

the commissioners and two of the ministers of the government of the republic, except in the case that by common consent it should be arranged to name representatives delegated by both parties.

3. During the negotiations the forces of the allied powers will occupy the towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their natural limits.

4. In order that it may not, in the most remote degree, be believed that the allies have signed these preliminaries in order to obtain the passage of the fortified positions garrisoned by the Mexican army, it is stipulated that, in the unfortunate event of the negotiations being broken off, the forces of the allies will retire from the said towns, and will place themselves in the line that is beyond the said fortifications, on the Vera Cruz side; Paso Ancho, on the Cordova road and Paso de Ovejas, on that of Jalapa, being the principal extreme points.

5. Should the unfortunate event of the breaking off of negotiations take place, and the allied troops retire to the line indicated in the preceding article, the hospitals that the allies may have will remain under the protection of the Mexican nation.

6. The day on which the allied troops commence their march to occupy the places marked out in the 3d article, the Mexican flag shall be hoisted in the city of Vera Cruz and on the castle of San Juan de Ulloa.

LA SOLEDAD, February 19, 1862.

EL CONDE DE REUS.
MANUEL DOBLADO.

I approve these preliminaries by virtue of the full powers of which I am invested.

BENITO JUAREZ.
JESUS TERAN.

MEXICO, February 23, 1862.

Approved:

C. LENNOX WYKE.
HUGH DUNLOP.

Approuvé les préliminaires ci-dessus :

E. JURIEU.
D. DE SALIGNY.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Minister in Mexico.

PARIS, March 31, 1862.

SIR: I have received the despatches addressed to me by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière up to the 20th of February; yours, of which he announced to me the consignment for transmission on the same date, have not yet reached me. I regret being deprived by this delay of the information transmitted to me by you on your part at this moment. However, my last despatches will have sufficiently apprised you, without doubt, of the impression necessarily produced on the Emperor's government by the regrettable preliminaries of La Soledad, to allow me to dispense myself from examining one by one all the clauses of that agreement. It is sufficient to state here, once more, that the negotiations entered into with the Mexican government did not correspond with the views of the allied powers. The annexed copy of the most recent despatches from the Count de Flahault and from M. Barrot will let you see that the cabinets of London and Madrid have not formed a judgment different from that of the Emperor's government in regard to the attitude accepted towards Mexico by the representatives of the three courts. What we demand of Mexico is, above all, I repeat it again, the redress of our grievances, and a government which will give us guarantees for the future. As to the form and *personnel* of this government, we do not pretend to impose any. What it ought or can be depends absolutely on local circumstances, and on the appreciation which may be had of it in Mexico by wise men and lovers of their country.

THOUVENEL.

[Annexed document No. 1.]

The French Ambassador at London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, March 28, 1862.

M. le MINISTRE: Yesterday I communicated to the principal secretary of state of the Queen the contents of the despatch which your excellency did me the honor of addressing to me, together with the report of Admiral Jurien de la Gravière.

I am happy to be able to inform your excellency that Lord Russell shares the opinion expressed by you in regard to the manner in which affairs have been conducted, for a difference of opinion between the governments on the course pursued by their commissioners could only aggravate, to a considerable extent, the inconveniences of the situation. Lord Russell does not hesitate to condemn the language used towards the Mexican government as in complete opposition to the facts which caused the necessity of the treaty of London; he thinks that the commissioners, after having taken possession of the ports, should have confined themselves to making the grievances of their respective courts known to the Mexican government and demanding redress for them, allowing a reasonable time for compliance, at the end of which recourse should be had to coercive measures, if the satisfaction demanded should not be obtained.

The Queen's principal secretary of state does not approve, any more than we do, the clause which permits the Mexican flag to float beside the flags of the three powers, and the engagement entered into by the commissioners to evacuate the posts occupied by our forces, if the negotiations should happen to fail. In brief, Monsieur le Ministre, Lord Russell agrees, on every point, with your excellency's opinion of the conduct adopted by our commissioners, and the state of affairs which that conduct has produced.

FLAHAULT.

[Annexed document No. 2.]

The French Ambassador at Madrid to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MADRID, February 26, 1862.

Monsieur le MINISTRE: M. Calderon Collantes coincides with the opinion expressed by your excellency in regard to the error into which the plenipotentiaries of the three powers have fallen, in opening negotiations with the government of Juarez, of which the only result possible is the loss of precious time, and the facility offered to the Mexican government to organize means of defence. In the first place, said the first secretary of state to me, the plenipotentiaries have acted contrary to the spirit and the tenor of the treaty of London; it had been decided, in fact, that each of the powers should draw up the claims which it had to make against the Mexican government, and that the other two had only to refrain from offering any opinion either on the amount or on the nature of such claims. Now the contrary has happened; the claims of the French plenipotentiary have been rejected by the English plenipotentiary, as being of such a character as not to be admissible by the Mexican government. Thence the resolution adopted by common consent not to send to Mexico the details of the claims, but merely to inform the Mexican government of what it already knows too well, that the powers have claims to make against it. I cannot understand, added M. Calderon Collantes, what idea has inspired this resolution into the plenipotentiaries, nor what purpose they proposed to themselves in adopting it; it is simply a useless step, for it is evident that Juarez will tell the agents sent to him that, before replying to them, his government should know what the claims are which it is sought to enforce against him, and it will then be necessary to draw them up a thing which it would be more simple to do at first. The Spanish government, therefore, censures General Prim for having swerved from the instructions which he received before his departure, and for having participated in an act which is a violation of one of the principal clauses of the treaty of London. However, this censure has been mitigated for the reason that General Prim acted in concert with his colleagues, with whom he had been recommended to keep always on terms of accord.

The first secretary of state entertains the same opinion that we do in regard to the demand made on the Mexican government for a healthy location where the allied troops might await the end of the negotiations. Three great powers have not combined and sent considerable forces to the shores of Mexico merely to open illusory negotiations with a government which has already given so many proofs of bad faith. The purpose of that display of military force was to compel the Mexican government, by prompt and energetic action, to give immediate and complete satisfaction for the grievances of which it has rendered itself guilty towards foreigners resident within its territory, and to prevent the repetition of them in future. Now, to attain this result, the plenipotentiaries were authorized to make all such arrangements as appeared suitable to them, and there was no reason to ask a government, which ought to be treated, and was, in fact, treated as an enemy, the very useless permission to establish themselves on such or such a point of its territory.

Negotiations being once opened with Juarez, was not the latter entitled to discuss the demands addressed to him? Suppose, said the first secretary of state, that he accepts them, and announces himself ready to give the powers all the securities which they shall be

pleased to demand for the future; shall the three powers rest contented with these promises already so often made and so often violated? Is it not evident, moreover, that if Juarez acted in good faith, it would be physically impossible for him to keep the engagements which he might make? It is known, in fact, that he wished to effect a loan of six millions of dollars from the government of the United States, in order to satisfy the claims of the powers, and that, as a guarantee for this loan, he would deliver to the government of the Union the province of Sonora and other parts of the Mexican territory; now these six millions of dollars scarcely cover one-twelfth of the claims which he will have to satisfy. Will the three powers accept this state of affairs and dissolve their alliance, satisfied with having obtained what probably would not have been refused to them on an energetic note from the representative of any one of them? An enterprise such as this, which has taken the combined forces of France, Spain, and England to Mexico, is not renewed twice. We must act in such a manner as to obtain all the results which we have in view. A grave fault has been committed; we must redouble our energy and activity and essay to regain lost time. To this effect has the Spanish government already written to the Count of Reus.

In the same conversation, abandoning the positive part of the consequential results of the treaty of London, M. Calderon Collantes expatiated on the eventualities of the future. He spoke to me of the necessity in which the powers find themselves placed of substituting for the government of Juarez a stable government which may give to Mexico that prosperity of which nature has lavished all the elements on that privileged land, and which may afford security for the lives and property of foreigners. Will this be effected by treating with the government of Juarez? Shall we also submit to him the question of a change of government? One of two things will be the consequence, (I here continue to be the interpreter of the words of the first secretary of state,) either Juarez will say: My government is solidly established; it is the only government now possible in Mexico; the only one which can give the powers the guarantees which they demand. He has been authorized to hold this language, and we would be inconsistent with ourselves if, after having solemnly opened negotiations with his government, we were to say to him: Your government is bad; withdraw; Mexico will choose another, and we will assist her in so doing. Or, perhaps, Juarez—which is quite improbable—will accept this proposal; he will consent ostensibly to lay down his power and to consult the country. But will not this apparent abnegation give him a moral power which he does not now possess? Evidently we would deprive him momentarily of power only to see that power fall back into his hands under circumstances infinitely more favorable to him than now. Some may reply to this, that Juarez ceasing to be President of the republic, the party of order, that is to say, the great majority of the Mexican people, will bestir themselves to choose either another form of government or another man. Do not believe it. That might have happened if, on landing on the coasts of Mexico, the powers had distinctly declared that they would not treat with Juarez, and appealed to the Mexican nation to choose immediately a government with which the dignity of the allied powers would permit them to negotiate; but from the moment we openly recognized the government of Juarez by negotiating with it, we have by that alone discouraged the sane part of the people; we have repressed their aspirations for a better rule of things, and it is to be feared that it will be very difficult now to revive the hopes which were based only on the certainty of the moral and material co-operation of the three powers in case of necessity.

The situation of affairs has, therefore, become more difficult than it was at the moment that the allied troops appeared on the coasts of Mexico. We must not, however, despair of the result; we must, on the contrary, profit by the experience we have acquired. Cost what it may, France, Spain, and England cannot abandon an enterprise for which they have united their forces; they must effect in Mexico what they have proposed to themselves to effect. Spain, as far as she is concerned, is quite decided on this point.

BARROT.

[Annexed document No. 3.]

The French Ambassador at Madrid to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MADRID, March 23, 1862.

Monsieur le MINISTRE: I inform your excellency, by a telegraphic despatch, of the result of the interviews which I had yesterday with the first secretary of state, and this morning with Marshal O'Donnell.

The Queen's government has been painfully impressed on receiving intelligence of the arrangement concluded at La Soledad between General Prim and General Doblado. The

marshal desired to give me a great mark of confidence by reading to me, from beginning to end, the despatch addressed by the Queen's government yesterday evening to the Count de Reus on this subject. In this despatch, the polished form of which conceals not the very pointed censure therein contained, the Queen's government expresses to the commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces in Mexico its disapproval of several of the clauses of the arrangement in question.

Thus it blames the plenipotentiaries for having given to the government of Juarez a moral force which it wanted before, by declaring in article 1 of the arrangement that that government appeared to them to present conditions of force and stability, and that they were ready to treat with it. If circumstances demanded it, said Marshal O'Donnell, they might certainly have opened negotiations with the government of Juarez, but it was not at all necessary to give it in any way a certificate of vitality; by doing so they had compromised the attitude of the allied powers towards the other parties opposed to that of Juarez.

The Queen's government is not, any more than in the former case, satisfied with the clause relative to the withdrawal of the allied troops, in case the negotiations which were about to be opened, should not reach an amicable solution. However, it accepts, to a certain extent, the explanations given in this respect by the Count de Reus.

Marshal O'Donnell likewise censures the abandonment, in the case of the failure to which I have referred, of the hospitals which might be established by the allies in the encampments which they are going to occupy, in spite of the engagement entered into by the Mexican government to respect them, and the certitude which that government should entertain that every infraction of that engagement would be sternly punished by the forces of the allied powers.

Censure most distinct and unqualified has been pronounced by the Queen's government on the clause which imposes on France, Spain, and England the duty of flying the Mexican flag beside their own at Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa.

In brief, Monsieur le Ministre, I repeat it, the government of Queen Isabella censures the arrangement of La Soledad, as that of his Majesty does, and the marshal has very decidedly expressed his opinion in this respect by saying to me that, if he had been in the place of the Count de Reus, he would not have signed it.

The Spanish government, moreover, attributes the faults which have been committed in the later stages of the proceedings to the misunderstanding which in the very beginning arose between the plenipotentiaries of France and England. General Prim had to interpose between them, and, being unable to succeed in conciliating them, he was drawn to give his sanction to the delay granted in the despatching of an ultimatum to the government of Juarez. Thence came the negotiations disapproved by the Spanish government, those negotiations entered into with the actual government of Mexico, and which resulted unfortunately in the conclusion of the arrangement of La Soledad, which the Queen's government likewise censures. It is settled, therefore, for this last, that the plenipotentiaries of the allied powers have departed from the instructions which they received from their respective governments, and that they have acted contrary to the spirit of the treaty of the 31st of October. But now that the evil is done, said Marshal O'Donnell, we must plan how to repair it.

M. Calderon Collantes has sent me, as the expression of his opinion in regard to the actual state of our affairs in Mexico, the memorandum of which I enclose a copy to your excellency.

BARROT.

[Annexed document.]

MADRID, March 23, 1862.

The Queen's government thinks that the complications and difficulties which have arisen in Mexico spring from the fact that the claims of the three powers were not drawn up in the very beginning, of which circumstance the Spanish plenipotentiary has not been the cause; that the first clause of the preliminaries, which gives the government of Juarez a moral force which it did not possess before, might well have been omitted; that the fourth clause is explained by reasons of a military point of honor, and that the Mexicans, recognizing the extreme generosity with which they have been treated, should have themselves renounced its benefits.

Among the conditions laid down by the conferences of Orizaba, the last among them is that which seems least justifiable. However, the Queen's government, while addressing to General Prim, Count de Reus, such observations as are proper to this subject, as well as in reference to the spirit of conciliation with which all the plenipotentiaries were in-

spired, formally directs him to act with the greatest promptitude and energy, and to abandon every kind of temporizing policy if the result of the conferences has not been completely satisfactory.

The next courier will inform us of that result, and until then any decisive resolution would be premature or hazardous

M. Calderon Collantes, First Secretary of State, to the Plenipotentiary Commanding-in-Chief the Spanish Expeditionary Corps in Mexico.

[Extract.]

MADRID, March 22, 1862.

The Queen's government allows their just value to the considerations set forth by your excellency to demonstrate the necessity of all that was done previous to the 20th of February last, and of the preliminaries agreed upon with the minister of foreign affairs of Juarez; but it believes that some of them will give occasion, in Mexico itself, to interpretations of such a nature as to foment a more obstinate resistance than would have been offered if the claims had been presented immediately.

In examining the preliminaries attentively, it is seen that in virtue of the first clause the government of Don Benito Juarez acquires a moral force which it did not possess, provided that, in giving credit to its declaration that it possesses all the elements of force and of opinion necessary to maintain itself, we enter immediately on the business of treaties and negotiations. This could have been done whilst omitting the declaration, and such a course would not have produced the inconveniences presented at the very first sight.

The fourth clause has excited the most lively disapprobation on the part of the imperial government, and her Majesty's government would not approve of it without the reflections which your excellency offers to justify it, which reflections have their influence upon the government. Really that cannot be kept by force which has been obtained by treaty. The valor and justice of the allied forces, and the honor of the chiefs who command them, would recoil from such an idea; but the Mexican government should have abandoned to their generous decision the adoption of the proper course, in case the negotiations should eventuate without result, or, to speak more properly, in case the claims of the three friendly governments should fail to be accepted.

Such a manifestation of good will would not have been very great when we consider that the Mexican government had then received from the allies so many proofs of moderation and generosity. Moreover, it would be very much to be regretted that, in case the troops should have to retire, the hospitals should remain in the power of the enemy, even though they had taken a solemn engagement to respect them, and even though they possessed the means of punishing any act committed against them.

The last clause or condition of the preliminaries is that of which the application is most difficult. The city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa have been occupied by the Spanish troops in the name of the three nations, not only as a base and starting point of operations, but also in the quality of a pledge and guarantee to compel the Mexican government to satisfy the claims which we have drawn up against it.

Inasmuch as this may not take place—inasmuch as all idea or all danger of a rupture may not have disappeared, Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa, abandoned by the Mexican troops, have no other authority or power to rule over them than the authority and power of the three allied nations.

The Queen's government, being assured that when this despatch shall reach you the negotiations opened will have reached a termination, and wishing to avoid giving occasion for the slightest want of concert and harmony in the resolutions of the three governments, has resolved (notwithstanding the brevity of the time past since the arrival of the courier yesterday, till the moment of the departure of the present) that I should instruct your excellency as follows:

Your excellency, acquainting yourself well with the spirit of the instructions which I have heretofore communicated to you, and with the sense of the present royal order, should proceed with the greatest promptitude and energy, and in accord with the plenipotentiaries and the commanders of the troops of the other two nations, in case the conferences of Orizaba do not have an entirely satisfactory result.

Your excellency justly recognizes that all imaginable means of conciliation having been exhausted, the necessity for hostilities, whatever may be their consequences, will be demonstrated before the world and in presence even of the Mexican people, who will not be able to preserve their confidence and their reliance, supposing that these qualities be actually

banished from it in a government which has not listened to the voice of justice after having previously eschewed the sentiments which direct the actions of all civilized governments.

In this extreme case your excellency can, doubtless, count on the active co-operation of all honorable men, and the three allied nations will obtain not only the requisite satisfaction for their numerous grievances, but also the satisfaction of having contributed, by the presence of their troops and without the commission of any outrage, to favor the independence of the Mexican people, and to give them a government which may put an end to their continual sufferings by protecting equally the rights of native Mexicans and the interests of foreigners.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Madrid.

PARIS, April 1, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of the report under date of March 23, in which you render me an account of the recent interview which you have had with M. Calderon Collantes and with Marshal O'Donnell in regard to the affairs of Mexico.

If we could possibly have still retained the least doubt in our minds as to the conformity of views which exists between the Emperor's government and that of her Catholic Majesty, it would be completely dissipated by the declarations and assurances, equally clear and formal, which you have received from the first secretary of state and the president of the Council.

The government of her Britannic Majesty, on its part, has likewise come over to our way of thinking in regard to the course of conduct pursued by our plenipotentiaries and the preliminary articles signed at La Soledad. We are, therefore, authorized to think that the respective plenipotentiaries, now perfectly enlightened on the identical views and intentions of the three cabinets, will strive, henceforward, to establish among themselves a unanimity of action conformable to the intentions of their governments, and thus to give to their action that unity which will be for them the surest element of strength and success.

At the distance at which we are from the scene of events we could not pretend to transmit to our agents directions sufficiently prompt and precise to modify the consequences of the first acts in which they have taken part. We must hope, however, that they will have understood of themselves that, if they do not obtain from the Mexican government such engagements and guarantees as are proper to give entire satisfaction for all our grievances, they ought immediately to have recourse to the military measures dictated by circumstances.

THOUVENEL.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Minister in Mexico.

PARIS, April 12, 1862.

SIR: I wrote to you by the last courier that the cabinets of Madrid and London had not judged otherwise than the Emperor's government of the attitude assumed towards Mexico by the representatives of the three courts. Marshal O'Donnell, in a new conversation which he has had with his Majesty's ambassador at Madrid, has taken the trouble to explain the circumstances which should, according to him, have influenced the conduct of General Prim; but he has expressed the confidence that a perfect understanding cannot fail to be established between the Marquis de Castillejos and General de Lorencez, and he has reiterated the assurance that the commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces had orders to reject, forthwith, all dilatory measures and to march without hesitation towards the end which the allied powers have proposed to themselves. The cabinet of Madrid, it is true, posterior to that despatch, has caused its desire to be expressed to me that the plenipotentiaries of the three courts should meet in order to agree in advance on the subject of the different questions which might arise from the negotiations opened at Orizaba. I have replied that I did not think that there was any practical utility in reassembling a conference which could only deliberate from afar on eventualities more or less hypothetical; that I believed, therefore, that it was better to await the development of the situation without seeking to anticipate events. Either the negotiations will be broken off in reality, and there will remain no other course than to follow up the expedition energetically, or they will terminate in a treaty, and to appreciate it we must, necessarily, know the text of it. For the rest, I have every reason to believe that the Spanish government has already understood the value of these observations, and that it is not disposed to insist on its proposition.

The language employed to the Count de Flahault by Lord Russell authorized me to say to you heretofore, as I have done, that the English government at that time shared in our opinion in regard to the course of conduct pursued in the last negotiations with the Mexican government. But it appears from the communication to me by Lord Cowley of a despatch from the British principal secretary of state, that, though at first the cabinet judged as severely, indeed, as we did the treaty of La Soledad, the explanations since furnished by Sir Charles Wyke have modified that first impression. Lord Russell, however, does not approve of all the details of that arrangement, and especially of that one which provides for the appearance of the Mexican flag at Vera Cruz; but he appears satisfied that the grievances, for which it is proposed to obtain reparation, should become the object of negotiations, and he expresses the hope that, having entered on this course, we will attain a result such as to satisfy the powers that signed the treaty of London. I have confined myself to telling Lord Cowley, in reply to the communication which I received from him, that we could not regard matters from the same point of view, and that from the moment that the English troops should no longer find themselves engaged with ours in the interior of Mexico, the Emperor's government remained the sole judge of the exigencies that behooved, under actual circumstances, the care of its military dignity.

THOUVENEL.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Madrid.

PARIS, April 15, 1862.

SIR: After the views, so very decisive, expressed to you by the ministers of her Catholic Majesty in regard to the preliminary treaty of La Soledad, and the line of conduct pursued by the respective plenipotentiaries, and especially by General Prim, we should have thought that the cabinet of Madrid entirely shared our views on this point. Our surprise, therefore, has been no less than yours in finding in the explanations given to the Cortes by M. Calderon Collantes, in reference to the affairs of Mexico, an unreserved approval of the course pursued by General Prim and of the preliminaries of La Soledad.

However it be, sir, the Emperor's government will abstain from insisting on the regrettable phase of this incident; it prefers to hope that it will have no influence on the further conduct of the affair, and that the request lately sent to the commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces, to act with vigor in conformity with his instructions, will have the effect of impressing, henceforward, on the efforts of the respective plenipotentiaries and of the commanders-in-chief that unity of direction and of action dictated by the community of those interests which have called us to Mexico.

THOUVENEL.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Minister in Mexico.

PARIS, May 31, 1862.

SIR: We know now, in all its details, the rupture which has definitely taken place between the plenipotentiaries of the three powers.

I need not tell you that the Emperor's government very much regrets that this has occurred; but I think we may hope that, beyond the divergence of views which it unfortunately manifests in regard to the affairs of Mexico, it will not produce any more general political complications.

The respective governments have now approved of the conduct of their representatives. It behooves us, then, to let things take their course. The cabinet of London, as I have already told you, retains all confidence in our intentions, and that of Madrid declares that it heartily wishes our success. As far as we are concerned, I have to approve especially the terms of the proclamation which, in concert with Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, you addressed to the Mexican people on the 6th of August. It is this stand which you have taken that it behooves you to maintain. Our sentiments in regard to the internal condition of Mexico, our desire to see the country reconstituted under new conditions of order and stability, cannot be modified or enfeebled. But if it should issue transformed from the actual crisis, it is not from the French camp that the movement for its regeneration should originate; it is from the country itself, which, thanks to our presence, should resume confidence in itself and in the moral support which it should certainly have to expect from all governments, on the day when, reorganizing itself more honorably and

more regularly, it would offer them all the guarantees which the combined expedition had for its object to demand. You will give your attention, I have no doubt, to observe strictly that course of conduct which has been already traced out for you by my previous instructions, and which I recall here only because we have now a much better opportunity from this circumstance that henceforward we pursue alone the end towards which we had hoped at first to proceed in concert with England and Spain.

THOUVENEL.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Madrid.

PARIS, June 10, 1862.

SIR: In shielding the responsibility of the Count De Reus by the official approbation which it has given to his conduct, the cabinet of Madrid obliges us to enter into new explanations with it, and to relieve from all ambiguity the ideas which direct our policy in the affairs of Mexico. Moreover, I cannot leave unanswered the despatch of the first secretary of state of her Catholic Majesty, of the date of the 21st of last month, of which the chargé d'affaires of Spain has permitted me a copy. In that despatch M. Calderon Collantes develops the motives which inspired the resolutions of General Prim, and he considers them fully justified by a private letter from Admiral Jurien de la Gravière to the Count De Reus, in which the latter thought he saw an insult to the dignity of his country. I regret the importance given to this document, which, in its confidential and intimate form, did not, perhaps, call for an official discussion, by an interpretation which its author would certainly have hastened to disavow if he could have foreseen it. Even though, in the freedom of private correspondence, some expressions had inexactly rendered the ideas of Admiral Jurien, his well known sympathies for our allies, his personal relations with the Count De Reus ought, it seems to me, have removed from him all suspicion of any intention to offend. General Prim seemed, for the rest, to have thought of it in the same way at first, and his reply, full of cordiality and of that affectionate brotherhood that honors the military career, scarcely permits the supposition that, at the receipt of his colleague's letter, he felt himself attacked for a moment in his dignity, still less in that of his country. As to the Emperor's government, I have not assuredly to defend it, the cabinet of Madrid knowing too well the sentiments which animate it in regard to Spain, and of which you have so often been the interpreter, to require me to renew the assurance of them. I might refuse even to admit that any doubt had arisen in this respect in the minds of the Queen's ministers, if it were possible to discover in the facts anterior to the correspondence which now occupies us the determining cause of the actual resolutions of the Spanish government. Having sometimes differed in our opinions on secondary points, the two governments have always found themselves of accord on essential questions arising from their co-operation, in the course to be pursued as well as in the end to be attained. So we should suppose that the cabinet of Madrid would be no less surprised than ourselves to learn that its plenipotentiary, on a divergence of conduct with his colleagues of France, abandoned the enterprise and, on his own responsibility, took a determination which the ministers of her Catholic Majesty have assured you never entered into their provisions.

I shall not trouble myself, sir, to recall the origin and the object of the treaty of London. France and England had not yet decided to have recourse to coercive measures against a government which ignored all its details, from which Spain, anticipating our agreement, had already prepared to claim, with arms in hand, the execution, ever refused, of the treaty signed by M. Mon and General Almonte, and the reparation which was due to her for the insult offered to her representative, M. Pacheco. The conformity of interests and of circumstances quickly produced the understanding which was established at London between the three courts. Having to pursue the redress of their similar grievances, they wished to obtain their satisfactions and their guarantees in common. Resolved at the very beginning, and by force, if necessary, to seize a material pledge to answer them for the reparation of the damages suffered by their countrymen, they contemplated as an eventual result, but a very desirable one, of their operations, the establishment in Mexico of a regular and stable political regime, which should offer them for the future such moral sureties as they had vainly demanded from all the governments which had succeeded each other in that republic. The three powers did not hesitate, then, to recognize that the government of Juarez offered them neither at present nor in future any of those guarantees which they sought. Thus, they were unanimous in disapproving the first steps of their representatives in Mexico, which appeared to them impressed with indecision and petty arrangements which the situation did not warrant. The cabinet of Madrid was no less eager to regret an attitude which, by raising up the authority of the gov-

ernment of Mexico, could not but encourage its resistance, and contrasted, above all, with the ardor of which Spain had given proof in preceding her allies to Mexico, and which seemed to indicate on her part the will to do herself justice rather than to negotiate. All the incidents that have occurred since have given occasion to explanations between us and the cabinet of Madrid too complete to authorize me to return to the subject, unless it be to state once more the conformity of the judgments which we formed of them. From the confidential exchange of our ideas, from the assurances which you have received, I should have concluded the identity of our views and of the directions transmitted to our agents. Thus it is that we have been able to believe ourselves authorized to suppose that if our plenipotentiaries, enlightened by the facts which were disclosed before their eyes and relieved from the much-to-be-regretted engagements of La Soledad by the new excesses of the Mexican government, would impress on their action a more decisive appearance, the Spanish government would think, like us, that, far from authorizing the abandonment of the policy of the treaty of London, this new attitude would, on the contrary, indicate a desire to return to that policy in order to effect its final triumph. We would, necessarily, have been confirmed in this idea and in our opinion with regard to the liberty of action restored to us by the acts of the Mexican government, in reading the reply of General Prim to the letter of Admiral Jurien de la Gravière. The Count of Reus wrote on the 21st of March to the following effect: "Can we permit, while we remain quiet in our camps, that the government should continue its vexatious proceedings against our countrymen throughout the entire republic, in exacting from them the payment of the contribution of 2½ per cent. on their capitals, as is done, M. Doblado pretending that he has the right to do so? Can we permit M. Doblado to threaten us with the re-establishment of the decree preventing commercial intercourse between the custom-house of Vera Cruz and the interior of the country, in case that custom-house should not be delivered up to him? Can we permit that a forced loan of 500,000 piastres should be exacted of six houses in Mexico, of which three are Spanish, taxed at 100,000 piastres each? These are the reasons why Sir Charles Wyke and myself have assumed a more energetic attitude than that which we held when we separated. Annexed is the last letter of M. Doblado; judge, in your generous pride, whether such a cool, curt style of speech suits us. You will find, then, in the letter of M. Doblado, and in my explanations, the real cause of our warlike humor; you need seek for no other, for no other exists."

Our plenipotentiaries shared the impressions of General Prim and of Sir Charles Wyke. Freed from their engagements by the act of the Mexican government, they were impatient to emerge from a situation which suited them no more than it did the Count of Reus. But I am at a loss to understand the reproach here addressed by M. Calderon Collantes to Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, of having wished to render the direct and personal interests which had led the allies to Mexico subordinate to the preliminary establishment of a monarchy in that country. The views of the Emperor's government, in this regard, have been too often explained to the cabinet of Madrid to presume the possibility of their having been mistaken; and as to our plenipotentiaries, it suffices to read the proclamation which they addressed to the Mexican people, when, in consequence of the retirement of our allies, they had no longer to regard anything but the sentiment of their government, in order to be convinced that they strictly conformed their words and their acts to that sentiment, in disavowing all intention of imposing by force a form of government rejected by the voice of the nation.

The first secretary of state insists very much on some phrases in which Admiral Jurien de la Gravière might seem to evince a regret of the too exclusively Spanish character which the expedition might have had in the beginning, according to him, when he intimated that in future the augmentation of our effective force would assure the independence of our policy, if circumstances imposed that necessity upon us. It is evident that, as long as the accord remained complete between the allies, the expedition should have a collective character; and our plenipotentiary merely stated a fact when he recalled to mind, in a confidential communication addressed to his colleague, that the arrival of the Spanish troops before the others, their numerical superiority, the conspicuous character even of their chief, had, in that phase of the combined operations, assigned a preponderating part to Spain. Admiral Jurien did not seek by any means to complain of this. In estimating the influence exerted in the common work up to that time by the particular action of each of the combined forces, he did not overstep, it seems to me, the limits of honest discussion, and the opinion which he expressed on this point was not calculated to surprise the Count of Reus, whilst a journal printed under his eyes lost no opportunity to represent him as the soul and complete impersonation of the expedition. Did he not himself write, on the 27th of February, to the first secretary of state of her Catholic Majesty, that, "in his opinion, the Spanish element ought to predominate, as well on account of the particular situation of Spain, in regard to Mexico, as of the initiative taken by his government in this important enterprise?" Admiral Jurien, in fine, confined himself to indicating that, in certain event-

ualities, independent action would become the right of each one, and that, if the time came when it would be necessary to renounce the idea of obtaining by collective efforts the results which they had promised themselves, he would remain free to pursue his task as he understood it, and to attend alone to the dignity and the interests of his country. It is under this anticipation, unfortunately realized, that our plenipotentiary undertook to say that the expedition would become French.

As to the particular facts which have occasioned the rupture, I wish to speak of the protection granted to General Almonte. I might, if needs be, find the justification of the conduct of our agents in the reflections, so full of wisdom and of foresight, which the expulsion of General Miramon inspired into the first secretary of state of her Catholic Majesty. After having recommended to the Count of Reus to use all his influence in order to prevent the repetition of an act of that nature, M. Calderon Collantes wrote to him, on the 7th of March—

"It might be feared that the good understanding now existing between the plenipotentiaries and the commanders of the forces of the three allied powers would be disturbed, if any one of these powers regarded itself as authorized to dictate against any Mexican such measures as that resorted to in regard to Ex-President Miramon. It would be equivalent to exercising a species of sovereignty, which, by placing itself in opposition to that of the others, might give occasion to dangerous debates, and, perhaps, even to acts of violence difficult to be justified. The representative of her Catholic Majesty has the important mission of protecting all persons without distinction, and of preventing any act that may appear dictated by passion or violence."

Finally, in his despatch of the 21st of May, M. Calderon Collantes refers to the proposition which he made, when the first differences broke out, to open a conference in order to establish between the three governments a new understanding, embracing at once accomplished facts and such eventualities as might possibly arise. The Emperor's government appreciates the sentiments which dictated that proposition, and it would have been happy to accept it if it could have hoped from it the good effects promised to itself by the cabinet of Madrid. But we had to observe that, at the distance at which we were from the scene of events, such a new understanding could exert no influence on their course; and it is enough, in fact, to compare dates, in order to convince ourselves that identical instructions, the most categorical from the three governments, could not have prevented the rupture consummated at Orizaba by their plenipotentiaries, nor rendered measures instantaneously accomplished.

I hasten, sir, to withdraw from a discussion henceforward without purpose and into which I have entered only with regret. Each government pronounces in full sovereignty on all the questions in which its dignity and its interests have been engaged. It is not our part to inquire into the motives which may determine the cabinet of Madrid to adopt now towards the government of Mexico a policy of conciliation and negotiation in which we cannot participate. We must state only, as far as we are concerned, that at the time when our plenipotentiaries separated from their colleagues of Orizaba, on the 9th of April, no insult had been avenged, no injury repaired. The object of the treaty of London had not therefore been attained, and it could not suit us to accept the results, thus far negative or illusory, of the expedition which we had sent to Mexico. We regret to have to accomplish alone a duty of which we would have been happy and proud to share the dangers with the glorious army of Spain. We will endeavor to prove equal to the effort; we will strive to obtain the reparation which is due to us; we will exact serious and lasting guarantees for the future. If, in the accomplishment of this task, which is that especially which we have imposed on ourselves, we can be of any assistance to the efforts which may be made by the country itself to emerge from the anarchy which devours it and to reconstitute itself on new and solid bases, we will not refuse our moral support to such manifestations as may appear to us to merit our sympathies. In acting thus, we confidently entertain the idea that we are serving the cause of civilization and of our own interests, which we do not separate, in those distant regions, from those of our allies who have signed the treaty of London with us.

You are authorized, sir, to read this despatch to the first secretary of state of her Catholic Majesty, and to leave with him a copy of it.

THOUVENEL.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Minister in Mexico.

PARIS, July 8, 1862.

SIR: The Emperor has resolved on sending considerable re-enforcements to Mexico, and his Majesty has confided the command in chief of his troops to General Forey. The

re-enforcements will not delay to join the expeditionary corps, but General Forey will precede them to Mexico, his departure being to take place in a few days. His Majesty has decided that this general officer should combine in his own hands all the powers previously conferred on Admiral Juien de la Gravière, and that consequently he should be simultaneously invested with the powers of plenipotentiary and of commander-in-chief of our expedition.

THOUVENEL.

The Emperor to General Forey.

FONTAINEBLEAU, July 3, 1862.

MY DEAR GENERAL: At the moment when you are about to start for Mexico, charged with political and military powers, I think it useful to make you acquainted with my ideas.

The line of conduct you will have to follow is: 1. To publish on your arrival a proclamation, the principal points of which will be indicated to you. 2. To receive with the greatest kindness all the Mexicans who shall present themselves. 3. Not to espouse the quarrel of any party; to declare that everything is provisional so long as the Mexican nation shall not have expressed its opinion; to show great deference for religion, but at the same time to tranquilize the holders of national property. 4. To feed, pay, and arm, according to your means, the Mexican auxiliary troops, and make them play principal parts in the combats. 5. To maintain among your own troops, as well as among the auxiliaries, the most severe discipline; to vigorously repress any act or word insulting to the Mexicans, for the pride of their character must not be forgotten, and it is important for the success of the enterprise to conciliate the good feelings of the people.

When you shall have reached the city of Mexico, it is to be desired that the principal persons of all political shades who shall have embraced our cause should come to an understanding with you to organize a provisional government. The government will submit to the Mexican people the question of the political *regime* which is to be definitively established. An assembly will be afterwards elected, according to the Mexican laws.

You will aid the new government to introduce into the administration, and particularly into the finances, that regularity of which France offers the best model. For that purpose, capable men will be sent to second its new organization.

The object to be attained is not to impose on the Mexicans a form of government which would be obnoxious, but to assist them in their efforts to establish, according to their own wishes, a government which may have a chance of stability, and can secure to France the settlement of the injuries of which she has to complain.

It follows, as a matter of course, that if the Mexicans prefer a monarchy, it is for the interest of France to support them in that path.

There will not be wanting people who will ask you why we expend men and money to found a regular government in Mexico.

In the present state of the civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is not a matter of indifference to Europe, for it is that country which feeds our manufactories and gives an impulse to our commerce. We have an interest in the republic of the United States being powerful and prosperous, but not that she should take possession of the whole of the Gulf of Mexico, thence command the Antilles as well as South America, and be the only dispenser of the products of the New World.

We now see, by sad experience, how precarious is the lot of a branch of manufacture which is compelled to procure its raw material in a single market, all the vicissitudes of which it has to bear.

If, on the contrary, Mexico maintains her independence and the integrity of her territory, if a stable government be there constituted with the assistance of France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side the Atlantic all its strength and its prestige; we shall have guaranteed security to our West India colonies and to those of Spain; we shall have established our friendly influence in the centre of America; and that influence, by creating immense markets for our commerce, will procure us the raw materials indispensable for our manufactures.

Mexico thus regenerated will always be well-disposed towards us, not only out of gratitude, but also because her interests will be in accord with ours, and because she will find support in her friendly relations with European powers.

At present, therefore, our military honor engaged, the necessities of our policy, the interests of our industry and commerce, all conspire to make it our duty to march on Mexico, to boldly plant our flag there, and to establish either a monarchy, if not incompatible with the national feeling, or at least a government which may promise some stability.

NAPOLÉON.

The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

ORIZABA, June 23, 1862.

Monsieur le MINISTRE: I have received a copy of a protest signed by the French of the city of Mexico against the inflammatory attacks and the calumnious accusations of which the policy of the Emperor has been the object on the part of some persons who give themselves out as the interpreters of the French colony. This protest has already been signed by more than three hundred Frenchmen, among whom figure all that are in any way respectable among our colony in the capital. I am informed of two or three hundred other adhesions which it was impossible to collect for want of time. I hasten to send this document to your excellency.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

[Annexed document.]

Protest of the members of the French colony in the city of Mexico.

MEXICO, May, 1862.

The undersigned, in obedience to the necessities of their position in the city of Mexico, and aware that it does not belong to them to take an active part in the questions and events in agitation at the present time, have abstained from protesting publicly against the injuries, the calumnies, and the insensate outrages directed against the French army, against the government of France and its representatives.

But what the undersigned consider as an imperious duty, is to protest loudly against the strange pretensions of certain persons to present themselves as the legitimate organs of the sentiments and ideas of the French population; is, also, to protest energetically against certain publications, signed or not signed, called forth by influences now well known, and destined—so it is asserted in them—to enlighten the government of the mother country in regard to the real interests of the French colony in Mexico.

The undersigned, therefore, declare that they repudiate all sort of sympathy with the ideas expressed in these writings; and inspired by the sentiment of national dignity, as well as by reason and justice, they await, full of hope and confidence, the accomplishment of the noble mission confided to the honor and loyalty of France.

[Here follow 314 signatures.]

The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

ORIZABA, July 17, 1862.

Monsieur le MINISTRE: I lose no time informing you that M. Dastugnes, one of the most estimable members of the French colony at Mexico, has been recently carried off, at the very gates of the capital, by the notorious Cuellar, long a highway robber, now a colonel in the troops of Juarez, who would have threatened our countryman to shoot him unless he paid a ransom fixed at first at 2,000 piastres, subsequently at 5,000. Here is what has been written to me on this subject:

"I am authorized to bring to your knowledge a new and odious outrage committed on the person of one of our countrymen. M. P. Dastugnes, the French citizen who has been several times robbed already, as well by the liberal as by the reactionary bands, and whose claims appear in the archives of the imperial legation, was seized some eight days ago at some leagues from the city of Mexico and carried off prisoner by Cuellar.

"A sum of 2,000 piastres was first demanded for his liberation, a sum which it is utterly impossible for him to pay; some days afterwards the ransom was raised to 5,000 piastres, a threat to shoot him if the amount stipulated was not remitted within a very short period. His family is ignorant whether these threats have been carried into execution, though there is reason to fear that they have, for these bands a short time ago hung several persons who were unable to pay the wretches.

"It has seemed proper to inform you of this new outrage committed at the gates of Mexico. Although in the present state of things your protection is powerless for us, it is well that you should know that this unfortunate government is powerless to perform the first duty imposed on every government worthy of that name, that of protecting persons and property. And yet it proclaims itself the representative of progress, the defender of guarantees, of liberty, of democracy.