

recognized centre of theological discussion. One of these discussions was on the doctrine of salvation, with Jacques Conet. It resulted in a bulky treatise, *De Jesu Christo Salvatore* (finished 12th July 1578), the circulation of which in manuscript appears to have commended his powers to the notice of Giorgio Biandrata (1515-1588), court physician in Transylvania, and an unscrupulous ecclesiastical wire-puller.<sup>1</sup>

Transylvania had for a short time (1559-71) enjoyed religious liberty under an antitrinitarian prince, John Sigismund. But the existing ruler, Christopher Báthori, favoured the Jesuits, and it was an object with Biandrata to limit the "Judaic" tendencies of the antitrinitarian bishop, Francis Dávid (1510-1579), with whom he had previously acted. By the alleged discovery of a stain upon Biandrata's morals of the gravest sort his influence with Dávid was destroyed. Now Sozzini's scheme of doctrine encouraged the use of seemingly orthodox language in an heretical sense. Christ was to be called God, and invoked with divine honours, though without any inherent title to such homage, but as "un Dio subalterno, al quale in un dato tempo il Dio supremo cedette il governo del mondo" (Canti). It occurred to Biandrata that, if Sozzini could convert the eloquent Dávid to this view, all would be well. Accordingly in November 1578 Sozzini reached Kolozsvár (Klausenburg), and did his best, during a visit of four months and a half under Dávid's roof, to teach him the doctrine of the invocation of Christ. Though Sozzini did not (as Biandrata desired) urge the absolute necessity of this invocation, the result was a public explosion on Dávid's part against the cultus of Christ in any shape or form. His trial followed, on a charge of innovation. Sozzini hurried off to Poland before it began. He cannot be accused of a guilty complicity with what he calls the rage of Biandrata, for he was no party to the incarceration of Dávid at Déva, where the old man miserably perished in prison. But he was willing that Dávid should be prohibited from preaching pending the decision of the controversy by a general synod; and his references to the case show that (as in the later instances of Jacobo Paleologo, Christian Franken, and Martin Seidel) theological aversions, though they never made him uncivil, froze up his kindness and blinded his perceptions of character. Biandrata ultimately conformed to the Catholic Church; yet as late as 1584 Sozzini, always constant to the leanings of friendship, sought his patronage for his treatise *De Jesu Christi Natura*, in reply to the Calvinist Andrew Wolan. The remainder (1579-1604) of Sozzini's life was spent in Poland. Excluded at first by his views on baptism from the Minor or Antitrinitarian Church (anabaptist in its constitution), he acquired by degrees a predominant influence in its synods. He converted the Arians from their avowal of our Saviour's pre-existence and their refusal to honour Him by invocation; he repressed the semi-Judaizers whom he could not convince. Through correspondence with his friends in official places he ruled also the policy of the Antitrinitarian Church of Transylvania. Forced to leave Cracow in 1583, he found a home with a Polish noble, Christopher Morsztyn, whose daughter Elizabeth he married (1586). She died in the following year, a few months after giving birth to

<sup>1</sup> Biandrata was Sozzini's evil genius. Born of an old family in Piedmont and educated in France, Biandrata had attached himself to the left wing of Protestantism, and had moved here and there among the upper circles of the Reformed, depending for professional advancement on a special knowledge of the diseases of women. Driven eastwards a second time in 1558 (after fomenting antitrinitarian heresy in the Italian church of Geneva), he had for twenty years been the confidential adviser of ladies of the reigning house, first in Poland and then in Transylvania. In both countries he was a dexterous meddler in church affairs; his policy was the establishment of a kind of broad church, with a confession nakedly Scriptural in its terms, and a resolute suppression of all compromising extremes.

a daughter, Agnese, afterwards the wife of Stanislaw Wiszowaty. In 1587 the grand-duke Francesco died, and to this event Sozzini's biographers attribute the loss of his Italian property. But he was on good terms with Francesco's successor, and might have continued to receive his rents had not family disputes arisen respecting the interpretation of his grandfather's will. The holy office at Siena disinherited him in October 1590; but he was allowed a pension, which does not seem to have been paid. The failure of supplies from Italy dissolved the compact under which his works were to remain anonymous. He began to publish under his own name. The consequence was that in 1598 a mob expelled him from Cracow, wrecking his house and grossly ill-using his person. Friends gave him a ready welcome at Luslawice, 30 miles east from Cracow; and here, having long been troubled with colic and the stone, he died on 4th March 1604. A limestone block, with illegible inscriptions, marks his grave.<sup>2</sup>

Sozzini's works, as edited by his grandson Andrew Wiszowaty and the learned printer F. Kuyper, are contained in two closely printed folios, Amsterdam, 1668. They are usually reckoned the first two volumes of the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, but in fact the works of Crell and Schlichting preceded them in the series. They include all Sozzini's extant theological writings, except his essay *On Predestination* (in which he denies that God foresees the actions of free agents), prefixed to Castellio's *Dialogi IV.*, 1578 (reprinted 1613), and his revision of a school manual, *Instrumentum Doctrinarum Aristotelicum*, 1586. His pseudonyms, easily interpreted, were Felix Turpio Urbevetanus, Prosper Dysideus, Gratianus Prosper, and Gratianus Turpio Gerapolensis (= Senensis). Some of his early poetry will be found in Ferretilli's *Scilla di Stanco di Diversi Autori Toscani*, 1579 (reprinted 1594); other specimens are given in Canti, and in the *Athenaeum*, 11th August 1877. Sozzini himself considered that his *Contro Atheos*, which perished in the riot at Cracow, was his ablest work. In later life he began, but left incomplete, more than one work intended to exhibit his system as a whole. His reputation as a thinker must rest on (1) his *De Auctoritate S. Scripturae*, and (2) his *De Jesu Christo Salvatore*. The former was first published at Seville (1588) by Lopez, a Jesuit, who claimed it as his own, but prefixed a preface in which, contrary to a fundamental position of Sozzini, he maintains that man by nature has a knowledge of God. A French version (1592) was approved by the ministers of Basel; and the English translation (1731) by Edward Coombe was undertaken in consequence of the commendation of the work in a charge (1728) by Bishop Smalbrooke, who observes that Grotius had laid it under contribution in his *De Veritate Christ. Rel.* In a small compass it anticipates the whole argument of the "credibility" writers; but in trying it by modern tests it should be remembered that Sozzini regarded it (in 1581) as not adequately meeting the cardinal difficulties attending the proof of the Christian religion, and subsequently began to reconstruct its argument in his unfinished *Lectioes Sacrae*. His treatise on salvation constitutes his main service to theology, placing orthodoxy and heresy in new relations of fundamental antagonism, and narrowing the conflict to the central interest of religion. Of the person of Christ in this treatise he says nothing; he deals exclusively with the work of Christ, which in his view operates upon man alone; and it is by the persistency with which this idea tends to recur that we must estimate the theological sagacity of Sozzini. Though his name has been attached to a school of opinion (Socinianism), he disclaimed the rôle of a heresiarch, and declined to give his unreserved adhesion to any one sect. The confidence with which he relied upon the conclusions of his own mind has gained him the repute of a dogmatist; but it was his constant aim to reduce and simplify the fundamentals of Christianity, and it is not without ground that the memorial tablet at Siena (inscription by Brigidi, 1879) characterizes him as a vindicator of human reason against the supernatural. Of his non-theological doctrines the most important is his assertion of the unlawfulness, not only of war, but of the taking of human life in any circumstances. Hence the comparative mildness of his proposals for dealing with religious offenders; but it cannot be said that he had grasped the full idea of toleration. Hence too his contention that magisterial office is unlawful for a Christian.

For the biography of Sozzini the best materials are his letters. There is a collection in his works; others are given by Canti; some are unpublished. In his correspondence he delineates himself freely, not sparing his weak points of character or of attainment. The earliest life, prefixed (with engraved portrait) to the works, is by Przytkowski (1850), translated into English by Estle (1852). This is the foundation of the article by Bayle, the *Memoirs* by Tomlinson

<sup>2</sup> No trace is discoverable on the stone of the alleged epitaph—

"Tota ruit Babylon: destruxit tecta Lutherus,  
Calvinus muros, sed fundamenta Socinus."

1777), and the *Life* by Wallace (*Antitrin. Biog.*, 1850, ii. 300). The sketch by Canti in *Gli Eretici d'Italia*, 1866, vol. II., gives a genealogy of the Sozzini (needing some correction). The best defence of Sozzini in his relations with Bayle is by James Yates, in *Christ. Pioneer*, February 1834; a less favourable view is taken by the Hungarian biographer of Dávid (Jakab, *David F. Emléke*, 1879). Of his system, most generally known through the *Racovian Catechism*, 1605 (planned by Sozzini, but chiefly carried out by others, principally Schmalz; translated by Rees, 1818), there is a special study by Fock, *Der Socinianismus*, 1847. See also "The Sozzini and their School," in *Theol. Rev.*, 1879 (corrected in *Christ. Life*, 25th August 1888). Usa has been made above of unpublished papers in the archives at Florence, with others in the archives, communal library, and collection of Padre Toti at Siena. (A. G. O.)

SOCORRO, a town of the United States, in a county of the same name in New Mexico, 76 miles south of Albuquerque junction on the Acheson, Topeka, and Santa Fé Railroad, is beautifully situated in the Rio Grande valley. It is the centre of a silver and lead mining district, and has a stamp mill and smelting-works. Fruit-growing and cattle-breeding are prosecuted in the vicinity. The population, including old and new town, was about 5000 in 1887.

SOCOTRA, or SOCOTORA (Arabic *Socotrá*), an island of the Indian Ocean, 150 miles from Cape Gardafui and about 220 from the Arabian coast. Its length from east to west is 71 miles, its greatest breadth 22. A plain 2 to 4 miles wide skirts the greater part of the coast, while the interior is mountainous. The granite peaks behind Tamarida (a village on the north coast and the chief place in the island, but now much decayed) rise to a height of 4000 feet, and a limestone chain connected with these runs north and south with an average height of about 1900 feet. The climate is moist, but not unhealthy, with much rain, especially during the south-west monsoon. At this season the temperature rises to 80° or even 95°, but on the whole the heat is not excessive. The scenery of the island is very striking, with bare rocky heights and fertile valleys; but there is little cultivation, the inhabitants living mainly by their vast flocks of sheep and goats, or on dates, home-grown and imported. Milch cows are numerous near Tamarida. The population is about 5000, of two distinct types. The nomad inhabitants of the uplands are a peculiar race, well built, with good features and long curling but not woolly hair; they resemble neither the Arabs nor the Somál. In Tamarida and other villages and towards the eastern end of the island the population is a mixture of Arab, African, and other elements, even including Portuguese. The native speech is not intelligible to ordinary Arabs, but Wellsted says that it can sometimes be made out by Arabs from the opposite (Mahra) coast. In fact, according to Ibn Mojawir and Hamdání, the Socotrans in the Middle Ages were regarded as Mahra and spoke the Mahra dialect. Their way of life is rude and simple in the extreme, but they are hospitable and generally well-behaved, though they have almost no government; they are nominally dependent on the sultan of Keshin. A certain dependence (at least of places on the coast) on some sovereign of the Arabian coast has endured for many centuries, except during the short Portuguese occupation of Tamarida by Albuquerque. From 1876 to 1886 the sultan of Keshin was bound by treaty not to cede the island to a foreign power or allow settlements on it without the consent of England. In 1886 it was formally annexed by Great Britain.

The fauna and flora of Socotra are peculiar. As regards mammalia the civet cat is found, but the ordinary wild beasts of Arabia are unknown. The flora was studied by Professor Bailey Balfour in 1880, and his account of it is about to be published by the Royal Society of Edinburgh. The most valuable vegetable products are now, as in the Middle Ages, aloes and dragon's-blood. The Socotran aloes (the French *chicotin*) is esteemed the best in the world when unadulterated. In old times the ambergris of Socotra was also famous.

Socotra was known to the ancients as the Isle of Dioscorides; this name, and that by which the island is now known, are usually traced back to a Sanscrit form, *Dvipa-Sakhádhára*, "the island abode of bliss," which again suggests an identification with the

*νησος εύδαιμονος* of Agatharchides (§ 103). The *Periplus* of the Erythraean Sea speaks of the island as peopled only in one part by a mixed race of Arab, Indian, and Greek traders. It was subject to the king of the Incense Country, and was a meeting-place of Arabian and Indian ships. Cosmas in the 6th century says that the people spoke Greek and were largely Christian, with a bishop sent from Persia. The Arab geographers also had a tradition of an early Greek settlement (which they naturally ascribe to Alexander), but also of later Persian influence, followed by a settlement of Mahra tribes, who partly adopted Christianity. The Socotrans remained Nestorian Christians, with a bishop under the metropolitan of Persia, through the Middle Ages (Assemani, *B.O.*, ii. 459; comp. Mohallebi, in Abulfeda, p. 371); but in their isolated position they have gradually lost all trace of Christianity except reverence for the cross, and practise the old South Arabian moon worship. There was much more at least of the forms of Christianity when Europeans first visited the island in the 16th century. In the Middle Ages Socotra was a station of the Indian corsairs who harassed the Arab trade with the far East. The population seems then to have been much larger; Arabian writers estimate the fighting men at 10,000.

See, for the history of Socotra, Yule, *Marco Polo*, ii. 400 sq., and, besides the authorities there cited, Yárit, s. p.; Hamdání, p. 55; Karwini, ii. 54. For the state of the island at the beginning of the 18th century, see the account of the French expedition to Yemen in 1768 (*Viaggio nell' Arabia Felice*, Venice, 1721); and, for the present century, Wellsted, *City of the Caliphs*, vol. ii. (1840). For the topography, &c., see *Red Sea Pilot*, 2d ed., 1882.

SOCRATES, son of the statuary Sophroniscus and of the midwife Phænarete, was born at Athens, not earlier than 471 nor later than May or June 469 B.C. As a youth he received the customary instruction in gymnastic and music; and in after years he made himself acquainted with geometry and astronomy and studied the methods and the doctrines of the leaders of Greek thought and culture. He began life as a sculptor; and in the 2d century A.D. a group of the Graces, supposed to be his work, was still to be seen on the road to the Acropolis. But he soon abandoned art and gave himself to what may best be called education, conceiving that he had a divine commission, witnessed by oracles, dreams, and signs, not indeed to teach any positive doctrine, but to convict men of ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, and by so doing to promote their intellectual and moral improvement. He was on terms of intimacy with some of the most distinguished of his Athenian contemporaries, and, at any rate in later life, was personally known to very many of his fellow-citizens. His domestic relations were, it is said, unhappy. The shrewishness of his wife Xanthippe became proverbial with the ancients, as it still is with ourselves. Aristotle, in his remarks upon genius and its degeneracy (*Rhet.*, ii. 15), speaks of Socrates's sons as dull and fatuous; and in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, one of them, Lamprocles, receives a formal rebuke for undutiful behaviour towards his mother.

Socrates served as a hoplite at Potidæa (432-429), where on one occasion he saved the life of Alcibiades, at Delium (424), and at Amphipolis (422). In these campaigns his bravery and endurance were conspicuous. But, while he thus performed the ordinary duties of a Greek citizen with credit, he neither attained nor sought political position. His "divine voice," he said, had warned him to refrain from politics, presumably because office would have entailed the sacrifice of his principles and the abandonment of his proper vocation. Yet in 406 he was a member of the senate; and on the first day of the trial of the victors of Arginuse, being president of the prytanes, he resisted—first, in conjunction with his colleagues, afterwards, when they yielded, alone—the illegal and unconstitutional proposal of Callixenus, that the fate of the eight generals should be decided by a single vote of the assembly. Not less courageous than this opposition to the "civium ardor prava jubentium" was his disregard of the "vultus instantis tyranni" two years later. During the reign of terror of 404 the Thirty, anxious to implicate in their crimes men of repute who might otherwise have opposed their plans, ordered five citizens, one of whom was Socrates, to go to

Salamis and bring thence their destined victim Leon. Socrates alone disobeyed. But, though he was exceptionally obnoxious to the Thirty,—as appears, not only in this incident, but also in their threat of punishment under a special ordinance forbidding “the teaching of the art of argument,”—it was reserved for the reconstituted democracy to bring him to trial and to put him to death. In 399, four years after the restoration and the amnesty, he was indicted as an offender against public morality. His accusers were Meletus the poet, Anytus the tanner, and Lycon the orator, all of them members of the democratic or patriot party who had returned from Phyle with Thrasybulus. The accusation ran thus: “Socrates is guilty, firstly, of denying the gods recognized by the state and introducing new divinities, and secondly, of corrupting the young.” In his unpremeditated defence, so far from seeking to conciliate his judges, Socrates defied them. He was found guilty by 280 votes, it is supposed, against 220. Meletus having called for capital punishment, it now rested with the accused to make a counter-proposition; and there can be little doubt that, had Socrates without further remark suggested some smaller but yet substantial penalty, the proposal would have been accepted. But, to the amazement of the judges and the distress of his friends, Socrates proudly declared that for the services which he had rendered to the city he deserved, not punishment, but the reward of a public benefactor,—maintenance in the Prytaneum at the cost of the state; and, although at the close of his speech he professed himself willing to pay a fine of one mina, and upon the urgent entreaties of his friends raised the amount of his offer to thirty minas, he made no attempt to disguise his indifference to the result. His attitude exasperated the judges, and the penalty of death was decreed by an increased majority. Then in a short address Socrates declared his contentment with his own conduct and with the sentence. Whether death was a dreamless sleep or a new life in Hades, where he would have opportunities of testing the wisdom of the heroes and the sages of antiquity, in either case he esteemed it a gain to die. In the same spirit he refused to take advantage of a scheme arranged by his friend Crito for an escape from prison. Under ordinary circumstances the condemned criminal drank the cup of hemlock on the day after the trial; but in the case of Socrates the rule that during the absence of the sacred ship sent annually to Delos no one should be put to death caused an exceptional delay. For thirty days he remained in imprisonment, receiving his intimates and conversing with them in his accustomed manner. How in his last conversation he argued that the wise man will regard approaching death with a cheerful confidence Plato relates in the *Phædo*; and, while the central argument—which rests the doctrine of the soul's immortality upon the theory of ideas—must be accounted Platonic, in all other respects the narrative, though not that of an eye-witness, has the air of accuracy and truth.

But what were the personal characteristics which won for this man, poor in worldly goods, the affectionate regard of the best of his contemporaries? Why was it that the Athenians, forgetting his loyal performance of civic duties, his virtuous life, and his disinterested anxiety for their welfare, brought him to trial, condemned him, put him to death? What were the principles upon which his teaching rested, and what was the message which, instant in season, out of season, he carried to his countrymen? How were his principles interpreted by his followers, and what influence did his teaching exert upon subsequent speculation? These are the questions which demand consideration in the present article.

Happily, though Socrates left no writings behind him; and indeed, as will hereafter appear, was by his principles

precluded from dogmatic exposition, we have in the *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* or *Memoirs* and other works of Xenophon records of Socrates's conversation, and in the dialogues of Plato refined applications of his method. Xenophon, having no philosophical views of his own to develop, and no imagination to lead him astray,—being, in fact, to Socrates what Boswell was to Johnson,—is an excellent witness. The *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* or *Memorabilia* are indeed confessedly apologetic, and it is easy to see that nothing is introduced which might embitter those who, hating Socrates, were ready to persecute the Socratics; but the plain, straightforward narrative of Socrates's talk, on many occasions, with many dissimilar interlocutors, carries with it in its simplicity and congruity the evidence of substantial justice and truth. Plato, though he understood his master better, is a less trustworthy authority, as he makes Socrates the mouthpiece of his own more advanced and even antagonistic doctrine. Yet to all appearance the *Apology* is a careful and exact account of Socrates's habits and principles of action; the earlier dialogues, those which are commonly called “Socratic,” represent, with such changes only as are necessitated by their form, Socrates's method; and, if in the later and more important dialogues the doctrine is the doctrine of Plato, echoes of the master's teaching are still discoverable, approving themselves as such by their accord with the Xenophontean testimony. In the face of these two principal witnesses other evidence is of small importance.

*Personal Characteristics.*—What, then, were the personal characteristics of the man? Outwardly his presence was mean and his countenance grotesque. Short of stature, thick-necked, and somewhat corpulent, with prominent eyes, with nose upturned and nostrils outspread, with large mouth and coarse lips, he seemed the embodiment of sensuality and even stupidity. Inwardly he was, as his friends knew, “so pious that he did nothing without taking counsel of the gods, so just that he never did an injury to any man, whilst he was the benefactor of his associates, so temperate that he never preferred pleasure to right, so wise that in judging of good and evil he was never at fault,—in a word, the best and the happiest of men.” His self-control was absolute; his powers of endurance were unfailing; he had so schooled himself to moderation that his scanty means satisfied all his wants. “To want nothing,” he said himself, “is divine; to want as little as possible is the nearest possible approach to the divine life”; and accordingly he practised temperance and self-denial to a degree which some thought ostentatious and affected. Yet the hearty enjoyment of social pleasures was another of his marked characteristics; for to abstain from innocent gratification from fear of falling into excess would have seemed to him to imply either a pedantic formalism or a lack of real self-control. In short, his strength of will, if by its very perfection it led to his theoretical identification of virtue and knowledge, secured him in practice against the ascetic extravagances of his associate Antisthenes.

The intellectual gifts of Socrates were hardly less remarkable than his moral virtues. Naturally observant, acute, and thoughtful, he developed these qualities by constant and systematic use. The exercise of the mental powers was, he conceived, no mere occupation of leisure hours, but rather a sacred and ever-present duty; because, moral error being intellectual error translated into act, he who would live virtuously must first rid himself of ignorance and folly. He had, it may be conjectured, but little turn for philosophical speculation; yet by the careful study of the ethical problems which met him in himself and in others he acquired a remarkable tact in dealing with questions of practical morality; and in the course of

the lifelong war which he waged against vagueness of thought and laxity of speech he made himself a singularly apt and ready reasoner.

While he regarded the improvement, not only of himself but also of others, as a task divinely appointed to him, there was in his demeanour nothing exclusive or pharisaical. On the contrary, deeply conscious of his own limitations and infirmities, he felt and cherished a profound sympathy with erring humanity, and loved with a love passing the love of women fellow-men who had not learnt, as he had done, to overcome human frailties and weaknesses. Nevertheless great wrongs roused in him a righteous indignation which sometimes found expression in fierce and angry rebuke. Indeed it would seem that Plato in his idealized portrait gives his hero credit not only for a deeper philosophical insight but also for a greater urbanity than facts warranted. Hence, whilst those who knew him best met his affection with a regard equal to his own, there were, as will be seen hereafter, some who never forgave his stern reproofs, and many who regarded him as an impertinent busybody.

He was a true patriot. Deeply sensible of his debt to the city in which he had been born and bred, he thought that in giving his life to the spread of sounder views in regard to ethical and political subjects he made no more than an imperfect return; and, when in the exercise of constitutional authority that city brought him to trial and threatened him with death, it was not so much his local attachment, strong though that sentiment was, as rather his sense of duty which forbade him to retire into exile before the trial began, to acquiesce in a sentence of banishment when the verdict had been given against him, and to accept the opportunity of escape which was offered him during his imprisonment. Yet his patriotism had none of the narrowness which was characteristic of the patriotism of his Greek contemporaries. His generous benevolence and unaffected philanthropy taught him to overstep the limits of the Athenian demus and the Hellenic race, and to regard himself as a “citizen of the world.”

He was blest with an all-pervading humour, a subtle but kindly appreciation of the incongruities of human nature and conduct. In a less robust character this quality might have degenerated into sentimentality or cynicism; in Socrates, who had not a trace of either, it showed itself principally in what his contemporaries knew as his “accustomed irony.” Profoundly sensible of the inconsistencies of his own thoughts and words and actions, and shrewdly suspecting that the like inconsistencies were to be found in other men, he was careful always to place himself upon the standpoint of ignorance and to invite others to join him there, in order that, proving all things, he and they might hold fast that which is good. “Intellectually the acutest man of his age,” says W. H. Thompson in a brilliant and instructive appendix to his edition of Plato's *Phædrus*, “he represents himself in all companies as the dullest person present. Morally the purest, he affects to be the slave of passion, and borrows the language of gallantry to describe a benevolence too exalted for the comprehension of his contemporaries. He is by turns an *εραστής*, a *προαγωγός*, a *μαστροπός*, a *μαιντικός*, disguising the sanctity of his true vocation by names suggestive of vile or ridiculous images. The same spirit of whimsical paradox leads him, in Xenophon's *Banquet*, to argue that his own satyr-like visage was superior in beauty to that of the handsomest man present. That this irony was to some extent calculated is more than probable; it disarmed ridicule by anticipating it; it allayed jealousy and propitiated envy; and it possibly procured him admission into gay circles from which a more solemn teacher would have been excluded. But it had for its basis a real greatness

of soul, a hearty and unaffected disregard of public opinion, a perfect disinterestedness, an entire abnegation of self. He made himself a fool that others by his folly might be made wise; he humbled himself to the level of those among whom his work lay that he might raise some few among them to his own level; he was ‘all things to all men, if by any means he might win some.’ It would seem that this humorous depreciation of his own great qualities, this pretence of being no better than his neighbours, led to grave misapprehension amongst his contemporaries. That it was the foundation of the slanders of the Peripatetic Aristoxenus can hardly be doubted.

Socrates was further a man of sincere and fervent piety. “No one,” says Xenophon, “ever knew of his doing or saying anything profane or unholy.” There was indeed in the popular mythology much which he could not accept. It was incredible, he argued, that the gods should have committed acts which would be disgraceful in the worst of men. Such stories, then, must be regarded as the inventions of lying poets. But, when he had thus purified the contemporary polytheism, he was able to reconcile it with his own steadfast belief in a Supreme Being, the intelligent and beneficent Creator of the universe, and to find in the national ritual the means of satisfying his religious aspirations. For proof of the existence of “the divine,” he appealed to the providential arrangement of nature, to the universality of the belief, and to the revelations and warnings which are given to men through signs and oracles. Thinking that the soul of man partook of the divine, he maintained the doctrine of its immortality as an article of faith, but not of knowledge. While he held that, the gods alone knowing what is for man's benefit, man should pray, not for particular goods, but only for that which is good, he was regular in prayer and punctual in sacrifice. He looked to oracles and signs for guidance in those matters, and in those matters only, which could not be resolved by experience and judgment, and he further supposed himself to receive special warnings of a mantic character through what he called his “divine sign” (*δαμόνιον*, *δαμόνιον σημεῖον*).

Socrates's frequent references to his “divine sign” were, says Xenophon, the origin of the charge of “introducing new divinities” brought against him by his accusers, and in early Christian times, amongst Neoplatonic philosophers and fathers of the church, gave rise to the notion that he supposed himself to be attended by a “genius” or “daemon.” Similarly in our own day spiritualists have attributed to him the belief—which they justify—in “an intelligent spiritual being who accompanied him through life,—in other words, a guardian spirit” (A. R. Wallace). But the very precise testimony of Xenophon and Plato shows plainly that Socrates did not regard his “customary sign” either as a divinity or as a genius. According to Xenophon, the sign was a warning, either to do or not to do which it would be folly to neglect, not superseding ordinary prudence, but dealing with those uncertainties in respect of which other men found guidance in oracles and tokens; Socrates believed in it profoundly, and never disobeyed it. According to Plato, the sign was a “voice” which warned Socrates to refrain from some act which he contemplated; he heard it frequently and on the most trifling occasions; the phenomenon dated from his early years, and was, so far as he knew, peculiar to himself. These statements have been variously interpreted. Thus it has been maintained that, in laying claim to supernatural revelations, Socrates (1) committed a pious fraud, (2) indulged his “accustomed irony,” (3) recognized the voice of conscience, (4) indicated a general belief in a divine mission, (5) described “the inward voice of his individual tact, which in consequence partly of his experience and penetration, partly of his knowledge of himself and exact appreciation of what was in harmony with his individuality, had attained to an unusual accuracy.” (6) was mad (“était fou”), being subject not only to hallucinations of sense but also to aberrations of reason. Xenophon's testimony that Socrates was plainly sincere in his belief excludes the first and the second of these theories; the character of the warnings given, which are always concerned, not with the moral worth of actions, but with their uncertain results, warrants the rejection of the third and the fourth; the fifth, while it sufficiently accounts for the matter of the warning, leaves unexplained its manner, the vocal utterance; the sixth, while it plausibly ex-