

the Old Academy contended (*μετρωπάθεια*). Further, it explains the incessant war which the later Stoics waged with imagination.

The end of action has then been explained to be a consistent life, a rational life, and, lastly, a life according to nature. Now the Cynics had already traced back consistency to a certain Herculean strength or force of will, which again is an effect of the bracing or tension of the soul's substance, so that this ever-recurring attribute is as available to explain will as intelligence. Herein we discover, as it were, an internal source of the external harmony and regularity of a consistent life. Our will should be directed to this source rather than to its manifestations,—to "right" (*i.e.*, inflexible and straight) "reason," which has attained a character of intense rigidity, an intensive energy raised to an impassable degree. For this infallible firmness of the reason the technical term is *διάθεσις*, a "disposition" which, like straightness or crookedness in a line, admits of no degrees of less or more; thence comes harmony, regularity, and consistency in all our acts, which alone is truly beautiful (*καλόν* = fair or noble; for which the Romans characteristically said *honestum* = honourable). Not even Christianity laid more stress upon inwardness, or taught more explicitly that motive counts for everything and external performance for very little. Once let the reason become "right" and it imparts this same character to all that it affects. First the soul is made strong, healthy, beautiful; when, therefore, it thus fulfils all the conditions of its being, it is absolutely perfect. Now the perfection of anything is called its virtue; the virtue of man, then, is the perfection of his soul, *i.e.*, of the ruling part or rational soul. But "out of the heart are the issues of life": make the soul perfect and you make the life perfect. From such a "disposition" must proceed a life which flows on smoothly and uniformly, like a gentle river (*εὐροια βίου*). No longer is there anything to hope or fear; this harmonious accord between impulses and acts is itself man's wellbeing or welfare (*εὐδαιμονία*). Cleanthes scouts the notion of adding to such perfection that occasional result of a decaying activity entitled pleasure; Chrysippus remonstrates indignantly with Plato for appealing to the "moral bugbears" of future rewards or punishments. There is no "wages of virtue," not even the continuance of her activity; for lapse of time can add nothing to perfect wellbeing; it is complete, whole, and indivisible now.

Virtue, then, as right reason, is at once knowledge and strength of will; for a right comprehension of Stoic psychology shows that these two are identical. The unity of all virtue is sufficiently apparent, but the Stoics also acknowledged a plurality of specific virtues grouped round the four cardinal virtues of Plato. Wisdom (*φρόνησις*) was, according to Zeno and Cleanthes, the common element; according to Aristo, it should rather be termed knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*); and this view was adopted in the school to avoid the awkwardness of using the same term (*φρόνησις*) both for a special virtue and for the generic attribute of them all. Wisdom or knowledge in distributing to others is justice, in endeavour it is temperance, in endurance it is courage or fortitude; but in every virtuous act all four of the virtues are implicit. Virtue is thus the unconditional good; it is at once the absolute end and the means to the end.

Goodness must be interpreted, as Socrates used to interpret it, that which furnishes some advantage or true utility; its opposite, evil, as that which produces harm or disadvantage. Obviously only virtue, and that which comes from virtue, confers any real advantage; only vice can really do harm. Goodness is a wider genus than virtue; all virtue is good, but not all goods are virtues. There are goods of soul, such as habits and happy aptitudes which may be acquired in varying degrees (*i.e.*, they are *εἴησις* not *διαθέσις*); others are only single actions (*ἐνέργειαι*). A friend again may be a means to good (*ποιητικὸν τέλος*). All these goods are utilities (*ὀφελήματα*), and therefore deserve to be sought (*αἰρετά*). Similarly evils may be classified as—(1) vices, settled dispositions contrary to right reason, proceeding from that ignorance which infallibly attends on a slackening of the soul's fibre; (2)

evil habits or inclinations (*εὐκαταφορίαι*); (3) isolated vicious actions. All these evils alike are to be shunned (*φευκτά*); all alike are harmful (*βλάμματα*); the moral responsibility rests with the individual, in so far as he is ignorant or has his soul relaxed.

Good and evil, however, is not an exhaustive classification. There is a large class of things which are neither the one nor the other; which do not conduce to our attainment of the end, nor hinder us therefrom; which are neither to be pursued nor shunned, but are simply indifferent (*ἀδιάφορα*). To all these objects the attitude of the Cynics was complete indifference, wherein they were followed by Aristo; that of the sceptics professedly utter insensibility. Now the most original feature of the Stoic ethics is the classification of things indifferent and their arrangement in a certain scale in accordance with the value, positive or negative (*ἀξία, ἀπαξία*), to be assigned to them either intrinsically or in certain circumstances (*κατὰ περίστασιν*). Some objects are so unimportant that in regard to them Aristo's attitude of complete indifference is justified. Placing them at the zero point, we may advance in both directions, assigning to all the objects of instinctive natural impulses a positive value, in virtue of which they are to be picked out (*ληπτά*) in preference to other indifferent things not of this description. Thus bodily health, though not a good, is entitled to a certain value; disease, though not an evil, has a certain negative value. The former class is according to nature, the latter contrary to nature; the former are instinctively sought by children as tending to maintain their "constitution" or nature; the latter their "uncorrupted impulses" (*ἀδιάστροφοὶ ἀφορμαί*) lead them to shun as tending to mar, cripple, or destroy life. Similarly, actions may be classified: all virtuous actions are right actions (*κατορθώματα*); all vicious actions are wrong actions or "sins" (*ἀμαρτήματα*). The attainment of any one of the objects in the class of things indifferent, looked at in itself, is neither right nor wrong. But, if the object picked out be that object out of all at the moment present to us which has the highest value, then the action of selecting it admits of being defended on probable grounds, and as such is entitled to be called (quite apart from the agent's disposition, whether virtuous or vicious), *materialiter*, an act "meet and fit" to do (*καθήκον*). Such an act need not be preceded by any reasoning at all; in the case of the brutes and of children it is always instinctive, yet in all cases it is capable of being justified on grounds of probability (*ὁ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει ἀπολογία*). Similarly with the selection of an object which has less value in preference to one of higher value: such a blunder is not, taken in itself, a wrong action, but it violates fitness (*παρὰ τὸ καθήκον*). Amongst fitting actions, some are always fitting, others only at times, under given circumstances; some indifferent objects we select for their own sakes, others merely as means. The range of such human functions is wide enough to include the acquisition of information, the exercise of temperance and courage, even altruistic conduct. And yet some actions in man are on a level with the nutritive functions of the plant (Diog. Laer., vii. 86). Again, our human functions compose our whole conscious life; even life, then, considered in itself, has in it no moral good; we may, if need be, under certain circumstances, voluntarily withdraw from it.

The Stoics maintain that the variety of things indifferent is essential to virtue, because it is the field upon which reason is exercised. Virtue is a body, therefore it is corporeal; therefore its active principle needs a passive material to act upon. Things indifferent are capable of being put to a good or a bad use, though some lend themselves to use more easily than others. Nor does virtue merely avail itself, now and then, of things indifferent,—it can do nothing else than avail itself of them. Though they are not goods, and though their attainment does not confer wellbeing, yet all virtue is the selection or choice of them. For how is

virtuous life manifested? In a series of external acts, each one of which is the choice of some natural end, some object according to nature, as possessing at the moment the highest value. The same external act may be done by an irrational agent, and in his case the act is not virtuous. For there is as great a gulf fixed between fitting and virtuous actions as between things indifferent having positive value and the good. No increase of value can raise a thing indifferent to the class of good; no degree of fitness in the external act done can render it virtuous. As right actions consist in following reason in the selection of things according to nature, it follows that such right actions (as distinct from the fitting actions of which all living things are capable) are the exclusive privilege of rational beings. So, too, with wrong actions: only rational beings can perform them; although children or the brutes may run counter to fitness, and pursue objects contrary to nature, they cannot be said to sin or do wrong. All actions, then, of rational beings must be either virtuous or vicious; there is no mean between the two. But what of fitting actions? Are not they also done by rational agents? Is not the distinction between right conduct and mere external fitness continually drawn when the Stoics are referring to the activity of rational human beings? Unquestionably so; but in examining a given act it is necessary to view it on the formal as well as on the material side,—as proceeding from a virtuous or vicious disposition, and again as tending, when taken in itself and apart from this disposition, to promote or destroy the agent's nature or constitution, *i.e.*, as something "meet and fit" to do, or as contrary to fitness (or, in rare cases, as having no tendency in either direction). Lastly, the analysis of conduct is incomplete unless the external object which the agent aims at attaining by the act is also taken into account: it may be natural, and may therefore excite desire; or it may be contrary to nature, and excite aversion; or it may be absolutely indifferent. Now the Stoic classifications of (a) external objects and (b) actions (as they have come down to us from not very discriminating sources) are hampered by the inclusion of right actions and wrong actions, which are made species of the wider genera. Under objects according to nature come (a) fitting actions, (b) right actions, (c) virtues; *i.e.*, conduct which is perfect contains all that in the imperfect imitates perfection: a right action has *ipso facto* all the fitness of a fitting action, and all the accord with nature of a thing according to nature. So with the opposite class: the vicious man, by the very fact of not having the tension of soul which is virtue, commits a sin in his every action; all that he does, therefore, is on this ground contrary to fitness and contrary to nature. Any defect in external conduct proves it to be a sin; the mere absence of defect does not establish its claim to be right conduct. It is as easy to prove a given person is unwise (and therefore a sinner) as it is hard to prove him a sage. Virtue is one, vice is manifold.

No act in itself is either noble or base; even the grossest violation of fitness, if it could be done with the right intention, would count as virtue, and the most fitting deeds without that intention are naught (see Orig., *C. Cels.*, iv. 45; Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, xi. 190; *Pyrrh. Hyp.*, iii. 245, is therefore wrong). It does not appear, then, that there is any divergence in principle between the doctrine of the end of action and the doctrine of fitness or relative duty; nor should the latter be regarded (as is done by Cicero and some modern expositors) as an afterthought, intended to soften the too rigorous demands of the Stoic ideal. For from the first it was an integral part of the system: Zeno wrote a treatise *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*; indeed he adopted it as a technical term. That this doctrine was a stumbling-block to the small band of his early disciples seems not unlikely; for Aristo and Herillus, who left him, as is believed, on independent grounds, modified it in their own ethical theories afterwards put forth. According to Hirzel (*Untersuch.*, ii. p. 54), however, the views of these two heterodox Stoics more closely approximated than at first sight appears: Herillus, as well as Aristo, maintained that all actions intermediate to vice and virtue are absolutely indifferent (Diog. Laer., vii. 155); and Aristo, like Herillus, defined virtue as knowledge, and held that the wise man will never form opinions, *i.e.*, will not act upon anything short of knowledge.

In their view of man's social relations the Stoics are greatly in advance of preceding schools. We saw that virtue is a law which governs the universe: that which Reason and God ordain must be accepted as binding upon the particle of reason which is in each one of us. Human law comes into existence when men recognize this obligation; justice is therefore natural, and not something merely conventional. The opposite tendencies, to allow to the individual responsibility and freedom, and to demand of him obedience to law, are both features of the system; but in virtue even of the freedom which belongs to him *qua* rational, he must recognize the society of

rational beings of which he is a member, and subordinate his own ends to the ends and needs of this society. Those who own one law are citizens of one state, the city of Zeus, in which men and gods have their dwelling. If that city all is ordained by reason working intelligently, and the members exist for the sake of one another; there is an intimate connexion (*συμπάθεια*) between them which makes all the wise and virtuous friends, even if personally unknown, and leads them to contribute to one another's good. Their intercourse should find expression in justice, in friendship, in family and political life. But practically the Stoic philosopher always had some good excuse for withdrawing from the narrow political life of the city in which he found himself. The circumstances of the time, such as the decay of Greek city-life, the foundation of large territorial states under absolute Greek rulers, which followed upon Alexander's conquests, and afterwards the rise of the world-empire of Rome, aided to develop the leading idea of Zeno's *Republic*. There he had anticipated a state without family life, without law courts or coins, without schools or temples, in which all differences of nationality would be merged in the common brotherhood of man. This cosmopolitan citizenship remained all through a distinctive Stoic dogma; when first announced it must have had a powerful influence upon the minds of men, diverting them from the distractions of almost parochial politics to a boundless vista. There was, then, no longer any difference between Greek and barbarian, between male and female, bond and free. All are members of one body as partaking in reason, all are equally men. Not that this led to any movement for the abolition of slavery. For the Stoics attached but slight importance to external circumstances, since only the wise man is really free, and all the unwise are slaves. Yet, while they accepted slavery as a permanent institution, philosophers as wide apart as Chrysippus and Seneca sought to mitigate its evils in practice, and urged upon masters humanity in the treatment of their slaves.

The religious problem had peculiar interest for the school which discerned God everywhere as the ruler and upholder, and at the same time the law, of the world that He had evolved from Himself. The physical groundwork lends a religious sanction to all moral duties, and Cleanthes's noble hymn is evidence how far a system of natural religion could go in providing satisfaction for the cravings of the religious temper:—

"Most glorious of immortals, O Zeus of many names, almighty and everlasting, sovereign of nature, directing all in accordance with law, thee it is fitting that all mortals should address. Thee all thy universe, as it rolls circling round the earth, obeys whosoever thou dost guide, and gladly owns thy sway. Such a minister thou holdest in thy invincible hands,—the two-edged, fiery, ever-living thunderbolt, under whose stroke all nature shudders. No work upon earth is wrought apart from thee, lord, nor through the divine ethereal sphere, nor upon the sea; save only whatsoever deeds wicked men do in their own foolishness. Nay, thou knowest how to make even the rough smooth, and to bring order out of disorder; and things not friendly are friendly in thy sight. For so hast thou fitted all things together, the good with the evil, that there might be one eternal law over all. . . . Deliver men from fell ignorance. Banish it, father, from their soul, and grant them to obtain wisdom, whereon relying thou rulest all things with justice."

To the orthodox theology of Greece and Rome the system stood in a twofold relation, as criticism and rationalism. That the popular religion contained gross errors hardly needed to be pointed out. The forms of worship were known to be trivial or mischievous, the myths unworthy or immoral. But Zeno declared images, shrines, temples, sacrifices, prayers, and worship to be of no avail. A really acceptable prayer, he taught, can only have reference to a virtuous and devout mind: God is best worshipped in the shrine of the heart by the desire to know

and obey Him. At the same time the Stoics felt at liberty to defend and uphold the truth in polytheism. Not only is the primitive substance God, the one supreme being, but divinity must be ascribed to His manifestations,—to the heavenly bodies, which are conceived, like Plato's created gods, as the highest of rational beings, to the forces of nature, even to deified men; and thus the world was peopled with divine agencies. Moreover, the myths were rationalized and allegorized, which was not in either case an original procedure. The search for a deeper hidden meaning beside the literal one had been begun by Democritus, Empedocles, the Sophists, and the Cynics. It remained for Zeno to carry this to a much greater extent, and to seek out or invent "natural principles" (λόγοι φυσικοί) and moral ideas in all the legends and in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. In this sense he was the pattern if not the "father" of all such as allegorize and reconcile. Etymology was pressed into the service, and the wildest conjectures as to the meaning of names did duty as a basis for mythological explanations. The two favourite Stoic heroes were Hercules and Ulysses, and nearly every scene in their adventures was made to disclose some moral significance. Lastly, the practice of divination and the consultation of oracles afforded a means of communication between God and man,—a concession to popular beliefs which may be explained when we reflect that to the faithful divination was something as essential as confession and spiritual direction to a devout Catholic now, or the study and interpretation of Scripture texts to a Protestant. Chrysippus did his best to reconcile the superstition with his own rational doctrine of strict causation. Omens and portents, he explained, are the natural symptoms of certain occurrences. There must be countless indications of the course of Providence, for the most part unobserved, the meaning of only a few having become known to men. His opponents argued, "if all events are foreordained, divination is superfluous"; he replied that both divination and our behaviour under the warnings which it affords are included in the chain of causation. Even here, however, the bent of the system is apparent: They were at pains to insist upon purity of heart and life as an indispensable condition for success in prophesying and to enlist piety in the service of morality.

Middle
Stoa.

When Chrysippus died (Ol. 143 = 208–204 B.C.) the structure of Stoic doctrine was complete. With the Middle Stoa we enter upon a period at first of comparative inaction, afterwards of internal reform. Chrysippus's immediate successors were Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Seleucia (often called the Babylonian), and Antipater of Tarsus, men of no originality, though not without ability; the two last-named, however, had all their energies taxed to sustain the conflict with CARNEADES (q.v.). This was the most formidable assault the school ever encountered; that it survived was due more to the foresight and elaborate precautions of Chrysippus than to any efforts of that "pen-doughty" pamphleteer, Antipater (καλαμοβόας), who shrank from opposing himself in person to the eloquence of Carneades. The subsequent history testified to the importance of this controversy. The special objects of attack were the Stoic theory of knowledge, their theology, and their ethics. The physical basis of the system remained unchanged but neglected; all creative force or even original research in the departments of physics and metaphysics vanished. Yet problems of interest bearing upon psychology and natural theology continued to be discussed. Thus the cycles of the world's existence, and the universal conflagration which terminates each of them, excited some doubt. Diogenes of Seleucia is said to have wavered in his belief at last; Boethius, one of his pupils, flatly denied it. He regarded the Deity as

the guide and upholder of the world, watching over it from the outside, not as the immanent soul within it, for according to him the world was as soulless as a plant. We have here a compromise between Zeno's and Aristotle's doctrines. But in the end the universal conflagration was handed down without question as an article of belief. It is clear that the activity of these teachers was chiefly directed to ethics: they elaborated fresh definitions of the chief good, designed either to make yet clearer the sense of the formulas of Chrysippus or else to meet the more urgent objections of the New Academy. Carneades had emphasized one striking apparent inconsistency: it had been laid down that to choose what is natural is man's highest good, and yet the things chosen, the "first objects according to nature," had no place amongst goods. Antipater may have met this by distinguishing "the attainment" of primary natural ends from the activity directed to their attainment (Plut., *De Comm. Not.*, 27, 14, p. 1072 F); but, earlier still, Diogenes had put forward his gloss, viz., "The end is to calculate rightly in the selection and rejection of things according to nature." Archedemus, a contemporary of Diogenes, put this in plainer terms still: "The end is to live in the performance of all fitting actions" (πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντας ζῆν). Now it is highly improbable that the earlier Stoics would have sanctioned such interpretations of their dogmas. The mere performance of relative or imperfect duties, they would have said, is something neither good nor evil; the essential constituent of human good is ignored. And similar criticism is actually passed by Posidonius: "This is not the end, but only its necessary concomitant; such a mode of expression may be useful for the refutation of objections put forward by the Sophists" (Carneades and the New Academy?), "but it contains nothing of morality or wellbeing" (Galen, *De Plac. Hipp. et Plat.*, p. 470 K). There is every ground, then, for concluding that we have here one concession extorted by the assaults of Carneades. For a similar compromise there is express testimony: "good repute" (εὐδοξία) had been regarded as a thing wholly indifferent in the school down to and including Diogenes. Antipater was forced to assign to it "positive value," and to give it a place amongst "things preferred" (Cic., *De Fin.*, iii. 57). These modifications were retained by Antipater's successors. Hence come the increased importance and fuller treatment which from this time forward fall to the lot of the "external duties" (καθήκοντα). The rigour and consistency of the older system became sensibly modified.

To this result another important factor contributed. The In all that the older Stoics taught there breathes that enthusiasm for righteousness in which has been traced the earnestness of the Semitic spirit; but nothing presents more forcibly the pitch of their moral idealism than the doctrine of the Wise Man. All mankind fall into two classes,—the wise or virtuous, the unwise or wicked,—the distinction being absolute. He who possesses virtue possesses it whole and entire; he who lacks it lacks it altogether. To be but a hand's-breadth below the surface of the sea ensures drowning as infallibly as to be five hundred fathoms deep. Now the wise man is drawn as perfect. All he does is right, all his opinions are true; he alone is free, rich, beautiful, skilled to govern, capable of giving or receiving a benefit. And his happiness, since length of time cannot increase it, falls in nothing short of that of Zeus. In contrast with all this, we have a picture of universal depravity. Now, who could claim to have attained to the sage's wisdom? Doubtless, at the first founding of the school Zeno himself and Zeno's pupils were inspired with this hope; they emulated the Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes, who never shrank out of

modesty from the name and its responsibilities. But the development of the system led them gradually and reluctantly to renounce this hope, as they came to realize the arduous conditions involved. Zeno indeed could hardly have been denied the title conferred upon Epicurus. Cleanthes, the "second Hercules," held it possible for man to attain to virtue. From anecdotes recorded of the tricks played upon Aristo and Sphaerus (Diog. Laer., vii. 162, 117) it may be inferred that the former deemed himself infallible in his opinions, i.e., set up for a sage; Persæus himself, who had exposed the pretensions of Aristo, is twitted with having failed to conform with the perfect generalship which was one trait of the wise man, when he allowed the citadel of Corinth to be taken by Aratus (Athen., iv. 102 D). The trait of infallibility especially proved hard to establish when successive heads of the school seriously differed in their doctrine. The prospect became daily more distant, and at length faded away. Chrysippus declined to call himself or any of his contemporaries a sage. One or two such manifestations there may have been—Socrates and Diogenes?—but the wise man was rarer, he thought, than the phoenix. If his successors allowed one or two more exceptions, to Diogenes of Seleucia at any rate the sage was an unrealized ideal, as we learn from Plutarch (*De Comm. Not.*, 33, 1075 B), who does not fail to seize upon this extreme view. Posidonius left even Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes in the state of progress towards virtue. Although there was in the end a reaction from this extreme, yet it is impossible to mistake the bearing of all this upon a practical system of morals. So long as dialectic subtleties and exciting polemics afforded food for the intellect, the gulf between theory and practice might be ignored. But once let this system be presented to men in earnest about right living, and eager to profit by what they are taught, and an ethical reform is inevitable. Conduct for us will be separated from conduct for the sage. We shall be told not always to imitate him. There will be a new law, dwelling specially upon the "external duties" required of all men, wise or unwise; and even the sufficiency of virtue for our happiness may be questioned. The introducer and expositor of such a twofold morality was a remarkable man. Born at Rhodes c. 185 B.C., a citizen of the most flourishing of Greek states and almost the only one which yet retained vigour and freedom, Panætius lived for years in the house of Scipio Africanus the younger at Rome, accompanied him on embassies and campaigns, and was perhaps the first Greek who in a private capacity had any insight into the working of the Roman state or the character of its citizens. Later in life, as head of the Stoic school at Athens, he achieved a reputation second only to that of Chrysippus. He is the earliest Stoic author from whom we have, even indirectly, any considerable piece of work, as books i. and ii. of the *De Officiis* are a *réchauffé*, in Cicero's fashion, of Panætius' "Upon External Duty" (περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος).

The introduction of Stoicism at Rome was the most momentous of the many changes that it saw. After the first sharp collision with the jealousy of the national authorities it found a ready acceptance, and made rapid progress amongst the noblest families. It has been well said that the old heroes of the republic were unconscious Stoics, fitted by their narrowness, their stern simplicity, and devotion to duty for the almost Semitic earnestness of the new doctrine. In Greece its insensibility to art and the cultivation of life was a fatal defect; not so with the shrewd men of the world, desirous of qualifying as advocates or jurists. It supplied them with an incentive to scientific research in archaeology and grammar; it penetrated jurisprudence until the belief in the ultimate

identity of the *jus gentium* with the law of nature modified the prætor's edicts for centuries. Even to the prosaic religion of old Rome, with its narrow original conception and multitude of burdensome rites, it became in some sort a support. Scævola, following Panætius, explained that the prudence of statesmen had established this public institution in the service of order midway between the errors of popular superstition and the barren truths of enlightened philosophy. Soon the influence of the pupils reacted upon the doctrines taught. Of speculative interest the ordinary Roman had as little as may be; for abstract discussion and controversy he cared nothing. Indifferent to the scientific basis or logical development of doctrines, he selected from various writers and from different schools what he found most serviceable. All had to be simplified and disengaged from technical subtleties. To attract his Roman pupils Panætius would naturally choose simple topics susceptible of rhetorical treatment or of application to individual details. He was the representative, not merely of Stoicism, but of Greece and Greek literature, and would feel pride in introducing its greatest masterpieces: amongst all that he studied, he valued most the writings of Plato. He admired the classic style, the exquisite purity of language, the flights of imagination, but he admired above all the philosophy. He marks a reaction of the genuine Hellenic spirit against the narrow austerity of the first Stoics. Zeno and Chrysippus had introduced a repellent technical terminology; their writings lacked every grace of style. With Panætius the Stoa became eloquent: he did his best to improve upon the uncouth words in vogue, even at some slight cost of accuracy, e.g., to discard προηγμένον for εὐχρηστον, or else designate it "so-called good," or even simply "good," if the context allowed.

The part Panætius took in philological and historical studies is characteristic of the man. We know much of the results of these studies; of his philosophy technically we know very little. He wrote only upon ethics, where historical knowledge would be of use. Crates of Mallus, one of his teachers, aimed at fulfilling the high functions of a "critic" according to his own definition,—that the critic must acquaint himself with all rational knowledge. Panætius was competent to pass judgment upon the critical "divination" of an Aristarchus (who was perhaps himself also a Stoic), and took an interest in the restoration of Old Attic forms to the text of Plato. Just then there had been a movement towards a wider and more liberal education, by which even contemporary Epicureans were affected. Diogenes the Babylonian had written a treatise on language and one entitled *The Laws*. Along with grammar, which had been a prominent branch of study under Chrysippus, philosophy, history, geography, chronology, and kindred subjects came to be recognized as fields of activity no less than philology proper. It has been recently established that Polybius the historian was a Stoic, and it is clear that he was greatly influenced by the form of the system which he learned to know, in the society of Scipio and his friends, from Panætius.¹ Nor is it improbable that works of the latter served Cicero as the originals of his *De Republica* and *De Legibus*.² Thus the gulf between Stoicism and the later Cynics, who were persistently hostile to culture, could not fail to be widened.

A wave of eclecticism passed over all the Greek schools in the 1st century B.C. Platonism and scepticism had left undoubted traces upon the doctrine of such a reformer as Panætius. He had doubts about a general conflagration; possibly (he thought) Aristotle was right in affirming the eternity of the present order of the world. He doubted the entire system of divination. On these points his disciples Posidonius and Hecato seem to have reverted to orthodoxy. But in ethics his innovations were more suggestive and fertile. He separated wisdom as a theoretic virtue from the other three which he called practical. Hecato slightly modified this: showing that precepts (θεωρήματα) are needed for justice and temperance also, he made them scientific virtues, reserving for his second class the unscientific virtue (ἀθεωρητος ἀρετή) of courage, together with

¹ Hirzel, *Untersuch.*, ii. p. 841 sq. Polybius's rejection of divination is decisive. See, e.g., his explanation upon natural causes of Scipio the elder's capture of New Carthage, "by the aid of Neptune," x. 11 (cf. x. 2). P. Voigt holds that in vi. 5, 1, τισιν ἐτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων is an allusion to Panætius.

² This, at least, is maintained by Schmeke.

health, strength, and such like "excellencies." Further, Panætius had maintained that pleasure is not altogether a thing indifferent: there is a natural as well as an unnatural pleasure. But, if so, it would follow that, since pleasure is an emotion, apathy or eradication of all emotions cannot be unconditionally required. The gloss he put upon the definition of the end was "a life in accordance with the promptings given us by nature"; the terms are all used by older Stoics, but the individual nature (*ἡμῶν*) seems to be emphasized. From Posidonius, the last representative of a comprehensive study of nature and a subtle erudition, it is not surprising that we get the following definition: the end is to live in contemplation of the reality and order of the universe, promoting it to the best of our power, and never led astray by the irrational part of the soul. The heterodox phrase with which this definition ends points to innovations in psychology which were undoubtedly real and important, suggested by the difficulty of maintaining the essential unity of the soul. Panætius had referred two faculties (those of speech and of reproduction) to animal impulse and to the vegetative "nature" (*φύσις*) respectively. Yet the older Stoics held that this *φύσις* was changed to a true soul (*ψυχή*) at birth. Posidonius, unable to explain the emotions as "judgments" or the effects of judgments, postulated, like Plato, an irrational principle (including a concupiscent and a spirited element) to account for them, although he subordinated all these as faculties to the one substance of the soul lodged in the heart. This was a serious departure from the principles of the system, facilitating a return of later Stoicism to the dualism of God and the world, reason and the irrational part in man, which Chrysippus had striven to surmount.¹

Yet in the general approximation and fusion of opposing views which had set in, the Stoics fared far better than rival schools. Their system became best known and most widely used by individual eclectics. All the assaults of the sceptical Academy had failed, and within fifty years of the death of Carneades his degenerate successors, unable to hold their ground on the question of the criterion, had capitulated to the enemy. Antiochus of Ascalon, the professed restorer of the Old Academy, taught a medley of Stoic and Peripatetic dogmas, which he boldly asserted Zeno had first borrowed from his school. The wide diffusion of Stoic phraseology and Stoic modes of thought may be seen on all hands,—in the language of the New Testament writers, in the compendious "histories of philosophy" industriously circulated by a host of writers about this time (cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*).

The writings of the later Stoics have come down to us, if not entire, in great part, so that Seneca, Cornutus, Persius, Lucan, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius are known at first hand. They do not profess to give a scientific exposition of doctrine, and may therefore be dismissed somewhat briefly (see EPICETUS and AURELIUS). We learn much more about the Stoic system from the scanty fragments of the first founders,² or even from the epitomes of Diogenes Laertius and Stobæus, than from these writers. They testify to the restriction of philosophy to the practical side, and to the increasing tendency, ever since Panætius, towards a relaxation of the rigorous ethical doctrine, and its approximation to the form of religious conviction. This finds most marked expression in the doctrines of submission to Providence and universal philanthropy. Only in this way could they hold their ground, however insecurely, in face of the religious reaction of the first century. In passing to Rome, Stoicism quitted the school for actual life. The fall of the republic was a gain, for it released so much intellectual activity from civic duties. The life and death of Cato fired the imagination of a degenerate age in which he stood out both as a Roman and a Stoic. To a long line of illustrious successors, men like Pætus Thrasea and Helvidius Priscus, Cato bequeathed his resolute opposition to the dominant power of the times; unsympathetic, impracticable, but fearless in demeanour, they were a standing reproach to the corruption and tyranny of their age. But

¹ Works of Posidonius and Hecato have served as the basis of extant Latin treatises. Cicero, *De Divinatione*, perhaps *De Natura Deorum*, i. 1, ii., comes in part from Posidonius; Cicero, *De Finibus*, iii., and Seneca, *De Beneficiis*, i. iv., from Hecato, who is also the source of Stobæus, *Ecl. Eth.*, ii. 110. Cf. H. H. Fowler, *Panæti et Hecatonis Fragmenta*, Bonn, 1885.

² Cf. C. Wachsmuth, *Commentationes II. de Zenone Citiensi et Cleanthe Assio*, Göttingen, 1874. Baguet's *Chrysippus*, Louvain, 1822, is unfortunately very incomplete.

when at first, under Augustus, the empire restored order, philosophy became bolder and addressed every class in society, public lectures and spiritual direction being the two forms in which it mainly showed activity. Books of direction were written by Sextius in Greek (as afterwards by Seneca in Latin), almost the only Roman who had the ambition to found a sect, though in ethics he mainly followed Stoicism. His contemporary Papirius Fabianus was the popular lecturer of that day, producing a powerful effect by his denunciations of the manners of the times. Under Tiberius, Sotion and Attalus were attended by crowds of hearers. In Seneca's time there was a professor, badly attended it is true, even in a provincial town like Naples. At the same time the antiquarian study of Stoic writings went on apace, especially those of the earliest teachers,—Zeno and Aristo and Cleanthes.

Seneca is the most prominent leader in the direction which Roman Stoicism now took. His penetrating intellect had mastered the subtleties of the system of Chrysippus, but they seldom appear in his works, at least without apology. Incidentally we meet there with the doctrines of Pneuma and of tension, of the corporeal nature of the virtues and the affections, and much more to the same effect. But his attention is claimed for physics chiefly as a means of elevating the mind, and as making known the wisdom of Providence and the moral government of the world. To reconcile the ways of God to man had been the ambition of Chrysippus, as we know from Plutarch's criticisms. He argued plausibly that natural evil was a thing indifferent,—that even moral evil was required in the divine economy as a foil to set off good. The really difficult problem why the prosperity of the wicked and the calamity of the just were permitted under the divine government he met in various ways: sometimes he alleged the forgetfulness of higher powers; sometimes he fell back upon the necessity of these contrasts and grotesque passages in the comedy of human life. Seneca gives the true Stoic answer in his treatise *On Providence*: the wise man cannot really meet with misfortune; all outward calamity is a divine instrument of training, designed to exercise his powers and teach the world the indifference of external conditions. In the soul Seneca recognizes an effluence of the divine spirit, a god in the human frame; in virtue of this he maintains the essential dignity and internal freedom of man in every human being. Yet, in striking contrast to this orthodox tenet is his vivid conception of the weakness and misery of men, the hopelessness of the struggle with evil, whether in society or in the individual. Thus he describes the body (which, after Epicurus, he calls the flesh) as a thera husk or fetter or prison of the soul; with its departure begins the soul's true life. Sometimes, too, he writes as if he accepted an irrational as well as a rational part of the soul. In ethics, if there is no novelty of doctrine, there is a surprising change in the mode of its application. The ideal sage has receded; philosophy comes as a physician, not to the whole but to the sick. We learn that there are various classes of patients in "progress" (*προκοπή*), i.e., on their way to virtue, making painful efforts towards it. The first stage is the eradication of vicious habits: evil tendencies are to be corrected, and a guard kept on the corrupt propensities of the reason. Suppose this achieved, we have yet to struggle with single attacks of the passions: irascibility may be cured, but we may succumb to a fit of rage. To achieve this second stage the impulses must be trained in such a way that the fitness of things indifferent may be the guide of conduct. Even then it remains to give the will that property of rigid infallibility without which we are always liable to err, and this must be effected by the training of the judgment. Other

peculiarities of the later Stoic ethics are due to the condition of the times. In a time of moral corruption and oppressive rule, as the early empire repeatedly became to the privileged classes of Roman society, a general feeling of insecurity led the student of philosophy to seek in it a refuge against the vicissitudes of fortune which he daily beheld. The less any one man could do to interfere in the government, or even to safeguard his own life and property, the more heavily the common fate pressed upon all, levelling the ordinary distinctions of class and character. Driven inwards upon themselves, they employed their energy in severe self-examination, or they cultivated resignation to the will of the universe, and towards their fellow-men forbearance and forgiveness and humility, the virtues of the philanthropic disposition. With Seneca this resignation took the form of a constant meditation upon death. Timid by nature, aware of his impending doom, and at times justly dissatisfied with himself, he tries all means of reconciling himself to the idea of suicide. The act had always been accounted allowable in the school, if circumstances should call for it: indeed, the first three teachers had found such circumstances in the infirmity of old age. But their attitude towards the "way out" (*ἐξαιρομένη*) of incurable discomforts is quite unlike the anxious sentimentalism with which Seneca dwells upon death.

From Seneca we turn, not without satisfaction, to men of sterner mould, such as Musonius Rufus, who certainly deserves a place beside his more illustrious disciple, Epictetus. As a teacher he commanded universal respect, and wherever we catch a glimpse of his activity in these perilous times—whether banished by Nero, or excepted from banishment by Vespasian, as the judicial prosecutor of that foul traitor Egnatius Celer, or as thrusting himself between the ranks of Vespasianists and Vitellianists, to preach conciliation on the eve of a battle—he appears to advantage. His philosophy, however, is yet more concentrated upon practice than Seneca's, and in ethics he is almost at the position of Aristo. Virtue is the sole end, but virtue may be gained without many doctrines, mainly by habit and training. Epictetus testifies to the powerful hold he acquired upon his pupils, each of whom felt as if Musonius spoke to his heart. Amongst a mass of his practical precepts, we come across an original thought, the famous distinction between "things in our power," i.e., our ideas and imaginations, and "things beyond our power," i.e., the course of events and external advantages. The practical lesson drawn from it is, that we must school ourselves to accept willingly the inevitable.

In the life and teaching of Epictetus this thought bore abundant fruit. The beautiful character which rose superior to weakness, poverty, and slave's estate is also presented to us in the *Discourses* of his disciple Arrian as a model of religious resignation, of forbearance and love towards our brethren, that is, towards all men, since God is our common father. With him even the "physical basis" of ethics takes the form of a religious dogma,—the providence of God and the perfection of the world. We learn that he regards the *δαίμων* or "guardian angel" as the divine part in each man; sometimes it is more nearly conscience, at other times reason. His ethics, too, has a religious character. He begins with human weakness and man's need of God: whose would become good must first be convinced that he is evil. Submission is enforced by an argument which almost amounts to a retraction of the difference between things natural and things contrary to nature, as understood by Zeno. Would you be cut off from the universe? he asks. Go to, grow healthy and rich. But if not, if you are a part of it, then become resigned to your lot. Towards this goal of approximation to Cynicism the later Stoics had all along been tending.

Withdrawal from the active duty of the world must lead to passive endurance, and, ere long, complete indifference. Musonius had recommended marriage and condemned unsparingly the exposure of infants. Epictetus, however, would have the sage hold aloof from domestic cares, another Cynic trait. So, too, in his great maxim "bear and forbear," the last is a command to refrain from the external advantages which nature offers.

Epictetus is marked out amongst Stoics by his renunciation of the world. He is followed by a Stoic emperor, M. Aurelius Antoninus, who, though in the world, was not of it. The *Meditations* give no systematic exposition of belief, but there are many indications of the religious spirit we have already observed, together with an almost Platonic psychology. Following Epictetus, he speaks of man as a corpse bearing about a soul; at another time he has a threefold division—(1) body, (2) soul, the seat of impulse (*ἡνευαριον*), and (3) *νοῦς* or intelligence, the proper *ego*. In all he writes there is a vein of sadness: the flux of all things, the vanity of life, are thoughts which perpetually recur, along with resignation to the will of God and forbearance towards others, and the religious longing to be rid of the burden and to depart to God. These peculiarities in M. Antoninus may perhaps be explained in harmony with the older Stoic teaching; but, when taken in connexion with the rise of Neoplatonism and the revival of superstition, they are certainly significant. None of the ancient systems fell so rapidly as the Stoa. It had just touched the highest point of practical morality, and in a generation after M. Antoninus there is hardly a professor to be named. Its most valuable lessons to the world were preserved in Christianity; but the grand simplicity of its monism slumbered for fifteen centuries before it was revived by Spinoza.

Literature.—The best modern authority is Zeller, *Phil. d. Græch.*, iii. pt. i. (3d ed., 1880).—Eng. transl. *Stoics*, by Reichel (1879), and *Eclectics*, by S. F. Alleyne (1883). Of the 214 numbers to which the bibliography of Stoicism extends in Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Phil.* (7th ed., 1886), may be cited F. Ravaisson, *Essai sur le Stoicisme*, Paris, 1856; M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, Oldenburg, 1872; H. Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Phil. d. Griechen*, Halle, 1873, and *Gesch. d. Psychologie*, i. 2, Gotha, 1884; R. Hirzel, "Die Entwicklung der stoisch. Phil.," in *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schriften*, ii. pp. 1–566, Leipzig, 1882; Ogereau, *Essai sur le Systeme des Stoiciens*, Paris, 1885; L. Stein, *Die Psychologie der Stoa*, i., Berlin, 1886.

STOKE-UPON-TRENT, a market-town and municipal and parliamentary borough of Staffordshire, is situated on the Trent, on the Trent and Mersey Canal, where it unites with the Cauldon Canal, and on the London and North-Western and North Staffordshire railway lines, 2 miles east of Newcastle-under-Lyme, and 15 north of Stafford. It is connected with Burslem and other places by steam tramway. The principal public buildings are the town-hall (1835), with assembly rooms, the new market-hall (1883), the Minton memorial building (1858), containing rooms for art and science classes, the free library and museum (1878), and the North Staffordshire infirmary, founded in 1815 and removed to its present site in 1868. A cemetery 21 acres in extent was laid out, in 1883. There are statues of Josiah Wedgwood (1863) and of Colin Minton Campbell (1886). The head offices of the North Staffordshire Railway Company are in the town. Stoke has no antiquarian interest, and owes its importance to the porcelain and earthenware manufactures. It may be regarded as the centre of the "Potteries" district. Stoke was created a parliamentary borough in 1832, with two members, but by the Act of 1885 a large part of this went to form the new borough of Hanley. The population of the municipal borough (formed in 1874, with an area of 1660 acres) was 19,261 in 1881; the area has since been increased to 1720 acres. The population of the