

France and concluded the Methuen treaty with England. This opened the Peninsula to the allied forces and necessitated a revision of the terms of the alliance. Pedro's support could only be purchased by the expulsion of the French from Spain, and the allies now determined to claim the whole Spanish inheritance for the archduke Charles. In 1704 the archduke appeared in Portugal, and the English fleet, under Sir George Rooke, captured Gibraltar. As the assistance of the Portuguese was only half-hearted, it was decided in 1705 to seek a new opening in the east. Catalonia, always inclined to revolt against its rulers, and recently irritated by the conduct of Philip V., offered a convenient base of operations. The brilliant but eccentric earl of Peterborough succeeded in capturing Barcelona, and by the end of the year the archduke was acknowledged as Charles III. in Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon. A great effort on the part of Philip to recover the lost provinces was repulsed, and a simultaneous advance of the allies from the east and from Portugal compelled him to evacuate Madrid, where Charles III. was formally proclaimed. But the provincial disunion, which had so often hampered the Hapsburg kings, proved the salvation of their Bourbon successor. The Castilians refused to obey a king who was forced upon them from Aragon, and their religious instincts were offended by the alliance of Charles with the heretics of England and Holland. Disunion among the allies aided the revolt of Castile, and by the end of 1706 Charles III. found himself compelled to evacuate his recent conquests and to return to Barcelona. In 1707 the allies attempted another invasion of Castile, but they were routed by the duke of Berwick at Almanza, and Aragon and Valencia were forced to return to their allegiance to Philip V. For the next two years the war in the Peninsula languished. Charles III. received reinforcements from Austria under Stahremberg, but he was unable to do more than retain his hold upon Barcelona. In 1710 the cause of the allies received a new impulse from the arrival of Stanhope with supplies of men and money from England. Under the joint command of Stanhope and Stahremberg the army advanced westwards from Barcelona, defeated Philip V. at Almenara and Saragossa, and for the second time occupied Madrid. The disasters which the French had experienced in other parts of Europe had broken the pride of Louis XIV., and he was prepared to purchase peace by sacrificing his grandson. A treaty would have been concluded to this effect at Gertruydenburg, if the allies had not insisted that the French troops should be employed in forcing Philip V. to accept it. Louis XIV. refused to take arms against his own family, and a sudden change in the current of fortune saved him from the humiliation which his enemies wished to force upon him. Charles III. found it impossible to maintain Madrid in face of the enthusiasm of the Castilians for his rival. The capital of Spain was of no importance from a military point of view, and the allies determined on its evacuation. On their retreat they were followed by Vendôme, whom Louis XIV. had sent to his grandson's assistance. Stanhope, attacked at Brihuega, was compelled to capitulate with all his forces before Stahremberg could arrive to his assistance. The latter was defeated after an obstinate struggle at Villa Viciosa. Aragon and Valencia again submitted to Philip, and the archduke was once more confined to Catalonia.

At this juncture two events occurred which completely altered the balance of the contending powers. The fall of the Whig ministry through a court intrigue gave the control of English policy to the Tories, who had always been hostile to the war. The death of Joseph I. in April 1711 left the Austrian territories to his brother, the archduke

Charles, who was soon afterwards elected emperor as Charles VI. To allow him to obtain the Spanish succession would be to revive the empire of Charles V., and would be even more dangerous to the balance of power than the recognition of Philip V. with adequate securities against the union of France and Spain. The object for which the allies had been making such immense exertions was now a result to be averted at any cost.

In these altered circumstances, Bolingbroke, the English minister, hurried on the negotiations with France which resulted in the treaty of Utrecht between England, France, Spain, and Holland. Philip V. was acknowledged as king of Spain, on condition that he should formally renounce all eventual claims to the crown of France. But the partition of the Spanish monarchy was insisted upon by the allies. The Netherlands were to be handed over to Austria, on condition that the Dutch should garrison the barrier fortresses. Austria was also to receive the Italian provinces of Spain, with the exception of Sicily, which was given to the duke of Savoy with the title of king. England naturally obtained considerable advantages from a war in which she had borne so prominent a part. The acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca gave her the control of the Mediterranean. The *asiento* conferred upon her the privilege of importing slaves into the Spanish colonies, and she also obtained the right of sending a single vessel into the South Seas. France had to recognize the Protestant succession, and to cede Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and Hudson's Bay. Charles VI. refused to accept the terms offered to him at Utrecht, but he found it impossible to carry on the war by himself, and in 1714 he made peace with France by the treaty of Rastatt. But he still retained the title of king of Spain, and showed no willingness to acknowledge Philip V.

The great blot on the conduct of the allies in arranging the treaty of Utrecht was the desertion of the Catalans, who had rendered such loyal services during the war. They were left to the tender mercies of Philip V., who sent Berwick to reduce the rebellious province. Barcelona resisted for many months with the heroism of despair, and was well-nigh reduced to ashes before it could be taken (September 1714). With its fall all resistance came to an end. The three Aragonese provinces were deprived of the last remnants of their ancient privileges, and were henceforth ruled from Madrid under Castilian laws.

With the final accession of a Bourbon king Spain entered upon a new period of history, in which it once more played a considerable part in European politics. The death of Louis XIV. (1715), and the acquisition of the regency in France by the duke of Orleans, destroyed the close connexion that had hitherto existed between France and Spain. Philip V. was hypochondriacal and bigoted, the slave of his wife and his confessor, but he had certain definite schemes to which he clung with the obstinacy of a weak character. In spite of his solemn renunciations and the guarantee of the European powers, he never relinquished the idea of ultimately succeeding to the French throne. In what was regarded as the probable event of Louis XV.'s death, he was determined to enforce his hereditary claim, even if he had to resign the crown of Spain. His interests were diametrically opposed to those of the duke of Orleans, who was, after Philip's family, the natural heir to Louis XV. Philip V. had one other guiding passion, enmity to Charles VI., who had robbed the Spanish monarchy of its fairest provinces in Italy. These provinces he set his heart upon regaining, and in this project he was encouraged by the two people who had most influence over him,—his wife and his minister.

Philip V.'s first wife, Maria Louisa of Savoy, had died in 1714, leaving him two sons, Louis and Ferdinand. A suc-

cessor was speedily found for her in the person of Elizabeth Farnese, niece of the duke of Parma, who was suggested by Alberoni, at that time agent for Parma at Madrid. The new queen speedily obtained unlimited ascendancy over her husband's mind, and she displayed an unbridled ambition and a capacity for intrigue astounding in one who had been brought up in complete retirement. As Philip's sons by his first wife would exclude her own children from the Spanish throne, she was anxious to obtain for the latter the reversion of the duchies of Parma and Tuscany, to which she had an eventual claim. With this end in view she encouraged her husband's designs in Italy, while personal ambition made her eager to see him on the French throne. Her favour gave the conduct of Spanish affairs for a short period to her countryman Alberoni, one of the strangest personages of the 18th century. The son of a gardener at Piacenza, he had sought a career in the church, and had come to Spain in the suite of Vendôme, whose favour he had won by combining the functions of a cook and a buffoon. After the death of his patron he remained in Spain, and conceived an ardent affection for the country of his adoption. Raised to power by the part he had played in effecting the king's marriage, he determined to exalt Spain from its long depression to the position it had once occupied in Europe. His domestic reforms showed that he had a real capacity for government. Commerce and industry revived under his patronage; the army was reorganized, and the revenue increased. But his chief attention was given to the navy, the real foundation of the former greatness of Spain. Foreigners who had known the country under Charles II. or during the Succession War were astounded at the strides which it had made under the new administration. Alberoni himself is said to have assured Philip that with five years of peace he would make him the most powerful sovereign of Europe. But these years of peace he was not destined to have. Alberoni cordially approved the Italian designs of Philip, and hoped to employ the restored might of Spain in freeing his native country from the hated rule of Austria. He had less sympathy with the king's hankering after the French crown and his enmity to the regent Orleans. But he held office only by the royal favour, and could not venture to set up his own will against that of his master. He was convinced, and not without reason, that everything would go well if he could secure the English alliance.

But the attitude of Spain had already awakened suspicion in France, and the ready mind of Dubois had conceived a plan for thwarting Alberoni. He determined to desert the policy of Louis XIV. and to conclude a close alliance between France and England. This was to be based upon the common danger from rival pretenders, which urged the houses of Orleans and Hanover to maintain the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht. An agreement was arranged between the two states in 1716, and, being joined by Holland in January 1717, was known as the Triple Alliance. This was a great blow to Alberoni, and made him anxious to postpone all hostilities until his preparations were complete. But his hand was forced by the indignation excited in Philip V.'s mind by an insult offered to him by the emperor. The grand inquisitor of Spain was arrested in Lombardy as a rebel against Charles III., his lawful king. Philip V. decided for an immediate rupture, and Alberoni against his will had to send an expedition to Sardinia, which overran the island in 1717. The enthusiasm excited in Spain by the unwonted news of a military success was increased in 1718 when another Spanish force occupied Sicily. But meanwhile Charles VI. had appealed to France and England for assistance against this rupture of the treaty of

Utrecht. The Triple Alliance, reinforced by the junction of Austria, became the Quadruple Alliance (August 1718). The resolution of the allies was convincingly displayed in a naval encounter in which Admiral Byng destroyed the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro.

Hitherto the only fault to be found with Alberoni's schemes is that they were attempted prematurely, and this was the fault of the king rather than of the minister. But the Quadruple Alliance drove him in despair to form those far-reaching projects which are generally associated with his name, and which have given rise to the unjust impression that his whole policy was chimerical and unsound. To meet the hostility of England and France he must make use of internal divisions. He invited the Pretender to Spain, prepared an expedition in his behalf, and concerted with Count Görz, the minister of Charles XII., a grand scheme by which Sweden and Russia were to combine in supporting the Jacobites against George I. At the same time, through the Spanish envoy Cellamare, he organized a conspiracy among the numerous opponents of the regent. All these schemes broke down simultaneously. Charles XII. was killed at the siege of an obscure town in Norway; Görz was executed by his successor; the Spanish fleet which was to carry the Pretender to England was wrecked; the conspiracy of Cellamare was discovered and suppressed. France declared war, and sent an army under Berwick across the Pyrenees. An English fleet gratified the national love of a maritime monopoly by burning along the Spanish coast the vessels and docks which Alberoni had created. The emperor, who had just ended a war with Turkey by the treaty of Passarowitz, was able to send a force which succeeded in recovering Sicily. Alberoni was sacrificed to appease the enemies of Spain, and was exiled from the kingdom he had served so loyally in December 1719. A month later Philip V. accepted the terms imposed upon him by the Quadruple Alliance. He had to confirm his renunciation of the French crown, and also to abandon all claims on the provinces of Spain which had been ceded to Austria by the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt. He also allowed the emperor to retain Sicily, the duke of Savoy being compensated with Sardinia. On the other hand Charles VI.'s pretensions to the Spanish crown were definitely abandoned, and the allies recognized the eventual claims to Parma and Tuscany of Philip's children by his second marriage, on condition that those duchies should never be united with Spain.

In spite of the conclusion of peace, Philip continued to cherish his animosity against Charles VI., especially as the latter showed an inclination to evade the condition about Parma and Tuscany by encouraging other claimants to come forward. To gratify this passion, Philip went so far as to lay aside his old enmity against the duke of Orleans, and to authorize the negotiation of a close alliance with France. His eldest son, Don Luis, was married to a daughter of the regent, and Louis XV. was betrothed to the infanta Maria Anna. But the death of Orleans in 1723 gave a new direction to the king's policy. In 1724 Europe was astounded by the news that Philip had abdicated in favour of Don Luis, and had gone into retirement at San Ildefonso. This act was generally attributed to the indolence and superstition which formed the basis of his character, but the real motive was undoubtedly a desire to remove the chief obstacle to his accession in France. Louis XV., however, disappointed his expectations by continuing to live, and the queen soon wearied of her unwonted seclusion. Luis only survived his accession eight months, and to the surprise of the world Philip V. emerged from his retreat to resume the crown which he had laid down of his own accord.

The queen returned to power more determined than ever to carry out her favourite scheme of obtaining an Italian principality for her eldest son Don Carlos. As France and England had shown themselves lukewarm in the matter, she resolved to turn to her husband's enemy, Charles VI. This scheme was suggested by a Dutch adventurer, Ripperda, who inspired Elizabeth with a belief that the Austrian alliance would enable her not only to effect her object in Italy, but also to regain Gibraltar and Minorca for Spain. This was rendered the more probable by the fact that Charles VI. had quarrelled with England about the foundation of the Ostend Company. The conduct of the affair was entrusted to Ripperda himself, and while he was at Vienna a great impulse was given to the negotiation by a complete rupture between Spain and France. The duke of Bourbon, who had become chief minister in France after the death of Orleans, had set himself to reverse the policy of his predecessor. To complete this, he sent the infanta back to Spain and married Louis XV. to Maria Leczinska, daughter of the ex-king of Poland. This insult removed the last scruples of Philip V. about the Austrian alliance, and in April 1725 Ripperda concluded the treaty of Vienna. The mutual renunciations arranged by the Quadruple Alliance were confirmed: Spain recognized the settlement of the Austrian succession by the Pragmatic Sanction and promised great commercial privileges to the Ostend Company, while Charles VI. pledged himself to secure the succession of Don Carlos in Parma and Tuscany and to use his influence with England to obtain the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca. By a secret treaty Charles further undertook, in the case of England's refusal, to assist Spain with arms and also to send aid to the Jacobites. These terms were soon divulged by the indiscreet vanity of Ripperda himself, and England and France formed the counter-league of Hanover (September 1725), which was also joined by Frederick William I. of Prussia, though only for a short time.

Ripperda returned to Spain, to be rewarded with the office of chief minister. But his success seems to have turned his head; his boasts about the grand results to be expected from the Austrian alliance proved to be ill-founded, and his fall was as sudden as his rise had been. After a brief period of exile in England, he sought a new home in Morocco, where he became a convert to Islam and died in 1737. But his policy was continued by his successor, Don Joseph Patiño, who sent a fleet to lay siege to Gibraltar. Europe was now divided into two hostile leagues, but the outbreak of a general war was averted, partly by the pacific inclinations of Walpole in England and Fleury in France, and partly by the growing coolness between Austria and Spain. Charles VI. had been led into the treaty of Vienna by a momentary pique against England, but he soon realized that he had more to lose than to gain by favouring the Spanish designs upon Italy. Accordingly, in May 1727, while the siege of Gibraltar was proceeding, he threw over his obligations to Spain and signed the preliminaries of a peace with England and France. The Ostend Company was suspended, and the questions about Parma, Tuscany, and Gibraltar were referred to a European congress at Soissons. The Spanish Government found it impossible to hold out in isolation, and accepted these terms by the convention of the Pardo (March 1728).

The congress of Soissons was a complete failure, and the irrepressible energy of the Spanish queen discovered a new method of obtaining her ends. The birth of a son to Louis XV. removed into the background all idea of the succession in France, and the attitude of Charles VI. proved that he would do nothing for Don Carlos. Under

these circumstances there was no alternative but to sacrifice the prospect of recovering Gibraltar and Minorca and to seek the alliance of England and France. By the treaty of Seville (November 1729) these powers, with Holland, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Spain. The privileges which the latter country had conferred upon the Ostend Company were revoked. Don Carlos was recognized as the heir to Parma and Tuscany, and to enforce his claims these provinces were to be occupied by 6000 Spanish troops. Charles VI., astounded at this sudden change in the aspect of affairs, took active steps to oppose this occupation of the duchies. He collected 30,000 troops in Italy, and when the old duke of Parma died in January 1731 he seized his territories as an imperial fief. Elizabeth called upon her allies to carry out the treaty of Seville, but Walpole and Fleury were unwilling to resort to hostilities. Luckily Charles VI. thought more of securing his daughter's succession in Austria than of anything else. By promising that England would guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, Walpole induced the emperor to conclude the second treaty of Vienna (March 1731), which dissolved the Ostend Company and confirmed the provisions of the treaty of Seville. In 1732 English ships conveyed Don Carlos and the Spanish troops to Italy. Parma and Piacenza were immediately occupied, and the grand-duke of Tuscany acknowledged Don Carlos as his heir.

In the long and intricate series of negotiations of which we have given a brief summary the guiding thread is the grasping ambition of the queen of Spain. That ambition was by no means satisfied by the results obtained in the treaty of Vienna. Austria still held the Italian provinces of Spain and was looking out for an opportunity to expel Don Carlos from central Italy. England retained her hold upon Gibraltar and Minorca, and claimed a maritime and colonial supremacy which threatened to thwart all schemes for the revival of Spanish commerce. Elizabeth never relinquished for a moment the hope of humiliating England and expelling the Hapsburgs from Italy. Circumstances at this time were more favourable than they had ever been before. The able administration of Patiño, "the Colbert of Spain," had restored order in the Spanish finances, and had already made considerable strides towards the creation of a formidable fleet. But the great advantage lay in the fact that the death of Orleans and the birth of children to Louis XV. had removed all obstacles in the way of an alliance between Spain and France. The close union between the two branches of the house of Bourbon, which the Grand Alliance had endeavoured to avert, and which circumstances had postponed for twenty years, was now to become an accomplished fact. In 1733 "an eternal and irrevocable family compact" was signed by the Count Rottembourg and Don Joseph Patiño. France and Spain pledged themselves to pursue a common policy in regard both to Austria and England, the object of which was to destroy the Italian ascendancy of the one and the commercial monopoly of the other. This treaty, which constituted a danger to Europe hardly less than the aggressions of Louis XIV., was kept a profound secret, and, though its existence was more than suspected at the time, its full importance has not been apprehended until recent times.

The first opportunity for carrying out this common policy was offered by the dispute about the Polish succession which broke out in 1733 between Stanislaus Leczinski and Augustus III. of Saxony. Austria and Russia supported the latter prince, while Louis XV. espoused the cause of his father-in-law. But the war in Poland itself was of very secondary importance compared with the hostilities to which it gave rise in southern Europe.

France, Spain, and Sardinia concluded the league of Turin (October 1733) for the partition of Charles VI.'s Italian provinces. The chief events of the war, from the Spanish point of view, were the occupation of Naples and Sicily by Don Carlos. It was intended that he should keep these kingdoms, and that Parma and Tuscany should be transferred to his younger brother Don Philip. But Fleury, seeing an opportunity of securing his own ends, refused to continue the war for the aggrandizement of Spain. In 1735 he concluded the preliminaries of a peace with Austria by which Don Carlos was to be recognized as king of the Two Sicilies, Charles VI. was to be compensated with Parma, and his son-in-law was to receive Tuscany in exchange for Lorraine, which was eventually to pass to France. The Spanish queen was bitterly indignant at the desertion of her ally, at the cession of her native Parma to Austria, and at the failure to provide anything for her second son. She struggled hard to prolong the war, but the only result of her manoeuvres was to postpone the conclusion of the definitive treaty until 1739, when the preliminaries were confirmed.

Meanwhile Spain had become involved in a maritime quarrel with England. The restrictions imposed by the treaty of Utrecht upon English trade with the Spanish colonies had been systematically evaded by the development of a system of organized smuggling on the part of the British traders. The Spaniards, encouraged by the secret compact with France, refused to tolerate an abuse which their weakness had compelled them to connive at in the previous century. To put a stop to it they rigidly enforced their right of search, often seizing British vessels on the high seas and treating the crews with gross brutality. This gave rise to great ill-feeling between the two nations, which was increased by other colonial disputes about the right of gathering logwood in Campeachy Bay and on the frontiers of Florida. The popular indignation in England, which Walpole's opponents fanned for their own purposes, was raised to fever-heat by the story of Jenkins, an English captain, who maintained that he had been tortured and his ears cut off by a Spanish *guarda costa*. Walpole, who had refused to believe in the Family Compact, and had steadily adhered to a policy of peace, was compelled by the popular clamour to declare war in October 1739. The maritime operations which followed were insignificant. Admiral Vernon took Porto Bello, and Anson plundered Payta; but England was distracted by party jealousies and her naval organization had fallen into disorder during the long peace. Luckily for her, Patiño had died in 1736, and the impulse which he had given to the Spanish navy ended with him. But before long the quarrel was absorbed in the great European war which arose about the Austrian succession.

Charles VI. had persuaded almost every European power to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, but the succession of Maria Theresa to his territories was not in the least facilitated by the paper promises to support her. England was almost the only power that adhered to its engagements. Frederick of Prussia advanced an obsolete claim to Silesia, and France seized the opportunity to humiliate the house of Hapsburg. Spain hastened to join the coalition against the unfortunate heir. Philip V. claimed to represent the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs, and pleaded the old family agreement by which they were to succeed on the extinction of the Austrian line. There was no possibility of so absurd a claim being recognized, but it opened the prospect of recovering the lost provinces in Italy. Sardinia was gained over by the promise of part of Lombardy. Naples and Sicily were already in the hands of Don Carlos. It seemed hardly possible that Maria Theresa, pressed by enemies on every side, could

successfully defend her Italian territories. A Spanish army under Montemar was embarked in French vessels, and, after evading the English fleet, landed in the Gulf of Genoa in 1741. The first news was discouraging, as Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia, ready like his predecessors to sell his alliance to the highest bidder, had been bought off by Maria Theresa. It was not till 1742 that the campaign began with an advance upon Modena, where the duke had promised his support to Spain. But the Austrians and Sardinians were the first in the field. They expelled the duke of Modena from his territories, and drove Montemar to retreat towards Naples. At the same time the English fleet appeared before Naples, and the threat of an immediate bombardment compelled Don Carlos to promise a strict neutrality during the rest of the war. Count Gages, who was sent to supersede the unsuccessful Montemar, was unable to recover the lost ground, and the first campaign ended without any serious advantage to either side beyond the Austrian occupation of Modena. In 1743 Gages again attempted the invasion of Lombardy, but was defeated at Campo Santo and repulsed. Austria and Sardinia concluded a close alliance in the treaty of Worms (September 1743), which was negotiated by England. France and Spain sought to meet this coalition by renewing the Family Compact at Fontainebleau (October 1743). France undertook to aid in conquering the Milanese for Don Philip, to declare war against England, and not to make peace until Gibraltar, and if possible Minorca too, had been restored to Spain. Don Philip himself was sent with a Spanish army through southern France, but he failed to force a passage through the Alps. The campaign of 1744 was indecisive, but in the next year the great efforts made by Maria Theresa to recover Silesia gave her opponents in Italy an opportunity of which they were not slow to avail themselves. Gages effected a junction at Genoa with the combined French and Spanish troops under Maillebois and Don Philip. Advancing into Piedmont the allies took Tortona, and after occupying Parma and Piacenza they invaded Lombardy. This move effected the desired object of separating the Austrians and Sardinians. Schulenburg hurried off to the defence of his mistress's territories, and the allies at once turned upon Charles Emmanuel and defeated him at Bassignano. The French wished to complete the conquest of Piedmont, but the Spaniards insisted upon renewing the invasion of Lombardy. That province was now entirely undefended, as the Austrians had returned to the assistance of Charles Emmanuel, who detained them by the threat that if he were deserted he would make terms with the allies. One town after another surrendered or was taken, and in December Don Philip entered Milan in triumph. But meanwhile Maria Theresa had ended the Silesian War by the treaty of Dresden, and was thus enabled to send reinforcements into Italy. The tide of success turned with marvellous rapidity. The Spaniards evacuated Lombardy, and were soon driven from all their conquests in Piedmont except Tortona. At Piacenza, to which the Bourbon army had retreated, it was completely defeated by the Austrians.

At this juncture the news arrived from Spain that Philip V. had died on July 9, and had been succeeded by Ferdinand VI., the only surviving son of his first marriage. Elizabeth Farnese, "the termagant," as Carlyle calls her, whose ambition had kept Europe embroiled for thirty years, went into retirement at San Ildefonso. This event naturally influenced the war in Italy. It was not likely that the new king, who had never been on good terms with his stepmother, would expend more of his country's blood and treasure to obtain a principality for his half-brother. His first act was to supersede Gages by the

marquis of Las Minas, who found the Spanish army at Tortona and hastened to withdraw it from Italy into Savoy, which Don Philip had occupied since 1742. The Austrians at once besieged and captured Genoa, thus cutting off the possibility of a renewed invasion of Italy, except through the well-guarded passes of the Alps. From this time the military operations ceased to have any direct importance for Spain, and all interest centred in the negotiations which were carried on at Breda in 1747 and transferred to Aix-la-Chapelle in the next year. The chief obstacle to peace was the demand of a principality for Don Philip, which Ferdinand VI. persisted in as necessary for the honour of Spain. Maria Theresa had already made sacrifices to Prussia and to Sardinia, and resented the idea of ceding any more of her territories. But the persistence of England carried the day, and in the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (October 1748) Don Philip obtained Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla as an hereditary principality, on condition that they should revert to Austria on extinction of his male descendants. This was the sole advantage gained by Spain. Austria retained Lombardy, shorn of the portion promised to Charles Emmanuel; and the commercial and naval ascendancy of England remained unshaken. The recovery of Gibraltar, which at one time Philip V. had confidently expected, was now further off than ever.

Ferdinand VI. was as feeble in health and as averse to business as his father had been, but he was equally obstinate on certain points. He would have nothing to do with the aggressive policy of his stepmother or with the Bourbon schemes for the humiliation of England. His accession broke off the Family Compact, and gave to Spain the unaccustomed boon of thirteen years' peace. His aim was to hold the balance between the rival powers of western Europe, and in this he was aided by the discord between his two ministers, Ensenada and Carvalho, of whom the former favoured France and the latter England. When Kaunitz, the Austrian envoy at Versailles, was endeavouring to negotiate an alliance between the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, Ferdinand seized the opportunity to conclude the treaty of Aranjuez, which guaranteed the neutrality of the Italian provinces of the two families. On the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 great efforts were made to draw Spain into the struggle. France offered Minorca, which had been lost by Byng at the first outbreak of hostilities, and England hastened to make the counter-proposition of a cession of Gibraltar. Ferdinand, however, refused both bribes, and maintained his policy of peace till his death in 1759.

This event gave the Spanish crown to Charles III., who had ruled the Two Sicilies since 1735. His accession threatened a speedy reversal of Spanish policy. The new king was a true Bourbon, and naturally inclined to the French alliance. He had an old grudge against England for the treatment he had received in the War of the Austrian Succession. He also owed a debt of gratitude to Maria Theresa for enabling him to transfer the crown of Naples to his third son, whereas by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle it ought to have passed to his brother, Philip of Parma. In spite of these motives, he hesitated for two years to take a decisive step. Spain was not prepared for war, and Charles had never cordially approved the change of policy at Versailles which had united France with its old rival Austria. But the rapid successes of England under Pitt's administration, and the danger of a vast extension of the maritime and colonial ascendancy of that country, soon overcame his scruples. In 1761 the third Family Compact was concluded, and Spain undertook to give active assistance to France unless peace were concluded within a year. Pitt, suspecting the existence

of this agreement, proposed an immediate declaration of war against Spain, but he failed to convince his cabinet and resigned. His successors, however, were driven to adopt his policy, and in January 1762 hostilities commenced between the two countries. But Spain only entered the war to share the disasters which France had already begun to suffer. An invasion of Portugal, which had been regarded as a defenceless prey, was foiled by English assistance, and the English fleet captured Martinique and Havana. The Bourbon powers found it necessary to implore peace, and it was fortunate for them that the English government had passed into the hands of Bute, who was eager to diminish the influence of Pitt by terminating the war. By the treaty of Paris (February 1763) England recovered Minorca, extended its colonies in every direction at the expense of France, and rejected all the demands which Charles III. had advanced on behalf of Spain.

In spite of the treaty Charles III.'s foreign policy continued to be guided by jealousy of England, and he clung to the French alliance as the only means by which he could avenge his recent humiliation. In this he was encouraged by his foreign minister, Grimaldi, who was so devoted to France that Choiseul declared himself to be more powerful at Madrid than at Versailles. In 1770 a dispute about the Falkland Islands, from which the English settlers had been expelled by a Spanish force, would probably have led to a renewal of war if a domestic intrigue had not succeeded at this juncture in overthrowing Choiseul. For the next few years a marked coolness grew up between France and Spain, which was increased when Louis XVI. disappointed the hopes that had been formed of his accession and left Choiseul in retirement. Grimaldi, chagrined at the failure of an alliance on which all his schemes were based, resigned office in 1777 and was succeeded by Count Florida Blanca, one of the most distinguished of the able ministers who ruled Spain during this period. The change of ministers made no difference to the policy of Charles III., whose obstinacy was in no way inferior to that of his predecessors. For many years Spain and Portugal had been engaged in disputes about the frontiers of their territories in South America, disputes which were rendered more bitter by the arrogance of Pombal, the Portuguese minister. The death of Joseph I. in 1777 and the consequent dismissal of Pombal enabled Florida Blanca to negotiate the treaty of San Ildefonso, by which Sacramento and the navigation of the Rio de la Plata were ceded to Spain, and a definite boundary was drawn between Brazil and Paraguay on the one side and Peru on the other. This was followed in March 1778 by the conclusion of a perpetual alliance at the Pardo, by which Portugal was attached to the interests of the Bourbon states. These treaties, which Florida Blanca regarded as among the most signal successes of his ministry, came very opportunely to enable Charles III. to resume the schemes that had lain in abeyance since 1763. England was involved in a desperate struggle with the revolted colonies of North America, and this offered the Bourbons the long-desired opportunity for revenge. In 1778 France entered into close alliance with the colonists, and in the next year Spain followed her example. Everything seemed to favour the allies. The Northern powers, irritated by the high-handed way in which England had asserted and exercised her maritime supremacy, formed the "armed neutrality" under the lead of Catherine II. of Russia. Even Holland, the oldest and most constant ally of England, was involved in the general coalition. England, which had failed single-handed to coerce its own subjects, was now face to face with the whole maritime power of Europe, and was also hampered by domestic and

Irish troubles. Spain succeeded in capturing Minorca and laid close siege to Gibraltar. Many of the West-Indian islands were captured from the English, and the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown destroyed the last hope of restoring American dependence. The most confident hopes were entertained of stripping England of the great bulk of its colonial possessions. But in 1782 the tide of success turned. Rodney, by the novel manoeuvre of breaking the line, destroyed the French fleet in the West Indies, while the heroic defence of General Elliott and the opportune arrival of supplies under the convoy of Lord Howe saved Gibraltar from overwhelming odds. The want of unanimity among the allies, each of whom thought only of its own interests, hastened the conclusion of peace in 1783. The treaty of Versailles, by which Spain kept Minorca and obtained the Floridas, was the most honourable which that country had concluded since Cateau Cambresis. But the failure to recover Gibraltar was a bitter disappointment to Charles III., who continued till his death (December 14, 1788) to cherish the scheme of renewing the war, though the growing disorders in France made it more and more certain that he could no longer rely upon the assistance of that country.

The reigns of the first three Bourbon kings form a period of great importance in Spanish history. At the end of the 17th century Spain appeared to be a lifeless corpse, over which the other powers of Europe could contend at will. In the 18th century men were astounded to see that country rise with renewed vigour to play once more an independent part on the international stage. This revival was due in the first place to the change of dynasty. Another Hapsburg would probably have continued the obsolete policy of his predecessors. The accession of the Bourbons introduced into Spain the methods and ideas of government which had raised France to greatness under Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert. The two great problems to be grappled with were the profound depression of trade and agriculture and the fatal wealth and ascendancy of the church. Philip V., feeble as he was personally, began the movement in advance even during the Succession War. The abolition of the old provincial independence rendered possible a more regular and centralized government, an increase of the revenue, and the removal of the old impediments to trade between the various provinces. The French officers who accompanied the king gave a new organization and new tactics to the Spanish army. Under the influence of the princess Orsini Philip seemed inclined to attack even the prescriptive privileges of the clergy. His marriage with Elizabeth Farnese saved the hierarchy and diverted his attention to wars of aggrandizement. But these wars were directed by purely political motives; the old Hapsburg idea of a religious propaganda was for ever abandoned. And even during the war the task of internal reform was hindered rather than neglected. The efforts of Alberoni and Patiño gave Spain a navy more powerful than that of Philip II. The conquest of the Two Sicilies and the acquisition of Parma, though they brought little direct advantage to Spain, yet gave conclusive evidence that the old lethargy had been shaken off and that the country was capable of exertions and sacrifices which had long appeared impossible. The period of peace under Ferdinand VI. was an inestimable boon to Spain. Taxation was lightened, production was facilitated by the removal of the most crushing burdens, yet at the same time the revenue improved and the chronic deficit of previous reigns was replaced by a surplus. And this prince took a step which no one would have expected from him. The concordat of 1753 was the first vindication of the political interests of Spain against the pretensions of Rome. The crown

asserted its right to appoint to all important benefices, and the number of papal presentations was reduced from twelve thousand to fifty-two. The revenue derived by the curia from Spain was proportionately diminished, and the clergy were compelled to recognize their obligations as members of the body politic. This measure was followed by an edict that henceforth papal bulls should not be obeyed until they had received the royal sanction.

The work of reform, thus tentatively commenced under Philip V. and Ferdinand VI., was carried still further by Charles III., whose reign is regarded with more pride by the Spaniards than any other since that of Philip II. Charles had served an apprenticeship in the art of government in Naples, where, with the help of his minister Tanucci, he had successfully grappled with evils similar to those from which Spain was suffering. He would have been a prince quite after the heart of the 18th century if he had not retained too large a share of the superstition of his family. He shared to the full that conception of the rights and duties of monarchy which inspired the reforms of Frederick the Great and Joseph II., and his allegiance to the church was fortunately counterbalanced by his desire for absolutism. His greatest work, the expulsion of the Jesuits, would never have been carried out if he had not been persuaded of its political necessity. The order had already been driven by Pombal from Portugal and by Choiseul from France, when Charles III. was convinced that a riot in Madrid, provoked by the financial measures of Squillaci, had been promoted by the Jesuits. This conviction overpowered all scruples; the fathers were promptly removed from the country, and Spain joined the other Bourbon courts in demanding that suppression of the order which was finally decreed by Clement XIV. in 1773. The Rubicon once crossed, Charles's ministers urged him on in the path of ecclesiastical reform. The increase of lands in mortmain was restricted; the number of monasteries was diminished; and the Inquisition was compelled to moderate its procedure and to subordinate its independence to the royal will. For the papal jurisdiction was substituted a national court, the *Rota*, established at Madrid.

These measures, of which the importance in a country like Spain can hardly be over-estimated, were accompanied by others no less notable for the development of trade and agriculture. The colonial trade was freed from the old restriction which compelled it to pass through Cadiz, and other ports were opened for its reception. Native manufactures were encouraged in every way, and a famous ordinance in 1773 endeavoured to remove the old prejudice against trade by declaring that the engaging in industrial occupations should not involve any loss of rank or its privileges. Internal communication was facilitated by the construction of canals. Agriculture was revived by the removal of the old prohibition against enclosures;—so long maintained by the selfish influence of the *Mesta*,—by the planting of trees in the arid deserts of central Spain, and by the rapid growth of population, which rose in the course of the century from 5,700,000 to 10,541,090. These measures, which are only selected from a large number tending in the same direction, are to be credited to three ministers, whose names reflect its chief lustre upon Charles III.'s reign. D'Aranda, who succeeded the Italian Squillaci as finance minister, was an Aragonese noble who had imbibed the spirit of philosophical speculation from France. He was the first layman who presided in the council of Castile, and he introduced into the Spanish administration a liberal tendency quite opposed to the traditions of the country. His views, however, were not congenial to the king, and, after completing his work with regard to the Jesuits and the Inquisition, he retired to the