

**DEFENSA DE LA
CAPITAL DE LA REPUBLICA
ATACADA
POR EL
EJERCITO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
DEL NORTE**

1847



D. 57
F. 235


DE LA CAPITALE DE LA REPUBLIQUE 1847



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
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


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DETALL

DE LAS

OPERACIONES OCURRIDAS EN LA DEFENSA

DE LA

CAPITAL DE LA REPUBLICA,

ATACADA

POR EL EJERCITO DE LOS ESTADOS-UNIDOS

DEL NORTE,

EN EL

AÑO DE 1847.




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


DETALL
DE LAS
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DE LA
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Esta Edición consta
de 500 ejemplares nu-
merados del 1 al 500.
Ejemplar Núm. 89

Reproducción Facsimilar sacada del ejemplar que figura en la Biblioteca particular del Sr. Ing. Marte R. Gómez, que gentilmente nos lo facilitó para llevar a cabo esta edición.

El Ing. Marte R. Gómez, acostumbra, en sus libros hacer anotaciones, comentarios, poner notas marginales, etc., por ello nos ha parecido de interés copiar la anotación que aparece en el original de este folleto.

Curioso Documento que explica lo que no tiene explicación:

“Ninguna referencia a los sacrificios —Churubusco, Chapultepec, etc.— que salvaron el buen nombre de México en aquellos desafortunados hechos de armas.”



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
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BL honor de mi patria y mi buen nombre, que son para mí de tanta estima, me impelen á patentizar al mundo, por medios legales y justos, como sin recurrir á las mas viles arterias no han podido mis enemigos reprochar mi conducta, ni aun con la mas ligera apariencia de razon. Miles de testigos pueden manifestar cuántos han sido mis desvelos, mis fatigas y mis sacrificios durante un año, para repeler la mas injusta de las agresiones y salvar el honor y la independenciam nacional. Cada paso dado con tan interesante objeto encontraba mil obstáculos, que la energia de mi alma y el noble entusiasmo que me anima, pudieron solamente superar. He tenido que crearlo todo, proveer á todo, y que trabajar en el gabinete y participar á la vez de las fatigas y peligros del soldado.

Desnaturalizados mexicanos, hombres infames para quienes la gloria nacional es indiferente, frios calculadores de intereses pecuniarios, agentes del gabinete enemigo, han ocurrido á invenciones de todas clases, aun á vulgaridades de todo punto increíbles, sacadas por fuerza hasta de las mismas desgracias lamentables de la patria, para preparar la opinion, enardecer los ánimos en mi contra con el perverso designio de conseguir mi desconcepto y mi ruina, aunque en ella se envuelva nuestra existencia política. De mi desprendimiento generoso, de mi ardiente deseo de hacer la guerra al injusto invasor, se han prevalido para llevar al cabo tan inicuos proyectos, unas veces atribuyéndome miras ambiciosas, y otras sembrando la desconfianza en todas las clases, para que mis esfuerzos no fueran secundados. Consiguen con tales maniobras separarme del teatro de la guerra, y cuando me consideran abandonado, caido, in-

defenso, descargan sobre mí toda la saña de que están poseídas sus miserables almas; no hay medio reprobado para ellos, ni resorte, por odioso que sea, que no pongan en ejecucion para llevar al cabo sus depravadas intenciones: en presencia de los invasores y á la sombra de su mismo pabellon, con objeto quizá de lisonjearlos, me insultan y calumnian por la prensa de una manera atroz, agena de la civilizacion y reprobada por todas las leyes, deshonorando así á la nacion que tantas veces me ha nombrado su primer magistrado y ha confiado á mi lealtad sus destinos.

Aunque tan infame conducta debe ser censurada severamente por todos los hombres sensibles y honrados, puesto que el crimen y la maldad se hacen odiosos por sí mismos, yo, sin embargo, me veo precisado á vindiçar mi honor, ultrajado con tanta alevosía como perversidad: á esas diatribas que se inventan para desvirtuar mis sacrificios, no opondré otras armas que hechos y documentos capaces de hacer lucir mi justicia, y de demostrar á los pueblos que me dispensaron su confianza que he correspondido dignamente á su llamado.

El parte que á continuacion aparece, dirigido por mí al Esemo. Sr. ministro de la guerra, es una relacion sencilla de todos los hechos ocurridos en la capital de la república desde fines de Mayo hasta mediados de Septiembre último, y de mis esfuerzos posteriores sobre la línea de comunicacion del enemigo, hasta el dia en que fui separado del mando del ejército por la disposicion arbitraria que el público ha visto impresa. Por él se vendrá en conocimiento del afanoso empeño con que procuré la defensa de la capital, y de que no perdoné medio alguno que hubiera estado á mi alcance para lograr tan importante objeto, pues como primer magistrado dicté cuantas providencias fueron necesarias; como general en jefe en el campo de batalla me espuse á los riesgos del simple soldado, ejerciendo funciones que no me correspondian.

No se me oculta que los hechos mas honrosos y notorios nada son para cobardes enemigos, que tan distantes están de saberlos apreciar en su justo valor, como de saberlos ejecutar; y como la mala fé siempre puede comentarlos siniestramente y sacar inducciones violentas, no será extraño que esta relacion, aunque verídica, solo sirva para irritar mas su envidia y redoblar sus sarcasmos; pero yo los someto al recto juicio de los que buscan la verdad únicamente para hacer justicia.


Si no he merecido encómios y recompensas, concedidas solamente á los brillantes resultados, á las espléndidas victorias, me considero

por lo menos con derecho á ser tratado con alguna indulgencia, por la sanidad de mis intenciones, por los esfuerzos y sacrificios impendidos por alcanzar un triunfo; porque he franqueado grandes sumas para socorrer al soldado que ha marchado á la campaña y de que no he sido reintegrado, aun cuando despues he estado en el poder; porque la consagracion al servicio de mi pais me ha hecho el blanco de las iras del invasor, como bien claro lo están diciendo mis campos talados, mis ganados consumidos y mis fincas convertidas en ruinas; por haber, en fin, espuesto mi reputacion y mi ecsistencia en servicio de la cara patria. ¿Qué, el haberme esquivado la voluble fortuna sus favores, es un crimen por mi parte? Carlos XII en Pultawa, Alejandro I en Austerlitz y el grande Napoleon en Waterloo, ¿fueron acaso criminales? ¿Lo fueron por ventura los primeros héroes de la independenciam por los desgraciados sucesos de Aculco y Calderon? ¿Se han ecsaminado con los precisos conocimientos y la indispensable imparcialidad, cuáles fueron las causas verdaderas que me han arrebatado los honores de vencedor? Si la desgracia no es un crimen; si no hay datos razonados para juzgar de los hechos; si los motivos que han contribuido á frustrar las combinaciones no están al alcance de todas las inteligencias, ¿cómo se levanta esa grito de *traicion ó ineptitud* con que alternativamente me apoda la perversidad? Los sucesos de la vida privada de un hombre, supuestos ó ciertos, ¿qué influencia pueden tener en los acontecimientos políticos ó militares . . . ? ¿Pues por qué se recurre á invenciones tan infames para calumniarme? ¿Por qué se repiten incesantemente hechos que pertenecen á la historia, y de que no pueden ser jueces los contemporáneos, porque mas ó menos todos han figurado en ellos, y no es fácil decidir quiénes sean los culpados? ¿Por qué á los generales que han sufrido reveses en el campo de batalla antes que yo, nada se les echa en cara, y solo á mí se me difama cruelmente, sin atender á las circunstancias de que me he visto rodeado? ¡Ah! se pretende concitarme el odio universal, para sustituirlo á las consideraciones que el buen ciudadano siempre merece. ¡Maldad inaudita . . . ! ¿Cómo no han de decir nuestros enemigos que los mexicanos solo saben destrozarse entre sí?

Separado de la escena política mes y medio hace, tranquilo espero el fallo de la sana opinion, que no dudo será justo, cuando el tiempo ponga en paralelo mi conducta de esta época con la de mis antagonistas. Por ahora, nada mas observaré, que desde mi separacion del teatro de la guerra, el cañon mexicano no ha vuelto á dispararse sobre

el invasor, y que éste levanta orgulloso su frente y se enseñorea sin ser siquiera molestado desde México á Veracruz, teniendo por todas partes seguras sus comunicaciones. Quizá no tardará en presentarse en Querétaro, si observa que no se reorganiza el ejército, ni se prepara resistencia alguna á sus incursiones.

Tehuacan, Diciembre 2 de 1847.



UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE NUEVO LEÓN

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE BIBLIOTECAS

Ministerio de guerra y marina.—Seccion de operaciones.—Escmo. Sr.—Los Escmos. Sres. secretarios del congreso general con fecha 3 del corriente me dicen lo que copio.

Escmo. Sr.—El congreso general en sesion de hoy se ha servido acordar lo siguiente:

Dígase al gobierno que remita al congreso todos los documentos relativos á los sucesos militares que pasaron durante el sitio y pérdida de la capital de la república.

Lo que tenemos el honor de transcribir á V. E. para los efectos consiguientes, reproduciéndole las seguridades de nuestro muy distinguido aprecio.

Y tengo el honor de transcribirlo á V. E. de orden del Escmo. Sr. presidente provisional, para que impuesto del contenido de los informes que en copia son adjuntos, se persuada V. E. de la dificultad de poderse sacar los documentos que pide la cámara, y por lo cual quiere S. E. que desde luego V. E. proceda á dar el parte de las operaciones militares durante la defensa y pérdida de la capital, para transmitirlo al conocimiento del soberano congreso.

Al decirlo á V. E. de orden suprema, tengo la satisfaccion de reproducirle las protestas de mi consideracion y aprecio.

Dios y libertad. Querétaro, Noviembre 6 de 1847.—Mora.—Escmo. Sr. benemérito de la patria, general de division, D. Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna.

Escmo. Sr.—El oficio de V. E. fecha 6 del corriente me impone que á consecuencia del acuerdo del congreso general que me inserta V. E., relativo á pedir los documentos que ecsistan sobre los sucesos del sitio y pérdida de la capital, el Escmo. Sr. encargado del supre-

mo poder ejecutivo, dispone que yo presente el parte de aquellas operaciones militares, para trasmitirlo al conocimiento del soberano congreso.

Cumpliendo con los deseos de los supremos poderes y con el deber que me impone el carácter de general en jefe del ejército con que funcioné en aquel tiempo, procederé desde luego á presentar una relacion sencilla de mis operaciones en la parte que me falta; pues como V. E. verá en la adjunta nota que al recibir la de V. E. iba á dirigirle por los motivos y para los objetos que indica, he formado ya la que comprende desde la celebracion del armisticio: me referiré, pues, ahora á los sucesos anteriores que tuvieron lugar desde que ingresé á la capital en fines de Mayo último.

He manifestado en documentos oficiales, que mi marcha de Orizava á Puebla tuvo varios objetos, y fueron el aumentar, equipar y organizar las cortas fuerzas con que me encontraba en aquella fecha y hacer una vigorosa defensa, si era favorecido de los poderosos recursos del Estado; pero que las circunstancias de haber encontrado la ciudad desmantelada, sin tropa ni material alguno de guerra, por haber dispuesto el comandante general que todo se trasladara á lejanos puntos y la aproximacion del ejército enemigo que siguió mis pasos sin darme lugar para nada, me precisaron á continuar hasta la capital de la república.

Cuando en ésta esperaba encontrar grandes preparativos de defensa, solo advertí síntomas de revolucion, que se conjuró afortunadamente con mi oportuna presencia. Me impuse con pesar igualmente que estaba resuelto su abandono, juzgándola sin elementos para defenderse, y que el tabaco, archivos y otras cosas habian comenzado á salir para el interior. Me apresuré por esto á citar una junta de todos los generales presentes, que tuvo lugar el siguiente dia de mi llegada. En consecuencia de su resultado, resolví encargarme del gobierno, indispensable medida, para preparar la defensa acordada en conformidad con mis deseos.

Como habia tan poco de que disponer, y era indispensablemente necesario ejército, fortificaciones, materiales de guerra, y sobre todo, dinero, mis apuros fueron tan grandes como debieron ser mis esfuerzos. Sobre esto me refiero á las constancias que deben aparecer en los ministerios, y que yo pido presenten los señores ministros que tuvieron la penosa tarea de acompañarme en dias tan angustiados. Yo no las acompaño por carecer en este lugar de mi archivo particular; mas al gobierno puede serle fácil acopiarlas, para que se vea que se

atendió á todo, y que absolutamente nada se omitió al llevar al cabo la buena defensa de la capital contra un ejército victorioso y provisto de cuanto el arte requiere para hacer con écsito la guerra.

Se nombró general en jefe del ejército de Oriente al Escmo. Sr. general de division benemérito de la patria D. Nicolás Bravo, y de segundo al Escmo. Sr. general D. Manuel Rincon. Igual nombramiento se hizo para el ejército del Norte en el Escmo. Sr. general D. Gabriel Valencia, y de su segundo en el Sr. general D. Mariano Salas. Estos dos Sres. generales marcharon luego para su destino; pero los dos primeros renunciaron pocos dias despues aquellos encargos, por lo que se nombró al Sr. general D. Manuel María Lombardini en jefe del ejército de Oriente, quien desempeñó este encargo á satisfaccion del gobierno, hasta que por la aproximacion del enemigo, tomé yo el mando general del ejército, en uso de las facultades extraordinarias con que el congreso general se habia servido investir al gobierno, en su decreto de 20 de Abril, para todo lo relativo al mejor écsito de la guerra contra nuestros invasores.

Designados los puntos que debieran fortificarse pasageramente en primera y segunda línea, no se perdió momento para aprontar los materiales, peones &c., y en menos de tres meses se vieron levantadas respetables fortificaciones, que dirigió primero el general de brigada D. Casimiro Liceaga, y despues el Sr. director general de ingenieros D. Ignacio de Mora y Villamil; cuyos generales y jefes que entendieron en ellas, ademas de acreditar su inteligencia, trabajaron con una constancia y actividad que siempre les hará honor. Grandes sumas se invirtieron en tantas obras, como se necesitaban para un radio tan prolongado; pero nunca faltó lo preciso. El comisario del ejército podrá rectificarlo.

Siendo miserables los cuadros de que se componia el ejército, fué indispensable ocurrir á los cupos y á los cuerpos de Guardia Nacional. No habiendo vestuario en almacenes, fornituras, monturas, ni utensilio alguno, se hizo necesario construirlo todo, estableciendo contratas al efecto. No habiendo tampoco un solo fusil, tuve que disponer que se compraran á cualquier precio, con lo que así se consiguieron (muchos sin bayoneta), y con los recompuestos en la maestranza, de los que habia de desecho, se logró que toda la fuerza quedara armada. Siendo muy escaso el material de guerra, ordené que el infatigable director de artillería general de brigada D. Martin Carrera, elaborase el necesario, y para proveerse á esta necesidad, se trabajó sin descanso y fué preciso gastar sumas crecidas. Se trajeron

de S. Luis Potosí varias piezas de artillería y del Sur otras, y aun las de fierro que estaban en mal estado se pusieron útiles y de servicio. Nada se escusaba al interesante objeto de ponernos en el mejor estado de defensa.

A mi llegada á la capital no ecsistia mas suma que ciento y pico de mil pesos en libranzas del clero, del millon y medio que proporcionó al gobierno en los dias de mi ausencia, y yo me procuré las cantidades que tantas y tan multiplicadas atenciones ecsigian, á que cooperó eficazmente el ministerio de hacienda con sus buenas relaciones.

En las plazas y en los estramuros de la ciudad diariamente se instruian reclutas, y los gefes se esmeraban de tal modo en los adelantos de sus cuerpos, que en pocos dias se vieron lucidas brigadas, que hicieron concebir muy lisonjeras esperanzas. Las fortificaciones se adelantaban prodigiosamente. Por todas partes se veian talleres que trabajaban los equipos de la tropa. Se alistaron hasta noventa piezas de artillería, y en fin, se contó con veinte mil hombres equipados y armados; en este número se comprendian los cinco mil veteranos del ejército del Norte, y en aquel los veinticuatro cañones que de San Luis Potosí condujo el Escmo. Sr. general Valencia. De manera que el 11 de Agosto, al presentarse el enemigo á las inmediaciones del Peñon, nuestra situacion era imponente y la confianza y entusiasmo se advertian en todos los semblantes.

Apelo sobre esto al testimonio de los habitantes de la capital.

El Escmo. Sr. general D. Nicolás Bravo se me presentó para ser empleado, y puse á sus órdenes la línea de Mexicalcingo, Churubusco y S. Antonio.

Al Escmo. Sr. general D. Juan Alvarez con la division de caballería que tenia á sus órdenes, lo mandé situar en Anacamilpa para que tomara la retaguardia del ejército enemigo, y se interpusiera entre éste y Puebla luego que pasara de San Martin Tescmelucan. Las instrucciones que á este general se le dieron deben constar en el ministerio de guerra: ellas fueron reducidas á que siguiendo la retaguardia del enemigo, lo hostilizara en cuanto fuere posible, y que lo atacase con decision cuando lo viera empeñado sobre alguno de nuestros puntos fortificados, aprovechando en todos casos los descuidos que le advirtiera, siempre obrando con la debida prudencia.

Al Escmo. Sr. General D. Gabriel Valencia, con su division completa lo mandé situar en Texcoco, y se le libraron instrucciones que debe tener en su poder, y han de encontrarse tambien en la secretaria de guerra, en la seccion de operaciones. Su objeto principal era ob-

servar al enemigo, para que si tomaba la direccion de Texcoco, se replegara á Guadalupe Hidalgo, adonde ocupando las posiciones fortificadas recibiera órdenes y refuerzos; mas si el enemigo se decidia á atacar al Peñon, él lo hiciera por su retaguardia, á cuyo objeto cooperaria la division de caballería del mando del Sr. general Alvarez á quien se le advirtió oportunamente que obrara en combinacion con dicho general.

Yo me pasé á situar al Peñon, para estar al frente del enemigo y poder dirigir con acierto las operaciones. En este punto se me presentó el Escmo. Sr. general de division D. Manuel Rincon, y lo empleé en el mando de las fortificaciones principales de aquel cerro. Lo mismo, y con igual entusiasmo, se me presentó el Escmo. Sr. general D. José Joaquin de Herrera, y lo nombré mi segundo. Fué empleado tambien de cuartel-maestre general el Escmo. Sr. general D. José María Tornel, quien manifestó los mayores deseos de servir á la nacion en la campaña.

Como no es posible tener á la memoria el número de tropa, artillería, municiones &c. que guarnecian todos los puntos, y como para poder presentar un detall exacto seria indispensable tener á la vista los estados generales que no me es posible aquí conseguir, ni los planos, que corresponden al director general de ingenieros, me limitaré á hablar de los sucesos en general, y de mis providencias relativas, reservándome presentar aquel, con los requisitos y exactitud convenientes, en la reseña histórica que preparo, para que la nacion sepa cuanto se practicó en su servicio, y conozca á sus leales servidores.

El ejército invasor, á las órdenes del general Scott, desdeñó la batalla que se le presentó en el Peñon, sin duda porque nuestras posiciones le parecieron muy fuertes; y yo pienso, que su buena suerte lo libertó de haberse estrellado en ellas, porque el Peñon estaba perfectamente fortificado, y aun sus proyectiles le habrian servido de poco. En el plano respectivo se advertirán las obras que se dispusieron tan hábilmente, y el mérito de tantos trabajos en tan pocos dias.

Habiéndose dirigido el general Scott hácia el Sur de la capital despues de reconocer las fortificaciones de Mexicalcingo, que no se atrevió á atacar, conociendo tal vez que allí tambien seria batido ventajosamente, me ví en la necesidad de cambiar mi cuartel general á S. Mateo Churubusco, inmediato al punto de S. Antonio, el mas avanzado de aquella línea. La marcha del ejército enemigo fué penosa y dilatada por el camino que tuvo que transitar, y este tiempo

se empleó en la conclusion de algunas fortificaciones y en la mejora de otras. El general Alvarez seguia á su retaguardia acechando la ocasion de hostilizarlo, segun participaba.

No siendo dudoso que el designio del enemigo era ocupar la ciudad de Tlalpam, se previno al general Valencia que cambiara de posicion, retirándose de Texcoco á la ciudad de Guadalupe Hidalgo, para pasar despues al pueblo de S. Angel, como lo verificó.

Al general graduado D. Francisco Perez, gefe de una lucida brigada, con fuerza entonces de mas de tres mil hombres, se le mandó situar en Coyoacán, quedando así cubierta la línea que formaban Mexicalcingo, Puente de Churubusco, convento de igual nombre, Coyoacán y S. Angel, la que apoyaba y servia de reserva al punto inmediato de S. Antonio. Este se encontraba bien fortificado y guarnecido; y como todas nuestras fuerzas inmediatas podian obrar con ventaja y oportunidad, llegué á desear que allí fuera el campo de batalla.

Malicié por algunos reconocimientos del enemigo, que intentaba dirigirse para Tacubaya, y se ordenó al general Valencia que se replegase á Coyoacán, y artillase los puntos de Churubusco con sus piezas, considerándolo en S. Angel, como debia estar en espera de posteriores prevenciones. Mi plan de concentracion sobre la segunda línea, se iba haciendo indispensable, y preciso era tambien preparar una retirada segura á las tropas y trenes de S. Antonio. La sorpresa é indignacion que el general Valencia me ocasionó desobedeciendo mi orden, bien pueden explicarlas el general Tornel y el ministro de la guerra, que me presentó su contestacion á las 11 de la noche del 18 de Agosto citado. Los mismos señores generales podrán igualmente revelar el anuncio que hice desde aquel momento, á consecuencia de una conducta tan irregular, que echaba por tierra mis combinaciones. Mi primera resolucion fué que se destituyera del mando y se repitiera la orden á su segundo; pero los señores generales citados me calmaron con juiciosas reflexiones, hijas de la mejor intencion, y despues de una conferencia dilatada, en óbvio de escándalos al frente del enemigo, vine en ceder, que solo se le advirtiera: *que sin aprobarle su conducta arbitraria, obrara bajo su responsabilidad como le pareciera*; lisonjeándonos, es verdad, que esto bastaria á hacerle volver sobre sus pasos; pero desgraciadamente no fué así: él continuó inalterable por el camino de perdicion que se habia trazado, y los resultados hoy los deplora toda la nacion.

El dia 19 como á las dos de la tarde, se me presentó en S. Antonio

un ayudante del general Valencia, participándome á nombre de este *que el enemigo se aprocsimaba á Padierna*; lugar adonde de su motivo habia situado á la division del Norte, y me añadió: *que segun los cañonazos que él habia oido en el camino, la consideraba batiéndose*. Este parte fué para mí el anuncio de la gran desgracia que preví la noche anterior, y que á su pesar comenzaba á conocer el inobediente general. Sin embargo de su estraviada conducta, desde este momento solo me ocupé en salvarlo y salvar á los dignos soldados que en mala hora puse á sus órdenes. Destaqué, pues, á un ayudante para Coyoacán, con orden de poner en marcha para Padierna á la brigada del general Perez, y para el mismo punto me dirigí al instante, á galope, seguido de mi estado mayor, de los regimientos de caballería Húsares y ligero de Veracruz, y de cinco piezas de batalla.

Alcancé á dicha brigada saliendo de Coyoacán para S. Angel, y por algunos cañonazos que se oian, la hice caminar á paso veloz hasta las lomas frente á Padierna, en que pude observar la fatal posicion del general Valencia. Esto ya sucedia como á las cinco de la tarde; y aunque me esforcé por reunirme á él, no fué posible estando cortado por el enemigo, y por el terreno que habia dejado á su retaguardia. No habia mas que un solo camino transitable de S. Angel á Padierna, bien angosto, dominado á derecha é izquierda por posiciones que algunos batallones enemigos habian tomado. Busqué paso por los flancos, y me cercioré por los prácticos del terreno, y por mi propia vista, que no era fácil la operacion en el resto de la tarde, pues por la derecha lo impedia una profunda barranca, que se dilataba mas de una legua hasta unas colinas, que se presentaban al Sur-Oeste de S. Angel, y unos quebrados y vallados por la izquierda; y como en los reconocimientos me sorprendió la noche, no me quedó mas recurso que campar y esperar el dia. En seguida una tempestad horrorosa, acompañada de copiosa lluvia, me obligó á disponer que la infantería se abrigase en el inmediato pueblo de San Angel, con orden de presentarse á la madrugada en el propio campo: en éste dejé á los cuerpos de caballería y artillería, que pasaron una noche cruel; porque no cesó de caer agua hasta el amanecer.

Considerando lo que sufriria la division del Norte con la lluvia, sin abrigo alguno, y que ni los hombres ni las armas quedarian útiles para empeñar una accion al otro dia, anhelando evitar la derrota que preveia, ordené al general Valencia que en la misma noche, clavando la artillería, se retirara á S. Angel, pudiendo servirle de

guía el que conducía á mi ayudante de campo coronel D. José María Ramiro, portador de mi orden; pero obstinado en desobedecerme, la despreció, y permaneció en aquel funesto lugar.

Inquieto yo por el cuidado que naturalmente me ocasionaba la temeridad del general Valencia, cuando hasta los elementos nos eran contrarios, al rayar la aurora dispuse que la infantería, abrigada en San Angel, emprendiera su marcha. Lo mismo verificó la brigada del general Rangel, que hice venir de la Ciudadela con intencion de abrirme paso á toda costa hasta el campo de Padierna. Caminaba á la cabeza de dichas brigadas, cuando oí un corto tiroteo de fusil por mi vanguardia: se apresuró el paso, y se me presentaron á la vista grupos de nuestra caballería que en retirada venian, y de quienes recibí la fatal nueva que estaba temiendo. Cuando no me cupo duda de la derrota del general Valencia, emprendí la contramarcha con la mas amarga pena.

Este general mal aconsejado, ó guiado de una ciega ambicion, juzgando fácil una victoria con la brillante division que mandaba, se lanzó al crimen con doble mira: si la fortuna le era favorable, apropiarse solo la gloria; si adversa, hacer recaer sobre mí la responsabilidad y desconcepto consiguiente. Esto está comprobado con el folleto que se apresuró á publicar, y que todos han visto, esperando sin duda en la credulidad del vulgo, y en el apoyo que encontraria en las facciones que están á caza de pretestos para hostilizarme de la manera atroz que lo hacen. Pero á tantas acechanzas, yo no opondré mas que hechos y testigos que harán valer la verdad y justificarán la sanidad de mis procedimientos.

En el pueblo de San Angel reuní todas mis fuerzas y porcion de dispersos de Padierna. Estos declararon, *que estando todo el armamento mojado, y no siendo posible responder al fuego del enemigo, la tropa buscó su salvacion en la fuga.* Destaqué dos ayudantes con órdenes para los Sres. generales Bravo y Gaona, reducidas á que *sin pérdida de instante se replegaran á las fortificaciones de la Candelaria,* y continué la retirada con direccion á Churubusco.

En el Puente de Panzacola ordené á la brigada del general Rangel, *que regresara á la Ciudadela,* y así lo verificó.

Mi retaguardia comenzó á batirse desde San Angel, á donde fué alcanzada por el enemigo. A mi paso por el convento de Churubusco, advertí al Sr. general Rincon lo que acababa de acontecer á la division del Norte, para que estuviera prevenido como gefe del punto. Debiendo llamar mi atencion preferente en aquel momento las tropas

y trenes de San Antonio y de Mexicalcingo, me apresuré á protegerlas en su retirada, situando en el puente de Churubusco la brigada del general Perez. En este lugar se me participó que el general Gaona se habia ya dirigido para la Candelaria, y que el general Bravo comenzaba á moverse. Momentos despues, llegaron al puente las compañías de San Patricio, el batallon de Tlapa y otros piquetes, y toda esta fuerza la mandé luego de refuerzo al convento inmediato de Churubusco, á donde para su defensa se encontraban los batallones Independencia y Bravos. Antes habia dispuesto quedasen con igual objeto las cinco piezas de artillería que venian de San Angel, y se les dió colocacion oportuna.

Me ocupaba de apresurar el movimiento de los trenes y tropas de S. Antonio, cuando por la retaguardia de éstas, el enemigo, que venia á su alcance, rompió el fuego. Con poca diferencia de tiempo aconteció lo mismo por el convento de Churubusco. Las tropas de San Antonio se desordenaron y abandonaron el material que venia con ellas, lo que produjo gran confusion, que vino á aumentar el arrojado del enemigo cuando llegó muy cerca de los fosos. Sin embargo, se rompió sobre él un vivo fuego, y se logró rechazar su primer ímpetu, trabándose en seguida una reñida accion.

En un momento que cesó el fuego, observé que un batallon enemigo por nuestro flanco derecho se dirigia á la Hacienda de los Portales para tomarnos la retaguardia y cortarnos la retirada. Para frustrar su intento ordené al coronel del batallon cuarto ligero, *que á paso veloz se posesionara de aquel edificio,* y como en el movimiento viera dilacion, fuí en persona á hacerlo ejecutar debidamente. Rechazado el batallon enemigo con grande pérdida, se aseguró nuestra retirada.

En Portales recibí parte de *haberse rendido el convento de Churubusco, y esta novedad habia producido desaliento en las tropas que defendian el puente, de manera que unas se retiraron con el general Bravo por Mexicalcingo al Peñon, y otras venian replegándose por el camino recto.* Esta otra desgracia nos produjo la pérdida de un gran material, y me hizo conocer la necesidad de replegarnos cuanto antes á nuestra segunda línea, como lo verifiqué con cuantas fuerzas pude reunir en Portales, llegando á la Candelaria entre cinco y seis de la tarde. Las tropas que el general Bravo llevó consigo, no pudieron incorporarse á la capital hasta la mañana siguiente.

La audacia de algunos dragones enemigos, llegó al extremo de atravesar á escape la columna que de Portales se retiraba, hasta los parapetos de la Candelaria, á donde siendo conocidos se les hizo fuego,

resultando todos muertos menos un oficial que cayó prisionero. Este declaró en aquel momento con bastante desembarazo, *que sabiendo por uno de nuestros prisioneros que entre aquella tropa se encontraba el general Santa-Anna, habia tomado la resolucion con los soldados que lo quisieron seguir, de alcanzarlo y quitarle la vida, pues si lo lograban adquiririan gloria, y si no, moririan con honor.* Cuando me impuse de esta declaracion, ordené que tal prisionero fuera tratado con toda consideracion, porque lejos de ofenderme su audacia, tributaba á su valor el homenaje debido.

Ni en el resto de la tarde ni en la noche ocurrió novedad particular, y sin embargo, dicté cuantas providencias creí convenientes para la mejor defensa de nuestra segunda línea, que juzgué seria muy pronto atacada.

Desde las cuatro de la mañana del día siguiente estuvo todo preparado para el combate, no obstante el mal estado en que nos habian colocado los sucesos del anterior; pero como á las once recibí en la calzada de la Viga el oficio del general Scott que acompaño en copia con el número 1, en que me proponia el armisticio de que está la nacion impuesta, que yo acepté al instante, como consta en la copia número 2, por nuestra situacion desesperada. Los descalabros de Padierna y convento de Churubusco; la pérdida de una mitad de nuestra mejor artillería; la de tanto parque y fusiles; la baja, en fin, de mas de la tercera parte de ejército, habian causado tal desaliento, que si el enemigo repite su ataque, como yo lo esperaba, seguramente ocupa la capital sin mucha resistencia. Este convencimiento me hizo considerar como una providencia del cielo aquel suceso inesperado, que venia á cambiar la situacion que aguardábamos, como en efecto sucedió... ¿Quién negará que el 8 de Septiembre escapó el ejército enemigo afortunadamente de ser derrotado? ¡Ah! sin la cobardía de algunos de nuestros militares, sin el egoismo de nuestros ciudadanos y sin las arterias de algunos funcionarios de los Estados, ¡cuán diverso aspecto presentaria hoy nuestra república! ¿Qué valen los esfuerzos de un solo hombre contra tantos contrarios?

Las conferencias habidas con el comisionado del gobierno de los Estados-Unidos, nadie dirá que han perjudicado en alguna cosa á los intereses de la nacion. Ellas publicadas, han desmentido la multitud de especies que divulgaron entónces contra mi conducta los agentes del desórden y mis constantes enemigos, y dado á conocer al mundo las ecsageradas é injustas pretensiones de aquel gobierno, que abusando de su preponderancia ó de su fortuna y de nuestras

desgracias, ha querido humillarnos privándonos por la violencia de mas de la mitad de nuestro territorio.

Encontrándose en el adjunto parte ya citado la relacion de los sucesos posteriores al armisticio, concluyo aquí con el presente, acompañando copias de las comunicaciones que precedieron á la prosecucion de hostilidades, y que van marcadas con los números 3 y 4.

Reciba V. E. con este motivo las consideraciones de mi particular aprecio.

Dios y libertad. Tehuacan, Noviembre 21 de 1847.—Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna.—Escmo. Sr. ministro de guerra y marina.—Querétaro.

NUMERO 1.

Cuartel general del ejército de los Estados-Unidos de América.—Coyoacan, Agosto 21 de 1847.—Escmo. Sr. presidente de la república de México y general en jefe de su ejército.—Demasiada sangre se ha vertido ya en la guerra que se ha suscitado, y que no debiera esperarse entre las dos grandes repúblicas de nuestro continente. Tiempo es de que las desavenencias que las dividen se trancen de una manera amistosa y honorífica, y no ignora V. E. que se halla en este ejército de mi mando un comisionado que han nombrado los Estados-Unidos, y que está investido de plenos poderes para el efecto. A fin de que las dos repúblicas puedan entablar negociaciones, me avengo á firmar, bajo equitativas condiciones, un armisticio de una duracion corta.

Esperaré con impaciencia hasta la mañana del día que sigue al de la fecha de esta nota, una contestacion á ella, pero entre tanto tomaré posesion de aquellos puntos de fuera de la capital que necesite para el abrigo y bienestar de mis tropas.

Tengo el honor de suscribirme con alta consideracion y profundo respeto, obediente servidor de V. E.—Windfield Scott.

NUMERO 2.

A S. E. el general Windfield Scott, en jefe del ejército de los Estados-Unidos de América.—Señor.—El infrascrito ministro de guerra y marina del gobierno de los Estados-Unidos mexicanos, ha recibido órden del Escmo. Sr. presidente general en jefe, de contes-

tar á la comunicacion de V. E., en que le propone la celebracion de un armisticio, con el fin de evitar mas derramamiento de sangre entre las dos grandes repúblicas de este continente, oyendo las proposiciones que haga para el efecto el comisionado del Escmo. Sr. presidente de los Estados-Unidos de América, que se halla en el cuartel general de su ejército.

Lamentable es ciertamente que por no haber sido considerados debidamente los derechos de la república mexicana, haya sido inevitable el derramamiento de sangre entre las primeras repúblicas del continente americano, y con mucha esactitud califica V. E. de desnaturalizada esta guerra, no solo por sus motivos, sino por los antecedentes de los pueblos tan identificados en relaciones y en intereses. La proposicion de un armisticio para terminar este escándalo, ha sido admitida con agrado por S. E. el presidente general en jefe, porque facilitará el que puedan ser escuchadas las proposiciones, que para el término decoroso de esta guerra haga el señor comisionado del presidente de los Estados-Unidos de América.

En consecuencia, me manda S. E. el presidente general en jefe, anunciar á V. E. que admite la proposicion de celebrar un armisticio, y que para el efecto ha nombrado á los Sres. generales de brigada D. Ignacio Mora y Villamil y D. Benito Quijano, quienes estarán en el lugar y hora que anuncie.

Tambien me previene S. E. el general presidente, que comuniqué á V. E. su deferencia á que el ejército de los Estados-Unidos tome cuarteles cómodos y provistos, esperando que éstos se hallarán fuera del tiro de las fortificaciones mexicanas.

Tengo el honor de ser con alta consideracion y respeto de V. E. su mas obediente servidor.—*Alcorta.*

NUMERO 3.

Cuartel general del ejército de los Estados-Unidos de América.—Tacubaya, Septiembre 6 de 1847.—A S. E. el presidente y general en jefe de la república de México.—Señor.—El artículo 7.º así como el 12.º que estipulan *que el tráfico del comercio de ningun modo se interrumpirá*, del armisticio ó convencion militar que tuve el honor de ratificar y cangear con S. E. el 24 de Agosto último, han sido repetidas veces violados poco despues de firmado el armisticio por parte de México, y ahora tengo muy buenas razones para creer que en las 48 últimas horas, si no antes, el artículo 3.º de la convencion fué igualmente violado por la misma parte.

Estos ataques directos á la buena fé, dan á este ejército un pleno derecho para romper las hostilidades contra México sin anunciarlas antes, pero concedo el tiempo necesario para una esplicacion, una satisfaccion y una reparacion si es posible, pues de lo contrario declaro ahora mismo formalmente que si no recibo una satisfaccion completa de todos estos cargos antes de las doce del dia de mañana, consideraré el espresado armisticio como terminado despues de aquella hora.

Tengo el honor de ser de V. E. obediente servidor.—*Windfield Scott.*

NUMERO 4.

Cuartel general del ejército de la república mexicana.—México, Septiembre 6 de 1847.—A S. E. el general Windfield Scott, general en jefe del ejército de los Estados-Unidos de América.—Señor.—Por la nota de V. E. de esta fecha me he enterado con sorpresa que considera violados por las autoridades civiles y militares mexicanas los artículos 7, 12 y 3 del armisticio que concluí con V. E. el dia 24 del mes pasado.

Las autoridades civiles y militares mexicanas no han impedido el paso de víveres para el ejército americano, y si alguna vez se ha retardado su remision, ha sido precisamente por la imprudencia de los agentes americanos, que sin ponerse préviamente de acuerdo con las espresadas autoridades, han dado lugar á la efervescencia popular que ha costado mucho trabajo al gobierno mexicano reprimir. Anoche y antes de anoche han estado listas las escoltas para la conduccion de víveres, y no se verificó su estraccion porque así lo quiso el Sr. Hargous, encargado de verificarla. La orden dada para suspender el tráfico entre los dos ejércitos, se dirigió á los particulares y no á los agentes del ejército de los Estados-Unidos, puntualmente para hacerla mas espedita reduciéndola á este solo objeto. En cambio de esta conducta, V. E. ha prevenido á los dueños ó administradores de los molinos de trigo de las inmediaciones de esta ciudad la importacion de harinas en ella, lo que ha abierto una verdadera brecha en la buena fé que de V. E. me prometia.

Es falso que alguna obra nueva de fortificacion se haya emprendido, porque uno ú otro reparo ha servido para restablecerlas en el estado que tenian el dia del armisticio, porque casualidades ó conveniencias del momento habian hecho destruir las obras preexistentes. Muy anticipadas noticias habia adquirido del establecimiento de una bateria cubierta con la tápia de la casa llamada de Garay en esa villa,

y no había reclamado porque la paz de dos grandes repúblicas no podía hacerse depender de cosas graves en sí mismas, pero que valen poco respecto del resultado en que se interesan todos los amigos de la humanidad y de la felicidad del continente americano.

No sin dolor y aun indignacion he recibido comunicaciones de las ciudades y pueblos ocupados por el ejército de V. E., sobre la violacion de los templos consagrados al culto de Dios, sobre el robo de los vasos sagrados y profanacion de las imágenes que venera el pueblo mexicano. Profundamente me he afectado de las quejas de los padres y esposos sobre la violencia ejercida en sus hijas y esposas; y esas mismas ciudades y pueblos han sido saqueados no solamente con violacion del armisticio, sino aun de los principios sagrados que proclaman y observan las naciones civilizadas. Silencio habia guardado hasta ahora, por no entorpecer una negociacion que prestaba esperanzas de terminar una guerra escandalosa, y que V. E. ha caracterizado con el nombre de desnaturalizada, tan justamente. Mas no insistiré en ofrecer apologías, porque no se me oculta que la verdadera, la indísimulable causa de las amenazas de rompimiento de hostilidades que contiene la nota de V. E., es que no me he prestado á suscribir un tratado que menoscabaria considerablemente, no solo el territorio de la república, sino tambien esa dignidad y decoro que las naciones defienden á todo trance. Y si estas consideraciones no tienen igual peso en el ánimo de V. E., suya será la responsabilidad ante el mundo, que bien penetra de parte de quien está la moderacion y la justicia.

Yo me lisonjeo de que V. E. se convencerá en medio de la calma, del fundamento de estas razones. Mas si por desgracia no se buscare mas que un pretesto para privar á la primera ciudad del continente americano de un recurso para la parte inerme de su poblacion, de librarse de los horrores de la guerra, no me restará otro medio de salvarla que repeler la fuerza con la fuerza, con la decision y energía que mis altas obligaciones me prescriben.

Tengo el honor de ser de V. E. muy obediente servidor.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna.*



Escmo. Sr.

DOS partes corren impresos en la capital de la república, que han llegado á mis manos por casualidad: uno es del Escmo. Sr. general de division benemérito de la patria D. Nicolás Bravo, y el otro del general de brigada graduado D. Andrés Terres, referentes á las pérdidas del fuerte de Chapultepec y garita de Belen, el dia 13 de Septiembre prócsimo pasado; cuyas inesactitudes han acogido luego mis incansables enemigos para sus recriminaciones y absurdos comentarios, por el criminal empeño que tienen en persuadir al sencillo pueblo, que el mas leal defensor de sus derechos, es un *traidor*. Circunstancias son estas, que me ponen en el caso de presentar al supremo gobierno inmediatamente una relacion circunstanciada de aquellos sucesos, para que dándosele la publicacion conveniente se juzgue de las cosas como han sucedido, y se frustren la superchería y el engaño.

Comenzaré, pues, por manifestar á V. S., para que se sirva hacerlo al Escmo. Sr. encargado del supremo poder ejecutivo, que el Escmo. Sr. general D. Nicolás Bravo, no ha sido esacto en su parte, y que oculta hechos vistos por muchos, cuyas circunstancias, y otras que despues referiré, lo hacen acreedor á severos cargos, de que parece ha querido substraerse previniendo la opinion en mi contra; y que el general graduado D. Andrés Terres, por su cobarde conducta en la garita de Belen, cuya defensa desgraciadamente le confié, es criminal, agravándola con la desercion que hizo del arresto que le impuse, á consecuencia de aquella, quedándose con el enemigo bajo el pretesto de prisionero: él ha creido, que suscribiendo un parte como el que ha impreso y circulado, quedaba á cubierto de sus críme-

nes: pues separado yo del poder, nada podria contra la grito de las facciones que me hacen la guerra á muerte, porque acogerian sin escámen sus producciones. Pero yo, que por la conservacion de mi buen nombre he impendido sacrificios costosos, estoy resuelto á sostener la verdad y mi justicia ante el mundo entero, sin que nada sea capaz de apartarme de mi noble propósito.

Entrando en la relacion de los sucesos que me propongo referir, diré á V. E.: que considerando conveniente fortificar el Cerro y edificios de Chapultepec, para que el invasor no se apoderase de tan importante posicion, y nos sirviera de base para las operaciones que su procsimidad obligara á practicar contra él, encargué la direccion de estas obras á un gefe facultativo, que lo fué el general D. Mariano Monterde, á quien para mejor espeditarlo nombré comandante militar del punto. Se dictaron por mí cuantas órdenes fueron necesarias para proveerlo de toda clase de materiales: el general de brigada D. Manuel María Lombardini, en gefe entónces del ejército de Oriente, y el gobernador del distrito, general D. Ignacio Gutierrez, podrán manifestar si se omitió alguna diligencia para que Chapultepec se fortificara debidamente: tambien el comisario de aquel ejército podrá presentar las sumas de pesos invertidas en dichas obras.

El general de brigada D. Antonio Leon, fué luego nombrado comandante principal de la línea de Chapultepec, y se le recomendó distintas veces, que vigilara y activara las obras de toda ella, y aun se le previno terminantemente, que estableciera su cuartel principal en el edificio de Chapultepec, y diera parte semanalmente de los adelantos. Yo mismo visité este punto, como lo hice con los demas y no me quedó duda del asiduo empeño con que se trabajaba; de manera, que al apócsimarse el enemigo á la capital, Chapultepec tenia establecidas tres líneas de defensa en buen estado, pudiendo muy bien sostenerse ventajosamente contra quintuplicado número, con diez piezas de artillería que en ellas se colocaron, y mil infantes.

Habiendo el general Monterde desaparecido de Chapultepec para curarse en la capital de enfermedades que dijo le habian sobrevenido, despues de los sucesos de Padierna y Churubusco, ordené se instruyese una averiguacion que pusiera en claro su conducta por haberme parecido impropia en aquellas circunstancias, y que S. E. el general Bravo tomara el mando de tan interesante fortaleza, adonde permaneció hasta el dia 13 citado. Ella estaba provista como he indicado, de diez piezas de artillería con dotaciones dobles de municiones, y con oficiales y tropa de esta arma escogidos, de sobradas

municiones de fusil, de mil infantes de los batallones 10.º de línea, y de Toluca, y de alumnos del colegio militar; y en fin, de víveres para ocho dias. Así permaneció durante el armisticio; pues al principio de este, ocurrió el nombramiento del Sr. Bravo.

Debiendo continuar las hostilidades, ordené el dia 6 de Septiembre en la tarde, que el general Leon con su brigada compuesta de los batallones Libertad, Union, Queréraro y Mina ocupara el Molino del Rey situado á medio tiro de cañon de Chapultepec en la parte del Oeste. El dia 7 por la mañana fué reforzado con la brigada del general Rangel compuesta de los batallones granaderos de la guardia, Activo de San Blas, Misto de Santa-Anna y Morelia. En la misma mañana, mandé ocupar la Casa-Mata, distante un tiro de fusil del Molino del Rey, con los batallones 4.º Ligeros y 11.º de línea á las órdenes del general graduado D. Francisco Perez. En el campo intermedio de los citados puntos, y á favor de las zanjas que allí habia coloqué la brigada del general Ramirez compuesta de los batallones 2.º Ligeros, Fijo de México, 1.º y 12.º de línea; en reserva á los batallones 1.º y 3.º Ligeros; además, seis piezas de artillería bien dotadas. La Casa-Mata conservaba su fortificacion antigua, que la hacia imponente: situé, pues, en ella un repuesto de municiones, y otro en el Molino del Rey. Todas las fuerzas citadas quedaron parapetadas con mas ó menos ventaja. En la hacienda de los Morales á una legua de Chapultepec, se situó la division de caballería del mando del Escmo. Sr. general D. Juan Alvarez, fuerte de 4 000 caballos, y la tarde del mismo dia 7 dispuse que se aprocsimara á poco mas de tiro de fusil de la Casa-Mata, y yo mismo marqué el terreno donde quedó campada, y ordené á dicho general, que cuando observara atacados los puntos inmediatos, obrara con toda aquella caballería decisivamente, pues el terreno era apropiado. Júzguese por todas estas disposiciones si por mí, Chapultepec se abandonaba.

El dia 8 á la madrugada, el enemigo atacó el Molino del Rey y la Casa-Mata con gran parte de sus fuerzas: el fuego vivo que hicieron nuestras tropas, y la ventaja de nuestras posiciones le hicieron sufrir una pérdida de mil hombres, como es notorio, habiendo sido rechazada su primera carga; mas la casualidad que estuvo siempre á su favor lo libertó de una derrota, porque la caballería no operó como debió hacerlo, segun testifica el adjunto parte de S. E. el general Alvarez, á la vez, que las tropas, que desde el Molino del Rey y Casa-Mata, habian rechazado las columnas enemigas, salieron entusiasmadas á perseguirlas sin el apoyo de la caballería, y cuando las

reservas del enemigo les cargaron, no atinaron á volver á sus posiciones, resultando la pérdida de estas, y de las 6 piezas de artillería por la dispersion consiguiente, quedando así ilusoriadas mis combinaciones, y mis órdenes, y á no presentarme en estos momentos con la columna que conducía desde la Candelaria, se hubiera tal vez perdido ese día á Chapultepec.

Me encontraba yo en la Candelaria al amanecer del citado día 8, porque desde la tarde anterior comencé á recibir partes, de que el enemigo amagaba con fuerzas respetables á este punto, y fué preciso atenderlo. Para poderlo verificar convenientemente dispuse; que la brigada del general Rangel, pernoctara esa noche en la Ciudadela; que el primer regimiento Ligero, lo hiciera en la casa Colorada de Alfaro, situada entre Chapultepec y la garita de Belen; y que varias piezas de artillería quitadas de otros puntos, por la escasez que de estas teníamos, reforzaran á la Candelaria. Aquellos partes se robustecieron con el que me dió de viva voz á las 4 de la mañana en mi habitacion el general D. Antonio Vizcayno, á quien habia mandado que observara al enemigo: como me espuso; *que no cabia duda hallarse aquel á la vista de la Candelaria, pues se advertia bien su campamento, y las luces que toda la noche habian estado en movimiento*, ordené en el acto, que la brigada del general Rangel, que debia amanecer en Chapultepec para ocupar la posicion del día anterior, marchase á la Candelaria, que el primer regimiento Ligero siguiera su movimiento, y yo tambien me puse en camino con mi estado mayor. Al llegar á dicho punto, su comandante el general D. Mariano Martinez me participó: *que segun los reconocimientos, que sus descubiertas acababan de hacer, el campo estaba libre de enemigos*. Disgustado por este chasco, vino á llamar mi atencion la luz de unos cañonazos, que advertí por Chapultepec, y no cabiéndome duda que por allí era el ataque, como yo lo habia presumido, destaqué uno de mis ayudantes para que hiciera contramarchar á paso veloz la brigada del general Rangel, y el primero Ligero, é incorporándome á esta fuerza, formé la columna de que hé hecho mencion, y con que llegué al punto del combate.

Próximo á Chapultepec encontré en retirada algunos arzones de las 6 piezas, cuyos carreteros me dieron la noticia de haberse perdido los cañones. Abrevié el paso, y tuve el sentimiento de encontrar tambien al general Leon y al coronel Valderas que conducian heridos: mas adelante observé la dispersion de las tropas que debieron haber dado un día de gloria á la patria tan solo con haber conserva-

do las posiciones donde las habia dejado colocadas. Me ocupé de reunir las como lo conseguí en el resto del día. Uno de mis ayudantes que destiné á indagar el paradero de la caballería, me participó que ésta se hallaba por los Morales retirándose en orden. Incontinentemente reforcé las fortificaciones establecidas en los dos caminos que van para Tacubaya y á la Casa-Mata y que formaban los flancos de derecha é izquierda de Chapultepec, é intenté recobrar los puntos del Molino del Rey y de la Casa-Mata, y aunque fueron inútiles mis primeros esfuerzos, conseguí como á las tres de la tarde que el enemigo se replegara á Tacubaya, quedando el campo por nuestras tropas. A esta operacion contribuyeron mucho los fuegos certeros de la artillería de Chapultepec.

En el resto de la tarde los cuerpos dispersos acabaron de reunirse, y por el mal estado en que los observé, desistí de que permanecieran en los puntos que antes de la accion ocupaban y los mandé á pernoctar á sus cuarteles, dejando en Chapultepec los restos de la brigada del general León que quedó mandando su segundo el general graduado D. Juan Perez de Castro, cuyo número se habia reducido á menos de 400 hombres por los muertos, heridos y dispersos que tuvo.

El enemigo que tanto sufrió en la jornada del 8, se mantuvo sin movimiento el 9 y este día lo emplee en reorganizar mis fuerzss y en adelantar mis fortificaciones. El día 10 comenzó aquel á hacer movimientos que amenazaban los puntos del Niño Perdido y Candelaria y las noticias que mis espías y corresponsales me comunicaban, estaban acordes en que su objeto era atacar aquella línea por creerla mas accesible. Reforcé sus guarniciones, mejoré sus fortificaciones y establecí fuertes reservas en las calzadas de San Antonio Abad y de la Viga. No descuidé por esto á Chapultepec; pues mandé al teniente coronel de ingenieros D. Juan Cano para que atendiera á sus fortificaciones mejorándolas ó aumentándolas en cuanto fuera posible, y en observacion mantuve en la Ciudadela una brigada.

El 11 los movimientos del enemigo ratificaban su intencion de atacar los puntos del Niño Perdido y la Candelaria, porque se presentaron á la vista respetables columnas y se observaban trabajos de fortificacion en la Ermita situada en la calzada del Niño Perdido, de manera que fué necesario estar batiéndola con la artillería del segundo punto, á cuyo fuego contestaban las piezas que aquel habia ya colocado. Por el reconocimiento que en la tarde practicó el regimiento de Húzares, me cercioré que el enemigo conservaba en las inmediaciones gran parte de sus fuerzas.

El día 12 á las seis de la mañana, se sintieron los fuegos del enemigo sobre la Candelaria y el Niño Perdido, con mas continuacion sobre el primero, lo mismo que en Chapultepec. Una hora despues tuve noticias por mis espías, que en Tacubaya se concentraban las fuerzas enemigas. En el instante volví á fijar toda mi atencion sobre Chapultepec, y me trasladé á este punto para proveer á su mejor defensa. Observé á mi llegada que el enemigo habia establecido en Tacubaya y en la hacienda de la Condesa grandes baterías con que sostenia un vivo fuego sobre nuestros puntos y que habia ocupado el Molino del Rey, y ya no dudé de sus verdaderas intenciones.

Mis providencias comenzaron por reforzar los atrincheramientos de los flancos de la fortaleza y quedaron bien artillados y suficientemente guarnecidos. Considerando conveniente asegurar con algunas obras y una pieza de artillería la puerta principal del bosque por la parte interior, encargué de ellas á los tenientes coroneles de Ingenieros D. Manuel y D. Luis Robles, quienes las concluyeron en el resto del día, así como algunas otras que por la parte exterior juzgué necesarias. Todas las fuerzas disponibles las hice situar en la inmediacion de Chapultepec donde permanecieron, no obstante el fuego incesante que llovía sobre ellas, y de los muertos y heridos que experimentaban á cada momento, en cuyo recinto me mantuve á caballo disponiendo todo lo conveniente, por lo que mi vida estuvo en peligro muchas ocasiones como lo vieron cuantos me rodeaban. En una vez que traté de situar en la falda del cerro de Chapultepec la brigada del general Ramirez, una bomba puso en tierra delante de mí entre muertos y heridos, á treinta hombres de ella y la sangre de un soldado salpicó mis vestidos; suceso que me convenció de no ser posible mantenerla en aquel lugar sin que toda pereciera y la hice retirar adonde tuviera algun abrigo.

Las obras de las puertas del rastrillo por la parte interior del bosque, quedaron guarnecidas con 500 hombres y una pieza de á 8 bien dotada.

A las oraciones concurrió el Escmo. Sr. general Bravo á la cita que le hice, y le manifesté los trabajos abajo aumentados, la pieza y fuerzas que los cubrian, la seguridad en que quedaban los dos caminos exteriores de los flancos, y la fuerte reserva que en la Casa Colorada de Alfaro subsistiría en la noche, teniendo órdenes todas las tropas disponibles para estar á las cuatro de la mañana en aquel sitio, y últimamente, que yo mismo estaria tambien. El Sr. Bravo me espuso entónces por primera vez: *que la guarnicion que tenia en el fuerte de arri-*

ba estaba espantada con el horroroso fuego que habia sufrido todo el dia y que celebraria se le relevase con otra clase de tropa. Le contesté, que el mal de espanto habia cundido á la que estaba abajo, y que siendo toda de una misma calidad escusado era el cambio que me proponia; pero que al amanecer, si el enemigo atacaba, yo lo reforzaria con oportunidad. Me reprodujo, que al menos le pusiera en el bosque un batallon, y para hacerle ver lo inútil de su solicitud, le relaté muy breve lo que habia acontecido en la tarde con la brigada del general Ramirez, y le añadió: que si arriba aglomeráramos mas fuerzas durante el bombardeo, sacrificaríamos inútilmente las pocas que ya nos quedaban, pues con mas de mil hombres que á tan pequeño recinto guarnecian, estaban bien cubiertas todas sus obras. Ninguna otra razon me dió en esta entrevista.

El 13 al amanecer concurrieron todas las tropas disponibles abajo de Chapultepec y yo así mismo estuve presente. El enemigo continuó sus fuegos de mortero y de cañon, y entre 7 y 8 de la mañana comenzó á mover sus columnas de ataque. Media hora antes llegó á mis manos un oficio del Sr. general Bravo contraido a decir al ministro de la guerra (que se hallaba siempre á mi lado) *que la guarnicion de arriba seguía acobardada, y que en la noche se habia notado alguna desercion, y pedia que se le relevara con otra clase de tropa.* En vista de esta nota dispuse que el batallon de San Blas con fuerza de cuatrocientos hombres, y á quien yo distinguia por el brio que advertía en tan buenos soldados, marchara á reforzar el fuerte de arriba, y á su comandante el bravo Xicotencatl le previne que se presentara al Sr. general Bravo y recibiera sus órdenes. Al romper la marcha este cuerpo, el toque de corneta anunció que el enemigo avanzaba sobre nuestros puntos, y entónces mandé al mismo gefe que á paso veloz subiera al fuerte. En estos momentos encontrábame yo en la puerta del bosque. En efecto, llegó á tiempo segun observé, y en los primeros atrincheramientos del cerro, se batió desesperadamente hasta concluir casi todo, resistiendo el empuje de los enemigos procedentes del Molino del Rey.

Haciéndose general el ataque yo proveía con mi reserva á las necesidades que se notaban. Esta reserva me quedó reducida á los Batallones 3.º Ligero con 400 plazas; 4.º idem con 300; 11.º de línea con 600; Activo de Morelia con 300, y el de Hidalgo de guardia nacional con 350, formando todos un total de 1.950 hombres, que fueron empleados del modo siguiente. Al 3º Ligero le mandé que reforzara al batallon de S. Blás, y en marcha tuvo que retroceder porque en

estos momentos el enemigo se apoderó del fuerte de Chapultepec: al 4.º Ligeró, al 11.º de línea y al activo de Morelia, que se mantuvieran en reserva á las órdenes del general Lombardini para ausiliar á los puntos de abajo que eran atacados por fuertes columnas vigorosamente; y la de Guardia Nacional de Hidalgo lo coloqué en el flanco izquierdo de la fortificación que defendía el camino de la Condesa donde se batió bien.

No obstante las pocas fuerzas que defendían las posiciones de abajo, el arrojó con que el enemigo las atacaba y su mayor número, él fué bizarramente rechazado, y no avanzaba un paso cuando comencé á advertir que el fuerte de arriba no hacía el fuego que era de esperar de su guarnición, y poco despues ví con sorpresa que en grandes pelotones descendían huyendo, y abandonaban cobardemente sus parapetos, que solo de esta manera pudiera el enemigo haber ocupado fácilmente. Tan infame conducta me puso en el mayor conflicto, pues ocupadas las alturas de Chapultepec por el enemigo, las fuerzas de abajo quedaban enteramente espuestas á ser asesinadas con impunidad, y para evitarlo, no quedó otro recurso que emprender la retirada para las garitas de Belén y Santo Tomás. Así lo ordené en medio de la mayor desesperación.

El general D. Matías de la Peña y Barragan, que mandaba el punto de mi derecha, se dirigió por la calzada de la Verónica á la fortificación de Santo Tomás con los batallones de granaderos de la guardia y 1.º ligero, llevando orden de sostenerla, protegido por la caballería, que segun mis órdenes anteriores debía allí encontrarse. El general Lombardini se dirigió á la garita de Belén en el mejor orden, y á su paso colocó en el parapeto intermedio, al batallón activo de Morelia, que sostuvo valientemente la retirada de los demas cuerpos, que con tanta bizarría defendieron los otros puntos de abajo de Chapultepec.

Algunos de los cobardes que huyeron del fuerte de arriba de Chapultepec, y que me fueron presentados pocas horas despues, se disculpaban con el abandono del punto, que decían *hizo antes el general Bravo*; espresiones que reproché delante de muchos á los que las vertían, porque me parecia impropia de S. E. tal conducta. Posteriormente he sabido que fué tomado prisionero en el bosque de abajo, metido en una zanja de agua que lo cubria hasta el pescuezo, adonde por lo blanco de su cabeza fué descubierto de los enemigos. Hecho es este, que prueba el dicho de aquellos, y que merece depurarse en un juicio. Viene en favor de lo espuesto, el no hacer mencion en su

parte del valiente batallón de San Blas, que pereció casi todo en las trincheras del cerro, pues si el Sr. Bravo hubiera permanecido en él hasta última hora debió haberlo visto precisamente, y si lo vió ¿para qué es ocultar que le fué este refuerzo, y quejarse que no se le ausilió? De todas maneras, la conducta del general Bravo no ha sido honrosa pues cuando menos, ha faltado á la verdad, sorprendiendo así al público con agravio de la justicia y de mi buen nombre. Además, el gefe de una fortaleza que debe defenderla á toda costa, aparece muerto ó prisionero en ella. Sensible es para mí tener que presentar hechos de un compañero, que de buena gana sepultaria en el silencio si él mismo no me precisara á hacerlo, dando á luz un parte que mis enemigos han acogido con algazara, y de que han sacado argumentos para apoyar sus diatribas y calumnias. Pido por lo mismo encarecidamente al supremo gobierno que se instruya el sumario correspondiente sobre los particulares referidos, incorporándose á él este parte.

Volviendo á la narración de los sucesos en la parte que toca al general Terres, manifestaré, que habiendo yo llegado á la garita de Belén, dispuse luego su mejor defensa. Las piezas grandes que estaban en la fortificación de la calzada de la Piedad, las hice trasladar á la de Belén en relevo de las chicas que en esta habia, con lo que quedó bien artillada. El general Terres mandaba dias antes ambos puntos, y tenia en ellos los batallones 1.º y 2.º activos de México y el de Guanajuato; á éstos aumenté el de inválidos y Lagos, que coloqué en la calzada de la izquierda, cuya defensa encomendé al general graduado D. Diego Argüelles, mi ayudante de campo; y el 2.º ligero con otros piquetes al mando del general Ramirez en la calzada de la derecha, y últimamente, se replegó á la garita el activo de Morelia despues de batirse como he mencionado. Los enemigos se acercaron y fueron rechazados. La Ciudadela fué reforzada con algunos cuerpos. Mandé tambien que de las piezas de la Candelaria se llevasen cuatro á Santo Tomás, que sirvieron con mucha oportunidad en la garita de San Cosmé.

En esta situación recibí parte *que los enemigos avanzaban por S. Cosme, y que las fuerzas de Santo Tomás venían en retirada.* Me dirigí al general Terres, y al hacerle saber que me pasaba á S. Cosme, y que volveria, le recomendé conservara todo en el mismo estado: observando que se menudeaba el fuego de cañón sin necesidad, y sabiendo la escasez de municiones, me aprocsimé á los artilleros, y les previne que no dispararan las piezas hasta que el enemigo se aprocsimara á buena distancia.

Con los batallones 3.º y 4.º ligeros, y 11.º de línea á las órdenes del general Perez marché á S. Cosme, y en la garita de este nombre encontré al general Rangel, y mas avanzado en un parapeto, al general Peña y Barragan, que con una corta fuerza se batia bizarramente con el enemigo; mandé ocupar algunos edificios á vanguardia y retaguardia de la garita, así como la azotea de la misma garita. En estos momentos llegaron las piezas de la Candelaria, y ordené al general Rangel que les diera colocacion como lo hizo violentamente, manifestándole mi resolucion de defender aquel punto á toda costa.

El general Peña y Barragan pidió refuerzo, y con mi ayudante el coronel Cosío le mandé dos compañías del 11.º batallon. El enemigo habia sido contenido, y me lisonjeaba ya de que no pasaria fácilmente, cuando se me dió parte *que el general Terres habia abandonado la garita de Belen, y por consiguiente que la Ciudadela estaba en peligro de perderse.* Con tan inesperada noticia me trasladé rápidamente para Belen con los tres cuerpos que en reserva tenia, á escepcion de las dos compañías del 11.º citadas. Mandé orden al general Martinez para que con toda la guarnicion y artillería de la Candelaria se replegara á la Ciudadela. A ésta llegué cuando el enemigo apoderado de la garita de Belen, avanzaba una columna por el Paseo Nuevo, y otra por la calzada de Belen próxima á la puerta, de manera que casi nos disputamos la entrada: se les rompió un fuego vivo, y conseguí replegarlas á la garita de Belen causándoles bastante daño.

Salvada la Ciudadela por la rapidez de mi movimiento, procuré indagar el motivo que habia ocasionado la funesta pérdida de la garita de Belen, y una voz uniforme me impuso *que el general Terres habia ordenado su evacuacion, ejecutada con tanto espacio, que hasta las piezas y municiones se habian salvado.* Al general Argüelles reconvine por el abandono del punto que le confié, y me manifestó, *que no queriendo él retirarse porque no veia una necesidad, se le repitió la orden á nombre del jefe de la línea, y no le quedó mas arbitrio que obedecerla.* Por tantas faltas y tantos acontecimientos desgraciados, producidos por la mas punible insubordinacion y cobardía, el despecho y desesperacion se apoderaron de mí de tal modo, que al presentárseme el general Terres, ciego de cólera, descargué sobre él dos ó tres golpes, y le mandé arrancar la espada y las divisas que portaba, declarándole indigno servidor de una nacion que le habia prodigado sus consideraciones, y que entre tanto era juzgado con arreglo á ordenanza, guardase arresto en la

Ciudadela. Este arresto fué quebrantado por tan mal militar, segun al principio de esta nota he insinuado, en el hecho de no continuar con el ejército mexicano, que evacuó la Ciudadela la madrugada del dia 14 para trasladarse á la ciudad de Guadalupe Hidalgo, y haberse quedado sin mi consentimiento en un lugar que ocupó despues el enemigo, teniendo el descaro de presentarse en su célebre parte, como prisionero de guerra, sin esplicar cómo apareció de esta manera. El supremo gobierno juzgará de estos hechos, y no dudo de su justificacion, que ordenará lo conveniente para que sean esclarecidos y castigados como ecsigen las leyes, el honor del ejército, y la vindicta pública.

Replegado el enemigo á la garita de Belen como he relatado, comenzó sus fuegos de cañon sobre la Ciudadela, á que correspondió ésta debidamente. Intenté desalojarlo con el batallon activo de Morelia y otros piquetes, y no fué posible, aunque nuestros soldados en esta vez obraron con extraordinario arrojo. Serian las cinco de la tarde, cuando recibí parte, *que la garita de San Cosme necesitaba refuerzo.* Regresé para aquel punto con el tercer batallon ligero y un piquete de granaderos de la guardia: al llegar me impuse por mi ayudante el coronel Cosío, *que el parapeto avanzado habia sido abandonado por las cargas repetidas del enemigo, y que al retirarse con las dos compañías del 11.º batallon le fueron muertos por nuestra metralla dos soldados, recibiendo el una contusion.* Observé en seguida que la defensa estaba reducida á la sola garita que sostenia con valor el general Rangel. Dispuse que el batallon 3.º ligero quedase de reserva á la espalda de la garita, y mandé ocupar la casa de D. Atilano Sanchez y otras inmediatas para que fuesen apoyadas nuestras fuerzas de la garita. Entre tanto se ejecutaba esta operacion por el batallon 1.º ligero, ví morir á algunos oficiales y soldados de este cuerpo por los proyectiles del enemigo que menudeaban. Se me dijo allí que por los jardines de la casa nombrada de Pinillos, se introducía el enemigo, y pasé á ella con cien granaderos de la guardia, que hice situar en las azoteas despues de cerciorado que no habia nada por los jardines. Acabada esta operacion ya al concluir la tarde, oí repentinamente un toque de corneta procedente de la garita de San Cosme, que repetido no me cupo duda que se tocaba retirada; salí precipitado con mi estado mayor para informarme de aquel incidente, cuando los grupos de tropa que venian desbandados nos atropellaban, de modo que no quedó mas recurso que marchar entre ellos hasta que por los esfuerzos de mis ayudantes se logró que detuvieran

la carrera y oyeran mi prevencion, de *replegarse á la Ciudadela*, a donde los conduje con no poco trabajo, siendo necesario destacar algunas partidas de caballería para hacer volver á muchos oficiales, que con mas ó menos número de soldados se marchaban por diferentes calles.

Las siete de la noche serian cuando me encontraba en las puertas de la Ciudadela, y hasta no quedar satisfecho de haber encontrado toda la fuerza de San Cosme, no me apeé del caballo, que montaba desde las cuatro de la mañana. Procuré indagar quién habia mandado tocar la retirada, que tanto desórden habia causado, y se me dijo que el general Rangel. Como desde entónces no he vuelto á ver á este general, no he podido cerciorarme mejor de este hecho, que causó por supuesto la pérdida de la citada garita, y el que quedara el paso franco al enemigo para introducirse al centro de la capital.

A las 8 de la noche presidí en la Ciudadela una junta de guerra de generales, que convoqué para oír sus opiniones y tomar con acierto un partido en tan terribles circunstancias. Asistió á esta junta el Excmo. Sr. gobernador del Estado de México, coronel de Guardia Nacional D. Francisco Modesto de Olaguibel, que á la sazón se hallaba en ella, pues en la tarde habia llegado con 200 infantes y 4 piezas ligeras de artillería con el fin de ausiliar la capital. En la junta se recapituláron los acontecimientos del día, y aun otros anteriores; se deploró la situacion á que nos habia reducido la desobediencia de unos, la cobardía de otros, y la inmoralidad en general de nuestro ejército, de manera, que no habia que esperar mejor conducta; tambien se hizo ver en favor de él que las continuas revueltas, nuestra desorganizacion social y el mal sistema de reemplazarlo, habian influido mucho en aquel mal, á la vez que por nuestras escaseces los soldados no eran atendidos con lo que les pertenecia como puntualmente acontecia en aquel día, que no habian probado alimento; que en cuatro anteriores se les debian los socorros, y no se sabia si para el siguiente tendrian que comer. Se manifestó igualmente la escasez de municiones para poder sostener un día mas el combate, las pocas fuerzas que habian quedado, y últimamente, que reducidos al solo recinto de la Ciudadela era consiguiente, que el enemigo apuraria sus proyectiles, y no seria posible permanecer en ella un par de horas: que ocurrir á los edificios de la ciudad, seria comprometerla sin esperanzas de un buen suceso, cuando el pueblo con pocas escepciones, no tomaba parte en la lucha. Estas y otras reflexiones se tuvieron presentes para resolver, como se acordó unánimemente, que la madrugada se evacuara la Ciudadela

y edificios inmediatos; y que la artillería, municiones y tropa se situaran en la ciudad de Guadalupe Hidalgo, todo á las órdenes del general Lombardini, como se efectuó.

Los cuerpos de caballería que estaban en la capital, recibieron órden de estar tambien á la madrugada en la citada ciudad de Guadalupe Hidalgo, para incorporarse á la division de caballería que allí se hallaba con el Excmo. Sr. general Alvarez.

Reunidas todas las fuerzas en Guadalupe Hidalgo, en medio de la hambre y de la miseria mas espantosa, acordé con el Excmo. Sr. general de division D. José J. de Herrera, que nos dividieramos las atenciones; S. E., pues, marchó para Querétaro con toda la infantería y artillería, y con la caballería y 4 piezas ligeras lo hice yo para Puebla. La necesidad y el buen servicio de la nacion escigieron esta medida, porque ni era posible subsistir un día mas sin comer en un lugar en que todo faltaba, ni debia perderse tiempo en salvar los restos de un ejército que aun podia prestar útiles servicios. El general Herrera fué encargado de reorganizar las fuerzas que puse á su mando con tal objeto, y yo no dudé que se verificaria con los recursos de los Estados mas ricos de la república, y me lisongeaba que entre tanto esto tenia efecto, yo hostilizaría á la guarnicion enemiga de Puebla, cuya rendicion juzgué muy importante.

Cuando acababa de llegar al pueblo de San Cristóbal, se presentaron en mi solicitud algunos ciudadanos de la capital anunciándome, *que la vista del pabellon americano elevado en el Palacio por nuestros enemigos, habia causado tanta irritacion en los ánimos, que en masa el pueblo se habia levantado contra los invasores, los tenia reducidos al círculo de la plaza y les habian quitado seis cañones; y me pidieron, por último, que contramarchara y fuera á tomar parte el ejército con el pueblo.* Tan plausible nueva, confieso, que me conmovió extraordinariamente y el mismo efecto advertí en el general Alvarez, que en ese momento se hallaba conmigo, y ambos unánimemente nos dispusimos á contramarchar sin pérdida de un instante, y casi á escape llegamos con la caballería á la ciudad de Guadalupe Hidalgo, á donde esperamos un corto rato al batallon del Sur, que marchaba con el Sr. Alvarez, el que continuó hasta la garita de Peralvillo seguido de algunos cuerpos de caballería. El Sr. Alvarez y yo penetramos hasta las calles de la capital para cerciorarnos por nuestra propia vista de lo que acontecia en ella, y obrar segun los sucesos, habiendo dejado en la calzada de Guadalupe en observacion el resto de la caballería. Desde San Cristóbal ordené al general Herrera que

contramarchara con la infantería y artillería; pero S. E. había ya llegado á Cuautitlan cuando recibí mi comunicacion, y no fué posible su vuelta.

Cuanto fué mi entusiasmo por las ecsageradas noticias que se me dieron en San Cristóbal, así fué el disgusto que me causó el desengaño, pues no observé mas que algunos tiros de fusil, que á los enemigos disparaban en algunas esquinas varios individuos del pueblo, siendo falso la quitada de piezas, y por consiguiente la sublevacion general de todas las clases que sitiaban en la plaza á los invasores. Sin embargo, en Peralvillo hice levantar una trinchera que pusiera á cubierto á la infantería del Sur, que allí se colocó para ausiliar al pueblo, y con igual objeto hice recorrer por diversos barrios gruesas partidas de caballería, que como los demas cuerpos de esta arma, se retiraron á pasar la noche á Guadalupe, quedando en Peralvillo la infantería hasta el 16 por la mañana.

El dia 15 destaqué á varios cuerpos de caballería para que recorriesen algunas calles de la capital y protegiesen al pueblo en el movimiento que se me aseguraba iba á ejecutar ese dia sobre los invasores si la tropa lo apoyaba. Marchó tambien el general Alvarez para estar á la mira y aprovechar la ocasion de hostilizar al enemigo; pero el dia pasó lo mismo que el anterior y el Sr. Alvarez al retirarse en la noche me participó: *que solamente se habia conseguido que los regimientos de caballería 5.º, 9.º y Guanajuato, lancearan á algunos soldados enemigos que encontraron; y en fin, que no observaba síntomas que confirmaran ese levantamiento que se nos aseguraba.*

Como en el citado dia 15 fueron muy temprano varios ciudadanos á representarme á nombre del pueblo de la capital, *que el alcalde primero D. Manuel Reyes Veramendi con el ayuntamiento, tomaba medidas para reprimir su entusiasmo,* mostrándome un impreso que lo confirmaba, yo le pasé el oficio marcado con el número 1, que me contestó dicho alcalde con el número 2, y que le reproduje con el número 3.

El 16 por la mañana se me incorporaron los señores ministros de guerra y relaciones, que se habian adelantado hasta San Juan Teotihuacan, y observándome con juiciosas razones las dificultades que traeria el no fijar el gobierno en un punto central como Querétaro, yo no vacilé en acordar el decreto de esa fecha, y á continuacion el manifiesto que ha visto la nacion; porque mi delicadeza no me permitia alejarme á tanta distancia del teatro de la guerra, y preferí la campaña al gabinete, como otras veces.

Tomada la determinacion indicada, dispuse la continuacion de la marcha para Puebla como se efectuó en el mismo dia, pues ya no se encontraba ni forrages para los caballos.

He relatado con esactitud mis últimas operaciones de la capital, para demostrar la injusticia con que se ha intentado poner en duda mi comportamiento, cuyos resultados si no han sido felices, como vivamente lo deseaba, es incuestionable que pureza de intenciones y patriotismo han sobrado. Terminaré pues, esta nota, cumpliendo á la vez con mi deber de participar al supremo gobierno, lo que hizo infructuosos mis últimos esfuerzos sobre Puebla.

Se me habia informado oficialmente que en Cholula se encontraban dos mil quinientos infantes de la Guardia Nacional del Estado y dos piezas pequeñas de artillería, á las órdenes del general de brigada D. Manuel María Villada, y que á las del general graduado D. Joaquin Rea, ecsistian 600 guerrilleros que circundaban á Puebla; cuyas fuerzas, y aun el pueblo de esta ciudad ardian en entusiasmo para combatir con la guarnicion enemiga, que insultaba con su presencia á aquellos habitantes. Por esto fué que, desde Guadalupe Hidalgo ordené al Escmo. Sr. general D. Juan Alvarez, nombrado comandante general del Estado de Puebla, que con las fuerzas del Sur de su mando, reducidas á 600 hombres de infantería y caballería, se dirigiera para dicha ciudad por el camino de Tescoco y San Martin Tsemelucan, haciéndolo yo con dos mil caballos y cuatro piezas ligeras por los llanos de Apam hasta el molino de Santo Domingo, lisonjeado con que reuniria sobre Puebla 6.000 hombres, que ayudados del pueblo harian muy pronto sucumbir á la guarnicion enemiga, que no ecsedia de mil hombres, aunque con buenas fortificaciones en los cerros de Loreto, Guadalupe y cuartel de San José.

En la tarde del 21 me presente en las calles de Puebla con una pequeña escolta y fuí recibido por el pueblo con música y entusiasmo, que me confirmó su buena disposicion contra el enemigo comun. Encontré en diversos cuarteles á la infantería de Guardia Nacional que se hallaba en Cholula.

El 22 me situé en la misma ciudad para dirigir las operaciones, y coloqué mis fuerzas en el Cármen y otros puntos. El general Alvarez llegó al siguiente dia.

Nombré gobernador militar de la plaza al general Rea, quien declaró en estado de sitio la ciudad, y tomó todas las providencias convenientes para estrechar al enemigo, privándole los recursos que disfrutaba sin oposicion; de manera que se vió precisado á no dar un

paso fuera de sus atrincheramientos. Reconocí estos muy de cerca, y juzgué difícil un asalto, sin embargo hice al gefe enemigo la intimacion que adjunto en copia con el número 4, y su contestacion número 5. Esta me dió á conocer, que no quedaba otro arbitrio que la fuerza, y mandé estrechar el sitio, de que resultó empeñarse á cada momento el fuego de una y otra parte, costandole al enemigo alguna pérdida y varios desertores que declararon *la escasez de víveres en que estaban.*

Cuando todo daba esperanzas de su pronta rendición, recibí noticias oficiales de hallarse un convoy en Jalapa con direccion á Puebla, y ya se hizo necesario salirle al encuentro. Dispuse al efecto, que el general Rea quedase con el mando de las fuerzas precisas para llevar á cabo el sitio, y con el resto me dirigí al Pinal como punto apropiado para esperar y batir la fuerza del convoy. El día primero de Octubre se emprendió la marcha, y en un momento de descanso en Amozoc, observé que la infantería de Guardia Nacional del Estado comenzaba á desertar dejando en pabellones los fusiles. Pernoctamos esa noche en Acajete, y tuve parte al amanecer, que cuerpos enteros de dicha Guardia Nacional se desertaron, unos con armas y otros dejándolas, cuyo escándalo me hizo conocer que mis planes se frustrarian. Sin embargo; proseguí la marcha á Nopalucan para observar al enemigo, y mandé fortificar algunos puntos del Pinal, que reconocí previamente para batirlo con ventaja. El coronel D. José María Carrasco, á quien encargué de esas obras, trabajó con una actividad extraordinaria, y las hubiera terminado en dos ó tres dias, con las cuadrillas de las haciendas que se reunieron, si la fatalidad que siempre presidió á nuestras operaciones, no me hubiera obligado á variar el plan que me habia propuesto. La desercion continuó sin poderse evitar, haciéndose trascendental á la tropa de línea de caballería, de cuyos cuerpos desertaron tambien algunos oficiales, pidiendo otros, pasaportes para separarse del servicio ó marcharse á Querétaro. A proporcion que el enemigo se aprocsimaba, crecia el escándalo hasta temerse una conspiracion. Pensé hacer algunos ejemplares con los cobardes, pero las prudentes reflexiones del general Alvarez me contuvieron, y al fin determiné que regresaran á Puebla los restos de Guardia Nacional. En seguida marchó el mismo Sr. general Alvarez con su tropa del Sur; pues como comandante general del Estado, debia dirigir las operaciones del sitio y disponer lo conveniente con oportunidad si no se lograba rendir la guarnicion antes de la llegada del convoy; y para reforzarlo puse á sus órdenes algu-

nos cuerpos de caballería. Yo me quedé en Nopalucan con mil y pico de caballos y seis piezas ligeras, con objeto de entretener al convoy y hostilizarlo en cuanto fuera posible, ya que no me quedaba otro recurso. Recibí noticias de Querétaro, que el general D. Isidro Reyes caminaba á reunírseme con una brigada y dos piezas de batir, y para esperarlo en buen lugar me pasé á situar á Huamantla.

Los sucesos que despues tuvieron lugar constan en el parte del dia 13 del mismo Octubre que corre impreso, y del que V. E. no se ha dignado acusarme recibo. En él ecsiste un testimonio de mis últimos afanes, y de que las armas que estaban á mi mando se empleaban en su objeto: de él adjunto copia con el número 6.

La imparcialidad juzgará si mi conducta es acreedora á las diatribas, y á las amargas censuras de los que aprovechando la confusion y el desórden, gritan y escriben con repeticion *abandono escandaloso de la capital* para sorprender la sencillez de algunos, y para robustecer las especies, que con fin siniestro han propagado, de *traicion*. Las facciones no se paran en medios, y hasta los infortunios de la patria los hacen servir á su objeto. Conozco que nada valdrán los hechos que han pasado á la vista de tantos hombres: la generosidad con que me presenté á sacrificar mi vida, mi fortuna y la de mis hijos, para libertar la independenciamenazada: los esfuerzos que todos han presenciado para organizar ejércitos cuando poco habia, y conducirlos al campo de batalla, á donde tantas veces estuvo en peligro mi existencia: que mi inocencia y mi justicia serán escarnecidas por mis enemigos; y que todo, todo será convertido en delitos para esa turba, que ansiosa aspira á cebarse en la víctima. Consúmese en hora buena la iniquidad si la Providencia así lo permite, acábese con una reputacion que la envidia mira con ódio; aténtese contra la vida de un viejo soldado, que las balas del invasor han respetado, y cébense en la sangre que vino á derramar en sostén del honor y derechos de la nacion, aun cuando así se aumente á nuestra historia un nuevo acto de barbárie y de ingratitude; pero yo con una conciencia tranquila haré frente á tanta maldad: alzaré mi voz hasta el cielo para que se me haga justicia y legaré, en fin, á mis verdugos el oprobio de mi muerte.

Sírvase V. E. ponerlo todo en conocimiento del Escmo. Sr. encargado del supremo poder ejecutivo, pidiendole á mi nombre se sirva mandar, que á esta nota se le dé la publicacion correspondiente, y reciba V. E. á la vez las consideraciones de mi particular aprecio.—

Dios y libertad. Tehuacan, Noviembre 12 de 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—Escmo. Sr. ministro de guerra y marina.



Comandancia general del Estado libre y soberano de Puebla.—Escmo. Sr.—Como llegará tiempo en que los sucesos de la jornada del día 8 en las lomas de la hacienda de los Morales y Chapultepec lleguen á publicarse, porque así está en el deber de los gefes que conocen el honor, y de los que perteneciendo á la primera division de caballería de las dos que estaban á mi mando, procuraron llenar sus deberes, tengo el honor de adjuntar á V. E. el parte de ellos, que suscrito desde México el día 11, me habia sido imposible remitirlo á V. E. por las muchas ocupaciones del servicio; suplicandole que admita á la vez mis consideraciones y atencion.—Dios y libertad. Santiago en Puebla, Septiembre 25 de 1847.—*Juan Alvarez*.—Escmo. Sr. general D. Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna en gefe del ejército mexicano.



Division de caballería.—General en gefe.—Escmo. Sr.—De propósito me habia guardado de no participar al supremo gobierno las ocurrencias de la jornada del 8, con respecto á la division de caballería que se dignó poner á mis órdenes, por el principio de que no se me atribuyese el mas leve deseo de perjudicar á algunos gefes de cuya carrera no he tenido antecedentes; pero cuando observo que mi silencio agravia el valor de sus valientes dragones y pone en vacilacion la reputacion de otros muchos gefes, dignos del rango que ocupan en la milicia, tengo necesidad de hablar, así como de esclarecer hechos que den por resultado, supuesta la justificacion del supremo gobierno, el que se corrijan anomalías que trastornan la disciplina militar y que son las que por desgracia han contribuido á que los esfuerzos extraordinarios de la patria, que tan maestramente ha puesto en juego el Escmo. Sr. presidente para la presente guerra, no hayan producido todos los efectos que eran de desearse, porque la moral del ejército no guarda el estado que debia. Entro en materia.

En cumplimiento de la suprema orden de V. E. que recibí en la Villa de Guadalupe el 6 á las diez y media de la noche, para que al amanecer del 7 me pusiese en marcha á Tacuba; lo verifiqué con las precauciones que eran consiguientes, por haberme añadido V. E. que batiese al enemigo que se me presentase en el tránsito. Al lle-

gar al punto indicado recibí órdenes vervales que me fueron comunicadas por algunos ayudantes del Escmo. Sr. presidente, para que siguiese hasta la hacienda de los Morales; lo hice así, y antes de llegar á ella alcancé la segunda division del mando del Sr. general D. Manuel Andrade que me llevaba la vanguardia. Cuando observé que este gefe la metia á la hacienda, le mandé decir con el Sr. coronel D. Manuel Falcon que creia conveniente formase su fuerza en el campo. Me propuse en esto dos objetos: el primero, que el Escmo. Sr. general en gefe la tuviese totalmente dispuesta para el momento que la mandase obrar, y segundo, que el enemigo se engañase en su número porque la de mi division que prolongaba mucho su línea, no estaba muy visible, por el terreno en que se le habia mandado marcar el alto; mas la contestacion de dicho señor general, que en otras circunstancias no habria tolerado, me hizo entender que no tenia la misma voluntad para acatarme, ni para que obrásemos con la combinacion necesaria caso de presentarse el enemigo. Su contestacion: "*Ni reconozco á V. por conducto para comunicarme órdenes, ni á ese general Alvarez para dárme las.*" Permítame V. E. que antes de entrar al fondo de mi parte de operaciones haya relatado un suceso, que de luego á luego le manifestará la ambicion de mando, la falta de armonía y la descortesía de un general que se precia de ilustrado, y que ha pretendido ridiculizarme, porque no tengo la facilidad de espresarme como su señoría, porque carezco de ese juego de palabras y estilo con que se engaña y se adula, y porque no uso bordados ni una ceñida corbata en el cuello. Yo he oido decir Escmo. Sr., y el Sr. general Andrade, quizá lo habrá leido, que el gran Gustavo Basa, padre de Carlos XII salió de los bosques porque no era mas que un rancharo, á hacer la felicidad de la Suecia, y que el príncipe de Menciloff de jóven pastelero, sin saber leer ni escribir por solos sus grandes servicios, se elevó tambien á ser en una laboriosa carrera hasta primer ministro y coolaborador de Pedro el Grande; así como que el duque de Dalmacia desde su oscura carrera militar se abrió un glorioso camino por sus servicios que lo elevaron á la encumbrada dignidad que guardaba con el capitan moderno de nuestro siglo.

No se me suponga tan fátuo que al citar estos rasgos quiera comparar mi carrerani mi porvenir con esos hombres que la historia recuerda con gloria, porque mi objeto es concluir con que menos puede esperarse de *esas reputaciones usurpadas, de esos empleos asalta-*

dos por el favor y por los compromisos, de esos hombres, en fin, cuyo patriotismo es el aspirar con temeridad.

El espresado dia 7 á que me refiero, lo pasamos como V. E. fué testigo; concluyéndolo con pernoctar en el campo las brigadas de la primera division, y en la hacienda de los Morales la segunda. Al amanecer del 8 me dirigí con mi estado mayor al camino en que habian amanecido la primera y segunda brigadas, y cuando el primer cañonazo me anunció el ataque, que comencé á presenciar, ordené que las dos brigadas de que hago mencion avanzasen sobre la falda del llano que tenian á su frente, para que las que componian la segunda division siguiesen sin tropiezo ni barullo hasta el punto donde yo me hallaba dirigiendo las operaciones. Desocupado ya el terreno mandé prevenir al Sr. general D. Manuel Andrade que avanzase con la suya, interim otros ayudantes daban órdenes á los señores generales Juvera y Guzman, que ya tenian ordenadas sus columnas sobre la loma contigua á la en que estaba el enemigo, para que cargase por su flanco en los momentos que la segunda lo haria por el frente: practicaron su movimiento aquellos gefes, y mi corazon palpité de júbilo cuando observé los vivas de entusiasmo que dirigian al supremo gobierno y á la patria sus ordenadas columnas; pero por más que mandaba avivar el movimiento del Sr. general Andrade, con su division, tenia el sentimiento de no verlo llegar y de que por su demora se escapaban los momentos que debiamos aprovechar para la carga. El Sr. general D. Tomás Moreno y otros gefes de mi estado mayor, se multiplicaban en comunicar mis órdenes al espresado Sr. Andrade para que avanzase; pero no llegó á verificarlo sino hasta que el enemigo para escaparse de la carga que le amenazaba, comenzó con sus fuegos de cañon á desorganizar las columnas que conducian los Sres. Juvera y Guzman, las que no encontrando apoyo en su flanco izquierdo, se empezaron á desvandar sin que fuese ya posible ordenarlas, no obstante el valeroso comportamiento de los Sres. generales Torrejon y Guzman que siempre estaban al frente de algunas masas para dirigir la carga.

V. E. sabe que los ataques de la caballería son muy precisos é instantáneos, y que solo deben practicarse cuando la fuerza á quien se ataca se desvanda ó desorganiza, á no ser en aquellos casos en que todo debe aventurarse, y yo quise aprovechar los que creí convenientes, porque el Escmo. Sr. presidente general en gefe me habia ordenado que dejaba á mi cuidado el operar; pero la cobardía del general Andrade me los dejó escapar, por que cuando empezó á entrar

la cabeza de su division al punto que se le llamaba, una bala de cañon que cayó entre el regimiento de Húzares fué lo bastante para que se desordenara y tomase el camino para atras; cuyo moviento ocasionó el que la tercera brigada del mando del Sr. general D. Angel Perez Palacios que marchaba al trote, se encontrase sin terreno para entrar.

Cuando me convencí de que no podiamos ya operar sobre el enemigo, porque las fuerzas que no ocupaban ya puntos ventajosos sobre nosotros, se habian concentrado al grueso de sus columnas, me pareció conveniente ordenar las brigadas, para que manteniéndose así á la vista del enemigo lo distrajera de sus operaciones que seguia sobre Chapultepec, y ordené al Sr. coronel D. Benito Haro previniéndose de mi parte al Sr. general Andrade se mantuviese en el terreno que ocupaba; pero fué otra vez desobedecido, porque su señoría tomando la vanguardia de su division llevaba tras sí otras porciones de tropa que seguian su movimiento, hasta que con el Sr. general D. Tomás Moreno le mandé hacer alto, cuando ya pasaba de las paredes que cercan el olivar de la hacienda de los Morales.

No hablaré á V. E. sobre la conducta de los demas gefes de la segunda division, porque arrastrados por la de su gefe no puedo calificar la suya; pero sí añadiré á V. E. que viendo el Sr. general D. Tomás Moreno la conducta pasiva que guardaba el de su clase D. Antonio Jáuregui en momentos que no debian desaprovecharse, le pidió su brigada para encaminarla al combate, y se la negó manifestándole estar sujeto á las solas órdenes que le comunicase el repetido Sr. Andrade.

Cuando el enemigo continuaba aunque con menos teson sus fuegos por la parte del Molino, y se ocupaba igualmente en recoger sus muertos y heridos, determiné que las brigadas primera, segunda y tercera de la primera division marchasen cubriéndose con el terreno á tomar por retaguardia las lomas que ocupaba el enemigo, y que la segunda formando dos trozos ocupase con uno el flanco de la misma loma, y con otro el camino; todo con el fin de emprender una carga combinada caso que el enemigo prolongase su ataque ó lo intentase sobre algunos de nuestros flancos. Como la conducta anterior del general Andrade me habia hecho conocer lo poco ó nada que se podia esperar de las fuerzas que tenia á sus órdenes si él seguia mandándolas, lo separé de ellas poniendo á su cabeza al Sr. general D. Anastasio Torrejon. El general Andrade estuvo deferente en que lo quitase del peligro, no reclamó derechos ni mando, y se sujetó al gefe

que por su cobardía lo reemplazaba; pero cuando al ponerse el sol regresaban las fuerzas para tomar cuarteles, tuvo la desvergüenza de decirme, que cómo daba órdenes al Sr. Torrejon y no á su señoría que era el gefe de la division. Yo haciendo uso de la prudencia que me es genial, solo le contesté: *que de la que llamaba su division era gefe el Sr. general Torrejon, y que él marchase de orden del Escmo. Sr. presidente general en gefe á presentarse á la cõmandancia general.*

Otros muchos pormenores podria sentar á V. E. sobre la cobarde conducta del Sr. Andrade, pero los omito por no ser tan dilalado este parte, concluyendo con decir á V. E. que el asoramiento del espresado general llegó á tal grado, que nuestra infantería dispersa de la Casa-Mata, creyó que eran dos mil enemigos que lo flanqueaban, y así me lo participó por medio de un ayudante suyo con repeticion, quien tuvo por contestacion que los acuchillara si se persuadia que eran contrarios, y si tenia terreno para verificarlo.

Por separado daré á V. E. los partes circunstanciados de los muertos, heridos y dispersos que tuvo mi division, terminando con manifestarle lo complacido que estoy del valeroso comportamiento de los Sres. generales D. Julian Juvera, D. Angel Perez Palacios, D. Angel Guzman, D. Anastasio Torrejon, el mayor general D. José Stávoli, y del de los señores gefes respectivos de los cuerpos que componen las brigadas de su digno mando, porque todos llenaron sin observaciones mis órdenes y su deber, principalmente en el resto de las operaciones militares que se practicaron hasta la conclusion del dia.

Dígnese V. E. dar cuenta con lo espuesto al Escmo. Sr. presidente, general en gefe del ejército, y admitir las protestas de mi consideracion y distinguido aprecio.

Dios y libertad. México, Septiembre 11 de 1847.—*Juan Alvarez.*
—Escmo. Sr. secretario del despacho de guerra y marina.

NUMERO 1.

Ejército mexicano.—General en gefe.—Se me acaba de presentar un papel impreso firmado por V. S., que ha hecho fijar en las esquinas, prohibiendo al pueblo que hostilice al bárbaro enemigo que saquea la poblacion y los templos y viola las mugeres, y como tal conducta es indigna de un mexicano, le prevengo á nombre de la nacion, que si volviese V. S. á incurrir en un acto semejante, lo trataré como traidor, y lo mismo haré con los individuos que componen ese ayuntamiento si contribuyen á enervar de cualquiera manera el entusias-

mo de los ciudadanos mexicanos que defienden justamente sus hogares, sus hijas y esposas.

Tampoco se prestará V. S. á facilitar á los enemigos víveres ni auxilio alguno, y le prevengo que antes se disolverá esa corporacion que contribuir de alguna manera á favorecerlos. Esta disposicion la hará V. S. saber á quienes corresponda para que nadie alegue ignorancia.

Dios y libertad. Cuartel general en Guadalupe, Septiembre 15 de 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna.*—Señor D. Manuel Reyes Veramendi, presidente del Escmo. ayuntamiento de México.

NUMERO 2.

Alcalde 1.º constitucional.—Escmo. Sr.—Ahora que son las tres y veinte minutos de la tarde, he recibido la nota de V. E. de esta fecha, en la cual veo con el mas amargo sentimiento la interpretacion que V. E. se ha servido dar al papel que he hecho fijar en algunas de las esquinas de esta capital. Era preciso señor presidente, que á las amarguras que desgarran mi alma en la angustiada situacion en que se me ha colocado despues de consagrarme todo al servicio de una patria, á quien sirvo hace muchos años, se añadiera la de sufrir reprimendas, no menos duras que inmerecidas, como las que ha tenido á bien hacerme. Ese papel, señor presidente, los mas que he publicado, y toda mi conducta observada hasta aquí, ni han reconocido ni pueden reconocer otro origen, que el de alejar de la inocente poblacion de esta capital los desastres, el luto, el llanto y la desolacion á que ha sido condenada cruelmente, segun mi error, por la rapiña mas evidenciada, y la desmoralizacion mas lamentable de nuestro pueblo, y no por el verdadero patriotismo, ni por el celo de evitar el saqueo de los templos, el de la capital y la violacion de las mugeres. Sí, señor presidente, esta es la verdad desnuda de todo atavío, y estos los motivos de mis procedimientos; si por ellos puedo merecer, en el concepto de V. E., las infames notas de mexicano indigno y aun la de traidor, aplíquese en hora buena, en la firme persuacion de que no las temo, porque descanso en el íntimo testimonio de mi conciencia, y porque en cuanto á mexicano idólatra de su patria y de sus santas libertades, permítame V. E. que me tome la libertad de decirle, aunque respetuosamente, que no cedo en una sola línea al que se contemple mas acrisolado. Hombre susceptible de error, habré incidido y seré capaz de incidir en los mas crasos, pero respecto de los deberes sagrados hácia mi patria, no tengo el menor remordimiento.

Esta contestacion, Sr. Escmo., es la que creo debo dar por lo que toca á mi persona, por lo que corresponde al Escmo. ayuntamiento, voy á darle cuenta con la nota de V. E. y le comunicaré su resolucion.

Hasta esta hora no me han pedido los invasores ninguna clase de víveres ni auxilio alguno, si lo hicieren no dude V. E. que tendré muy presente lo que debo á mi patria y lo que me debo á mí mismo. Esto será en el muy corto tiempo que permaneceré en el lugar público, que por desgracia de la capital y mia, ocupo, porque me basta que V. E. interprete mis operaciones muy al contrario del modo que me las dicta mi corazon, todo mexicano, para que yo me aleje de ese mismo lugar y me dirija á deplorar en secreto la situacion angustiada y peligrosa á que ha sido conducida la magnánima nacion á que me glorío pertenecer, y que por tantos títulos es digna de mejor suerte.

Sírvase V. E. admitir las sinceras protestas de todos mis respetos.

Dios y libertad. México, Septiembre 15 de 1847.—A las cinco de la tarde.—Escmo. Sr.—*Manuel Reyes Veramendi*.—Escmo. Sr. presidente de la república y general en jefe del ejército mexicano.

NUMERO 3.

Ejército mexicano.—General en jefe.—La nota que V. S. me ha dirigido contestando la mia de esta fecha, en que le manifiesto mi disgusto por el aviso que V. S. mandó fijar en las calles prohibiendo al pueblo que continuase las hostilidades sobre los invasores, me confirma la opinion que formé de V. S. luego que llegó á mis manos aquel documento, porque veo que lejos de vindicarse del cargo que le resulta por tal procedimiento, se atreve V. S. á inculpar á ese heróico pueblo, suponiéndole los crímenes y escesos que comete el invasor; pero lo que mas me ha llenado de vergüenza es, que una autoridad mexicana en documentos públicos llame ilustrado á un ejército de aventureros que ha cometido toda clase de escesos desde que ha profanado el territorio de la república con su inmundá planta. Solo un estrayío de razon ó la cobardía puede haber inducido á V. S. á obrar de tal manera, y á invitar á la moderacion á un pueblo justamente irritado contra un enemigo salvage que ha hollado las garantías. V. S. obrando así, ha olvidado sus mas sagrados deberes; mejor le hubiera estado robustecer ese admirable entusiasmo poniéndose á la cabeza de un pueblo que ha pretendido vengar sus ultrajes.

V. S. despues de su reprehensible conducta, pretende inculpar al ejér-

cito porque evacuó la capital, cuando es constante que ha peleado quince horas consecutivas disputando al enemigo la entrada á ella palmo á palmo con el sacrificio de una gran parte de su fuerza; y si lo ha evacuado, motivos poderosos ha tenido para hacerlo, como V. S. podia considerar. Ese ejército que V. S. injuria repitiendo en su fatal proclama que abandonó la capital, peleó sin alimento y sin sueldos hacia cinco dias, y continúa hasta hoy del mismo modo: contramarchó lleno de entusiasmo luego que supo que sus hermanos de la capital necesitaban de su auxilio, y en union de ellos ha lanceado hoy en esas calles á muchos de los invasores. Ultimamente, siendo mi verdadero objeto evitar el oprobio de la patria, y que no se enerve el entusiasmo del pueblo para hostilizar al enemigo, vuelvo á prevenir á V. S. que evite la repeticion de esos hechos vergonzosos y perjudiciales á la nacion, y que estrañe V. S. á ese ayuntamiento por la proclama anti-patriota que ha osado dar, y de que me he impuesto con asombro é indignacion.

Dios y libertad. Cuartel general en Guadalupe, á 15 de Septiembre de 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—Sr. D. Manuel Reyes Veramendi, presidente del Escmo. ayuntamiento.

NUMERO 4.

Ejército mexicano.—General en jefe.—Habiendo tomado posesion de esta ciudad con el ejército de mi mando, para obrar sobre los puntos que V. S. ocupa, á fin de dejar en completa librtad á estos habitantes que han sufrido bastante por las fuerzas de los Estados-Unidos, he creido conveniente, antes de toda operacion en obsequio de la humanidad, intimar á V. S. se sirva evacuar la parte que ocupa de la poblacion en un término perentorio; en inteligencia que podrá salir con los honores de la guerra, ya sea para reunirse al general Scott ó para Perote, segun mas le conviniere. Pero si una intimacion tan comedida, fuese desatendida por V. S., en este caso, aunque sensible para mí, obraré militarmente hasta asaltar sus posiciones, cuyas consecuencias reportaran sus guarniciones, pues tiene V. S. á su inmedicacion un ejército de ocho mil hombres decididos á hacer respetar los derechos de su nacion.

Dios libertad. Cuartel general en Puebla, Septiembre 25 de 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—Sr. coronel del ejército de los Estados-Uunidos D. Tomás Childs.

NUMERO 5.

Cuartel general. Ciudad de Puebla.—México.—Septiembre 25 de 1847.—Al Esqmo. Sr. D. Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna, general en jefe del ejército mexicano al frente de esta ciudad.—Tuve el honor de recibir hoy, á las 2 de la tarde, la nota de V. E. de esta fecha, advirtiéndome que habia tomado posesion de esta ciudad con el objeto de dejar en plena libertad á sus ciudadanos que habian sufrido tanto de las tropas de los Estados-Unidos y ofreciendo á esta guarnicion ciertas condiciones en caso de que abandone en un tiempo limitado los puntos que ocupa.

En cuanto al primer punto, creo justo y necesario en vindicacion del buen nombre de las fuerzas militares de los Estados-Unidos que han ganado con la humanidad por el buen orden y disciplina que en todos tiempos han distinguido su conducta, y con mas particularidad mientras que han tenido posesion militar de la ciudad de Puebla, negar el cargo hecho por V. E. en su comunicacion; al contrario, aseguro que la propiedad y los derechos de las personas han sido mantenidos y respetados con la mayor escrupulosidad, á un grado sin igual en la guerra, y dejaria la decision de este punto á la parte inteligente é imparcial de la poblacion de esta ciudad, para que dijese de quién habia sufrido mas violencia, de sus propios paisanos, ó de las tropas de los Estados-Unidos.

En cuanto á la parte de la nota de V. E. pidiendo una rendicion, dentro de un tiempo limitado, de las posiciones ocupadas por las tropas de mi mando, solo tengo esta respuesta que dar á V. E: que habiendo sido honrado con la custodia y salvaguardia de estas posiciones, es igualmente mi deseo y deber conservarlas hasta el último, estando plenamente satisfecho de poderlo hacer con los medios que tengo á mi disposicion.

Con consideraciones del mas alto respeto, tengo el honor de ser de V. E. su mas obediente servidor.—*Tomas Childs*, coronel del ejército de los Estados-Unidos, gobernador civil y militar.

NUMERO 6.

Ejército de Oriente.—General en jefe.—Esqmo. Sr.—Con fecha 5 del corriente desde Nopalucan participé á V. E. para que se sirviera hacerlo al Esqmo. Sr. presidente interino, lo que me proponia hacer sobre el convoy enemigo, si se me reunia oportunamente la fuerza que

de esa ciudad conducia el señor general de brigada D. Isidro Reyes; pero no habiendo llegado esta con oportunidad y habiendo avanzado el convoy hasta tres leguas de Nopalucan, me pasé á situar á este pueblo el 8 del actual con mil caballos que me habian quedado y seis piezas ligeras, á fin de observar sus movimientos y obrar segun ellos.

Habiendo el enemigo pernoctado la noche del 8 citado entre Nopalucan y Cuapiastla, y preparándose para continuar su marcha á Acajete, resolví hostilizarlo por su retaguardia en el Pinal, y darle una carga con decision cuando menos lo pensara, y al efecto, emprendí mi marcha desde este lugar á las 7 de la mañana; pero estando emboscado en el pueblo de San Pablo inmediato al Pinal en observacion de aquel para ejecutar mi proyecto, observé desde la torre, que el convoy enemigo en vez de proseguir su marcha, se dirigia á este punto adonde yo habia dejado mi tren de artillería, los rancheros de los cuerpos de caballería y los equipages de gefes y oficiales, y al momento comprendí la intencion del jefe enemigo, y con la mayor violencia contramarché á su encuentro, mas ya encontré á su vanguardia apoderada de la plaza y edificios principales, y aunque lo atacé llegando mis columnas hasta la misma plaza, no fué posible con mis dragones desalojarlo de dichas posiciones, y tuve que retirarme á pernoctar á una hacienda inmediata. El enemigo perdió en este encuentro al comandante de su caballería, un oficial y varios individuos de tropa, y yo tuve dos muertos y siete heridos, varios dispersos y dos de mis ayudantes de campo prisioneros, el coronel graduado D. José María Diaz de la Vega y el comandante de escuadron D. Agustin de Iturbide, quienes al comunicar mis órdenes fueron interceptados.

Al siguiente dia me aprosimé á esta poblacion á observar los movimientos del enemigo, y supe que este se habia entregado á todos los excesos, saqueando cuantos establecimientos existian, y asesinando hasta algunas infelices mugeres, y que lleno de botin contramarchaba á Nopalucan; entónces me decidí á hostilizarlo por su retaguardia, y mis lanceros comenzaron á lancear á varios soldados que se habian quedado entretenidos todavia con el saqueo, cuya operacion continuó hasta la hacienda de San Isidro, á donde hizo alto toda la fuerza y á donde pasó todo el resto del dia y la noche. En dicha jornada logré hacerles cerca de cien muertos y veinticuatro prisioneros, con lo que quedaron de algun modo vengados el ultraje y perjuicios que infirieron á estos pacíficos habitantes.

Aunque el enemigo casi sorprendió esta poblacion, solo logró apo-

derarse de dos piezas pequeñas, pues las cuatro restantes fueron salvadas afortunadamente y están en mi poder.

La inesperada operacion del enemigo sobre este pueblo, fué inspirada, segun he sabido, por un infame mexicano de los criminales que lo acompañan, llamado Miguel Hernandez, quien pudo introducirse en este pueblo sin ser conocido, y observar mi salida y la quedada de las piezas; pero como V. E. advertirá, le fué bien costosa, ademas de dos dias que perdió de camino.


El 11 continuó su marcha para Acajete á donde pernoctó, y en el Pinal pude alcanzarlo; pero no logré ninguna otra ventaja en este dia aunque hice lo posible por conseguirlo, porque caminó con demasiadas precauciones, escarmentado de lo que habia experimentado el dia anterior. Segun mis espías, ayer llegó á Amozoc, y hoy debe haber entrado á Puebla con cerca de 3,000 hombres, y seis piezas de artillería que sacó de Perote. Antier tarde se me incorporó la seccion del general Reyes en este punto, y tan estropeada la tropa, que será necesario darle algunos dias de descanso; por consiguiente, no pudo obrar sobre el citado comboy enemigo.

El Escmo. Sr. general D. Juan Alvarez, con todas las fuerzas que sitiaban la guarnicion enemiga de Puebla, inclusas las que le proporcioné para reforzarlo, se ha replegado á Atlixco segun he sabido.

Luego que las tropas ecistentes en este cuartel general que hoy componen el ejército de Oriente, estén en estado de espedicionar, y la comisaría se encuentre con algunos recursos pecuniarios, de que absolutamente carece, buscaré al enemigo y continuaré hostilizándolo de la manera que pueda, llenando así mis deseos y mis deberes.

Reproduzco á V. E. con este motivo, las seguridades de mi aprecio y consideracion.—Dios y libertad. Cuartel general en Huamantla, Octubre 13 de 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—Escmo. Sr. ministro de la guerra y marina.





OPERATIONS OF DEFENCE

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. This publication written only nine weeks after the fall of Mexico and reproduced in facsimile from its original on the preceding pages, holds value as a contemporary historical document as well as a revelation of the tragic character of its author, Santa-Anna. Rather than aiming at literary quality, this translation endeavors to reproduce the polemical tendency and the bombastic pamphleteering style of the period and of the writer, president and general.—J. HEFTER.

The honor of my fatherland and my good name, that are to me of so much esteem, urge me to make it clear to the world, by legal and just means, how my enemies could not reproach my behavior, not even with the lightest semblance of reason, without recurring to the vilest cunning. Thousands of witnesses can manifest how many had been my sleepless night watches, my toils and sacrifices throughout a whole year, to repel the most unjust of aggressions and to save national honor and independence. Every step toward so interesting an object met with a thousand obstacles that solely the energy of my soul and the noble enthusiasm that fires me could overcome. I had to create everything, to provide for everything, and to toil in the meetings of state as well as partake in the fatigues and perils of the soldier.

Outcast Mexicans, infamous men to whom the glory of the nation is immaterial, cold schemers of monetary interests, agents of the enemy councils, have fallen back on all kinds of inventions, even on vulgarities incredible from every point of view, deliberately extracted from the very lamentable misfortunes of the fatherland, to prepare public opinion, to arouse passions against me with the perverse scheme of bringing about my confusion and my ruin, even if our own political existence become entangled in it. They have taken advantage of my generous disinterestedness, of my ardent desire to make war against the unjust invader, they have taken advantage of this to bring about so wicked a project, at some times attributing to me ambitious

goals, at other sowing distrust among all classes in order that my efforts should not be seconded. With these manipulations, they succeed in removing me from the theatre of war, and when they deem me abandoned, fallen, defenseless, they discharge upon me all the rage of which their miserable souls are possessed; to them, no means is too reprehensible, no cause hateful as it may be, that they would not put to work in order to bring about their depraved intentions; in the presence of the invaders and under the shadow of their very flag, perhaps with the object of fawning on them, they insult and slander me through the press in an atrocious manner abhorrent to civilization and condemned by the laws, thus dishonoring the nation that had so many times appointed me its first magistrate and had confided its destinies to my loyalty.

Although such infamous a conduct ought to be severely censured by all sensible and honorable men, considering that crime and evil make themselves hateful by their own nature, I, nevertheless, see myself compelled to redeem my honor now outraged with as much perfidy as perversity: to these diatribes that are being invented to pall my sacrifices, I shall not oppose other weapons than facts and documents capable of making my justice shine, and to prove to the peoples that have conferred their confidence on me, that I have responded with dignity to their call.

The report that appears in the following pages, directed by me to his Excellency the Minister of War, is a simple narrative of all the events that took place in the capital of the Republic from the end of May to the middle of last September, and of my subsequent efforts against the enemy's line of communications, until I was separated from the command of the army by an arbitrary disposition which the public has seen in print. From this report, it will be possible to arrive at a recognition of the painstaking constancy with which I have procured the defense of the capital and have overlooked no means that could have been within my reach to attain such important an object, since as First Magistrate, I dictated all such provisions as were necessary; and as the General in Chief on the battlefield, I have exposed myself to the risks of the common soldier, performing functions that did not correspond to me.

It is not a hidden matter to me that the most honorable and publicly known deeds mean nothing to cowardly enemies who are as remote from knowing how to appreciate them in their just value, as from understanding how to execute them; and since ill will can always comment on them in a sinister way and arrive at violent

deductions, it would not be surprising that this narrative, although truthful, will serve only to irritate their jealousy even more and to redouble their sarcasms; but I am submitting them to the forthright judgment of those who search for the truth solely to do justice.

If I did not merit praise and compensations awarded solely to the brilliant results, to the splendid victories, I consider myself nevertheless in the right to be treated with some indulgence because of the sanity of my intentions, for the efforts and sacrifices barred from attaining a triumph; for I have expended large sums to pay in part what was due to the soldier who has gone forth to battle and which I have not been reimbursed, even later, after I had attained power; because my devotion to the service of my country exposed me as a target to the invader's rage, so well proven by my razed fields, my devoured cattle and my properties now converted into ruins; finally, because I have exposed my reputation and my existence for the dear fatherland. Is it then, fickle fortune having deprived me of her favors, a crime on my part? Charles XII at Poltava, Alexander I at Austerlitz and the great Napoleon at Waterloo, were they perchance criminals? Were the same perhaps, the first heroes of our independence because of the unfortunate results at Aculco and Calderon? Has anybody ever examined with knowledge and indispensable impartiality, which had been the true reasons that have deprived me of the honors of a victor? If misfortune is no crime; if no reasonable evidence exists to judge the events, if the motives that had contributed to frustrate the combinations are not within reach of all intelligences, how is it that this cry arises of *treason* or *ineptitude* with which adversity alternately labels me? Incidents in a man's private life, true or imaginary, what influence can they possibly have on political or military events...? Why, then, are such infamous inventions repaired to in order to slander me? Why this incessant repetition of facts that already belong to history and over which our contemporaries cannot sit in judgment, because all, more or less, have taken part in them and it is therefore not easy to decide who should be indicted? Why does nobody throw accusations into the faces of generals who had suffered reverses on the fields of battle before me, and only I alone am cruelly defamed without considering the circumstances in which I had found myself involved? Ah! It is pretended to incite universal hatred toward me and to substitute it for the considerations a good citizen always deserves. Unheard of wickedness...! How could our enemies fail to claim that Mexicans only know how to destroy one another?

Separated from the political scene nigh on a month and a half, I calmly await the verdict of sane opinion which I do not doubt will be just, when time will place my conduct during this period, on a parallel with that of my antagonists. For the present, I shall only point out that since my retirement from the theatre of war, no Mexican cannon has ever again fired upon the invader, and that the latter lifts his forehead in pride, dominating without being even molested, everything from Mexico to Veracruz, his communications safe wherever he passes. Perhaps he will not be late in presenting himself in Querétaro when he notices that the army is not being reorganized, nor that any resistance is being prepared against his incursions.

Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna

Tehuacán, December 2nd 1847

The Ministry of War and Navy.—Operations Section.—Your Excellency. Their Excellencies the Secretaries of the General Congress, under date of the 3rd instant, tell me what I have here copied.

Excel. Sir.—General Congress in today's session deemed it proper to accord the following:

Let it be told to the government that it forward to congress all documents related to the military events that took place during the siege and loss of the capital of the Republic.

We are honored in transcribing the above to Y.E. for the required effects, expressing to you the assurance of our most distinguished appreciation.

And I have the honor of transcribing this to Y.E. by orders of H.E. the provisional president so that, informed of the contents of the information enclosed as copies, Y.E. might convince yourself of the difficulty of extracting the documents asked by the chamber, for which reason H.E. requests that Y.E. proceed immediately to render a report on the military operations during the defense and loss of the capital, in order to transmit the same to the sovereign congress.

Notifying Y.E. of this by supreme order, I have the satisfaction of expressing to you the assurances of my consideration and appreciation.

Excellent Sir. Your Excellency's official letter dated the 6th inst., places me under obligation, in consequence of the decision of the general congress enclosed by Y.E., relative to the request for

documents that exist regarding the events of the siege and loss of the capital, His Excellency charged with the supreme executive power disposes that I present a report on the said military operations in order to pass it on to the cognizance of the sovereign congress.

Complying with the desires of the supreme powers and the duty imposed upon me by my post then occupied as General in Chief of the army, I shall immediately proceed to the presentation of a simple statement of my operations in the part that is lacking, since as Y.E. will see in the attached note which I was about to direct to you at the moment of receiving the one from Y.E., for the purposes and objectives indicated, I have already composed the part that covers the time since an armistice was concluded; I shall, therefore, refer now only to previous events that occurred after my entry into the capital toward the end of last May.

I have declared in official documents that my march from Orizaba to Puebla had various reasons, such as to increase, equip and organize the small forces I had found myself with at that time, and to undertake a vigorous defense if the powerful means of the state were to favor me; but that the circumstance of having encountered the city stripped, without any troops or war material whatever, due to the commandant general's disposition that all be transferred to distant points, and the nearness of the enemy army that followed my steps without leaving me time or place for anything, obliged me to continue on to the capital of the Republic.

When I expected to find there vast defensive preparations, I came face to face instead with symptoms of revolution that could be averted only by my timely appearance. As willing as I was, I had to decide much to my regret, to abandon the capital, judging it bare of any elements of defense, since even the tobacco, archives and other things have already commenced their exodus toward the interior. I hastened therefore, to call a meeting of all the generals then present, that took place on the second day after my arrival. As a result of it, I resolved to take charge of the government, an indispensable measure in order to prepare the defense agreed upon in accordance with my desires.

As there was so little of which to dispose, and it was indispensably necessary to provide an army, fortifications, war material and above all, money, my worries became as great as my efforts should have been. In this, I refer myself to the proceedings that ought to exist in the ministries, and which I request be presented by these gentlemen, the ministers who bore the painful task of accompanying

me during these days of anxiety. I do not enclose these proceedings, not having my personal archives with me in this locality; but the government should find it easy to copy them and to see that everything was attended to and that absolutely nothing was omitted in order to undertake a good defense of the capital against a victorious army well provided with everything that the art of waging war successfully required.

The Excel. Sir Nicolás Bravo, division general well deserved of the fatherland, was appointed as general in chief of the army of the East, with the Excel. Sir general Manuel Rincón as second in command. An equal appointment was made for the army of the North in the person of the Excel. general Gabriel Valencia, with general Mariano Salas as his second. The two generals marched off immediately to their destinations; but the first two resigned their posts a few days afterward, for which reason general Manuel Maria Lombardini was appointed chief of the army of the East and carried out his duties to the government's satisfaction, until due to the enemy's approach, I took over the general command of the army, in consequence of the extraordinary faculties with which General Congress saw fit to invest the government in its decree of April 20th relative to everything connected with achieving greater success in the war against our invaders.

Having assigned the points to be fortified for the time being in the first and second lines, not a moment was lost in providing materials, laborers, etc., and in less than three months, respectable fortifications arose before our eyes, directed at first by brigadier general Casimiro Liceaga and later by general of engineers Ignacio de Móra y Villamil; all generals and staff officers who participated in this work, apart from rendering credit to their intelligence, labored with a constancy and activity that will do them honor always. Great sums were invested in as many projects as were necessary for such an elongated radius; but the necessary was never lacking. The army commissary will be able to verify this.

The cadres of which the army consisted being exhausted, it became indispensable to fall back on the reserves and the National Guard corps. Since neither dress nor furnitures, saddlery or any other utensil whatever existed in the depots, it became necessary to manufacture everything, letting contracts to this effect. Not a single rifle being available either, I had to order that they be bought at any price; with the firearms that were thus acquired (many without bayonets), together with the ones repaired at the arsenal and others that

had been discarded, we procured to arm the entire force. War material being very scarce, I ordered that the tireless artillery director, brigade general Martin Carrera, manufacture what was necessary, and so as to provide ourselves with these needs, it became urgently unavoidable to work without rest and to spend heavy sums. Several artillery pieces were brought up from S. Luis Potosi, others from the south, and even iron pieces in bad condition were made useful again and pressed into service. Nothing was forgiven in the face of the goal that was our concern, to place ourselves in the best condition for a defense.

Upon my arrival in the capital, no other moneys existed except some one hundred and fifty thousand pesos in warrants of the clergy, a remnant of the million and a half they had advanced to the government in the days of my absence, but I personally procured the sums required for so many and multiple attentions, in which the ministry of the treasury co-operated efficiently through their good connections.

In the city squares and outside the walls, recruits were drilled daily, and the staff officers took so much interest in the progress of their corps that within a few days, smart brigades were in evidence that made us cherish flattering hopes. The fortifications advanced prodigiously. On all sides one could see army workshops producing equipment for the troops. As many as ninety pieces of artillery were made ready and finally, we could count on twenty thousand men, equipped and armed; this number comprised the five thousand veterans of the army of the North, and the twenty four cannon conducted by the Excel. general Valencia from San Luis Potosi. So that on August 11th, when the enemy appeared in the vicinity of Peñon Mountain, our situation was imposing, and confidence and enthusiasm could be seen reflected in all countenances.

In this, I appeal to the testimony of the inhabitants of the capital.

The Excel. Sir, general Nicolás Bravo presented himself to me to be employed, and I placed the line of Mexicalcingo, Churubusco and S. Antonio under his orders.

As to Excel. Sir, general Juan Alvarez with the cavalry division he had at his orders, I sent him to occupy Anacamilpa so he could take the rear guard of the enemy army and place himself between it and Puebla as soon as it had passed San Martin Tשמלucan. The instructions issued to this general ought to be on file at the ministry of war: these were reduced to following the enemy's rear guard and harassing it as far as possible, but attacking it decisively should he see the enemy moving toward any of our fortified points, taking ad-

vantage of all cases of carelessness noticed, but always acting with due circumspection.

The Excel. Sir, general Gabriel Valencia, I sent with his complete division to station himself in Texcoco, and instructions were issued which he still ought to have in his possession, as well as in the operations section of the war secretariat. His principal objective was to observe the enemy and in case the latter were taking the road to Texcoco, to retreat to Guadalupe Hidalgo where, after occupying fortified positions, he could receive further orders and reinforcements; but if he saw that the enemy was decided to attack the Peñon, he would do the same against his rear guard, in which case the cavalry division command by general Alvarez would co-operate with him, as he had received timely advice to act in combination with the above general.

I myself, took up positions on Peñon Mountain, so as to be in front of the enemy and to effectively direct operations. At this point, the Excel. Sir, division general Manuel Rincón reported to me, and I assigned to him command of the principal fortifications of this mountain. Equally and with the same enthusiasm, the Excel. Sir, general José Joaquin de Herrera presented himself to me and I appointed him my second in command. The Excel. Sir, general José Maria Tornel was employed as quartermaster and expressed his greatest desire to serve the nation in this campaign.

As it is not possible to retain in memory the number of troops, artillery, ammunition, etc., garrisoning all points, and since to be able to present an exact account it would be indispensable to have before me the General Report which I am not in a position to obtain here, nor the plans that belong to the director general of engineers, I shall limit myself to speaking of the happenings in general and of my relative measures, reserving the right to present the former with all the corresponding requirements and exactness, in the historical resumé I am preparing, that the nation may know how much had been performed in its service, and may recognize its loyal servants.

The invading army, under orders of general Scott, scorned the battle that was presented to him at the Peñon, undoubtedly because our positions appeared to him as too strong; and I think that his good luck has saved him from having dashed himself to pieces against them, as the Peñon was fortified to perfection, and even his projectiles would have served him little. The respective plan will reveal the works so skillfully deployed, and the merits of so much labor done in so few days.

General Scott, having directed himself to the south of the capital, after having reconnoitered the Mexicalcingo fortifications which he dared not to attack, recognizing perhaps that there, too, he would be beaten advantageously, I saw myself in the necessity of changing my general quarters to S. Mateo Churubusco, close to S. Antonio, the most advanced point within this line. The advance of the enemy army was painful and slow over the road he had to take, and this time was put to use to finish some fortifications and to improve others. General Alvarez was following his rear guard, awaiting an occasion to harass him, according to the directives he had received.

There being no doubt that the enemy's design was to occupy the town of Tlalpam, a warning was sent to general Valencia to change his position by retiring from Texcoco to the town of Guadalupe Hidalgo and then moving to S. Angel, which he did.

Brevet general Francisco Perez, chief of a splendid brigade consisting at that time of more than three thousand men, was sent to occupy Coyoacan, thus covering the line formed by Mexicalcingo, Churubusco bridge, the equally named convent, Coyoacan and S. Angel, which line supported and served as a reserve for the S. Antonio point close by; the latter was well fortified and garrisoned; and as all our forces on the spot could maneuver to their advantage and opportunity, I came to wish that the battlefield were just there.

From some enemy reconnaissances, I suspected that he intended to move toward Tacubaya and orders were sent to general Valencia that he retire to Coyoacan and arm the point of Churubusco with his artillery pieces, expecting him to be in S. Angel where he should have been according to later provisions. My plan of concentrating on the second line was becoming indispensable and it was also urgent to prepare a safe retreat for the troops and trains of S. Antonio. The surprise and indignation that general Valencia caused me by disobeying my order, could well be explained by general Tornel and the minister of war who presented to me his reply at 11 o'clock at night on that 18th of August. The generals themselves could reveal the announcement I made from that moment on as a result of so irregular a conduct that threw to the ground all my combinations. My first resolution was to relieve him of his command and that my orders be repeated to his second in command; but the above mentioned generals calmed me with prudent reflexions, daughters of their best intentions, and after a prolonged conference, to avoid scandals in front of the enemy, I gave way that he should only be advised: *that without approving his arbitrary behavior, he may act upon his own*

responsability, in any way he deemed fit; deceiving ourselves, to be true, that this would be sufficient to make him reverse his steps; unfortunately, it was not so: he continued immutable on the road to perdition he had traced for himself, and today, the whole nation deplores the results.

On the 19th, about two o'clock in the afternoon, an adjutant of general Valencia reported to me in S. Antonio, informing me in his behalf *that the enemy was approaching Padierna*; the place where for reasons of his own, he had lined up the division of the North, adding that: *by the cannon fire he had heard on the way, he considered that the division was engaged in battle*. This report was to me a premonition of the great misfortune I foresaw the night before, and that the disobedient general had now begun to realize this to his sorrow. His deranged conduct notwithstanding, from that moment on I occupied myself solely with saving him and saving the deserving soldiers whom I had placed under his orders in an evil hour. I now sent an adjutant to Coyoacan, with orders for general Perez's brigade to move on toward Padierna, and I myself started out immediately for the same point, at a gallop, followed by my general staff, by the regiments of Hussars and of the Veracruz Light Cavalry as well as five field pieces.

I caught up with the same brigade coming out of Coyoacan on the way to S. Angel and due to some cannonade that could be heard, I made them advance at a run to the hills in front of Padierna from which I could observe the fatal position of general Valencia. This happened at about five o'clock in the evening, and although I strove to join him, it was not possible because of his being cut off by the enemy and by the terrain he had left to his rear. There was only one passable road from S. Angel to Padierna, much too narrow, dominated to the right and left by positions already taken by some enemy battalions. I searched for a pass on the flanks, but convinced myself by the guides to this terrain and by my own eyes that this operation was not easy to execute in what remained of the evening, as a deep ravine formed an obstacle to the right, extending for more than a league up to some hills that appear to the south-west of S. Angel, and to the left some steep slopes and palisades; and since night surprised me while executing these reconnaissances, no other means were left me but to camp and to await daylight. Suddenly, a horrendous storm accompanied by a copious rainfall, forced me to direct that the infantry seek shelter immediately within the nearby town of San Angel with orders to present itself at daybreak on the same field:

on the field, I left the cavalry and artillery corps to pass a cruel night, as the rain did not cease until daybreak.

Considering all the division of the North had suffered under this rain without any shelter, and that neither its men or equipment would be in condition to go into action on the following day, hoping to evade a defeat which I foresaw, I ordered general Valencia that he spike his artillery this same night and retire to S. Angel, whereby the guide who led my field adjutant colonel Jose Maria Ramiro, bearer of my orders, could serve him as a guide, too; but obstinate in disobeying me, he scorned the order and remained in this dismal place.

Restless from the natural worry that general Valencia's temerity was causing me, when the elements themselves were adverse to us, at the break of dawn I directed that the infantry sheltered in San Angel set itself in motion. The same thing was executed by general Rangel's brigade which I brought up from the Citadel with the intention of cutting through a way to the field of Padierna at any cost. I marched at the head of these brigades when I heard a short burst of rifle fire from my advance guard; we accelerated our steps and before my eyes appeared groups of our cavalry in retreat, who brought me the fatal news I had been fearing. When I had no doubt left of the defeat of general Valencia, I undertook the march to the rear with bitterest sadness.

This general, ill-advised or guided by blind ambition, judging a victory easy with the brilliant division he commanded, threw himself into this crime with a double purpose: if fortune was favorable to him, he could appropriate the glory to himself; if adverse, he could heap upon me all the consequent responsibility and discredit. This is proved by the booklet he hastened to publish, seen by all, undoubtedly placing his hope in the mob's credulity and in the support he would find amidst the factions that are hunting for pretexts to harass me in the atrocious manner in which they are doing it. But to all these ambushes, I shall oppose naught but facts and witnesses who will make truth prevail and will justify the soundness of my proceedings.

Once in the town of San Angel, I gathered all my forces and part of those dispersed at Padierna. The latter declared that *all their armament being soaking wet, making it impossible to return the enemy's fire, the troops sought salvation in flight*. I dispatched two adjutants to generals Bravo and Gaona ordering them *to fall back without an instant's loss on the Candelaria fortifications*

while I continued the retreat in the direction of Churubusco.

At Penzacola bridge, I ordered general Rangel's brigade to return to the Citadel, which he fulfilled.

My rear guard commenced to fight from San Angel where it was reached by the enemy. While passing Churubusco convent, I notified general Rincón of what had just happened to the division of the North, so that he might take precautions as commander of this point. Since it was preferable at this moment to concentrate my attention on the troops and baggage trains of San Antonio Mexicalcingo, I hastened to protect them in their withdrawal by stationing general Perez's brigade at Churubusco bridge. At this point, I was notified that general Gaona had already marched off toward Candelaria and that general Bravo had started to move. Moments later, the San Patricio company, the Tlapa batallion and other units reached the bridge, and I sent all this force immediately to reinforce the convent next to Churubusco where the Independence and Bravos batallions stood to defend it. Before that, I disposed that the five artillery pieces from San Angel remain there for the same purpose, and these were promptly emplaced.

I was busy speeding up the movement of train and troops from S. Antonio, when the enemy who was coming up to catch up with them, opened fire at their rear guard. Within a small lapse of time, the same happened at Churubusco. The troops from San Antonio broke ranks and abandoned the material they were bringing with them, which produced great confusion and increased the enemy's pressure close to the ditches. Nevertheless, a lively fire broke out against him and it was possible to repulse his first onrush, engaging him immediately in a hard-fought action.

At the moment of a break in firing, I observed that an enemy battalion on our right flank was moving up the Portales Ranch to reach our rear guard and cut off our retreat. To frustrate this intention, I ordered the colonel of the Fourth Light Infantry to take possession of this building at the double and as I saw some hesitation in this movement, I went over in person to have this order executed properly. The enemy battalion was thrown back with great losses and our retreat was secured.

At Portales, I received a report that *Churubusco convent had surrendered and that this news had produced discouragement among the troops defending the bridge, so that some of them retreated with general Bravo through Mexicalcingo to the Peñon, and others were falling back straight along the road.* This second misfortune brought

about the loss of much of our material and made me recognize the necessity of falling back as soon as possible on our second line, which I executed with as many forces as I could gather at Portales, reaching Candelaria between five and six in the evening. The troops that general Bravo took with him, could not enter the capital until on the following morning.

The daring of some enemy dragoons reached the extreme of cutting through the column in retreat from Portales up to the parapets of Candelaria at a full run, where, having been recognized, they were fired upon, killing them all except one officer who was taken prisoner. This one declared on the spot and with plenty of cocksuredness that, *knowing through one of our prisoners that general Santa-Anna was in the midst of these troops, he took the decision with some of his troopers who wanted to follow him, to fall upon him and deprive him of his life, as they would achieve glory if they succeeded, and if not, they would die with honor.* When I became aware of this declaration, I ordered that this prisoner be treated with every consideration because, far from offending me with his daring, I paid due tribute to his valor.

No particular news occurred through the rest of the evening, nor through the night, nevertheless, I dictated as many provisions as I considered useful toward a better defense of our second line which would be very soon under attack, I judged.

From four o'clock in the morning of the following day, everything was ready for combat, the bad situation notwithstanding in which previous events have placed us, but about 11 o'clock, on Vega avenue, I received the official letter from general Scott which I enclose here under Nr. 1, in which he proposed an armistice as expressed therein and which I instantly accepted, due to our desperate situation, as confirmed by copy Nr. 2. The calamities of Padierna and Churubusco convent; the loss of half of our best artillery; of so many rifles and ammunition; finally, the dispersion of more than a third part of our army, had produced such dismay that if the enemy had repeated his attack, as I expected him to do, he would surely occupy the capital without much resistance. This conviction made me consider this unexpected occurrence as a heaven-sent providence that could well change the situation in which we had found ourselves, as it actually did. Who will deny that on the 8th of September, the enemy escaped defeat only by pure luck? Ah! Were it not for the cowardice of some of our military leaders, the selfishness of our citizens and the cunning of some functionaries of the state, what a

different aspect would our Republic present right now! Of what avail are the efforts of one man, alone against so many adversaries? As to the conferences held with the commissioner of the government of the United States, nobody will say that they have in any way damaged the interests of the nation. Published, they have contradicted the multitude of motives that the agents of disorder and my constant enemies have at that time divulged against my conduct, and have made known to the world the exaggerated and unjust pretensions of that government which, abusing of its preponderance or its fortune and of our misfortunes, has endeavored to humiliate us, depriving us by violence of more than half of our territory.

Since a description of the events following the armistice already appear in the enclosed report as previously mentioned, I conclude here the present relations, attaching copies of the communications that preceded the continuation of hostilities, marked as Nrs. 3 and 4.

Please receive, Y.E., on this occasion, the considerations of my personal appreciations.

God and Liberty. Tehuacan, November 21st 1847.—Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna. To the Excel. Sir, the Minister of War and Navy.—Queretaro.

NUMBER 1

General Headquarters of the army of the United States of America.—Coyoacan, August 21st of 1847.—Most Excellent Sir, President of the Republic of Mexico and General in Chief of its army.—Too much blood has already been spilled in the war that broke out and which should not have been expected between the two great republics of our continent. It is high time that the discords that divide them be bridged in an amicable and honorific way, and Y.E. does not ignore that within this army under my command, a commissioner is present, appointed by the United States, who is invested with full powers toward this effect. In order that the two republics may take steps preparatory to negotiations, I consent to the signing, under equitable conditions, of an armistice of short duration.

I shall impatiently await until the morning of the day following the date of this note, a reply to it, but in the meantime, I shall take possession of those points on the outskirts of the capital that I may need for the shelter and welfare of my troops.

I have the honor of signing with high consideration and profound respect, Y. Excellency's obedient servant.—*Winfield Scott.*

NUMBER 2

To H.E. Windfield Scott, general in chief of the army of the United States of America.—Sir.—The undersigned minister of war and navy of the government of the United Mexican States, has received an order from the most Exc. Sir, the president and general in chief, to answer Y.E. communication, in which you propose the signing of an armistice, with a view to avoidingg the shedding of more blood between the two great republics of this continent, hearing the proposition that the commissioner of the most excellent Sir, the president of the United States of America, who is present at the headquarters of your army make to this effect.

It is of course lamentable that the rights of the Mexican republic not having been duly considered, the shedding of blood between the foremost republics of the American continent had become inevitable, and Y.E. qualifies this war with a great deal of certainty as wicked, not only because of its motives, but also because of the antecedents of the peoples, so identified with each other in relations and interests. The proposition of an armistice to put an end to this shameful commotion, was received with favor by H. E. the president and general in chief, because it will facilitate listening to the propositions which the commissioner of the president of the United States of America may advance toward a decorous conclusion of this war.

Consequently, H.E. the president and general in chief orders me to announce to Y.E. that he accepts the proposition of concluding an armistice and that he has appointed to this effect, the brigade generals Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Benito Quijano, who will be present at the spot and on the hour you may announce.

H.E. the general and president also advises me to notify Y.E. of his complaisance that the army of the United States occupy comfortable and sheltered quarters, trusting that the latter will be located beyond the reach of fire from the Mexican fortifications.

I have the honor of being, with high consideration and respect, your Excellency's most obedient servant.—Alcorta. ®

NUMBER 3

General Headquarters of the Army of the United States of America.—Tacubaya, September 6th 1847.—To H.E. the president and general in chief of the republic of Mexico.—Sir.—The 7th as well as the 1th article stipulating that the traffic of commerce shall by no means be interrupted, of the armistice or military covenant

which I had the honor of ratifying and exchanging with Y.E. on the 24th of past August, were repeatedly violated on the part of Mexico shortly after the signing of the armistice, and now, I have very good reasons to believe that during the last 48 hours, if not sooner, article 3 of the covenant was likewise violated by the same party.

These direct attacks upon good faith, give this army the full right to break out in hostilities against Mexico without previous announcement, but I grant the time required for an explanation, a satisfaction and reparations if it be possible, since to the contrary, I declare formally right now that if I do not receive complete satisfaction to all these accusations before twelve o'clock tomorrow, I shall consider the said armistice ended after that hour.

I have the honor of being Y.E. obedient servant.—Windfield Scott.

NUMBER 4

General headquarters of the army of the Mexican republic.—Mexico, September 6th 1847. To H.E. general Windfield Scott, general in chief of the army of the United States of America.—Sir.—From the notifications from Y.E. of this date, I have learned with surprise that you consider the articles 1, 12 and 3 of the armistice which I have concluded with Y.E. on the 24th of last month, as violated by the Mexican civil and military authorities.

The Mexican civil and military authorities have not obstructed the movement of provisions to the American army, and if their shipment has lagged at any time, it was precisely because of the carelessness of American agents who, without first coming to an agreement with the above mentioned authorities, have brought about popular ebullition that had caused the Mexican authorities much effort to suppress. Last night, and the night before, escorts were ready to conduct the provisions, but their delivery was not effected, because Mr. Hargous, in charge of effecting it, wanted it so. The order issued to suspend traffic between the two armies was directed to private persons, and not to the agents of the United States army, exactly with a view to expedite it by reducing it to this sole object. In contrast to this conduct, Y.E. has prevented that the owners and administrators of the wheat mills in the vicinity of this city import flour into it, which has opened a real breach in the good faith Y.E. had promised me.

It is false that any new fortifications had been undertaken, as one repair or another served merely to re-establish them to the state

they were in on the day of the armistice, since incidents or conveniences of the moment have wrought destruction in pre-existing works. I have obtained well anticipated news of a battery covered by the earth wall of the so-called Garay house in this town, but I have not objected, because peace between two great republics could not be made to depend on things grave in themselves, but of little weight in view of the result in which all friends of humanity and of the happiness of the American continent are interested.

Not without pain and even indignation, have I received notices from the cities and town occupied by Y.E. army, about violations of temples consecrated to the worship of God, about robbery of sacred vessels and profanation of the images which the Mexican people venerate. I have been profoundly affected by the complaints of fathers and husbands about violations committed on their daughters and wives; and these same cities and towns were looted not only in violation of the armistice, but even of the sacred principles proclaimed and observed by civilized nations. I have guarded silence up to now, so as not to blunt negotiations that offered hopes of terminating a scandalous war which Y.E. has so justly characterized with the expression of wicked. However, I shall not insist in offering apologies, because it is not hidden from me that the true, the barefaced cause of the threats of breaking the armistice contained in Y.E. note, is that I have not lent myself to the signing of a treaty that would considerably impair not only the territory of the republic, but also that dignity and integrity that nations defend in any danger. And if these considerations do not bear equal weight in the spirit of Y.E., yours will be the responsibility before the world that well understands on whose part rest moderation and justice.

I flatter myself that Y.E. will convince yourself in calmness of the sound foundation of these reasons. However, if unfortunately nothing else is being sought but a pretext for depriving the first city of the American continent of a recourse for the unarmed part of its population to free itself of the horrors of war, no other means will be left to me to save it than repelling force with force, with the decision and energy prescribed by my high obligations.

I have the honor of being Y. E. very obedient servant.—Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.



Most Excellent Sir:

Two official communications that circulate in print in the capital of the republic happened to come to my hands: one is by the most Exc. division general well deserved of the fatherland, Sir Nicolas, Bravo, and the other by brevet brigade general Sir Andres Terres, referring to the loss of the fort of Chapultepec and the Belen gate on the past 13th of September; my tireless enemies have promptly seized upon their inaccuracies for recriminations and absurd comments, because of the criminal eagerness cherished by them to convince the plain people that the most loyal defender of their rights is a *traitor*. These circumstances place me in the need of immediately presenting to the supreme government a detailed relation of the events, so that by giving it convenient publication, things can be judged as they happened, and fallacy and deceit can be frustrated.

Thus, I'll begin by declaring to Y. Lordship, so that you may wish to do the same to the Exc. Sir charged with the supreme executive power, that the most Exc. Sir, general Bravo, was not exact in his communications, concealing facts that were seen by many, which circumstances, together with others I shall refer to later, make him subject to severe charges from which he has apparently tried to retreat by arousing opinion against me; and that brevet general Sir Andres Terres, due to his cowardly conduct at the Belen gate the defense of which I had unfortunately confided in him, is a criminal, aggravated by the desertion he committed while placed under arrest by me, remaining in consequence with the enemy under the pretext of a prisoner of war; he believed that signing a communication such as he has printed and circulated, he would cover up his crime, since I, separated from power, could not do anything against the vociferation of the factions warring against me to the death, because they would accept his concoction without criticism. But I, who have shouldered costly sacrifices in order to conserve my good name, am determined to uphold my truth and justice before all the world, and nobody shall be capable of stopping me in this my noble purpose.

Entering upon a relation of the events I propose to narrate, I shall tell Y.E.: that having considered it convenient to fortify the

hill and the buildings of Chapultepec, so that the invader may not occupy so important a position, and that it may serve as a base of operations which his proximity would force us to bring against him, I entrusted the direction of these works to a master staff officer, general Sir Mariano Monterde, whom I appointed military commander of this point, to help him expedite his work. I dictated as many orders as were necessary to provide him with every kind of material; brigade general Sir Manuel Maria Lombardini, at that time chief of the Army of the East, and general Sir Ignacio Gutierrez, district governor, can still testify to whether any performance had been omitted in properly fortifying Chapultepec; the commissioner of that army, too, can present the sums of pesos invested in these works.

Brigade general Sir Antonio Leon was then appointed principal commandant of the Chapultepec line and it was recommended to him several times to watch and speed up the work all along it; he was even warned in definite terms to establish his main quarters in the Chapultepec building so as to make weekly reports on the work progress. I myself was visiting this point as well as all others and I had no doubt left about the laborious eagerness with which work was performed; so that upon the enemy's approach to the capital, Chapultepec had three lines of defense established in good order, able to sustain itself very well and with advantage against quintuple numbers, with ten artillery pieces emplaced, and a thousand infantrymen.

Since general Monterde had disappeared from Chapultepec to undergo medical treatment in the city for illnesses he said had befallen him after the events of Padierna and Churubusco, I ordered an investigation to clear up his conduct that appeared improper to me under these circumstances, and that H.E. general Bravo take over command of such important a fortress, where he remained up to the said 13th. The fort was provided, as I have indicated, with ten pieces of artillery and double ammunition stocks, manned by selected officers and men of this branch, with ample rifle ammunition, with a thousand footmen of the 10th Line and the Toluca battalions, Military Academy cadets, and finally with provisions for eight days. In this state, it remained all through the armistice, since the appointment of general Bravo occurred at the beginning of the same.

Obliged to continue hostilities, I ordered on the afternoon of September 6th that general Leon with his brigade consisting of the Liberty, Union, Queretaro and Mina battalions occupy Molino del Rey located at half a gunshot to the west of Chapultepec. On the

morning of the 7th, he was reinforced by general Rangel's brigade consisting of two battalions of Grenadier Guards, the San Blas militia, the Santa-Anna Mixed and the Morelia battalion. On the same morning, I ordered the Casemate, at a rifleshot distance from Molino del Rey, to be occupied by the 4th Light Line battalions under command of brevet general Sir Francisco Perez, at half way between the said points and taking advantage of the ditches that existed there. I located general Ramirez' brigade with the 2nd Light, the Fixed Mexico, and the 1st and 12th Line battalions, and in reserve the 1st and 3rd Light, further six pieces of artillery, well munitioned. The Casemate conserved its old fortification that made it imposing: therefore, I located there a stock of ammunition, and another one in Molino del Rey. All the above mentioned forces remained entrenched with more or less advantage. At Morales Ranch, a league distant from Chapultepec, I stationed the cavalry division under the most Exc. Sir, general Juan Alvarez, 4000 horses strong, and on the afternoon of the same 7th, I disposed that he approach to more or less a rifleshot from the Casemate, and I myself staked out the terrain where he was to encamp, and I ordered this general that as soon as he observed that any of the immediate points were being attacked, he were to act with utmost decision at the head of all this cavalry, since the terrain was suitable for this. Let it be judged, from all these dispositions, whether Chapultepec was being abandoned through my fault.

At dawn of the 8th, the enemy attacked Molino del Rey and the Casemate with a large part of his forces: the lively fire delivered by our troops and the advantage of our positions made him suffer the loss of a thousand men, as it is well known, his charge having been thrown back; but coincidence that always seemed to be in his favor, saved him from a defeat, because the cavalry did not operate as it should have, as testified to be the enclosed communication from H.E. general Alvarez, at the same time that the troops that had thrown back the enemy columns from Molino del Rey and the Casemate, rushed forth enthusiastically to pursue them without cavalry support, and when the enemy reserves counterattacked, they could no longer return to their positions, thereby losing the latter and the six artillery pieces in the dispersal that followed; thus, my combination became illusory as well as my orders, and if I had not presented myself at that moment with the column I had been leading up from Candelaria, Chapultepec would have perhaps been lost that same day.

I found myself at Candelaria at dawn of the 8th because, since the evening before, I began to receive reports that the enemy had surrounded this point with a respectable force, and it was urgent to attend to this. To verify these reports conveniently, I ordered that the Rangel brigade pass this night at the Citatel, the First Light regiment at the Alfaro Red House situated between Chapultepec and Belen gate; and that various artillery pieces brought up from other points, reinforce Candelaria where there was a shortage of them. These reports were confirmed by a communication brought to me by word of mouth at 4 o'clock in the morning at my quarters by general Sir Antonio Vizcayno, whom I had sent to observe the enemy: as he explained to me, *there was no doubt that the enemy was within sight of Candelaria, as his encampment was clearly visible by the lights that have been in motion all night long.* I ordered immediately that general Rangel's brigade which was to occupy yesterday's positions on Chapultepec at dawn, march off toward Candelaria, that the First Light regiment follow this movement, while I too, with my general staff, took to the road. Arriving at the said point, its commandant general Sir Mariano Martinez informed me: *that according to a reconnaissance his scouts had just carried out, the field was free of enemies.* Disgusted by this sham, the flashes of some cannon shot from the direction of Chapultepec drew my attention, and no longer harboring any doubt that the attack was taking place there, just as I had presumed, I dispatched one of my adjutants to make general Rangel's brigade and the First Light countermarch at the double, and joining this force, I formed the above mentioned column with which I reached the combat area.

Close to Chapultepec, I encountered some carriages of the six artillery pieces in retreat, the drivers having told me that the guns have been lost. I expedited our steps and was sorry to encounter also general Leon and Colonel Valderas in an escort of wounded; farther ahead, I observed the dispersion of the troops that should have given a day of glory to the fatherland by merely holding the positions where I had left them stationed. I busied myself in reassembling them, which I attained during the remainder of the day. One of my adjutants, dispatched to spot the whereabouts of our cavalry, reported to me that the latter was now in the vicinity of Los Morales retiring in good order. I instantly reinforced the fortifications set up on the two roads that lead to Tacubaya and the Casemate forming the right and left flank of Chapultepec and I endeavored to recover the points of Molino del Rey and the Casemate, and although my first efforts

were useless, I succeeded about 3 o'clock in the afternoon in making the enemy retreat to Tacubaya and leaving the field to our troops. Sure hits from the artillery at Chapultepec contributed greatly to this operation.

For the rest of the afternoon, the dispersed corps managed to assemble but because of the poor condition in which I saw them, I desisted from leaving them in the positions they had occupied before this action and I sent them off to pass the night in their barracks, leaving in Chapultepec the remainder of general Leon's brigade under his second in command, brevet general Sir Juan Perez de Castro, their number reduced to 400 men because of the fallen, the wounded and missing it had lost.

The enemy who suffered so much in the battle of the 8th, remained inactive throughout the 9th, and I utilized this day to reorganize my forces and to advance my fortifications. On the 10th, the enemy commenced movements that threatened the Niño Perdido and Candelaria points and the intelligence which my spies and correspondents communicated to me, coincided in that his aim was to attack that line, believing it to be more accessible. I reinforced its garrisons, improved its fortifications and established strong reserves along the San Antonio Abad and Viga avenues. Without, however neglecting Chapultepec, since I sent Lt. colonel of engineers Sir Juan Cano to attend to its fortifications, improving or enlarging them wherever possible, and I maintained one brigade on observation at the Citadel.

On the 11th, enemy movements supported his intention to attack the Niño Perdido and Candelaria points, as respectable columns came in sight and fortification works were observed at the Hermitage on Niño Perdido avenue, making it necessary for us to fight them with our artillery emplaced at the second point, to which his pieces, already in position, replied. A reconnaissance carried out in the afternoon by the Hussar regiment convinced me that the enemy was keeping a large part of his forces in this vicinity.

At six o'clock on the 12th, the enemy's fire was felt against Candelaria and Niño Perdido, with more continuity against the former, as well as against Chapultepec. An hour later, my spies notified me that enemy forces were concentrating in Tacubaya. Instantly, I directed all my attention to Chapultepec and I myself left for this point determined to provide for its best defense. Arriving, I observed that the enemy had established large batteries in Tacubaya and at the Condesa Ranch, sustaining with them a lively fire against

our points and occupying also Molino del Rey, so that I no longer had any doubt as to his true intentions.

My dispositions began by reinforcing the entrenchments of the flanks of the fortress, leaving them well provided with artillery and sufficiently garrisoned. Considering it convenient to secure the inside of the main gate to the park with some earthworks and a cannon, I entrusted this to the Lt. colonels of engineers Manuel and Luis Robles who finished them in the course of this day in addition to some outer works I judged necessary. I made all available forces take up positions next to Chapultepec, where they remained, the incessant fire that poured down on them notwithstanding and in spite of the dead and wounded they were losing with every moment, in which precinct I remained in the saddle issuing all convenient instructions, as a result of which my life was in danger many times, as all who surrounded me could see. At one time, when I tried to place general Ramirez' brigade on the slope of Chapultepec Hill, a shell threw thirty men dead and wounded to the ground in front of me and the blood of one of the soldiers spattered my dress; a fact that convinced me of the impossibility of holding the force in this place without leaving it to perish, and I made it retire to where it found some shelter.

The earthworks on the inside of the park gate were garrisoned with 500 men and a piece of 8, well munitioned.

At the hour of Angelus, the most excellent Sir general Bravo presented himself for an appointment I made with him and I showed him the enlarged works at the foot of the hill, the cannon and the force that guarded it, the safety of the two outer roads at the flanks, and the strong reserve that was to occupy the Alfaro Red House all night, with orders issued to all available troops to present themselves at this post at four in the morning, and that I myself would also be there. Mr. Bravo then explained to me, for the first time: *that the garrison he had at the top fort was scared by the horrendous fire it had suffered all day long and that he would appreciate having it relieved with other types of troops.* I answered: *that the scare had also taken root among the troops below and both scares being of the same nature, the change he proposed was superfluous; but that at dawn, if the enemy attacked, I would promptly reinforce him.* He replied that I should at least dispose one battalion in the park and to make him see the futility of his request, I related very briefly what had happened to the Ramirez brigade, adding that: *if he accumulated more forces at the top during the bombardment, we would uselessly*

sacrifice the few we still had, since with the more than thousand men garrisoning such a small precinct, all forts were well covered. He did not give me any other explanation during this interview.

At dawn of the 13th, all available troops assembled at the foot of Chapultepec and I, too, was present there. The enemy continued his mortar and cannon fire and between 7 and 8 in the morning, he started to move his assault columns. Half an hour before, an official communication reached me from general Bravo, written to tell the minister of war (who was always at my side) *that the garrison at the top continued intimidated and that some desertions were noted during the night, and asking that they be replaced by other types of troops.* In view of this note, I disposed that the San Blas battalion, four hundred men strong, and which I distinguished by the courage I noted in such good soldiers, march up to reinforce the fort at the top, and I admonished its commandant, the valiant Xicotencatl, to report to general Bravo and to receive his orders. While this unit marched off, a bugle call announced that the enemy was advancing upon our points, and I then sent the battalion chief himself to ascend to the fort at a run. At this moment, I was at the gate to the park. In effect, he got there just in time, as I could well see, and fought back desperately in the foremost entrenchments of the hill until all was nearly finished, resisting the pressure of the enemy who was coming up from Molino del Rey.

Since the attack became general, I covered with my reserves all such necessities as became noticeable. This reserve had melted down to the 3rd Light Battalion with 400 men; the 4th idem with 300; the 11th Line with 600; the Morelia Militia with 300, and the Hidalgo National Guard with 350, making a total of 1,950 men who were employed in the following manner: The 3rd Light was sent to reinforce the San Blas battalion, but it had to turn back on the march, because the enemy had at that moment captured Chapultepec fort; the 4th Light, the 11th Line and the Morelia Militia, I ordered to stand by in reserve under command of general Lombardini in support of such points below as were being vigorously attacked by strong columns; and the Hidalgo National Guard, I placed on the left flank of the fortification that defended Condesa road, where it put up a good fight.

In spite of the few forces that defended the lower positions, the boldness with which the enemy attacked them and of his superior numbers, he was gallantly thrown back and could not advance a single step, when I began to notice that the fort above was not delivering the

amount of fire that could be expected of its garrison, and shortly afterward I saw with surprise that it descended in flight in large platoons, cravenly abandoning its parapets which the enemy could have only in this manner occupied easily. This infamous conduct placed me in the greatest of conflicts, since once the heights of Chapultepec were occupied by the enemy, the forces below were left completely exposed to be murdered with impunity, and to avoid this, no other means were left than to undertake a retreat toward the Belen and St. Thomas gates. This I ordered in the midst of the greatest despair.

General Sir Matias de la Peña y Barragán, in command of the point at my right, went off along Veronica avenue toward the St. Thomas forts with the Grenadier Guard and the 1st Light battalions, under orders to sustain them, protected by the cavalry that should have been there in accordance with my previous orders. General Lombardini marched off to the Belen gate in perfect order, and on the way placed the Morelia militia battalion behind the middle parapet, where it covered valiantly the retreat of the other units that had with so much courage defended the other points below Chapultepec.

Some of the cowards who fled the upper Chapultepec fort and who were presented to me a few hours later, excused themselves for their abandoning of the point, saying that *general Bravo did the same first*; I reproached these expressions in front of the many who voiced them, because such conduct seemed to me unworthy of H.E. Subsequently, I learned that he was taken prisoner in the park below, hidden in a water ditch up to his neck, where he was discovered by the enemy because of the white hair on his head. This fact proves the former story and deserves to be brought to light in a trial. Also, in favor of this declaration remains the fact, that he did not mention in his official communication the valiant San Blas battalion that perished almost totally in the entrenchments on the hill, because if Mr. Bravo would have remained on top to the last hour, he would have had to see it clearly, and if he did see it, why hide what this effort had meant to him instead of complaining that it was of no help? At any rate, general Bravo's conduct was not honorable, since the least he did was fail in telling the truth, thus taking the public by surprise to the detriment of justice and of my good name. Furthermore, the commander of a fortress he is expected to defend at any cost, ought to end up dead or a prisoner in it. It is painful to me to have to present such facts about a companion, and I would gladly bury them in

silence if he himself had not forced me to state them by publishing a report which my enemies have seized upon with a huzza, and whence they extracted arguments in support of the diatribes and slander. I therefore earnestly request the supreme government to open a corresponding summary trial on the strength of the particulars above referred to, and to include this communication in the proceedings.

Returning to a relation of the events connected with general Terres, I will declare that when I arrived at the Belen gate, I at once went about preparing its best defense. I had the large cannon that were in the Piedad avenue fortification transferred to Belen to replace the light pieces emplaced there, leaving it well gunned. Days before, general Terres had commanded both points, having at his disposal the 1st and 2nd Militia of Mexico battalions and the one from Guanaajuato; to these I added the Invalid and Lagos battalions, placing them astride the avenue to the left and entrusting this defense to brevet general Sir Diego Arguelles, my field adjutant; then I stationed the 2nd Light with other pickets under general Ramirez across the avenue to the right, while the Morelia militia likewise fell back toward the gate after the fight I have already described. The enemy approached and was thrown back. The Citadel was reinforced with some units. I ordered further that four of the Candelaria cannon be sent to St. Thomas, and they did good service at the San Cosme gate.

In this situation, I received a report that *the enemy was advancing along San Cosme, and that the forces of St. Thomas were in retreat.* I addressed general Terres to tell him that I was going over to S. Cosme and would return, recommending that he preserve everything as it was; observing that canon fire was increasing without necessity, and knowing of our shortage of ammunition, I went up to the gunners and warned them not to discharge their pieces until the enemy would approach to a favorable distance.

With the 3rd and 4th Light battalions, and the 11th Line under general Perez, I marched to San Cosme and at the gate of the same name, I encountered general Rangel and, at a still more advanced parapet, general Peña y Barragan who fought the enemy gallantly with his small force; I ordered the occupation of some buildings to the fore and rear of the gate, as well as the roof of the gate-house itself. In these moments, the Candelaria artillery pieces arrived and I ordered general Rangel to emplace them, which he did at once, and expressed to him my resolution to defend this point at all cost.

General Peña y Barragan requested reinforcements, and I sent him my adjutant, general Cosio, with two companies of the 11th

battalion. The enemy had been stopped and I already flattered myself that he would not break through easily, when a report was brought to me that *general Terres had abandoned the Belen gate and that as a result, the Citadel was in peril of being lost.* At this unexpected notice, I rode off rapidly toward Belen with the three units I had in reserve, except the two above mentioned companies of the 11th. I sent orders to general Martinez to fall back on the Citadel with the whole Candelaria garrison and artillery. I myself arrived at the Citadel when the enemy was already in possession of Belen gate and was advancing in one column along the Paseo Nuevo, and in another along Belen avenue, close to the gate, so that we almost disputed the entry with each other; a lively fire was opened against them and I succeeded in thrusting them back against the Belen gate, inflicting plenty of damage to them.

Having saved the citadel by the rapidity of my movement, I tried to investigate the reasons that caused the doleful loss of Belen gate, and a uniform voice convinced me that *general Terres had ordered its evacuation and executed it so leisurely that even the artillery pieces and ammunition could be salvaged.* I reproached general Arguelles for abandoning the point I had confided to his care, and he explained to me that *unwilling to retreat, since he saw no necessity for it, the order was repeated to him in behalf of the commanding officer of the line, and he had no other choice left but to obey.* Because of so many unfortunate happenings produced by the most reprehensible insubordination and cowardice, dismay and desperation overcame me to such a degree that when general Terres appeared before me, blinded by rage I struck two or three blows against him and I ordered his sword and the insignia he wore torn off him, declaring him an unworthy servant of the nation that had prodigiously heaped considerations upon him, and that until he would be judged by the rules of ordinance, he should be kept under arrest at the Citadel. This bad soldier broke the arrest, as I have insinuated at the beginning of this note, by the fact of not remaining with the Mexican army that evacuated the Citadel at dawn of the 14th to move to the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and by having remained against my permission in a place subsequently occupied by the enemy, having then the impudence to appear in his famous report as a prisoner of war without an explanation as to how he found himself in this condition. The supreme government must judge these facts and I have no doubt that it will find confirmation to order all that is necessary toward bringing light into these happenings and to punish them as required by the laws, by the honor of the army

and by public vindication.

The enemy having fallen back upon Belen gate, as I have already mentioned, he opened cannon fire upon the Citadel, which the latter duly returned. I endeavored to dislodge him with the Morelia militia battalion and other pickets, and it was not possible even though our soldiers acted this time with extraordinary intrepidity. It might have been five o'clock in the afternoon, when I received word *that the San Cosme gate needed reinforcements*. I returned to that point with the Third Light battalion and a small detachment of Grenadier Guards; on arriving, I learned from general Cosio, my adjutant, *that the advance parapet had been abandoned under repeated enemy charges, and when retreating with the two companies of the 11th battalion, two soldiers were killed by our own fire, he himself receiving a bruise*. I noticed at once that the defense was reduced to just the gate itself, held with courage by general Rangel. I disposed that the 3rd Light battalion remain in reserve at the back of the gate and I sent to occupy the house of Mr. Atilano Sanchez and other adjoining ones to lend support to our defense of the gate. While this operation was being carried out by the 1st Light battalion, I saw some officers and men of this unit fall dead under the rain of enemy projectiles. I was told there that the enemy was penetrating through the gardens of the so-called Pinillos house, and I went over there with a hundred Grenadiers of the Guard, stationing them on the roofs after assuring ourselves that there was nobody in the gardens. This operation concluded, well toward the evening, I suddenly heard a bugle call coming from the San Cosme gate and on being repeated, I had no doubt that retreat was being sounded; I hastened forth with my general staff to inform myself about this incident, when groups of soldiers coming toward us in full flight were nearly overrunning us in such manner that we had no other way left but to move along with them until my adjutants succeeded by their efforts to halt the race and to make them listen to my warning *to assemble at the Citadel* to which I led them not without difficulty, it having been necessary to send out cavalry detachments and turn back many officers who were marching off by different streets with larger or smaller bodies of troops.

It might have been seven in the evening when I found myself at the door of the Citadel and I did not dismount until making sure of having rounded up all the San Cosme force, although I had been in the saddle since four o'clock in the morning. I tried to find out who ordered to sound retreat which had caused so much disorder, and I was told that it was general Rangel. But as I have not seen this

gentleman again since then, I could not ascertain better the truth about this incident that resulted, of course, in the loss of this gate, thereby leaving the way open for the enemy to penetrate to the center of the capital.

At the Citadel, at 8 o'clock that night, I presided over a war council of generals whom I had summoned to hear their opinions and to arrive at a proper decision under such terrible circumstances. Participating in this council was also the most Exc. governor of the State of Mexico, National Guard colonel Mr. Francisco Modesto de Olaguibel, who had just arrived at the capital that afternoon with 200 infantry and 4 artillery pieces to aid in the defense. In this council, the day's events and some previous ones were recapitulated; the situation was deplored, to which the disobedience of some, the cowardice of others, and the general lack of morale in our army has reduced us, so that a better performance could no longer be expected; in justice to it, it was also observed that the continuous revolts, our social disorganization and the poor recruiting system had a great deal of influence upon this indisposition, while at the same time, our penury did not permit us to attend to the troops with what was due to them, as was the case precisely on this day in which they had not tasted food; that rations for the past four days were still due to them, and nobody could tell whether they would have food on the morrow. Shortage of munitions was likewise too manifest to enable us to sustain even one more day of battle, the scarce forces still left, and finally, that reduced to the sole precinct of the Citadel, the enemy would overwhelm us with his projectiles, making it untenable for even a couple of hours; that to fall back on the city buildings would mean sacrificing them without any prospect of success, when with few exceptions, the population did not take part in the fighting. These and other considerations were presented for solution and it was unanimously agreed upon to evacuate the Citadel and the adjoining buildings at dawn; and that the artillery, ammunition and troops situate themselves in the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, all under command of general Lombardini, which was made effective.

The cavalry corps stationed in the capital received orders to present themselves, likewise at dawn, in the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, to join the cavalry division that stood there under the most Exc. general Alvarez.

With all the forces assembled in Guadalupe Hidalgo amidst the most fearful hunger and misery, I agreed with the most Exc. division general Sir Jose J. de Herrera, that we divide our responsibilities;

thus H.E. marched off to Queretaro with all the infantry and artillery, while I led the cavalry and 4 light field pieces toward Puebla. Necessity as well as the nation's good services compelled this measure, because it was neither possible to exist one more day without food in a place where everything was lacking, nor should any time have been lost saving the remnants of an army that could still render useful services. General Herrera was charged with the reorganization of the forces I placed under his command for this purpose, and I did not doubt that he could accomplish this with the aid of the richest states of the republic, flattering myself that while this was taking place, I would harass the enemy garrison of Puebla, the surrender of which was, in my judgment, of utmost importance.

When I reached the town of San Cristobal, a few citizens from the capital presented themselves in search of me, to notify me *that the sight of the American flag raised over the palace by our enemies had caused so much irritation, that the population had risen in strength against the invaders, had them surrounded in the circle of the main plaza and had deprived them of six cannon; and they asked me finally to countermarch and to add the army's force to that of the people.* I confess that this plausible news elated me exceptionally and I noticed the same emotion in general Alvarez who was with me at that moment, and both of us agreed unanimously to march back without an instant's loss and almost at a gallop we arrived with the cavalry at Guadalupe Hidalgo where we halted a short time to await battalion of the South of general Alvarez' force, who continued up to the Peralvillo gate, followed by some cavalry units. Mr. Alvarez and I penetrated as far as the city streets to make sure by our own eyes just what was happening there and to act in accord with the events, having first left the bulk of the cavalry in observation along the Guadalupe highway. From San Cristobal, I ordered general Herrera that he countermarch likewise with his infantry and artillery; but H.E. had already reached Cuautitlan when my communication arrived, and his about face was no longer possible.

As high as my enthusiasm had been over the exaggerated news given me in San Cristobal, as great was my disgust over the disappointment, since I could see nothing except some rifle shots which several persons from among the people were firing on some of the streets corners, it being false that they had captured the guns, or that there was a general uprising of all classes that were supposed to besiege the invaders in the plaza. Nevertheless I had an entrenchment thrown up in Peralvillo to cover the approaching southern infantry

that took up positions there to aid the population, and with the same purpose in mind, I sent heavy cavalry patrols through several of the suburbs; these and other mounted troops retired for the night to Guadalupe, while the infantry stayed at Peralvillo until the morning of the 16th.

On the 15th, I detached various cavalry units to patrol some city streets and protect the people in the movement which, as I had been assured, *they would undertake that day against the invaders if the troops would support them.* General Alvarez, too, went forth to be on the lookout and use this occasion to harass the enemy; but the day went by the same as before and Mr. Alvarez, upon retiring at night, notified me: *that the only thing accomplished was that the 5th, 9th and Guanajuato cavalry regiments lanced a few enemy soldiers they had encountered; and finally that he could observe no symptoms to confirm the uprising of which we had been assured.*

Very early on that day of the 15th, a number of citizens came to tell me in the name of the people of the capital, *that the first mayor Mr. Manuel Reyes Veramendi and the city council were taking measures to suppress their enthusiasm* and showed me an imprint that confirmed it, for which reason I sent him a communication marked number 1, to which this mayor replied with number 2, and I again answered with number 3.

On the morning of the 16th, the ministers of war and of foreign relations who had gone forward as far as San Juan Teotihuacan, commented with well founded reasons the difficulties that would arise by not establishing the government in some central point, such as Queretaro, so that I did not hesitate in issuing the decree of that date, followed by a proclamation which the nation has seen; because my susceptibility did not permit me to remove myself to such a distance from the theatre of war, as on other occasions, I preferred the battlefield to the office.

After making the above decision, I ordered to continue the march to Puebla, which was undertaken the same day, as we no longer had even fodder for the horses.

I have related with exactness my last operations in the capital, to demonstrate the injustice with which intents were made to throw doubts on my behavior which, although it did not produce fortunate results, as vividly as I desired them, shows unquestionably that there was a surplus of frankness, of good intentions and of patriotism in them. I shall thus conclude this note, complying at the same time with my duty of explaining to the supreme government what it was

that had frustrated my last efforts at Puebla.

Officially, I had been informed that two thousand five hundred State National Guard infantry stood at Cholula with two small pieces of artillery under brigade general Manuel Maria Villada, and under brevet general Joaquin Rea 600 guerrillas were encircling Puebla; and that these forces as well as the people of the city were burning with eagerness to combat the enemy garrison whose presence was an insult to the inhabitants. For this reason, I ordered from Guadalupe Hidalgo that the most Exc. general Sir Juan Alvarez, appointed commandant general of Puebla State, move upon this city with the forces of the South, now reduced to 600 infantry and cavalry, taking the road to Texcoco and San Martin Tescmelucan, while I would do the same with two thousand horse and four light pieces across the Apam plains to the Santo Domingo mill, hoping that I could assemble 6,000 men against Puebla who, with the aid of the civilian population, would very quickly subdue the enemy garrison which did not exceed a thousand men, although well fortified on the hills of Loreto, Guadalupe and San Jose barracks.

In the afternoon of the 21st, I entered the streets of Puebla with a small escort and was received by the people with music and enthusiasm which confirmed their good morale against the common enemy. I found the National Guard infantry, formerly of Cholula, distributed in various quarters.

On the 22nd, I stationed myself within the city limits, to direct operations, disposing my forces at Carmen and at other points. General Alvarez arrived on the following day.

I appointed general Rea military governor of the place, who declared the city in a state of siege and took all convenient measures to surround the enemy and cut off the resources he was enjoying without any hindrance; so that he saw himself compelled not to make a single step outside of his entrenchments. I reconnoitered these entrenchments from very close and judged an attack difficult, nevertheless, I proposed to the enemy commander an intimation, copy of which is enclosed here under number 4, as well as of his reply number 5. He let me know that there was no alternative but force and I ordered to tighten the siege, resulting in an intermitent exchange of fire by both parties, which cost the enemy some casualties and several deserters who revealed the *shortage of food they suffered*.

When all seemed to presage an early surrender, I received official notice that a convoy was under way from Jalapa headed for Puebla, and it became necessary to move out and meet it. After order-

ing that general Rea remain in command of the troops necessary to continue the siege, I marched off with the rest to Pinal, an appropriate point to await and attack the convoy. We set out on the first of October and during a brief rest at Amozoc, I observed that the State National Guard infantry began to desert, leaving their rifles stacked. We passed that night at Acajete and at dawn, I received a report that entire units of the said National Guard had deserted, some with and some leaving their arms, which commotion made me realize that my plans would be frustrated. Nevertheless, I continued the march to Nopalucan to observe the enemy and I had some previously reconnoitered points at Pinal fortified to attack him with advantage. Colonel Sir Jose Maria Carrasco to whom I entrusted these works, labored with extraordinary activity and would have finished them in two or three days with the help of ranch hands rounded up for this purpose, if that fatality that always seemed to preside our operations had not compelled me to change the plan I had marked out for myself.

Desertions continued without remedy and spread even to the line cavalry from whose ranks even some of the officers deserted, while others requested passes to resign from service and to continue to Queretaro. In the proportion in which the enemy approached, the scandal increased until a conspiracy was to be feared. I thought of making a few examples of the cowards, but prudent reflexions by general Alvarez contained me and in the end, I decided that the remnants of the National Guard return to Puebla. General Alvarez himself left at once with his troops of the South; as commandant general of the State, he had to direct the siege operations and make the necessary arrangements ahead of time in case the garrison's surrender could not be forced prior to the arrival of the convoy; and to reinforce him, I placed under his orders some of my cavalry units. I myself remained in Nopalucan with a thousand and a half of horse and six light artillery pieces for the purpose of detaining the convoy and to harass it as much as possible, since I had no other alternative left. I then received notice from Queretaro that general Isidro Reyes was marching to join me with a brigade and two field pieces, and to await him in a good spot, I moved out to station myself at Huamantla. . . . The events that took place afterward are established in the official report of October 13th, now in print, and receipt of which Y.E. did not deem fit to confirm. It contains a testimony of my last efforts, and that the arms under my command were being employed within their purpose; I here enclose copy number 6 of this report.

Impartiality shall judge if my conduct deserves the diatribes and the embittered censures of those who taking advantage of the confusion and disorders, shout and write repeatedly of the *scandalous abandonment of the capital* to surprise the simple-mindedness of some, and to strengthen the gossip of *treason* which they have propagated with sinister ends in mind. The factions do not stop at any means, and subordinate even the misfortunes of the fatherland to the service of their aims. I know that the facts that have occurred in plain sight of so many people will be of no avail; the generosity with which I presented myself to sacrifice my life, my fortune and that of my sons to free the threatened independence; the efforts witnessed by all, to organize armies when few were in evidence, and to lead them to the field of battle where my existence was so many times in peril; that my innocence and my justice would be mocked by my enemies; and that all, all will be converted into guilt by this mob that is anxiously waiting to fatten on its victim. Let, then, this iniquity be duly perpetrated if Providence permit it, let a reputation be destroyed upon which jealousy stares with hatred; let the life of an old soldier, respected even by the enemy's bullets, be now assaulted, and let them fatten on the blood he spilled in support of the nation's honor and rights, even though this add to our history one more new act of barbarity and ingratitude; but I, my conscience calm, shall stand up to so much evil; I shall raise my voice to the skies until justice is done to me and shall bequeath, in the end, the shame of my death to my henchmen.

Have the kindness, Y.E., to bring all this to the cognizance of the most Exc. Sir charged with the supreme executive power, asking him in my behalf to order that this note receive proper publication, and accept, Y.E., at the same time, the considerations of my personal appreciation.—God and Liberty.—Tehuacan, November 12th 1847. *Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—To the most Exc. Sir, the minister of war and navy.

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General Commandancy of the free and sovereign State of Puebla.—Most Exc. Sir.—As the time will come when the events of the action of the 8th in the hills of the Los Morales ranch and of Chapultepec will be made public, because this is within the duty of officers who know honor, and as those who having belonged to the first cavalry division of the two that were under my command,

managed to fulfill their duties, I have the honor of enclosing their reports for Y.E. attention, signed in Mexico on the 11th although I found it impossible to forward them to Y.E. because of the many preoccupations of the service; requesting you at the same time to accept my considerations and attention.—God and Liberty. Santiago in Puebla, September 5th 1847.—*Juan Alvarez*.—To the most Exc. Sir, general Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna, in command of the Mexican army.



Cavalry Division.—General in chief.—Most Exc. Sir.—I delayed purposely reporting to the supreme government the events of the action of the 8th, regarding the cavalry division you were kind enough to place under my orders, principally so that not the slightest desire might be attributed to me to harm some officers about whose career I had no antecedents; but when I observe that my silence weighs upon the bravery of its valiant dragoons and places in doubt the reputation of many more chiefs who well deserve the ranks they occupy in the service, I feel the necessity of speaking up and of revealing facts that will result, if the supreme government finds them justified, in correcting anomalies that disturb military discipline and that unfortunately contributed to it that the endeavors of the fatherland which the most Exc. president has so masterfully put into play during the present war, have not produced all the effects that were to be desired, because the morale of the army is not up to the level it ought to occupy. I now enter upon the subject.

In fulfilment of Y.E. supreme order received by me at the town of Guadalupe on the 6th, at ten and a half o'clock at night, to the effect that I march off for Tacuba at dawn of the 7th, I carried this out with the necessary precautions, since Y.E. added that I attack any enemy presenting himself to me on the move. On arriving at the indicated point, I received verbal orders brought me by some adjutants of the most Exc. president, to continue to Los Morales ranch; this I did, and before reaching it, I caught up with the second division commanded by general Sir Manuel Andrade who was moving ahead of my advance guard. When I observed that this officer was leading it into the ranch, I sent colonel Manuel Falcon to tell him that I considered it convenient that he draw up his force in the open field. I did this for two purposes: first, that H.E. the general in chief might have this force totally at his disposal for the moment

he would want to order it into action, and second, to deceive the enemy as to its numbers, because my division which was greatly prolonging his line, was not too well visible due to the terrain in which I ordered it to halt; but the reply of the said general, which I would not have tolerated in other circumstances, made me understand that he did not display any willingness of obeying me, nor of maneuvering with me in a necessary combination in case the enemy presented himself. His answer was: "*I neither recognize you as a messenger fit to transmit orders to me, nor that general Alvarez to issue them.*" Y.E. will permit me, before going further into my report of the operations, that I may relate an incident which will reveal immediately the ambition to command, the lack of harmony and the discourtesy of a general who preens himself to be educated, and who has pretended to ridicule me because I do not possess the facility of expression of his lordship, because I lack that play of words and style that deceives and flatters, and because I do not wear embroideries nor a knotted tie around my neck. I have heard it say, and general Andrade might have perhaps read it that the great Gustav Vasa, father of Charles XII came out of the woods, being nothing but a farmer, to bring greatness to Sweden, and that prince Menshikoff also rose from a young pastryboy not knowing how to read or write, solely by his great services, to become prime minister and collaborator of Peter the Great; as also the duke of Dalmatia, starting from a lowly military career, opened up for himself a glorious road on the strength of his services, rising to the highest dignity he occupied with the modern captain of our age.

Let it not be assumed that I am vain enough to compare, by citing these data, either my career or my future with these men whom history remembers in glory, because my goal is to end up with what could much less be expected of *those usurped reputations, of those ranks assaulted by favors and by promises, of those men, finally, whose patriotism consists of slaving with tenacity.*

On the said 7th to which I am referring, we moved, as Y.E. had seen; the brigades of the first division passed the night in the open field, and those of the second at Los Morales ranch. At dawn of the 8th, I rode off with my general staff toward the road, where the first and second brigade had arrived, and when the first cannon shot announced the attack I could see taking shape, I ordered that the two above mentioned brigades advance toward the plain in front of them, so that those composing the second division could follow them without clashing or confusion up to the point where I stood

directing operations. The terrain being thus free, I sent to alert general Manuel Andrade to advance with his division, while other adjutants carried orders to generals Juvera and Guzman who had already drawn up their columns on the hill adjoining the one on which the enemy was stationed, to attack his flank in the same moment as the second division was attacking his front; these two officers carried out their movements and my heart beat faster hearing the shouts of enthusiasm their ordered columns were raising to the supreme government and the fatherland; but as much as I was trying to wake up the movement of general Andrade and his division, I was mortified not seeing him arrive and that by this delay, the moments were escaping in which we could have charged to advantage, General Sir Tomas Moreno and other officers of my staff time and again communicated my orders to the said Mr. Andrade to advance; but he did not carry out the order until the enemy, to escape the threatening charge, commenced to disorganize the columns led by Mr. Juvera and Guzman with his cannon fire, and the former, not finding any support on their left flank, started to disband without it being possible to reorganize them any longer, the valiant behavior of generals Torrejon and Guzman notwithstanding, who were constantly in front of their massed ranks, ready to lead the charge.

Y.E. knows that cavalry charges are very precise and instantaneous, and that they ought to be carried out only when the force to be attacked is disbanding or disorganizing, unless in cases when all should be risked, and I wanted to take advantage of those moments I considered favorable, as the most Exc. Sir, the president and general in chief had left such operations to my judgment; but the cowardice of general Andrade made them escape me, because when the head of his division began to arrive at the point to which he had been summoned, a cannon ball that made a hit in the midst of the Hussar regiment was sufficient to throw it into disorder and make it take the road to the rear; this movement brought about that the third brigade under command of general Angel Perez Palacio, coming up at a trot, found itself without space enough to enter the field.

When I convinced myself that we could no longer operate against the enemy, because the forces that did not occupy points of vantage against us any more, had concentrated themselves around the bulk of their columns, I considered it convenient to order the brigades to maintain themselves in sight of the enemy and thereby distract him from his operations he was carrying out against Chapultepec, and I ordered colonel Benito Haro to notify general Andrade

in my behalf, that he remain on the terrain he was occupying; but once again, I was disobeyed, because his lordship, taking the advance guard of his division, carried behind him other sections of troops who followed his movement, until I sent general Tomas Moreno with orders to halt when he was already passing the walls that fence the olive grove of Los Morales ranch.

I shall not speak, Y.E., about the conduct of the other officers of the second division, as they were being carried along by the attitude of their chief, and I could not properly evaluate their own; but I will add, Y.E., that general Sir Tomas Moreno, seeing the passive behavior of Sir Antonio Jauregui, of his own rank, at a moment that should not have been wasted, asked him for his brigade to lead it into battle, but the latter denied his request, explaining that he was subject solely to orders given him directly by the oft repeated Mr. Andrade.

While the enemy was continuing his fire at Molino del Rey, although with diminished force, and was likewise occupied in collecting his dead and wounded, I determined that the first, second and third brigade march off under cover of the terrain, to capture from the rear the hills occupied by the enemy, and that the second division, forming two bodies, occupy with one the flank of the same hill, and with the other the road; all this with a view of leading a combined charge in case the enemy continued his attack or tried to assault any of our flanks. Since the previous conduct of general Andrade revealed to me how little or nothing could be expected of the forces at his orders as long as he continued in command, I removed him from it, appointing general Torrejon to lead them. General Andrade, obedient to an order that saved him from the danger zone, did not claim his rights or his command, and subordinated himself to the chief who substituted him because of his cowardice; but at sundown, when the forces returned to their quarters, he had the shamelessness of asking me how it was that I transmitted orders to Mr. Torrejon and not to his lordship who was the chief of his division. I, employing the prudence which is part of my nature, replied only: *that general Torrejon was now chief of what he called his own division, and that he better get on his way to present himself at Headquarters for disposal by the most Exc. Sir, the president and general in chief.*

I could cite to Y.E. many more details regarding the cowardly behavior of Mr. Andrade, but I omit them so as not to make this report so extensive, concluding by telling Y.E. that the scare of the said general reached a degree that he thought our dispersed infantry

from the Casemate were two thousand enemies who were flanking him, which he reported to me repeatedly through one of his adjutants, to which I replied that the ought to massacre them if he could prove that they were enemies, and if he had room enough to do it in.

Separately, I will submit to Y.E. detailed reports on the dead, wounded and missing suffered by my division, concluding with the expression of how pleased I am with the behavior of the generals Sir Julian Juvera, Angel Perez Palacios, Angel Guzman, Anastasio Torrejon, major general Jose Stavoli and the staff officers of the respective corps constituting the brigades under their worthy command, because all of them complied with my orders and with their duty without comment, especially during the remainder of military operations carried out to the end of that day.

May Y.E. have the kindness of giving an account of the above explanation to the most Exc. Sir, the president and general in chief of the army, and accept the assurances of my consideration and distinguished appreciation.—God and Liberty. Mexico, September 11th 1847.—*Juan Alvarez.*—To the most Exc. Sir, the Secretary of the office of war and navy.

NUMBER 1

The Mexican Army.—General in Chief.—I was just shown a printed paper signed by Y.L., which you had posted on the street corners, prohibiting the population to harass the barbarous enemy who is looting the city and its temples, violating the women, and as such behavior is unworthy of a Mexican, I warn you in the name of the nation, that if Y.L. again perpetrate a similar act, I shall treat you as a traitor, doing the same with the persons that compose your city council if they contribute in any way to enervate the enthusiasm of Mexican citizens who are justly defending their homes, their daughters and wives.

Neither will you lend yourself, Y.L., to facilitate provisions or any other aid to the enemies, and I warn you that I shall rather dissolve your organization than permit that it contribute in any manner toward doing them favors. Y.L. will make public this order to all concerned, so that none of them may claim ignorance. God and Liberty.—General Headquarters in Guadalupe. September 15th 1847. *Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.*—To Mr. Manuel Reyes Veramendi, president of the most Exc. city council of Mexico.

NUMBER 2

Constitutional 1st Mayor.—Most Exc. Sir.—Now, at three o'clock and 20 minutes in the afternoon, I have received Y.E. note of this date, in which I see, with the bitterest feeling, the interpretation Y.E. has seen fit to apply to the paper I had posted at some of the street corners of this capital. It was fitting, Mr. president, that to the bitterness that rends my soul apart in the anguished-situation in which I was placed after having sacrificed my all in the service of a fatherland which I have served for many years past, should be added that of suffering reprimands, not less harsh than undeserved, such as those you had seen fit to direct to me. This paper, Mr. president, as well as others I have published, and my entire conduct observed that far, have never recognized, nor will ever recognize any other origin than to remove from the innocent population of this capital, the disasters, the mourning, the laments and desolation to which it was cruelly condemned, according to my error, by the most evident rapine and the most lamentable demoralization of our people, and not so much due to true patriotism, nor to the eagerness to avoid looting of temples, of the capital, and the violation of women. Yes, Mr. president, this is the truth divested of all trappings, and these are the motives of my action; if for them, I can merit in Y.E. conception, the infamous labels of an unworthy Mexican and even that of traitor, let them be applied to me once and for all, in the firm conviction that I do not fear them, because I rest on the testimony of my innermost conscience, and as far as being a Mexican who idolizes his fatherland and its sacred liberties, may Y.E. permit me to take the liberty of saying, although respectfully, that I do not cede by a single line to him who contemplates himself as the purest of all. Being human and susceptible to error, I may have made a mistake and may be capable of falling into the crassest ones, but with regard to the sacred duties toward my fatherland, I feel not the slightest remorse.

This reply, most Exc. Sir, is the one I believe to have to make regarding my own person, and as far as the most Exc. city council is concerned, I shall place before it an account of Y.E. note, and shall communicate its resolution to you.

Up to this hour, the invaders have not asked me for any kind of food or any aid whatever, and should they do it, may Y.E. harbor no doubt that I shall have very much in mind what I owe to my fatherland and what I owe to myself. This will occur within the very short time I may remain in the public post I am occupying to the

misfortune of the capital and of my own, because it is sufficient for me that Y.E. interpret my operations all to the contrary of the way dictated by my heart of a fullblooded Mexican, that I remove myself from this very place and go off to deplore in secret the anguished and perilous situation this magnanimous nation, to which I glory myself in belonging, has been brought to, although it deserved, for so many reasons, a better fate.

Permit Y.E. to accept sincere assurances of all my respects.

God and Liberty.—Mexico, September 15th 1847.—At five o'clock in the afternoon.—The most Exc. Sir, Manuel Reyes Veramendi.—To the most Exc. Sir, president of the republic and general in chief of the Mexican army.

NUMBER 3

The Mexican army.—General in Chief.—The note which Y.L. has addressed to me in reply to my own of the same date, and in which I expressed to you my annoyance over the announcement Y.L. has ordered posted in the streets, prohibiting the people to continue hostilities against the invaders, confirms the opinion I have formed of Y.L. as soon as that document reached my hands, and I see that far from vindicating yourself of the charges raised against you because of this step, Y.L. dares to accuse this heroic population, blaming it for the crimes and excesses committed by the invader; but what has most filled me with shame is that a Mexican authority, in public documents, calls "enlightened" an army of adventurers that has perpetrated all kinds of excesses ever since it has desecrated the territory of the republic with its filthy soles. Only a derangement of reason or cowardice could have induced Y.L. to act in this manner and to invite to moderation a people justly irritated against a savage enemy who has trampled on all guarantees. Y.L. acting thus, has forgotten his most sacred duties; it would have served you better to strengthen this admirable enthusiasm, placing yourself at the head of a population that has endeavored to avenge its outrage.

Y.L., after your reprehensible conduct, pretends to blame the army for having evacuated the capital, when it is proven that it had fought for fifteen consecutive hours disputing the enemy's entrance palm by palm with the sacrifice of a large part of its forces; and if it has evacuated the capital, powerful were the reasons for its doing so, as Y.L. may well have considered. This army which Y.L. insulted by repeating in your fatal proclamation that it had abandoned the

capital, fought without food and without pay for the past five days and continues in the same condition to this day; it marched back full of enthusiasm as soon as it learned that its brothers within the capital needed its help, and jointly with them has struck down today in these streets many of the invaders. Finally, my true purpose being to avoid ignominy to the fatherland, and that the enthusiasm of the people to harass the enemy should not weaken, I again warn Y.L. to avoid a repetition of these shameful deeds so harmful to the nation, and I expect that Y.L. will express your astonishment to that city council over the anti-patriotic proclamation it dared to issue, and of which I have taken notice with amazement and indignation.

God and Liberty. General Headquarters at Guadalupe, September 15th 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—To Sir Manuel Reyes Veramendi, president of the most Exc. city council.

NUMBER 4

The Mexican army.—General in chief.—Having taken possession of this city with the army at my command, to act against the points occupied by Y.L., in order to bring complete liberty to these inhabitants who have suffered amply from the forces of the United States, I have thought it advisable prior to any action, in deference to humanity, to intimate to Y.L. kindly to evacuate within a peremptory period, the part of the city you are occupying; with the understanding that you could leave with military honors and either rejoin general Scott or go to Perote, whichever is more convenient to you. But if this gentle intimation were to be ignored by Y.L., in that case, although to my regret, I shall proceed militarily to an assault upon your positions, the consequence of which would be borne by their garrisons, since Y.L. has in your vicinity an army of eight thousand men decided to enforce respect for the rights of their nation.

God and Liberty. General Headquarters at Puebla, September 25th 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—To the colonel of the army of the United States, Sir Thomas Childs.

NUMBER 5

General Headquarters.—City of Puebla.—Mexico. September 25th 1847.—To the most Exc. Sir, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, general in chief of the Mexican army in front of this city.—I had the honor of receiving today, at 2 c'clock in the afternoon, Y.E. note of

the same date, notifying me that you have taken possession of this city for the purpose of bringing complete liberty to its citizens who had suffered so much from the troops of the United States, and offering to this garrison certain conditions in case it should abandon the points it occupies, within a limited time.

Concerning the first point, I believe it just and necessary in vindication of the good name of the military forces of the United States, won by them by their humanity, good order and discipline which have at all times distinguished their conduct, and particularly so while they have been in military possession of the city of Puebla, to deny the charge made by Y.E. in your communication; on the contrary, I assure you that the property and rights of the persons were maintained and respected with utmost scrupulosity, to a degree incomparable during a war, and I would leave decision on this point to the intelligent and impartial section of this city's population, so it may tell from whom it had suffered more violence, from its own countrymen, or from the troops of the United States.

As far as that part of Y.E. note asking for surrender within a limited time, of the positions occupied by the troops at my command, I have only this answer to give to Y.E.: that having been honored with the custody and safeguard of these positions, it is equally my desire and my duty to conserve them to the last, being fully satisfied that I can do this with the means at my disposal.

With considerations of the highest respect, I have the honor of being Y.E. most obedient servant.—Thomas Childs, colonel of the army of the United States, civil and military governor.

NUMBER 6

Army of the East.—General in chief.—Most Exc. Sir.—With the date of the 5th inst., from Nopalucan, I notified Y.E., so that you may wish to forward it to the most Exc. Sir, the interim president, what I had in mind to do against the enemy convoy, if I could in time join up with the force which brigade general Sir Isidro Reyes was leading from that city; but not having arrived in time while the convoy had advanced up to three leagues of Nopalucan, I moved up to that town on the 8th inst., with the thousand horse and six light pieces that were left to me, in order to observe his movements and to act accordingly.

The enemy having passed the night of the 8th between Nopalucan and Cuapiastla in preparation for his continued march to

Acajete, I decided to harass him at his rear guard in Pinal and charge him with decision when he least expected it, and in effect, I set out on my march from that place at 7 o'clock in the morning; but while being in ambush in the village of San Pablo close to Pinal, I observed from the tower that the enemy convoy, instead of continuing its march, started for this point where I had left my artillery train, the cavalry provisions and the baggage of officers and subalterns; in an instant I understood the intentions of the enemy commander, and I marched back at the greatest speed to intercept him, but I found his advance guard already in possession of the plaza and the principal buildings, and although I attacked him and my columns penetrated to the plaza itself, it was not possible to dislodge him from these positions with my dragoons and I had to retreat and pass the night on an adjoining ranch. In this encounter, the enemy lost his cavalry commander, an officer and several troopers, while I had two dead, seven wounded, various missing and two of my field adjutants taken war prisoners, namely brevet colonel Jose Maria Diaz de la Vega, and squadron commander Agustin de Iturbide who were intercepted while carrying my orders.

On the next day, I approached this village to observe the enemy's movements and I learned that he abandoned himself to all excesses, sacking every establishment in existence and even murdering some unfortunate women, and that loaded down with loot, he marched back to Nopalucan; I then decided to harass his rear guard and my lancers started to stab down various soldiers who had fallen behind while still looting, and this action continued up to San Isidro ranch where the whole force halted and passed the rest of the day and the night. In this action, I managed to slay about a hundred of them dead, and to take twenty four prisoners, which in some way avenged the outrage and damages they had inflicted upon these peaceful inhabitants.

Although the enemy took this village almost by surprise, he could only capture two small pieces, since the other four were fortunately saved and are in my possession.

The unexpected enemy attack on this village was inspired, as I have learned, by an infamous Mexican among the criminals who accompany him, Miguel Hernandez by name, who succeeded in entering the place without being recognized and to observe my departure and the whereabouts of the artillery pieces; but as Y.E. will observe, he paid a high price for it, in addition to losing two days on the march.


On the 11th, he continued his way to Acajete where he passed

the night and I could catch up with him at Pinal; but I achieved no other advantage that day, although trying every possible way to do so, because he moved with too much caution, chastised by the experience of the day before. According to my spies, he reached Amozoc yesterday, and today he should have entered Puebla with about 3,000 men and six artillery pieces withdrawn from Perote. The afternoon before yesterday, general Reyes' section joined me at this point, but with troops so exhausted that it will be necessary to give them a few days rest; consequently, I could not operate against the said enemy convoy.

The most Exc. Sir, general Juan Alvarez with the entire force that besieged the enemy garrison in Puebla, including the ones I gave him as reinforcements, fell back on Atlixco, as I have learned.

As soon as the troops within this general headquarters who now form the army of the East will be in shape for an expedition, and the commissary will obtain some monetary resources which it is now absolutely lacking, I will search out the enemy and will continue to harass him in any way I can, thus fulfilling my desire and my duties.

I express to Y.E. on this occasion, the assurances of my appreciation and consideration.—God and Liberty. General Headquarters at Huamantla, October 13th 1847.—*Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna*.—To the most Exc. Sir, the minister of war and navy.



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