

embolden monied men to invest their capitals, once more, in those branches of industry which were formerly most productive.

It is to be regretted, that the non-introduction of the Trial by Jury, the want of publicity in the administration of justice, and of a little more tolerance in religious matters, should cramp this rising spirit, and check the progress which must otherwise be made.

But I am inclined to consider these defects, as perhaps unavoidable sacrifices to the prejudices of the day, and to look to time, and to the action of the system itself, as the best mode of removing them.

SECTION II.

THE NAVY AND ARMY OF MEXICO IN 1827.

The Navy.

WHEN the Spanish troops, after being driven from the Capital and the Continent, occupied the Castle of St. John of Ulloa, which is situated upon a sand bank nearly opposite the town of Veracruz, the necessity of driving them from this last stronghold, and the impossibility of effecting it without a naval force, induced the Government to purchase six gun-boats and two sloops of war in the United States, which, with one brig, and two launches, on the Pacific side, constituted, in 1823, the whole Navy of the Republic.

During the siege of St. John, which lasted till November, 1825, this force was gradually increased; until, in January 1827, it consisted of one ship of the line, (formerly the Spanish Asia, now the Congress) two frigates, (the *Líbértād* and *Tēpēyāc*), the corvette, *Morelos*; brigs of war, *Guerrero*, *Victoria*, *Bravo*, and *Constante*; the schooner *Hermon*, four

gun-boats, four large launches, and two pilot-boats, used in the conveyance of the Government correspondence with California.

The expense of the whole, with that of the naval departments, stores, pay of officers and men, repairs, &c., is estimated at 1,309,045 dollars, and this it will probably never exceed, as Mexico, both from the thinness of the population upon her coasts, and from the natural difficulties of the access to the Interior, is neither able, nor called upon, to undertake the defence of her territory at a distance from her own shores.

Her squadron, (such as it is) is under the orders of Commodore Porter; who, ignorant probably of the very superior force assembled by the Spaniards at the Havana, under Admiral Laborde, threatened to blockade that port, and, by destroying the trade of the island of Cuba, to compel the Spanish Government to come to some understanding with its former Colonies.

The fallacy of these expectations was soon demonstrated, and Porter, unable to keep the sea a moment before Laborde's fleet, which consists of six really fine frigates, and two ships of the line, besides some smaller vessels, was forced to take refuge in Key West, from whence he did not for some time extricate himself.

The attempt upon the Havana was injudicious, as, with so feeble a force, it could hardly, under any circumstances, have led to any decisive result. As

it is, it has only served to introduce a system of privateering, which will increase the irritation of the Mother country, and probably lead to reprisals upon the Mexican coasts, without producing any one good effect.

A little time will, however, convince the Mexicans that a few light vessels, to check smuggling, and keep up the communication between the different points of the coast, is all that they require; and the country will then be saved a very considerable, and a very useless expense.

The Army.

The Republic of Mexico is divided into eighteen *Comandancias Generales*, or districts, each under the orders of a Military Commandant, who receives his instructions, not from the Government of the State in which he resides, but from the Minister of War.

The army for the present year consists of 58,955 men, of whom 32,161 are actually under arms; the remainder are ready to be called out should their services be required.

The troops of the line are composed of Twelve Battalions of Infantry, each of 823 men (full war complement 1,223); Twelve Regiments of Cavalry, each of 559 men, (war complement 815); and three Brigades of Artillery of 1,767 men in all.

In addition to these, there are thirty-four Presidential Companies, consisting entirely of Cavalry, and employed, principally, in the protection of the North-

ern Frontier; and eleven *Compañías sueltas*, (local corps of infantry and cavalry) distributed upon different points of the coast; the first consists of 3,317 men in all; the second of 1,120. With those previously enumerated, they make a total of 22,788 regular troops, now under arms, as specified in the accompanying table, (No. 1,) taken from the official report of this year.

The *Milicia Activa*, or Militia on actual service, consists of 9,373 men, divided into four battalions in the Interior,—four upon the Coasts, and fifteen Presidial Companies. (*Vide* Table 2.) This force can be augmented, at pleasure, to 36,167 men, who are already enrolled, and disciplined to a certain extent, although allowed to retire to their homes, while not wanted: (*Vide* Table 1.) A similar regulation is adopted, though to a less extent, with the Troops of the line; so that as long as the country is not menaced with actual hostility from without, the War establishment, although nominally kept up, is attended with, (comparatively) but little positive expense.

The *Estado-Major-General*, which seems to unite the duties of the Quarter-master General's Office, with the more scientific branches of the department of Engineers, has been occupied, since its creation in September, 1823, in making military surveys,—preparing a general plan of defence, in the event of an invasion, determining, astronomically, the position of the most important points, laying the foun-

dation for a Military College, and establishing a general depôt of maps and charts. Some of the surveys are very interesting, particularly that of the Isthmus of Tehuāntēpec, by Colonel Örbēgösö,) which proves the impossibility of opening a ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific at that point, and those of parts of Veracruz, executed, principally, by General Tērān, and Colonel İbērrī. General Mōrān, (better known, before the abolition of titles, as the Marques de Vibāncō, is at the head of the *Estado-Mayor*, and employs no small portion of his private fortune in promoting useful projects, and giving an impulse to every thing connected with this department.

The total number of officers employed, together with the estimate of the expenses of the War department, for the year ending June, 1828, will be found in the Table of General Expenditure, at the end of the Fourth section.

It amounts to 9,069,633 dollars, or, with the Navy, (both being under the same Ministry,) to 10,378,678 dollars,—about four-fifths of the whole annual expenditure of the Republic.

Nor is this merely a nominal outlay, for on the 1st of January of this year, not one dollar was due to any Regiment in the service:—It is, however, an enormous drain upon the country, and must undoubtedly, if continued, prove a serious obstacle to prosperity.

On the other hand, reduction has already been carried very far, and can now only be very gra-

dually effected. The Estimates for the year 1825, amounted to nearly *nineteen millions* of dollars, (18,916,524 dollars); in 1826, they were reduced to 13,587,083 dollars; and in 1827, (as I have just stated,) to 10,378,678 dollars. From this again the Minister conceives that one *fourth* may be deducted, without too much weakening the national means of defence; thus reducing the total expense of the army in 1829, to 7,784,000: and he expresses both in the report for 1826, and in that of the present year, his hopes that it may be ultimately brought down to seven millions of dollars, which he regards as the minimum, until the war with Spain be at an end.

The greatest credit is due to General Góm̄ez Pēdr̄az̄a for the zeal with which he has carried the views of the Congress respecting the organization of the Militia, into execution. By no other means could so great a reduction in the troops of the line, (and consequently in the expenses of the War department) have been effected; and, from what he has already done, I see every reason to believe that, before the expiration of the present Presidency, (April, 1829,) the minimum of seven millions of dollars will be attained.

But a saving of eleven millions of dollars annually, is not the only beneficial change that has been introduced into the War department, during the present Presidency. Nothing could be more deplorable than the state of the army in the Autumn

of 1824. The Revolution had destroyed all discipline, and all respect for the Civil Authorities; and the soldier, accustomed to the license of a camp, was ready to follow any leader that could promise him plunder, in lieu of his arrears of pay. This dangerous state of things ended with the establishment of the Constitution, and the command of money, which the Government obtained by means of the Foreign loans. The troops, well clothed, well fed, and punctually paid, were soon brought into subjection. A number of the most turbulent officers were dismissed on half-pay, and the greatest attention was paid to the gradual improvement of the remainder.

Arms were distributed in equal proportions to the Militia and the Troops of the line, so as to make them serve, in some measure, as a check upon each other; and as the new system has been, at the same time, gradually taking root, and acquiring stability, there has been little difficulty in preserving tranquillity, and repressing partial disorders wherever they appeared. Since the insurrection of Lōbātō, in 1824, there has been but one instance of gross insubordination on the part of any corps, or regiment, and that was repressed without the intervention of an armed force. It occurred at Durango, where one of the lieutenants of a regiment of cavalry quartered in the town, found means to persuade his men, that he had orders from the President to carry into execution, there, a project for central-

izing the Republic; and, after seizing, with their assistance, his superior officers, published a *bando*, or decree, deposing the constituted authorities, dissolving the State Congress, and, in fact, declaring himself the lord and master of the place.

This extraordinary state of things lasted until intelligence of what had passed reached the Capital, when Gonzalez, and all his followers, were outlawed by the Congress, and troops from the neighbouring states of Jalisco and Zacatecas were ordered to march against them. Three thousand men would have been assembled before Durango in three weeks, but General Parres, the Military Commandant of Jalisco, who was appointed to take the command of the expedition, felt so confident that the troops under Gonzalez had been deceived by false representations, that he advanced upon Durango with an escort of only fifty dragoons, and was joined, as he expected, by the whole of Gonzalez's men the instant that the decree of Congress was communicated to them. Their leader, unfortunately, escaped with one of his associates, and, up to the time of my departure from Mexico, had not received the punishment, which he had so justly merited.

The vigour displayed, both by the Congress and the Executive, upon this occasion, produced the very best effect; but it must be admitted that in a country where, from the extreme ignorance of the soldiery, and the unsettled character of many of the officers, facilities exist for such attempts as these,

a large standing army is not unaccompanied with some danger. The best security lies in the separation of the different Corps, which prevents any large mass of troops from being acted upon by the influence of any particular officer; and in the opposition which public opinion in one State, (acting, of course, in some degree upon the troops resident there), presents to any violent innovation in another. This, as long as there exists no cause of complaint common to the whole army, will be sufficient to preserve tranquillity. In the mean time, due attention should be paid to the manly representations of the Minister of War respecting the mode in which the army is at present recruited, and the greatest pains taken to prevent the ranks from being filled with the scum and refuse of society, with which the States but too often supply the deficiencies in their legal Contingent. The better sort of Mexican soldier is excellent of his kind. He possesses great docility, great powers of enduring fatigue, considerable personal courage, and great readiness in acquiring all the manual duties of his profession: such, at least, is the character which I have constantly heard given of them both by their own officers, and by foreigners, who have held any command amongst them: but the bad are bad indeed, and, perhaps, more difficult to manage than any other race of men in existence.

Notwithstanding the nominal war with Spain, few countries are so well able as Mexico to dispense with

the existence of a large permanent force. There is hardly a single point upon her long-extended line of coast, upon which it would be practicable to disembark an invading army; and were it even landed, such are the difficulties with which it would have to contend upon the ascent to the Interior, from the want of roads, and provisions, and the deadly nature of the climate, that its destruction would be almost inevitable. A month's detention in the *Tierra Caliente* would be equivalent to the loss of a pitched battle; and, even supposing every natural defence to be successively carried in the shortest possible time, a month would hardly, under any circumstances, suffice to reach the Table-land. There, the struggle would commence anew; and such is the horror entertained at present, of foreign domination, that I am convinced that a levy *en masse* of the whole population, would be the consequence of any hostile aggression. How formidable this might prove, in a country where the distances are too great to admit of lines of communication being kept up, and where the greatest part of the population are admirable horsemen, and not unaccustomed to partizan warfare, it is needless to point out: but I do not think that the most formidable expeditionary army that Spain could furnish, would have the slightest chance of success.

It might desolate a portion of the country, and throw it back fifty years, in the career of civilization, but few would live to tell the tale, and little encouragement would be given for a second attempt.

Mexico possesses only five fortresses, St. John of Ullōā, Cāmpēchē, Pērōtē, Ācāpūlcō, and Sān Blās. In most of them the works are in a bad state, but there is little prospect of their being necessary.

The Government has published a table of the quantity of arms of all kinds now in its possession; that is, either distributed to the troops, or in the Public magazines, which I subjoin. (No. 3.)

Most of the muskets, sabres, pistols, and lances, have been purchased during the last three years, and are in very good order. The Brass artillery, too, which is all Spanish, is beautiful; but many of the iron guns are, probably, unfit for service. The sum total is formidable, and amply sufficient for the defence of the country.

TABLE, No. 1.

TROOPS OF THE LINE.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Total.
Thirteen brigades of artillery - -	1178		589	1767
Twelve battalions of infantry - -		9876		9876
Twelve regiments of cavalry - -			6708	6708
Thirty-four presidial companies -			3317	3317
Eleven <i>compagnias sueltas</i> on the coasts - -		920	200	1120
	1178	10796	10814	22788
MILICIA ACTIVA.				
Twelve companies of artillery - -	1152			1152
Twenty battalions of infantry in the interior - -		24240		24240
Thirteen battalions on the coasts -		6600		6600
Six squadrons and nine companies of coast guards - -			2475	2475
Fifteen companies in the northern States - -			1500	1500
One squadron at Mazatlán - -			200	200
	1152	30840	4175	36167

TABLE, No. 2.

FORCE UNDER ARMS IN 1827.				
Troops of the Line, <i>vide</i> preceding Table.				
MILICIA ACTIVA.				
	Artillery.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Total.
Four battalions in the interior - -		4848		4848
Four battalions <i>guarda costas</i> - -		2000		2000
Two squadrons and three companies <i>guarda costas</i> - -			825	825
Fifteen presidial companies - -			1500	1509
One squadron at Mazatlán - -			200	200
		6848	2525	9373
General <i>resume</i> of Force under Arms.				
Troops of the line - -	-	-	-	22788
Militia - -	-	-	-	9373
Total - -	-	-	-	32161

TABLE, No. 3.

Brass cannon of different calibers - -	308
Iron ditto - - - - -	456
Brass culverins - - - - -	35
Mortars - - - - -	17
Carronades, &c. - - - - -	93
Cannon-balls of from 36 to 6 - - -	210,145
Rounds of grape - - - - -	19,913
Shells - - - - -	38,644
Muskets - - - - -	111,564
Rifles - - - - -	2,000
Carbines - - - - -	15,280
Pistols - - - - -	8,000 pairs
Sabres, &c. - - - - -	26,500
Lances - - - - -	5,792
Ball-cartridges - - - - -	3,701,113