

sacrifice the few we still had, since with the more than thousand men garrisoning such a small precinct, all forts were well covered. He did not give me any other explanation during this interview.

At dawn of the 13th, all available troops assembled at the foot of Chapultepec and I, too, was present there. The enemy continued his mortar and cannon fire and between 7 and 8 in the morning, he started to move his assault columns. Half an hour before, an official communication reached me from general Bravo, written to tell the minister of war (who was always at my side) *that the garrison at the top continued intimidated and that some desertions were noted during the night, and asking that they be replaced by other types of troops.* In view of this note, I disposed that the San Blas battalion, four hundred men strong, and which I distinguished by the courage I noted in such good soldiers, march up to reinforce the fort at the top, and I admonished its commandant, the valiant Xicotencatl, to report to general Bravo and to receive his orders. While this unit marched off, a bugle call announced that the enemy was advancing upon our points, and I then sent the battalion chief himself to ascend to the fort at a run. At this moment, I was at the gate to the park. In effect, he got there just in time, as I could well see, and fought back desperately in the foremost entrenchments of the hill until all was nearly finished, resisting the pressure of the enemy who was coming up from Molino del Rey.

Since the attack became general, I covered with my reserves all such necessities as became noticeable. This reserve had melted down to the 3rd Light Battalion with 400 men; the 4th idem with 300; the 11th Line with 600; the Morelia Militia with 300, and the Hidalgo National Guard with 350, making a total of 1,950 men who were employed in the following manner: The 3rd Light was sent to reinforce the San Blas battalion, but it had to turn back on the march, because the enemy had at that moment captured Chapultepec fort; the 4th Light, the 11th Line and the Morelia Militia, I ordered to stand by in reserve under command of general Lombardini in support of such points below as were being vigorously attacked by strong columns; and the Hidalgo National Guard, I placed on the left flank of the fortification that defended Condesa road, where it put up a good fight.

In spite of the few forces that defended the lower positions, the boldness with which the enemy attacked them and of his superior numbers, he was gallantly thrown back and could not advance a single step, when I began to notice that the fort above was not delivering the

amount of fire that could be expected of its garrison, and shortly afterward I saw with surprise that it descended in flight in large platoons, cravenly abandoning its parapets which the enemy could have only in this manner occupied easily. This infamous conduct placed me in the greatest of conflicts, since once the heights of Chapultepec were occupied by the enemy, the forces below were left completely exposed to be murdered with impunity, and to avoid this, no other means were left than to undertake a retreat toward the Belen and St. Thomas gates. This I ordered in the midst of the greatest despair.

General Sir Matias de la Peña y Barragán, in command of the point at my right, went off along Veronica avenue toward the St. Thomas forts with the Grenadier Guard and the 1st Light battalions, under orders to sustain them, protected by the cavalry that should have been there in accordance with my previous orders. General Lombardini marched off to the Belen gate in perfect order, and on the way placed the Morelia militia battalion behind the middle parapet, where it covered valiantly the retreat of the other units that had with so much courage defended the other points below Chapultepec.

Some of the cowards who fled the upper Chapultepec fort and who were presented to me a few hours later, excused themselves for their abandoning of the point, saying that *general Bravo did the same first*; I reproached these expressions in front of the many who voiced them, because such conduct seemed to me unworthy of H.E. Subsequently, I learned that he was taken prisoner in the park below, hidden in a water ditch up to his neck, where he was discovered by the enemy because of the white hair on his head. This fact proves the former story and deserves to be brought to light in a trial. Also, in favor of this declaration remains the fact, that he did not mention in his official communication the valiant San Blas battalion that perished almost totally in the entrenchments on the hill, because if Mr. Bravo would have remained on top to the last hour, he would have had to see it clearly, and if he did see it, why hide what this effort had meant to him instead of complaining that it was of no help? At any rate, general Bravo's conduct was not honorable, since the least he did was fail in telling the truth, thus taking the public by surprise to the detriment of justice and of my good name. Furthermore, the commander of a fortress he is expected to defend at any cost, ought to end up dead or a prisoner in it. It is painful to me to have to present such facts about a companion, and I would gladly bury them in

silence if he himself had not forced me to state them by publishing a report which my enemies have seized upon with a huzza, and whence they extracted arguments in support of the diatribes and slander. I therefore earnestly request the supreme government to open a corresponding summary trial on the strength of the particulars above referred to, and to include this communication in the proceedings.

Returning to a relation of the events connected with general Terres, I will declare that when I arrived at the Belen gate, I at once went about preparing its best defense. I had the large cannon that were in the Piedad avenue fortification transferred to Belen to replace the light pieces emplaced there, leaving it well gunned. Days before, general Terres had commanded both points, having at his disposal the 1st and 2nd Militia of Mexico battalions and the one from Guana-juato; to these I added the Invalid and Lagos battalions, placing them astride the avenue to the left and entrusting this defense to brevet general Sir Diego Arguelles, my field adjutant; then I stationed the 2nd Light with other pickets under general Ramirez across the avenue to the right, while the Morelia militia likewise fell back toward the gate after the fight I have already described. The enemy approached and was thrown back. The Citadel was reinforced with some units. I ordered further that four of the Candelaria cannon be sent to St. Thomas, and they did good service at the San Cosme gate.

In this situation, I received a report that *the enemy was advancing along San Cosme, and that the forces of St. Thomas were in retreat*. I addressed general Terres to tell him that I was going over to S. Cosme and would return, recommending that he preserve everything as it was; observing that canon fire was increasing without necessity, and knowing of our shortage of ammunition, I went up to the gunners and warned them not to discharge their pieces until the enemy would approach to a favorable distance.

With the 3rd and 4th Light battalions, and the 11th Line under general Perez, I marched to San Cosme and at the gate of the same name, I encountered general Rangel and, at a still more advanced parapet, general Peña y Barragan who fought the enemy gallantly with his small force; I ordered the occupation of some buildings to the fore and rear of the gate, as well as the roof of the gate-house itself. In these moments, the Candelaria artillery pieces arrived and I ordered general Rangel to emplace them, which he did at once, and expressed to him my resolution to defend this point at all cost.

General Peña y Barragan requested reinforcements, and I sent him my adjutant, general Cosio, with two companies of the 11th

battalion. The enemy had been stopped and I already flattered myself that he would not break through easily, when a report was brought to me that *general Terres had abandoned the Belen gate and that as a result, the Citadel was in peril of being lost*. At this unexpected notice, I rode off rapidly toward Belen with the three units I had in reserve, except the two above mentioned companies of the 11th. I sent orders to general Martinez to fall back on the Citadel with the whole Candelaria garrison and artillery. I myself arrived at the Citadel when the enemy was already in possession of Belen gate and was advancing in one column along the Paseo Nuevo, and in another along Belen avenue, close to the gate, so that we almost disputed the entry with each other; a lively fire was opened against them and I succeeded in thrusting them back against the Belen gate, inflicting plenty of damage to them.

Having saved the citadel by the rapidity of my movement, I tried to investigate the reasons that caused the doleful loss of Belen gate, and a uniform voice convinced me that *general Terres had ordered its evacuation and executed it so leisurely that even the artillery pieces and ammunition could be salvaged*. I reproached general Arguelles for abandoning the point I had confided to his care, and he explained to me that *unwilling to retreat, since he saw no necessity for it, the order was repeated to him in behalf of the commanding officer of the line, and he had no other choice left but to obey*. Because of so many unfortunate happenings produced by the most reprehensible insubordination and cowardice, dismay and desperation overcame me to such a degree that when general Terres appeared before me, blinded by rage I struck two or three blows against him and I ordered his sword and the insignia he wore torn off him, declaring him an unworthy servant of the nation that had prodigiously heaped considerations upon him, and that until he would be judged by the rules of ordinance, he should be kept under arrest at the Citadel. This bad soldier broke the arrest, as I have insinuated at the beginning of this note, by the fact of not remaining with the Mexican army that evacuated the Citadel at dawn of the 14th to move to the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and by having remained against my permission in a place subsequently occupied by the enemy, having then the impudence to appear in his famous report as a prisoner of war without an explanation as to how he found himself in this condition. The supreme government must judge these facts and I have no doubt that it will find confirmation to order all that is necessary toward bringing light into these happenings and to punish them as required by the laws, by the honor of the army

and by public vindication.

The enemy having fallen back upon Belen gate, as I have already mentioned, he opened cannon fire upon the Citadel, which the latter duly returned. I endeavored to dislodge him with the Morelia militia battalion and other pickets, and it was not possible even though our soldiers acted this time with extraordinary intrepidity. It might have been five o'clock in the afternoon, when I received word *that the San Cosme gate needed reinforcements*. I returned to that point with the Third Light battalion and a small detachment of Grenadier Guards; on arriving, I learned from general Cosio, my adjutant, *that the advance parapet had been abandoned under repeated enemy charges, and when retreating with the two companies of the 11th battalion, two soldiers were killed by our own fire, he himself receiving a bruise*. I noticed at once that the defense was reduced to just the gate itself, held with courage by general Rangel. I disposed that the 3rd Light battalion remain in reserve at the back of the gate and I sent to occupy the house of Mr. Atilano Sanchez and other adjoining ones to lend support to our defense of the gate. While this operation was being carried out by the 1st Light battalion, I saw some officers and men of this unit fall dead under the rain of enemy projectiles. I was told there that the enemy was penetrating through the gardens of the so-called Pinillos house, and I went over there with a hundred Grenadiers of the Guard, stationing them on the roofs after assuring ourselves that there was nobody in the gardens. This operation concluded, well toward the evening, I suddenly heard a bugle call coming from the San Cosme gate and on being repeated, I had no doubt that retreat was being sounded; I hastened forth with my general staff to inform myself about this incident, when groups of soldiers coming toward us in full flight were nearly overrunning us in such manner that we had no other way left but to move along with them until my adjutants succeeded by their efforts to halt the race and to make them listen to my warning *to assemble at the Citadel* to which I led them not without difficulty, it having been necessary to send out cavalry detachments and turn back many officers who were marching off by different streets with larger or smaller bodies of troops.

It might have been seven in the evening when I found myself at the door of the Citadel and I did not dismount until making sure of having rounded up all the San Cosme force, although I had been in the saddle since four o'clock in the morning. I tried to find out who ordered to sound retreat which had caused so much disorder, and I was told that it was general Rangel. But as I have not seen this

gentleman again since then, I could not ascertain better the truth about this incident that resulted, of course, in the loss of this gate, thereby leaving the way open for the enemy to penetrate to the center of the capital.

At the Citadel, at 8 o'clock that night, I presided over a war council of generals whom I had summoned to hear their opinions and to arrive at a proper decision under such terrible circumstances. Participating in this council was also the most Exc. governor of the State of Mexico, National Guard colonel Mr. Francisco Modesto de Olaguibel, who had just arrived at the capital that afternoon with 200 infantry and 4 artillery pieces to aid in the defense. In this council, the day's events and some previous ones were recapitulated; the situation was deplored, to which the disobedience of some, the cowardice of others, and the general lack of morale in our army has reduced us, so that a better performance could no longer be expected; in justice to it, it was also observed that the continuous revolts, our social disorganization and the poor recruiting system had a great deal of influence upon this indisposition, while at the same time, our penury did not permit us to attend to the troops with what was due to them, as was the case precisely on this day in which they had not tasted food; that rations for the past four days were still due to them, and nobody could tell whether they would have food on the morrow. Shortage of munitions was likewise too manifest to enable us to sustain even one more day of battle, the scarce forces still left, and finally, that reduced to the sole precinct of the Citadel, the enemy would overwhelm us with his projectiles, making it untenable for even a couple of hours; that to fall back on the city buildings would mean sacrificing them without any prospect of success, when with few exceptions, the population did not take part in the fighting. These and other considerations were presented for solution and it was unanimously agreed upon to evacuate the Citadel and the adjoining buildings at dawn; and that the artillery, ammunition and troops situate themselves in the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, all under command of general Lombardini, which was made effective.

The cavalry corps stationed in the capital received orders to present themselves, likewise at dawn, in the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, to join the cavalry division that stood there under the most Exc. general Alvarez.

With all the forces assembled in Guadalupe Hidalgo amidst the most fearful hunger and misery, I agreed with the most Exc. division general Sir Jose J. de Herrera, that we divide our responsibilities;

thus H.E. marched off to Queretaro with all the infantry and artillery, while I led the cavalry and 4 light field pieces toward Puebla. Necessity as well as the nation's good services compelled this measure, because it was neither possible to exist one more day without food in a place where everything was lacking, nor should any time have been lost saving the remnants of an army that could still render useful services. General Herrera was charged with the reorganization of the forces I placed under his command for this purpose, and I did not doubt that he could accomplish this with the aid of the richest states of the republic, flattering myself that while this was taking place, I would harass the enemy garrison of Puebla, the surrender of which was, in my judgment, of utmost importance.

When I reached the town of San Cristobal, a few citizens from the capital presented themselves in search of me, to notify me *that the sight of the American flag raised over the palace by our enemies had caused so much irritation, that the population had risen in strength against the invaders, had them surrounded in the circle of the main plaza and had deprived them of six cannon; and they asked me finally to countermarch and to add the army's force to that of the people.* I confess that this plausible news elated me exceptionally and I noticed the same emotion in general Alvarez who was with me at that moment, and both of us agreed unanimously to march back without an instant's loss and almost at a gallop we arrived with the cavalry at Guadalupe Hidalgo where we halted a short time to await battalion of the South of general Alvarez' force, who continued up to the Peralvillo gate, followed by some cavalry units. Mr. Alvarez and I penetrated as far as the city streets to make sure by our own eyes just what was happening there and to act in accord with the events, having first left the bulk of the cavalry in observation along the Guadalupe highway. From San Cristobal, I ordered general Herrera that he countermarch likewise with his infantry and artillery; but H.E. had already reached Cuautitlan when my communication arrived, and his about face was no longer possible.

As high as my enthusiasm had been over the exaggerated news given me in San Cristobal, as great was my disgust over the disappointment, since I could see nothing except some rifle shots which several persons from among the people were firing on some of the streets corners, it being false that they had captured the guns, or that there was a general uprising of all classes that were supposed to besiege the invaders in the plaza. Nevertheless I had an entrenchment thrown up in Peralvillo to cover the approaching southern infantry

that took up positions there to aid the population, and with the same purpose in mind, I sent heavy cavalry patrols through several of the suburbs; these and other mounted troops retired for the night to Guadalupe, while the infantry stayed at Peralvillo until the morning of the 16th.

On the 15th, I detached various cavalry units to patrol some city streets and protect the people in the movement which, as I had been assured, *they would undertake that day against the invaders if the troops would support them.* General Alvarez, too, went forth to be on the lookout and use this occasion to harass the enemy; but the day went by the same as before and Mr. Alvarez, upon retiring at night, notified me: *that the only thing accomplished was that the 5th, 9th and Guanajuato cavalry regiments lanced a few enemy soldiers they had encountered; and finally that he could observe no symptoms to confirm the uprising of which we had been assured.*

Very early on that day of the 15th, a number of citizens came to tell me in the name of the people of the capital, *that the first mayor Mr. Manuel Reyes Veramendi and the city council were taking measures to suppress their enthusiasm* and showed me an imprint that confirmed it, for which reason I sent him a communication marked number 1, to which this mayor replied with number 2, and I again answered with number 3.

On the morning of the 16th, the ministers of war and of foreign relations who had gone forward as far as San Juan Teotihuacan, commented with well founded reasons the difficulties that would arise by not establishing the government in some central point, such as Queretaro, so that I did not hesitate in issuing the decree of that date, followed by a proclamation which the nation has seen; because my susceptibility did not permit me to remove myself to such a distance from the theatre of war, as on other occasions, I preferred the battlefield to the office.

After making the above decision, I ordered to continue the march to Puebla, which was undertaken the same day, as we no longer had even fodder for the horses.

I have related with exactness my last operations in the capital, to demonstrate the injustice with which intents were made to throw doubts on my behavior which, although it did not produce fortunate results, as vividly as I desired them, shows unquestionably that there was a surplus of frankness, of good intentions and of patriotism in them. I shall thus conclude this note, complying at the same time with my duty of explaining to the supreme government what it was

that had frustrated my last efforts at Puebla.

Officially, I had been informed that two thousand five hundred State National Guard infantry stood at Cholula with two small pieces of artillery under brigade general Manuel Maria Villada, and under brevet general Joaquin Rea 600 guerrillas were encircling Puebla; and that these forces as well as the people of the city were burning with eagerness to combat the enemy garrison whose presence was an insult to the inhabitants. For this reason, I ordered from Guadalupe Hidalgo that the most Exc. general Sir Juan Alvarez, appointed commandant general of Puebla State, move upon this city with the forces of the South, now reduced to 600 infantry and cavalry, taking the road to Texcoco and San Martin Tescmelucan, while I would do the same with two thousand horse and four light pieces across the Apam plains to the Santo Domingo mill, hoping that I could assemble 6,000 men against Puebla who, with the aid of the civilian population, would very quickly subdue the enemy garrison which did not exceed a thousand men, although well fortified on the hills of Loreto, Guadalupe and San Jose barracks.

In the afternoon of the 21st, I entered the streets of Puebla with a small escort and was received *by the people with music and enthusiasm* which confirmed their good morale against the common enemy. I found the National Guard infantry, formerly of Cholula, distributed in various quarters.

On the 22nd, I stationed myself within the city limits, to direct operations, disposing my forces at Carmen and at other points. General Alvarez arrived on the following day.

I appointed general Rea military governor of the place, who declared the city in a state of siege and took all convenient measures to surround the enemy and cut off the resources he was enjoying without any hindrance; so that he saw himself compelled not to make a single step outside of his entrenchments. I reconnoitered these entrenchments from very close and judged an attack difficult, nevertheless, I proposed to the enemy commander an intimation, copy of which is enclosed here under number 4, as well as of his reply number 5. He let me know that there was no alternative but force and I ordered to tighten the siege, resulting in an intermittent exchange of fire by both parties, which cost the enemy some casualties and several deserters who revealed *the shortage of food they suffered*.

When all seemed to presage an early surrender, I received official notice that a convoy was under way from Jalapa headed for Puebla, and it became necessary to move out and meet it. After order-

ing that general Rea remain in command of the troops necessary to continue the siege, I marched off with the rest to Pinal, an appropriate point to await and attack the convoy. We set out on the first of October and during a brief rest at Amozoc, I observed that the State National Guard infantry began to desert, leaving their rifles stacked. We passed that night at Acajete and at dawn, I received a report that entire units of the said National Guard had deserted, some with and some leaving their arms, which commotion made me realize that my plans would be frustrated. Nevertheless, I continued the march to Nopalucan to observe the enemy and I had some previously reconnoitered points at Pinal fortified to attack him with advantage. Colonel Sir Jose Maria Carrasco to whom I entrusted these works, labored with extraordinary activity and would have finished them in two or three days with the help of ranch hands rounded up for this purpose, if that fatality that always seemed to preside our operations had not compelled me to change the plan I had marked out for myself.

Desertions continued without remedy and spread even to the line cavalry from whose ranks even some of the officers deserted, while others requested passes to resign from service and to continue to Queretaro. In the proportion in which the enemy approached, the scandal increased until a conspiracy was to be feared. I thought of making a few examples of the cowards, but prudent reflexions by general Alvarez contained me and in the end, I decided that the remnants of the National Guard return to Puebla. General Alvarez himself left at once with his troops of the South; as commandant general of the State, he had to direct the siege operations and make the necessary arrangements ahead of time in case the garrison's surrender could not be forced prior to the arrival of the convoy; and to reinforce him, I placed under his orders some of my cavalry units. I myself remained in Nopalucan with a thousand and a half of horse and six light artillery pieces for the purpose of detaining the convoy and to harass it as much as possible, since I had no other alternative left. I then received notice from Queretaro that general Isidro Reyes was marching to join me with a brigade and two field pieces, and to await him in a good spot, I moved out to station myself at Huamantla. . . . The events that took place afterward are established in the official report of October 13th, now in print, and receipt of which Y.E. did not deem fit to confirm. It contains a testimony of my last efforts, and that the arms under my command were being employed within their purpose; I here enclose copy number 6 of this report.

Impartiality shall judge if my conduct deserves the diatribes and the embittered censures of those who taking advantage of the confusion and disorders, shout and write repeatedly of the *scandalous abandonment of the capital* to surprise the simple-mindedness of some, and to strengthen the gossip of *treason* which they have propagated with sinister ends in mind. The factions do not stop at any means, and subordinate even the misfortunes of the fatherland to the service of their aims. I know that the facts that have occurred in plain sight of so many people will be of no avail; the generosity with which I presented myself to sacrifice my life, my fortune and that of my sons to free the threatened independence; the efforts witnessed by all, to organize armies when few were in evidence, and to lead them to the field of battle where my existence was so many times in peril; that my innocence and my justice would be mocked by my enemies; and that all, all will be converted into guilt by this mob that is anxiously waiting to fatten on its victim. Let, then, this iniquity be duly perpetrated if Providence permit it, let a reputation be destroyed upon which jealousy stares with hatred; let the life of an old soldier, respected even by the enemy's bullets, be now assaulted, and let them fatten on the blood he spilled in support of the nation's honor and rights, even though this add to our history one more new act of barbarity and ingratitude; but I, my conscience calm, shall stand up to so much evil; I shall raise my voice to the skies until justice is done to me and shall bequeath, in the end, the shame of my death to my henchmen.

Have the kindness, Y.E., to bring all this to the cognizance of the most Exc. Sir charged with the supreme executive power, asking him in my behalf to order that this note receive proper publication, and accept, Y.E., at the same time, the considerations of my personal appreciation.—God and Liberty.—Tehuacan, November 12th 1847. *Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna*.—To the most Exc. Sir, the minister of war and navy.



General Commandancy of the free and sovereign State of Puebla.—Most Exc. Sir.—As the time will come when the events of the action of the 8th in the hills of the Los Morales ranch and of Chapultepec will be made public, because this is within the duty of officers who know honor, and as those who having belonged to the first cavalry division of the two that were under my command,

managed to fulfill their duties, I have the honor of enclosing their reports for Y.E. attention, signed in Mexico on the 11th although I found it impossible to forward them to Y.E. because of the many preoccupations of the service; requesting you at the same time to accept my considerations and attention.—God and Liberty. Santiago in Puebla, September 5th 1847.—*Juan Alvarez*.—To the most Exc. Sir, general Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna, in command of the Mexican army.



Cavalry Division.—General in chief.—Most Exc. Sir.—I delayed purposely reporting to the supreme government the events of the action of the 8th, regarding the cavalry division you were kind enough to place under my orders, principally so that not the slightest desire might be attributed to me to harm some officers about whose career I had no antecedents; but when I observe that my silence weighs upon the bravery of its valiant dragoons and places in doubt the reputation of many more chiefs who well deserve the ranks they occupy in the service, I feel the necessity of speaking up and of revealing facts that will result, if the supreme government finds them justified, in correcting anomalies that disturb military discipline and that unfortunately contributed to it that the endeavors of the fatherland which the most Exc. president has so masterfully put into play during the present war, have not produced all the effects that were to be desired, because the morale of the army is not up to the level it ought to occupy. I now enter upon the subject.

In fulfilment of Y.E. supreme order received by me at the town of Guadalupe on the 6th, at ten and a half o'clock at night, to the effect that I march off for Tacuba at dawn of the 7th, I carried this out with the necessary precautions, since Y.E. added that I attack any enemy presenting himself to me on the move. On arriving at the indicated point, I received verbal orders brought me by some adjutants of the most Exc. president, to continue to Los Morales ranch; this I did, and before reaching it, I caught up with the second division commanded by general Sir Manuel Andrade who was moving ahead of my advance guard. When I observed that this officer was leading it into the ranch, I sent colonel Manuel Falcon to tell him that I considered it convenient that he draw up his force in the open field. I did this for two purposes: first, that H.E. the general in chief might have this force totally at his disposal for the moment