

"Indeed, we feel the blush rise to our cheek at the idea that people allow themselves to be carried away by these senseless words, especially when they are sincerely devoted to the cultivation of liberal ideas. Experience now is precise and positive. What individual is there of the slightest honor and intelligence who does not understand that there is no salvation possible for Mexico except by means of intervention vigorously conducted, which may organize this country, now fallen into dissolution, and rescue it from the miserable condition in which it is now deeply buried? We know that you have thus understood the question, and what efforts you have made and are making to produce a result which may assure at the same time the future of the country and that of your countrymen, not allowing yourself to be moved by the nameless injuries and outrages of which you are the object, and which are for you a source of honor at the very time that they degrade the stupid government which tolerates them, if it does not even excite them. For the rest, I believe I can affirm that these outrages have excited the disgust of the immense majority of the French population, and that they await the moment of being able to manifest the sentiments of gratitude with which they are animated towards you. You have been already enabled to know their sentiments in reading the protest of which you will probably have received a copy, and which is now signed with more than 500 signatures. It is a peremptory reply to the proceedings of some Frenchmen, very limited in number, who would willingly sacrifice to their personal interests the interests and future of the whole French population in Mexico. This population has faith in you, Monsieur le Ministre, and firmly trusts that the French government will accomplish in its entire extent the mission of justice and humanity which it has commenced."

This letter renders any reflections on my part entirely superfluous

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

*The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

ORIZABA, August 20, 1862.

Monsieur le MINISTRE: In spite of the denials and threats resorted to by the government to terrify the French of the capital, new signatures have been added to the protest of our countrymen enclosed to you in my despatch of June 23; a new list which has reached me, and which I have the honor herewith to transmit to you, increases to 450 the number of adhesions received up to the 22d of July.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

*The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

ORIZABA, October 2, 1862.

Monsieur le MINISTRE: I wrote some time ago to your excellency that the government of Juarez, seriously excited by the protest spontaneously signed by the French of the capital, had set its police at work to prevent the circulation of the list and the addition of new signatures. A person who has recently arrived from the city of Mexico advises me of another manœuvre of the administration. For some time past the agents of government have been presenting themselves before our countrymen in order to summon them to declare categorically, and in writing, whether they are for or against the intervention, not leaving them in ignorance of the fact that on this declaration on their part depended the question of knowing whether they should be expelled or not from the territory of the republic. This question of the expulsion of the French is, moreover, the order of the day among the journals of Juarez, as also in the clubs and patriotic juntas organized by the police who proclaim themselves almost unanimously for the affirmative.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

*The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

ORIZABA, October 6, 1862.

I have heretofore informed your excellency that the journals of the government and the patriotic juntas of the city of Mexico loudly demanded that all the French who did not publicly declare against the French intervention should be expelled, and that their goods should be confiscated. A sheet established by Juarez to excite the evil passions of the masses, *La Cuchara*, goes still further; it desires to have all our countrymen constrained,

under pain of expulsion, not only to place their fortunes at the disposal of Juarez, but to take up arms to combat, under the command of Mexican officers, the flag of their country. In the fear that certain persons might be tempted to cry out at this as exaggeration, I annex here the article of that journal which proposes the measure as a very simple thing.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

*The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

ORIZABA, October 8, 1862.

The Monitor Republicano of the 3d of October speaks of arrests that have been made in the capital among Mexicans and French. Chief among the former are mentioned the three generals Santiago, Miguel Blanco, and Guitian, as well as several other persons belonging to the first classes of society. As to the French, the number of those thrown into prison by Juarez is, it is said, quite considerable, and comprises some who have been his partisans. Many persons here seem to fear that extreme acts of violence may be resorted to against our unfortunate fellow-countrymen.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

*The French Minister in Mexico to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

ORIZABA, October 11, 1862.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: I hasten to transmit to you such items of information from the city of Mexico as are worthy of credit. In the evening of September 16, the festival day of independence, sixteen houses inhabited by French were assailed with stones by bands of ruffians, shouting cries of "Death to them!" Windows, doors, and fronts of shops were broken, and two Frenchmen were wounded. No measures were taken to prevent these disorders, which, however, might have been easily expected, since previously, on the night of the 15th, such cries had been raised.

We cannot in any way regard these disorders as a manifestation of public opinion. Two bands of two or three hundred individuals at most, composed of children, mob-leaders, and that rabble which it is always so easy to collect in a large city, will never prove the spontaneous and irresistible enthusiasm of a population of two hundred thousand souls. It has required the daily harangues of the newspapers and clubs, the incendiary speeches delivered on the evening of the 15th in the theatres, and on the evening of the 16th at the Alameda, and finally the excitement of the festival, to arrive at this sad result. It has required especially the carelessness or the ill-will of the administration, which, with a garrison, of two or three thousand men and a strong police, could not or would not maintain order, when a hundred men properly employed would have sufficed for the purpose.

What the Mexican government, although not disposed to recoil from any measures, be they as tyrannical or as odious as they may, cannot procure for itself, is the money necessary for the support of troops and the purchase of materials indispensable for the execution of works of defence. The people reduced to the most frightful misery, laboring under the absolute impossibility of paying the forced loans with which they crush them down every day, their property is seized and exposed to sale; but no purchasers present themselves. Then a resolution is adopted to issue about fifteen millions of piasters in paper money having compulsory circulation. The question is asked, What do the representatives of England and the United States intend to do in presence of this measure which so seriously affects the English and the Americans?

The question was always agitated as to whether all our countrymen should be expelled in a body from the territory of the republic. But it has been decided to expel those who were arrested at the commencement of this month. They were to be conveyed to Acapulco, on the Pacific. It is to be feared that, for many among them at least, expulsion under such circumstances may be equivalent to a condemnation to death.

DUBOIS DE SALIGNY.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Madrid.*

PARIS, December 22, 1862.

SIR: I have received the despatches which you have done me the honor to write to me, and I have laid before the Emperor those in which you give me an account of the discussion which took place in the Spanish senate in reference to the affairs in Mexico.

H. Ex. Doc. 11—13

The speech delivered by the minister of state of her Catholic Majesty in that discussion contains, in regard to the events that have occurred in Mexico since the signing of the treaty of London, assertions and conclusions which it will not behoove us, perhaps, to leave unanswered. I might at present confine myself to saying that the explanations furnished by his excellency M. Billault to the legislative body, and since developed in the correspondence of my predecessor, retain all their effect in the eyes of the Emperor's government; and permit me, before replying to the speech of M. Calderon Collantes, to wait until the result of the debates entered upon in the Cortes has indicated the necessity of it to me.

There is one point, however, which appears to me to call forth on my part an immediate explanation; I mean the exchange of ideas which has taken place between the Marquis of Havana and myself in reference to the eventual return of Spain to a community of action with France, and I also refer to the notes exchanged between us, and in which these ideas are expressed. The words uttered by the minister of state in regard to this diplomatic incident have been variously repeated, and, as far as regards the opinion expressed by him on the dispositions of the two cabinets, and on the import of the engagements entered into, there has resulted at least an obscurity which it is our common interest to dispel. The affairs of Mexico have been the occasion of confusion and misunderstanding between us and the Queen's government too frequent not to compel me to be as precise and specific as possible in rendering the terms of the intercommunications in question, and the worth of the assurances which have been the consequences of them. M. Calderon Collantes, moreover, not having deemed it proper to lay before the Cortes the written documents of this negotiation, I believe it my duty to annex them to this despatch, although they be all well known to you already, accompanying them with such explanations as seem proper to be made.

Upon my entrance into the ministry, the Marquis of Havana, inspired with that cordiality of sentiment which he has invariably manifested during the whole course of his mission, came to acquaint me with the desire of his government to re-establish with us, in reference to the affairs of Mexico, the accord unfortunately broken, and to inquire into the conditions of the future co-operation of the two powers. In his opinion the treaty of London was not annulled by the dissension that arose between the parties signing it; it was simply suspended; the end was not obtained. To the exclusion of all particular advantages, each of the three powers was always entitled to seek the satisfaction demanded for the injuries which it had received, the indemnities due for the damages sustained by its citizens, and guarantees for the future. France would certainly accomplish, to her glory, the work of war which henceforward she supported alone; but the assistance of Spain would become necessary to her, or very useful, at least, to pacify that country and conclude a solid peace, from which the interests of none of the powers that signed the treaty of London would have to suffer. If, to obtain these results, the occupation of the capital or of some other points of Mexico was judged indispensable, the Queen's government was ready to come to an understanding with that of the Emperor in order to determine the number of troops to be furnished, and to indicate the way in which they should be employed.

These considerations, developed by the ambassador of Spain, were resumed in a note which he addressed to me in the course of the month of October, and which you will find hereunto annexed, under the designation of No. 1.

I was enabled to dispense with entering on any discussion with the Marquis of Havana in reference to anterior events, to which I had personally remained a stranger, and I have been fortunate enough, under these circumstances, to avoid any recrimination with him in regard to the past. I had found, as I said to him, France alone at war with Mexico. The question of inquiring whether the treaty which had regulated the co-operation of the three powers was yet in force, when two of them had abandoned the enterprise commenced in common, appeared to me to have become a purely theoretic investigation, and without any practical application to the circumstances. We were fully impressed with the importance of the moral and material assistance which Spain would bring in a common work, but accomplished facts had imposed a position upon us which we had accepted, and which was for the moment governed by the interests of our military dignity and honor. We did not, for the rest, contest the right of either Spain or England to follow up their claims; we thought, whilst congratulating ourselves for it, that the expedition with which we found ourselves alone charged would turn to their advantage, and we would be happy, when the proper time arrived, to come to an understanding with our allies, in order to consolidate the results. I committed these explanations to an unofficial note which I transmitted to the Marquis of Havana on the 27th of October, (annexed document, No. 2,) in reply to that which he had addressed to me.

Always anxious to efface any traces which might have been left in our relations with Spain by the dissensions that separated us in Mexico, the Marquis of Havana nevertheless persisted with the most honorable solicitude to devise some means for the renewal of the

good understanding of which his high intelligence of the best interests of his country caused him to appreciate the value. He did not cease to have interviews with me on this subject full of mutual confidence.

The ambassador of Spain thought that it would be desirable that plenipotentiaries should be nominated by Spain and England before the operations of our army were accomplished; moreover, he judged it useful to suspend for the present the mode of procedure for the establishment of a national government in Mexico, and he suggested a system already indicated by his government in 1860. The Marquis of Havana desired to communicate to me a draught of an unofficial note which he had prepared on these bases. I had to decline these new proposals, and if I mention them now, though they did not produce any result, it is because one of the accounts of the part of the speech of M. Calderon Collantes, which refers to those negotiations, would tend to make us suppose that we had actually entered into engagements analogous to those which the Marquis of Havana proposed to us, whilst it is precisely for not having entered into such an engagement that I requested the ambassador of Spain to consider as not sent the note which he had desired to submit to me preliminarily. I had in fact to remind him of the rights which accrued to us from our state of war; we could not admit any control or any restriction in the exercise which we made of those rights. We were carrying on war; peace should result from it; when and how I could not tell him. At the distance at which we were from the scene of events, I could not anticipate them by hypothetical calculations. I could still less bind myself by engagements which accomplished facts in Mexico might, perhaps, have weakened before they were known there. Moreover, there was no question for us about founding and constituting a government, and the proposition even of the Marquis of Havana seemed to me, moreover, to take too little account of the part which it belongs to the Mexicans to act in such a work. We had no need of returning to what we had so often repeated, of our desire to see that country profit by the crisis through which it was passing in order to make its regeneration arise from it, and of our good will to aid it in the efforts which it might make in order to attain that object; but the work of its salvation is above all its own; it is not ours. If our troops enter the city of Mexico in triumph, we know not what influence that event may have on the country; we do not wish to exclude any combination in advance, nor to restrict the use which the Mexican nation may be able to make of its sovereign rights; if the government, whatever it may be, which it may choose to select, offers us sufficient guarantees, our clearest interests will counsel us to labor for its consolidation. Whatever may happen, Mexico will never be for us either a conquest or a colony; our interests there will consequently never be opposed to those of Spain or England. We could, therefore, only receive with eagerness their concurrence, of which we highly appreciate the potent efficacy, in order to consolidate a state of things which might assure us all the guarantees claimed on the same grounds by the interests of all the powers.

I added, finally, that before resuming with our allies of the treaty of London a negotiation destined to regulate a new understanding, it was necessary to be assured of the disposition of the English cabinet, and that I had no indication up to that time to authorize me to judge of it in advance.

The ambassador of Spain was eager to take note of these considerations, and he addressed to me, on the 29th of November, the note hereunto annexed under the designation of No. 3, in which he expressed to me a desire to see the Emperor's government indicate the time and the means which appeared to it most proper to arrive at such an agreement. I hastened to reply to the Marquis of Havana on the 1st of December, (annexed document No. 4.) "That as soon as the present phase of military operations should be terminated, the imperial government would be disposed to invite the two powers that signed with it the treaty of London to send to Mexico plenipotentiaries specially appointed for this purpose (*ad hoc*), who had not been engaged in the previous transactions, in order to advise in concert upon the means of consolidating a state of affairs in Mexico that might insure the prosperity of the country and offer guarantees of security to the interests of foreign nations." I added that the Emperor's government would consider the declarations contained in the present note as final, as soon as the governments of Spain and England had given their adherence to them.

Such, sir, is the last act of that negotiation, the various incidents of which it has appeared useful to me to repeat, before setting forth the conclusion to be derived from them, and in order the better to illustrate their character and value. It is my duty, in conclusion, to say that the ambassador of Spain brought to the negotiation a mind entirely free from prejudice, and a frankness and straightforwardness of purpose to which I am highly pleased to be here able to render homage.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

## [Annexed Document No. 1.]

*Unofficial note transmitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by his Excellency the Marquis of Havana, ambassador of Spain at Paris.*

OCTOBER, 1862.

The government of her Catholic Majesty has declared on several occasions that it did not consider the treaty of London of the date of October 31, 1861, as annulled, but only as suspended; and that, in its opinion, it could be replaced in full force by the agreement of the powers which had signed it.

The purpose of the treaty was to obtain the satisfaction due for the offences committed against the contracting governments, indemnity for the wrongs endured by their subjects, and, as far as possible, some guarantee that similar acts should not be repeated in future.

No one of these results has yet been obtained; the disagreement supervening between the plenipotentiaries and among the chiefs of the expedition arrested their course, just at the very moment when that expedition seemed in the way of attaining the end which the powers had proposed to themselves.

Since then the French government pursues its task alone. Without the slightest doubt, it will triumph over all armed resistance that it may encounter; nevertheless it is to be feared that obstacles of another nature may prevent it from causing the Mexican republic to enter on a solid and stable career, which, by insuring internal order, may externally present a guarantee for the execution of any engagements entered into by its government; for this latter, notwithstanding all the liberty allowed to the country in order to reconstitute itself, might be considered as imposed by France.

The community of action stipulated by the treaty of London would have avoided this grave inconvenience, seeing that the three powers which signed that treaty had engaged themselves, on the one part, to abstain from all intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico calculated to infringe on the rights of the Mexican nation to choose the form of government which suited it, and on the other, not to seek for any territorial acquisitions or special advantages for themselves.

Taking the existence of the treaty of London as a starting point, the contracting powers would have to settle the amount of the claims which they have to exact from the Mexican government, and the guarantees which the latter would have to give to insure the execution of its engagements and to avoid the repetition of former offences. It is evident, moreover, that if the allied governments ought to remain free to decide on the claims which they will judge it their duty to maintain, it would nevertheless be proper not to place Mexico in a state of impossibility to acquit herself of the engagements by which she may have bound herself. Moreover, this would be no more than adhering to the spirit of the treaty of London, which was not signed for the purpose of crushing out Mexican nationality, but rather, on the contrary, to aid it to recover from the state of anarchy in which the country has been so long plunged.

This suffices to explain the ideas of the government of her Catholic Majesty; however, it is not useless to add that if, in order to obtain the results indicated, the temporary occupation of the capital of the republic or of other points of its territory was judged necessary, the Queen's government would find itself ready to enter into a special agreement, having for its end to fix the forces which each power might have to send thither and the posts which they should have to occupy.

Under the influence of these ideas, her Catholic Majesty's government is disposed to take part in any new conferences destined to attain the object which the three powers proposed to themselves by the treaty of the 31st of October last.

The Emperor's government, if it shares in this way of thinking, may impart these ideas to the cabinet of her Britannic Majesty.

## [Annexed Document No. 2.]

*Unofficial Note addressed to the Spanish Ambassador by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

OCTOBER 29, 1862.

The minister of foreign affairs has examined with the most serious attention the unofficial note which the ambassador of Spain has done me the honor of transmitting to me in reference to the affairs of Mexico.

After having reviewed the essential objects which the three powers proposed to themselves to realize, when signing the treaty of October 31, 1861, at London, the note ex-

presses regret that the course of the expedition sent to Mexico should have been arrested in consequence of the disagreement supervening between the plenipotentiaries and the respective commanders at the very moment that the object was about to be attained.

His imperial Majesty's minister cannot but share this regret, but, without desiring to re-enter here on a retrospective discussion which has already been sufficiently elucidated by the correspondence of his predecessor, he will confine himself to expressing, in his turn, the conviction that the Emperor's government has faithfully interpreted the treaty of October 31, and that, if it has thought proper to act alone where it had no more ardent desire than that of operating in concert with its allies, it is because it has not depended upon it to conciliate the divergencies which have been produced, and because it has judged that the honor of its flag and the care of its interests imposed on it the obligation of continuing alone the work on which it has entered.

It appears from the note of his Excellency the Marquis of Havana that the government of her Catholic Majesty would be disposed now to come to an understanding with those of France and England, for the purpose of determining, in special conferences, the measures which it might be opportune to adopt in concert, and the number of troops which each one of the powers should have to furnish in case the temporary occupation of the city of Mexico or of other points in the country should be judged necessary to produce the results indicated by the treaty of 1860.

The Emperor's government appreciates, as becomes it, those suggestions, and his Majesty's minister of foreign affairs is pleased to acknowledge the good intentions which dictated them. Impressed with the importance of the moral and material support of its allies, it cannot, however, lose sight of the state of affairs which accomplished facts have imposed upon it. Very far, moreover, from wishing, even in the most indirect manner, to contest the right of Spain or England to pursue their legitimate claims upon Mexico, it entertains the confidence, on the contrary, that the expedition, of which, by force of circumstances, it now finds itself alone compelled to bear the burden, will turn to the advantage of those two powers at the same time as to its own. It looks with the sincerest wishes for the moment when, the efforts of its arms having obtained the success which it would have been happy to pursue in common with its allies, it will be permitted to resume serious negotiations with Mexico, to insure, with complete satisfaction of pending claims, the security which up to this time has been wanting to the persons and property of foreigners resident in that country, and to accomplish, in fine, in a new understanding with Spain and England, the enterprise commenced in common, and to the success of which their cordial co-operation can so powerfully contribute.

## [Annexed Document No. 3.]

*Unofficial note transmitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Spanish Ambassador.*

NOVEMBER 29, 1862.

In the unofficial note concerning the affairs of Mexico, addressed to the ambassador of her Catholic Majesty, under date of the 29th of October last, by the minister of foreign affairs, his excellency declared that if, by the force of accomplished facts, France has found herself under the necessity of pursuing alone the expedition commenced in common, she did not the less long most ardently for the moment when the efforts of her arms would permit the final accomplishment of the enterprise, under a new understanding, for the success of which enterprise the cordial co-operation of the powers that signed the treaty of London can so powerfully contribute.

In thus expressing himself the minister of foreign affairs gives it to be understood that, in his opinion, it would be difficult to arrive at a new agreement before the French troops entered the capital of the Mexican republic.

Without wishing to dispute the validity of this opinion, her Catholic Majesty's ambassador thinks that it would be desirable to see the Emperor's government now indicate the time and the means which would appear to it the most suitable to come to that agreement.

It is not solely in the interest of the Spanish claims in Mexico that the ambassador of Spain proposes to the Emperor's government to make this declaration; he thinks that its advantages would make themselves more especially felt by the confidence which it would be destined to inspire into the people of the republic, who would recognize, by this act, that the Emperor's government has not ceased to consider as still in force the declaration contained in Article 2 of the treaty of London, in accordance with which the powers signing it should abstain from exercising their influence on the right of the Mexicans to choose and freely constitute the form of their government.

[Annexed Document No. 4.]

*Unofficial note transmitted to the Spanish Ambassador by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

DECEMBER 1, 1862.

His excellency the ambassador of Spain, in a note of the 29th of November last, after having referred to the conciliatory disposition manifested by the minister of foreign affairs of France on the subject of the eventual re-establishment of a mutual understanding in regard to the affairs of Mexico as soon as circumstances will allow it, expresses the desire that the Emperor's government should now indicate the time and the means which would appear to it the most proper to come to this agreement. It is not solely in the interest of the Spanish claims that the Marquis of Havana proposes to make this declaration. According to his excellency, the advantages of it would make themselves more especially felt by the confidence which it would inspire into the Mexican people, who would by this fact recognize that the Emperor's government has not ceased to consider as yet in force the principle laid down in Article 2 of the treaty of London.

In spite of the change which has been produced in the attitude and in the conduct of his allies the Emperor has not modified his first intentions. So the minister of foreign affairs does not hesitate to reply to his excellency the ambassador of her Catholic Majesty, that as soon as the phase of military operations shall be terminated, the imperial government will be disposed to invite the two powers that signed with it the aforesaid treaty to send to Mexico plenipotentiaries named for that especial purpose, (*ad hoc*), and who have not been engaged in any of the previous transactions, to advise in concert on the means of consolidating in Mexico a state of things which may insure the prosperity of the country, and offer guarantees of security to the interests of foreign nations.

As to the agreement on the claims which the three powers ought to exact from Mexico, it is understood that those of Spain and England cannot be any obstacle to the demands which France will have to present in consequence of the war which she has seen herself obliged to maintain.

The Emperor's government will consider the declarations contained in the present note as final as soon as the governments of Spain and England shall have given their adherence to them.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Madrid.*

PARIS, December 23, 1862.

SIR: I have received the despatches which you have done me the honor to address to me; your telegraphic messages of the 19th and 20th of this month have likewise reached me, and I am therefore enabled to form an entirely correct estimate of the consequences and conclusion of the incident originated by the language used by M. Calderon Collantes, before the senate in the session of the 13th. That language was calculated to alter the sense of the explanations that took place between that minister and yourself in reference to various circumstances of the Mexican affair, and especially in regard to the estimate of which the treaty of La Soledad had been the object, and to place in doubt the perfect correctness of the advices which you had transmitted to the government of the Emperor.

The telegraphic despatch which I had the honor of addressing to you on the 18th will have shown you, sir, all the importance that the Emperor's government attached to the fact that the assertions of the first secretary of state of her Catholic Majesty, made in opposition to those which you had set down in your correspondence with my predecessor, should become on your part the object for a demand for immediate reparation. It is, then, with satisfaction that I have learned that you had anticipated in this regard the instructions which I have transmitted to you by order of his Majesty.

The Emperor, to whom I have given an account of your proceedings, has been pleased to approve of them, and, as I have hastened to announce to you by telegraph, his Majesty authorizes you to consider as a sufficient satisfaction the words which M. Calderon Collantes has pronounced before the senate, in the session of the 18th. Those explanations, in fact, under a form more or less obscure, contain an evident retraction of the allegations which had provoked our legitimate susceptibilities, and the notoriety which has not failed to follow the demand for reparation which you addressed to the first secretary of state cannot but contribute to render still more complete the satisfaction which has been given to us. You may, then, consider this affair as ended.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*The French Minister at Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1863.

M. LE MINISTRE: Mr. Seward tells me that I may assure your excellency that I was perfectly right in representing him as having always at heart a desire to avoid giving us any cause of complaint on the Mexican question; that his policy has not ceased to be frank and open, and that in all his correspondence not one word could be found to testify the slightest participation in any combinations directed against the government of the Emperor, or which would excite his susceptibilities.

MERCIER.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Mercier, at Washington.*

PARIS, April 23, 1863.

SIR: I send you a copy of a letter from the minister of the United States at London, which has just been published in the English papers. Written, as you see, to the commander of the federal fleet, it has for its object to request him to allow free passage for arms and munitions of war sent from England to Matamoras by Mexican agents. This document reveals too plainly with what sentiments the representative of the United States is inspired in regard to us in this circumstance to allow me to refrain from explaining myself to Mr. Dayton on the matter. I have done so in friendly but strong terms, and I have deemed it proper, moreover, to embody the observations suggested to me by this strange incident in an unofficial note which I have transmitted to him, and of which you will find a copy enclosed. That such shipments as those in question should not be arrested by the American cruisers is not what we have to complain of, but we have reason to consider ourselves aggrieved at the conduct of Mr. Adams in giving such a preliminary assurance to the consigners, and thus contributing, as far as it depends on him, to the success of unlawful operations directed against us. Perhaps, nevertheless, I would not have bestowed so much attention on this singular document emanating from Mr. Adams if, at the same moment, your correspondence had not made me acquainted with the very different and entirely friendly language used to you by Mr. Seward. It is enough to compare it with the letter written by the minister of the United States at London in order to be struck with the contradiction which exists between the attitude of this latter agent and the disposition with which he ought to show himself animated, in order to correspond with the sentiments of his government.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*The French Minister at Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1863.

M. LE MINISTRE: I received yesterday the despatch which your excellency has done me the honor of addressing me on the subject of the letter written by Mr. Adams to the commanders of the federal cruisers to request them to let freely pass such arms and munitions of war as are sent from England to Matamoras by Mexican agents.

On the same day I waited upon the Secretary of State to inform him of the impression made on the Emperor's government by such a proceeding on the part of the representative of the United States at London.

As he had already received advice of the unofficial note which your excellency had on that occasion placed in the hands of Mr. Dayton, he expected my call. After I had unfolded to him the observations which I had been charged to make to him, and which confirmed those which I had hastened to make to him of my own accord as soon as I had learned through the newspapers of the letter of Mr. Adams, Mr. Seward entered into some explanations tending to exonerate entirely the cabinet of Washington from any responsibility for the affair. I replied to him that, in my correspondence with your excellency I had always made it my duty to render full justice to the honorable and loyal attitude which he had at no time failed to maintain in the Mexican question.

MERCIER.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Mercier, at Washington.*

PARIS, June 4, 1863.

Mr. Dayton has read to me a letter addressed to him by Mr. Seward in reference to that addressed by Mr. Adams to the commanders of the federal cruisers. The Secretary of State explains himself to Mr. Dayton in regard to that circumstance in the same manner that he did to you in your last interview. According to him, what Mr. Adams desired to effect was merely that the federal cruisers should prevent all transportation of arms to the south, without troubling themselves with other transportations of the same nature for a different destination, whatever that destination might be. Mr. Seward, moreover, recognizes that the document emanating from the American minister at London apparently manifests an unkindly disposition, entirely at variance with the sentiments of friendship which we have reason to expect from the cabinet of Washington, and with which it is sincerely animated in our regard. Therefore he does not hesitate to consider the letter of Mr. Adams as an ill-considered proceeding.

In presence of these declarations I had no further cause to insist with Mr. Dayton on what there might be to regret in the conduct of his colleague at London.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Mercier, at Washington.*

PARIS, September 15, 1863.

SIR: Mr. Dayton, who exhibits in his relations with me a great confidence, and a rectitude to which I am pleased to bear testimony, has been moved at certain rumors, propagated with a design which I have not now to inquire into, but which appear lately to have obtained some credit at Paris, and he has come to converse with me about them. According to these reports, too inconsiderately accepted, the Emperor's government has decided to recognize the States of the south, and a treaty has even been already signed, according to which the new confederacy is to cede to France, either for herself, or that she may make a retrocession of them to Mexico, Texas and a portion of Louisiana.

At the moment in which Mr. Dayton was imparting to me this information, I was exactly in a position to offer him information for information, and, before answering the questions which he addressed me, I asked him if, among the alarming symptoms for the maintenance of the good relations of the two countries, he had not, like myself, received other news, likewise diffused in public, such as, for instance, the transmission by him to me of a protest from his government against our expedition to Mexico and its consequences; the conclusion of an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the United States and Russia; the appearance of a federal fleet before Vera Cruz, &c., &c.

In regard to the protest, after remarking to me that I, better than any one else, knew that he had not transmitted to me any, Mr. Dayton said to me that, under the promptings of the general tenor of the correspondence of Mr. Seward, and of the knowledge which he himself had of the inclinations of his fellow-citizens, he had been able to speak to me of the painful impression produced on public opinion in his country by the preponderant intervention of a European power in an American republic, and by the creation of a monarchical establishment in a country adjacent to the United States; but that from that to a protest, or to any intention whatever of comminatory intermeddling, was very far, and that nothing in his instructions authorized him to overleap that distance. He knew nothing, on the other hand, of the alleged alliance of his government with Russia, and he had every reason to disbelieve it. As to the presence of a federal fleet before Vera Cruz, this news did not seem to him even to merit the honor of a contradiction.

I told Mr. Dayton that I had never attached any importance to the reports which I had pointed out to him, and that, in speaking to him of them, my object was much less to call forth explanations on his part, than to warn him against rumors of a different character; but having probably the same origin of which he had spoken to me, I could, however, contradict them categorically. In regard to the recognition of the States of the south, the intentions of the Emperor's government were known to him, and this question was still at the point where our late conversations had left it. We had not, therefore, recognized the south, and, much more, we had not signed with it any treaty for the cession of Louisiana and Texas. With respect to this, I could repeat to him, what I had so often said to him already, that we neither sought for ourselves, nor for others, any acquisition in America. I added that I trusted that the good sense of the people of the United States would do justice to exaggerations and false suppositions, by the aid of which it was endeavored to mislead and sour public opinion; and that I relied on his co-operation in trying to render prevalent a more equitable appreciation of our intentions and of the necessities which our policy obeyed.

I have thought, sir, that it was well that you should be informed of the particulars of this conversation, in order that you might, on your part, communicate it to Mr. Seward, and receive the precise words of it, in order to rectify around you false opinions and unjustifiable anticipations.

Accept, sir, assurances of my high consideration.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

MR. MERCIER,

*Minister of the Emperor at Washington, D. C.*

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to General Bazaine, commander-in-chief of the French forces in Mexico.*

PARIS, August 14, 1863.

GENERAL: The despatches which I receive to-day from Mexico confirm the news which had already reached Europe by means of the telegraph, of the important resolutions voted by the Assembly of Notables, at Mexico, on the 10th of last July. This news could be received only with sincere satisfaction by the government of the Emperor, and we congratulate ourselves on seeing our anticipations justified by the good sense and patriotism of the assembly.

As you know, general, when the necessity of proceeding to obtain redress for accumulated wrongs conducted us to Mexico, the Emperor entertained the idea of the possibility of procuring the regeneration of that country from the very crisis brought upon it by the government of M. Juarez. According to his Majesty's ideas, no pressure should be exercised upon the Mexican nation; it alone should have the right of deciding on the form of its institutions, and in case it should adopt a monarchical constitution, on the choice of the prince who should be called to reign over it. It should only know in advance that our moral support was pledged to all honorable and serious efforts which should be used to rescue the country from anarchy and dissolution. This is what, in conformity with the orders of the Emperor, the generals and all the agents of his Majesty in Mexico have had for their mission to cause to be well understood around them. It is, then, in the plenitude of its rights and in the free exercise of its independence that the Mexican nation founds, at this moment, its new destinies. We already see, in the vote of the Assembly of Notables, a spontaneous manifestation and a most imposing one of its dispositions; but it is important that this vote should be confirmed and ratified as soon as possible by the assent of the people. We likewise applaud the choice of the eminent prince whom the assembly has called to the throne by an acclamation which must, in like manner, receive its definitive approval from the suffrages of the country.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to General Bazaine.*

AUGUST 17, 1863.

GENERAL: At the moment in which you find yourself invested with the plenitude of political and military power, and when, thanks to the heroism of our soldiers and the skill of our chiefs, the elaboration of a new political régime supersedes the clash of arms in Mexico, I deem it useful to retrace once more the ideas with which the Emperor's government is inspired. Those ideas have been most clearly indicated in the letter addressed by his Majesty to General Forey, July 3, 1862, and to this memorable document we must always refer.

I shall not return to enumerate the facts which caused our intervention, or the incidents too well known which have signalized the first phase of it, whilst we were engaged in collective action with other powers. I refer to them merely to recall to mind that, left alone, we have used our independence only to pursue the work which it was not in our power to accomplish in conjunction with the rest, and without deviating from the line which, from the beginning, we had traced out for ourselves and which we had indicated to our allies. In acting thus, we persist in believing that we serve the general interests of Europe.

We have recognized that the legitimacy of our intervention resulted solely from our grievances against the government of that country; we have declared that, whatever rights war conferred on us, we sought neither conquest nor colonial establishment, nor even any political or commercial advantage to the exclusion of other powers. Penetrated, however, with the idea, which several onerous experiences justified, that an expedition, analogous to those of which the traditional proceedings of the Mexican government have so often imposed on us and others the necessity, would assure us only very precarious satis-

faction and no guarantees for the future, we have thought that it would be worthy of us and profitable for all to remind the Mexican people of the iniquities of their government, and to afford them, if they desired to avail themselves of it, the occasion and the means to react against the elements of dissolution accumulated on their soil by a deplorable succession of anarchical powers. We applaud ourselves heartily now for not having despaired of the good sense and patriotism of the Mexican nation. For the rest, we most unequivocally eschew, as you are aware, any intention of substituting our influence in place of the free resolutions of the country; we promise it our moral support to second whatever efforts it may wish to make in its own independence; but it is from its own loins that its regeneration must issue.

We have received with pleasure, as a symptom of favorable augury, the manifestation of the Assembly of Notables of Mexico in favor of the establishment of a monarchy, and the name of the prince called to the empire. However, as I have indicated to you in a preceding despatch, we can consider the votes of the Assembly at Mexico only as the first indication of the disposition of the country. With all the authority which attaches to the eminent men who compose it, the Assembly recommends to its fellow-countrymen the adoption of monarchical institutions, and it designates a prince for their suffrages. It belongs, however, to the provisional government to collect those suffrages in such a manner as to banish all doubt in regard to the expression of the will of the country. It is not my part to indicate to you the mode to be adopted in order that this indispensable result should be completely attained; we must search for this in the local customs and institutions. Whether the municipalities should be called upon to declare their wishes in the different provinces according as they shall have recovered the free disposal of themselves, or whether the lists should be opened by their care in order to collect the votes, the best method will be that which shall insure the largest manifestation of the popular will in all its independence and sincerity. General, the Emperor particularly recommends this essential point to your most careful attention.

Other questions at the same time demand your solicitude. We have flattered ourselves with the idea that we represent in Mexico the cause of progress and of civilization, and our regard for our responsibility does not permit us to accept the species of provisional guardianship with which we are invested by circumstances, except on condition of serving that cause faithfully by our counsels and by our actions. From this point of view, we have to regret certain measures which contrast in an unfavorable manner with the ideas which we ought to strive to establish. Sequestrations, prohibitions, outlawries have too often been, in Mexico, the arms used by parties in straits, in their desperate contests—too often, indeed, not to interdict the use of them to a government that goes to conserve and restore. Adopted, doubtless, in view of the urgent necessities of which I cannot judge, they can have but a provisional character, and at the moment at which I write to you they are certainly revoked, if they have not been already so at the reception of the instructions sent out by the last packet.

The reorganization of the Mexican army is one of the most important questions which should, at present, occupy the attention of the provisional government and yours. It is the duty of the minister of war to transmit special instructions to you on this point. I will confine myself to saying, that, the desire of the Emperor's government being to restrict, as promptly as circumstances will permit, the extent and the duration of our occupation, it is essential that this reorganization should be pushed forward with all possible activity, and that it is desirable that in future, and in proportion to the progress realized, an honorable share of duty should be assigned to the Mexican army. In the interest of the country and its ulterior development, as well as to provide for present necessities, I recommend you to press upon the government the duty of applying its utmost care to multiply the means of communication, and to assure, on the roads which now exist, security of transportation and rapid exchange of correspondence.

Without directly substituting your initiative for that of the government, all your counsels, general, should tend to have the administration, properly so called, reconstituted in conditions of regularity and strength, such as may give confidence to the country and reassure it against all ideas of reactionary and exclusive policy. Under the shadow of our flag, all parties can be worthily reconciled, and we will induce them to this; but as we repudiate their passions, we must never allow it to serve as a shelter for them to work out their revenges.

The same principles should preside over the reorganization of the judicial administration, and you will have to recommend to the government, to be inspired with them in the choice of magistrates and in the impulse which it will give them, the independence and honesty of the magistracy being able to contribute powerfully to elevate the moral state of a people among whom the notions of right must have been very much blunted by the contact of so many revolutions.

The existing administrative and judicial institutions appear, moreover, to answer the

wants and customs of the country. Your counsels should, therefore, be directed, in this regard, rather to the choice of functionaries and the directions to be impressed upon them, than to the institutions themselves.

It is not entirely so with regard to the finances. We have there, moreover, a direct interest, which commands us to watch more closely over the execution of such regulations as ought to assure to the country the benefits of a regular system of accountability. The proper management of the public money is the guarantee of our debts, and, from this point of view, we have good reason to exercise an active control over the financial administration. We have, for the rest, as far as depended on us, facilitated its reorganization by assuring to it the precious support of special agents delegated for that purpose by the minister of finance. Under their enlightened influence, the germs of prosperity so varied and abundant which the country possesses cannot fail to be rapidly developed.

I have spoken of our claims. They are, as you know, general, of two kinds: those which are anterior to the war, and those which have their origin in the war. As to the former, they will be all referred for examination to a commission which shall be instituted in connexion with my department, and which shall be composed in such a way as to assure an unquestionable authority to its decisions. The total amount to be presented to the Mexican government will be composed of the sum of all these claims that shall be recognized by the commission as legitimately founded in justice.

As to those which proceed from the war which we are now maintaining, my colleagues in the departments of war and marine are occupied in combining such elements as will allow them to form a proper estimate of the expenses of which we shall have to claim reimbursement. We shall most likely be able to transmit to you, by the next packet, the result of this labor, and you will then have to present to the provisional government for acceptance the demand for reimbursement of the sum which shall be indicated to you

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to General Bazaine.*

GENERAL: I have communicated, as I announced to you my intention of doing, with my colleagues in the departments of war, marine, and finance, in order to agree upon the amount of indemnity for the war, for which we shall have to claim reimbursement from Mexico. The various items of information which were indispensable to us in order to appreciate exactly the sum total of our expenses are now in our possession. Consequently we shall not delay in settling definitely the figures of the sum at which this indemnity ought to be estimated. We had, likewise, to take into consideration, in advance, the expenses yet to be incurred before our forces shall have completely evacuated the Mexican territory. I have, therefore, conferred on this subject with my colleagues, and I shall, in all probability, be able to transmit to the Marquis de Montholon, at the moment of his departure, suitable instructions to enable him to negotiate these two arrangements immediately upon his arrival in Mexico.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*Mr. Romero to Mr. Seward.*

[Translation.]

MEXICAN LEGATION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Washington, January 31, 1864.

MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to send to you, enclosed with this note, a series of articles which contain the history of political occurrences in Mexico, interwoven with the European interference, which it is attempted to carry into effect in that republic, and which demonstrate the notorious injustice of the war which the French government is making on my country, and the complete insufficiency and inexactness of the pretexts which have been alleged by the invader to the civilized world while pretending to justify such a war. The said articles were written by Mr. Lefevre, French by birth, nationality, and sentiments, who has resided many years in the Mexican republic; who has witnessed, in person, many of the acts which he recounts; and had access to the archives

of the Mexican government, while writing a more extended work on the same events, which he published in 1862. Although they are not of official character, they may serve much to illustrate the truth in a question so complicated, for which reason I send them to your department.

I avail of this opportunity to repeat to you, sir, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, &c., &c., &c.

M. ROMERO.

[From the Daily News, Wednesday, December 30, 1863.]

THE INTERVENTION IN MEXICO.

No. I.—ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION.

There are two methods of representing facts. The first and easiest, which is that followed by the panegyrists of established power, and assumes the legitimacy of what is done from the mere existence of the facts.

Writers of the fatalistic school proceed in this manner. The secret of their reasoning is found in that unlucky declaration of M. de Montalembert, "Everything which is possible is just;" and if we accepted such a doctrine without protest, we should have nothing more to do than to bow everywhere and in all things before the deification of force. All the logic of the writers of this school reduces itself, in fact, to this somewhat unintellectual glorification.

But because the head of the French empire thinks fit to overthrow the republic of Mexico, because his troops are in possession of Vera Cruz, Puebla, Mexico, and probably by this time of San Luis Potosi, is that a reason for maintaining the legitimacy of a war which all France disapproves of, and which has never had any advocates except among the fanatics paid to glorify, everywhere and always, the acts of the imperial government? Assuredly not.

The other school, on the contrary, considers itself bound to take everything into account. Its criticism maintains that every fact which takes place before our eyes proceeds logically from certain causes, which are always pre-existent, and that in no case can success destroy right. Belonging, ourselves, to this later school, it is according to its principles that we are about to study the circumstances which are taking place at this moment upon the territory of Mexico.

And, in the first place, why has the French army interfered in the internal affairs of that unhappy country, and whence comes its intervention?

This intervention, it ought to be distinctly stated, does not proceed, as is pretty generally supposed, from the causes which led to the signing of the convention of the 31st of October, 1861, and which are recorded therein.

It would be an impeachment of the good faith of the powers whose names are at the bottom of that diplomatic document to believe for an instant in the anterior necessity of an armed intervention in the affairs of the country, when all the facts, on the contrary, unite in establishing that this eventuality had been carefully repudiated in all the diplomatic documents exchanged between the official representatives of the three powers, in order to arrive at a common understanding. Search must be made elsewhere, therefore, if the origin of the present intervention is to be discovered; and however slightly we refer to what has taken place, we shall find that origin in the support which the ministers of the imperial government have constantly afforded to the reactionary parties against the liberal tendencies of nearly all the people of Mexico.

This, however, demands a word of explanation.

In 1856 Mexico, weary of a system of *pronunciamentos*, a system which had lasted for forty years, rose against General Santa Anna, the last representative of that unenlightened system, and the insurrection, soon driving before it the defenders of the despot, arrived victorious even in the capital itself, where it installed General Alvarez at first, and M. Comonfort afterwards, as provisional presidents of a *de facto* government. This was the legitimate insurrection of the interests of the many against the privileges of the few; the victory of right over might; and to put an end in future to the *pronunciamentos* which were ruining and demoralizing the country, it was resolved to solemnly proclaim in a charter the rights and duties of every one.

This charter—an expression of the ideas and of the wishes of the entire country, inasmuch as the representatives of all the people of Mexico were summoned to discuss it—was

concluded on the 12th of January, 1857. After being voted by the constituent assembly, it was submitted to the ratification of the people, was voluntarily accepted by all the States of the republic, and received the special oath of M. Comonfort, appointed President in virtue of article 75, on the 1st of December of the same year.

Finally, to conclude with the reforms of this period, we ought to add that the vote of the constitution had been preceded by two laws, the object of one of which was to come to the assistance of property by bringing mortmain property into circulation; while the other suppressed all special jurisdictions known under the name of *fueros eclesiasticos et militares*, and subjected to the undeviating regulations of general law the members, until then privileged, of the army and the clergy.

There was, however, no spoliation. The property rights of the chapters and convents were openly recognized; and to indemnify the clergy, it was decided that the revenue of all real property should be capitalized, by taking for basis of estimate the annual value of the said property, as representing a sum lent at 6 per cent. per annum, but that the capital in question should be repaid to the chapters and convents by the principal tenant, substituted by the terms of the new law, as proprietor, for the rights of the clergy henceforth barred.

It was, however, from the army and the clergy that protests against the new order of things proceeded. These two bodies combined their intrigues in order to exert a pressure upon the honest but undecided mind of M. Comonfort, and on the 17th of December, 1857, *i. e.*, only sixteen days after having taken his oath, he overthrew the constitution that he had just sworn to. He then pronounced in favor of a reactionary plan, drawn up by himself and some of his councillors; and in order not to be opposed in these projects, he arrested M. Juarez, president of the supreme court of justice, designated in virtue of Art. 79 of the same constitution to supply the place of the *coup d'Etat* President until the nomination of his successor.

Nevertheless, in spite of the avowed assistance, or rather the treason of the chief magistrate of the republic, the triumphant faction had adherents in the cities of Mexico, Queretaro, and Puebla only; while the entire State of Vera Cruz, Yucatan, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Michoacan, San Luis (with the exception of a small portion of the garrison,) Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Jalisco, Colima, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tabasco, Chihuahua, Sonora, Sinaloa, and a great part even of the district of Mexico, continued to recognize the constitution of 1857 as the fundamental law of the republic.

Nay, more, M. Gutierrez Zamora, governor of the State of Vera Cruz, deceived by a friend who had come to him on behalf of M. Comonfort, pronounced, in the first place, in favor of the *coup d'Etat*, in the trust that that movement had no other object than that of investing the President with powers which would enable him to accomplish, without the intervention of a congress, always slow in deciding, the reforms initiated by the last revolution. But when he learnt the truth—when he knew that M. Comonfort, instead of advancing, had, on the contrary, bound himself hand and foot to the reactionary party by throwing open the council to the famous Father Miranda, he felt that he had been trifled with; and not content with repairing his error by returning within the three days which followed his defection to the constitution of 1857, he himself assembled the legislature of his State in order to submit his conduct to it, and to surrender himself thus to the justice of his fellow-citizens.

If, therefore, in the events of this period there was a pressure of any kind of the minority upon the majority to employ expressions so often repeated recently by the agents of the imperial government, this pressure proceeded solely from the authors of the *coup d'Etat*, all of whom are now partisans of the intervention, except MM. Comonfort and Payno; and but for the necessity of giving a liberal coloring to an expedition the real motives of which it is not yet dared to state, we should not be able to understand how in so simple a question the ministers of the empire have been able to blind themselves so far as constantly to take the part for the whole.

M. Comonfort, nevertheless, soon perceived what a deplorable part he had been made to play. But too weak to dare to publicly admit his fault, and surrender himself, like M. Gutierrez Zamora, to the justice of the congress, he preferred to shuffle, and continued to vacillate from side to side, hoping, doubtless, in time, to oppose the credit of the president of the supreme court, then a prisoner, to the annoying influence of the leader of the *pronocés*, and the ambition of the general of the counter-revolutionary army to the well-known patriotism of the provisional president appointed by Art. 79 of the constitution. With this object he arrested General Zuloaga; but this time also his half-and-half policy failed before the pitiless logic of the spirit of the party, and he was compelled, in spite of himself, to liberate his two prisoners, M. Juarez and M. Zuloaga.

The former, restored to liberty, on the 11th January, 1858, immediately repaired to Guanajuato, to organize there the constitutional government. Zuloaga, glad to be let off so easily, shut himself up in the citadel, determined to no longer trust his fortune in the hands of M. Comonfort; and the latter, abandoned by everybody, without party or pres-