

The contested indemnities are those which are named in Article 1 and in Article³ of the ultimatum laid down by the plenipotentiaries of France. These articles are thus stated: "ARTICLE 1. Mexico engages to pay to France a sum of \$12,000,000, at which the whole of the French reclamations are valued, rating the various wrongs up to the 31st of July last, 1861, and exclusive of the exceptions stipulated in Articles 2 and 4, hereinafter stated, and which relate to what has happened since the 31st of July last, for which a special reserve is made. The amount of the reclamations against Mexico which may spring from these causes will be fixed at a later period by the plenipotentiaries of France."

"ARTICLE 3. Mexico will be held to the full, faithful, and immediate fulfilment of the contract undertaken in the month of February, 1859, between the Mexican government and the house of Jecker."

The first figure of twelve millions of dollars has seemed, in fact, excessive, for the whole number of Frenchmen permanent residents of Mexico does not exceed, according to the latest official documents, 2,048. The demand for the entire and instant execution of the contract made between Miramon and the house of Jecker, reaching the large sum of \$15,000,000, has also been judged to be too rigorous.

These two demands gave rise in the beginning of the expedition to a first disagreement between the plenipotentiaries of France, of England, and of Spain.

As soon as Earl Russell was informed of the nature of the French reclamations by Sir Charles Wycke, he wrote to Lord Cowley, the English ambassador at Paris:

"It is surely not possible that reclamations so excessive as that of \$12,000,000 in mass and without detailed account, and that of \$15,000,000 for \$750,000 received, can have been made with the hope of their being entertained."

M. Thouvenal hastened, by a despatch addressed to M. Dubois de Saligny, the 28th of February, 1862, to soften the too absolute nature of these demands. He wrote as follows:

"The figure at which this department felt itself obliged to value our reclamations did not reach that fixed by your Article No. 1; but, in the absence of sufficient elements of valuation, a great latitude is now left to you on this subject. While, therefore, I do not expressly ask you to reduce a sum which Sir Charles Wycke and General Prim both seem to have thought exorbitant, you may, nevertheless, be less exacting on this point if it prove too evident a cause of difference between the representatives of the three courts."

M. Thouvenal was further of opinion that if France still insisted on a large sum of indemnity, it was no longer necessary to exact reparation of another kind, whether for the death of the French consul at Tepic, or for the attempts upon the person of M. Dubois de Saligny in the month of August, 1861.

So far as the Jecker affair was concerned, M. Thouvenal declared that there was a distinction to be drawn between what immediately concerned our interests and what was foreign to them. At the time when the Jecker contract was signed the minister of France to Mexico had informed the French government that foreign commerce would be greatly relieved by this financial measure. It was only in this view that the French government insisted on its execution. But the question would be treated very differently if the house of Jecker^o was to be alone, or almost alone, benefited by the fulfilment of the contract.

"I call your attention," said M. Thouvenal, "in conclusion, to the importance of separating in this affair all that may really affect interests which it is our duty to protect from what may affect other interests of a wholly different character. The actual government (the government of Juarez) cannot assume to deprive our countrymen of advantages assured to them by a regular measure passed by the administration of General Miramon for the single reason that this measure emanated from an enemy; but it would not be just for us, on the other hand, to impose upon the actual government (upon Juarez) obligations which do not necessarily flow from his governmental responsibility."

Finally, M. Drouyn de L'huys expressed himself in the following terms in a despatch of the 17th of August, 1863, addressed to General Bazaine:

"I have spoken of our reclamations. They are, as you are aware, general, of two kinds: those which are anterior to the war, and those which spring from the war itself. As to the first, they are all referred to the examination of a commission, which will be instituted in my department, and which will be organized in a manner to secure to its decisions an indisputable authority. The total amount to present to the Mexican government will include all the reclamations which shall be recognized by the commission as legitimate."

The despatches of M. Thouvenal and of M. Drouyn de L'huys materially diminish the ultimatum given to Juarez by M. Dubois de Saligny; and there is no doubt that Juarez would have instantly received and acted upon the reclamations of France if they had been thus presented in the beginning.

^oTo this it may be objected that M. Jecker is to-day a French citizen; but he was not naturalized until by the decree of the 20th of March, 1862, while the contract signed between him and the government of Miramon was dated the 29th of October, 1859.

But these sundry pecuniary reclamations were not the only cause of intervention. France seeks redress for other wrongs which are the result of the state of anarchy in Mexico for the last forty years. Many of our countrymen have been attacked, robbed, murdered, and no reparation has ever been obtained, not even the punishment of the guilty. Be it always understood, however, that when the time arrived for general expiation in 1861, the crimes of all the governments and pretenders who, during the last twelve or fifteen years, have disputed the reins of power, were unjustly ascribed to Juarez and his partisans.

SOCIAL STATE OF MEXICO.—ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH PARTY.

It is necessary to go back further than fifteen years, and even more than a century, to attain a fair, impartial understanding of the social state of Mexico. Mexico had not, like the United States, the good fortune to be colonized by intelligent and laborious men, who sought in a new land an asylum from persecution. Like all other Spanish colonies, it has been given up to debauched and quarrelsome invaders, who disdained any other occupation than war, and who sought in America a people to persecute at their leisure.

Wherever Spain planted her flag she established a licentious despotism; she degraded labor by favoring with all her power the introduction and increase of black slaves; her greatest care was to keep all ranks in ignorance and superstition; she intrusted education only to the clergy, and charged the inquisition to watch over the publication of books; lastly, she thought to retain a perpetual hold on her colonies by isolating them from the rest of mankind, and by forbidding to her colonial subjects all direct commerce with foreign nations.

Populations thus governed could have neither domestic nor social virtues, and if some Mexican creoles had not found means toward the close of the 18th century to visit Europe secretly, the struggle for independence would have been delayed until our day. These hardy travellers were imbued with the teachings of Voltaire and of Rousseau, and undertook, immediately on their return to their country, a propagande. They were burned, just as they would have been in the middle ages. But the first seeds were sown, and they so fructified, that in less than a quarter of a century all the Spanish colonies had conquered their independence. Yet this emancipation was not the result of a well-studied or understood need, and in Mexico even more than elsewhere it was exclusively the work of some leading minds. It did not bring any essential change in manners, nor dissipate all prejudice. Property was not divided, and the new clergy had neither less ambition than the old, nor less influence on the spirit of the people. It formed of the remnant of the privileged classes a party which, having on its side the wealth of the country and the religious influence, was, in fact, the most powerful of all those which partitioned out Mexico among themselves.

This party, which was then designated by the name of the Spanish church party, and which is known to-day as the reactionist or conservative, gradually prepared the way for a return of Mexico to the Spanish rule, and when it failed in all its efforts, endeavored to establish an independent monarchy, and looked to France to aid it to accomplish this object. Their proposals were rejected, but they would not give up the field, and shrank from no means to render intervention inevitable.

In 1838 took place the unfortunate expedition commanded by Admiral Baudin. The causes of this expedition are frankly set forth in a book by MM. Blanchard, Dauzats & Maisin, published in 1839, by order of the French government, under the auspices of Baron Tupinier, then minister of the marine:

"It is known that it is to the clerical party that the differences which have arisen between France and Mexico must be attributed. This party wishes to bring back Mexico to monarchical rule, and has pushed it to a war with us in order to arrive at this end. Since the Algerian expedition, we are supposed to fear distant expeditions and foreign conquests. It is well known that the Algerian affair has disgusted us with the rôle of dupe. It is less known in Mexico than anywhere else. The priest party thought that by injustice, insult, and outrage, it would bring France to undertake the conquest of the Mexican republic, and that a monarchy would then be established. France seemed better suited than any other nation to carry out this vast design. Her humor is warlike. She chafes under injustice, even though its redress would involve a greater injury."

It is curious to compare these lines, written in 1839, with the following extract from "The London Times," of May 27, 1862, twenty years later, and five months after the beginning of the present intervention:

"We now understand the origin of the whole affair. The monarchy, with Archduke Maximilian for Emperor, was the idea of certain Mexican refugees, members of the reactionary or clerical party in Mexico, and partisans of Marquez and other ruffians, whose misdeeds have been among the principal causes of our intervention. If Ferdinand Maximilian goes to Mexico, he will find his most active friends among the men who have shot, tortured, and robbed until Europe has at last lost patience."

OUTRAGES UPON FOREIGNERS BY THE CHURCH PARTY.

The conservative party has not ceased, in fact, to be guilty of such wrongs to foreigners as were most likely to provoke the intervention of France, England, and of Spain. We will recall a few of the most recent of these. An aide-de-camp of President Zuloaga, in 1858, publicly and in the grossest manner insulted M. Brasseur, captain under the first empire and attached to the chancellery of France. Shortly after, twenty high clerical officers, among whom was General Miramon, attacked and beat three Frenchmen in the streets of Mexico. Later, and while himself invoking the intervention of France, Miramon ordered one of his generals, Silverio Ramirez, to throw into prison the vice-consul of France at Zacatecas, M. Lacroix, who had refused to pay an illegal tax. In 1859 General Marquez ordered the frightful massacres of Tacubaya, and robbed a *conducta* on the road to San Blas. Lastly, on the 17th of November, 1860, Miramon, in broad daylight and by main force, carried off \$660,000 from the English legation. "For forty years," says the report in which the Assembly of Notables set forth the motives which determined it to proclaim the Archduke Maximilian Emperor of Mexico, "for forty years Mexico has been governed by brigands, vagabonds, and incendiaries."

The Assembly of Notables has too soon forgotten that for forty years Mexico has almost always been governed by the party which to-day proclaims the throne in Mexico. It has too soon forgotten, too, that twenty-two of the thirty-five members of the superior council were formerly ministers or judges of the supreme court; that two of the three high personages who compose the regency have been ministers, and that one of them, General Salas, was at one period, in 1847, provisional president, while then belonging to the liberal party.

We do not certainly pretend that the liberal party has been without fault. M. Thouvenel had ample ground for saying in his despatch of the 30th October, 1861, addressed to M. Dubois de Saligny, that the measures of the government of Juarez in 1861, a few months before intervention, to obtain means, displayed the same disposition to abuse authority as all those which had preceded it. But the abuses with which Juarez and his ministers are reproached should not lead us to forget the excesses committed by their opponents, and we have declared to them that if we may legitimately treat the former as enemies, there is no good reason to consider the others as friends whose past is any guarantee for their future conduct.

Perhaps it is to be regretted that circumstances have not permitted us to change the situation. Suppose, for instance, that Juarez had been our ally, and that he had aided us as efficiently and energetically as he has opposed us, there is no doubt that Mexico would be to-day at peace.

This hypothesis leads us to regret that the premature presence in the French camp of certain Mexicans who are too well known deprived us of the opportunity of presenting ourselves as mediators. Perhaps there is yet time to appeal anew for an agreement with conditions acceptable to all, and of a nature to put an immediate end to the civil war, and to intervention. Before stating what, in our opinion, these acceptable conditions are, we think it useful to recall all that has been said as to the purpose of the French intervention. We will then sketch a rapid picture of the existing situation, and we will deduce from this showing the only possible solution of the question.

II.

THE FRENCH PROGRAMME.—THE EMPEROR'S INSTRUCTIONS.

The end which the French government proposes to attain by intervention in Mexico may be learned by an examination of the documents published, but no declarations so precise and formal as to leave no doubt as to the intentions of the government have been made upon this subject. M. Thouvenel wrote, October 11, 1861, that the legitimacy of our coercive measures in regard to Mexico only resulted, assuredly, from our grounds of complaint against the government of that country, and that these wrongs, as well as the means to redress them and prevent their repetition, could alone be made the object of an ostensible convention. Earl Russell, taking note of this declaration, demanded that it should be absolutely stipulated that the three powers should not interfere in the internal government of Mexico; but M. Thouvenel would make no engagement on this point; he was of opinion that the intervening powers, while leaving the Mexicans free as to the choice of their government, should not interdict in advance the possible exercise of a legitimate participation in events which might spring from the military operations.

M. Thouvenel, therefore, made certain reservations before signing the convention of the 31st October, and the cabinets of London and Madrid were perfectly aware that the French government proposed to itself a triple end:

1. To obtain redress for certain wrongs.
2. To aid the Mexicans in their work of regeneration.
3. To oppose to the too great expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race in the New World an insurmountable barrier, by restoring to the Latin race in Mexico its force and prestige.

This programme was completely and very clearly laid down in the letter written by the Emperor to General Forey the 3d of July, 1862, and as constant reference must be had to this important document, we think it of use to reproduce it at length. We may afterwards better understand what has been accomplished, and what remains for us to do.

THE EMPEROR TO GENERAL FOREY.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, July 3, 1862.

“MY DEAR GENERAL: At the moment when you are about to leave for Mexico, charged with political and military powers, I deem it useful that you should understand my wishes.

“This is the line of conduct which you are expected to pursue: 1. To issue a proclamation on your arrival, the principal ideas of which will be indicated to you. 2. To receive with the greatest kindness all Mexicans who may join you. 3. To espouse the quarrel of no party, but to announce that all is provisional until the Mexican nation shall have declared its wishes; to show a great respect for religion, but to reassure at the same time the holders of national property. 4. To supply, pay, and arm, according to your ability, the auxiliary Mexican troops; to give them the chief part in combats. 5. To maintain among your troops, as well as among the auxiliaries, the most severe discipline; to repress with vigor every act, every design, which might wound the Mexicans, for their pride of character must not be forgotten, and it is of the first importance to the success of the undertaking to conciliate the good will of the people.

“When we shall have reached the city of Mexico, it is desirable that you should have an understanding with the notable persons of every shade of opinion who shall have espoused our cause, in order to organize a provisional government. This government will submit to the Mexican people the question of the form of political rule which shall be definitively established. An assembly will be afterwards elected in accordance with the Mexican laws.

“You will aid the new government to introduce into the administration of affairs, and especially into the finances, that regularity of which France offers the best example. To effect this, persons will be sent thither capable of aiding this new organization.

“The end to be attained is not to impose upon the Mexicans a form of government which will be distasteful to them, but to aid them to establish, in conformity with their wishes, a government which may have some chance of stability, and will assure to France the redress of the wrongs of which she complains.

“It is not to be denied that if they prefer a monarchy it is in the interest of France to aid them in this path.

“Persons will not be wanting who will ask you why we propose to spend men and money to establish a regular government in Mexico.

“In the present state of the world's civilization Europe is not indifferent to the prosperity of America; for it is she which nourishes our industry and gives life to our commerce. It is our interest that the republic of the United States shall be powerful and prosperous, but it is not at all to our interest that she should grasp the whole Gulf of Mexico, rule thence the Antilles as well as South America, and be the sole dispenser of the products of the New World. We see to-day, by sad experience, how precarious is the fate of an industry which is forced to seek its raw material in a single market, under all the vicissitudes to which that market is subject.

“If, on the contrary, Mexico preserve its independence, and maintain the integrity of its territory, if a stable government be there established with the aid of France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its force and its prestige; we shall have guaranteed the safety of our own and the Spanish colonies in the Antilles. We shall have established our benign influence in the centre of America, and this influence, while creating immense outlets for our commerce, will procure the raw material which is indispensable to our industry.

“Mexico thus regenerated will always be favorable to us, not only from gratitude, but also because her interests will be identical with our own, and because she will find a support in the good will of European powers.

“To-day, therefore, our military honor involved, the demands of our policy, the interest of our industry and our commerce, all impose upon us the duty of marching upon Mexico, there boldly planting our flag, and establishing perhaps a monarchy, if not incompatible with the national sentiment of the country, but at least a government which will promise some stability.

“NAPOLEON.”

Here, certainly, is a magnificent programme: to assure the independence of Mexico, and to render her forever favorable to us through gratitude and interest; to establish the benign influence of France in the centre of America; to open immense outlets to our commerce, and new markets, where our industry may find the raw materials which are indispensable to it; to restore to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its power and prestige.

CAN THE FRENCH PROGRAMME BE REALIZED?

But is it possible to realize this brilliant programme? Has Mexico the necessary elements for its transformation in a day into a great power? for it will need nothing less than a first-class power to restrain the ambition of the great American republic, whenever this republic seriously wishes to extend itself over Central America. Is it possible to establish a government of the Latin race which will give promise of any stability in a country seven-eighths of whose population are of the Indian race? Is it prudent to develop a new phase of the question of race, which has been and still is a subject of so much discord in America, and thereby still further complicate its solution? Can it be seriously believed that a country without industrial resources, without capital, without roads—at least at all adequate to its population—will all at once offer to our commerce immense outlets, or to our industry the indispensable raw material?

It was at least necessary to the unanimous and loyal acceptance of our intervention that the imperial programme should be strictly conformed to. Unfortunately, when General Forey arrived at Vera Cruz the political success of this enterprise had already been long compromised by the inopportune and arbitrary acts of M. Almonte. These acts were disavowed, but it was too late.

A very remarkable pamphlet, which attracted great public attention, was published about six months since, under the title “What will we do in Mexico?” To-day we may ask “What have we done in Mexico?”

III.

PROGRESS OF THE INVASION.—PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

General Forey made his entry into the capital of Mexico on the 12th of June, 1863, and immediately undertook, with the aid of M. Dubois de Saligny, to organize the municipal powers and a provisional government. One of his first acts was to subject the Mexican press to the rule which governs the French press.*

A Superior Council, or Junta, composed of thirty-five members, instituted by a decree of the 16th June, designated in its turn, as members of the executive powers, General Almonte, the archbishop of Mexico, and General Salas. The same Junta afterward summoned 215 persons as an Assembly of Notables.

The provisional government was therefore composed, first, of a Superior Council or Junta, named by General Forey; second, of a Triumvirate and of an Assembly of Notables designated by the Superior Junta.†

* A decree declaring null and void, as presenting an obstacle to the law of sequestration, all sales of property or of merchandise belonging to persons hostile to intervention, was, without doubt, annulled by the simple fact of cancellation by the French government of the decree relating to sequestration, rendered at Puebla on the 21st May.

† It has been incorrectly stated that “representatives of all parties, even of the Juarists,” were included in the Superior Junta. This high council was composed of the following persons: José Ignacio Pavón, president of the supreme court under the dictatorship of Santa Anna; Manuel Díaz de Bonilla, minister of foreign affairs under Santa Anna; José Basilio Arrillaga, a priest of the Jesuit order; Teodosio Lares, minister of justice under Santa Anna; Francisco Xavier Miranda, priest, minister of justice under Miramon; Ignatio Aguilar y Marocho, minister of justice under Santa Anna; José Sallano, priest; Joaquin Velasquez de Leon, minister of finance under Santa Anna; Antonio Fernandez Monjardin, minister of justice under Santa Anna; Ignacio Mora y Villamil, general director of engineers under Santa Anna; Ignacio Sepulveda, judge of Mexico under Santa Anna; José María Andrade; Agapito de Muñoz y Muroz; José Ildonsofo Amable; Gerardo García Rogas; Joaquin de Castillo y Lanzas, minister under Santa Anna and under Miramon; Mariano Domínguez, judge of the supreme court under Santa Anna; José Guadalupe Arriola, priest; Teofilo Marín, minister of justice under Miramon; General Adrien Woll, Frenchman, governor of the state of Tamaulipas under Santa Anna, and of Guadalajara under Miramon; Fernando Mangino, chargé d'affaires of Mexico in France under Santa Anna; José Miguel Arroyo, director of the department of foreign affairs under Santa Anna and Miramon; Miguel Cervantes, general and marquis of Salvatierra in the time of the Spaniards; Crispiano del Castillo, minister under Santa Anna and Miramon; Alessandra Arango of Escudon, one of the leading partisans of Miramon; Juan Hierro Maldonado, minister of finance under Miramon; Manuel Miranda, a Spanish merchant; José Lopez Ortigosa; Manuel Jimenez; Gajetano Montego; Santiago Blanco, general, minister of war under Santa Anna; Pablo Vergare, member of the supreme court under Santa Anna and under Miramon; Manuel Tejada, superintendent of church property; Urbano Tovar, secretary of the treasury under Miramon; Antonio Moran, director of the department of justice under Miramon.

The Assembly of Notables, at its first session, and without debate, voted for an imperial form of government, by a majority of 213 in a vote of 215. The Archduke Maximilian was immediately proclaimed Emperor by the same majority, and it was voted at the same session that in the case of refusal by the archduke, the Emperor Napoleon be urged to designate a substitute.

We find nowhere any question of a submission of the vote of the Assembly of Notables to ratification by universal suffrage. The decree by which the Superior Junta of the Assembly of Notables was constituted nowhere refers to an appeal to the people. The articles of this law or decree which relate to the form of government are thus stated:

"ART. 14. The Assembly of Notables will discuss in the first place the form of government to be *definitively* established in Mexico. The vote upon this question must embrace at least one-half of the suffrages.

"ART. 15. In case this majority shall not be obtained, the executive power will dissolve the assembly, and the Superior Junta will proceed without delay to form a new assembly.

"ART. 16. The members of the present assembly will be eligible to re-election.

"ART. 17. After having decided upon the form of government to be *definitively* established, the Assembly of Notables will take into consideration the questions which will be submitted to it by the executive power."

"ART. 23. The functions of the executive power will cease when the Assembly of Notables shall have proclaimed the inauguration of the definitive government."

The resolution adopted by the Assembly of Notables is in effect stated in absolute terms, and undertakes the definitive settlement of the question. This resolution declares that—

"The Mexican nation, through its organ, the Assembly of Notables, chooses the empire as its form of government, and proclaims the Archduke Maximilian, of Austria, Emperor."

The Assembly of Notables has deserved the reproaches which have been cast upon it from every quarter, of having acted with too great haste. It lost neither a day nor an hour. A deputation named by it, and charged with the offer of the crown to the Archduke Maximilian, left Vera Cruz the 18th of August to proceed to Miramar with the utmost speed. This deputation was composed of the following persons:

M. Gutierrez de Estrada, formerly minister of foreign affairs and ambassador of Mexico at the court of Rome, president of the deputation; Father Miranda, formerly minister of justice; M. Aguilar y Marocho, clerk of the commission named by the Assembly of Notables; M. J. Hidalgo, formerly secretary of the embassy; General Woll, Colonel Velasquez de Leon, M. Angel Iglésias.*

DEPARTURE FROM THE IMPERIAL PROGRAMME.

But the Assembly of Notables, in pretending to be the organ of the Mexican nation, and in *definitively* choosing the empire as the form of government, did not conform to the imperial programme. The Emperor had said in his letter to General Forey:

"When we shall have reached the city of Mexico, it is desirable that you should have an understanding with the notable persons of every shade of opinion who shall have espoused our cause, in order to organize a provisional government. This government will submit to the Mexican people the question of the form of political rule which shall be definitively established—an assembly will be afterward selected, in accordance with the Mexican laws."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys consequently hastened to remind General Bazaine, who had been named commander-in-chief of the French forces, that the imperial programme should be scrupulously followed.

"We have noticed with pleasure," he wrote on the 17th of August, 1863, "as a symptom of favorable augury, the manifestation of the Assembly of Notables in Mexico in favor of the establishment of a monarchy, and the name of the prince called to the empire. But, as I indicated to you in a former despatch, we can only consider the vote of this assembly as a first indication of the inclinations of the country. With the great authority which attaches to the men of mark which compose it, the assembly recommends to its fellow-citizens the adoption of monarchical institutions, and designates a prince for their suffrages.

"It is now the part of the provisional government to collect these suffrages in such a manner that no doubt shall hang over this expression of the will of the country. I shall not indicate to you the mode to adopt to completely obtain this indispensable result. It must be found in the institutions of the country and its local customs.

"Whether the municipalities should be summoned to declare their wishes in the different provinces, as fast as they regain their independence of action, or whether the polls should be opened under their authority to receive the votes, that mode will be the best

* Messrs. Gutierrez de Estrada and J. Hidalgo were already in Europe.

which will assure the largest manifestation of the popular voice under the best conditions of independence and sincerity. The Emperor, general, particularly commends this essential point to your constant care."

The vote of the Assembly of Notables is, therefore, in the opinion of the French government, only a *symptom of favorable augury, a first indication of the wish of the country.*

REPLY OF THE ARCHDUKE MAXIMILIAN.

The reply made by the Archduke Maximilian on the 3d of October, 1863, to the Mexican deputation is, moreover, in the same spirit. This is his reply:

"I am profoundly grateful for the wishes expressed by the Assembly of Notables.

"It cannot be other than flattering to our house that the thoughts of your countrymen turn to the descendants of Charles V.

"It is a proud task to assure the independence and the prosperity of Mexico under the protection of free and lasting institutions. I must, however, recognize the fact—and in this I entirely agree with the Emperor of the French, whose glorious undertaking makes the regeneration of Mexico possible—that the monarchy cannot be re-established in your country on a firm and legitimate basis unless the whole nation shall confirm, by a free manifestation of its will, the wishes of the capital.

"My acceptance of the offered throne must, therefore, depend upon the result of the vote of the whole country.

"Further, a sentiment of the most sacred of the duties of the sovereign requires that he should demand for the proposed empire every necessary guarantee to secure it against the dangers which threaten its integrity and its independence.

"If substantial guarantees for the future can be obtained, and if the universal suffrage of the noble Mexican people select me as its choice, I shall be ready, with the consent of the illustrious chief of my family, and trusting to the protection of the Almighty, to accept the throne.

"It is my duty to announce to you now, gentlemen, that in case Providence shall call me to the high mission of civilization which is attached to this crown, it is my fixed intention to open to your country, by means of a constitutional government, a path to a progress based on order and civilization, and as soon as the empire shall be completely pacified, to seal with my oath the fundamental agreement concluded with the nation.

"It is only in this manner that a truly national policy can be established, in which all parties, forgetting their ancient quarrels, will unite to raise Mexico to the high rank which she should attain under a government whose first principle will be law based on equity.

"I beg of you to communicate these my intentions, frankly expressed, to your countrymen, and to take measures to obtain from the nation an expression of its will as to the form of government it intends to adopt."

EUROPEAN OPINION OF THE ARCHDUKE'S REPLY.

"This wise and noble reply, which was in conformity with the line of conduct traced by the French government, disappointed no one but the Mexican deputation.

"It will be understood," said the General Correspondence of Vienna of the 5th of October, "that the Archduke could not accept the offer of the Assembly of Notables (which has as yet only received adhesion from a small number of departments occupied by the French troops) so long as certain other conditions, and chiefly the effective support of the maritime powers, are as yet in the region of possibilities. England has not yet officially promised her support, although the public opinion of that country seems to favor the project."

The London Times, in fact, said on this subject on the 1st of October:

"The Archduke expects much from France and a little from England. He will deceive himself if he expects England to take an equal part with France in the aid to be given to Mexico. It is impossible that France can recall its troops after the arrival of Maximilian in Mexico. This would be to expose him to humiliation and to the return of anarchy. But it is impossible that England should ever join in a military occupation of Mexico. We will immediately recognize the Archduke. We will be friendly to Mexico, but nothing more."

The Times only repeated in other words what Lord Russell said in all his despatches.

IV.

THE FRENCH PROGRAMME—ITS DIFFICULTIES.

It results from all the documents quoted, and especially from the despatch addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Bazaine, the 17th of August, 1863—

1. That France seeks in Mexico "neither conquest nor colonial establishment, nor even any political or commercial advantage to the exclusion of other powers."

2. That the French government expressly disavows any intention to substitute its influence for the free will of the Mexican nation, and that the desire of the Emperor's government is to limit, as promptly as circumstances will permit, the extent and length of our occupation.

3. That the Archduke Maximilian will not definitely accept the crown until the Mexican people, being consulted, shall have freely elected him, and until he shall have obtained every guarantee, necessary to assure the proposed empire against the dangers which threaten its integrity and its independence.

It is necessary, therefore, to collect as soon as possible the suffrages of the Mexican people, and, conforming to the instructions of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, it is in the institutions and local customs of the country that the mode must be sought to obtain this indispensable result in the most thorough manner.

These institutions and local customs are quite simple. Every Mexican who has a lawful occupation, of more than eighteen years of age if married, and of more than twenty-one years of age if unmarried, exercises the privileges of a citizen, and his name is inscribed on the electoral lists of the municipality to which he belongs.

But how shall the vote be taken? Shall the poll be declared open only in the localities occupied by the French troops, or in all Mexico? If in the former manner, the vote would not be the largest manifestation of the popular will, because the whole people would not be consulted; in the latter, the appeal could not be made known to them, and would consequently fall to the ground.

The situation may be understood at a single glance by a reference to the map which is added to this pamphlet. The French occupation is only effective in the part of the Mexican territory colored in red; and even this part of the territory is overrun by seventy-two hostile guerilla bands, averaging from seventy to three hundred men each. The freedom and purity of the ballot could, therefore, only be guaranteed in a portion of the territory of Mexico, relatively very small. Seven-eighths of the population of Mexico and twenty-nine thirtieths of its territory are beyond the lines of the French protection, as may be ascertained by an examination, without reference to the map, of some of the statistical and geographical details which follow.

V.

STATES, CAPITALS, AND POPULATION OF MEXICO.

Mexico is divided into 22 States, 6 Territories, and a Federal District.°

States.	Superficial or square miles.	Population in 1858.	Capitals.	Inhabitants.
Aguascalientes	2,739	88,329	Aguascalientes	39,693
Chiapa	18,679	167,472	San Cristobal	7,649
Chihuahua	83,512	164,073	Chihuahua	12,069
Coahuila	36,572	67,590	Saltillo	19,898
Durango	48,489	144,331	Durango	22,000
Guanajuato	11,396	729,103	Guanajuato	48,954

* The Constitution of 1857, made in this political division of Mexico the following alterations:

TITLE II—SECTION 2. ART. 43. The Mexican confederation is composed of twenty-four States and one Territory, the names of which are as follows: Aguascalientes, Colima, Chiapa, Chihuahua, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon and Cohahuila, Oajaca, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, the Valley of Mexico, Vera Cruz, Yucatan, Zacatecas, and the Territory of Lower California.

ART. 44. The States of Aguascalientes, Chiapa, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Mexico, Puebla, Queretaro, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and the Territory of Lower California, retain the boundaries which they have had hitherto (1857.)

ART. 45. The States of Colima and of Tlaxcala retain, being erected into States, boundaries which they had when they were only Territories of the confederacy.

ART. 46. The State of the Valley of Mexico comprises the territory which has, until now, (1857,) formed the federal district; but it will only take rank as a State when the federal government shall have been removed to some other place.

ART. 47. The State of Nuevo Leon and Cohahuila, comprises the former Territory of Nuevo Leon and Cohahuila, unless the hacienda of Bonanza, shall be re-incorporated into the State of Zacatecas.

The other States, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Vera Cruz, and San Luis Potosi, make some exchanges of towns, to rectify their frontier lines.

States.	Superficial or square miles.	Population in 1858.	Capitals.	Inhabitants.
Guerrero	32,003	279,109	Tixtla	6,501
Jalisco	48,591	894,058	Guadalajara	68,000
Mexico	19,539	1,129,629	Toluca	12,000
Michoacan	22,993	554,585	Morelia	25,000
Nuevo Leon	16,688	145,779	Monterey	17,309
Oajaca	23,642	525,938	Oajaca	25,000
Puebla	8,879	658,609	Puebla	71,631
Queretaro	1,884	165,155	Queretaro	29,702
San Luis Potosi	28,142	397,189	San Luis Potosi	19,678
Sinaloa	33,722	163,714	Caliacan	9,647
Sonora	100,228	139,374	Ures	6,009
Tabasco	12,359	70,628	San Juan Bautista	5,300
Tamaulipas	30,334	109,673	Victoria	4,621
Vera Cruz	27,415	349,125	Vera Cruz	9,647
Yucatan	48,869	668,623	Merida	23,575
Zacatecas	27,768	296,789	Zacatecas	15,427
Territories.				
Lower California	60,662	12,000	La Paz	1,254
Colima	3,019	62,109	Colima	31,774
Isla de Carman	7,298	11,807	V. del Carmen	3,068
Sierra Gorda	3,127	55,358	San Luis de la Paz	4,411
Tehuantepec	12,526	82,395	Minatitlan	339
Tlaxcala	1,984	90,158	Tlaxcala	3,463
District.				
Federal District	90	260,534	City of Mexico	205,000
Total	793,179	8,400,236		

The population has increased since 1793 at the following rate:

Years.	Population.	Years.	Population.
1793	5,273,029	1839	7,065,000
1803	5,873,100	1842	7,015,509
1808	6,500,000	1851	7,867,520
1824	6,500,000	1854	7,853,395
1830	7,996,000	1858	8,287,413

The population is composed of about 1,000,000 white, descendants of Europeans, 4,000,000 Indians, 6,000 blacks, and 3,400,000 metis (part white and part Indian) or mulattoes (part white and part black.) The foreigners, to the number of 9,234 in 1838, are classed as follows: Spaniards, 5,141; French, 2,048; English, 615; Germans, 681; Americans, 444; miscellaneous, 405.

VI.

AN EXPRESSION OF MEXICAN OPINION IMPOSSIBLE.

The orders sent by Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Bazaine, the 14th of August last, could not be executed. The commander-in-chief saw the impossibility of obtaining a popular ratification of the vote of the Assembly of Notables so long as seven hundred thousand inhabitants only were under the protection of France, and more than seven millions still clung to Juarez or his partisans. Rightly or wrongly, if the polls had been declared open under such circumstances, the provisional government would have been accused of the exercise of a pressure, in the part of the country occupied by it, contrary to the freedom of the ballot. On the other hand, it would have been a strange delusion to suppose that the adversaries of intervention would permit a resort to a regular election in the immense territory not yet occupied.

Too early an announcement was made that the organization of the new political régime had replaced the power of arms. Such was not the opinion of General Bazaine, whose position well enabled him to survey the field, for he determined a new campaign against Juarez to be absolutely necessary. Great preparations have been made, and the latest news left the expeditionary forces masters of Queretaro. But no matter how skillfully and energetically this campaign may be managed, a prompt conclusion cannot be looked for.

Juarez will not risk everything on a single engagement. He will take good care not to enter battle, and he will use every effort to avoid one. Everything leads to the belief that

he will persist in the tactics which he has followed since the surrender of Puebla. He will abandon San Luis Potosi, just as he has abandoned Mexico and Queretaro. He will beat a continual retreat before the French army, confining himself to the distribution of a large part of his force into guerilla bands.

Shall we continue to pursue these forces, which ever evade our grasp, into a mountainous country, extremely difficult of access to a regular army, and in which we shall be obliged to leave garrisons in every town and village, and to distribute all along the roads flying columns to secure the safety of our communications? The effective numbers of the expeditionary corps would soon prove insufficient to such a task, and prudence would not permit us to leave too far in the rear, and exposed to a *coup de main*, Cordova, Orizaba, Puebla, and Mexico.

A MILITARY SOLUTION POSTPONED.

A solution of this question by force of arms seems, therefore, to be indefinitely postponed, unless the French expeditionary corps shall be trebled or quadrupled; and such is certainly not the intention of the French government, since M. Drouyn de l'Huys has ordered General Bazaine to take measures to limit, as promptly as circumstances will admit, the extent and length of our occupation.

These circumstances will spring up of their own accord as soon as a stable and truly national government shall have succeeded the provisional government inaugurated the 18th of June. We may then retire; the end proposed by our intervention will have been fulfilled, and we shall be finally free from our responsibility. But this result, so much desired, cannot, we fear, be obtained within any short period of time unless by the proclamation of a suspension of hostilities, during which the question of what form of political rule they shall prefer definitely to establish may be submitted to the Mexican people. The mode to obtain this is very simple:

PROPOSED SOLUTION BY AN ARMISTICE AND A BALLOT.

1. An armistice of three months.
2. During the armistice an appeal to be made to the people.
3. The electoral processes will be carried out under the supervision of an equal number of agents chosen by the provisional government in power at Mexico, and of agents named by President Juarez. Commissioners delegated by the commander-in-chief of the French forces will take care that the vote shall be surrounded by every possible guarantee of independence.
4. The people will be called upon to vote for the establishment of an empire, according to the wish expressed by the Assembly of Notables, or for the maintenance of the republic and of the constitution of 1852.
5. Juarez will engage to abide by the new order of things, or to quit the country, in case the vote of the Assembly of Notables shall be ratified by the people. If Juarez, on the contrary, or any other candidate of the liberal party, shall obtain the majority of the votes, the French occupation would no longer have any purpose.

Whatever might be the result of the vote, France would certainly obtain the redress of its wrongs. If the people pronounce in favor of the re-establishment of the empire, the Archduke Maximilian could proceed without apprehension to receive the crown which has been tendered to him, for the submission or withdrawal of Juarez would end all serious opposition. If, on the contrary, Juarez should receive the majority of the votes, his reelection under such solemn conditions would give him the moral force which he lacks, and the clerical party, knowing well that it need never count again upon a European intervention, would stop its intrigues.

The government of Juarez represents the abolition of political privileges, civil equality, the union of two races which for three centuries have been kept forcibly apart—the Indians and the creoles. What motive could be assigned for refusing to treat with him if he should be, for the third time, regularly proclaimed president? He has been reproached with a wish to dismember Mexico for the benefit of the United States. But he will not linger in the trying situation against which he has had to struggle for the last six years, and he will hereafter find his interest in maintaining the integrity of Mexico. And further, what better guarantees can the conservatives give in this respect? Did not Santa Anna sell to the United States, in 1854, the Mesilla valley for the sum of fifty millions of francs, (\$10,000,000,) and did not Mr. Almonte himself, at that time minister of Mexico at Washington, approve this sale and receive the first payment, reaching the sum of thirty-five millions of francs, (\$7,000,000?)

It has been falsely stated that there was a perfect unity in the views and action of the conservatives. On the contrary, the conservatives are very much divided; the archbishop of Mexico and General Salas, in tendering their resignations as members of the provisional executive power, afford a new proof of this fact.

We cannot, therefore, see what good reason there is to prefer the conservatives to the liberals.

The Emperor said in his letter to General Forey, the 3d July, 1862:

"The end to be attained is not to impose upon the Mexicans a form of government which will be distasteful to them, but to aid them to establish, in conformity with their wishes, a government which has some chance of stability, and will assure to France the redress of wrongs of which she has had to complain."

Why pursue the struggle and persist in so useless a spilling of blood, from which there cannot even result any glory to our arms? Would it not be more wise and simple not to treat with Juarez, but to proclaim on both sides a suspension of hostilities, during which the people shall freely and finally decide between the two parties in opposition—between the conservatives and the liberals? The Mexican people will be taken as the arbiter of its own destinies, and the essential part of the imperial programme will receive within a very short period its full application. We will bring to an honorable end a costly enterprise. We will avoid all danger of a collision with the United States, and we will have besides, on the eve, perhaps, of a European struggle, the free disposal of our land and naval forces.

Mr. Romero to Mr. Seward.

[Translation.]

MEXICAN LEGATION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Washington, February 25, 1864.

MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit to you, annexed to this note, a translation into English of the discourses pronounced in the French legislative body by Mr. Gueroult, Mr. Thiers, Mr. Berryer, and Mr. Favre, during the discussions which took place in that assembly on the affairs of Mexico on the 25th, 26th, and 27th days of January last past. The speeches referred to are translated from the official text thereof as it was published in the *Moniteur Universel*, official paper of the French government, in the Nos. 26, 27, and 28, answering to the 26th, 27th, and 28th of the said January.

The orators of whom I have made mention had, for purpose, political censure of the course followed by the French government in its expedition against Mexico, and they considered it either in the point of view of advantage to France only, as did Mr. Thiers, or under the more elevated aspect of the justice of intervention and the motives or pretexts of the war, which engaged the attention of Mr. Favre.

I think it possible to say that, although there are in said speeches some sufficiently serious and substantial inaccuracies, which are patent to all who are well informed of the facts which had happened in Mexico, they constitute a deliberate and solemn rebuke of the imperial policy, made (and this is worthy of note) by the most distinguished and respected representatives of the nation for whose benefit it is pretended to carry out the intervention.

I do not include the speeches made by the organs of the French government in defence of the imperial policy, because, besides the supposition that the said government will take care to give them wide circulation, and that they will reach the department through other channels, they contain inaccuracies of such nature, that it would not be proper for me to send them to the government of the United States without exposing the inaccuracies to which I allude, and this would be a greater labor than I can at present undertake, being, moreover, of little use, on the supposition that the defences attempted to be made of the Napoleonic policy were so feeble that, taking for granted as true all the facts and reasons alleged by the imperial organs, that policy would forever rest condemned in the opinion of impartial and right-minded men.

I avail of this opportunity to repeat to you the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

M. ROMERO.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, &c., &c., &c.

Debate in the French legislative body, on the affairs of Mexico.

Corps Legislative, Session of the 25th of January.—Presidency of his Excellency the Duc of Morny.

The PRESIDENT. Now, gentlemen, we pass to the 6th paragraph, relative to China, Cochinchina, and Mexico. It is as follows :

"The legislative body believes with you, sire, that the most wisely-governed nations cannot flatter themselves that they will always escape external complications, and that they ought to regard them without illusions as without weakness. The distant expeditions to China, Cochinchina, and Mexico, which have succeeded each other, have, in fact, disquieted many persons in France, on account of the obligations and sacrifices which they entail. We acknowledge that they ought to inspire respect afar for our countrymen and for the French flag, and that they can, therefore, develop our maritime commerce ; but we will be happy to see the speedy realization of the good results which your Majesty gives us reason to hope."

The first amendment which is presented is that of Messrs. Guérout, Magnin, A. Darimon, Jules Simon, Hénon, Havin, Jules Favre, Lanjuinais, Dorian, Eugene Pelletan, Ernest Picard, and Emile Ollivier. The amendment is couched in the following terms :

"We see with pain that the government persists in the Mexican expedition. We cannot associate ourselves with this ruinous enterprise ; and we are the interpreters of public opinion when we demand that it should be brought to an immediate termination."

M. Guérout is entitled to the floor

M. GUÉROUT. Gentlemen : It has now become almost commonplace to come and criticise the Mexican expedition. That expedition is not popular. The uncertain or but little known causes which have produced it, its problematical results, the considerable sums which it has cost, the sacrifices of men mowed down by war or disease, all have brought a certain unpopularity on this expedition. So my intention, in addressing you now, is not to criticise the details of accomplished facts or actions already brought about by our generals or by the chiefs of the expedition. I am going to examine, in your presence, the causes which led to the Mexican expedition—the apparent causes and the real causes—in the hope, if we succeed in pointing out the prime idea of the expedition, to show you that this idea is wanting in justness. This result would not be useless. We will not demand of an expedition to obtain results which the very nature of things does not permit it to reach ; we will then show ourselves less severe and less exacting in regard to the conditions on which we can put an end to this disastrous expedition. What are the causes which gave occasion for the Mexican expedition ? I speak, first, of the apparent causes. They are, outrages inflicted for a long period on our countrymen—extortions, exactions of every kind, assassinations in great number ; an attempt even of assassination committed on the person of the representative of France.

It would seem, at first sight, that all these causes combined would suffice to explain the motives for a declaration of war, and yet, on a closer examination, we reach the conviction that, if there had been no other motives, the expedition should never have taken place.

In fact, gentlemen, the exactions, the extortions, the violences are real. They have been very numerous. But, seriously and sincerely, can a European power demand that, in a country given up to civil war, rent asunder by anarchy, our countrymen who go thither with full knowledge of these facts, and perfectly aware of the state of disorder into which the country is plunged, can enjoy a security which is not accorded to the people of the country themselves ?

This consideration is so strong, that for a long time there were numerous causes of complaint in Mexico which never resulted in the application of any remedy, either on account of the difficulty of the expedition itself, or by reason of this general sentiment with regard to the state of the country. I do not think that these reasons were the principal reasons, the fundamental ones, of the expedition ; and if you will allow me, I will proceed to seek them elsewhere, and in a higher sphere.

Gentlemen, in the treaty signed between France, Spain, and England, under date of October 31, 1861, no disposition foreign to the causes which I have just enumerated is mentioned. "This expedition is undertaken to insure, by means of combined action in common, efficacious protection to the persons and property of their respective countrymen in Mexico."

In article 2 it is said that, "The high contracting parties engage not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the coercive measures provided for by the present convention, any acquisition of territory or any particular advantage, and not to exert in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a character calculated to infringe on the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely establish the form of its government."

You see, gentlemen, in the commencement there is question only of reparation to be exacted.

However, it is evident that among the three contracting parties one at least entertained greater projects. In fact, when the three combined armies had arrived in Mexico, there were at first, as you know, preliminaries signed at La Soledad, subsequently disavowed by the French government ; finally conferences took place at Orizaba, in which a rupture occurred. We are perfectly aware of the motives of it. The proceedings of the conference of Orizaba have been published, and from them it appears that General Almonte was present in the camp of the allies ; that he asked their protection, in order to march against Mexico ; that he put forth the idea that no treaty, no arrangement, should be entered into between the allies and the Mexican government. Moreover, he enunciated the idea that the allied armies were going to Mexico to overthrow the Mexican government and to establish a monarchy. He proclaimed himself as authorized for this purpose by the very words of the sovereign of France. Hereupon ensued a rupture, which is yet present to the memory of all. The Spanish army withdrew, England followed ; France remained alone in Mexico, and pursued the expedition on her own account.

After some military events, on which it is useless to insist, a new commander, General Forey, was sent out. Here the idea, which, in my opinion, is the real idea of the expedition, shows itself with the greatest clearness. In a letter which you all remember, a letter addressed by the Emperor to General Forey, we read :

"There will not fail to be persons who will ask you why we proceed to expend men and money to found a regular government in Mexico.

"In the actual state of the civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is not a matter of indifference to Europe, for it is it that supports our manufactures and gives life to our commerce. We have an interest that the republic of the United States should be powerful and prosperous, but we have none that it should possess itself of the whole Gulf of Mexico, thence dominate over the Antilles as well as over South America, and be the sole dispensator of the products of the New World. We now see, by sad experience, how precarious is that sort of industry which is reduced to look for its raw material to one quarter only in all the vicissitudes of which it is thus compelled to participate.

"If, on the contrary, Mexico preserves its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a stable government is established there with the assistance of France, we shall have rendered to the Latin race, on the other side of the ocean, its due strength and its prestige ; we shall have guaranteed their proper security to our colonies in the Antilles and to those of Spain ; we shall have established our beneficent influence in the centre of America ; and that influence, in creating immense outlets for our commerce, will procure us those staples that are indispensable for our industry.

"Mexico, thus regenerated, will always be favorable to us, not only through gratitude, but also because its interests will be in unison with our own, and because it will find a powerful means of support in its friendly relations with the European powers."

There is here evidently a very grand and very lofty thought, that of opposing a barrier to the invasion of the Anglo-Saxon race.

The idea of raising up the Latin and Catholic races in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant races is certainly a grand political idea. It only remains to be known whether this idea is as practicable as it is great. It is upon this point that I entertain doubts, which are confirmed by a residence of four years that I have spent in Mexico, and by the attentive observation which I have made of its manners and its institutions. Permit me here to enter into some details.

I commence by asserting that it appears evident to me that this idea of constituting an empire in Mexico would not have entered into the views of the French government had not a most important event, the civil war in the United States, been inaugurated a few months previously. It was in the month of January, (March,) 1861, if I am not mistaken, that the first cannon shots were exchanged at Charleston between the south and the north of the United States ; it was in the month of June that complaints became urgent on the part of the French legation in Mexico ; it was in the month of October that the treaty was signed between the three interfering powers.

It seems, then, that these two elementary notions, the desire of withdrawing our commerce from the preponderating influence of the United States in furnishing a precious staple, cotton, and the idea of a political equilibrium, perhaps of a religious equilibrium, combined to urge on this expedition.

Well, it is from this point of view that I propose to myself to examine the Mexican expedition, abstracting entirely, I repeat, from any criticism of details which has been already most satisfactorily done, and in regard to which I could only repeat what has been better said than I am capable of doing.

It was projected, then, gentlemen, to establish an empire in Mexico. It was evident that such an establishment could not be agreeable to the Americans of the north. There-