

for all the power of education; it ought to inspire a sentiment which is noble but hard to be attained, namely, that disregard of one's own interest whence arises the love of one's country.

BOOK V.—The laws which the legislator makes ought to be conformed to the principle of each government—in a republic, to maintain equality and frugality; in monarchy, to support the nobility without ruining the people; in a despotic government, to silence and to keep equally under subjection those of every condition. M. de Montesquieu ought not to be accused of having pointed out to sovereigns the principles of arbitrary power, the very name of which is so odious to a just prince, and still more so to a wise and virtuous citizen. To point out what is necessary to maintain it is to labor to destroy it; the perfection of this government is its ruin, and an exact system of the laws of tyranny, such as our author describes to us, is at the same time a satire upon, and the most formidable scourge of, tyrants. With respect to other governments, they have each their advantages: the republican is more appropriate to small, the monarchical to great, states; the republican is more subjected to excesses, the monarchical to abuses; the republican executes the laws after more mature deliberation, the monarchical with more promptitude.

BOOKS VI and VII.—The difference of the principles of the three governments must produce many differences in the number and object of laws, in the form of judgments, and the nature of punishments. The constitution of monarchies, being invariable and fundamental, requires more civil laws and tribunals that justice may be administered in the most uniform and least arbitrary manner. In moderated governments, be they monarchical or republican, there cannot be too many formalities in criminal law. Punishments ought not only to be in proportion to the crime, but also as gentle as possible, especially in a democracy: the opinion attached to punishments will often have more effect than their severity. In republics, judgment must be given according to law, because no individual has the power to alter it. In monarchies, the clemency of the sovereign can sometimes soften the law; but crimes ought never to be judged there except by magistrates expressly intrusted with that office. Lastly, it is principally in democracies that the laws ought to be severe against luxury, looseness of

morals, and debauching of women. Their very softness and weakness render them fit enough to govern in monarchies; and history proves that they have often worn a crown with glory.

BOOKS VIII and IX.—M. de Montesquieu, having thus run over each government in particular, afterwards examines them in the relation which they may bear to each other, but only from the most general point of view, that is to say, from that which has reference only to their nature and their principle. Viewed in this light, states can have no relations but that of defending themselves or of attacking. Republics by their nature, supposing their state to be small, cannot defend themselves without alliances; but it is with republics that they ought to ally themselves. The defensive force of a monarchy consists principally in having frontiers secured from insults.

BOOK X.—States, like men, have a right to attack for their own preservation; from the right of war that of conquest is derived—a right necessary, lawful, calamitous, which always lays an immense debt upon us, if we would discharge what on that account becomes due from us to human nature, and the general law of which is to do as little harm as possible to the conquered. Republics can conquer less than monarchies; immense conquests suppose despotism already in a state, or render its approach certain. One of the great principles of the spirit of conquest ought to be to render the condition of the conquered as much better as possible; this is to fulfil, at once, the law of nature and a maxim of state. Nothing is more noble than that treaty of peace which Gelo made with the Carthaginians, by which he forbade them for the future to sacrifice their own children. The Spaniards, when they conquered Peru, ought in the same way to have obliged the inhabitants no more to have sacrificed men to their gods; but they thought it more advantageous to sacrifice these people themselves. There remained nothing to them as a conquest but a vast desert; they were obliged to depopulate their own country, and forever weakened it by their own conquest of it. It may sometimes be necessary to change the laws of the conquered people; it can never be so, to deprive them of their observances, or even of their customs, which are often all they have for observances. But the surest way of retaining a conquest is to put, if it is possible, the conquered on a level with the conquerors, to grant them the same

rights and the same privileges; this the Romans often did, and thus especially Cæsar acted with respect to the Gauls.

Hitherto, when considering each sort of government, as well in itself as in its relation to others, we have neither taken notice of what ought to be common to all nor of those circumstances particular to each which arise either from the nature of the country or from the genius of the people. It is this which we must now explain.

BOOK XI.—That political liberty which every citizen ought to enjoy is the common law of all governments, at least moderate governments, and consequently just ones. This liberty is not an absurd license of doing everything we wish to do, but the power of doing everything that the laws permit. It may be considered either in its relation to the constitution or in its relation to the citizen. There are in the constitution of every state two sorts of power—the legislative and the executive; and this last has two objects, its internal condition and its external relations. It is from the legitimate distribution and proper subdivision of these different powers that the greatest perfection of political liberty with relation to the constitution depends. M. de Montesquieu brings as a proof of this the constitution of the Roman republic and that of England. He finds the principle of the last in that fundamental law of the government of the ancient Germans, that affairs of small importance were determined by the chiefs, and that great affairs were brought before the tribunal of the nation, after they had been first debated by them. M. de Montesquieu does not examine whether the English enjoy actually or not that high political liberty which their constitution gives them; it is enough for him that it is established by their laws. He is still further from writing a satire upon other states; he believes, on the contrary, that an excess even of good is not always desirable; that extreme liberty, like extreme slavery, has its inconveniences, and that in general human nature is most adapted to a middling state of freedom.

BOOK XII.—Political liberty, considered with relation to a citizen, consists in that security in which he lives under shelter of the laws, or at least in an opinion of this security which makes no one citizen entertain any fear of another. It is principally by the nature and proportion of punishments that this liberty is established or destroyed. Crimes against religion

ought to be punished by deprivation of those advantages which religion procures; crimes against morality, by disgrace; crimes against the public tranquillity, by imprisonment or banishment; crimes against its security, by extreme penalties. Writings ought to be less punished than actions; simple thoughts ought never to be so. Accusations which are not according to the forms of law, spies, anonymous letters, all those resources of tyranny which are equally disgraceful to those who are the instruments and to those who make use of them, ought to be proscribed in every good monarchical government. Nobody ought to be permitted to accuse but in face of the law, which always punishes either the accused person or the calumniator. In every other case those who govern ought to say, with the Emperor Constantius: "We cannot suspect a man against whom no accuser appeared, whilst at the same time he was not without an enemy." It is a very fine institution by which a public officer is charged, in the name of the state, with the prosecution of crimes; for this answers all the good purposes served by informers without being exposed to those sordid interests, inconveniences, and that infamy which attend them.

BOOK XIII.—The amount of taxation ought to be in a direct proportion to public liberty. Thus, in democracies taxes may be greater than elsewhere, without being burdensome, because every citizen looks upon them as a tribute which he pays to himself, and which secures the tranquillity and fortune of every member of it. Besides, in a democratic state, an unjust application of the public revenue is more difficult, because it is easier to find it out and to punish it; he who is intrusted with it being obliged to give an account of it, as it were, to the first citizen who requires it of him.

In every government, of whatever sort, the least burdensome kind of tax is that which is laid upon merchandise, because the citizen pays without perceiving it. An excessive number of troops in time of peace is only an occasion for loading the people with taxes, a means of enervating the state, and an instrument of slavery.

That administration of the revenues which makes the whole produce of it enter into the public treasury is beyond comparison least expensive to the people, and consequently more advantageous, when it can be adopted, than the farming out of

these taxes, which always leaves in the hands of private persons part of the revenue of the state. But, above all, everything is ruined (these are the author's own words) when the profession of a farmer of the revenues becomes honorable, and it becomes so when luxury is at a great height. To permit some men to acquire vast fortunes out of what belongs to the public, to plunder them in their turn, as was formerly practised in certain states, is to repair one injustice by another, and to commit two ills instead of one.

BOOK XIV.—Let us now come, with M. de Montesquieu, to those particular circumstances which are independent of the nature of government, and to which laws ought to be adapted. The circumstances which arise from the nature of the country are of two sorts: the one has relation to the climate, the other to the soil. Nobody doubts but that the climate has an influence upon the habitual disposition of the bodies, and consequently upon the characters, of men; on which account laws ought to be framed to accord with the nature of the climate in indifferent things, and to resist, on the other hand, its bad effects. Thus, in countries where the use of wine is hurtful, the law which forbids it is a very good one; in countries where the heat of the climate inclines people to laziness, that law which encourages labor is a very proper one. The government then can correct the effects of the climate, and this is enough to obviate that reproach which has been thrown upon "The Spirit of Laws," that it attributes everything to cold and heat; for, besides the fact that heat and cold are not the only circumstances by which climates are distinguished, it would be as absurd to deny certain effects of climate as to attribute everything to it.

BOOK XV.—The practice of having slaves, established in the warm countries of Asia and America, and rejected in the temperate climates of Europe, affords our author an opportunity of treating of slavery in a state. Men having no more right over the liberty than over the lives of each other, it follows that slavery, generally speaking, is against the law of nature. In effect, the right of slavery cannot arise from war, because it could not then be founded on anything but the redemption of an individual life, and nobody has a right over the life of those who no longer attack him; nor from that sale which a man may

make of himself to another, since every citizen, being accountable for his life to the state, is still more so for his liberty, and consequently has no title to sell it. Besides, what could be a proper price for such a sale? It cannot be the money given to the seller, because the moment he sells himself everything that belongs to him becomes the property of his master. Now a sale without a price is as chimerical as a contract without a condition. There could never be but one just law in favor of slavery; this was that Roman law which made a debtor become the slave of a creditor; and even this law, to be equitable, ought to limit the slavery, both with respect to its degree and time of duration. Slavery can only be tolerated in despotic states, where freemen, too weak against the government, endeavor to become, for their own advantage, the slaves of those who tyrannize over the state, or in those climates where heat so enervates the body and weakens the courage that men cannot be incited to a laborious task save by the fear of punishment.

BOOK XVI.—Near to civil slavery may be placed domestic slavery, or that in which women are kept in certain countries. This can only take place in those countries of Asia where they are in a condition to live with men before they can make use of their reason; marriageable by the law of the climate, children by that of nature. This subjection becomes still more necessary in those countries where polygamy is established, a custom which M. de Montesquieu does not pretend to justify, in so far as it is contrary to religion; but which, in places where it is received, and, only speaking politically, may have a foundation to a certain degree, either from the nature of the climate or the relation which the number of women bears to that of men. M. de Montesquieu speaks upon this occasion of repudiation and divorce, and he shows, from good reasons, that repudiation, once admitted, ought to be permitted to women as well as to men.

BOOK XVII.—If the climate has so much influence on domestic and civil slavery, it has no less on political slavery; that is, upon what subjects one nation to another. The people in the North are stronger and more courageous than those of the South; the latter must then in general be conquered, the former conquerors; the one slaves, the other free. And history confirms this; Asia has been eleven times conquered by the people of the North; Europe has suffered fewer revolutions.

BOOK XVIII.—With respect to laws in relation to the nature of the soil, it is plain that democracy is better adapted than monarchy to barren countries, where the earth has occasion for all the industry of men. Besides, liberty, in this case, is a sort of recompense for the difficulty of labor. More laws are necessary for a people which follows agriculture than for one which tends flocks; and for the latter than for a hunting people; for a people which makes use of money, than for one that does not; in a word, the particular genius of a nation ought to be attended to.

BOOK XIX.—Vanity, which magnifies objects, is a good spring for government; pride, which undervalues them, is a dangerous one. The legislator ought to respect, to a certain degree, prejudices, passions, abuses. He ought to imitate Solon, who gave the Athenians, not those laws which were best in themselves, but the best which they were capable of receiving; the gay character of this people required gentle, the austere character of the Lacedæmonians severe, laws. Laws are a bad method of changing the manners and customs; it is by rewards and example that we ought to endeavor to bring that about. It is, however, true, at the same time, that the laws of a people, when they do not grossly and directly tend to shock its manners, must insensibly have an influence upon them, either to confirm or change them.

BOOK XX.—After having in this manner deeply considered the Nature and Spirit of Laws with relation to different kinds of climates and peoples, our author returns again to consider states in that relation which they bear to each other. At first, when comparing them in a general manner, he could only view them with respect to the harm which they can do each other; here he considers them with respect to that mutual succor which they can give. Now this succor is principally founded on commerce. If the spirit of commerce naturally produces a spirit of interest, which is opposed to the sublimity of moral virtues, it also renders the people naturally just and averse to idleness and living on plunder. Free people who live under moderate governments must be more given to it than enslaved nations. No nation ought ever to exclude from its commerce another nation without great reasons. Besides, liberty in this way is not an absolute privilege granted to merchants to do what they will—

a power which would be often prejudicial to them; it consists in laying no restraint on merchants except for the advantage of commerce. In a monarchy, the nobility ought not to have recourse to it, and still less the prince. In short, there are some nations to which commerce is disadvantageous, but they are not such as stand in need of nothing, but such as stand in need of everything; a paradox which our author renders intelligible by the example of Poland, which wants everything except corn, and which, by that commerce which it carries on in corn, deprives the common people of the necessaries of life to gratify the luxury of the nobility.

BOOK XXI.—M. de Montesquieu takes occasion, when treating of those laws which commerce requires, to give us a history of its different revolutions; and this part of his book is neither the least interesting nor the least curious. He compares the impoverishment of Spain by the discovery of America to the fate of that weak prince in the fable, ready to perish for hunger, because he had requested of the gods that everything he touched should be turned into gold.

BOOK XXII.—The use of money being one considerable part of the object of commerce, and its principal instrument, he was of opinion that he ought, in consequence of this, to treat of the different operations with respect to money, of exchange, of the payment of public debts, of lending out money for interest, the rules and limits of which he fixes, and which he distinguishes accurately from that excess so justly condemned as usury.

BOOK XXIII.—Population and the number of inhabitants have an immediate connection with commerce; and marriages having population as their object, under this article M. de Montesquieu goes to the root of this important subject. That which favors propagation most is general chastity; experience proves that illicit amours contribute very little, and even sometimes are prejudicial to it. The consent of fathers has with justice been required in marriages; nevertheless some restrictions ought to be added, for the law ought in general to favor marriage. That law which forbids the marriage of mothers with their sons is, independently of the precepts of religion, a very good civil law; for, without mentioning several other reasons, the parties being of very different ages, this sort of marriages can rarely have propagation as their object. That law which forbids the mar-

riage of a father with a daughter is founded upon the same motives, although (speaking only in a political sense) it is not so indispensably necessary to the object of population as the other, because the power of propagating continues much longer in men; and the contrary custom has, besides, been established among certain nations which the light of Christianity had not illuminated. As nature of herself prompts to marriage, that must be a bad government which is obliged to encourage it. Liberty, security, moderate taxes, absence of luxury, are the true principles and supports of populousness. However, laws may, with success, be made to encourage marriage when, in spite of corruption, there is still something remaining in the people which attaches them to the love of their country. Nothing is finer than the laws of Augustus to promote the propagation of the species. Unfortunately he made those laws in the decline, or rather after the downfall, of the republic; and the dispirited citizens must have foreseen that they would no longer propagate anything but slaves; and, indeed, the execution of those laws was very faint during all the time of the Pagan emperors. At last Constantine abolished them when he became a Christian: as if Christianity had had in view to unpeople the world when it recommended the perfection of celibacy to a small number.

The establishment of charitable institutions, according to the different spirit of these foundations, may be hurtful or favorable to population. There may, and indeed there ought to be, such institutions in a state where the greater part of the citizens are maintained by their industry, because this industry may sometimes be unsuccessful; but that relief which those institutions give ought to be only temporary, not to encourage beggary and idleness. The people are first to be made rich, and then almshouses to be built for unforeseen and pressing occasions. Unhappy are those countries where the multitude of charities and of monasteries, which are only a kind of perpetual charities, makes all the world live at ease but those who work!

Books XXIV and XXV.—M. de Montesquieu has hitherto only spoken of human laws; he now proceeds to those of religion, which in almost all states compose so essential an object of government. Everywhere he breaks forth into praises of Christianity; he points out its advantages and its grandeur;

he endeavors to make it beloved; he maintains that it is not impossible, as Bayle had pretended, that a society of perfect Christians should actually form a durable state. But he also thought that he might be permitted to examine what different religions, humanly speaking, might have been suitable or unsuitable to the genius and situation of those people who profess them. It is from this point of view that we must read all that he has written upon this article, and which has been the subject of so many unjust declamations. It is especially surprising that, in an age which presumes to call so many others barbarous, what he has said of toleration should be objected to as a crime—as if approving and tolerating a religion were the same; as if the gospel itself did not forbid every other way of propagating it but that of meekness and persuasion. Those in whose heart superstition has not extinguished every sentiment of compassion and justice will not be able to read, without being moved, the Remonstrance to the Inquisitors, that odious tribunal, which outrageously affronts religion when it appears to avenge it.

In fine, after having treated in particular of the different kinds of laws which men can have, there remains nothing more than to compare them all together, and to examine them in their relation to those things concerning which they prescribe rules.

BOOK XXVI.—Men are governed by different kinds of laws: by natural law, common to each individual; by the divine law, which is that of religion; by the ecclesiastical law, which is that of the policy of religion; by the civil law, which is that of the members of the same society; by the political law, which is that of the government of that society; by the law of nations, which is that of societies with respect to each other. These laws have each their distinct objects, which are carefully to be discriminated. That which belongs to the one ought never to be regulated by the other, lest disorder and injustice should be introduced into the principles which govern men.

BOOKS XXVI and XXIX.—In short, those principles which prescribe the nature of the laws, and which determine their objects, ought to prevail also in the manner of enacting them. A spirit of moderation ought, as much as possible, to dictate all their different dispositions. Laws that are properly made will conform to the intention of the legislator, even when

they appear to be in opposition to it. Such was the famous law of Solon, by which all who should not take some part in the public insurrections were declared infamous. It prevented seditions, or rendered them useful by forcing all the members of the republic to attend to its true interests. Even the ostracism was a good law; for, on the one hand, it was honorable to the citizen who was the object of it, and on the other it obviated the effects of ambition; moreover, a great number of suffrages were necessary, and they could only banish every fifth year. Laws which appear the same have often neither the same motive nor the same effect nor the same equity. The form of government, different conjunctures, and the genius of the people quite change them.

In fine, the style of laws ought to be simple and grave. They may dispense with giving reasons, because the reason is supposed to exist in the mind of the legislator; but when they do give reasons, they ought to be founded upon obvious principles; they ought not to resemble that law which, prohibiting blind people from pleading, gives this as a reason, that they cannot see the ornaments of magistracy.

BOOKS XXVII and XXVIII.—M. de Montesquieu, to point out by examples the application of his principles, has chosen two different people, the most celebrated in the world, and those whose history most interests us—the Romans and the French. He only dwells upon one point of the jurisprudence of the former—that which regards succession. With regard to the French, he enters into a greater detail concerning the origin and revolutions of their civil laws, and the different usages abolished or still subsisting which have been the consequences of them.

BOOKS XXX and XXXI.—He principally enlarges upon the feudal laws, that kind of government unknown to all antiquity, which will perhaps forever be so to future ages, and which has done so much good and so much ill. He especially considers these laws in their relation to the establishment and revolutions of the French monarchy. He proves, against the Abbé du Bos, that the Franks actually entered as conquerors among the Gauls; and that it is not true, as this author pretends, that they had been called by the people to succeed to the rights

of the Roman emperors who oppressed them; an investigation profound, exact, and curious, but in which it is impossible for us to follow him.

Such is the general analysis, though a very imperfect one, of M. de Montesquieu's work on "*The Spirit of Laws*."

MONTESQUIEU'S PREFACE

IF amidst the infinite number of subjects contained in this book there is anything which, contrary to my expectation, may possibly offend, I can at least assure the public that it was not inserted with an ill intention—for I am not naturally of a captious temper. Plato thanked the gods that he was born in the same age with Socrates; and for my part I give thanks to the Supreme that I was born a subject of that government under which I live, and that it is His pleasure I should obey those whom He has made me love.

I beg one favor of my readers, which I fear will not be granted me; this is, that they will not judge by a few hours' reading of the labor of twenty years; that they will approve or condemn the book entire, and not a few particular phrases. If they would search into the design of the author, they can do it in no other way so completely as by searching into the design of the work.

I have first of all considered mankind, and the result of my thoughts has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners, they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.

I have laid down the first principles, and have found that the particular cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all nations are only consequences of them; and that every particular law is connected with another law, or depends on some other of a more general extent.

When I have been obliged to look back into antiquity I have endeavored to assume the spirit of the ancients, lest I should consider those things as alike which are really different, and lest I should miss the difference of those which appear to be alike.

I have not drawn my principles from my prejudices, but from the nature of things.

Here a great many truths will not appear till we have seen the chain which connects them with others. The more we enter into particulars, the more we shall perceive the certainty of the principles on which they are founded. I have not even given all these particulars, for who could mention them all without a most insupportable fatigue?

The reader will not here meet with any of those bold flights which seem to characterize the works of the present age. When things are examined with never so small a degree of extent, the sallies of imagination must vanish; these generally arise from the mind's collecting all its powers to view only one side of the subject, while it leaves the other unobserved.

I write not to censure anything established in any country whatsoever. Every nation will here find the reasons on which its maxims are founded; and this will be the natural inference, that to propose alterations belongs only to those who are so happy as to be born with a genius capable of penetrating the entire constitution of a state.

It is not a matter of indifference that the minds of the people be enlightened. The prejudices of magistrates have arisen from national prejudice. In a time of ignorance they have committed even the greatest evils without the least scruple; but in an enlightened age they even tremble while conferring the greatest blessings. They perceive the ancient abuses; they see how they must be reformed; but they are sensible also of the abuses of a reformation. They let the evil continue, if they fear a worse; they are content with a lesser good, if they doubt a greater. They examine into the parts, to judge of them in connection; and they examine all the causes, to discover their different effects.

Could I but succeed so as to afford new reasons to every man to love his prince, his country, his laws; new reasons to render him more sensible in every nation and government of the blessings he enjoys, I should think myself the most happy of mortals.

Could I but succeed so as to persuade those who command to increase their knowledge in what they ought to prescribe, and those who obey to find a new pleasure resulting from obedience—I should think myself the most happy of mortals.

The most happy of mortals should I think myself could I contribute to make mankind recover from their prejudices. By prejudices I here mean, not that which renders men ignorant

of some particular things, but whatever renders them ignorant of themselves.

It is in endeavoring to instruct mankind that we are best able to practice that general virtue which comprehends the love of all. Man, that flexible being, conforming in society to the thoughts and impressions of others, is equally capable of knowing his own nature whenever it is laid open to his view, and of losing the very sense of it when this idea is banished from his mind.

Often have I begun, and as often have I laid aside, this undertaking. I have a thousand times given the leaves I had written to the winds: *a* I, every day, felt my paternal hands fall. *b* I have followed my object without any fixed plan—I have known neither rules nor exceptions; I have found the truth, only to lose it again. But when I once discovered my first principles, everything I sought for appeared; and in the course of twenty years I have seen my work begun, growing up, advancing to maturity, and finished.

If this work meets with success I shall owe it chiefly to the grandeur and majesty of the subject. However, I do not think that I have been totally deficient in point of genius. When I have seen what so many great men, in France, in England, and in Germany, have said before me, I have been lost in admiration; but I have not lost my courage: I have said with Correggio, "And I also am a painter."*c*

a Ludibria ventis.

b Bis patriæ cecidere manus.
c Ed io anche son pittore.

AUTHOR'S EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. For the better understanding of the first four books of this work, it is to be observed that what I distinguish by the name of virtue, in a republic, is the love of one's country, that is, the love of equality. It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political virtue; and it is the spring which sets the republican government in motion, as honor is the spring which gives motion to monarchy. Hence it is that I have distinguished the love of one's country, and of equality, by the appellation of political virtue. My ideas are new, and therefore I have been obliged to find new words, or to give new acceptations to old terms, in order to convey my meaning. They, who are unacquainted with this particular, have made me say most strange absurdities, such as would be shocking in any part of the world, because in all countries and governments morality is requisite.

2. The reader is also to notice that there is a vast difference between saying that a certain quality, modification of the mind, or virtue, is not the spring by which government is actuated, and affirming that it is not to be found in that government. Were I to say such a wheel or such a pinion is not the spring which sets the watch going, can you infer thence that it is not to be found in the watch? So far is it from being true that the moral and Christian virtues are excluded from monarchy, that even political virtue is not excluded. In a word, honor is found in a republic, though its spring be political virtue; and political virtue is found in a monarchical government, though it be actuated by honor.

To conclude, the honest man of whom we treat in the third book, chapter 5, is not the Christian, but the political honest man, who is possessed of the political virtue there mentioned. He is the man who loves the laws of his country, and who is

actuated by the love of those laws. I have set these matters in a clearer light in the present edition by giving a more precise meaning to my expression: and in most places where I have made use of the word virtue I have taken care to add the term political.

AUTHORS EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. For the better understanding of the text I have added in some places, it is to be observed that when I speak of the love of virtue in a republic, I mean the love of the good, which is the love of the law. It is not a virtue, but a passion, and it is the passion which acts in the republican government in nature, as honor is the passion which gives motion to monarchy. Hence it is that I have distinguished the love of one's country, and of equality, by the appellation of political virtue. My ideas are new, and therefore I have been obliged to find new words, or to give new significations to old terms, in order to convey my meaning. Thus, when we compare with this particular, have made no use of the word, because it is not a word which signifies in any sense of the word, but in all countries and governments, a virtue.

2. The reader is to be advised that the word, as used in the text, signifies that excessive quality, the perfection of the good, or virtue, is not the name of virtue, government, or republic, and affirming that it is not to be found in the government. Were I to use such a word in such a place, it would be the same which sets the word, and which sets the word, and it is not to be found in the word. So far as it is found in the text, the word and Christian virtue are extracted from the text, and that even political virtue is not excluded. In a word, from the word to a republic, though it is not political virtue, and political virtue is found in a monarchical government, though it be actuated by honor.

To conclude the notes, it is to be observed that the word, as used in the text, is not the Christian, but the political, and that it is the name which is given to the love of the country, and which

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