

extraordinary. It was during this period of his life that he acquired that suppleness of feeling and love of finesse which may be traced throughout his subsequent career. From February 1679 to January 1681, a period when the country was rent in twain by real or fancied dangers to the Protestant faith, he held the post of secretary of state for the northern department; but his conduct in office was not marked by discretion. He voted for the exclusion of the duke of York from the succession to the throne, and the ill-feeling which this action created in the mind of Charles II. was augmented by the overtures which Sunderland made to the prince of Orange, whilst differences of opinion on the subject of the Exclusion Bill brought about a fierce quarrel between Sunderland and Halifax, the head of the "trimmers." Early in 1683, having been reconciled to the duke of York and having secured a warm friend in the duchess of Portsmouth, Sunderland regained his place as secretary for the northern department. When James II. succeeded to the throne, Sunderland became secretary for the southern department, from March 1685 to 27th October 1688, for most of which period he held the additional post of president of the council, and was a member of the high commission for ecclesiastical causes. He afterwards claimed that he had used his influence to mitigate the proceedings of this obnoxious body, but he went sufficiently far with his royal master to sign the warrant for the committal of the bishops and to appear as a witness against them. Though Lord Sunderland was in sympathy, if not in actual communion, with Roman Catholicism, he hesitated to commit himself entirely to the acts of the fierce devotees who surrounded James II., and through their opposition he was dismissed in disgrace and sought security in Holland. He had been too much engaged in the acts of James II. to find a place among the advisers of William and Mary.

The visit which William paid to Althorp in Northamptonshire, the country seat of Sunderland, in 1695 was the prelude of a reconciliation between the king and his ambitious subject and of Sunderland's recall into public affairs. From April to December 1697 he discharged the duties of lord chamberlain of the household and for the greater part of that time he was also lord justice of England; but he finally retired from active life in the close of 1697 through disgust at the check which William received in the retention of a standing army. The rest of his life was passed in strict seclusion at Althorp, and there he died on 28th September 1702.

Lord Sunderland possessed a keen intellect and was consumed by intense restlessness; but his character was wanting in steadfastness, and he yielded too easily to opposition. His adroitness in intrigue and his fascinating manners were exceptional even in an age when such qualities formed part of every statesman's education; but the characteristics which ensured him success in the House of Lords and in the royal closet led to failure in his attempts to understand the feelings of the mass of his countrymen. Consistency of conduct was not among the objects which he aimed at, nor did he shrink from thwarting in secret a policy which he supported in public. A large share of the discredit attaching to the measures of James II. must be assigned to the earl of Sunderland.

SUNDERLAND, CHARLES SPENCER, THIRD EARL OF (1675-1722), was the second son of the second earl, but on the death of his elder brother at Paris, on 5th September 1688, he became the heir to the peerage. He was born in 1675, and when twenty years old was sent to the House of Commons by the two constituencies of Hedon in Yorkshire and Tiverton in Devonshire. He chose the latter, and represented it until his succession to the earldom of Sunderland in 1702. Throughout this period of his life


his career was undistinguished; his first start in the world of politics occurred in 1705, when he was sent to Vienna as envoy extraordinary, a mission which he discharged with signal ability. Although Sunderland was tinged with republican feeling and had rendered himself personally obnoxious to Anne, he was foisted by the all-powerful influence of his father-in-law, the duke of Marlborough, into the ministry as secretary of state for the southern department. This office he held from 3d December 1706 to 14th June 1710, when he fell, as he rose, through his connexion with the duke and duchess of Marlborough. The queen offered him a pension of £3000 a year, but he proudly refused the temptation, saying that, if he could not serve, he would not plunder, his country. After the accession of George I. he was lord lieutenant of Ireland (1714-15), lord keeper of the privy seal (1715-17), and secretary of state for the northern department (April 1717 to March 1718). At the latter date he was raised to the post of prime minister, holding with the office of first lord of the treasury the position of lord president of the council. Sir Robert Walpole had been shelved, and he revenged himself on the new administration by resisting and defeating the Bill which was designed to limit the numbers of the House of Lords,—a victory over Sunderland which led to a partial reconciliation between him and Townshend and Walpole, his rivals. Lord Sunderland was at the head of affairs during the South Sea mania, and the bursting of the financial bubble led to his political ruin. Through Walpole's influence he was acquitted of personal corruption, but he was forced to resign his place as first lord of the treasury on 1st April 1721. The passion for intrigue which characterized the father had descended to the son: he was ever plotting, and within a few months after Walpole had saved him from disgrace, if not from a worse fate, he was engaged in scheming against the friend who had saved him. But his plots were interrupted by his death, which occurred on 19th April 1722. Lord Sunderland's manners were repelling and his disposition was harsh, but he stands high among his contemporaries for disinterestedness. The love of books ranked among the ruling passions of his life, and he spent his leisure hours and his wealth in forming the great collection at Althorp.

SUN-FISH. This name is chiefly and properly applied to a marine fish (*Orthogoriscus*) which by its large size, grotesque appearance, and numerous peculiarities of organization has attracted the attention equally of fishermen as of naturalists. Only two species are known,—the rough or short sun-fish (*O. mola*), which is found in all seas of the temperate and tropical zones; and the much smaller and scarcer smooth or oblong sun-fish (*O. truncatus*), of which only a small number of specimens have been obtained from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. That this genus belongs to the order *Plectognathi* and is allied more especially to the globe-fishes (*Diodon* and *Tetrodon*) has been indicated in the article ICHTHYOLOGY (vol. ix. pp. 663, 694), where also the principal anatomical peculiarities have been noticed, and where illustrations of the young have been given (see figs. 64, 65).

Sun-fishes have the appearance of tailless fish. This is due to the extreme shortening of the tail, which is supported by only a few short vertebrae and reduced to a broad fringe of the trunk. Directly in front of it rise dorsal and anal fins, high and broad, similar to each other in size and triangular in form. The head is completely merged in the trunk, the boundary between them being indicated only by a very small and narrow gill-opening and a comparatively small pectoral fin. This fin can be of but little use in locomotion, and the horizontal and vertical movements of the fish, as well as the maintenance of its body in a vertical position, are evidently executed by

the powerful dorsal and anal fins. The small mouth, situated in front of the head, is armed with an undivided dental plate above and below, similar to but weaker than the teeth of the globe-fish (*Diodon*).

Sun-fishes are truly pelagic, propagating their species in the open sea, and only occasionally approach the coast. During the stormy season they live probably at some depth, but in calm bright weather they rise and rest or play on the surface with their dorsal fin high above the water. This habit has given rise to the popular name "sun-fish," a term also sometimes applied to the basking-shark (vol. xxi. p. 777), which in like manner enjoys the warmth of a sunny day. In some years the rough sun-fish is by no means scarce on the south coast of England and on the Irish coasts, where it appears principally in the summer months. The usual size is from 3 to 4 feet in length, but this species attains to 7 feet and more. One of the largest specimens (see the accom-



Sun-fish (*Orthogoriscus mola*).

panying figure) was caught near Portland (Dorsetshire) in 1846, and is now in the British Museum; its length is 7 feet 6 inches. The sun-fish has no economic value, and is rarely, if ever, eaten.

Whist the rough sun-fish has a granulated, rough, shagreen-like skin, the second species (*O. truncatus*) has the surface of the body smooth and polished, with its small dermal scutes arranged in a tessellated fashion. It is oblong in shape, the body being much longer than it is deep. The sides are finely ornamented with transverse silvery, black-edged stripes running downwards to the lower part of the abdomen. It has not been found to exceed 2 feet in length, but is very scarce, only a few specimens having been captured on the coasts of Europe, at the Cape of Good Hope, and off Mauritius.

SUNFLOWER. In the modern vernacular this name is most commonly applied to various species of *Helianthus*, especially to *H. annuus*; but, as this is a tropical American herb, and the word "sunflower" or something corresponding to it existed in English literature prior to its introduction; or at any rate prior to its general diffusion in gardens, it is obvious that some other flower than the *Helianthus* must have been intended. The marigold (*Calendula officinalis*) is considered by Dr Prior to have been the plant intended by Ovid (*Met.*, iv. 269-70)—

"... Illa suum, quamvis radice tenetur,
Vertitur ad solem; mutataque servat amorem"—

and likewise the *solsæce* of the Anglo-Saxon, a word equivalent to *solsæquium* (sun-following). But this movement with the sun is more imaginary than real, the better explanation being afforded by the resemblance to "the radiant beams of the sun," as Gerard expresses it. The central disk of tubular hermaphrodite flowers, encompassed by

the spreading neuter florets of the ray, has, indeed, a marked resemblance to the sun as conventionally depicted. The florets are provided with two or three dry, sharply pointed scales, which serve as pappus, and the whole mass of florets is encircled by a close involucre of leafy bracts. There are numerous varieties of the common sunflower in cultivation, the so-called double form being one in which the ordinarily tubular florets in the centre become spreading and "ligulate" like those at the circumference. The seeds, or more strictly speaking the fruits, contain much oil, for which the plant is cultivated in southern Russia. The oil is used in the manufacture of soap. The seeds are also valued for their agreeable flavour, and are much used as food for poultry, &c. The so-called "Jerusalem artichoke" (*Helianthus tuberosus*) belongs to the same genus. It is believed to be a native of Canada, or perhaps a modified form of *H. doricoides*. The tubers are rich in inulin and sugar, and the plant deserves more attention at the hands of cultivators than it has yet received. The word "Jerusalem" is evidently a corruption, while "artichoke" applies to the flavour of the tuber, which is not unlike that of the artichoke.

SUNNITES AND SHĪTES. The religion of Mohammed is at present professed by 150 to 200 million souls, spread over great parts of Asia (including the Indian Archipelago), Africa, and southern Europe,¹—over Asia Minor, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, the Caucasus, Persia, all upper Asia (including Siberia), the steppes of southern Russia, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, Tibet, China, Japan, India, Egypt, the Soudan as far as the equatorial lakes, the whole north coast of Africa and thence deep into the interior, European Turkey, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. In most of these regions Moslems live side by side with men of other confessions, even where Islam is the ruling creed; it is found unmixed in Central Asia and some parts of Arabia.

Mohammedans fall into the two great divisions of Sunnites and ShĪtes (ShĪ'a), separated by such bitter hatred as belongs to two hostile religions, or such as some Catholic populations feel towards a Protestant.² The Sunnites, who accept the orthodox tradition (*Sunna*) as well as the Koran as a source of theologico-juristic doctrines, predominate in Arabia, the Turkish empire, the north of Africa, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and the Mohammedan parts of India and the east of Asia; the ShĪtes, whose origin has been explained in MOHAMMEDANISM (vol. xvi. pp. 564, 568, 592), have their main seat in Persia, where their confession is the state religion, but are also scattered over the whole sphere of Islam, especially in India and the regions bordering on Persia, except among the nomad Tatars, who are all nominally Sunnite. Even in Turkey there are many native ShĪtes, generally men of the upper classes, and often men in high office. The ShĪtes are less numerous and less important than the Sunnites, but on the whole may amount to 20 millions.

SUNNITES.

Orthodox Islam preserves unchanged the form of doctrine established in the 10th century by Abū 'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari (see vol. xvi. p. 593, and also pp. 553 sq., 592, 584). The attacks of rationalism, aided by Greek philosophy, were repelled and vanquished by the weapons of scholastic dialectic borrowed from the enemy; on most points of dispute discussion was forbidden altogether,

¹ Exact statistics are unattainable because we lack details as to the great advances which Islam has recently made and is still making in Central Africa.

² Generally speaking the Sunnites are the more bitter party. The relation is least strained in India, where the Sunnites approach the ShĪtes in reverence for 'Alī, Hasan, and Hosain, and share the feasts of these saints.

and faith in what is written in Koran and tradition was enjoined without question as to how these things were true (*bilá kaifa*). Freer allegorical views, however, were admitted on some specially perplexing points, such as the doctrine of the eternity of the Koran, the crude anthropomorphisms of the sacred text, &c.; and, since Mo'tazilite views had never taken deep root among the masses, while the caliphs required the help of the clergy, and from the time of Motawakkil (847 A.D.) became ever more closely bound to orthodox views, the freethinking tendency was thoroughly put down, and to the present day no rationalizing movement has failed to be crushed in the bud. Philosophy still means no more than scholastic dialectic, and is the humble servant of orthodoxy, no man venturing on devious paths except in secret. In the years 1872-78 the Afghan Jamál al-Dín, a professor in the Azhar mosque at Cairo, attempted to read Avicenna with his scholars, and to exercise them in things that went beyond theology, bringing, for example, a globe into the mosque to explain the form of the earth. But the other professors rose in arms, forbade him to enter the mosque, and in 1879 procured his exile on the pretext that he entertained democratic and revolutionary ideas. Thus the later movements of thought in Islam never touch on the great questions that exercised Mohammedanism in its first centuries, e.g., the being and attributes of God, the freedom of the will, sin, heaven and hell, &c. Religious earnestness, ceasing to touch the higher problems of speculative thought, has expressed itself in later times exclusively in protest against the extravagances of the dervishes, of the worship of saints, and so forth, and has thus given rise to movements analogous to Puritanism.

Ulema.

That even in early times the masses were never shaken in their attachment to the traditional faith, with all its crude and grotesque conceptions, is due to the zeal of the ulema, or clergy, for the protection of Islam from every alien influence. Mohammedanism has no priesthood standing between God and the congregation, but Koran and Sunna are full of minute rules for the details of private and civil life, the knowledge of which is necessarily in the hands of a class of professed theologians. These are the *ulemá* ("knowers," singular *alim*), theology being briefly named "the knowledge" (*ilm*). Their influence is still enormous and hardly has a parallel in the history of religions. For it is not supported by temporal agencies like the spiritual authority of the Christian priesthood in the Middle Ages, but is a pure power of knowledge over the ignorant masses, who do nothing without consulting their spiritual advisers. When the vigorous Spanish sultan Mansúr b. Abí 'Amir proposed to confiscate a religious foundation and the assembled ulema refused to approve the act, and were threatened by his vizier, one of them replied, "All the evil you say of us applies to yourself; you seek unjust gains and support your injustice by threats; you take bribes and practise ungodliness in the world. But we are guides on the path of righteousness, lights in the darkness, and bulwarks of Islam; we decide what is just or unjust and declare the right; through us the precepts of religion are maintained. We know that the sultan will soon think better of the matter; but, if he persists, every act of his government will be null, for every treaty of peace and war, every act of sale and purchase, is valid only through our testimony." With this answer they left the assembly, and the sultan's apology overtook them before they had passed the palace gate.¹ The same consciousness of independent authority and strength still survives among the ulema. Thus the sheikhu 'l-Islám 'Abbásí (who was deposed by the professors of the Azhar in 1882) had in

¹ Von Kremer, *Gesch. d. herrschenden Ideen d. Islams*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 464.

the first period of his presidency a sharp conflict with 'Abbás Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, who asked of him an unjust legal opinion in matters of inheritance. When bribes and threats failed, the sheikh was thrown into chains and treated with great severity, but it was the pasha who finally yielded, and 'Abbásí was recalled to honours and rich rewards.

The way in which the ulema are recruited and formed into a hierarchy with a vigorous *esprit de corps* throws an instructive light on the whole subject before us. The brilliant days are past when the universities of Damascus, Baghdád, Nishápúr, Cairo, Kairówan (Kairwan), Seville, Cordova, were thronged by thousands of students of theology, when a professor had often hundreds or even, like Bokhárf, thousands of hearers, and when vast estates in the hands of the clergy fed both masters and scholars. Of the great universities but one survives—the Azhar mosque at Cairo—where thousands of students still gather to follow a course of study which gives an accurate picture of the Mohammedan ideal of theological education.²

The students of theology generally begin their course in the early youth, but not seldom in riper years. Almost all come from the lowest orders, a few from the middle classes, and none from the highest ranks of society,—a fact which in itself excludes all elements of freer and more refined education. These sons of poor peasants, artisans, or tradesmen are already disposed to narrow fanaticism, and generally take up study as a means of livelihood rather than from genuine religious interest. The scholar appears before the president's secretary with his poor belongings tied up in a red handkerchief, and after a brief interrogatory is entered on the list of one of the four orthodox rites,—Sháfi'ite, Hanafite, Málíkite, and Hanbalite. If he is lucky he gets a sleeping-place within the mosque, a chest to hold his things, and a daily ration of bread. The less fortunate make shift to live outside as best they can, but are all day in the mosque, and are seldom deserted by Moslem charity. Having kissed the hands of the sheikh and teachers of his school, the pupil awaits the beginning of the lectures. For books a few compendiums suffice him. Professors and students gather every morning for the daily prayer; then the professors take their seats at the foot of the pillars of the great court and the students crouch on mats at their feet. The beginner takes first a course in the grammar of classical Arabic, for he has hitherto learned only to read, write, and count. The rules of grammar are read out in the memorial verses of the Ajrúmiya, and the teacher adds an exposition, generally read from a printed commentary. The student's chief task is to know the rules by heart; this accomplished, he is dismissed at the end of the year with a certificate (*ijáza*), entered in his text-book, which permits him to teach it to others. The second year is devoted to dogmatic (*kalám* and *tawhíd*), taught in the same mechanical way. The dogmas of Islam are not copious, and the attributes of God are the chief subject taken up. They are demonstrated by scholastic dialectic, and at the end of his second year the student, receiving his certificate, deems himself a pillar of the faith. The study of law (*fiqh*), which rests on Koran and tradition, is more difficult and complex, and begins, but is often not completed, in the third year. The student had learned the Koran by heart at school and has often repeated it since, but only now is the sense of its words explained to him. Of the traditions of the Prophet he has learned something incidentally in other lectures; he is now regularly introduced to their vast and artificial system. From these two sources are derived all religious and civil laws, for Islam is a political as well as a religious institution. The five main points of religious law, "the pillars of Islam," have been

² Of the 126 madrasa or colleges which once belonged to the university of Damascus but five remained in 1880.

enumerated in vol. xvi. p. 553 sq.; the civil law, on the development of which Roman law had some influence, is treated under heads similar to those of Western jurisprudence. It is here that the differences between the four schools (vol. xvi. p. 594 sq.) come most into notice: the Hanafite praxis is the least rigorous, then the Sháfi'ite; the Hanbalites, whose system is the strictest, have practically disappeared in the Málíkites. The Hanafite rite is official in the Turkish empire, and is followed in all Government offices whenever a decision still depends on the sacred law, as well as by all Mohammedans of Turkish race. In Egypt and North Africa Sháfi'ites are more numerous than Málíkites, while the opposite is the case in Arabia. In 1878 the Azhar had 7691 students,—3723 Sháfi'ites with 106 sheikhs, 2855 Málíkites with 75 sheikhs, 1090 Hanafites with 49 sheikhs, 23 Hanbalites with 1 sheikh. In this as in the previous studies a compendium is learned by heart, and explanations are given from commentaries and noted down by the students word for word. The professors are expressly forbidden to add anything of their own. The recognized books of jurisprudence, some of which run to over twenty folio volumes, are vastly learned, and occasionally show sound sense, but excel mainly in useless hair-splitting and feats of scholastic gymnastics, for which the Arabian race has a natural gift.

Besides the three main disciplines the student takes up according to his tastes other subjects, such as rhetoric (*ma'ání wabayán*), logic (*manlíq*), prosody (*'arúd*), and the doctrine of the correct pronunciation of the Koran (*kir'á watajwíd*). After three or four years, fortified with the certificates of his various professors, he seeks a place in a law-court or as a teacher, preacher, *cadi*, or mufti of a village or minor town, or else one of the innumerable posts of confidence for which the complicated ceremonial of Mohammedanism demands a theologian, and which are generally paid out of pious foundations. A place is not hard to find, for the powerful corporation of the ulema seeks to put its own members into all posts, and, though the remuneration is at first small, the young 'alim gradually accumulates the revenues of several offices. Gifts, too, fall in, and with his native avarice and economy he rises in wealth, position, and reputation for piety. The commonalty revere him and kiss his hand; the rich show him at least outward respect; and even the Government treats him as a person to whom consideration is due for his influence with the masses.

This sketch of his education is enough to explain the narrow-mindedness of the 'alim. He deems all non-theological science to be vain or hurtful, has no notion of progress, and regards true science—i.e., theology—as having reached finality, so that a new supercommentary or a new students' manual is the only thing that is perhaps still worth writing. How the mental faculties are blunted by scholasticism and mere memory work must be seen to be believed; such an education is enough to spoil the best head. All originality is crushed out and a blind and ludicrous dependence on written tradition—even in things profane—takes its place. Acuteness degenerates into hair-splitting and clever plays on words after the manner of the rabbins. The Azhar students not seldom enter Government offices and even hold important administrative posts, but they never lose the stamp of their education—the narrow unteachable spirit, incapable of progress, always lost in external details, and never able to grasp principles and get behind forms to the substance of a matter. (W. S.-B.)

Schools.

Yet it is but a small fraction of the ulema of the Moslem world that enjoy even such an education as the Azhar affords. It draws few students from foreign parts,¹ where

¹ In 1878 seventeen lecture-rooms of the Azhar had 3707 students, of whom only 64 came from Constantinople and the northern parts of

the local schools are of the poorest kind, except in India (thanks to the British Government) and perhaps in Constantinople.² Bokhárá was once a chief seat of learning, but is now so sunk in narrow fanaticism that its eighty *madrasas* with their 5000 students only turn out a bigoted and foolish clergy (*Vámbery*).³ But for this very reason Bokhárá is famed as a luminary of pure theology and spreads its influence over Turkestan, Siberia, China, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and even over India. Minor schools attached to mosques are found in other places, but teach still less than the great schools already mentioned.

Except in India, where it is controlled by the Government, the organization of the priestly and judicial persons trained in the schools is a compromise between what theological principles dictate and what the state demands. Neither Koran nor Sunna distinguishes between temporal and spiritual powers, and no such distinction was known as long as the caliphs acted in all things as successors of the prophets and heads of the community of the faithful. But, as the power of the 'Abbásids declined (see vol. xvi. p. 585 sq.) and external authority fell in the provinces into the hands of the governors and in the capital into those of the *amír al-omará*, the distinction became more and more palpable, especially when the Búyids (Buwaihids), who were disposed to Shí'ite views, proclaimed themselves sultans, i.e., possessors of all real authority. The theologians tried to uphold the orthodox theory by declaring the sultanate to be subordinate to the imámate or sovereignty of the caliphs, and dependent on the latter especially in all religious matters; but their artificial theories have never modified facts. The various dynasties of sultans (Búyids, Ghaznevids, Seljúks, and finally the Mongols) never paid heed to the caliphs and at length abolished them; but the fall of the theocracy only increased the influence of the clergy, the expounders and practical administrators of that legislation of Koran and Sunna which had become part of the life of the Mohammedan world. The Mamelukes in Egypt tried to make their own government appear more legitimate by nominally recognizing a continuation of the spiritual dignity of the caliphate in a surviving branch of the 'Abbásid line which they protected, and in 923 A.H. (1517) the Ottoman Selim, who destroyed the Mameluke power, constrained the 'Abbásid Mutawakkil III., who lived in Cairo, to make over to him his nominal caliphate. The Ottoman sultans still bear the title of "successors of the Prophet," and still find it useful in foreign relations, since there is or may be some advantage in the right of the caliph to nominate the chief *cadi* (*kádi*) of Egypt and in the fact that the spiritual head of Khiva calls himself only the *nakíb* (vicegerent) of the sultan.⁴ In India too the sultan owes something perhaps to his spiritual title. But among his own subjects he is compelled to defer to the ulema and has no considerable influence on the composition of that body. He nominates the *sheikhu 'l-Islám* (senior, i.e., president of Islam) or mufti of Constantinople (grand mufti), who is his representative in the imámate and issues judgments in points of faith and law from which there is no appeal; but the nomination must fall on one of the *mollahs*,⁵ who form the upper stratum of the hierarchy

the Ottoman empire, 8 from North Arabia, 1 from the government of Baghdád, 12 from Kurdistan, and 7 from India with its thirty million Sunnites.

² In Kazan also the standard of learning seems to have been raised by Russian and Western scholars.

³ The *madrasa* is here a college, generally attached to a mosque, with lands whose revenues provide the means of instruction and in part also food and residence for scholars and teachers.

⁴ Till the Russians gained preponderating influence the khán of Khiva also acknowledged the sultan as his suzerain.

⁵ Mollah is the Perso-Turkish pronunciation of the Arabic *marúf*, literally "patron," a term applied to heads of orders and other religious dignitaries of various grades.

of ulema. And, though the various places of religious dignity are conferred by the sultan, no one can hold office who has not been examined and certified by older ulema, so that the corporation is self-propagating, and palace intrigues, though not without influence, can never break through its iron bonds. The deposition of 'Abd al-Aziz is an example of the tremendous power that can be wielded by the ulema at the head of their thousands of pupils¹ when they choose to stir up the masses; nor would Mahmūd II, in 1826 have ventured to enter on his struggle with the Janissaries unless he had had the hierarchy with him.

The student who has passed his examinations at Constantinople or Cairo may take up the purely religious office of *imām* (president in worship) or *khatīb* (preacher) at a mosque. These offices, however, are purely ministerial, are not necessarily limited to students, and give no place in the hierarchy and no particular consideration or social status. On the other hand, he may become a judge or *cadi*. Every place of any importance has at least one *cadi*, who is nominated by the Government,² but has no further dependence on it, and is answerable only to a member of the third class of the ulema, viz., the mufti or pronouncer of *fatwas*. A *fatwa* is a decision according to Koran and Sunna, but without reasons, on an abstract case of law which is brought before the mufti by appeal from the *cadi's* judgment or by reference from the *cadi* himself. For example, a dispute between master and slave may be found by the *cadi* to turn on the general question, "Has Zaid, the master of 'Amr,³ the absolute right to dispose of his slave's earnings?" When this is put to the mufti, the answer will be simply "Yes," and from this decision there is no appeal, so that the mufti is supreme judge in his own district. The grand mufti of Constantinople is, as we have seen, nominated by the sultan, but his hold on the people makes him quite an independent power in the state; in Cairo he is not even nominated by the Government, but each school of law chooses its own sheikh, who is also mufti, and the Hanafite is head mufti because his school is official in the Turkish empire.

Modern changes. All this gives the judges great private and political influence. But the former is tainted by venality, the plague-spot of the East, which, aggravated by the scantiness of judicial salaries or in some cases by the judge having no salary at all, is almost universal among the administrators of justice. Their political influence, again, which arises from the fusion of private and political law in Koran and Sunna, is highly inconvenient to the state, and often becomes intolerable now that relations with Western states are multiplied. And even in such distant parts as Central Asia the law founded on the conditions of the Prophet's lifetime proves so unsuited to modern life that cases are often referred to civil authorities rather than to canonical jurists. Thus a customary law (*urf*) has there sprung up side by side with the official sacred law (*shari'a*), much to the displeasure of the mollahs. In Turkey, and lately above all in Egypt, it has been found necessary greatly to limit the sphere and influence of the canonical jurists and introduce institutions nearer to Western legal usage. We do not here speak of the paper constitutions (*khatti-i-sherif*) and the like, created to dupe Western diplomatists and amuse their authors, but of such things as consular and commercial courts, criminal codes, and so forth. The present sultan seems also to aim at diminishing the power of the ulema by such measures as frequent changes of the

¹ Called in Constantinople *sofya*, Persian *sikhtha*, "burned up," *scil.*, with zeal or love to God.

² In Egypt before the time of Sa'id Pasha (1854-63) the local judges were appointed by the chief *cadi* of Cairo, who is sent from Constantinople. Since then they have been nominated by the Egyptian Government.

³ Zaid and 'Amr are the Caius and Sempronius of Arabian law.

sheikhu 'l-islām, though this policy is perhaps less likely to confirm his power than to rob it of its last supports.

The official hierarchy, strong as it is, divides its power with the dervishes. A religion which subdues to itself a race with strongly marked individuality is always influenced in cultus and dogma by the previous views and tendencies of that race, to which it must in some measure accommodate itself. Mohammed himself made a concession to heathen traditions when he recognized the Kaaba and the black stone; and the worship of saints, which is now spread throughout Islam and supported by obviously forged traditions, is an example of the same thing. So too are the religious orders now found everywhere except in some parts of Arabia. Mystical tendencies in Mohammedanism arose mainly on Persian soil (see vol. xvi. p. 594), and Von Kremer has shown that these Eastern tendencies fell in with a disposition to asceticism and flight from the world which had arisen among the Arabs before Islam under Christian influence.⁴ Intercourse with India had given Persian mysticism the form of Buddhistic monkery, while the Arabs imitated the Christian anchorites; thus the two movements had an inner kinship and an outer form so nearly identical that they naturally coalesced, and that even the earliest organizations of orders of dervishes, whether in the East or the West, appeared to Mohammedan judgment to be of one type. Thus, though the name of *Sūfi* (see vol. xvi. p. 594) is first applied to Abū Hashim, who died in Syria in 150 A.H. (767), we find it transferred without question to the mystical brotherhood which appears in Khorāsān under Abū Sa'īd about 200 A.H. (815/6). Yet these two schools of *Sūfis* were never quite similar; on Sunnite soil *Sūfism* could not openly impugn orthodox views, while in Persia it was saturated with Shī'ite heresy and the pantheism of the extreme devotees of 'Alī (see vol. xvi. p. 593). Thus there have always been two kinds of *Sūfis*, and, though the course of history and the wandering habits which various orders borrowed from Buddhism have tended to bring them closer to one another, we still find that of the thirty-six chief orders three claim an origin from the caliph Abū-bekr, whom the Sunnites honour, and the rest from 'Alī, the idol of the Shī'ites.⁵ Mystic absorption in the being of God, with an increasing tendency to Pantheism and ascetic practices, are the main scope of all *Sūfism*, which is not necessarily confined to members of orders; indeed the secret practice of contemplation of the love of God and contempt of the world is sometimes viewed as specially meritorious. And so ultimately the word *sūfi* has come to denote all who have this religious direction, while those who follow the special rules of an order are known as dervishes ("beggars," in Arabic *fuqarā*, sing. *faqīr*—names originally designating only the mendicant orders). In Persia at the present day a *Sūfi* is much the same as a freethinker. Several of the chief dervish orders arose in the evil times before and after the invasion of the Mongols: thus 'Abd al-Kādir al-Jilāni (d. 561 A.H.; 1165/66) founded the Kādiriya order, Ahmad al-Rifā'i (d. 578 A.H.; 1182/3) the Rifā'iya, Jalālu 'l-dīn Rūmī (see Rūmī) the Mawlawiya, Abū 'l-Hasan al-Shādhilī (d. 656 A.H.; 1258) the Shādhiliya, Ahmad al-Badawī (d. 675 A.H.; 1276) the Ahmadīya or Badawīya, an order still very widely spread in Egypt. While civil distress drove men to flee from the world, the stupid fanaticism of Turkish rule has helped on the belief in miracles so often associated with mysticism and all those deceptions that go with the spread of enthusiastic notions. Of later orders we may name the

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 52 sq.

⁵ These claims to early origin are mere fables, like the claim of the Oweisī order to spring from Oweis, one of the oldest traditionalists, and so forth.

Nakshbandīya, now the most important in the khanatés of Turkestan, whose founder died 719 A.H. (1319), the Sa'dīya (736 A.H.; 1335), the Bektashīya (758 A.H.; 1357), the Khalwatīya (800 A.H.; 1397).¹

The modern dervishes have sunk as low as the modern ulema. The idea of absorbed contemplation of the divine being, freed from all earthly conceptions, and of mortification of the flesh in order to become one with God is grossly caricatured in the insane howlings *hu hu* ("he, he") and self-torture with red-hot knives, &c., practised by the "howling" Rifā'iya and in the dizzy whirling of the "dancing" Mawlawīya. Very pestilent too is their traditional reputation for holiness with the common people, while ecstatic piety easily passes into deceit where it is still generally believed that a saint (*walī*) can work miracles. The wandering dervishes especially, who move constantly from place to place, are noted for all sorts of juggling impostures, by the aid of which, like the Yogis of India, they live at the cost of the people.² But they are no longer trusted or held in much esteem even by the populace, whereas the conventual orders are usually regarded as pious and inspired men. Sheikh Ahmad, the founder of the Badawīya, is the national saint of Egypt, and his tomb at Tanta is a great place of pilgrimage. The ulema dislike these rivals, but can do little against their influence.

The bright side in the modern world of Islam is found among the lower classes. The ruling classes of Turkey are utterly corrupt, and for centuries their one art of administration has been to suck the provinces dry. Taxes are exorbitant and bad laws check the production of wealth, while what remains of the useful institutions and public works of old time daily decays. To this is added the recklessness born of a more or less clear consciousness that things cannot last as they are. The effendi of Constantinople has lost faith in his religion and the future of his race; as for a sense of honour, as we understand it, that does not exist in the East. In Egypt things have not been quite so bad since Mohammed 'Alī destroyed the Mamelukes and founded a state with some pretensions to order and solidity; selfish as he was, he saw that to maintain the revenue it was necessary to stimulate production, and to this end, amid many mistakes, he took not a few useful steps. His successors were less wise and skilful, yet prosperity increased, and for the first time for centuries national feeling began to assert itself. But this movement fell into the hands of the ignorant and fanatical 'Orabī Pasha (1882) and led to the English occupation and the entire disorganization of the country, so that Cairo is now little better than Constantinople.

Yet with all this the poorer classes have not lost their vigour, and among them Islam has still a deep-rooted strength. The common Turk of Roumelia or Asia Minor is still a solid sober honest fellow and a brave soldier, always ready to make every sacrifice for his religion. In Egypt the morality of the people has suffered from the great foreign immigration, which has introduced many evil elements as well as some good; yet even here the great mass of both townsmen and peasants are loyal to the old faith and to the traditional sobriety and parsimony which the nature of the country itself prescribes. These qualities taken with the undoubted intelligence of the Arabian population give hope of a revival of prosperity on the Nile under more favourable political conditions. The people have a persuasion of the superiority of their religion, which,

¹ The best account of the dervishes is still that in D'Ohsson, *Tableau Général de l'Emp. Ottoman*, vol. ii., Paris, 1790.

² These mendicants belong in part to orders like the Bektashīya and Rifā'iya, whose other members live in convents (Khangah, Takiya); in part they are Kalandariya (Kalanders), i.e., bound by the rule of Kalander, a disciple of Bektash, which enjoins constant wandering.

while it often makes necessary reforms difficult, prevents them from losing national individuality and self-reliance, and the belief in predestination gives a certain dignity and self-possession under calamities, without excluding foresight and activity in daily duty. But whether all this is enough to secure the political revival of the Sunnite commonwealths is doubtful in face of the preponderating influence on all the coasts of the Levant of Western civilization, which as yet is almost entirely a disintegrating force and seems certain to prevent a reintegration of Islam in Turkey, and probably also in Egypt. The khanates, again, are sunk in incredible moral corruption cloaked by blind fanaticism, while most of the Bedouin tribes of Arabia have known little about Koran and religion for the last eight centuries.³ Islam has certainly still a great future in Central Africa, but this can hardly lead to veritable reformation of its system. Still there are many evidences that the faith is not yet dead even in its old realms. We lay no stress on the existence of various sects opposed to the current Sunnite orthodoxy, such as the puritanical Wahhabites of Arabia and India, or the DRUSES (*q.v.*), Noçairīya, Isma'īliya, and Metwālīya of Syria, who are tinged with Shī'ite views and belong only politically to the Sunnite section of Islam. But in India there are still living seeds of further development within Islam proper. Under English control the ulema are unable to maintain the same spiritual tyranny over men's minds as elsewhere, and we find more mutual toleration between Sunna and Shī'a, an easy accommodation to local tradition,⁴ and even an ability to leave the grooves of Al-Ash'arī's scholasticism and approach the ideas of the old rationalistic Mo'tazilites. Movements in this direction have come to light quite recently; but their further growth need not here be speculated on.⁵

SHĪ'ITES.

The extreme Shī'ite view that 'Alī is to be regarded as an incarnation of the Godhead (see vol. xvi. pp. 568, 592) maintained its predominance only in times when and places where the opposition to the sovereignty of the Omayyads and 'Abbāsids was intense, or where pantheistic influences from India were at work. From the first there existed also a milder form of Shī'ite faith, which soon was at open war with the fanatical Isma'īliya and their disciples, the Fātimites and Assassins (vol. xvi. p. 593 sq.).⁶

It was through the moderate Shī'ites that the caliph Ma'mūn thought to reconcile his dynasty with the house of 'Alī (vol. xvi. p. 584), and it was this party that became dominant in Persia in the 10th Christian century under the Būyids. When they conquered Baghdad the Būyids abstained from interfering with the Sunnite orthodoxy of the populations of the capital and Arabian 'Irāk, but the Shī'ite faith was openly professed in their courts at Rai, Shirāz, and Kirmān. But in the next century the power of the Shī'ite dynasty crumbled and fell before the Ghaznevīds and Seljūks, who as Turks were Sunnites, and repressed the opposing views. In the 13th century the Mohammedan East was overrun by the Mongols, who at first were indifferent to all religion, and gave the Persian Shī'ites perfect liberty; later on the great-grandson of Jenghis Khān, Mohammed Khodahbende Oeljitu (1303-16),

³ *Sefer Nameh*, ed. Schefer, Paris, 1881, pp. 30 sq., 233.

⁴ See Garcin de Tassy, "Sur les particularités de la rel. musulmane de l'Inde," reprinted in *L'Islamisme*, 3d ed., Paris, 1874, pp. 290 sq., 296 sq. The Wahhabites protest against this laxity.

⁵ See Syed Ameer 'Alī, *Personal Law of Mohammedans*, London, 1880, preface.

⁶ When the Fātimites lords of Egypt tried to enter into relations with the moderate Shī'ite Būyids in Baghdad they were met with polite reserve, and subsequently public protests against them emanated from the 'Alīde circles of that city (Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der Fātimidischen-Chalifen*, Göttingen, 1881, pp. 197, 237).