SUMBAL, or SUMBUL, also called MUSK ROOT, a drug recently introduced into European medical practice. It consists of the root of *Ferula Sumbul*, Hook., a tall Umbelliferous plant found in the north of Bokhara, its range apparently extending beyond the Amur. It was first brought to Russia in 1835 as a substitute for musk; it was subsequently recommended as a remedy for cholera, and in 1867 was introduced into the British pharmacopœia. The root as found in commerce consists of transverse sections an inch or more in thickness and from 1 to 3 or more inches in diameter. It has a dark thin papery bark, a spongy texture, and the cut surface is marbled with white and blackish or pale brown; it has a musky odour and a bitter aromatic taste. Sumbal is used in medicine as an antispasmodic and stimulating tonic, especially in nervous diseases. It owes its medicinal properties to a balsamic resin and an essential oil. Of the former it contains about 9 per cent. and of the latter one-third per cent. The resin is soluble in ether and has a musky smell, which is not fully developed until after contact with water; by dry distillation it yields umbelliferone, $C_9H_6O_3$, a crystalline substance soluble in water, ether, and chloroform, and producing in an alkaline solution a brilliant blue fluorescence, which is destroyed by the addition of an acid in excess.

Under the name of East Indian sumbal, the root of *Dorema ammoniacum*, Don., has occasionally been offered in English commerce. It is of a browner hue, has the taste of ammoniacum, and gives a much darker tincture than the genuine drug; it is thus easily detected. The name "sumbal" (a word of Arabic origin, signifying a spike or ear) is applied to several fragrant roots in the East, the principal being *Nardostachys Jatamansi*, D.C. (see SPIKENARD). West African sumbal is the root of a species of *Cyperus*.

SUMBAWA (properly SAMBAWA or SAMAWA), an island of the East Indian Archipelago, one of the Sunda group, lies between 8° 6′ and 9° 3′ S. lat. and 116° 47′ and 119° 12′ E. long., to the east of Lombok, from which it is separated by the narrow Allas strait. Its area is estimated at 5186 square miles. The population was computed to number about 150,000 in 1887. The deep Bay of Salee or Sumbawa on the north divides the island into two peninsulas, and the isthmus is further reduced by the narrower Bay of Tjempi (Chempi) entering from the south. The eastern peninsula is deeply indented by the Bay of Bima. The whole surface of Sumbawa is mountainous: G. Nyenges, in the western peninsula, is 5560 feet high, and G. Tambora, in the eastern, which is said to have lost a third of its elevation in the eruption of 1815, is still 8697 feet high. There are no navigable streams. The climate and productions are not unlike those of Java, though the rains are heavier, the drought more severe, and the fertility less. Sulphur, arsenic, asphalt, and petroleum are the mineral products. Mohammedanism prevails throughout the island, except among certain mountain tribes.

Sumbawa is divided into four independent states,—Sumbawa proper, Dompo, Sangar, and Bima. Two other states on the northern extremity of the island were so devastated by the Tambora eruption of 1815 that their territory, after lying for long uninhabited, was in 1866 divided between Dompo and Sangar. Sumbawa proper occupies the western peninsula. The residence of the sultan is Sumbawa, 2 miles from the coast of the great bay, in 8° 32′ S. lat. and 117° 20′ 33″ E. long. It is surrounded with palisade and ditches. The inhabitants of this state employ sometimes the Malay and sometimes the Macassar character in writing. A considerable trade is carried on in the export of horses, buffaloes, goats, dinding (dried flesh), skins, birds' nests, wax, rice, katjang, sappanwood, &c. Sumbawa entered into treaty relations with the Dutch East India Company in 1674. Dompo is the western half of the eastern peninsula. The capital of the state, Dompo, lies in the heart of the country, on a stream that falls into Tjempi Bay. Bada, the sultan's residence, is farther west. Sangar occupies the north-western promontory of the island, and Bima the extreme east. Bima or Bodjo, the chief town of the latter state, lies on the east side of the Bay of Bima; it has a stone-walled palace and a mosque, as well as a Dutch fort. The population of Bima is curiously divided into twelve guilds or castes (*dari*). In the town is a Government Christian school dating from 1874.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION. By a court of summary jurisdiction is meant a court in which cases are heard and determined by a justice or justices of the peace, without the intervention of a jury. Such a court has duties to perform of two different kinds. It either hears and determines a case in a judicial capacity, or it acts rather in a ministerial capacity where a *prima facie* case has been established, as by issuing a warrant of distress for non-payment of poor rate, or by committing an accused person for the decision of a higher court, generally assizes or quarter sessions. It is to the court acting in the former capacity that the term "court of summary jurisdiction" more strictly applies. Ever since the first institution of justices of the peace (see JUSTICE OF THE PEACE), the tendency of English legislation has been to enlarge their jurisdiction and to enable offences of a less heinous nature to be tried in their courts without a jury. This inroad upon the functions of the jury can only be made by legislation. "The common law is a stranger to it, unless in the case of contempts," says Blackstone. At common law all offences must be proceeded against by indictment, and an indictment can only be tried before a jury. Even where an offence is created by statute and is unknown to the common law the procedure must be by indictment, unless the statute creating the offence or some other statute specially makes it summary. The history of the gradual growth of summary jurisdiction will be found in Stephen, *History of the Criminal Law*, vol. i. chap. iv. The summary jurisdiction exercised by justices is the only one of much practical importance. It is unnecessary to do more than mention in passing the two other kinds named by Blackstone, that of the commissioners of taxes for revenue offences and that of the superior courts for CONTEMPT OF COURT (*q.v.*). A very remarkable case of the latter is the power given to a judge by 12 Geo. I. c. 29, s. 4, to summarily sentence to seven years' penal servitude a solicitor practising after conviction for perjury, forgery, or barratry.

The principal Acts now dealing with summary jurisdiction are the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848[1] (11 and 12 Vict. c. 43), one of what are called Jervis's Acts, and the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 and 43 Vict. c. 49). The former consolidated the law up to that time of a large number of Acts, but only to a certain extent, for a considerable number of previous enactments dealing in a greater or less degree with this subject are still law, the earliest being 5 Hen. IV. c. 10. It also amended the law in several important particulars. The amendment was in the direction of greater simplicity of procedure, and related to both criminal and only quasi-criminal matters. The procedure under the Act is shortly this. In all cases where an information is laid or complaint made the justices are, on proof of a *prima facie* case, to issue a SUMMONS (*q.v.*). An information is laid in criminal matters in which the decision of the justices, if adverse to the defendant, would be a conviction. A complaint is made where the decision of the justices in such an event would be an order for the payment of money or otherwise in what may be called only quasi-criminal matters, *e.g.*, claims under the Employers and Workmen Act. If the summons is disobeyed, a warrant may (in criminal charges only) issue in the first instance at the discretion of a justice. The warrant is good only within the local jurisdiction of the justice issuing it; and, if it is required to be executed in another jurisdiction, it must be backed, *i.e.*, endorsed, by a justice of that jurisdiction (unless in case of a fresh pursuit, when it is good for 7 miles beyond the bounds of the jurisdiction in which it was issued). Complaints need not be in writing; informations usually are, though the Act does not make writing necessary. Where a warrant issues in the first instance, the information must be upon oath. In all cases not otherwise provided for, the information must be laid or complaint made within six calendar months from the time at which the matter of the information or complaint arose. The hearing is in open court, and parties may appear by counsel or solicitor. If both parties appear, the justices must hear and determine the case. If the defendant does not appear, the justices may hear and

[1] This name of the Act of 1848 is an example of a title of an Act conferred retrospectively (see STATUTE). The name was given to it by the Act of 1879. In the same way the name of the Scotch Summary Procedure Act, 1864, was changed to that of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1864, by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1881.

determine in his absence, or may issue a warrant and adjourn the hearing until his apprehension. If the complainant does not appear, the justices may dismiss the complaint or adjourn the hearing. The punishment inflicted may be fine or imprisonment, or both. Imprisonment as a rule cannot exceed six months. The regular mode of proceeding where a conviction adjudges a pecuniary penalty, or an order requires payment of a sum of money, is by issue of a warrant of distress to be levied on the goods of the defendant. The court usually consists of two or more justices, but the lord mayor or an alderman of the City of London, a metropolitan police magistrate, and a stipendiary magistrate have each the authority of two justices. The Act further makes provision for curing defects in form in the proceedings for the payment of costs, for removing difficulties as to the boundaries of jurisdiction, and for various other matters. The schedule gives forms of proceedings, which are as far as possible to be followed. The Act of 1879 amended the Act of 1848 in several important particulars, chiefly in the direction of greater leniency and enlarged jurisdiction and power of appeal. A greater discretion in the infliction of punishment is conferred on the court. A scale of imprisonment in respect of non-payment of a fine or default of distress is fixed at periods varying according to the amount of the fine unpaid, but in no case exceeding three months (except in certain revenue offences, where the limit is six months), and without hard labour, unless hard labour is specially authorized by the Act on which the conviction is founded. Time may be given for payment of money, or it may be ordered to be paid by instalments, or security may be taken. Summary trial of children under twelve is allowed at the discretion of the court in case of any indictable offence other than homicide, unless objection is made by the parent or guardian. A child cannot on summary conviction be imprisoned for more than a month or fined more than 40s. Summary trial of juvenile offenders between twelve and sixteen and of adults is allowed in certain crimes mentioned in the Act, if the accused assents and foregoes his right to trial by jury. There are cases in which the court can deal summarily with an adult pleading guilty where it would have been necessary to commit him for trial had he pleaded not guilty. The court may in trivial cases discharge the accused without punishment or with only a nominal punishment. Improvements are made in the practice as to sureties, recognizances (see SURETY, RECOGNIZANCE), and the issue and execution of warrants of commitment and distress. The issue of such a warrant may be postponed if the court thinks fit. The wearing apparel and bedding of a person and his family, and the tools and implements of his trade to the value of £5, are exempt from distress. Imprisonment may in certain cases be ordered instead of distress. The right of appeal is much extended. An appeal now lies from every conviction or order adjudging imprisonment without the option of a fine where the accused did not plead guilty. The appeal by the Act of 1884 must be in accordance with the procedure of the Act of 1879, or of any subsequent Act giving a right of appeal in the particular case. The appeal is to QUARTER SESSIONS (*q.v.*). A summons or warrant is not avoided by the death or cesser of office of the justice issuing it. Under the powers of the Act rules and forms were framed which came into effect on 1st January 1880. The Summary Jurisdiction (Process) Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. c. 24, applying to Great Britain, but not to Ireland), gave additional facilities for serving and executing the process of an English court of summary jurisdiction in Scotland or of a Scotch court in England, on endorsement in the country where it is executed. The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884 (47 and 48 Vict. c. 43), repealed a number of enactments rendered obsolete by the Acts of 1848 and 1879 and explained certain sections of those Acts as to which doubts had arisen. There are numerous other enactments dealing less directly with the powers of courts of summary jurisdiction. For instance, the Merchant Shipping Acts give justices large powers in case of salvage claims and of offences by seamen. The Criminal Law Consolidation Acts of 1861 give them limited jurisdiction in larceny, coining, malicious injuries to property, and offences against the person. Among many other Acts conferring summary jurisdiction are the Army, Bastardy, Customs, Employers and Workmen, Game, Highway, Licensing, Post Office, and Vagrant Acts. Some of the later Acts, such as the Customs and Army Acts, apply to the United Kingdom. The decision of a court of summary jurisdiction may be reviewed by, besides appeal, a writ of certiorari, mandamus, or habeas corpus, or by statement of a special case.

Scotland.—Summary jurisdiction in Scotland depends chiefly upon the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, 1864 and 1881. A court of summary jurisdiction includes the sheriff court. The Acts follow, *mutatis mutandis*, the lines of English legislation. All proceedings for summary conviction or for recovery of a penalty must be by way of complaint according to one of the forms in the schedule to the Act of 1864. The English summons and warrant are represented in Scotland by the warrant of citation and the warrant of apprehension. Where no punishment is fixed for a statutory offence, the court cannot sentence to more than a fine of £5 or sixty days' imprisonment, in addition to ordering caution to keep the peace. The Act of 1881 adopts many of the provisions of the English Act of 1879. In addition, it confers the discretion as to punishment to a sheriff trying by jury in cases where the prosecution might have been by complaint under the Acts. Appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction are now mainly regulated by 58 and 39 Vict. c. 62, and proceed on case stated by the inferior judge.

Ireland.—The principal Acts dealing with the subject are the Summary Jurisdiction and Petty Sessions Acts, 1851 (14 and 15 Vict. cc. 92, 93). These Acts are more extensive in their purview than the English Acts, as they form in a great degree a code of substantive law as well as of procedure. The exceptional political circumstances of Ireland have led to the appointment of resident magistrates under 6 and 7 Will. IV. c. 13, and to the conferring at different times on courts of summary jurisdiction of an authority, generally temporary, greater than that which they can exercise in Great Britain. Recent instances are the Peace Preservation Act, 1881, and the Prevention of Crime Act, 1882. The provisions of the English Act of 1879 as to children were extended to Ireland by 47 and 48 Vict. c. 19.

United States.—By Art. III. s. 2 of the constitution the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, is to be by jury. By Art. V. of the amendments no person can be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Considerable changes have been made by State legislation in the direction of enlarging the powers of courts of summary jurisdiction. (J. Wt.)

SUMMONS (*summonitio*) is a legal form demanding the attendance of a person in parliament (see PEERAGE, vol. xviii. p. 462) or before a court of justice. The term as it applies to courts of justice is used both in civil and in criminal procedure, but is not applied universally to all cases of demanding attendance. Thus in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division the summons is usually, following the civil law, called a "citation," while a summons to a witness (at least in the superior courts) bears the name of "subpœna," taken from the initial words of the penal clause in its Latin form. Whatever be the name, the principle of law is invariable, that a court before proceeding to adjudicate should bring before itself by some formal legal process all persons interested in the decision or able to influence the decision by giving evidence as material witnesses. The oral summons, like the oral pleading, seems to have been earlier in time than the written form. In Roman law the oral *in jus vocatio* existed centuries before the written *libellus conventionis*. The antiquity and importance of the summons as a legal form in England is shown by the presence of the "sompnour," or summoner of the ecclesiastical court, as one of the characters in the *Canterbury Tales*, and by the comparative frequency of "Sumner" as a surname. In civil procedure a summons may be issued either in the High Court or in an inferior court, such as a county court. In the High Court all actions are commenced by writ of summons. In the High Court the summons (in this case not in the form of a writ) is also a convenient mode of determining interlocutory matters by a judge or some other officer of the court—such as a master in the Queen's Bench Division or a chief clerk in the Chancery Division—without the necessity of bringing the case into court.

The tendency of recent legislation is towards the increased use of the summons as a mode of presenting a case for decision. For instance, under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, and the Conveyancing Act, 1881, many important questions, even of title to real property, may be raised on summons. It thus approaches very nearly to PLEADING (*q.v.*); in fact, the definition of pleading in the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 100, includes summons. The Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, introduced two new forms of summons—(1) the general summons for directions, by which several matters may be included in a single summons which before the rules must have been the subject of separate applications; (2) the originating summons in the Chancery Division, by which proceedings may be commenced without writ for certain kinds of relief specified in the rules (see Ord. lv. r. 3). The originating summons to a great extent supersedes the action for administration of a trust or of the estate of a deceased person.[1] An ordinary summons must be served

[1] A similar practice existed before 1883 under the powers given by 15 and 16 Vict. c. 86, but was very limited in its operation, as it applied simply to the personal estate of a deceased person.

two; an originating summons seven, clear days before its return. A decision on a summons is generally subject to appeal. In the Chancery Division it is customary to adjourn into court the consideration of a summons of more than ordinary importance. The appendix to the Rules of 1883 contains forms of every kind of summons in the High Court. In the county courts an action is commenced by plaint and summons. Two kinds of summons are in use,—the ordinary and the default summons. The latter is an optional remedy of the plaintiff in actions for debts or liquidated demands exceeding £5, and in all actions for the price or hire of goods sold or let to the defendant to be used in the way of his calling. It may also issue by leave of the judge or registrar in other cases, with the single exception that no leave can be given in claims under £5 where the claim is not for the price or hire of goods sold or let as above, if the affidavit of debt discloses that the defendant is a servant or person engaged in manual labour. The advantage of a default summons is that judgment is entered for the plaintiff without hearing unless the defendant gives notice of defence within a limited time. A default summons must as a rule be served personally on the defendant; an ordinary summons need not be served personally, but may in most cases be delivered to a person at the defendant's house or place of business. A summons is also issued to a witness in the county court. Forms of summons are given in the County Court Rules, 1886. These include certain special forms used in Admiralty and interpleader actions and in proceedings under the Charitable Trusts Acts, the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, and the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. In criminal law a summons is the mode of securing the attendance of the defendant before a court of summary jurisdiction, whether it be sought to obtain a conviction or an order against him. Forms of summons to a defendant, a witness, or a surety will be found in the schedule to the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, and in the rules issued in accordance with the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (see the article SUMMARY JURISDICTION, *supra*). Forgery of a summons or use of any document falsely purporting to be a summons or professing to act under such a document is punishable as felony under the County Courts Act, 1846, and the Forgery Act of 1861.

Scotland.—Summons is a term confined in strictness to the commencement of an action in the Court of Session. Formerly it was the mode of commencing an action in the sheriff court, but such an action is now commenced by PETITION (*q.v.*). In some Acts of Parliament, however—*e.g.*, the Citation Amendment Acts—the term "summons" is certainly used to denote part of the process of an inferior court. The summons is a writ in the sovereign's name, signed by a writer to the signet, citing the defender to appear and answer the claim. The will of the summons calls upon the defender to appear on the proper *induciæ*. A privileged summons is one where the *induciæ* are shortened to six days against defenders within Scotland (6 Geo. IV. c. 120, s. 53). Defects in the summons are cured by amendment or by a supplementary summons. The summons goes more into detail than the English writ of summons, though it no longer states, as it once did, the grounds of action, now stated in the condescendence and pursuer's pleas in law annexed to the summons. The form of the summons is regulated by 13 and 14 Vict. c. 36, s. 1, and Schedule A. After the action has been set on foot by summons, the attendance of the parties and witnesses is obtained by citation. The Citation Amendment Acts, 1871 and 1882, give additional facilities for the execution of citations in civil cases by means of registered letters. In cases in a court of summary jurisdiction the English summons is represented by the warrant of citation.

SUMNER, CHARLES (1811-1874), American statesman, was born at Boston, Mass., on 6th January 1811. He graduated at Harvard in 1830, and studied law with Judge Story. His natural powers of mind were great, his habits of study intense, and his success immediate and conspicuous. Everything seems to have been expected of him, and he disappointed nobody. In 1834 he had been admitted to the bar, was editor of the *American Jurist*, and was reporting the decisions of Judge Story. For the next three years he was a lecturer in the Harvard law school. He then spent three years in Europe, always, however, studying with an intensity that never relaxed. Returning, he began the practice of law, but gradually drifted into politics during the anti-slavery struggle. In 1851 the few "free-soilers" in the Massachusetts legislature offered to vote for Democrats for other officers in return for Democratic votes for Sumner as United States senator. Sumner was thus sent to the Senate, to which he was regularly re-elected for the rest of his life. He at once became a man of mark, though not of popularity, in the Senate. His fine personal presence, his somewhat florid rhetoric, his wealth of citation from learned and foreign tongues, his wide foreign acquaintance, high culture, and social standing, seem to have staggered his Southern colleagues. They could not look down upon him, and they hardly knew what else to do. A long series of speeches brought about an assault upon him, 22d May 1856, by Preston S. Brooks, a representative from South Carolina, in retaliation for Sumner's criticism of Brooks's uncle, a senator from his State. Brooks found Sumner writing in the Senate chamber, and beat him so cruelly that he narrowly escaped death. He was absent from his place until 1859, and never fully recovered from the effects of the assault. When his party took control of the Senate in 1861 Sumner became one of its foremost members. Like Stevens (see STEVENS), he propounded a theory of the relations of the seceding States to the Union which never was endorsed, but had its influence on the outcome of reconstruction. In the American Union States are autonomous, but Territories are theoretically under the absolute government of Congress, though in practice Congress gives them as much self-government as is possible or prudent. A Territory becomes a State by admission through an Act of Congress. Sumner held that the national boundaries of the Union were so fixed that no State could escape from them by secession, that a State's secession was merely an abandonment of its Statehood, so that it fell back into the condition of a Territory and came under the absolute government of Congress. This "State-suicide" theory was in due time condemned by the Supreme Court, which held that a State could not lose its Statehood; but Congress had really acted upon it already in several points of reconstruction. Sumner's peculiar field was in the Senate committee on foreign relations, of which he was chairman from 1861 until 1871. It was during this period, in 1869, that he urged the "indirect" items of the Alabama claims, sacrificing without hesitation the English popularity which had always been dear to him. Within a year or two he felt compelled to oppose the new administration of President Grant in several particulars. In the expectation of gratifying the president, the Republican senators removed Sumner from his chairmanship; and, like Seward, he passed his later years in general opposition to the party which he had helped to organize. In December 1872 he introduced a resolution that the names of victories over fellow-citizens should be removed from the regimental flags of the army. For this his State legislature censured him, but the censure was rescinded just before his death. He had been from the beginning of the Civil War the advocate of emancipation and of the grant of full status to the Negroes; and for the last few years of his life his energies were devoted to forwarding his Civil Rights Bill, intended to give the freedmen the same legal rights as the whites. He died at Washington on 11th March 1874.

Sumner's speeches were collected in 1850 under the title of *Orations and Speeches*, to which was added, in 1856, *Recent Speeches and Addresses*. His *Works*, in twelve volumes, were issued in 1875. See also Lester's *Life of Sumner*, 1874; Harsha's *Life of Sumner*: and Pierce's *Memorial and Letters of Sumner*.

SUMPTUARY LAWS are those intended to limit or regulate the private expenditure of the citizens of a community. They may be dictated by political, or economic, or moral considerations. They have existed both in ancient and in modern states. In Greece, it was amongst the Dorian races, whose temper was austere and rigid, that they most prevailed. All the inhabitants of Laconia were forbidden to attend drinking entertainments, nor could a Lacedæmonian possess a house or furniture which was the work of more elaborate implements than the axe and saw. Amongst the Spartans proper, simple and frugal habits of

life were secured rather by the institution of the *pheiditia* (public meals) than by special enactments. The possession of gold or silver was interdicted to the citizens of Sparta, and the use of iron money alone was permitted by the Lycurgean legislation. "Even in the cities which had early departed from the Doric customs," says K. O. Müller, "there were frequent and strict prohibitions against expensiveness of female attire, prostitutes alone being wisely excepted." In the Locrian code of Zaleucus citizens were forbidden to drink undiluted wine. The Solonian sumptuary enactments were directed principally against the extravagance of female apparel and dowries of excessive amount; costly banquets also were forbidden, and expensive funeral solemnities. The Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia not only protested against the luxury of their time but encouraged legislation with a view to restraining it.

At Rome the system of sumptuary edicts and enactments was largely developed, whilst the objects of such legislation were concurrently sought to be attained through the exercise of the censorial power. The code of the Twelve Tables contained provisions limiting the expenditure on funerals. The most important sumptuary laws of the Roman commonwealth were those which follow. (1) The Oppian law, 215 B.C., provided that no woman should possess more than half an ounce of gold, or wear a dress of different colours, or ride in a carriage in the city or within a mile of it except on occasions of public religious ceremonies. This law, which had been partly dictated by the financial necessities of the conflict with Hannibal, was repealed twenty years later, against the advice of Cato. Livy (xxxiv. 1-8) gives an interesting account of the commotion excited by the proposal of the repeal, and of the exertions of the Roman women against the law, which almost amounted to a female *émeute*. (2) The Orchian law, 187 B.C., limited the number of guests at entertainments. An attempt being made to repeal this law, Cato offered strong opposition and delivered a speech on the subject, of which some fragments have been preserved. (3) The Fannian law, 161 B.C., limited the sums to be spent on entertainments; it provided amongst other things that no fowl should be served but a single hen, and that not fattened. (4) The Didian law, 143 B.C., extended to the whole of Italy the provisions of the Fannian law, and made the guests as well as the givers of entertainments at which the law was violated liable to the penalties. After a considerable interval, Sulla anew directed legislation against the luxury of the table and also limited the cost of funerals and of sepulchral monuments. We are told that he violated his own law as to funerals when burying his wife Metella, and also his law on entertainments when seeking to forget his grief for her loss in extravagant drinking and feasting (Plut., *Sull.*, 35). Julius Cæsar, in the capacity of *præfectus moribus*, after the African war re-enacted some of the sumptuary laws which had fallen into neglect; Cicero implies (*Ep. ad Att.*, xiii. 7) that in Cæsar's absence his legislation of this kind was not attended to. Suetonius tells us that Cæsar had officers stationed in the market-places to seize such provisions as were forbidden by law, and sent lictors and soldiers to feasts to remove all illegal eatables (*Jul.*, 43). Augustus fixed anew the expense to be incurred in entertainments on ordinary and festal days. Tiberius also sought to check inordinate expense on banquets, and a decree of the senate was passed in his reign forbidding the use of gold vases except in sacred rites, and prohibiting the wearing of silk garments by men. But it appears from Tacitus (*Ann.*, iii. 5, where a speech is put into his mouth very much in the spirit of Horace's "Quid leges sine moribus Vanæ proficiunt?"), that he looked more to the improvement of manners than to direct legislative action for the restriction of luxury. Suetonius mentions some regulations made by Nero, and we hear of further legislation of this kind by Hadrian and later emperors. In the time of Tertullian the sumptuary laws appear to have been things of the past (*Apol.*, c. vi.).

In modern times the first important sumptuary legislation was—in Italy that of Frederick II.; in Aragon that of James I., in 1234; in France that of Philip IV.; in England that of Edward II. and Edward III. In 1294 Philip IV. made provisions as to the dress and the table expenditure of the several orders of men in his kingdom, the most remarkable of which may be seen in Guizot's *Civilisation en France*, leç. 15. Charles V. of France forbade the use of long-pointed shoes, a fashion against which popes and councils had protested in vain. Under later kings the use of gold and silver embroidery, silk stuffs, and fine linen wares was restricted,—at first moral and afterwards economic motives being put forward, the latter especially from the rise of the mercantile theory. In England we hear much from the writers of the 14th century of the extravagance of dress at that period. They remark both on the great splendour and expensiveness of the apparel of the higher orders and on the fantastic and deforming fashions adopted by persons of all ranks. The parliament held at Westminster in 1363 made laws (37 Edw. III. c. 8-14) to restrain this undue expenditure and to regulate the dress of the several classes of the people. These statutes were repealed in the following year, but similar ones were passed again in the same reign. They seem, however, to have had little effect, for in the reign of Richard II. the same excesses prevailed, apparently in a still greater degree. Another statute was passed in the year 1463 (3 Edw. IV. c. 5) for the regulation of the dress of persons of all ranks. In this it was stated that "the commons of the realm, as well men as women, wear excessive and inordinate apparel to the great displeasure of God, the enriching of strange realms, and the destruction of this realm." An Act of 1444 had previously regulated the clothing, when it formed a part of the wages, of servants employed in husbandry; a bailiff or overseer was to have an allowance of 5s. a year for his clothing, a hind or principal servant 4s., and an ordinary servant 3s. 4d.,—sums equivalent respectively to 50s., 40s., and 33s. 4d. of our money (Henry). Already in the reign of Edward II. a proclamation had been issued against the "outrageous and excessive multitude of meats and dishes which the great men of the kingdom had used, and still used, in their castles," as well as "persons of inferior rank imitating their example, beyond what their stations required and their circumstances could afford"; and the rule was laid down that the great men should have but two courses of flesh meat served up to their tables, and on fish days two courses of fish, each course consisting of but two kinds. In 1363, at the same time when costumes were regulated, it was enacted that the servants of gentlemen, merchants, and artificers should have only one meal of flesh or fish in the day, and that their other food should consist of milk, butter, and cheese. Similar Acts to those above mentioned were passed in Scotland also. In 1433 (temp. James I.), by an Act of a parliament which sat at Perth, the manner of living of all orders in Scotland was prescribed, and in particular the use of pies and baked meats, which had been only lately introduced into the country, was forbidden to all under the rank of baron. In 1457 (temp. James II.) an Act was passed against "sumptuous clething." A Scottish sumptuary law of 1621 was the last of the kind in Great Britain.

Ferguson and others have pointed out that "luxury" is a term of relative import and that all luxuries do not deserve to be discouraged. Roscher has called attention to the fact that the nrevalent luxury changes with the stage of social development. He endeavours to show that there are three periods in the history of luxury,—one in which it is coarse and profuse; a second in which it aims mainly at comfort and elegance; and a third, proper to periods of decadence, in which it is perverted to vicious and unnatural ends. The second of these began, in modern times, with the emergence of the Western nations from the mediæval period, and in the ancient communities at epochs of similar transition. Roscher holds that the sumptuary legislation which regularly appears at the opening of this stage was then useful as promoting the reformation of habits. He remarks that the contemporary formation of strong Governments, disposed from the consciousness of their strength to interfere with the lives of their subjects, tended to encourage such legislation, as did also the jealousy felt by the hitherto dominant ranks of the rising wealth of the citizen classes, who are apt to imitate the conduct of their superiors. It is certainly desirable that habits of wasteful expenditure and frequent and wanton changes of fashion should be discouraged. But such action belongs more properly to the spiritual than to the temporal power. In ancient, especially Roman, life, when there was a confusion of the two powers in the state system, sumptuary legislation was more natural than in the modern world, in which those powers have been in general really, though imperfectly, separated. How far regulation of this kind could, and might usefully, be carried out by a spiritual power under purely moral sanctions, and whether and to what extent social offices, private as well as public, should be discriminated by costume, are questions which need not be discussed at present. Political economists are practically unanimous in their reprobation of the policy of legislative compulsion in these matters. In a well-known passage Adam Smith protests against the "impertinence and presumption of kings and ministers in pretending to watch over the economy of private people and to restrain their expense, being themselves always and without any exception the greatest spendthrifts in the society." Yet he does not seem to have been averse to all attempts to influence through taxation the expenditure of the humbler classes. The modern taxes on carriages, coats of arms, hair-powder, playing-cards, &c., ought perhaps not to be regarded as resting on the principle of sumptuary laws, but only as means of proportioning taxation to the capacity of bearing the burden.

The *loci classici* on Roman sumptuary laws are Gellius, *Noctes Atticæ*, ii. 24, and Macrobius, *Saturn.*, iii. 17. On the similar English legislation Henry's *History of Great Britain* may usefully be consulted. One of the best extant treatments of the whole subject is that by Roscher, in his essay *Ueber den Luxus*, republished in his *Ansichten der Volkswirthschaft aus dem geschichtlichen Standpunkte* (3d ed., 1878). (J. K. I.)

SUMY, a district town of Little Russia, in the government of Kharkoff, situated 125 miles to the north-west of the chief town of the government, was founded in 1652 by Little Russian Cossacks. It is poorly built, chiefly of wood, but is an important centre for the trade of Great Russia with Little Russia,—cattle and corn being sent to the north in exchange for various kinds of manufactured and grocery wares. It has a classical pro-gymnasium and a technical school. Its inhabitants, who numbered 16,030 in 1884, are engaged in commerce, in various kinds of petty trades, and in agriculture.

SUN. In the article ASTRONOMY (vol. ii. p. 768 *sq.*) the sun has been considered as a member of the solar system, and references are given to various discoveries which have been made from time to time relating to its physical and chemical constitution. In the present article we propose to consider the sun as a star, and to state as briefly as may be the views at present held regarding its structure, and subsequently to refer to the most recent observations dealing with the physics and chemistry of the various phenomena which are open to our study.

The sun as ordinarily visible to us, bounded by the photosphere, is only a small part of the real sun: from observations made during eclipses it is now known that outside the photosphere are—first, an envelope, namely the chromosphere, which is mainly composed of hydrogen, and outside this another envelope, called the corona, while there is evidence that outside these, and especially along the plane of the sun's equator, there is a considerable extension of matter which may or may not be of the same nature as that of which the corona is composed.

These various parts of the solar economy have been examined by the spectroscope, and from this examination two widely divergent views have arisen.

According to the first view, the true atmosphere of the sun is limited by the chromosphere, and the constituents of that atmosphere consist essentially of the vapours of the chemical elements recognized on the earth. It will be seen that on this view the corona and the equatorial extension observed occasionally are merely solar appendages. In the other view the atmosphere of the sun is extended to the confines of the corona, the temperature naturally increasing as we descend; and it is held that towards the photosphere the temperature is so high that the chemical elements are dissociated into finer forms of matter, so that descending vapours get more simple, ascending vapours get more complex, and it is only in the cooler regions of the atmosphere that vapours resembling those of our terrestrial elements can exist, while near the confines of the corona these vapours give place to solid particles and masses. Broadly stated, these divergent views have arisen from the application of two distinct methods of inquiry. In one method, light coming from every portion of the sun, and reflected, let us say, by a cloud into the spectroscope, gives us a spectrum full of absorption lines, and these lines are practically constant from year to year. In the other method, each minute portion of the solar economy has been examined bit by bit, and thus we have the spectrum of the spots, the spectrum of the prominences, the spectrum of the chromosphere, the spectrum of the corona. All these spectra vary enormously, not only among themselves, but from year to year; and, when we consider merely the spots and prominences, we may say that they vary from spot to spot and from prominence to prominence.

It will be obvious that the true mean density of the sun cannot be the same on the two hypotheses to which we have referred. If the atmosphere is practically limited by the photosphere, it has been found that the density of the sun is 1·444, water being taken as unity. If we include the corona in the sun's atmosphere, and assume that its height is half a million of miles above the photosphere, then the volume of the sun is ten times that bounded by the photosphere, and the density is reduced to a tenth of the value given above.

We next proceed to discuss the chemical results obtained by the first method of inquiry to which reference has been made. For these results we are of course dependent upon comparisons of the lines given by various incandescent vapours with the Fraunhofer lines seen in the ordinary spectrum of the sun. If by such means complete evidence is afforded of the existence of one of our chemical elements in the sun, it is obvious that no information is given as to its precise locality; further, if the high temperatures used in our laboratories to produce a spectrum should break up the molecules of the vapours as known to the chemist into finer ones, and if the temperature of the sun were to do the same, there would still be a considerable similarity between the solar and the terrestrial spectrum of any one substance.

The first (A) of the following tables gives the substances present in the sun's atmosphere according to (1) Kirchhoff, and (2) Ångström and Thalén.

TABLE A.

Kirchhoff.	Sodium, Iron, Calcium, Magnesium, Nickel, Barium, Copper, Zinc.
Ångström and Thalén.	Sodium, Iron, Calcium, Magnesium, Nickel, Chromium, Cobalt, Hydrogen, Manganese, Titanium.

A subsequent method of inquiry, which was capable of tracing merely a small quantity, gave the additional substances shown in Table B.