

which so momentarily concerns France, its policy, its destinies, its future, its finances, let us know what is in store for us; let us not be doomed to find, some morning, on awaking, when we least expect it, declarations of war which we could not have foreseen, declarations of policy which we cannot accept. We are, in the end, the parties who give the money and who give the men; it is to us that account must be rendered; it is we who are to be consulted, and consequently, when a war of this nature is undertaken, we should know what end you propose to give it.

So, gentlemen, this will doubtless be for the government an occasion to inform us about its external policy. What is it? what does it seek to effect? It seems to me that it has sought to apply, in its external relations, the principle which it applies so sorrowfully and so sadly in its internal policy, that of force, [vehement reprobation:] that is to say, impotency itself. [Murmurs.]

Has it succeeded in it? And after so much blood spilled by our soldiers, let us see and let us see closely what is your influence in Europe. We are a great nation; we know it well, and for this reason alone that you have the honor of governing us, you can speak loudly and speak firmly. But are not your policy and your diplomacy strangely distanced by those of the neighboring powers? When the throne of Greece becomes vacant who receives the advantages of this vacancy? To whom are the eyes turned? Who are the candidates that are proposed, and, above all, what are the institutions that are sought? [To the question! To Mexico!]

You console yourselves by giving sad counsels to those in Prussia who desire resistance, and who give to the ministers of a king, perhaps blind, the detestable counsel not to yield to the will of the nation. [Murmurs.]

Yesterday you were at Turin for Turin; to-day you are at Rome for Rome. [Murmurs.]

M. the Baron MARIANI. Stay in Mexico, and speak of Mexico.

M. ERNEST PICARD. If this policy is an enigma we should have the clue to it. Tell us who you are; tell us what are your names. A year ago you appealed to the nationalities; then there was exultation through all Europe, and it seemed that France, under the impulse of its government, was going to deliver the people. [Cries of no, no.] Yesterday you heard the declaration of the minister; you know how he treats the Polish nationality which ought never perish. [Renewed murmurings.]

I resume now, and assert, if you are for the principle of non-intervention you must explain otherwise your war in Mexico. If, on the contrary, you are for the principle of intervention, you should not be in Mexico when you ought to be elsewhere. [Noises.]

The PRESIDENT. M. David has the floor.

Baron JEROME DAVID. Gentlemen, I have been struck by one fact in the discourse which we have just heard; it is that the Spanish, the English, and the Mexicans, everybody is right and France alone is wrong. [That's so; good good.] I confess to you that my feelings, that my national pride revolts at this idea. [Good, good.]

I oppose the amendment which has just been defended by the honorable M. Picard. I oppose it, while acknowledging at the same time that the Mexican expedition has caused vehement excitement in the country. The distance, the nature of the obstacles, the foreseen increase of the expenses, the uncertainty of the results, must have impressed and must yet impress painfully all those who are not deeply convinced of the imperious necessity of this expedition. The discussions kept up in a neighboring nation have not contributed to the formation of an opinion favorable to the policy of the government towards Mexico. But, as I firmly approve this policy, I shall endeavor to refute such views as cannot gain credit without injury to justice and truth. [Good.]

Gentlemen, have we need of the documents placed before our eyes to know that the insinuations contained in the amendment should not be accepted; to know, according to the expressions made use of by the honorable M. Picard, that the government can justify the expedition which it has undertaken; to know that the Emperor's government should have accepted the Mexican war without having sought it?

Have we forgotten that a preceding government found itself, under the same circumstances, obliged to demand by force the redress of these same grievances? I shall not be wanting in the regard due to fallen dynasties, when I say that the government to which I allude did not usually permit itself to be carried away by exaggerated susceptibilities at a period of ultra pacific tendencies. In 1839 the address of the Chamber included these words:

"The outrages and spoliations to which our countrymen have been subjected in Mexico demand an exemplary satisfaction, and your government should have required it. The Chamber hopes that it shall have taken prompt and decisive measures to obtain it."

It was during the discussion of the same address that M. Piscatory cried out: "France has descended from the rank which she occupied; it is painful to me to say it, but I do say it, it is my duty and my right." We must not use such language under the empire.

The government of July confined itself to half measures; the blockade of 1838, the capture of San Juan de Ulloa, the descent upon Vera Cruz, did not, in any respect, remedy

the state of affairs; the actual government has been no less willing to push moderation to its utmost limits; the treaty of 1853, the conciliatory mission of Admiral Penaud in 1858, the diplomatic proceedings anterior to the treaty of October 31, 1861—are not all these undeniable proofs of our patience?

What remained to be done? Was it necessary to undertake by force of arms the reparation of our grievances? Should we have acted with inopportune timidity when there was question of the French honor? Would the second of these ways suit my opponents? In any case, I maintain that the first was the only one which becomes the Imperial government.

Gentlemen, our grievances against Mexico have been strangely slurred over by tactics habitual with parties. Some of these grievances have been omitted; the most serious have been thrown into the back-ground; the least striking have been discussed at length, so as to lose sight of the gravity of the situation, resulting from their being seen altogether. [Good; that's so.]

We have in Mexico, not 3,000, but more than 8,000 fellow-countrymen. Among them, several have been the victims of assassination, of robberies, of spoliations of all kinds. They have had to bear forced loans, military contributions, sometimes amounting to 5 per cent. of their capital. French commerce has been capriciously subjected to ruinous and abusive duties of importation and exportation. Finally, all these misdeeds have been followed by the rupture of solemn engagements guaranteed by diplomatic conventions. To remain quiet would be truly to show oneself quite regardless of national honor, unless, indeed, a person regulates his susceptibility according to the dangers of the case, or supposes the flag of France too small to extend its protecting folds to the shores of the New World. [Good, good.]

There are not many members in this assembly disposed to think that we ought to bear these injuries in silence or content ourselves with showing our indignation by an ineffectual military manifestation. After having taken up arms we cannot lay them down, we will not lay them down, but with the certitude that we will not have to recommence periodically a murderous and expensive campaign. So we will not let our most legitimate rights, I will say even our duties, be obscured in the confusion of words or ideas. We will justly interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico as often as our interests shall there be involved to a momentous extent; we will assign to them the place which is acquired for them by our efforts and by our sacrifices; we are bound by the very fact of our expedition to treat only with a government offering serious guarantees for the future; and if it is not granted to us to influence the Mexicans in the choice of their government, it will be incumbent upon us to inquire whether that government promises efficacious protection to the life, to the property of our countrymen, and a sure fulfilment of stipulated engagements.

Let us examine from this point of view the actual government of Mexico, that government recently defined in the following terms in the tribune of the Spanish Senate by the president of the counsel of the Queen's ministers. "In Mexico there is nothing but proscription of the vanquished and established anarchy in government."

The democratic, federalist party, the party of the *puros*, to which M. Juarez belongs, after having figured with various chances in all the troubles that have agitated Mexico since its independence, finally attained to power by the fall of Santa Ana, in the month of August, 1855; it maintained itself until the insurrection at Mexico, which overthrew President Comonfort in the beginning of 1858. M. Juarez, constitutional vice-president at that period, established himself at Vera Cruz, whence he kept up a contest, terminated by his attainment to power in January, 1861, after the defeat of the government at Mexico, under Miramon.

The history of Mexico remains, during these last years, what it was previously: individuals more or less audacious, causing themselves to be followed by some thousands of soldiers, proclaimed a plan, a system of government.

The principles of conservatism or progression formed the basis of these proclamations. The chiefs of each of the belligerent parties adjudged to themselves the commission of saving the nation. Meanwhile they levied imposts, extorted money from foreigners, infested the highways, pillaged the churches, devastated the country. So far did it go, gentlemen—and what I am going to say belongs to history—so far did it go, that, in the course of the year 1858 alone, there occurred in Mexico eight regular battles, twenty-four serious combats, thirty-nine secondary encounters—in all seventy-one engagements.

Therefore you will vainly seek there for roads, for canals, for works of art; you would look in vain for the slightest notion of political or social economy. Exorbitant tariffs impoverish the receipts of the government by exciting a contraband trade along the open frontier of 500 leagues which separates the United States from Mexico. There is everywhere, in Mexico, folly, disorder, want of security for strangers. To discover the least vestiges of civilization we must go back to the epoch of the empire of Montezuma, which



has given place only to the tyrannical monopoly of Spain or the disastrous convulsions of the Spanish American republics.

In Mexico there are eight millions of inhabitants separated by difference of race, of manners, and of language, who know no other equality than that of oppression by ambitious upstarts who found their private fortunes on the ruin and degradation of the nation.

For the rest, I grant you, conservatives, democrats, federalists, puros, are all equivalent, [approbative laughter,] all pursue the same line of conduct; it is an incontestable fact. However, I may be permitted to state that there is a striking distinction between the conservatives and the progressionists, the puros, to whom M. Juarez belongs; it is that the conservatives have a patriotic shame entirely unknown to M. Juarez and his friends.

However strange this assertion may appear, it is confirmed by facts. The separation of Texas, its admission into the American Union, the cession of Upper California and New Mexico, were accomplished only after memorable battles sustained by the Mexican army under the orders of the conservative General Santa Anna. The conservative General Miramon, of whom mention was made a while ago, found in his patriotism, at the moment of greatest trial in 1860, the energy to protest against the odious McLane treaty, subscribed by M. Juarez and his friends, a treaty which placed all Mexico in the hands of the United States.

The compliance of M. Juarez was not useless to him. The following year the American Captain Jarvis, commanding the man-of-war *Saratoga*, took part with M. Juarez by forcibly seizing on two Mexican vessels which were carrying from Havana arms and munitions of war for the army of operation which was besieging Vera Cruz. It is, then, to M. Juarez and his friends and party that we should first apply the reproof justly incurred by citizens relying upon foreign assistance. It was also M. Juarez who in 1861 wished to borrow ten millions of dollars from the United States, by delivering to them the province of Sonora and other parts of the Mexican territory. Such acts call our attention to the consistency of Mexico, to the morality of the means employed by M. Juarez, in whose cause it is now sought to raise the prestige attaching to the defence of one's native land.

M. Juarez applied to the United States for money. Let us see their opinion with regard to Mexico, and then we will be forced to recognize that to borrow money of the United States is to sell Mexico to the United States.

President Buchanan said in his message of 1858: "Mexico has been in a constant state of revolution almost since the moment when it conquered its independence. Military chiefs, one after another, have usurped the government in rapid succession. The different constitutions, adopted at different periods, have been reduced to nullity almost as soon as proclaimed. The successive governments have been unable to afford effectual protection either to Mexican citizens or resident foreigners against violence and illegality."

We read further on: "The truth is, that this beautiful country, blessed with a productive soil and a beneficent climate, finds itself reduced by civil dissensions to a condition of anarchy and impotence almost irremediable."

Then the message asks that the government of the United States should assume a temporary protectorate over the northern parts of the States of Chihuahua and Sonora by establishing military posts there. Is this significant enough? President Buchanan submits to Congress the suitability of establishing military posts, without even regarding the consent of Mexico.

Mr. Buchanan says also in his message of 1859: "Is it possible that Mexico must be abandoned to anarchy and ruin without an effort to deliver and save her? Will the commercial nations of the world who have so many interests involved in Mexico remain indifferent to this result? The United States especially, which should have the greatest number of commercial relations with Mexico—will they permit this neighboring state to ruin and destroy itself? Without aid Mexico cannot resume its position among the nations, nor enter upon a career fruitful in good results. Every American citizen must be deeply moved at this. A government which cannot or will not repress such disorders deserts its duty."

Finally, we read further on: "Mexico is a ship drifting with the current of the ocean and governed only by the passions of opposing parties that dispute the government with one another."

Behold the judgment of the President of a republic. It is not out of place to contrast it with the opinions of our honorable opponents.

The messages quoted show that the United States, after having already conquered the third part of Mexico, would not be slow to seize upon the rest. Their policy in the New World was well settled. They wished to remove Spain from her ancient colonies under the pretext that the island of Cuba, by its geographical position, commands the mouth of the Mississippi, one of the principal arteries of their commerce. They sought to purchase it with thirty millions of dollars. Their attitude towards the Spanish American republics was that of expectation. Persuaded that these republics would be absorbed by the Amer-

ican Union, they commenced, by means of treaties, to assure to themselves the transit over the most suitable points for the connexion of the two oceans. The bases of these treaties were successively enlarged. They asked the establishment of neutral ports at the extremities of the lines of transit. Then they claimed the abolishment of all custom-house duties on American merchandise, and authority to transmit troops and munitions of war. Finally, they specified the grant to the United States of the right to assure by force the security of the transit, which thus made them masters of the great routes of commerce.

Behold the whole diplomatic history of the United States with the rest of the New World. The success has been complete as far as concerns the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. As to the republics of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and New Granada, they yet oppose these pretensions with the assistance of England, which likewise showed itself at the time of the invasion of Central America by the Anglo-American adventurer Walker. Nevertheless, the opposition was drawing to a close, when civil war surprised the United States in the full career of the application of the celebrated doctrine of President Monroe—of that doctrine which declared that all the States of America have devolved on the Anglo-Americans, whose duty it is to oppose in every manner the interference of Europe in the affairs of the New World.

Gentlemen, the projects of the Anglo-Americans would not have failed to be soon realized, whilst placing Europe in a condition of inferiority, of which the dangers fully manifest themselves. However, the European powers that signed the treaty of October 31, 1861, now follow a different system in their policy towards Mexico. France has loyally persevered in the line of conduct originally traced out by common consent.

Let me be permitted, gentlemen, to show forth this truth whilst throwing into the background the accessory facts to which, in my opinion, too much importance has been attached in other discussions on the same subject; I shall very succinctly place in relief the principal points of the alliance of the three powers.

I select a primary point which serves as a basis for the treaty of October 31—that is, the overthrow of M. Juarez and his government. The maintenance of M. Juarez was recognized as incompatible with the end specified in the preamble of the treaty, namely, the effectual protection of persons and property, and the execution of stipulated engagements with the three powers contracting.

Whatever interpretation it may be sought to give to M. Thouvenel's despatch of October 11, 1861, addressed to our ambassador at London, after a conversation with Lord Cowley, we are forced to recognize that, twenty days before the signing of the treaty, England admitted *a priori*, as well as we did, the fall of M. Juarez and his government; the diversity of opinion concerned only the greater or less influence that was to be exercised on the form of the government that was to replace it.

As to Spain, she declared herself still more clearly; the Queen's minister of state wrote to M. Mon, ambassador to Paris, September 7, fifty-three days before the treaty of October 31: "If England and France agree to act in accord with Spain, the forces of the three powers will unite, as well to obtain reparation for outrages as to establish a regular and stable order of things in Mexico." On the 8th of October—that is to say, twenty-three days before the treaty of October 31—the minister of the Queen of Spain wrote again to M. Mon: "Far from renouncing its projects, (the action in common of Spain, France, and England,) the Spanish government is more persuaded every day that the accord of the three governments, in procuring satisfaction for offences received and the reparation of all injuries, will contribute more or less directly to create in Mexico a regular and settled state of affairs, which will permit the establishment of a government affording security and repose to the unfortunate people of that country, and guarantees for the interests and the lives of strangers."

These two despatches, gentlemen, are explicit; they speak of the establishment, of the creation, of a new order of things; this is the sense of article 11 of the treaty of October 31.

The high contracting parties engage not to exert in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of such a nature as to attack the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government.

Does not this paragraph place beyond doubt, beyond doubt, the overthrow of the existing government in order to choose and constitute a new one?

I come to establish a second important point—that is, that the three powers had admitted the eventuality of a march to Mexico. England had declared from the beginning that her assistance should be limited to a display of maritime forces; but Spain, who sent the strongest contingent of forces for disembarkation, recognized, from the 6th of November, that it was possible that there might be occasion to march upon Mexico. Here is the despatch of the ambassador of France at Madrid, addressed on the 6th of November to our minister of foreign affairs:

"MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: As I have had the honor to make known to your excellency this morning by telegraph, I have communicated to Marshal O'Donnell and M. Calderon Collantes the desire expressed by your excellency that instructions should be given to the



commanders-in-chief of the Spanish and French forces in Mexico, in order that these commanders may, if the circumstances appear favorable to them, march upon Mexico.

"The Duke of Tetuan agreed, without hesitation, to the opinion of the Emperor's government; he declared to me and authorized me to say, that very elastic, discretionary instructions would be given to the commander of the Spanish forces, and that he would moreover send him a private letter, signed by himself, authorizing him to act, if the case should occur in the sense of the eventual measures indicated by your excellency's despatch.

"At the close of a conversation which I had on the same subject with M. Calderon Collantes, the first secretary of state has authorized me to inform you that his opinion was conformable in every respect to that expressed by Marshal O'Donnell, and to confirm in his name the engagement entered into with me by the president of the council."

The treaty of October 31 specifies precisely the results to be attained, but in no respect limits the course of military operations; on the contrary, it says, "That the commanders of the allied forces are authorized to accomplish the operations which shall be judged, on the spot, the most suitable to realize the end specified in the preamble of the treaty." The treaty said no more, because the hope was cherished that it would suffice to seize and occupy the different fortresses and military positions of the coast, to decide the people to shake off the yoke under which they groaned.

M. Calderon Collantes, minister of foreign affairs, had said, in the commencement of October, 1861, to M. Barrot, our ambassador, "That, in his opinion, the active employment of the allied forces would be useless, and that their moral action would suffice." That was calculating too much on the spontaneous energy of populations prostrated by forty years of continual discord.

I resume, gentlemen, the consideration of the meaning and purpose of the treaty of October 31.

Spain and England appeared resolved, as well as we did, to overturn the government of M. Juarez, recognized as incompatible with the results to be attained by them in common. From the moment that the capture of San Juan de Ulloa and the occupation of Vera Cruz failed to produce the desired effects, it was necessary to march onward without waiting till the void should be formed around us, to remove from the warm country, to penetrate into the more favorable and more salubrious regions, to await re-enforcements if they should be necessary, and to plant the allied banners on the walls of Mexico.

The secondary, very secondary incidents of the exaggerated claims of M. Dubois de Saligny on the subject of the Jecker debt, to protection given to General Almonte, the hypothesis of a monarchical *regime* with an archduke of Austria, cannot be called up in good faith to explain the abandonment of which we have been the object; for they weakened in no respect the principal object of the enterprise. [Good.]

This abandonment was decided upon at the moment when, instead of acting, they parleyed; from the moment when, instead of striking the government of M. Juarez, they strengthened it, they gave it by negotiations the moral force that was wanting to it. Our plenipotentiaries have, perhaps, failed in energy, but the government has remained firm in the line of conduct which it had traced out and which it wished to pursue. As to our plenipotentiaries, we must take into account the restricted means which they had at their disposal in the beginning. Whence comes it, then, that England and Spain have withdrawn from an enterprise conducted conformably to the preliminary understanding of the three powers? I shall try to treat this delicate question—I shall treat it, if not with talent, at least patriotically, [good,] and I hope to show that France can say she has persevered loyally in the line of conduct which she has traced for herself. I shall treat this question with all the regard due to friendly nations, and at the same time with the frankness becoming our lawful rights.

Before betaking myself to this examination, I shall call attention to the general situation of the New World, in order to show clearly the conflicting interests in Mexico. It is one of those questions which becomes obscured when viewed in their petty details, but which, on the contrary, become clear and rise to their true height when they are placed on their proper level.

Passing from the frontiers of the United States to the extremities of South America you will meet only the former Spanish colonies, with the exception of Guiana and Brazil. Since their liberation, which belongs to the history of another age, these colonies have generally been given up to internal dissensions, excited in the name of federalism or of centralization. When a European nation interferes in the affairs of one of these republics, all the rest are thereby thrown into a profound excitement.

The idea of Bolivar, the liberator of South America, was that all these republics should be united in a treaty of defensive union; and so it was that in 1856 a treaty of alliance was concluded at Santiago, in Chili, between the representatives of Peru, Chili, and Ecuador. In the course of the years 1856, 1857, 1858, this treaty was submitted to the approbation of the republics of Central America, of Venezuela, and of New Granada.

In 1861, the President of Peru took the initiative in a treaty of alliance between all the American governments in order to resist all action on the part of Europe in the affairs of the New World. This treaty of alliance included the following significant phrase: "To attack the independence of one of the Spanish American republics is to wound that of all." In 1862, a deputy of Chili, M. Artega Alemparte, asked his government, in open assembly, to take part against us. M. Leane, minister from Peru to La Plata, strove to rouse the national feelings of the States of the Argentine Confederation, of Paraguay, and of the Oriental State; he appears to have failed in that part of his mission which consisted in obtaining effective measures. All these republics are too much embarrassed with their own affairs to seek for external complications.

Gentlemen, I desired to deduce from these facts that the question in debate in Mexico is not merely a Mexican question, but one which concerns the interests of France and of Europe in all the New World. Circumstances have brought us to undertake an expedition to Mexico, when it was necessary to show that we would support our countrymen in all regions where they might happen to be. [Good, good.]

After these preliminary explanations, let us examine, gentlemen, the conduct of the three powers.

England considerably surpasses other powers in her commercial relations with the New World; even the commercial relations of the United States are behind hers. The possessions of Belize, in the bay of Honduras, permit her to profit by the commercial transactions of the rich Mexican provinces of Yucatan and Tabasco, and to explore Central America; she has often even interfered in the events that have agitated those countries. Hence arose serious and frequent difficulties with the United States, of which difficulties the Clayton-Bulwer treaty is the best testimony. The English policy, like the American policy, has persistently striven to prevent the probable pretensions of Spain over her former colonies, in order not to see them rescued from the state of commercial and industrial infancy in which they languish in order not to lose a market. It appears evidently, from the recent discussions in the Spanish Cortes, that England decided upon the Mexican expedition solely to prevent Spain from undertaking it alone. The English policy, so justly styled a policy of material interests by the Marquis of Havana, ex-ambassador from Spain to Paris, had especially tended to participate but feebly in the expedition so as to disengage itself from the treaty of October 31 on the first occasion, whilst causing Spain to follow her example. This occasion the English plenipotentiary, Sir Charles Wyke, undertook to bring about by shuffling the cards—pardon me the expression—on minor points of detail, so as to treat separately with M. Juarez, whom they were to overturn.

As Spain took sides with England the expedition ran a chance of miscarrying, whilst leaving to Great Britain the merit of having removed the arms of the European powers from Mexico—a thing which could not fail to cause a deep sensation in America; a thing which could not but consolidate her influence; a thing which could not but extend her relations of importation and exportation and benefit her commerce. We have defeated these calculations by a perseverance which was not counted on. That was forgotten which causes our superiority, and perhaps our isolation, namely, that we subordinate our profits and our advantages to the principles of civilization and of morality, which are the marks of greatness of the times. [Applause.]

English diplomacy shows itself less accommodating than it was in Mexico, when it is alone in the case. In 1856 a *casus belli* was made with New Granada on account of a delay in the payment of some millions to an English creditor, Mr. Mackintosh. In 1859, in consequence of the detention at Assumption of an English subject, Mr. Canstalt, an English vessel, without any previous declaration of war, gave chase in the river La Plata to a Paraguayan vessel, the Tamari, which had on board the son of the President of Paraguay; M. Lopez had to return to Buenos Ayres in all haste and proceed to Assumption by way of land.

I do not ambition for my country the policy of England, however lucrative it may be. [Good, good.] We must, however, acknowledge that, in the Mexican question, it has shown itself skilful enough to escape officially the charge of disloyalty. [Sensation.]

As to Spain, gentlemen, her grievances had an exceptional importance; her resolution to have recourse to arms was anterior to ours; her military contingent was stronger, her army was commanded by a brilliant general, well known by numerous deeds of war. These different reasons explain the position assigned to Spain in the beginning of the expedition.

I shall not go back to the treaty of La Soledad; its clauses are well known to you. I shall say only that they are a symptom of the hesitancy of General Prim, a hesitancy which should be deemed merely transitory, to judge from his correspondence of March 20 and 21, 1862. The chief of the Spanish expedition said that he wished even to burn his vessels in order to march as a soldier; his warlike humor reawoke in presence of the fresh injuries committed by the Mexican government, and twenty-four hours afterwards Admiral Jurien de la Gravière received intimation that General Prim was embarking his troops.

We had never been expelled from the New World after a series of reverses once cele-



brated; we never had our standards suspended in testimony of defeat under the vaults of the cathedral of Mexico; the violences exercised against the French arose from the general disorder, and not at all from national hatred; our ambassador had never been expelled from Mexico, and yet we have remained faithful to our alliance, whilst the Spanish army set sail, abandoning us to a contest with an enemy numerically much superior; abandoning us to a struggle with the calamities of war, under an inexorable climate, during the worst season of the year. [Applause.]

Surely, if the Spanish army had not been already tried, if General Prim had not been renowned for his personal bravery, the retreat of the Spanish troops would be very much like a flight from danger. This supposition is inadmissible. I think we must search in another order of ideas for the origin of the facts. General Prim could not resist the illusions, the seductions, that have dazzled all the representatives of Spain charged to repress by force the excesses of the Spanish American republics. In 1856, after the sequestration of Spanish property by President Comonfort, an imposing fleet, having on board S'r de los Santos Alvarez, minister from Spain, appeared before Vera Cruz, to retire at the end of some days without having done anything and without having obtained anything. In 1860, after the massacre of some hundred Spaniards in Venezuela, some Spanish vessels again appeared. After remaining some time before La Guayra they retired, without having obtained the least satisfaction from the cabinet of Caracas. General Prim shows, for the third time, a Spanish plenipotentiary failing to carry out the instructions of his government, in order to make more noise than work. [Good, good.]

Gentlemen, all the representatives of Spain that arrive in the New World are seized with a veritable fever of national ambition. The official language, the men who direct affairs, the manners of the population of the towns, the religious practices, the traditions, the inscriptions on the monuments, everything recalls to them the Spanish dominion; then they say to themselves that Spain might reanimate, might easily revive the elements of prosperity now hidden behind the anarchy of the moment, provided she raises no new barriers between herself and her former colonies by a recourse to violent measures. This illusion is easily worked up by the crafty diplomacy of the natives and creoles of America. Have things happened this time also in the same style in Mexico? Everything induces us to believe so.

Spain, thanks to the measures of France, now figures, in the European system, in the ranks of the great powers; thanks, also, to the wisdom of her statesmen, she has, for some years past, taken a truly remarkable flight; her preponderance in the New World would give her an *éclat* surpassing the days of her greatest splendor. Could Spain realize this grand idea she would be worthy of the gratitude, of the admiration of her citizens. But successes of this kind disdain egotism and chicanery; nations that pursue such objects should commence by raising their banners from the degradation into which the reverses of other times have thrown them. The confidence and the esteem of nations are accorded only to loyalty and the moral strength of nations. So we are permitted to doubt whether the commander-in-chief of the Spanish expedition, whatever may have been his intentions, has served his country well in withdrawing after the example of England.

For the rest, we need not regret too bitterly the withdrawal of Spain in an enterprise in which she had the honor of marching by our side; we will prove but once the more that, to have justice done us, we can do without allies. We have gone to Mexico under the impulse of necessity; we will stay there under the impulse of duty and fidelity to the end set in view. Our allies have acted differently; that is a matter that concerns them; in such cases, on each one be the responsibility of his own acts.

The honorable M. Picard asks, What is the end pursued by the government? Gentlemen, I am not in the secrets of the government; I cannot, therefore, answer him absolutely; but it is, however, an end which appears evident to me; which can be immediately understood, provided we examine it without passion, without prejudice; provided we examine with precision the state of affairs. We desire, and the treaty of October 31 says so clearly—we desire security for persons and property, with a stable and regular government; we shall soon be enabled in Mexico to second such measures as will answer this programme. How long shall we stay there? How long shall we figure in the ulterior events of Mexico? In this respect I cannot unite my wishes with those expressed in the address. For questions of this nature previsions and precise replies are difficult. In any war whatever the future belongs to the unforeseen. All that can be said at present, all that can be said for certain, is, that the difficulties which we will have to conquer will be slight beside the difficulties already surmounted by our army and navy with a degree of self-denial and courage above all praise. [Good, good.] Our fleet will no longer be stationed along the coast; the means of transportation are being organized; a railroad will shorten the distance through the hot country; our troops are encamped in the more salubrious regions; all arms of the service will rival each other in emulation and zeal, and, without any doubt, our soldiers will soon be in Mexico.

Gentlemen, there is an idea cherished with much complacency when it is desired to offer opposition to the Emperor's government. They say, "But when you are at Mexico will you be any further advanced?" It is enough to have studied, to have read the history of the transactions of Mexico for the last forty years to know, in an incontestable manner, that the occupation of Mexico, Puebla, and the seaports will comprise the whole of Mexico; there will be partial resistance here and there, which will cease of itself for want of means of propagation. The city of Mexico is the point of union where all the elements of Mexican vitality are concentrated; it is the capital and the heart of the nation; and surely it cannot be seriously said that once at Mexico we will not be further advanced than at the setting out of the expedition. At the city of Mexico we will serve as a rallying point for the reaction of the masses against the upholders of disorder. Our presence at Mexico will be an energetic and salutary act of repression; it will be felt throughout the whole of the New World. Our maritime commerce, assured of protection, will multiply its operations in America to the great advantage of international intercourse and commercial development. Our emigrants will carry with confidence the genius of the nation into the wilderness of the New World; there will be an outlet for those ardent and discontented imaginations that now turn their eyes towards the era of revolutions.

Gentlemen, what I say may be criticised; my words may be deemed quite poetical, but utterly void of the reality; it may be pretended that I place myself in a world of chimeras. Will not these assertions be refuted by considering, for example, that the Argentine Confederation, that country so rich in products of all sorts, has, for a territory of 200,000 square leagues, only 800,000 inhabitants, or four persons to the square league, whilst in France there are 1,100. And this is also the case in Mexico, in Central America, and in all the old Spanish colonies of the continent; everywhere there is an enormous disproportion between the extent of territory and the amount of population. How does it happen that the population does not increase? It is because there is no security. Adventurers, and even honorable men, can repair to these distant countries, but commercial enterprises recoil before such innumerable apprehensions. Is it not a prudent and generous undertaking to restore to native production and commercial activity an important part of the globe, of which at present the richness remains in a state of absolute sterility?

Now, if we consider the question in a purely real point of view, for at that I aim, there is not one European power that has not been injured in its relations with the Spanish American republics. To cite but one instance, which has reference to the people whom I have the honor to represent: A few years ago a Girondist emigration was attracted to Paraguay to establish a colony there, which was called New Bordeaux. Not one of the engagements entered into by the president of that state were kept, and after some months' residence most of our countrymen died, after tribulations of every kind. Others took refuge in Buenos Ayres.

In America, in La Plata especially, our diplomatic agents have continual discords and quarrels on account of serious and numerous claims against the local governments.

There are more than 100,000 Frenchmen scattered through the Spanish American republics. Before the Mexican expedition, it might be thought that we abandoned all influence beyond a certain circle; that we knew not how to afford to our countrymen any other assistance than that of protocols. When an English subject is touched, the blow that strikes him resounds throughout all England. Shall we permit it to be supposed that we are fallen into lethargy? Shall we let it be supposed that we are incapable of protecting our own?

Truly it is too easy to spread alarm and false suggestions among a public not always correctly informed as to the state of affairs; truly it is too easy to enumerate the rough labors of our soldiers and sailors whilst attacking the spirit of system or adventure which has caused them. When facts are thus distorted, when this manner is adopted, why not have the courage to be logical to the end? Why not have the boldness to say that they are satisfied with a restricted influence for their country on the European continent; that beyond this our countrymen should seek assistance under other flags, [noise.] like those eastern vessels, which shelter their fortunes and their heads under foreign protectorates? [Good, good.] If we reject this degradation and disgrace we must proclaim the Mexican expedition so much the more meritorious by how much the more arduous and difficult it is. Our worthy army, too, must be sustained in the midst of its severe trials by the consciousness that we are usefully defending the honor and the interests of France. [Good.] Our soldiers and our sailors, so admirable and so devoted, should have faith in their work; and in fine, those among them who fall in those distant regions should know well that they sleep in glorious death in serving the cause of humanity, of right, and of civilization. [Good, good.]

(The speaker was congratulated by many of his friends.)

The PRESIDENT. Does the Chamber desire some minutes of repose? [Cries of "Yes, yes."]



[The session is suspended for twenty minutes. It is resumed at a quarter before five o'clock.]

The PRESIDENT. Does any one of the authors of the amendment desire the floor to reply to M. David?

M. JULES FAVRE. Mr. President, I should have desired to reply to the minister.

A MEMBER. The minister will reply to you.

M. JULES FAVRE. My intention was to spare the time of the Chamber. It is well known that I am at its disposal; if it desires me to reply to the honorable M. David—[cries of "Yes, yes; speak."]

Gentlemen, the remarkable speech which you have just heard causes him who is charged with the honor of replying to it to experience an embarrassment which I can explain in a few words. I am not commissioned to defend that which has been attacked by the honorable M. David, and he does not appear to me to have justified that which was criticised by my honorable friend, M. Picard. Grant that the government of Juarez has to reproach itself with serious wrongs; that it is by no means popular in Mexico; that England has been, as opposed to us, haughty and perfidious; that Spain, our ally, has broken the treaty which united her with us—all these things, gentlemen, have, in the discussion in which we are now engaged, only a secondary importance.

I will say as much, and perhaps still more justly, of the brilliant considerations which I have remarked in the speech of our honorable colleague. His generous spirit has encountered no difficulty, no limit; and, if we believe him, France would have for her mission to spread everywhere the lights and benefits of civilization; to substitute order for anarchy; to plant the principles of morality and self-respect wherever they are badly known; and to accomplish this glorious work she should regard neither the treasures which flow from her liberal hand, nor the blood of her children which she sacrifices. This generous programme has the inconvenience of strangely involving the policy which our interests and our strength order us to restrain; and it is not to open outlets for human activity; it is not even to permit those diseased and impotent imaginations, of which M. David just spoke, to go and seek under eastern skies for realities which they have dreamed, that our soldiers can be engaged and our treasures spent.

Moreover, gentlemen, I may be allowed to add that all these things could have found a more suitable place in the discussion of last year. If the Chamber had heard them then, it would have known to what it engaged itself; it could have, with full knowledge of the question, followed the honorable M. David in those brilliant and distant expeditions, or else stopped short with those who advised it to reserve its treasures for cases exclusively personal to us. And the language then held by the minister very little resembles that which we now find in the mouth of the honorable M. David.

Permit me, gentlemen, to refer back to that, for there is the real question. We have to ask ourselves how and why the expedition has been undertaken; how it seems to have deflected from its primitive design, and how it may be terminated; all which questions, I need not say, in the highest degree concern the future, the honor, and the morality of France. At the moment in which I am speaking, gentlemen, there are very few families that are not uneasy in consequence of this war—glorious undoubtedly, but already disastrous, and yet so obscure.

It is becoming, then, in the means of control that belongs to it, that the legislative body should be able to clear up that which is yet confused, and it is for this reason that I entreat you to have the kindness to hear me for a few minutes.

Well, without repeating the details given to you by my honorable *confrère*, M. Picard, [laughter.] I wished to say, my colleague, I hope the Chamber will excuse my mistake; I made use of a softer word than I am in the habit of employing. ["Yes, yes." "Go on, go on."] I was saying that it would be rash for me to repeat all the details given to you by my honorable colleague, Master Picard. [General hilarity.] I have need, gentlemen, that your indulgence should be on a level with my weakness. ["Go on, go on."] I ask your pardon for these failings. ["No, no." "Go on."]

The honorable M. Picard has explained to you in what circumstances the treaty of London was signed, and on this point I might grant to our honorable colleague, M. David, all that he has said relative to the outrages of which our countrymen have been the object. In this respect it is a matter of public notoriety throughout the entire world that Spanish America is unhappily given up to a sort of chronic anarchy.

Mexico, on this point, is not an exception to the evil; and if we examine its neighbors in Bolivia, in the Argentine republics, we will meet examples in every respect analogous. That France should protect those who suffered thus; that she should interfere diplomatically—by arms, even, if it was necessary—no one would contest, and when the honorable M. David recalled certain discussions entered into under the monarchy of July, the military enterprises to which it resigned itself, in spite perhaps of its too pacific tendency, the honorable M. David showed us an evil on which every one is agreed, and which it was urgently

sought to heal. Only all exaggerations should have been avoided. Now, permit me to say that no serious explanation has yet been rendered. For if the despatches of our chargé d'affaires have brought to our notice instances of violence to property and person, the representatives of friendly powers have replied that these violences were the consequence of a state of things engendered by the civil war; that all the successive governments should be accused of them, and the responsibility not made to fall exclusively on M. Juarez.

And in fact, gentlemen, it has been told you General Miramon, his lieutenant, Marquez, and others whom it is useless to mention, had all successively occupied the presidential chair, and the civil war was awhile ago related to you in energetic terms by the honorable speaker to whom I reply; and it is during the phases of this civil war that our countrymen have had most to suffer; for what is most remarkable is, that if the claims which have been addressed to the government date from to-day, their causes go back to yesterday, that is, to a period when Juarez was not yet established in the city of Mexico.

I have said that I did not wish to repeat what has been already shown; nevertheless, I must remark that Juarez belonged to the civil order. He was a lawyer; he afterwards became a magistrate. He was president of the supreme court at the moment when the suffrages of his fellow-citizens called him to the presidency. His election was opposed by force; he was compelled to fly; and after long wanderings in the United States, he came to seek refuge at Vera Cruz, where his authority was recognized. It was not till towards the end of the year 1861, in the last days of December, that—the power of Miramon having crumbled away—Juarez proceeded to occupy at Mexico the place that had been regularly assigned to him by the usual method of constitutional institutions.

And it is at the moment when Juarez proceeds to take his seat that all the reclamations are addressed to him, of which the chargé d'affaires of France has spoken; and he is yet exposed to all the horrors of civil war, which the capture of Mexico has been unable to stop; he struggles amid the convulsions of a violent state. It is at this moment that we send in our complaints, and that Spain and England join in our quarrel.

Hitherto the attitude of France is irreproachable. They cannot reproach her with having too lightly received the information given to her by her agents who engage her to hold herself in a state of distrust. But what is important, and what certainly will have its influence with you, is, that the two great powers that acted in concert with us had the same interests that we had. No one, indeed, has dared to maintain that in the different acts of violence committed in Mexico there have been any specially directed against the French. If our national colony in Mexico is important, which I acknowledge, the English and the Spanish have establishments there no less considerable.

Indeed, our honorable colleague, M. David, just awhile ago told you what vigor, what vigilance, England usually displayed in the protection of her subjects. It is, then, gentlemen, for the sole purpose of protecting them that the three powers form an agreement—that they wish to form an expedition against Mexico, and obtain by main force respect for treaties hitherto most outrageously violated.

I acknowledge, gentlemen, that at this moment there was presented to the minds of the negotiators a hypothesis, which I have the right to qualify now as a chimera, which has sprung from the brain of some exiles, and which probably has been the cause of all the evil. This hypothesis was the following: that the government of Juarez was as unpopular as frail; as detested as all those which had preceded it; that as soon as an imposing force should present itself he would be immediately abandoned by all his partisans; and that it would be possible to construct a new government. Permit me, gentlemen, to say that, if this hypothesis could appear seductive when it was proposed at length by interested lips, it seems that it found from the very beginning its counteraction in the very inanity of the element that it designated, and that were to be disposed in order to reconstitute the pretended new government, which was to offer to the belligerent parties sufficient guarantees, for, after all, it was only substituting Mexican element for Mexican element. And if you introduce the foreign element there, it will be an active element of dissolution. Indeed, no one doubts but that a haughty nation like the Mexican, which, perhaps, pushes national vanity too far, might regard with suspicion and distrust the undertakings of the foreigner.

These considerations did not occur to the minds of the negotiators, so much eloquence did these refugees display when they pleaded the cause of the exile whilst pleading that of their personal interest. It was thought that it was only requisite to touch the soil of Mexico in order that, at the instant, what the minister last year called the phantom of a government of Juarez should immediately vanish; and this had been announced—I appeal to your memories and to the proclamation, become famous, of the loyal officer who commanded the troops—encountering obstacles on which they had not calculated. Our soldiers were to be received with crowns of flowers. Here were lying promises, extravagant dreams, on the faith of which it was wrong to enlist the policy and the arms of France.

I acknowledge, however, that this hypothesis had been diplomatically foreseen, and



under this respect our honorable colleague M. David was perfectly right to call attention to it. Only in this regard I would address a direct reproach to the member of the cabinet. Whatever be our position in the state, although it be quite modest, although it becomes none of us to exaggerate it, it must, however, be acknowledged that it transcends all positions in two respects, which are equally interesting to be recalled to mind.

In the first place, we dispose of the finances; and in the second place, having acquired the right of advising the government on its external as well as on its internal policy, we have the right to speak with frankness. Our respect ought not to arrest the truth upon our lips. It is our duty to declare the whole truth as soon as ever we are asked, and if we were convinced that a war was unjust, that it had been undertaken on false principles, we should say so, we should refuse our concurrence, for the blood of France, its treasures, cannot be lavished but with our responsibility. And it is for this reason, gentlemen, that, in similar conjunctions, the words which are pronounced by the government ought to be impressed with the most complete frankness.

I regret not to be able to make this concession to those which were pronounced in the month of March last.

You know, in fact, that at this period all was yet uncertainty and confusion, as far as concerned the Mexican expedition. Official information was wanting to us; we were convinced that in fact the little expeditionary corps, which had been directed to the shores of the Atlantic, had no other purpose than to solicit, to demand, and to obtain, in case of need by force of reparation for the grievances of our countrymen.

And yet Europe, which has a fine ear, heard rumors of various indiscretions which had transpired through the imperfectly closed doors of diplomacy, and of which the press had obtained possession. The most extraordinary things were repeated. It was said, especially, that there was an intention of overturning the republic of Mexico, not to put in the place of the deposed president a man of the country, acquainted with its language, its usages, familiar with all the necessities of the government, but, what was most strange to the south, a prince of the north, an archduke of Austria.

And you have not probably forgotten, gentlemen, the reserved manner in which he who has the honor to address you thought it his duty to explain himself in this regard whilst asking of the government such information as it interested you to obtain. For, permit me to subjoin it here, gentlemen, here was the dividing line between these two opposing policies—that of our colleague, the honorable M. David, and that of my honorable colleague, M. Picard; M. David wishing to have civilization reign in Mexico, even at the price of our millions and of our armies; M. Picard and I modestly demanding that we should confine ourselves to going to Mexico to obtain payment of the contributions which are due, and re-establish security which is threatened.

What will the minister answer? His language, gentlemen, will be perfectly clear, and it will be impossible for you not to recognize that it is the second of these policies which the minister has adopted.

"England and Spain," said he, "have joined with us. The same offers have been made to the United States . . ." Hear the sequel, gentlemen; if we may use such a word in a discussion so serious, I might say that this application is piquant. "But the United States do not seem, in regard to Mexico, to concentrate their views on a simple reparation of injury done; their policy sees things otherwise, and we have decided to act without them."

Wonderful! The United States are ambitious; they are neighbors; they have the immediate occasion of sin; we who are so very distant, who can undertake expeditions only at very great expense, we are wise of necessity, and we desire nothing further than the reparation of our grievances.

"But," added the minister, "should not this union of the three powers of itself completely reassure you against the particular suppositions on which you build your discourse? Beyond patent, declared facts, you persist in seeing I know not what secret machinations of France in favor of a foreign interest."

"When such suppositions are affirmed, there should be at least some proofs, and you have none."

"The treaty made between the three powers is clear and precise. The object is to demand of Mexico: 1st, a more effectual protection for the property and persons of their subjects; 2d, the execution of the obligations entered into with them by that republic." And the second article of the treaty adds: "The three contracting parties engage themselves, &c., &c." But this is a thing already known to you, and I shall not repeat it.

"All this," said the minister also, "clearly indicates to you both what the three powers wish to effect in common, and what they forbid themselves to do."

And, after having explained that the occupation of the capital is necessary for the reparation of our grievances, the minister adds: "See why our standards are carried to Mexico. Our troops, having set out on the 20th of February, should have now arrived there." Unhappily, gentlemen, events proceed not as fast as our speeches.

It is not the orators that I attack; the intention of the minister was full of patriotism, but he did not foresee, I am sure, the obstacles of all kinds which our brave soldiers were to encounter.

The minister continued: "Now, if in the midst of this conflict, through a reaction easily conceivable, the unfortunate populations of those countries, weary at last of all the evils inflicted on them for forty years by the incessant alternatives of anarchy and tyranny, formed the wish to shake off at length the yoke of their oppressors conquered by us; if in an hour of good sense, of instinct of sovereign welfare, they endeavored to give to themselves at least a government of order and liberty, shall we hinder them?"

So we go to Mexico not to hinder it from giving itself a government.

"This case," also added the minister, "is precisely provided for by the treaty as well as by the instruction: we will not bind the people by force . . ."

"We will not go to violate at Mexico the independence of the popular will; but we will leave these unfortunate people perfectly free . . .; if they wish to continue their miserable existence, we will not impose on them a better fate."

One could not be more categorical than this; and it is here that the minister is in complete variance with our honorable colleague, M. David:

"Yes, if at the sight of our squadrons there is revealed in this Mexican people a movement attracting them towards us, we will not close our arms to them, but we will not use force; and if they prefer the miserable government under which they live, we will do nothing to cause its downfall."

These are the words that were spoken in the name of the government; here is the engagement in the face of which you have given your adhesion to its policy. And as to those allusions which I had unfortunately allowed myself to make in regard to that Austrian prince, see with what disdain the minister replies to me:

"And as to those rumors which, says the honorable member with remarkable foresight, give umbrage to the ambassador of her Britannic Majesty, permit me to decline dwelling upon them. Officers have said at parting that they were going to Mexico to enthrone a foreign prince. What! you imagine that this great secret of diplomacy, if it ever existed, would have been thus confided to the first officer that came on his way to Mexico! This is not certainly serious. If, as you say, our ally has become uneasy at these rumors, you tell us also that she applied to the proper quarter for information as to their foundation in reality; she asked our minister of foreign affairs, and you acknowledge yourselves the reply has been a denial of the truth of these rumors."

This is important, gentlemen; for if the contrary is true, what will you think of the language of the minister?

As to me, it is painful to me to suppose that the Chamber has been deceived; yet, to repel such a supposition, I must admit another equally inadmissible; it is that the minister of foreign affairs has so well kept the secret that the minister without portfolio did not know it. [Laughter.] For it is in the month of March, 1862, that this language is held to you. Now hear what was that of the minister of foreign affairs in the month of October, 1861, that is, at the very time that the treaty was signed. He gives an account of a conversation had with the English minister:

"Such an event (he speaks of the social dissolution in Mexico) cannot be a matter of indifference to England, and the principal means, in our opinion, to prevent its accomplishment would be the establishment in Mexico of a regenerative government strong enough to arrest its internal dissolution." Pursuing the development of these ideas in the form of an intimate and confidential conversation, "I have," says he, "added that, in case the contingency which I have indicated should be realized, the Emperor's government, free from all anticipations of self-interest, laid aside in advance all ideas of aspiring to the candidacy for any prince of the imperial family, and that, desirous of respecting the susceptibilities of all parties, it would see with pleasure the choice of the Mexicans and the assent of the powers fall on a prince of the house of Austria."

See, gentlemen, the value of ministerial denials. They are themselves belied by official documents. The truth has not been told to the Chamber, [murmurs of disapprobation:] indeed, its conscience has been ensnared. [Cries of No, No.] For if the Chamber had known that there was question, not of avenging our countrymen, but of destroying one government to replace it by another, its decision would certainly have been different. [Renewed marks of disapprobation.]

However it be, you see that, in this first phase of the expedition, you were assured at the same time by the concurrence of the other two powers and by the declaration made to you, that our forces and our treasures should be employed only in avenging our own injuries; and that if we ought to accept a political regeneration that might be offered to us, we ought by no means to impose it.

Three months pass away, and from the month of March I proceed to the month of June,