the interaction of these elements with their interpenetration as its infinite destination. The dualism is therefore not absolute, and, though present in man's own constitution as composed of body and soul, is relative only even there. The ego is itself both body and soul,—the conjunction of both constitutes it; our "organization" or sense nature has its intellectual element, and our "intellect" its organic element. There is no such thing as "pure mind" or "pure body." The one general function of the ego, thought, becomes in relation to the non-ego either receptive or spontaneous action, and in both forms of action its organic, or sense, and its intellectual energies co-operate; and in relation to man, nature, and the universe the ego gradually finds its true individuality by becoming a part of them, "every extension of consciousness being higher life." The specific functions of the ego, as determined by the relative predominance of sense or intellect, are either functions of the senses (or organism) or functions of the intellect. The former fall into the two classes of feelings (subjective) and perceptions (objective); the latter, according as the receptive or the spontaneous element predominates, into cognition and volition. In cognition being is the object and in volition it is the purpose of thought: in the first case we receive (in our fashion) the object of thought into ourselves; in the latter we plant it out into the world. Both cognition and volition are functions of thought as well as forms of moral action. It is in those two functions that the real life of the ego is manifested, but behind them is *self-consciousness* permanently present, which is always both subjective and objective—consciousness of ourselves and of the non-ego. This self-consciousness is the third special form or function of thought,—which is also called feeling and immediate knowledge. In it we cognize our own inner life as affected by the non-ego. As the non-ego helps or hinders, enlarges or limits, our inner life, we feel pleasure or pain. Æsthetic, moral, and religious feelings are respectively produced by the reception into consciousness of large ideas,—nature, mankind, and the world; those feelings are the sense of being one with these vast objects. Religious feeling therefore is the highest form of thought and of life; in it we are conscious of our unity with the world and God; it is thus the sense of absolute dependence. Schleiermacher's doctrine of knowledge accepts the fundamental principle of Kant that knowledge is bounded by experience, but it seeks to remove Kant's scepticism as to knowledge of the *Ding an sich*, or *Sein*, as Schleiermacher's term is. The idea of knowledge or scientific thought as distinguished from the passive form of thought—of æsthetics and religion—is thought which is produced by all thinkers in the same form and which corresponds to being. All knowledge takes the form of the concept (*Begriff*) or the judgment (*Urtheil*), the former conceiving the variety of being as a definite unity and plurality, and the latter simply connecting the concept with certain individual objects. In the concept therefore the intellectual and in the judgment the organic or sense element predominates. The universal uniformity of the production of judgments presupposes the uniformity of our relations to the outward world, and the uniformity of concepts rests similarly on the likeness of our inward nature. This uniformity is not based on the sameness of either the intellectual or the organic functions alone, but on the correspondence of the forms of thought and sensation with the forms of being. The essential nature of the concept is that it combines the general and the special, and the same combination recurs in being; in being the system of substantial or permanent forms answers to the system of concepts and the relation of cause and effect to the system of judgments, the higher concept answering to "force" and the lower to the phenomena of force, and the judgment to the contingent interaction of things. The sum of being consists of the two systems of substantial forms and interactional relations, and it reappears in the form of concept and judgment, the concept representing being and the judgment being in action. Knowledge has under both forms the same object, the relative difference of the two being that when the conceptual form predominates we have speculative science and when the form of judgment prevails we have empirical or historical science. Throughout the domain of knowledge the two forms are found in constant mutual relations, another proof of the fundamental unity of thought and being or of the objectivity of knowledge. It is obvious that Plato, Spinoza, and Kant had contributed characteristic elements of their thought to this system, and directly or indirectly it was largely indebted to Schelling for fundamental conceptions.

Schleiermacher's Ethics.—Next to religion and theology it was to the moral world, of which, indeed, the phenomena of religion and theology were in his systems only constituent elements, that he specially devoted himself. In his earlier essays he endeavoured to point out the defects of ancient and modern ethical thinkers, particularly of Kant and Fichte, Plato and Spinoza only finding favour in his eyes. He failed to discover in previous moral systems any necessary basis in thought, any completeness as regards the phenomena of moral action, any systematic arrangement of its parts, and any clear and distinct treatment of specific moral acts and relations. His own moral system is an attempt to supply these deficiencies. It connects the moral world by a deductive process with the fundamental idea of knowledge and being; it offers a view of the entire world of human action which at all events aims at being exhaustive; it presents an arrangement of the matter of the science which tabulates its constituents after the model of the physical sciences; and it supplies a sharply defined treatment of specific moral phenomena in their relation to the fundamental idea of human life as a whole. Schleiermacher defines ethics as the theory of the nature of the reason, or as the scientific treatment of the effects produced by human reason in the world of nature and man. As a theoretical or speculative science it is purely descriptive and not practical, being correlated on the one hand to physical science and on the other to history. Its method is the same as that of physical science, being distinguished from the latter only by its matter. The ontological basis of ethics is the unity of the real and the ideal, and the psychological and actual basis of the ethical process is the tendency of reason and nature to unite in the form of the complete organization of the latter by the former. The end of the ethical process is that nature (*i.e.*, all that is not mind, the human body as well as external nature) may become the perfect symbol and organ of mind. Conscience, as the subjective expression of the presupposed identity of reason and nature in their bases, guarantees the practicability of our moral vocation. Nature is preordained or constituted to become the symbol and organ of mind, just as mind is endowed with the impulse to realize this end. But the moral law must not be conceived under the form of an "imperative" or a "*Sollen*"; it differs from a law of nature only as being descriptive of the fact that it ranks the mind as conscious will, or *zweckdenkend*, above nature. Strictly speaking, the antitheses of good and bad and of free and necessary have no place in an ethical system, but simply in history, which is obliged to compare the actual with the ideal, but as far as the terms "good" and "bad" are used in morals they express the rule or the contrary of reason, or the harmony or the contrary of the particular and the general. The idea of "free" as opposed to necessary expresses simply the fact that the mind can propose to itself ends, though a man cannot alter his own nature. In contrast to Kant and Fichte and modern moral philosophers Schleiermacher reintroduced and assigned pre-eminent importance to the doctrine of the *summum bonum*, or highest good. It represents in his system the ideal and aim of the entire life of man, supplying the ethical view of the conduct of individuals in relation to society and the universe, and therewith constituting a philosophy of history at the same time. Starting with the idea of the highest good and of its constituent elements (*Güter*), or the chief forms of the union of mind and nature, Schleiermacher's system divides itself into the doctrine of moral ends, the doctrine of virtue, and the doctrine of duties; in other words, as a development of the idea of the subjection of nature to reason it becomes a description of the actual forms of the triumphs of reason, of the moral power manifested therein, and of the specific methods employed. Every moral good or product has a fourfold character: it is individual and universal; it is an organ and symbol of the reason, that is, it is the product of the individual with relation to the community, and represents or manifests as well as classifies and rules nature. The first two characteristics provide for the functions and rights of the individual as well as those of the community or race. Though a moral action may have these four characteristics at various degrees of strength, it ceases to be moral if one of them is quite absent. All moral products may be classified according to the predominance of one or the other of these characteristics. Universal organizing action produces the forms of intercourse, and universal symbolizing action produces the various forms of science; individual organizing action yields the forms of property and individual symbolizing action the various representations of feeling, all these constituting the relations, the productive spheres, or the social conditions of moral action. Moral functions cannot be performed by the individual in isolation but only in his relation to the family, the state, the school, the church, and society,—all forms of human life which ethical science finds to its hand and leaves to the science of natural history to account for. The moral process is accomplished by the various sections of humanity in their individual spheres, and the doctrine of virtue deals with the reason as the moral power in each individual by which the totality of moral products is obtained. Schleiermacher classifies the virtues under the two forms of *Gesinnung* and *Fertigkeit*, the first consisting of the pure ideal element in action and the second the form it assumes in relation to circumstances, each of the two classes falling respectively into the two divisions of wisdom and love and of intelligence and application. In his system the doctrine of duty is the description of the method of the attainment of ethical ends, the conception of duty as an imperative, or obligation, being excluded, as we have seen. No action fulfils the conditions of duty except as it combines the three following antitheses: reference to the moral idea in its whole extent and likewise to a definite moral sphere; connexion with existing conditions and at the same time absolute personal production; the fulfilment of the entire moral vocation every moment though

it can only be done in a definite sphere. Duties are divided with reference to the principle that every man make his own the entire moral problem and act at the same time in an existing moral society. This condition gives four general classes of duty: duties of general association or duties with reference to the community (*Rechtspflicht*), and duties of vocation (*Berufspflicht*)—both with a universal reference, duties of the conscience (in which the individual is sole judge), and duties of love or of personal association. It was only the first of the three sections of the science of ethics —the doctrine of moral ends—that Schleiermacher handled with approximate completeness; the other two sections were treated very summarily. In his *Christian Ethics* he dealt with the subject from the basis of the Christian consciousness instead of from that of reason generally; the ethical phenomena dealt with are the same in both systems, and they throw light on each other, while the Christian system treats more at length and less aphoristically the principal ethical realities—church, state, family, art, science, and society. Rothe, amongst other moral philosophers, bases his system substantially, with important departures, on Schleiermacher's. In Beneke's moral system his fundamental idea was worked out in its psychological relations.

Schleiermacher's Religious System.—From Leibnitz, Lessing, Fichte, Jacobi, and the Romantic school he had imbibed a profound and mystical view of the inner depths of the human personality. The ego, the person, is an individualization of universal reason; and the primary act of self-consciousness is the first conjunction of universal and individual life, the immediate union or marriage of the universe with incarnated reason. Thus every person becomes a specific and original representation of the universe and a compendium of humanity, a microcosmos in which the world is immediately reflected. While therefore we cannot, as we have seen, attain the idea of the supreme unity of thought and being by either cognition or volition, we can find it in our own personality, in immediate self-consciousness or (which is the same in Schleiermacher's terminology) feeling. Feeling in this higher sense (as distinguished from "organic" sensibility, *Empfindung*), which is the minimum of distinct antithetic consciousness, the cessation of the antithesis of subject and object, constitutes likewise the unity of our being, in which the opposite functions of cognition and volition have their fundamental and permanent background of personality and their transitional link. Having its seat in this central point of our being, or indeed consisting in the essential fact of self-consciousness, religion lies at the basis of all thought and action. At various periods of his life Schleiermacher used different terms to represent the character and relation of religious feeling. In his earlier days he called it a feeling or intuition of the universe, consciousness of the unity of reason and nature, of the infinite and the eternal within the finite and the temporal. In later life he described it as the feeling of absolute dependence, or, as meaning the same thing, the consciousness of being in relation to God. In our consciousness of the world the feelings of relative dependence and relative independence are found; we are acted upon, but we also react. In our religious consciousness the latter element is excluded, and everything within and without us is referred to its absolute cause, that is, God. But, when we call this absolute cause God, the name stands solely as indicating the unknown *source* of our receptive and active existence; on the one hand it means that the world upon which we can react is not the source of the feeling, on the other, that the Absolute is not an object of thought or knowledge. This feeling of absolute dependence can arise only in combination with other forms of consciousness. We derive the idea of a totality by means of its parts, and the transcendental basis of being comes to us through the agency of individual phenomena. As in every affection of our being by individual phenomena we are brought into contact with the whole universe, we are brought into contact with God at the same time as its transcendental cause. This religious feeling is not knowledge in the strict sense, as it is purely subjective or immediate; but it lies at the basis of all knowledge. As immediate knowledge, however, it is no more than the consciousness of the unity of the world, a unity which can never be reached by human inquiry. Religious truths, such as the determination of all things by God, are simply the implications of the feeling of absolute dependence. While that feeling is the characteristic of religion generally, this assumes various forms as the religions of the world. The so-called natural as distinguished from positive religion, or the religion of reason, is a mere abstraction. All religions are positive, or their characteristics and value are mainly determined by the manner in which the world is conceived and imagined. But these varying conceptions with their religious meaning become religiously productive only in the souls of religious heroes, who are the authors of new religions, mediators of the religious life, founders of religious communities. For religion is essentially social. It everywhere forms churches, which are the necessary instruments and organs of its highest life. The specific feature of Christianity is its mediatorial element, its profound feeling of the striving of the finite individual to reach the unity of the infinite whole, and its conception of the way in which Deity deals with this effort by mediatorial agencies, which are both divine and human. It is the religion of mediatorial salvation, and, as Schleiermacher emphatically taught in his riper works, of salvation through the mediation of Christ; that is, its possessors are conscious of having been delivered by Jesus of Nazareth from a condition in which their religious consciousness was overridden by the sense-consciousness of the world and put into one in which it dominates, and everything is subordinated to it. The consciousness of being saved in this sense is now transmitted and mediated by the Christian church, but in the case of Jesus, its originator, it was an entirely new and original factor in the process of religious development, and in so far, like every new and higher stage of being, a supernatural revelation. It was at the same time a natural attainment, in as far as man's nature and the universe were so constituted as to involve its production. The appearance of the Saviour in human history is therefore as a divine revelation neither absolutely supernatural nor absolutely beyond reason, and the controversy of the 18th century between the rationalists and supernaturalists rests on false grounds, leads to wrong issues, and each party is right and wrong (see RATIONALISM). As regards Christian theology, it is not its business to formulate and establish a system of objective truth, but simply to present in a clear and connected form a given body of Christian faith as the contents of the Christian consciousness. Dogmatic theology is a connected and accurate account of the doctrine held at a particular time in a given section of the Christian church. But such doctrines as constitute no integral part of the Christian consciousness—*e.g.*, the doctrine of the Trinity—must be excluded from the theological system of the evangelical theologian. As regards the relation of theology and philosophy, it is not one of dependence or of opposition on either side, but of complete independence, equal authority, distinct functions, and perfect harmony. Feeling is not a mental function subordinate to cognition or volition, but of equal rank and authority; yet feeling, cognition, and volition alike conduct to faith in the unknown Absolute, though by different paths and processes.

The marked feature of Schleiermacher's thought in every department is the effort to combine and reconcile in the unity of a system the antithetic conceptions of other thinkers. He is realistic and idealistic, individualistic and universalistic, monistic and dualistic, sensationalist and intellectualist, naturalist and supernaturalist, rationalist and mystic, gnostic and agnostic. He is the prince of the *Vermittler* in philosophy, ethics, religion, and theology. But he does not seek to reconcile the antitheses of thought and being by weakening and hiding the points of difference; on the contrary, he brings them out in their sharpest outlines. His method is to distinctly define the opposing elements and then to seek their harmonious combination by the aid of a deeper conception. Apart from the positive and permanent value of the higher unities which he succeeds in establishing, the light and suggestiveness of his discussions and treatment of the great points at issue in all the principal fields of human thought, unsatisfactory as many of his positions may be considered, make him one of the most helpful and instructive of modern thinkers. And, since the focus of his almost universal thought and inquiry and of his rich culture and varied life was religion and theology, he must be regarded as the classical representative of modern effort to reconcile science and philosophy with religion and theology, and the modern world with the Christian church.

Schleiermacher's collected works have been published in three sections: I. Theological, II. Sermons, III. Philosophical and Miscellaneous, Berlin, 1835-64, in 30 vols. Of lives of him the best are his own correspondence, *Aus Schleiermacher's Leben in Briefen*, published by W. Dilthey (Berlin, 1858-1863, in 4 vols., Eng. transl. by Rowan); *Leben Schleiermacher's* by Wilhelm Dilthey (vol. i., the period from 1768-1804, all published as yet); *Friedrich Schleiermacher, ein Lebens- u. Charakterbild*, by D. Schenkel (Elberfeld, 1868). The accounts and critiques of his philosophy, ethics, and theology are numerous; some of the most valuable are—J. Schaller, *Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher* (Halle, 1844); Weissenborn, *Darstellung und Kritik der Schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre* (1849); Siegwart, "Schleiermacher's Erkenntnisstheorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Glaubenslehre," in the *Jahrb. f. Deut. Theol.*, vol. ii. pp. 267-327, 829-864; Zeller, "Schleiermacher's Lehre von der Persönlichkeit Gottes," in the *Theol. Jahrbb.*, 1842, pp. 263 *sq.*; F. Vorländer, *Schleiermacher's Sittenlehre* (Marburg, 1851); W. Bender, *Schleiermachers Theologie mit ihren philosophischen Grundlagen* (1876-78). See also the histories of philosophy and theology by Zeller, Ueberweg, Chalybæus, Dorner, and Gass, and the article by the last-named in Herzog's *Encyklopädie*. (J. F. S.)

SCHLESWIG (Danish *Slesvig*), the capital of the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, is situated at the west end of the long narrow arm of the sea called the Schlei, 30 miles to the north-west of Kiel. The town consists mainly of a single street, 3½ miles long, forming a semicircle round the Schlei, and is divided into the Altstadt (with the Holm), the Lollfuss, and the Friedrichsberg. The principal church, erected as a cathedral about 1100, but renewed in the Gothic style in the 15th century, contains a very fine carved oak altar-screen, regarded as the most valuable work of art in

Schleswig-Holstein. Between Friedrichsberg and Lollfuss is the old chateau of Gottorp, now despoiled of its art treasures and used as barracks. The former commercial importance of the town has disappeared, and the Schlei now affords access to small vessels only. Fishing and the manufacture of a few articles of common use are the chief occupations of the inhabitants. The population in 1885 was 15,187, all Protestants except about 250 Roman Catholics and 70 Jews.

Schleswig (ancient forms *Sliesthorp*, *Sliaswic*, *i.e.*, the town or bay of the Slia or Schlei) is a town of very remote origin, and seems to have been a trading place of considerable importance as early as the 9th century. It served as a medium of commercial intercourse between the North Sea and the Baltic, and was known to the old Arabian geographers. The first Christian church in this district was built here by Ansgarius about 850, and it became the seat of a bishop about a century later. The town also became the seat of the dukes of Schleswig, but its commerce gradually dwindled owing to the rivalry of Lübeck, the numerous wars in which the district was involved, and the silting up of the Schlei. At the partition of 1544 the old chateau of Gottorp, originally built in 1160 for the bishop, became the residence of the ducal or Gottorp line of Schleswig-Holstein, which remained here till expelled by Frederick IV. in 1713. From 1731 to 1846 it was the seat of the Danish governors of the duchies. In the wars of 1848 and 1864 Schleswig was an important strategical point on account of its proximity to the Danewerk, and was occupied by the different contending parties in turn. It has been the capital of Schleswig-Holstein since its incorporation by Prussia.

To the south of Schleswig are the scanty remains of the *Danewerk* or *Dannewirke*, a line of entrenchments between the Schlei and the Treene, believed to have been originally thrown up in the 9th century or even earlier, and afterwards repeatedly strengthened and enlarged. After the union of Schleswig and Holstein it lost its importance as a frontier defence, and was allowed to fall into disrepair. The Danewerk was stormed by the Prussians in 1848, but was afterwards so greatly extended and strengthened by the Danes that it would have been almost impregnable if defended by a sufficient number of troops. In the war of 1864, however, the Danish army was far too small for this task, and General de Meza abandoned the Danewerk without striking a blow, a step which caused deep disappointment to the Danes and led to the dismissal of the general. Since then the works have been entirely levelled.

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, a maritime province in the north-west of Prussia, formed out of the once Danish duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, is bounded on the W. by the German Ocean, on the N. by Jutland, on the E. by the Baltic, Lübeck, and Mecklenburg, and on the S. by Mecklenburg and the lower course of the Elbe (separating it from Hanover). It thus consists of the southern half of the Cimbric peninsula, and forms the connecting link between Germany and Denmark. In addition to the mainland, which decreases in breadth from south to north, the province includes several islands, the most important being Alsen and Fehmarn in the Baltic, and Röm, Sylt, and Föhr in the North Sea. The total area of the province is 7280 square miles, 450 of which belong to the small duchy of Lauenburg in the south-east corner, while the rest are divided almost equally between Holstein to the south of the Eider and Schleswig to the north of it. From north to south the province is about 140 miles long, while its breadth varies from 90 miles in Holstein to 35 miles at the narrower parts of Schleswig.

Schleswig-Holstein belongs to the great North-German plain, of the characteristic features of which it affords a faithful reproduction in miniature, down to the continuation of the Baltic ridge or plateau (see GERMANY) by a range of low wooded hills skirting its eastern coast and culminating in the Bungsberg (570 feet), a little to the north of Eutin. This hilly district contains the most productive land in the province, the soil consisting of diluvial drift or boulder clay. The central part of the province forms practically a continuation of the great Lüneburg Heath, and its thin sandy soil is of little use in cultivation. Along the west coast extends the "Marsh-land," a belt of rich alluvial soil formed by the deposits of the German Ocean, and varying in breadth from five to fifteen miles. It is seldom more than a few feet above the sea-level, while at places it is actually below it, and it has consequently to be defended by an extensive system of dykes or embankments, 25 feet high, resembling those of Holland. The more ancient geological formations are scarcely met with in Schleswig-Holstein. The contrast between the two coast-lines of the province is very marked. The Baltic coast, about 300 miles in length, has generally steep well-defined banks and is very irregular in form, being pierced by numerous long and narrow fjords, which run deep into the interior of the land and often afford excellent harbours. The islands of Alsen and Fehmarn are separated from the coast by very narrow channels. The North Sea coast (200 miles), on the other hand, is very low and flat, and its smooth outline is interrupted only by the estuary of the Eider and the peninsula of Eiderstedt. Dunes or sand-hills, though rare on the protected mainland, occur on Sylt and other islands, while the small unprotected islands called "Halligen" are being gradually washed away by the sea. The numerous islands on the west coast probably formed part of the peninsula at no very remote period, and the sea between them and the mainland is very shallow and full of sandbanks. The climate of Schleswig-Holstein is mainly determined by the proximity of the sea, and the mean annual temperature, varying from 45° Fahr. in the north to 49° Fahr. in the south, is rather higher than is usual in the same latitude. Rain and fog are frequent, but the climate is on the whole very healthy. The lower course of the Elbe forms the southern boundary of Holstein for 65 miles, but the only river of importance within the province is the Eider, which rises in Holstein, and after a course of 120 miles falls into the North Sea, forming an estuary 3 to 12 miles in breadth. It is navigable from its mouth as far as Rendsburg, and the waterway between the two seas is completed by a canal from Rendsburg to Kiel. The new Baltic Canal, which is to be navigable for large vessels, will also intersect Holstein. There are numerous lakes in north-east Holstein, the largest of which are the Plöner See (12 square miles) and the Selenter See (9 square miles).

Of the total area of the province 58·3 per cent. is occupied by tilled land, 28·5 per cent. by meadows and pastures, and only 6·4 per cent. by forests. The ordinary cereals are all cultivated with success and there is generally a considerable surplus for exportation; rape is grown in the marsh lands and flax on the east coast, while large quantities of apples and other fruit are raised near Altona for the Hamburg and English markets. In 1883 the province contained 156,534 horses, 727,505 cattle, 320,768 sheep, 268,061 pigs, and 42,580 goats. The marsh lands afford admirable pasture, and a greater proportion of cattle (65 per 100 inhabitants) is reared in Schleswig-Holstein, mainly by small owners, than in any other Prussian province. Great numbers of fat cattle are exported to England. The Holstein horses are also in request, but sheep-farming is comparatively neglected. Bee-keeping is found a productive industry, and in 1883 the province possessed 113,836 hives. The hills skirting the bays of the Baltic coast are generally pleasantly wooded, but the forests are nowhere of great extent except in the duchy of Lauenburg. The fishing in the Baltic is productive; Eckernförde is the chief fishing station in Prussia. The oysters from the beds on the west coast of Schleswig are widely known under the misnomer of "Holstein natives." The mineral resources of the province are almost confined to a few layers of rock-salt near Segeberg. The manufacturing industry is also insignificant and does not extend much beyond the large towns, such as Altona, Kiel, and Flensburg. The shipbuilding of Kiel and other seaports is, however, important; and lace is made by the peasants of North Schleswig. The commerce and shipping of Schleswig-Holstein, stimulated by its position between two seas, as well as by its excellent harbours and waterways, are much more prominent than its manufactures. Kiel is the chief seaport of Prussia, while an oversea trade is also carried on by Altona and Flensburg. The main exports are grain, cattle, horses, fish, and oysters, in return for which come timber, coal, salt, wine, and

colonial produce. The trading fleet of Schleswig-Holstein in 1884 consisted of 713 vessels (142 steamers), with a total burthen of 115,600 tons; more than half the ships belonged to the North Sea coast, but 90 per cent. of the steamers and 65 per cent. of the tonnage must be credited to the Baltic.

The population of the province in 1880 was 1,127,149, comprising 1,111,383 Protestants, 8903 Roman Catholics, and 3522 Jews. The urban and rural communities are in the proportion of 4 to 6. About 38 per cent. of the population are supported by agriculture, 26 per cent. by manufacturing industry, 10 per cent. by trade, while 12 per cent. are domestic servants and day-labourers, 6 per cent. is absorbed by the official and professional classes, and 5½ per cent. by those who returned no occupation. The great bulk of the Holsteiners and more than half the Schleswigers are of genuine German stock, but there are about 150,000 Danes in the north part of Schleswig. Among the Germans the prevalent tongue is Low German, but the North Frisians on the west coast of Schleswig and the North Sea islands (about 30,000 in all) still speak a Frisian dialect, which, however, is gradually dying out. The peninsula of Angeln, between the Gulf of Flensburg and the Schlei, is supposed to have been the original seat of the English, and most observers profess to see a striking resemblance between this district and the counties of Kent and Surrey. The peasants of Dithmarschen also retain many of their ancient peculiarities. The boundary between the Danish and German languages is approximately a line between Flensburg and Tondern; not more than 15 per cent. of the entire population of the province speak Danish as their mother-tongue. The chief educational institution in Schleswig-Holstein is the university of Kiel; and the excellence of the ordinary school system is proved by the fact that in 1883–84 the Schleswig-Holstein recruits showed a smaller proportion of illiteracy (0·11 per cent.) than those from any other part of the German empire. Schleswig is the official capital of the province, but Altona and Kiel are the largest towns, the former being also the headquarters of an army corps and the latter the chief naval station of Germany. Kiel and Friedrichsort are fortified, and the old lines of Düppel are also maintained. The province sends ten members to the reichstag and nineteen to the Prussian house of deputies. The provincial estates meet in Rendsburg.

History.—The history of the southern part of the Cimbric peninsula is the record of a struggle between the Danes and the Germans, ending in the meantime in favour of the latter. The earliest inhabitants of whose existence we have any trace seem to have been of German stock, and German authorities maintain that it was the emigration to England of the Jutes and Angles that first gave the Scandinavian or Danish element scope to develop in the district. In the early part of the ninth century we find Charlemagne in conflict with the Danish rulers of South Jutland or Schleswig[1] and establishing a "Danish mark" between the Eider and the Schlei. Some attempt to introduce Christianity was also made at this time by Bishop Ansgarius, but it was not till the middle of the following century that the new creed found anything approaching to general acceptance. In 1027 the Danish king Knud (the English Canute) obtained from Conrad the recognition of Schleswig's independence of the empire, and henceforth the Eider became the recognized boundary between Germany and Denmark ("Eidora Romani terminus imperii"). Schleswig, though a Danish province, was not merged in the other possessions of Denmark, but enjoyed a certain measure of independence under the rule of viceroys or dukes chosen from the younger sons of the royal house. One of the most vigorous of these rulers was Knud Laward (1115–1131), who extended his sway over the Wendish district of Wagria (see below) and held it as a fief of the German empire. He was thus the first ruler of Schleswig to hold that singular double relationship to the king of Denmark and the German empire which afterwards became so important a factor in the history of the country. Valdemar, son of Knud, became king of Denmark, and Knud's grandson, King Valdemar II., conferred the duchy of South Jutland or Schleswig on his son Abel in 1232. The terms of this investment afterwards became a fertile subject of dispute between the dukes and the crown, the former maintaining that they held their land as an hereditary and inalienable fief, while the kings argued that the fief was revocable at pleasure. The dukes, however, assisted by their kinsmen, the counts of Holstein, succeeded in establishing their position and finally remained in undisputed possession of their duchy. In 1326 Duke Valdemar V. of Schleswig was raised to the throne of Denmark through the influence of his uncle, Count Gerhard of Holstein, to whom in return he ceded his duchy. Valdemar had to abdicate in 1330 and received his duchy back again, granting, however, the "Constitutio Valdemaria," which ensured the rights of eventual succession in Schleswig to the Holstein counts. This compact came to fruition in 1375, when the male ducal line became extinct, and Margaret of Denmark formally recognized the union of the two territories in 1386. Henceforth we have the same prince ruling over Schleswig and Holstein, holding the first as a fief of the Danish crown and the other as a fief of the German empire.

The history of Holstein before its union with Schleswig has been partly indicated in the foregoing paragraph. Nordalbingia, or the land to the north of the Elbe, was inhabited by the Saxons, under whom it was divided into four *gaus* or hundreds:—DITHMARSCHEN (*q.v.*) on the west, Holstein proper or Holtsaten ("men of the forest") in the middle, Wagria on the east, and Stormarn on the south. The Nordalbingians were the last of the Saxons to be subdued by Charlemagne (804), who gave Wagria to his Wendish allies the Obotrites, and established a Wendish mark on their frontier at the same time that he established a Danish mark on the Eider. The other three gaus were incorporated with the duchy of Saxony, Dithmarschen being included in the countship of Stade while Holstein and Stormarn had a count of their own. In 1110 the countship of Holstein was conferred upon Adolphus I. of Schauenburg, who founded the influential line that eventually ruled over Schleswig-Holstein. Wagria was added to Holstein by Adolphus II. about 1140. In the beginning of the 13th century the Danish kings extended their sway over all German territory to the north of the Elbe, and their conquests were confirmed by an imperial grant in 1214. This state of affairs, however, was of no long continuance, and Adolphus III. of Holstein succeeded in re-establishing his independence in 1225. The Holstein family now became split up into several branch-lines, of which that of Rendsburg proved the most lasting and important. A daughter of this line married Duke Abel of Schleswig, and the Holstein counts lent faithful aid to their kinsmen in resisting the encroachments and claims of the kings of Denmark. In the distracted state of Denmark at the beginning of the 14th century Count Gerhard of Holstein became the practical ruler of the kingdom, but preferred to place the crown on the head of his nephew Valdemar. Legally speaking, Holstein remained a mediate fief of Saxony; but with the decline of the Saxon duchy this relationship became obscured, and, when the Holstein lands were created a duchy in 1474, the new duke held his lands directly from the emperor.

In 1448 the royal line of Denmark became extinct, and the crown was offered to Adolphus VII. of Schleswig-Holstein, who refused it for himself but exerted his influence to secure it for his nephew Christian of Oldenburg. Adolphus died in 1459, leaving no sons. Christian was the legal heir of Schleswig, but his claims to Holstein were by no means so strong. The estates of Schleswig-Holstein, however, decided in his favour on the plea that the duchies[2] could not be separated, and exacted from him a confirmation of this indissoluble connexion. It was also formally stipulated that the duchies should never be actually incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark, while the hereditary nature of the fief was given up and the estates acquired the right to choose as their duke any one of Christian's descendants. This Succession Act was the basis of the union of the two duchies for the next four hundred years, and the practical contradiction between their own inseparable connexion and their feudal duty to different sovereigns is at once the cause and the explanation of the complicated "Schleswig-Holstein question."

Now follows a series of endless shiftings, divisions, and reunions of the two duchies. After 1580 the various collateral lines of the Oldenburg family thus formed are represented by two main branches,—the royal or Glückstadt line and the Gottorp or ducal line. In the division of Schleswig-Holstein between these two no regard was paid to the boundary of the Eider; each of them ruled over detached parts of both duchies, though the whole of Schleswig was still under the sovereignty of Denmark and the whole of Holstein under that of Germany. Practically Schleswig came to be regarded merely as a part of Denmark, while Holstein's connexion with Germany preserved for it a flicker of independence. In 1660 Denmark became an absolute monarchy and the principle of female succession was acknowledged. As in Schleswig-Holstein the right of inheritance was confined to the male line, the policy of Denmark was vigorously directed towards doing away as far as possible with all separate rights in the duchy and to getting the Gottorp or ducal portions into the possession of the crown. This policy was naturally more successful in Schleswig than in Holstein, and in 1721 Frederick IV. was able to gain the guarantee of the powers for the incorporation of the whole of Schleswig with the Danish monarchy. He had, however, to give up his claim to Holstein. In 1762 the Holstein-Gottorp line succeeded to the throne of Russia in the person of Peter III., and this led in 1773 to an agreement by which the Gottorp line resigned its share of Holstein to the king of Denmark in exchange for Oldenburg and Delmenhorst. The whole of Schleswig-Holstein thus came once more under the sway of a ruler who was at the same time king of Denmark.

The period from 1773 to 1846 was one of peace for the duchies, with considerable progress in material prosperity. The fall of the

[1] The name of Schleswig did not come into general use for this part of the Cimbric peninsula until the end of the 14th century.

[2] This use of the term "duchies" anticipates a little, as Holstein was not made a duchy till 1474. Dithmarschen, indeed, which was supposed to be a part of ducal Holstein, was not subdued till 1559.

German empire in 1806 released Holstein for a time from any connexion with a power outside of Denmark, but in 1815 the Danish monarch had to enter the German Confederation for Holstein and for the recently acquired duchy of LAUENBURG (*q.v.*). A strong feeling of German patriotism gradually arose in Holstein, affecting part of Schleswig also, and dissatisfaction with the delay of the Danish crown in recognizing the constitutional rights of the duchies led to the events forming the recent history of Schleswig-Holstein. These will be found described with some detail in the articles DENMARK (vol. vii. pp. 88, 89) and GERMANY (vol. x. pp. 507, 509–512). (J. F. M.)

SCHLETTSTADT, a small town in Lower Alsace, stands on the Ill, 26 miles to the south of Strasburg. It possesses two fine churches, relics of a period of former importance, and carries on manufactures of wire gauze, and a considerable trade in country produce. The population in 1880 was 8979 (7755 Roman Catholics), showing a slight decrease since it has passed into German hands.

Schlettstadt is a place of very early origin, and became a free town of the empire in the 13th century. In the 15th century it was the seat of a celebrated academy, founded by Agricola, which contributed not a little to the revival of learning in this part of Germany; Erasmus of Rotterdam was one of its students. In 1634 the town came into the possession of France, and it was afterwards fortified by Vauban. It offered little resistance, however, to the Germans in 1870, and the fortifications have been razed.

SCHLÖZER, AUGUST LUDWIG VON (1735–1809), German historian, was born at Gaggstedt, in the county of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, on the 5th July 1735. Having studied at the universities of Wittenberg and Göttingen, he went in 1755 as a tutor to Stockholm, and afterwards to Upsala; and while in Sweden he wrote in the Swedish language an *Essay on the History of Trade* (1758). In 1759 he returned to Göttingen, where he began the study of medicine. Afterwards he went to St Petersburg with Müller, the Russian historiographer, as Müller's literary assistant and as tutor in his family. Here Schlözer learned the Russian language and devoted himself to the study of Russian history; and in 1762 he was made an adjunct of the Academy and a teacher at the Rasumovski educational institute. A quarrel with Müller placed him in a position of some difficulty, from which he was happily delivered by a call to a professorship at the university of Göttingen. He began his career at Göttingen in 1767, and soon ranked among the foremost historical writers of his day. His most important works were his *Allgemeine nordische Geschichte* (1772) and his translation of the Russian chronicler Nestor to the year 980 (1802–9). He awoke much intelligent interest in universal history by his *Weltgeschichte im Auszuge und Zusammenhange* (1792–1801); and in several works he helped to lay the foundations of statistical science. He also produced a strong impression by his political writings, the *Briefwechsel* (10 vols., 1776–82) and the *Staatsanzeigen* (18 vols., 1782–93). In 1804 he was ennobled by the emperor of Russia. He withdrew from active life in 1805, and died on the 9th September 1809.

See Zermelo, *August Ludwig Schlözer* (1875), and Wesendonk, *Die Begründung der neuern deutschen Geschichtschreibung durch Gatterer und Schlözer* (1876). Schlözer's daughter, Dorothea, born on the 10th August, 1770, was one of the most learned women of her time, and received in 1787 the degree of doctor. She was recognized as an authority on several subjects, especially on Russian coinage. After her marriage with Rodde, the burgomaster of Lübeck, she devoted herself to domestic duties. She died on the 12th July 1825. Schlözer's son Christian (born 1774, died 1831) was a professor at Bonn, and published *Anfangsgründe der Staatswirthschaft* (1804–6) and his father's *Oeffentliches und Privat-Leben aus Originalurkunden* (1828).

SCHMALKALDEN, a town of Prussia, in the province of Hesse-Nassau, lies about 30 miles to the south-west of Erfurt, and in 1885 contained 6788 inhabitants, chiefly employed in the manufacture of hardware articles. It still possesses the inn in which the important Protestant League of Schmalkalden or Smalkald was concluded in 1531, and also the house in which the articles were drawn up in 1537 by Luther, Melanchthon, and other Reformers. See GERMANY, vol. x. p. 498, and LUTHER, vol. xv. p. 83.

SCHNEIDEMÜHL (Polish *Pila*), a small town of Prussia, in the province of Posen, lies on the Cüddow, 45 miles north of Posen and 140 miles east by north of Berlin. It is a railway junction of some importance, carries on a trade in wood, grain, and potatoes, and possesses an iron foundry, several glass works and machine-shops, and other industrial establishments. In 1885 the population was 12,259, of whom 7700 were Protestants and about 1000 Poles.

SCHNORR VON KAROLSFELD, JULIUS (1794–1872), of a family of artists, was born in 1794 at Leipsic, where he received his earliest instruction from his father, a draughtsman, engraver, and painter. At seventeen he entered the Academy of Vienna, from which Overbeck and others of the new school who rebelled against the old conventional style had been expelled about a year before. In 1818 he followed the founders of the new school of German pre-Raphaelites in the general pilgrimage to Rome. This school of religious and romantic art abjured modern styles with three centuries of decadence, and reverted to and revived the principles and practice of earlier periods. At the outset an effort was made to recover fresco painting and "monumental art," and Schnorr soon found opportunity of proving his powers, when commissioned to decorate with frescos, illustrative of Ariosto, the entrance hall of the Villa Massimo, near the Lateran. His fellow-labourers were Cornelius, Overbeck, and Veit. His second period dates from 1825, when he left Rome, settled in Munich, entered the service of King Louis, and transplanted to Germany the art of wall-painting learnt in Italy. He showed himself qualified as a sort of poet-painter to the Bavarian court; he organized a staff of trained executants, and set about clothing five halls in the new palace with frescos illustrative of the *Nibelungenlied*. Other apartments his prolific pencil decorated with scenes from the histories of Charlemagne, Frederick Barbarossa, and Rudolph of Hapsburg. These vast and interminable compositions display the master's merits and defects: they are creative, learned in composition, masterly in drawing, but exaggerated in thought and extravagant in style. Schnorr's third period is marked by his "Bible Pictures" or Scripture History in 180 designs. The artist was a Lutheran, and took a broad and unsectarian view which won for his Pictorial Bible ready currency throughout Christendom. The merits are unequal: frequently the compositions are crowded and confused, wanting in harmony of line and symmetry in the masses; thus they suffer under comparison with Raphael's Bible. Chronologically speaking, the style is severed from the simplicity and severity of early times, and surrendered to the florid redundance of the later Renaissance. Yet throughout are displayed fertility of invention, academic knowledge with facile execution; and modern art has produced nothing better than Joseph Interpreting Pharaoh's Dream, the Meeting of Rebecca and Isaac, and the Return of the Prodigal Son. The completion of the arduous work was celebrated in 1862 by the artists of Saxony with a festival, and other German states offered congratulations and presented gifts.

Biblical drawings and cartoons for frescos formed a natural prelude to designs for church windows. The painter's renown in Germany secured commissions in Great Britain. Schnorr made designs, carried out in the royal factory, Munich, for windows in Glasgow cathedral and in St Paul's cathedral, London. This Munich glass provoked controversy: mediævalists objected to its want

of lustre, and stigmatized the windows as coloured blinds and picture transparencies. But the opposing party claimed for these modern revivals "the union of the severe and excellent drawing of early Florentine oil-paintings with the colouring and arrangement of the glass-paintings of the latter half of the 16th century." Schnorr's busy life closed at Munich in 1872.

SCHOLASTICISM is the name usually employed to denote the most typical products of mediæval thought. The final disappearance of ancient philosophy may be dated about the beginning of the 6th century of our era. Boetius, its last representative in the West, died in 525, and four years later the Athenian schools were closed by order of the emperor Justinian. Before this time Christian thought had already been active in the fathers of the church, but their activity had been entirely devoted to the elaborating and systematizing of theological dogmas. Although the dogmas unquestionably involve philosophical assumptions, the fathers deal with them throughout simply as churchmen, and do not profess to supply for them a philosophical or rational basis. Only incidentally do some of them—like Augustine, for example—digress into strictly philosophical discussion. After the centuries of intellectual darkness during which the settlement of the new races and their conversion to Christianity proceeded and the foundations of the modern European order were being laid, the first symptoms of renewed intellectual activity appear contemporaneously with the consolidation of the empire of the West in the hands of Charlemagne. That enlightened monarch endeavoured to attract to his court the best scholars of Britain and Ireland (where the classical tradition had never died out), and by imperial decree (787) commanded the establishment of schools in connexion with every abbey in his realms. Peter of Pisa and Alcuin of York were his advisers in directing this great work, and under their fostering care the opposition long supposed to exist between godliness and secular learning speedily disappeared. Besides the celebrated school of the Palace, where Alcuin had among his hearers the members of the imperial family and the dignitaries of the empire as well as talented youths of humbler origin, we hear of the episcopal schools of Lyons, Orleans, and St Denis, the cloister schools of St Martin of Tours, of Fulda, Corbie, Fontenelle, and many others, besides the older monasteries of St Gall and Reichenau. These schools became the centres of mediæval learning and speculation, and from them the name Scholasticism is derived. They were designed to communicate instruction in the seven liberal arts which constituted the educational curriculum of the Middle Ages—grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric forming the trivium of arts proper, while geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music constituted the quadrivium of the sciences. The name *doctor scholasticus* was applied originally to any teacher in such an ecclesiastical gymnasium, but, as the study of dialectic or logic soon became the object of absorbing interest to the best intellects of the time, it tended to overshadow the more elementary disciplines, and the general acceptation of "doctor" came to be one who occupied himself with the teaching of logic and the discussion of the philosophical questions arising therefrom. The philosophy of the later Scholastics is more extended in its scope; but to the very end of the mediæval period philosophy centres in the discussion of the same logical problems which began to agitate the teachers of the 9th and 10th centuries.

Scholasticism in the widest sense thus extends from the 9th to the end of the 14th or the beginning of the 15th century—from Erigena to Occam and his followers. The belated Scholastics who lingered beyond the last-mentioned date served only as marks for the obloquy heaped upon the schools by the men of the new time. But, although every systematic account of Scholasticism finds it necessary to begin with Erigena, that philosopher is of the spiritual kindred of the Neoplatonists and Christian mystics rather than of the typical Scholastic doctors. In a few obscure writings of the 9th century we find the beginnings of discussion upon the logical questions which afterwards proved of such absorbing interest; but these are followed by the intellectual interregnum of the 10th century. The activity of Scholasticism is therefore mainly confined within the limits of the 11th and the 14th centuries. It is clearly divisible (by circumstances to be presently explained) into two well-marked periods,—the first extending to the end of the 12th century and embracing as its chief names Roscellinus, Anselm, William of Champeaux, and Abelard, while the second extended from the beginning of the 13th century to the Renaissance and the general distraction of men's thoughts from the problems and methods of Scholasticism. In this second period the names of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus represent (in the 13th century and the first years of the 14th century) the culmination of Scholastic thought and its consolidation into system.

It is a remark of Prantl's that there is no such thing as philosophy in the Middle Ages; there are only logic and theology. If pressed literally the remark is hypercritical, for it overlooks two facts,—in the first place that the main objects of theology and philosophy are identical, though the method of treatment is different, and in the second place that logical discussion commonly leads up to metaphysical problems, and that this was pre-eminently the case with the logic of the Schoolmen. But the saying draws attention in a forcible way to the two great influences which shaped mediæval thought—on the one side the traditions of ancient logic, on the other the system of Christian theology. Scholasticism opens with a discussion of certain points in the Aristotelian logic; it speedily begins to apply its logical distinctions to the doctrines of the church; and when it attains its full stature in St Thomas it has, with the exception of certain mysteries, rationalized or Aristotelianized the whole churchly system. Or we might say with equal truth that the philosophy of St Thomas is Aristotle Christianized. It is, moreover, the attitude of the Schoolmen to these two influences that yields the general characteristic of the period. Their attitude throughout is that of interpreters rather than of those conducting an independent investigation. And though they are at the same time the acutest of critics, and offer the most ingenious developments of the original thesis, they never step outside the charmed circle of the system they have inherited. They appear to contemplate the universe of nature and man not at first hand with their own eyes but in the glass of Aristotelian formulæ. Their chief works are in the shape of commentaries upon the writings of "the philosopher."[1] Their problems and solutions alike spring from the master's dicta—from the need of reconciling these with one another and with the conclusions of Christian theology.

The fact that the channels of thought during the Middle Ages were determined in this way by the external influence of a twofold tradition is usually expressed by saying that reason in the Middle Age is subject to authority. It has not the free play which characterizes its activity in Greece and in the philosophy of modern times. Its conclusions are predetermined, and the initiative of the individual thinker is almost confined, therefore, to formal details in the treatment of his thesis. From the side of the church this characteristic of the period is expressed in the saying that reason has its proper station as the hand-

[1] The common designation of Aristotle in the Middle Ages.

maid of faith (*ancilla fidei*). But it is only fair to add that this principle of the subordination of the reason wears a different aspect according to the century and writer referred to. In Scotus Erigena, at the beginning of the Scholastic era, there is no such subordination contemplated, because philosophy and theology in his work are in implicit unity. According to his memorable expression, "Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam" (*De Divisione Naturae*, i. 1). Reason in its own strength and with its own instruments evolves a system of the universe which coincides, according to Erigena, with the teaching of Scripture. For Erigena, therefore, the speculative reason is the supreme arbiter (as he himself indeed expressly asserts); and in accordance with its results the utterances of Scripture and of the church have not infrequently to be subjected to an allegorical or mystical interpretation. But this is only to say again in so many words that Erigena is more of a Neoplatonist than a Scholastic. In regard to the Scholastics proper, Cousin suggested in respect of this point a threefold chronological division,—at the outset the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology, then the period of their alliance, and finally the beginning of their separation. In other words, we note philosophy gradually extending its claims. Dialectic is, to begin with, a merely secular art, and only by degrees are its terms and distinctions applied to the subject-matter of theology. The early results of the application, in the hands of Berengarius and Roscellinus, did not seem favourable to Christian orthodoxy. Hence the strength with which a champion of the faith like Anselm insists on the subordination of reason. To Bernard of Clairvaux and many other conservative churchmen the application of dialectic to the things of faith at all appears as dangerous as it is impious. At a later date, in the systems of the great Schoolmen, the rights of reason are fully established and amply acknowledged. The relation of reason and faith remains, it is true, an external one, and certain doctrines—an increasing number as time goes on—are withdrawn from the sphere of reason. But with these exceptions the two march side by side; they establish by different means the same results. For the conflicts which accompanied the first intrusion of philosophy into the theological domain more profound and cautious thinkers with a far ampler apparatus of knowledge had substituted a harmony. "The constant effort of Scholasticism to be at once philosophy and theology"[1] seemed at last satisfactorily realized. But this harmony proved more apparent than real, for the further progress of Scholastic thought consisted in a withdrawal of doctrine after doctrine from the possibility of rational proof and their relegation to the sphere of faith. Indeed, no sooner was the harmony apparently established by Aquinas than Duns Scotus began this negative criticism, which is carried much farther by William of Occam. But this is equivalent to a confession that Scholasticism had failed in its task, which was to rationalize the doctrines of the church. The two authorities refused to be reconciled. The Aristotelian form refused to fit a matter for which it was never intended; the matter of Christian theology refused to be forced into an alien form. The Scholastic philosophy speedily ceased therefore to possess a *raison d'être*, and the spread of the sceptical doctrine of a twofold truth proclaims the destruction of the fabric erected by mediæval thought. The end of the period was thus brought about by the internal decay of its method and principles quite as much as by the variety of external causes which contributed to transfer men's interests to other subjects.

[1] Milman's *Latin Christianity*, ix. 101.

Scholasticism not unprogressive.

But, although the relation of reason to an external authority thus constitutes the badge of mediæval thought, it would be in the last degree unjust to look upon Scholasticism as philosophically barren, and to speak as if reason, after an interregnum of a thousand years, resumed its rights at the Renaissance. Such language was excusable in the men of the Renaissance, fighting the battle of classic form and beauty and of the many-sidedness of life against the barbarous terminology and the monastic ideals of the schools, or in the protagonists of modern science protesting against the complete absorption of human talent by metaphysics—an absorption never witnessed to the same extent before or since. The new is never just to the old; we do not expect it to be so. It belongs to a later and calmer judgment to recognize how the old contained in itself the germs of the new; and a closer study of history is invariably found to diminish the abruptness of the picturesque new beginnings which furnish forth our current divisions of epochs and periods. In the schools and universities of the Middle Age the intellect of the semi-barbarous European peoples had been trained for the work of the modern world. It had advanced from a childish rudeness to an appreciation of the subtlest logical and metaphysical distinctions. The debt which modern philosophy owes to the Schoolmen for this formal training has been amply acknowledged even by a writer like J. S. Mill. But we may go further and say that, in spite of their initial acceptance of authority, the Scholastics are not the antagonists of reason; on the contrary they fight its battles. As has often been pointed out, the attempt to establish *by argument* the authority of faith is in reality the unconscious establishment of the authority of reason. Reason, if admitted at all, must ultimately claim the whole man. Anselm's motto, *Credo ut intelligam*, marks well the distance that has been traversed since Tertullian's *Credo quia absurdum est*. The claim of reason has been recognized to manipulate the data of faith, at first blindly and immediately received, and to weld them into a system such as will satisfy its own needs. Scholasticism that has outlived its day may be justly identified with obscurantism, but not so the systems of those who, by their mighty intellectual force alone, once held all the minds of Europe in willing subjection. The scholastic systems, it is true, are not the free products of speculation; in the main they are *summæ theologiæ*, or they are modified versions of Aristotle. But each system is a fresh recognition of the rights of reason, and Scholasticism as a whole may be justly regarded as the history of the growth and gradual emancipation of reason which was completed in the movements of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Indeed, the widening of human interests which then took place is not without its prelude in the systems of the second period of Scholasticism. The complementary sciences of theology and philosophy remain, of course, the central and dominating interest; but Albertus Magnus was keenly interested in natural science, and a system like that of Aquinas is as wide as Aristotle's in its range, and holds no part of nature to lie outside its inquiries.

In speaking of the origin of Scholasticism—name and thing—it has been already noted that mediæval speculation takes its rise in certain logical problems. To be more precise, it is the nature of "universals" which forms the central theme of Scholastic debate. This is the case almost exclusively during the first period, and only to a less extent during the second, where it reappears in a somewhat different form as the difficulty concerning the principle of individuation. Otherwise expressed, the question on which centuries of discussion were thus expended concerns the nature of genera and species and their relation to the individual. On this, Nominalists and

Realists take opposite sides; and, exclusively logical as the point may at first sight seem to be, adherence to one side or the other is an accurate indication of philosophic tendency. The two opposing theories express at bottom, in the phraseology of their own time, the radical divergence of pantheism and individualism—the two extremes between which philosophy seems pendulum-wise to oscillate, and which may be said still to await their perfect reconciliation. First, however, we must examine the form which this question assumed to the first mediæval thinkers, and the source from which they derived it. A single sentence in Porphyry's *Isagoge* or "introduction" to the *Categories* of Aristotle furnished the text of the prolonged discussion. The treatise of Porphyry deals with what are commonly called the predicables, *i.e.*, the notions of genus, species, difference, property, and accident; and he mentions, but declines to discuss, the various theories that have been held as to the ontological import of genera and species. In the Latin translation of Boetius, in which alone the *Isagoge* was then known, the sentence runs as follows:—"Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa haec consistentia, dicere recusabo; altissimum enim negotium est hujusmodi et majoris egens inquisitionis." The second of these three questions may be safely set aside; the other two indicate with sufficient clearness three possible positions with regard to universals. It may be held that they exist merely as conceptions in our minds (*in solis nudis intellectibus*); this is Nominalism or Conceptualism. It may be held, in opposition to the Nominalistic view, that they have a substantial existence of their own (*subsistentia*), independent of their existence in our thoughts. But Realism, as this doctrine is named, may be again of two varieties, according as the substantially existent universals are supposed to exist apart from the sensible phenomena (*separata a sensibilibus*) or only in and with the objects of sense as their essence (*in sensibilibus posita et circa haec consistentia*). The first form of Realism corresponds to the Platonic theory of the transcendence of the ideas; while the second reproduces the Aristotelian doctrine of the essence as inseparable from the individual thing. But, though he implies an ample previous treatment of the questions by philosophers, Porphyry gives no references to the different systems of which such distinctions are the outcome, nor does he give any hint of his own opinion on the subject, definite enough though that was. He simply sets the discussion aside as too difficult for a preliminary discourse, and not strictly relevant to a purely logical inquiry. Porphyry, the Neoplatonist, the disciple of Plotinus, was an unknown personage to those early students of the *Isagoge*. The passage possessed for them a mysterious charm, largely due to its isolation and to their ignorance of the historic speculations which suggested it. And accordingly it gave rise to the three great doctrines which divided the mediæval schools:—Realism of the Platonic type, embodied in the formula *universalia ante rem*; Realism of the Aristotelian type, *universalia in re*; and Nominalism, including Conceptualism, expressed by the phrase *universalia post rem*, and also claiming to be based upon the Peripatetic doctrine.

To form a proper estimate of the first stage of Scholastic discussion it is requisite above all things to have a clear idea of the appliances then at the disposal of the writers. In other words, what was the extent of their knowledge of ancient philosophy? Thanks to the researches of Jourdain and others, it is possible to answer this question with something like precision. To begin with, we know that till the 13th century the Middle Age was ignorant of Greek, and possessed no philosophical works in their Greek original, while in translations their stock was limited to the *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione* of Aristotle in the versions of Boetius, and the *Timæus* of Plato in the version of Chalcidius. To these must be added, of course, Boetius's translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* already referred to. The whole metaphysical, ethical, and physical works of Aristotle were thus unknown, and it was not till the 12th century (after the year 1128) that the *Analytics* and the *Topics* became accessible to the logicians of the time. Some general information as to the Platonic doctrines (chiefly in a Neoplatonic garb) was obtainable from the commentary with which Chalcidius (6th cent.) accompanied his translation, from the work of Apuleius (2d cent.) *De Dogmate Platonis*, and indirectly from the commentary of Macrobius (*c.* 400) on the *Somnium Scipionis* of Cicero, and from the writings of St Augustine. As aids to the study of logic, the doctors of this period possessed two commentaries by Boetius on the *Isagoge* (*Ad Porphyrium a Victorino translatum* and *In Porphyrium a se translatum*), two commentaries by the same author on the *De Interpretatione* and one on the *Categories*, as well as another, mainly rhetorical, *Ad Ciceronis Topica*. To these are to be added the following original treatises of Boetius:—*Introductio ad Categoricos Syllogismos*, *De Syllogismo Categorico*, *De Syllogismo Hypothetico*, *De Divisione*, *De Definitione*, and *De Differentiis Topicis*, the last dealing almost exclusively with rhetoric. There were also in circulation two tracts attributed to St Augustine, the first of which, *Principia Dialecticae*, is probably his, but is mainly grammatical in its import. The other tract, known as *Categoriae Decem*, and taken at first for a translation of Aristotle's treatise, is really a rapid summary of it, and certainly does not belong to Augustine. To this list there must be added three works of an encyclopædic character, which played a great part as text-books in the schools. Of these the oldest and most important was the *Satyricon* of Marcianus Capella (close of 5th century), a curious medley of prose and allegorical verse, the greater part of which is a treatise on the seven liberal arts, the fourth book dealing with logic. Similar in its contents is the work of Cassiodorus (468–562), *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Literarum*, of which the third work referred to, the *Origines* of Isidore of Seville (*ob.* 636), is little more than a reproduction. The above constitutes without exception the whole material which the earlier Middle Age had at its disposal.

The grandly conceived system of Erigena (see ERIGENA and MYSTICISM) stands by itself in the 9th century like the product of another age. John the Scot was still acquainted with Greek, seeing that he translated the work of the pseudo-Dionysius; and his speculative genius achieved the fusion of Christian doctrine and Neoplatonic thought in a system of quite remarkable metaphysical completeness. It is the only complete and independent system between the decline of ancient thought and the system of Aquinas in the 13th century, if indeed we ought not to go further, to modern times, to find a parallel. Erigena pronounces no express opinion upon the question which was even then beginning to occupy men's minds; but his Platonico-Christian theory of the Eternal Word as containing in Himself the exemplars of created things is equivalent to the assertion of *universalia ante rem*. His whole system, indeed, is based upon the idea of the divine as the exclusively real, of which the world of individual existence is but the theophany; the special and the individual are immanent, therefore, in the general. And hence at a much later date (in the beginning of the 13th century) his name was invoked to cover the pantheistic heresies of Amalrich of Bena. Erigena