

while I continued the retreat in the direction of Churubusco.

At Penzacola bridge, I ordered general Rangel's brigade *to return to the Citadel*, which he fulfilled.

My rear guard commenced to fight from San Angel where it was reached by the enemy. While passing Churubusco convent, I notified general Rincón of what had just happened to the division of the North, so that he might take precautions as commander of this point. Since it was preferable at this moment to concentrate my attention on the troops and baggage trains of San Antonio Mexicalcingo, I hastened to protect them in their withdrawal by stationing general Perez's brigade at Churubusco bridge. At this point, I was notified that general Gaona had already marched off toward Candelaria and that general Bravo had started to move. Moments later, the San Patricio company, the Tlapa battalion and other units reached the bridge, and I sent all this force immediately to reinforce the convent next to Churubusco where the Independence and Bravos battalions stood to defend it. Before that, I disposed that the five artillery pieces from San Angel remain there for the same purpose, and these were promptly emplaced.

I was busy speeding up the movement of train and troops from S. Antonio, when the enemy who was coming up to catch up with them, opened fire at their rear guard. Within a small lapse of time, the same happened at Churubusco. The troops from San Antonio broke ranks and abandoned the material they were bringing with them, which produced great confusion and increased the enemy's pressure close to the ditches. Nevertheless, a lively fire broke out against him and it was possible to repulse his first onrush, engaging him immediately in a hard-fought action.

At the moment of a break in firing, I observed that an enemy battalion on our right flank was moving up the Portales Ranch to reach our rear guard and cut off our retreat. To frustrate this intention, I ordered the colonel of the Fourth Light Infantry *to take possession of this building at the double* and as I saw some hesitation in this movement, I went over in person to have this order executed properly. The enemy battalion was thrown back with great losses and our retreat was secured.

At Portales, I received a report that *Churubusco convent had surrendered and that this news had produced discouragement among the troops defending the bridge, so that some of them retreated with general Bravo through Mexicalcingo to the Peñon, and others were falling back straight along the road.* This second misfortune brought

about the loss of much of our material and made me recognize the necessity of falling back as soon as possible on our second line, which I executed with as many forces as I could gather at Portales, reaching Candelaria between five and six in the evening. The troops that general Bravo took with him, could not enter the capital until on the following morning.

The daring of some enemy dragoons reached the extreme of cutting through the column in retreat from Portales up to the parapets of Candelaria at a full run, where, having been recognized, they were fired upon, killing them all except one officer who was taken prisoner. This one declared on the spot and with plenty of cocksureness that, *knowing through one of our prisoners that general Santa-Anna was in the midst of these troops, he took the decision with some of his troopers who wanted to follow him, to fall upon him and deprive him of his life, as they would achieve glory if they succeeded, and if not, they would die with honor.* When I became aware of this declaration, I ordered that this prisoner be treated with every consideration because, far from offending me with his daring, I paid due tribute to his valor.

No particular news occurred through the rest of the evening, nor through the night, nevertheless, I dictated as many provisions as I considered useful toward a better defense of our second line which would be very soon under attack, I judged.

From four o'clock in the morning of the following day, everything was ready for combat, the bad situation notwithstanding in which previous events have placed us, but about 11 o'clock, on Viga avenue, I received the official letter from general Scott which I enclose here under Nr. 1, in which he proposed an armistice as expressed therein and which I instantly accepted, due to our desperate situation, as confirmed by copy Nr. 2. The calamities of Padierna and Churubusco convent; the loss of half of our best artillery; of so many rifles and ammunition; finally, the dispersion of more than a third part of our army, had produced such dismay that if the enemy had repeated his attack, as I expected him to do, he would surely occupy the capital without much resistance. This conviction made me consider this unexpected occurrence as a heaven-sent providence that could well change the situation in which we had found ourselves, as it actually did. Who will deny that on the 8th of September, the enemy escaped defeat only by pure luck? Ah! Were it not for the cowardice of some of our military leaders, the selfishness of our citizens and the cunning of some functionaries of the state, what a

different aspect would our Republic present right now! Of what avail are the efforts of one man, alone against so many adversaries? As to the conferences held with the commissioner of the government of the United States, nobody will say that they have in any way damaged the interests of the nation. Published, they have contradicted the multitude of motives that the agents of disorder and my constant enemies have at that time divulged against my conduct, and have made known to the world the exaggerated and unjust pretensions of that government which, abusing of its preponderance or its fortune and of our misfortunes, has endeavored to humiliate us, depriving us by violence of more than half of our territory.

Since a description of the events following the armistice already appear in the enclosed report as previously mentioned, I conclude here the present relations, attaching copies of the communications that preceded the continuation of hostilities, marked as Nrs. 3 and 4.

Please receive, Y.E., on this occasion, the considerations of my personal appreciations.

God and Liberty. Tehuacan, November 21st 1847.—Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna. To the Excel. Sir, the Minister of War and Navy.—Queretaro.

#### NUMBER 1

General Headquarters of the army of the United States of America.—Coyoacan, August 21st of 1847.—Most Excellent Sir, President of the Republic of Mexico and General in Chief of its army.—Too much blood has already been spilled in the war that broke out and which should not have been expected between the two great republics of our continent. It is high time that the discords that divide them be bridged in an amicable and honorific way, and Y.E. does not ignore that within this army under my command, a commissioner is present, appointed by the United States, who is invested with full powers toward this effect. In order that the two republics may take steps preparatory to negotiations, I consent to the signing, under equitable conditions, of an armistice of short duration.

I shall impatiently await until the morning of the day following the date of this note, a reply to it, but in the meantime, I shall take possession of those points on the outskirts of the capital that I may need for the shelter and welfare of my troops.

I have the honor of signing with high consideration and profound respect, Y. Excellency's obedient servant.—*Winfield Scott.*

#### NUMBER 2

To H.E. Windfield Scott, general in chief of the army of the United States of America.—Sir.—The undersigned minister of war and navy of the government of the United Mexican States, has received an order from the most Exc. Sir, the president and general in chief, to answer Y.E. communication, in which you propose the signing of an armistice, with a view to avoidingg the shedding of more blood between the two great republics of this continent, hearing the proposition that the commissioner of the most excellent Sir, the president of the United States of America, who is present at the headquarters of your army make to this effect.

It is of course lamentable that the rights of the Mexican republic not having been duly considered, the shedding of blood between the foremost republics of the American continent had become inevitable, and Y.E. qualifies this war with a great deal of certainty as wicked, not only because of its motives, but also because of the antecedents of the peoples, so identified with each other in relations and interests. The proposition of an armistice to put an end to this shameful commotion, was received with favor by H. E. the president and general in chief, because it will facilitate listening to the propositions which the commissioner of the president of the United States of America may advance toward a decorous conclusion of this war.

Consequently, H.E. the president and general in chief orders me to announce to Y.E. that he accepts the proposition of concluding an armistice and that he has appointed to this effect, the brigade generals Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Benito Quijano, who will be present at the spot and on the hour you may announce.

H.E. the general and president also advises me to notify Y.E. of his complaisance that the army of the United States occupy comfortable and sheltered quarters, trusting that the latter will be located beyond the reach of fire from the Mexican fortifications.

I have the honor of being, with high consideration and respect, your Excellency's most obedient servant.—Alcorta.

#### NUMBER 3

General Headquarters of the Army of the United States of America.—Tacubaya, September 6th 1847.—To H.E. the president and general in chief of the republic of Mexico.—Sir.—The 7th as well as the 1th article stipulating that the traffic of commerce shall by no means be interrupted, of the armistice or military covenant

which I had the honor of ratifying and exchanging with Y.E. on the 24th of past August, were repeatedly violated on the part of Mexico shortly after the signing of the armistice, and now, I have very good reasons to believe that during the last 48 hours, if not sooner, article 3 of the covenant was likewise violated by the same party.

These direct attacks upon good faith, give this army the full right to break out in hostilities against Mexico without previous announcement, but I grant the time required for an explanation, a satisfaction and reparations if it be possible, since to the contrary, I declare formally right now that if I do not receive complete satisfaction to all these accusations before twelve o'clock tomorrow, I shall consider the said armistice ended after that hour.

I have the honor of being Y.E. obedient servant.—Windfield Scott.

#### NUMBER 4

General headquarters of the army of the Mexican republic.—Mexico, September 6th 1847. To H.E. general Windfield Scott, general in chief of the army of the United States of America.—Sir.—From the notifications from Y.E. of this date, I have learned with surprise that you consider the articles 1, 12 and 3 of the armistice which I have concluded with Y.E. on the 24th of last month, as violated by the Mexican civil and military authorities.

The Mexican civil and military authorities have not obstructed the movement of provisions to the American army, and if their shipment has lagged at any time, it was precisely because of the carelessness of American agents who, without first coming to an agreement with the above mentioned authorities, have brought about popular ebullition that had caused the Mexican authorities much effort to suppress. Last night, and the night before, escorts were ready to conduct the provisions, but their delivery was not effected, because Mr. Hargous, in charge of effecting it, wanted it so. The order issued to suspend traffic between the two armies was directed to private persons, and not to the agents of the United States army, exactly with a view to expedite it by reducing it to this sole object. In contrast to this conduct, Y.E. has prevented that the owners and administrators of the wheat mills in the vicinity of this city import flour into it, which has opened a real breach in the good faith Y.E. had promised me.

It is false that any new fortifications had been undertaken, as one repair or another served merely to re-establish them to the state

they were in on the day of the armistice, since incidents or conveniences of the moment have wrought destruction in pre-existing works. I have obtained well anticipated news of a battery covered by the earth wall of the so-called Garay house in this town, but I have not objected, because peace between two great republics could not be made to depend on things grave in themselves, but of little weight in view of the result in which all friends of humanity and of the happiness of the American continent are interested.

Not without pain and even indignation, have I received notices from the cities and town occupied by Y.E. army, about violations of temples consecrated to the worship of God, about robbery of sacred vessels and profanation of the images which the Mexican people venerate. I have been profoundly affected by the complaints of fathers and husbands about violations committed on their daughters and wives; and these same cities and towns were looted not only in violation of the armistice, but even of the sacred principles proclaimed and observed by civilized nations. I have guarded silence up to now, so as not to blunt negotiations that offered hopes of terminating a scandalous war which Y.E. has so justly characterized with the expression of wicked. However, I shall not insist in offering apologies, because it is not hidden from me that the true, the barefaced cause of the threats of breaking the armistice contained in Y.E. note, is that I have not lent myself to the signing of a treaty that would considerably impair not only the territory of the republic, but also that dignity and integrity that nations defend in any danger. And if these considerations do not bear equal weight in the spirit of Y.E., yours will be the responsibility before the world that well understands on whose part rest moderation and justice.

I flatter myself that Y.E. will convince yourself in calmness of the sound foundation of these reasons. However, if unfortunately nothing else is being sought but a pretext for depriving the first city of the American continent of a recourse for the unarmed part of its population to free itself of the horrors of war, no other means will be left to me to save it than repelling force with force, with the decision and energy prescribed by my high obligations.

I have the honor of being Y. E. very obedient servant.—Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.



Most Excellent Sir:

Two official communications that circulate in print in the capital of the republic happened to come to my hands: one is by the most Exc. division general well deserved of the fatherland, Sir Nicolas, Bravo, and the other by brevet brigade general Sir Andres Terres, referring to the loss of the fort of Chapultepec and the Belen gate on the past 13th of September; my tireless enemies have promptly seized upon their inaccuracies for recriminations and absurd comments, because of the criminal eagerness cherished by them to convince the plain people that the most loyal defender of their rights is a *traitor*. These circumstances place me in the need of immediately presenting to the supreme government a detailed relation of the events, so that by giving it convenient publication, things can be judged as they happened, and fallacy and deceit can be frustrated.

Thus, I'll begin by declaring to Y. Lordship, so that you may wish to do the same to the Exc. Sir charged with the supreme executive power, that the most Exc. Sir, general Bravo, was not exact in his communications, canceling facts that were seen by many, which circumstances, together with others I shall refer to later, make him subject to severe charges from which he has apparently tried to retreat by arousing opinion against me; and that brevet general Sir Andres Terres, due to his cowardly conduct at the Belen gate the defense of which I had unfortunately confided in him, is a criminal, aggravated by the desertion he committed while placed under arrest by me, remaining in consequence with the enemy under the pretext of a prisoner of war; he believed that signing a communication such as he has printed and circulated, he would cover up his crime, since I, separated from power, could not do anything against the vociferation of the factions warring against me to the death, because they would accept his concoction without criticism. But I, who have shouldered costly sacrifices in order to conserve my good name, am determined to uphold my truth and justice before all the world, and nobody shall be capable of stopping me in this my noble purpose.

Entering upon a relation of the events I propose to narrate, I shall tell Y.E.: that having considered it convenient to fortify the

hill and the buildings of Chapultepec, so that the invader may not occupy so important a position, and that it may serve as a base of operations which his proximity would force us to bring against him, I entrusted the direction of these works to a master staff officer, general Sir Mariano Monterde, whom I appointed military commander of this point, to help him expedite his work. I dictated as many orders as were necessary to provide him with every kind of material; brigade general Sir Manuel Maria Lombardini, at that time chief of the Army of the East, and general Sir Ignacio Gutierrez, district governor, can still testify to whether any performance had been omitted in properly fortifying Chapultepec; the commissioner of that army, too, can present the sums of pesos invested in these works.

Brigade general Sir Antonio Leon was then appointed principal commandant of the Chapultepec line and it was recommended to him several times to watch and speed up the work all along it; he was even warned in definite terms to establish his main quarters in the Chapultepec building so as to make weekly reports on the work progress. I myself was visiting this point as well as all others and I had no doubt left about the laborious eagerness with which work was performed; so that upon the enemy's approach to the capital, Chapultepec had three lines of defense established in good order, able to sustain itself very well and with advantage against quintuple numbers, with ten artillery pieces emplaced, and a thousand infantrymen.

Since general Monterde had disappeared from Chapultepec to undergo medical treatment in the city for illnesses he said had befallen him after the events of Padierna and Churubusco, I ordered an investigation to clear up his conduct that appeared improper to me under these circumstances, and that H.E. general Bravo take over command of such important a fortress, where he remained up to the said 13th. The fort was provided, as I have indicated, with ten pieces of artillery and double ammunition stocks, manned by selected officers and men of this branch, with ample rifle ammunition, with a thousand footmen of the 10th Line and the Toluca battalions, Military Academy cadets, and finally with provisions for eight days. In this state, it remained all through the armistice, since the appointment of general Bravo occurred at the beginning of the same.

Obliged to continue hostilities, I ordered on the afternoon of September 6th that general Leon with his brigade consisting of the Liberty, Union, Queretaro and Mina battalions occupy Molino del Rey located at half a gunshot to the west of Chapultepec. On the

morning of the 7th, he was reinforced by general Rangel's brigade consisting of two battalions of Grenadier Guards, the San Blas militia, the Santa-Anna Mixed and the Morelia battalion. On the same morning, I ordered the Casemate, at a rifleshot distance from Molino del Rey, to be occupied by the 4th Light Line battalions under command of brevet general Sir Francisco Perez, at half way between the said points and taking advantage of the ditches that existed there. I located general Ramirez' brigade with the 2nd Light, the Fixed Mexico, and the 1st and 12th Line battalions, and in reserve the 1st and 3rd Light, further six pieces of artillery, well munitioned. The Casemate conserved its old fortification that made it imposing: therefore, I located there a stock of ammunition, and another one in Molino del Rey. All the above mentioned forces remained entrenched with more or less advantage. At Morales Ranch, a league distant from Chapultepec, I stationed the cavalry division under the most Exc. Sir, general Juan Alvarez, 4000 horses strong, and on the afternoon of the same 7th, I disposed that he approach to more or less a rifleshot from the Casemate, and I myself staked out the terrain where he was to encamp, and I ordered this general that as soon as he observed that any of the immediate points were being attacked, he were to act with utmost decision at the head of all this cavalry, since the terrain was suitable for this. Let it be judged, from all these dispositions, whether Chapultepec was being abandoned through my fault.

At dawn of the 8th, the enemy attacked Molino del Rey and the Casemate with a large part of his forces: the lively fire delivered by our troops and the advantage of our positions made him suffer the loss of a thousand men, as it is well known, his charge having been thrown back; but coincidence that always seemed to be in his favor, saved him from a defeat, because the cavalry did not operate as it should have, as testified to be the enclosed communication from H.E. general Alvarez, at the same time that the troops that had thrown back the enemy columns from Molino del Rey and the Casemate, rushed forth enthusiastically to pursue them without cavalry support, and when the enemy reserves counterattacked, they could no longer return to their positions, thereby losing the latter and the six artillery pieces in the dispersal that followed; thus, my combination became illusory as well as my orders, and if I had not presented myself at that moment with the column I had been leading up from Candelaria, Chapultepec would have perhaps been lost that same day.

I found myself at Candelaria at dawn of the 8th because, since the evening before, I began to receive reports that the enemy had surrounded this point with a respectable force, and it was urgent to attend to this. To verify these reports conveniently, I ordered that the Rangel brigade pass this night at the Citatel, the First Light regiment at the Alfaro Red House situated between Chapultepec and Belen gate; and that various artillery pieces brought up from other points, reinforce Candelaria where there was a shortage of them. These reports were confirmed by a communication brought to me by word of mouth at 4 o'clock in the morning at my quarters by general Sir Antonio Vizcayno, whom I had sent to observe the enemy: as he explained to me, *there was no doubt that the enemy was within sight of Candelaria, as his encampment was clearly visible by the lights that have been in motion all night long.* I ordered immediately that general Rangel's brigade which was to occupy yesterday's positions on Chapultepec at dawn, march off toward Candelaria, that the First Light regiment follow this movement, while I too, with my general staff, took to the road. Arriving at the said point, its commandant general Sir Mariano Martinez informed me: *that according to a reconnaissance his scouts had just carried out, the field was free of enemies.* Disgusted by this sham, the flashes of some cannon shot from the direction of Chapultepec drew my attention, and no longer harboring any doubt that the attack was taking place there, just as I had presumed, I dispatched one of my adjutants to make general Rangel's brigade and the First Light countermarch at the double, and joining this force, I formed the above mentioned column with which I reached the combat area.

Close to Chapultepec, I encountered some carriages of the six artillery pieces in retreat, the drivers having told me that the guns have been lost. I expedited our steps and was sorry to encounter also general Leon and Colonel Valderas in an escort of wounded; farther ahead, I observed the dispersion of the troops that should have given a day of glory to the fatherland by merely holding the positions where I had left them stationed. I busied myself in reassembling them, which I attained during the remainder of the day. One of my adjutants, dispatched to spot the whereabouts of our cavalry, reported to me that the latter was now in the vicinity of Los Morales retiring in good order. I instantly reinforced the fortifications set up on the two roads that lead to Tacubaya and the Casemate forming the right and left flank of Chapultepec and I endeavored to recover the points of Molino del Rey and the Casemate, and although my first efforts

were useless, I succeeded about 3 o'clock in the afternoon in making the enemy retreat to Tacubaya and leaving the field to our troops. Sure hits from the artillery at Chapultepec contributed greatly to this operation.

For the rest of the afternoon, the dispersed corps managed to assemble but because of the poor condition in which I saw them, I desisted from leaving them in the positions they had occupied before this action and I sent them off to pass the night in their barracks, leaving in Chapultepec the remainder of general Leon's brigade under his second in command, brevet general Sir Juan Perez de Castro, their number reduced to 400 men because of the fallen, the wounded and missing it had lost.

The enemy who suffered so much in the battle of the 8th, remained inactive throughout the 9th, and I utilized this day to reorganize my forces and to advance my fortifications. On the 10th, the enemy commenced movements that threatened the Niño Perdido and Candelaria points and the intelligence which my spies and correspondents communicated to me, coincided in that his aim was to attack that line, believing it to be more accessible. I reinforced its garrisons, improved its fortifications and established strong reserves along the San Antonio Abad and Viga avenues. Without, however neglecting Chapultepec, since I sent Lt. colonel of engineers Sir Juan Cano to attend to its fortifications, improving or enlarging them wherever possible, and I maintained one brigade on observation at the Citadel.

On the 11th, enemy movements supported his intention to attack the Niño Perdido and Candelaria points, as respectable columns came in sight and fortification works were observed at the Hermitage on Niño Perdido avenue, making it necessary for us to fight them with our artillery emplaced at the second point, to which his pieces, already in position, replied. A reconnaissance carried out in the afternoon by the Hussar regiment convinced me that the enemy was keeping a large part of his forces in this vicinity.

At six o'clock on the 12th, the enemy's fire was felt against Candelaria and Niño Perdido, with more continuity against the former, as well as against Chapultepec. An hour later, my spies notified me that enemy forces were concentrating in Tacubaya. Instantly, I directed all my attention to Chapultepec and I myself left for this point determined to provide for its best defense. Arriving, I observed that the enemy had established large batteries in Tacubaya and at the Condesa Ranch, sustaining with them a lively fire against

our points and occupying also Molino del Rey, so that I no longer had any doubt as to his true intentions.

My dispositions began by reinforcing the entrenchments of the flanks of the fortress, leaving them well provided with artillery and sufficiently garrisoned. Considering it convenient to secure the inside of the main gate to the park with some earthworks and a cannon, I entrusted this to the Lt. colonels of engineers Manuel and Luis Robles who finished them in the course of this day in addition to some outer works I judged necessary. I made all available forces take up positions next to Chapultepec, where they remained, the incessant fire that poured down on them notwithstanding and in spite of the dead and wounded they were losing with every moment, in which precinct I remained in the saddle issuing all convenient instructions, as a result of which my life was in danger many times, as all who surrounded me could see. At one time, when I tried to place general Ramirez' brigade on the slope of Chapultepec Hill, a shell threw thirty men dead and wounded to the ground in front of me and the blood of one of the soldiers spattered my dress; a fact that convinced me of the impossibility of holding the force in this place without leaving it to perish, and I made it retire to where it found some shelter.

The earthworks on the inside of the park gate were garrisoned with 500 men and a piece of 8, well munitioned.

At the hour of Angelus, the most excellent Sir general Bravo presented himself for an appointment I made with him and I showed him the enlarged works at the foot of the hill, the cannon and the force that guarded it, the safety of the two outer roads at the flanks, and the strong reserve that was to occupy the Alfaro Red House all night, with orders issued to all available troops to present themselves at this post at four in the morning, and that I myself would also be there. Mr. Bravo then explained to me, for the first time: *that the garrison he had at the top fort was scared by the horrendous fire it had suffered all day long and that he would appreciate having it relieved with other types of troops.* I answered: *that the scare had also taken root among the troops below and both scares being of the same nature, the change he proposed was superfluous; but that at dawn, if the enemy attacked, I would promptly reinforce him.* He replied that I should at least dispose one battalion in the park and to make him see the futility of his request, I related very briefly what had happened to the Ramirez brigade, adding that: *if he accumulated more forces at the top during the bombardment, we would uselessly*