

embassy in Paris and was succeeded by Campomanes. The latter was not only a distinguished statesman but also one of the foremost representatives of Spanish literature. He was one of the earliest students of political economy, and many of the most enlightened measures for the relief and encouragement of trade are to be assigned to him. But his administration, which aimed at educating the people to a share in political life, was almost as alien to the wishes of Charles III. as the liberal and anti-clerical schemes of D'Aranda. A far more congenial minister was found in Florida Blanca, whose aim was to promote the material interests of Spain by the supervision of an internal despotism, who stopped the attack on the church when its subordination was secured, who supported the economic reforms of Campomanes, but would only carry them out by a rigid bureaucracy, and who conciliated the king by falling in with his foreign policy even when it conflicted with the national welfare.

Meritorious as Charles III.'s reforms were, it would give a false impression to represent them as completely successful. The regeneration of Spain was by no means accomplished, and many of the abuses which had been growing for centuries survived the attempt to effect their annihilation. One of the chief causes of this failure was the corruption and ignorance of the lower officials. The reforming impulse was confined to the educated classes, and made little impression upon the bulk of the people. It was of little use to devise the most enlightened measures when there was no efficient machinery to carry them out. Many of the most promising reforms remained mere paper schemes. The methods employed, too, were not always the best calculated to obtain their end. The state took too much upon itself, and attempted to discharge functions which would have been better left to local enterprise. Roads were constructed on a magnificent scale, but only too often in directions where they were not wanted, and they remained almost unused. Thus the debt was increased without any improvement of the revenue. The return of Charles III. to a military policy imposed serious burdens upon the country, and it would have been better to have prolonged the peace of Ferdinand VI.'s reign, inglorious as it appeared to an ambitious king. Undoubtedly a great advance was made, but equal exertions would have produced a greater result in any other country. The population of Spain remained to a great extent sunk in sloth and superstition. Much might be hoped from a steady persistence in ameliorative measures, but unfortunately the work of reform was interrupted just at the moment when success appeared to be within reach.

The death of Charles III. and the accession of Charles IV. were contemporary with the outbreak of the French Revolution, which was destined to exercise a decisive influence over the fortunes of the adjacent peninsula. Florida Blanca, who continued to hold office during the first three years of the new reign, found it impossible to continue his policy. The revival of Spain could only be effected by the restoration of its naval and colonial ascendancy at the expense of England, and for the carrying out of this scheme the support of France was imperatively necessary. But the French alliance rested upon the relationship between the two branches of the house of Bourbon, and the Family Compact ceased to exist when Louis XVI. was deprived of power by his subjects. Of this conclusive evidence was given in 1791. Some English merchants founded a settlement at Nootka Sound on the west coast of America, which provoked an indignant protest from Spain. But the French national assembly refused to send any assistance, and Florida Blanca was compelled to conclude a humiliating treaty and to give up

all hope of opposing the progress of England. This failure was attributed by the minister to the Revolution, of which he became the uncompromising opponent. The reforms of Charles III.'s reign were abandoned; all liberal tendencies in Spain were suppressed; and the Government set itself to restore the old lethargy under absolute rule from which the country had been gradually awakened. The movement of reform had made so little progress among the mass of the people that reaction was really easier than progress. But Florida Blanca was not content with suppressing liberalism in Spain; he was eager to avenge his disappointment by crushing the Revolution in France. He opened negotiations with the emigrants, urged the European powers to a crusade on behalf of legitimacy, and paraded the devotion of Charles IV. to the head of his family. This bellicose policy, however, brought him into collision with the queen. Maria Louisa of Parma, a woman whose real abilities were perverted to the gratification of sensual lusts, was unwilling to allow the minister to share her ascendancy over the feeble mind of her husband, and she feared that the outbreak of war would diminish the revenues which she squandered in self-indulgence. She had already removed from the ministry Campomanes and other supporters of Florida Blanca, and had compelled the latter to restrict himself to the single department of foreign affairs. Early in 1792 she completed her task by inducing Charles IV. to banish Florida Blanca to Murcia, and his place was entrusted to the veteran D'Aranda. But the new minister found that he held office only at the favour of the queen, and that this had to be purchased by a disgraceful servility to her paramour, Emanuel Godoy. Spain withdrew from the projected coalition against France, and sought to maintain an attitude of neutrality, which alienated the other powers, while it failed to conciliate the republic. The repressive measures of Florida Blanca were withdrawn; society and the press regained their freedom; and no opposition was offered to the propaganda of French ideas. D'Aranda's policy might have been successful if it had been adopted earlier, but the time for temporizing was now past, and it was necessary for Spain to choose one side or the other. But the decision was not allowed to rest with the man who had always shown a sympathy with the revolutionary principles. In November 1792 the queen felt herself strong enough to carry out the scheme which she had been long maturing. D'Aranda was dismissed, and the office of first minister was entrusted to Godoy, who had recently received the title of duke of Alcudia. Godoy, who was at once the queen's lover and the personal favourite of the king, had had no education for the part which he was called upon to play. Though endowed with a natural quickness of parts and a capacity for intrigue, he had no habits of application, no experience of the routine of office, and above all no settled policy. His appointment was regarded with jealousy by the *grandees* of Spain, while his undisguised relations with the queen outraged the moral feelings of the best part of the nation. Luckily for Godoy, the course to be pursued was decided for him. The execution of Louis XVI. (January 21, 1793) made a profound impression in a country where loyalty was a superstition. Charles IV. was roused to demand vengeance for the insult to his family, and from one end of Spain to the other a cry resounded for immediate war with the impious rebels who had shed the blood of an anointed king. Godoy had nothing to do but to follow the national impulse, and Spain became a member of the first coalition against France. Everything seemed to promise a rapid and complete success. The number of volunteers who offered their services rendered conscription unnecessary; and the southern provinces of France were so preponder-

atingly royalist that they were ready to welcome the Spaniards as deliverers. These advantages, however, were nullified by the shameful incompetence and carelessness of the Government. The troops were left without supplies; no plan of combined action was imposed upon the commanders; and each regiment was left to act of its own will. The military action of Spain provoked the contempt of Europe. The two campaigns of 1793 and 1794 were one long catalogue of failures. The bravery of the soldiers was rendered useless by the incapacity of their officers, and the maladministration of the central Government excited such disgust that an outbreak of revolutionary disturbance in Spain itself seemed more than possible. Instead of reducing the southern provinces of France, the Spaniards were driven from the strong fortresses that guarded the Pyrenees, and the French advanced almost to the Ebro. And at the same time the English, the hated rivals of Spain, were utilizing the war to extend their colonial power and were establishing more firmly that maritime supremacy which the Spanish Government had been struggling for almost a century to overthrow. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the queen and Godoy hastened to follow the example set by Prussia, and concluded the treaty of Basel with France. The terms were unexpectedly favourable. Spain purchased the evacuation of her territories and fortresses by the cession of her share of St Domingo, which had little but a sentimental value as the first discovery of Columbus, and which had already been occupied by the English. So great was the joy excited in Madrid that popular acclamation greeted the bestowal upon Godoy of the title of "Prince of the Peace." But the moderation of the treaty was only a flimsy disguise of the disgrace that it involved. Spain found herself tied hand and foot to the French republic. Godoy had to satisfy his allies by the encouragement of reforms which both he and his mistress loathed, and in 1796 the veil was removed by the conclusion of the treaty of San Ildefonso. This was a virtual renewal of the Family Compact of 1761, but with far more disadvantageous terms to Spain. Each power was pledged to assist the other in case of war with twenty-five ships, 18,000 infantry, and 6000 cavalry. The real object of the treaty, which was to involve Spain in the war against England, was cynically avowed in the eighteenth article, by which, during the present war, the Spanish obligations were only to apply to the quarrel between England and France. A scheme was prepared for a joint attack on the English coast, but it was foiled by the battle of St Vincent, in which Jervis and Nelson forced the Spanish fleet to retire to Cadiz. This defeat was the more disastrous because it cut off the connexion with the colonies and thus deprived Spain of the revenues derived from that quarter. The finances, already exhausted by extravagance and maladministration, were in no condition to meet the expenses of a naval war. England seized the opportunity to punish Spain for its conduct in the American War by encouraging discontent in the Spanish colonies, and in the Peninsula itself both nobles and people were bitterly hostile to the queen and her favourite. It was in vain that Godoy sought to secure the friendship of the reforming party by giving office to two of its most prominent members, Jovellanos and Saavedra. Spanish pride and bigotry were offended by the French occupation of Rome and the erection of a republic in the place of the papal government. The treatment of the duke of Parma by the Directory was keenly resented by the queen. Godoy found himself between two parties, the liberals and the ultramontanes, who agreed only in hatred of himself. At the same time the Directory, whose mistrust was excited by his attitude

in the question of Parma, insisted upon his dismissal. Charles IV. could not venture to refuse a demand from France; the queen was alienated by Godoy's notorious infidelities; and in March 1798 he was compelled to resign his office. But he did not forfeit his hold on the king's favour, and he only waited for a favourable opportunity to emerge from his retirement.

Godoy's office was entrusted to Saavedra, but the reformers did not obtain the advantages which they expected from the change. Jovellanos was compelled in August to retire on account of ill-health,—the result, it was rumoured, of attempts on the part of his opponents to poison him. His place was taken by Caballero, an ardent opponent of reform, who restored all the abuses of the old bureaucratic administration and pandered to the most bigoted prejudices of the clergy and the court. The ministry was hopelessly divided, and the policy of the country was directed by the basest and most paltry intrigues. The only advantage which Spain enjoyed at this period was comparative independence of France. The military plans of the Directory were unsuccessful during the absence of their greatest general in Egypt, and the second coalition gained successes in 1799 which had seemed impossible since 1793. But the return of Bonaparte, followed as it was by the fall of the Directory and the establishment of the Consulate, commenced a new epoch for Spain. As soon as the First Consul had time to turn his attention to the Peninsula, he determined to restore Godoy, who had already regained the affection of the queen, and to make him the tool of his policy. Maria Louisa was easily gained over by playing on her devotion to the house of Parma, and on October 1, 1800, a secret treaty was concluded at San Ildefonso. Spain undertook to cede Louisiana and to aid France in all her wars, while Bonaparte promised to raise the duke of Parma to the rank of king and to increase his territories by the addition either of Tuscany or of the Roman Legations. This was followed by Godoy's return to power, though he left the department of foreign affairs to a subordinate. Spain was now more servile to France than ever and in 1801 was compelled to attack Portugal in the French interests. Bonaparte was indignant against Portugal, partly because its fleet had aided his enemies in Egypt, and partly because its harbours offered great naval advantages to the English. The Spanish invasion, which was commanded by Godoy in person, met with no resistance, and the prince ventured to conclude a peace on his own authority by which Portugal promised to observe a strict neutrality on condition that its territories were left undiminished. But Bonaparte resented this show of independence, and compelled Charles IV. to refuse his ratification of the treaty. Portugal had to submit to far harsher terms, and could only purchase peace by the cession of territory in Guiana, by a disadvantageous treaty of commerce, and by a payment of twenty-five millions of francs. This insult to his ally Bonaparte followed up by others. In the preliminary treaty with England he ceded the Spanish colony of Trinidad without even consulting the court of Madrid, while he sold Louisiana to the United States in spite of his promise not to alienate it except to Spain. For these humiliations Spain had to console itself with the empty honour of being the first signatory of the treaty of Amiens.

For nearly three years Spain was allowed to remain at peace. Its finances were partially revived by the restoration of free intercourse with the colonies and by the payment of the supplies which had been withheld for the last six years. But the administration was as incompetent and misdirected as ever. Godoy, since his return to office, had abandoned all connexion with the reforming party

and had thrown himself into the reactionary policy of Caballero. The Spanish church was once more placed in strict subjection to the Roman see, from which for a short time it had been freed. But the worst evil lay in the undisguised domination of France, which the Government was wholly incapable of shaking off. As soon as Bonaparte saw himself involved in a new war with England, he turned to Spain for assistance and extorted a new treaty (October 9, 1803), which was still more burdensome than that of 1796. Spain had to pay a monthly subsidy of six million francs, and to pledge itself to enforce a strict neutrality upon Portugal. Thus the country was involved in a new and still more disastrous war with England. The last remnants of its maritime power were shattered in the battles of Cape Finisterre and Trafalgar, and the English seized Buenos Ayres. The popular hatred of Godoy was roused to passion by these disasters, and many competent observers believed that Spain stood on the brink of revolution. At the head of the opposition was the crown prince Ferdinand, as insignificant as his rival, but endowed with all good qualities by the credulous favour of the people. To maintain himself against his domestic enemies Godoy turned to France, where Bonaparte, now the emperor Napoleon I., was irritated by the crown prince's marriage with a daughter of the king of Naples. The court quarrels at Madrid were fomented from Paris in order to complete the subordination of Spain. Napoleon was at this time eager to humble England by excluding it from all trade with Europe. The only country which had not accepted his "continental system" was Portugal, and he determined to reduce that kingdom by force. It was not difficult to bribe Godoy, who was conscious that his position could not be maintained after the death of Charles IV. In October 1807 Spain accepted the treaty of Fontainebleau, which arranged a partition of Portugal into three parts. The northern provinces were to be given to the young king of Etruria, who was to purchase them by the cession of Tuscany. In the south a principality was to be carved out for Godoy himself. The central district was to be kept in pledge by France until the conclusion of a general peace. The treaty was hardly concluded when a French army under Junot marched through Spain to Portugal, and the royal family of that country fled to Brazil. But Spain was destined to share the same fate as its neighbour. The crown prince, whose wife had died in 1806, determined to imitate his rival by bidding for French support. He entered into secret relations with Beauharnais, Napoleon's envoy at Madrid, and went so far as to demand the hand of a Bonaparte princess. Godoy, who discovered the intrigue, induced Charles IV. to order his son's arrest. Napoleon at once seized the opportunity to make himself absolute master of Spain, and ordered French troops to cross the Pyrenees in support of the prince. This act terrified Godoy into a reconciliation with his opponents, but the French invasion was not delayed by the removal of its pretext. Charles IV. and his minister, conscious that they could expect no support from the people, determined on flight. The news of this intention, however, excited a popular rising in Madrid, and the king was compelled to abdicate in favour of his son Murat, however, who commanded the French, refused to be turned aside by this change of circumstances. He obtained from Charles IV. a declaration that his abdication had been involuntary, and occupied Madrid (March 23, 1808). Meanwhile Napoleon advanced to the frontier, and Ferdinand was lured by French agents to an interview with the emperor at Bayonne. There he was confronted with his parents and Godoy, and was intimidated into restoring the crown to his father, who at once made a

second abdication. Napoleon now divulged the real intention of his actions, and the crown of Spain was formally conferred upon his brother Joseph Bonaparte, who two years before had been made king of Naples.

But Spanish loyalty was too profound to be daunted even by the awe-inspiring power of the French emperor. For the first time Napoleon found himself confronted, not by terrified and selfish rulers, but by an infuriated people. The rising in Spain commenced the popular movement which ultimately proved fatal to his power. At first he treated the novel phenomenon with contempt, and thought it sufficient to send his less prominent generals against the rebels. Madrid was taken without difficulty, but the capital was absolutely devoid of military importance, and the Spaniards showed great capacity for the guerilla warfare in the provinces. The French were repulsed from Valencia; and Dupont, who had advanced into the heart of Andalusia, was compelled to retreat and ultimately to capitulate with all his forces at Baylen (July 10). The Spaniards now advanced upon Madrid and drove Joseph from the capital, which he had just entered. Unfortunately the insurgents displayed less political ability than military courage. The government was entrusted in Ferdinand's name to a central junta of thirty-four members, a number which was far too large for the conduct of executive business. Napoleon's arrival in Spain was enough to restore victory to the French. In less than a week the Spanish army was broken through and scattered, and Napoleon restored his brother in Madrid. Sir John Moore, who had advanced with an English army to the relief of the capital, retired when he found he was too late, and an obstinate battle, in which the gallant general lost his life, had to be fought before the troops could secure their embarkation at Coruña. Napoleon, thinking the work accomplished, had quitted the Peninsula, and Soult and Victor were left to complete the reduction of the provinces. The capture of Seville resulted in the dissolution of the central junta, and the Peninsula was only saved from final submission by the obstinate resistance of Wellington in Portugal and by dissensions among the French. The marshals were jealous of each other, and Napoleon's plans were not approved by his brother. Joseph wished to restore peace and order among his subjects in the hope of ruling an independent nation, while Napoleon was determined to annex Spain to his own overgrown empire. So far did these disputes go that Joseph resigned his crown, and was with difficulty induced to resume it. Meanwhile Cadiz became the capital of what was left of independent Spain, and there the cortes met in 1810 for the purpose of drawing up a new constitution. The fall of the old monarchy and the exigencies of self-defence had given to the reforming party an ascendancy which they had never before possessed. In the constitution which was promulgated early in 1812 the principles of the French constituent assembly were closely followed. The Inquisition had already perished, and the last relics of the old autocratic government shared its fate. Supreme legislative power was placed in the hands of a single national assembly, and effective checks were devised to restrict the power of the monarchy whenever it should be revived. The freedom of the press was established, and the property of the clergy was confiscated to defray the expenses of the war. The great defect of the constitution was that it was the work of one party, to which circumstances had given a temporary supremacy, and it failed to command the support of the united nation. The nobles and priests were bitterly hostile, and the latter had more influence in Spain than in any European country except Ireland.

The restoration of Spanish independence could hardly

have been accomplished without the assistance of England. Wellington had already made two attempts to advance from Portugal into the adjacent kingdom, but had been foiled by superior forces. In 1812 he determined on a great effort. He secured his base of operations by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and at Salamanca he completely routed the opposing army of Marmont. This victory enabled the English general to enter Madrid (August 12), and Joseph retreated to Valencia. But further advance was prevented by the concentration of the French forces in the east, and Wellington found it advisable to retire for the third time to winter-quarters on the Portuguese frontier. It was during this winter that Napoleon suffered his first and greatest reverse in the retreat from Moscow and the destruction of his grand army. This was the signal for the outbreak of the "war of liberation" in Germany, and French troops had to be withdrawn from Spain to central Europe. For the first time Wellington found himself opposed by fairly equal forces. In the spring of 1813 he advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo and defeated Jourdan at Vittoria, the battle which finally decided the Peninsular War. Joseph retired altogether from his kingdom, and Wellington, eager to take his part in the great European contest, fought his way through the Pyrenees into France. Napoleon, who had suffered a crushing defeat at Leipsic, hastened to recognize the impossibility of retaining Spain by releasing Ferdinand VII., who returned to Madrid in March 1814.

After the convulsions it had endured Spain required a period of firm but conciliatory government, but the ill-fate of the country gave the throne at this crisis to the worst of her Bourbon kings. Ferdinand VII. had never possessed the good qualities which popular credulity had assigned to him, and he had learnt nothing in his four years' captivity except an aptitude for lying and intrigue. He had no conception of the duties of a ruler; his public conduct was regulated by pride and superstition, and his private life was stained by the grossest sensual indulgence. Spain was still governed under the constitution of 1812, but the king's first act was to dissolve the cortes and to abrogate the constitution, promising, however, to grant a new one in its place. But no sooner was he established on the throne, and conscious of the strong reaction in favour of the monarchy, than he threw his promises to the wind and set himself to restore the old absolutism with all its worst abuses. The nobles recovered their privileges and their exemption from taxes; the monasteries were restored; the Inquisition resumed its activity; and the Jesuits returned to Spain. The liberals were ruthlessly persecuted, together with all who had acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte. A *camarilla* of worthless courtiers and priests conducted the government, and urged the king to fresh acts of revolutionary violence. For six years Spain groaned under a royalist "reign of terror," and isolated revolts only served as the occasion for fresh cruelties. The finances were squandered in futile expeditions to recover the South American colonies, which had taken advantage of Napoleon's conquest of Spain to establish their independence. In his straits for money Ferdinand ventured to outrage national sentiment by selling Florida to the United States in 1819. Discontent found expression in the formation of secret societies, which were especially powerful among the neglected and ill-paid soldiers. At last, in 1820, Riego and Quiroga, two officers of an expedition which had been prepared for South America, raised the standard of revolt in Cadiz. Ferdinand and his advisers proved as incapable as they were tyrannical, and their feeble irresolution enabled the movement to spread over the whole country. In March the king gave way and accepted the constitution of 1812.

The royalists or *serviles*, as they were called, were dismissed from office and their places taken by liberals. The cortes met in July, and at once proceeded to dissolve the monasteries and the Inquisition, to confiscate the clerical tithes, to abolish entails, and to secure the freedom of the press and of popular meetings. Great results might have been achieved if the moderate party, under Martinez de la Rosa, had been able to grapple with the task of suppressing disorder and establishing a permanent constitution. But this was the last thing which the king desired, and the moderates were defeated by a factious combination of the *serviles* and the radicals. Risings took place among the loyal and bigoted peasants of the provinces, and their suppression contributed to the victory of the extreme party, which seemed to be secured in 1822 by the election of Riego as president of the cortes.

But Spain was not allowed to work out its own salvation. Europe was dominated at this time by the Holy Alliance, which disguised a resolution to repress popular liberties and to maintain despotism under a pretended zeal for piety, justice, and brotherly love. At the congress of Verona (October 1822) France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia agreed upon armed intervention in Spain, in spite of the protest of Canning on the part of England. Spain was to be called upon to alter her constitution and to grant greater liberty to the king, and if an unsatisfactory answer were received France was authorized to take active measures. The demand was unhesitatingly refused, and a French army, 100,000 strong, at once entered Spain under the duke of Angoulême (April 1823). No effective resistance was made, and Madrid was entered by the invaders (May 23). The cortes, however, had carried off the king to Seville, whence they again retreated to Cadiz. The bombardment of that city terminated the revolution and Ferdinand was released (October 1). His first act was to revoke everything that had been done since 1819. The Inquisition was not restored, but the secular tribunals took a terrible revenge upon the leaders of the rebellion. The protest of the duke of Angoulême against these cruelties was unheeded. Even the fear of revolt, the last check upon despotism, was removed by the presence of the French army, which remained in Spain till 1827. But Spain had to pay for the restoration of the royal absolutism, as Canning backed up his protest against the intervention of France by acknowledging the independence of the Spanish colonies.

Ferdinand VII. was enabled to finish his worthless and disastrous reign in comparative peace. In 1829 he married a fourth wife, Maria Christina of Naples, and at the same time he issued a "Pragmatic Sanction" abolishing the Salic law in Spain. No one expected any practical results from this edict, but a formal protest was made against it by the king's brothers, Carlos and Francisco, and also by the French and Neapolitan Bourbons. In the next year, however, the queen gave birth to a daughter, Isabella, who was proclaimed as queen on her father's death in 1833, while her mother undertook the office of regent. Don Carlos at once asserted his intention of maintaining the Salic law, and rallied round him all the supporters of absolutism, especially the inhabitants of the Basque Provinces. Christina was compelled to rely upon the liberals, and to conciliate them by the grant of a constitution, the *estatuto real*, which established two chambers chosen by indirect election. But this constitution, drawn up under the influence of Louis Philippe of France, failed to satisfy the advanced liberals, and the Christinos split into two parties, the *moderados* and *progresistas*. In 1836 the latter party extorted from the regent the revival of the constitution of 1812. At this time the Government was involved in a desperate struggle

with the Carlists, who at first gained considerable successes under Zumalacarreñ and Cabrera. But the death of Zumalacarreñ in 1835 and the support of France and England ultimately gave the regent the upper hand, and in 1839 her general, Espartero, forced the Basque Provinces to submit to Isabella. Don Carlos renounced his claims in favour of his eldest son, another Carlos, and retired to Trieste, where he died in 1855. Christina now tried to sever herself from the *progresistas*, and to govern with the help of the moderate party who enjoyed the patronage of Louis Philippe. But England, jealous of French influence at Madrid, threw the weight of her influence on to the side of the radicals, who found a powerful leader in Espartero. In 1840 Christina had to retire to France, and Espartero was recognized as regent by the cortes. But his elevation was resented by the other officers, while his subservience to England made him unpopular, and in 1843 he also had to go into exile. Isabella was now declared of age. Christina returned to Madrid, and the *moderados* under Narvaez obtained complete control over the government. This was a great victory for France, and Louis Philippe abused his success by negotiating the infamous "Spanish marriages." A husband was found for Isabella in her cousin, Francis of Assis, whose recommendation in French eyes was the improbability of his begetting children. On the same day the queen's sister, Maria Louisa, was married to Louis Philippe's son, the duke of Montpensier. By this means it was hoped to secure the reversion of the Spanish throne for the house of Orleans. The scheme recoiled on the heads of those who framed it. The alienation of England gave a fatal impulse to the fall of Louis Philippe, while the subsequent birth of children to Isabella deprived the Montpensier marriage of all importance.

Spanish history during the reign of Isabella II. presents a dismal picture of faction and intrigue. The queen herself sought compensation for her unhappy marriage in sensual indulgence, and tried to cover the dissoluteness of her private life by a superstitious devotion to religion and by throwing her influence on to the side of the clerical and reactionary party. Every now and then the *progresistas* and *moderados* forced themselves into office, but their mutual jealousy prevented them from acquiring any permanent hold upon the government. In 1866 Isabella was induced to take vigorous measures against the liberal opposition. Narvaez was appointed chief minister; and the most prominent liberals, Serrano, Prim, and O'Donnell, had to seek safety in exile. The cortes were dissolved, and many of the deputies were transported to the Canary Islands. The ascendancy of the court party was maintained by a rigorous persecution, which was continued after Narvaez's death (April 1868) by Gonzales Bravo. Common dangers succeeded at last in combining the various sections of the liberals for mutual defence, and the people, disgusted by the scandals of the court and the contemptible *camarilla* which surrounded the queen, rallied to their side. In September 1868 Serrano and Prim returned to Spain, where they raised the standard

of revolt and offered the people the bribe of universal suffrage. The revolution was speedily accomplished, and Isabella fled to France, but the successful rebels were at once confronted with the difficulty of finding a successor for her. During the interregnum Serrano undertook the regency, and the cortes drew up a new constitution, by which an hereditary king was to rule in conjunction with a senate and a popular chamber. As no one of the Bourbon candidates for the throne was acceptable, it became necessary to look round for some foreign prince. The offer of the crown to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen excited the jealousy of France, and gave Napoleon III. the opportunity of picking a quarrel, which proved fatal to himself, with the rising state of Prussia. At last a king was found (1870) in Amadeus of Aosta, the second son of Victor Emmanuel, who made an honest effort to discharge the difficult office of a constitutional king in a country which was hardly fitted for constitutional government. But he found the task too hard and too distasteful, and resigned in 1873. A provisional republic was now formed, of which Castelar was the guiding spirit. But the Spaniards, trained to regard monarchy with superstitious reverence, had no sympathy with republican institutions. Don Carlos seized the opportunity to revive the claim of inalienable male succession, and raised the standard of revolt in the Basque Provinces, where his name was still a power. The disorders of the democrats and the approach of civil war threw the responsibility of government upon the army. The cortes were dissolved by a military *coup d'état*; Castelar threw up his office in disgust; and the administration was undertaken by a committee of officers. Anarchy was suppressed with a strong hand, but it was obvious that order could only be restored by reviving the monarchy. Foreign princes were no longer thought of, and the crown was offered to and accepted by Alfonso XII., the young son of the exiled Isabella (1874). His first task was to terminate the Carlist War, which still continued in the north, and this was successfully accomplished in 1876. Time was required to restore the prosperity of Spain under a peaceful and orderly government and to consolidate by prescription the authority of the restored dynasty. Unfortunately a premature death carried off Alfonso XII. in 1885, before he could complete the work which circumstances laid upon him. The regency was entrusted to his widow, Christina of Austria, and the birth of a post-humous son (May 17, 1886), who is now the titular king of Spain, has excited a feeling of pitying loyalty which may help to secure the Bourbon dynasty in the last kingdom which is left to it.

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PART III.—LANGUAGE.

The Iberian Peninsula is not a linguistic unity. Not to speak of the Basque, which still forms an island of some importance in the north-west, three Romance languages share this extensive territory:—(1) Portuguese-Galician, spoken in Portugal, Galicia, and a small portion of the province of Leon; (2) Castilian, covering about two-thirds of the Peninsula in the north, centre, and south; (3) Catalan, occupying a long strip of territory to the east and south-east.

These three varieties of the *Romana Rustica* are marked

off from one another much more distinctly than is the case with, say, the Romance dialects of Italy; they do not interpenetrate one another, but where the one ends the other begins. It has only been possible to establish at the points of junction of two linguistic regions the existence of certain mixed jargons in which certain forms of each language are intermingled; but these jargons, called into existence for the necessities of social relations by bilingualists, have an essentially individualistic and artificial character. The special development of the vulgar

Latin tongue in Spain, and the formation of the three linguistic types just enumerated, were promoted by the peculiar political circumstances. From the 9th century onwards Spain was slowly recaptured from the Mohammedans, and the Latin spoken by the Christians who had taken refuge on the slopes of the Pyrenees was slowly carried back to the centre and ultimately to the south of the Peninsula, whence it had been driven by the Arab invasion. Mediæval Spain divides itself into three *conquistas*—that of Castile (much the most considerable), that of Portugal, and that of Aragon; and to these three political conquests correspond an equal number of linguistic varieties. If a given province now speaks Catalan rather than Castilian, the explanation is to be sought simply and solely in the fact that it was conquered by a king of Aragon and peopled by his Catalan subjects.

I. CATALAN.—This domain now embraces, on the mainland, the Spanish provinces of Gerona, Barcelona, Tarragona, and Lerida (the old principality of Catalonia), and of Castellon de la Plana, Valencia, and Alicante (the old kingdom of Valencia), and, in the Mediterranean, that of the Balearic Islands (the old kingdom of Majorca). Catalan, by its most characteristic features, belongs to the Romance of southern France and not to that of Spain; it is legitimate, therefore, to regard it as imported into Spain by those *Hispani* whom the Arab conquest had driven back beyond the mountains into Languedoc, and who in the 9th century regained the country of their origin; this conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the dialect is also that of two French provinces on the north of the Pyrenees—Roussillon and Cerdagne. From the 9th to the 12th century Catalan spread further and further within the limits of Catalonia, properly so called; in 1229 it was brought to Majorca by Jaime el Conquistador, and in 1238 the same sovereign carried it to Valencia also. Even Murcia was peopled by Catalans in 1266, but this province really is part of the Castilian conquest, and accordingly the Castilian element took the upper hand and absorbed the dialect of the earlier colonists. The river Segura, which falls into the Mediterranean in the neighbourhood of Orihuela, a little to the north of Murcia, is as nearly as possible the southern boundary of the Catalan domain; westward the boundary coincides pretty exactly with the political frontier, the provinces of New Castile and Aragon not being at all encroached on. Catalan, which by the reunion of Aragon and the countship of Barcelona in 1137 became the official language of the Aragonese monarchy,—although the kingdom of Aragon, consisting of the present provinces of Saragossa, Huesca, and Teruel, has always been Castilian in speech,—established a footing in Italy also, in all parts where the domination of the kings of Aragon extended, viz., in Sicily, Naples, Corsica, and Sardinia, but it has not maintained itself there in modern times except in a single district of the last-named island (Alghero); everywhere else in Italy, where it was not spoken except by the conquerors, nor written except in the royal chancery, it has disappeared without leaving a trace.

From the 13th century the name given to the vulgar tongue of eastern Spain has been *Catalanesch* (*Catalanescus*) or *Catalá* (*Catalanus*),—the idiom of the Catalans.¹ By *Catalanesch* or *Catalá* was understood, essentially, the spoken language and the language of prose, while that of poetry, with a large admixture of Provençal forms, was early called *Lemosi*, *Limosi*, or language of Limousin,—Catalan grammarians, and particularly the most celebrated of them, Ramon Vidal de Besalú, having adopted *Lemosi* as the generic name of the language of the troubadours. These grammarians carefully distinguish the vulgar speech, or *pla Catalá*, from the refined *trobar*

¹ The origin of the name *Catalanus* is unknown.

idiom which originally is simply a more or less modified form of Provençal. Afterwards, and especially in these parts of the Catalan domain outside of Catalonia which did not care to acknowledge that they derived their language from that province, *Lemosi* received a more extensive signification, so as to mean the literary language in general, whether of verse or of prose. To this hour, particularly in Valencia and the Balearics, *Lemosi* is employed to designate on the one hand the old Catalan and on the other the very artificial and somewhat archaizing idiom which is current in the "jochs florals"; while the spoken dialect is called, according to the localities, *Valenciá* (in Valencia), *Majorquí* and *Menorquí* (in Majorca and Minorca), or *Catalá* (in Catalonia); the form *Catalanesch* is obsolete.

The principal features which connect Catalan with the Romance of France and separate it from that of Spain are the following. (1) To take first its treatment of the final vowels,—Catalan, like French and Provençal, having only oxytones and paroxytones, does not tolerate more than one syllable after the tonic accent: thus *anima* gives *arma*, *cámara* gives *cambra*. All the proparoxytones of modern Catalan are of recent introduction and due to Castilian influence. Further, the only post-tonic Latin vowel preserved by the Catalan is, as in Gallo-Roman, *a*: *mare* gives *mar*, *gratu(s)* gives *grat*, but *anima* gives *arma*; and, when the word terminates in a group of consonants requiring a supporting vowel, that vowel is represented by an *e*: *arb(o)rem*, Cat. *arbre* (Prov. and Fr. *arbre*, but Cast. *árbol*); *pop(u)l(us)*, Cat. *poble* (Prov. *poble*, Fr. *peuple*, but Cast. *pueblo*); sometimes, when it is inserted between the two consonants instead of being made to follow them, the supporting vowel is represented by an *o*: *escándol* (*scándalum*); *frévol* (*frivolus*), *círcol* (*circulus*). In some cases a post-tonic vowel other than *a* is preserved in Catalan, as, for example, when that vowel forms a diphthong with the tonic (*Deu*, *Deus*; *Ebrin*, Hebrews); or, again, it sometimes happens, when the tonic is followed by an *i* in hiatus, that the *i* persists (*dilávi*, *dilúvium*; *servici*, *servicium*; *lábi*, *lábium*; *ciri*, *cereus*); but in many cases these ought to be regarded as learned forms, as is shown by the existence of parallel ones, such as *servey*, where the atonic *i* has been attracted by the tonic and forms a diphthong with it (*servíci*, *servíi*, *servey*). What has just been said as to the treatment of the final vowels in Catalan must be understood as applying only to pure Catalan, unaltered by the predominance of the Castilian, for the actual language is no longer faithful to the principle we have laid down; it allows the final *o* atonic in a number of substantives and adjectives, and in the verb it now conjugates *canto*, *temo*, *sento*,—a thing unknown in the ancient language. (2) As regards conjugation, only two points need be taken up here:—(a) it employs the form known as the inchoative, that is to say, the lengthening of the radical of the present in verbs of the third conjugation by means of the syllable *ex-* or *ix-*, a proceeding common to Italian, Walachian, Provençal, and French, but altogether unknown in Hispanic Romance; (b) the formation of a great number of past participles in which the termination is added, as in Provençal, not to the radical of the verb, but to that of the perfect: *tingut* formed from *tinch*, *pagut* from *poch*, *conegut* from *conech*, while Castilian says *tenido* (formerly also *tenudo*), *podido*, *conocido*, that is to say, it forms those participles from the infinitive.

As for features common alike to Catalan and Hispanic (Castilian and Portuguese) Romance, on the other hand, and which are unknown to French Romance, there is only one which possesses any importance, the conservation, namely, of the Latin *u* with its original sound, while the same vowel has assumed in French and Provençal, from a