which he had promised to his people, and stimulated the misgivings which were arising in the mind of the czar, hitherto the champion of European liberalism. A few months later the murder of Alexander's German agent, Kotzebue, by a fanatical student gave Metternich an excellent pretext for organizing a crusade against German liberty. A conference of ministers was held at Carlsbad. The king of Prussia allowed his representative to follow Metternich's lead. The resistance of the constitutional minor states proved of no avail; and a series of resolutions was passed which made an end of the freedom of the press throughout Germany, and subjected the teaching and the discipline of the universities to officers of state. A commission was established at Mainz to investigate the conspiracies which Metternich alleged to have been formed for the overthrow of all existing governments, and for the creation of a German republic, one and indivisible. In the following year new articles were added by Metternich's direction to the original Federal Act, the most important being one that forbade the creation in any German state of an assembly representing the community at large, and enforced the system of representation by separate estates or orders, each possessed of certain limited definite rights, and all alike subordinate to the supremacy of the crown. Metternich would gladly have made an end of the parliamentary constitutions which had already come into being in Bavaria and the southern states; but he was unable to attack them openly, and had to confine himself to the advocacy of strict monarchical principles through his representatives at these courts. With regard to Prussia, however, he was completely successful. The king of Prussia broke his promise of establishing a national representation, and satisfied his conscience by creating certain powerless provincial diets, exactly as Metternich had recommended him. Throughout Germany at large a system of repression was carried out against the advocates of constitutional right. The press was silenced; societies were dissolved; prosecutions became more and more common. While Metternich imagined himself to be stifling the spirit of discontent, he was in fact driving it into more secret and more violent courses, and convincing eager men that the regeneration of Germany must be sought not in the reform but in the overthrow of governments.

Meanwhile revolution broke out in Spain and Italy. Ferdinand of Spain, who had restored despotism, was compelled, in March 1820, to accept the constitution of 1812 which he had subverted. The same constitution was accepted a few months later by Ferdinand of Naples. Spain was outside Metternich's range, but his hand fell heavily upon Naples. A congress of the great powers was held at Troppau in October 1820. Metternich, who was president, as he had been at Vienna, and continued to be in later congresses, completely won over the czar to his own views. Resolutions in favour of an intervention, if necessary by force of arms, against the Neapolitan liberal Government were adopted by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, though England and France held aloof. The congress was then adjourned to Laibach in Carniola, whither Ferdinand of Naples was summoned, in order that he might mediate between the powers and his people, and induce the latter to give up a constitution which offended the three northern courts. Ferdinand's journey and mediation were an imposture as regarded the Neapolitans; he pretended that he went to negotiate on behalf of his people, when in fact his intention was exactly the same as Metternich's, namely, to

have absolute monarchy restored. The proceedings of the congress at Laibach were a farce. A letter was concocted by Metternich for King Ferdinand to send to his subjects, informing them that the powers would not permit the constitution to exist, and that, in default of their submission, the allied courts would employ force. The British Government, while protesting against the joint action of the three powers as an assumption of international sovereignty, was perfectly willing that Austria, as a state endangered by the Neapolitan revolution, should act on its own account. Metternich, however, continued to treat the Neapolitan question as the affair of Europe, and maintained his concert with Russia and Prussia. Early in 1821 an Austrian force, acting in the name of the allies, entered central Italy. The armies opposed to it collapsed, and the Austrians entered Naples on March 24. But in the meantime a revolution broke out in Piedmont, which threatened to cut off the Austrians from their supports, and to raise all Italy against them. For a moment the bold action of Metternich seemed to have resulted in immense danger both to his own conservative policy and to the peace of Europe; for it was believed that the Piedmontese revolution would be answered, not only by a general Italian movement, but by a rising against the Bourbons in France. The cloud, however, passed away. Order was quickly restored in Piedmont; Lombardy was safely held by Austrian garrisons; and the conclusion of the Italian difficulties, in which Metternich had played a very difficult part with great resolution and dexterity, was his complete and brilliant personal triumph. No statesman in Europe at this moment held a position that could compare with his own.

At the congress of Verona, held in 1822, the affairs of Spain were considered by the powers. In the end, the Spanish constitution was overthrown by a French invading army; but, though the arm employed was that of France, the principle of absolutism which animated the crusade was that which Metternich had made his own. A severe check, however, now met him in another quarter. Greece had risen against Turkish rule in 1821. The movement was essentially a national and a religious one, but Metternich treated it as a Jacobinical revolt against lawful authority,—confusing, or affecting to confuse, the struggle for national independence with the shallow and abortive efforts of political liberalism in Italy and Spain. Metternich's attitude towards the Greeks was for some time one of unqualified hostility. If, under the pressure of the Tilsit alliance, he had once been willing that Austria should join Russia in dismembering Turkey, he had now reverted to the principle of maintaining Turkey at all costs against a Russian advance southwards; and he attributed the Greek movement to the efforts of Russian agitators unauthorized by the czar. His desire was that the sultan should deprive Russia of all possible cause for complaint as regarded its own separate interests, and so gain freedom to deal summarily with the Greeks. Metternich's hopes failed, partly through the obstinacy of the Turks, partly through the wavering conduct of Alexander, and partly through the death of Castlereagh and the accession of Canning to power. It was in great part owing to Canning's moral support that Greece ultimately became an independent state; and the extraordinary violence of Metternich's language whenever he mentions this English statesman marks only too well the opposite character of his aims. No politician has left a more damning record against himself than Metternich in his bigoted abuse of Canning. The Greek question, however, was only the first on which the judgment of events was now beginning to declare itself against Metternich and all his principles. The French revolution of 1830 shattered the moral fabric which he had so proudly inaugurated, and in great part himself raised, in 1815. The accord that grew up between England and France now made any revival of the kind of presidency that he had once held in Europe impossible. He was indeed bold and rapid in throwing troops into the papal territory when revolutionary movements broke out there in 1831 and 1832, though war with France seemed likely to result from this step. He was as unsparing as he had been in 1819 in suppressing the agitation which after 1830 spread from France to Germany; and the union of the three eastern courts was once more exhibited in the meeting of the monarchs which took place at Münchengrätz in 1833, and in a declaration delivered at Paris, insisting on their right of intervention against revolution in other countries. It was, however, the new czar of Russia, Nicholas, who was now the real head of European conservatism; and the stubborn character, the narrow, unimaginative mind, of this prince made it impossible for Metternich to shape his purposes by that delicate touch which had been so effective with his predecessor. But in Austria itself Metternich continued without a rival. In 1835 the emperor Francis, with whom he had worked for nearly thirty years, died. Metternich, himself falling into the mental habits of old age, remained at the head of the state till 1848. The revolution of that year ended his political career. He resigned office with the dignity of demeanour which had never failed him; his life was scarcely safe in Vienna, and the old man came for a while to England, which he had not visited since 1794. Living on till June 1859, he saw every great figure of his earlier life, and many that had appeared on the horizon since his own prime, pass away; and a few more months of life would have enabled him to see the end of that political order which it had been his lifework to uphold; for the army of Napoleon III. was crossing the Sardinian frontier at the moment when he died, and before a second summer had gone Victor Emmanuel had been proclaimed king of Italy.

Metternich was a diplomatist rather than a statesman. His influence was that of an expert manager of individuals, not of a man of great ideas. All his greatest work was done before fifty; and at an age when most statesmen are in the maturity of their powers he had become tedious and pedantic. His private character was very lovable. He was an affectionate if not a faithful husband, a delightful friend, and a most tender father. The excessive egotism which runs through his writings gives perhaps an impression of weakness which did not really belong to his nature. Drawn by a firmer pen, the scene in which he describes himself labouring in the German conferences of 1820, while his favourite daughter was dying in an adjoining room, would have been one of the most affecting things in political biography. The man who could so have worked and felt together must have possessed no ordinary strength of character, no common force of self-control.

The collection of Metternich's writings published by his family under the title of *Denkwürdigkeiten*, along with French and English editions, contains letters and despatches of great value. The autobiography is not always trustworthy, and must be read with caution. Gentz's correspondence is of first-rate importance for the years 1813–30. Original papers are also contained in various German works upon particular events or movements, as in Oncken for the negotiations of 1813; Welcker, Aegidi, Nauwerck for German affairs in 1819 and following years; Prokesch von Osten for Eastern affairs. (C. A. F.)

METZ, the capital of German Lorraine, and one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, is situated at the confluence of the Moselle and the Seille, 80 miles to the north-west of Strasburg, and 190 miles to the east of Paris. It is the seat of a military governor, the judicial and administrative authorities of Lorraine, a Roman Catholic bishop,

Protestant and Jewish consistories, and a chamber of commerce. The general appearance of the town is quaint and irregular, but there are also many handsome modern streets. The Moselle flows through it in several arms, crossed by fourteen or fifteen bridges. In the south-west corner of the town is the esplanade, an extensive open space commanding a fine view of the fertile "Pays Messin" around Metz. The most interesting of the ten city gates is the Porte d'Allemagne or Deutsches Thor, a castellated structure erected in 1445, and still bearing traces of the siege of Charles V. Metz contains seven Roman Catholic churches, two Protestant churches, and a synagogue. The cathedral, with huge pointed windows, slender columns, and numerous flying buttresses, was begun in the 13th century, and finished in 1546, and belongs to the decadence of the Gothic style. The Gothic churches of St Vincent and St Eucharius, and the handsome garrison-church, completed in 1881, also deserve mention. Among secular buildings the most important are the large covered market, the town-hall, the palace of justice, the theatre, the governor's house, and the various buildings for military purposes. The public library contains 35,000 volumes, including an



Metz and Neighbourhood.
1. Palace of Justice. 2. Prefecture. 3. Cathedral. 4. Town-Hall and Governor's House.

extensive collection of works relating to the history of Lorraine. In the same building is the museum, which contains a picture gallery, a numismatic cabinet, and a collection of specimens of natural history. Metz also possesses several learned societies and charitable institutions, a gymnasium, three seminaries, and a military academy. The cemetery of Chambière contains the graves of 8400 French soldiers who died here in 1870.

The commerce and industry of Metz have not yet entirely recovered from the blow inflicted by the withdrawal of French capital in 1871. The principal articles of manufacture are leather, coarse cloth and canvas, gunpowder, arms, needles, billiard tables, hats, and artificial flowers. There are several large iron-works in the neighbourhood. The trade of Metz is chiefly carried on in leather, timber, wine, brandy, liqueurs, beer, preserved fruits, and hardwares. A large annual fair is held here. The civil population of Metz, which in 1869 amounted to 48,066, sank in 1872 to 33,134. Since then it has steadily increased, and in 1881 was 43,275, about half of whom were Germans. The garrison of Metz consists of 10,000 men, or including the surrounding forts nearly 16,000. The total of 58,813 includes 17,000 Protestants and 1600 Jews.