

all over the country that I had written a paper censuring the United States for not having assisted the Spanish colonies in their war for independence, and for not having permitted Mexico and Colombia to make Cuba independent, when my article did not contain a word of censure against the United States Government, and was only a brief statement of historical facts with quotations from high American authorities. I thought that the reason for this misunderstanding was the fact that my paper had not been read in its entirety by those who telegraph to us press extracts from the same, but only such extracts from it as were thought to be of importance, and thus its object was misapprehended. I was under the impression that anybody who read carefully the whole text could find nothing incorrect or improper in it, much less disrespectful, either to the United States or to the Spanish Government.

I was therefore somewhat surprised when I saw that a man of Senator Money's great abilities shared such views, which he expressed in an answer to my article published in the *North American Review*, for September, 1897, under the title of "The United States and the Spanish-American Colonies. A Reply." In that paper Senator Money stated that my assertions were incorrect, and that the United States had materially and morally assisted in the liberation of the Spanish-American Republics. It afforded me great pleasure to have the opportunity of making clear that my statements were correct, and that my article did not contain a word of censure against the Government of the United States, and with that purpose in view I published in the November number of the *North American Review* a rejoinder to Senator Money's article, amplifying what I had said in my first article, and showing, in my opinion in a very clear and conclusive manner, the correctness of my former statements.

I would much prefer to insert in this volume Senator Money's answer as well as my rejoinder, but as that would take a great deal of space and the question is not of such momentous importance as to warrant it, I have added to my first article such portions contained in the second as I think would make it more complete and clear, and consider in a few foot-notes some of Senator Money's principal objections.

As the paper relating to the origin of Mexican independence, which I have now entitled "Genesis of Mexican Independence," refers to a period which precedes our revolutions, I will insert it first, and it will be followed by the other entitled "Philosophy of the Mexican Revolutions."

PART I.

GENESIS OF MEXICAN
INDEPENDENCE.

I. GENESIS OF MEXICAN INDEPENDENCE.¹

The independence of the United States, proclaimed in 1776, and recognized by England in the treaty signed at Paris on September 3, 1783, based really on economic reasons, and, still more, the recognition of that independence by Spain, principally on account of her hostility to England and at the suggestion of her ally, France, at that time waging war upon England, could not fail to produce a profound impression in the Spanish colonies of America. These events showed the native Americans² that the European colonies of this continent had the right, recognized by Spain, to sever their connection with the mother-country, not only for political but for economic reasons. It was this consideration that caused Count de Aranda, a very able statesman, to advise Charles III., immediately upon the recognition of the United States by Spain, in a treaty signed at Paris in 1783, to establish among the Spanish colonies in America three great empires—one in Mexico, another in Peru, and a third on the Spanish Main, which should embrace New Granada, Venezuela, etc., each to be ruled by a member of the Spanish royal family. He proposed that the King should assume the title of Emperor, that the new sovereigns should intermarry into the Spanish royal family, and that each of them should pay an annual tribute into the Spanish treasury. Although this scheme might have proved difficult of realization, and might in the process of its execution have had to undergo radical changes, the final result would have certainly been less disastrous to Spain than the complete emancipation of her American colonies.

¹ This paper has been made up of the two articles published under the title of "The United States and the Liberation of the Spanish-American Colonies" in the *North American Review* of New York, for July and November, 1897, with several additions and revisions.

² It was my purpose to speak only about the origin of Mexican independence, but in preparing my paper I found that my subject was so closely related to the revolutionary movement in the other American Republics, that it would have been hardly possible for me to do full justice to it, without giving some account of the manner in which independence originated and was accomplished in the South American colonies. To do this has necessarily extended this paper beyond its intended limits, but I have endeavored to make my references to the wars of independence of the South American colonies as brief as possible.

The French Revolution, which to a certain extent was the result of the American independence,¹ must have exercised a great influence also on the minds of the native Spanish Americans, since it was a very serious blow to the theory of divine right by which it was then supposed in the Western World that nations were governed, as well as a recognition of the natural rights of the people; and this notwithstanding that the discreditable and sanguinary deeds of that revolution, and especially its acts of hostility to the Catholic religion, were represented by the Spanish authorities to the American colonists as being the acts of frenzied men, inspired by the worst passions, as well as illustrating the excesses to which the people were liable when unrestrained by their legitimate rulers. The fact that the Bourbons were not restored to power, but that the French Revolution took a conservative turn and was finally succeeded by the Empire of the First Napoleon, who ruled, not by divine right, but as the choice of the people for the benefit of the people, was the final blow to the principles on which the rule of the Spanish monarchy in America was based.

Spain did not hold her American colonies as forming a part with her of one common country, but as the fiefs or the personal property of the monarch, not so much by reason of her discovery and possession of them, as by reason of the Bull of Pope Alexander VI., which divided the ownership of the American continent between the Kings of Spain and Portugal, "in virtue of the jurisdiction which the Pope had over the world as the head of mankind," as expressed by the most learned commentator of the Spanish laws for the Indies (Solorzano, in his *Politica Indiana*, lib. i., cap. x. and xi., n. 8).

The American vassals of the King of Spain had no political rights of any kind, and no personal rights that the King could not ignore or

¹ The correctness of this assertion has been sometimes doubted, and although I think that its exactness has been proved, I will mention in support of it Mr. Henry Thomas Buckle's opinion, who, in speaking of the immediate cause of the French Revolution, says in his *History of Civilization in England*, vol. iii., pp. 291-293. edition of F. A. Brockhaus, Leipsic, 1865:

"While all these things were conspiring to overthrow the old institutions, an event suddenly occurred which produced the most remarkable effects in France."

The event to which he refers is the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence of the United States. He then adds:

"Indeed there is reason to believe that the final blow the French Government received was actually dealt by the hand of an American, for it is said that it was in consequence of the advice of Jefferson, that the popular part of the legislative body proclaimed itself the National Assembly, and thus set the crown at open defiance."

This assertion is supported by a letter which the Duke of Dorset, British Ambassador at Paris, addressed to Pitt on July 9, 1789, in which he says:

"Mr. Jefferson, the American Minister at this Court, has been a great deal consulted by the principal leaders of the *Tiers Etat*; and I have great reason to think that it was owing to his advice that order called itself 'L'Assemblée Nationale.'"

trample upon; they were, in fact, serfs; yet, by an inconsistency hardly to be accounted for, the Spanish Government established in its colonies municipal government; in this way laying unintentionally the foundation of the democratic institutions which were finally to prevail.

There was an unwritten colonial law, designed, no doubt, for the maintenance of the colonial system, but which was destined finally to put an end to it, in regard to which the Spaniards differed from the other European countries having colonies in America. This law concerned the status of the children of Spaniards born in America. The mere fact that they were born on this continent made them of an inferior caste, debarred from the enjoyment of any of the political or social rights of those born in Spain.

The Spaniards born in Spain formed a privileged class, and their children born in America were considered of an inferior race, born to oppression, who could not regard their parents as fathers, but as masters and oppressors.

The colonial economic system was also of so restrictive a nature as to make it impossible that it should permanently exist; and, more than any other grievance, it served to enlist in favor of the colonies the sympathy of the commercial nations of Europe, as it also affected their own interests. The commercial policy of the European nations with regard to their American colonies was essentially one of monopoly and protection, but the policy of Spain exceeded in point of fact all reasonable bounds, as it prohibited the colonies from raising or manufacturing any article produced or manufactured in the metropolis. To establish a complete monopoly, Spain undertook to provide her colonies with such goods as they needed, and to receive in return their natural products and specie. To carry out this policy, it was settled that only the port of Seville should be the one from which merchant vessels could be sent to the colonies; all commercial intercourse between the colonies was forbidden; the natural products of the American colonies could be shipped only at certain ports, as Veracruz, on the Atlantic, and Acapulco, on the Pacific, for Mexico, and Panama and Portobelo for South America; and the merchant vessels could sail only once or twice a year in custody and escorted by war vessels, and the articles had to be transported overland to some remote place, as the City of Mexico in Mexico, and Potosi in South America, in the centre of the continent, from whence they were distributed to the several colonies where they were needed, sometimes at a cost of 500 or 600 per cent. above their original price. After a century of this policy, the merchant marine of Spain had disappeared, its capital and manufactures had considerably diminished, its commerce was conducted by foreigners by smuggling, and the gold and silver of the New World went everywhere except to Spain.

European Conspiracy to Accomplish Independence.—I have no information that would lead me to believe that the Mexicans who favored the independence of their country had organized, for the promotion of their cause, any secret society or political revolutionary centre, either in Mexico or in Europe, at the end of the eighteenth century. From a revolutionary manifesto¹ signed in Paris, on the 22d of December, 1797, by Don José del Poso y Sucre, Don Manuel José de Salas, and Don Francisco de Miranda, who called themselves "delegates from the Junta of Deputies from the Provinces and the people of South America, which convened at Madrid, Spain, on October 8, 1797, to settle upon the best means of effecting the independence of the American colonies of Spain," it appears that prominent men from South America had been endeavoring since 1782 to establish independence. To aid in attaining that object, the alliance of England, at that time at war with France, was recommended. They entered into several negotiations with England to that end, especially one initiated in London in 1790, with the British Premier, as a consequence of the conference held at Holliwood, which, it was stated, had been approved by the South American provinces, for the purpose of obtaining from Great Britain a naval force not exceeding 20 warships, 8000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, the provinces promising to pay to England a pecuniary indemnity which the *Edinburgh Review* stated was to be 30,000,000 pounds sterling, after their independence was accomplished, and to grant her besides certain commercial advantages.

In that manifesto it was suggested that the United States of America should be invited to make a treaty of friendship and alliance with South America, "on the basis that the possession of the two Floridas and of Louisiana should be guaranteed to the United States, so as to make the Mississippi the boundary between the two great nations, and that to the United States and Great Britain should be given all the islands of the American Archipelago, except Cuba, the key of the Gulf of Mexico." In return for these advantages it was proposed that the United States should furnish to South America an army of 5000 infantry and 2000 cavalry.

That document entrusted the leadership of the scheme, and the military operations necessary to carry it out, as well as the negotiations with England and the United States, to General Don Francisco de Miranda, born in 1750, in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela. Miranda entered the Spanish army, and served in the United States in the revo-

¹ This paper was published in 1815 by ex-President John Adams in the *Boston Advertiser*, with a letter addressed to the editor, Mr. Lloyd, in defence of his course in that incident, and reproduced in Spanish by Señor Don Ricardo Becerra, in the first volume of his book, *Vida de Don Francisco de Miranda*, published in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1896.

lutionary war against Great Britain. When the war was ended he was sent to Cuba, and while there he was accused of conspiring to deliver the island of Cuba to the British Government, and he was consequently court-martialled. Miranda then fled to Europe. He travelled in England, Germany, and Turkey, and finally visited Russia under the reign of Empress Catherine.

Miranda then went to France and enlisted in the revolutionary army. Serving under General Dumouriez, he was soon promoted to Brigadier-General, having achieved distinction in the Belgian campaign. The failure of the siege of Maelstrich which he conducted, the defeat of Nerwinden, in which battle he commanded the left wing, and the fall of the Girondists in Paris, caused Miranda's downfall, and he was arrested and court-martialled. But the reaction which followed the 9th Thermidor gave him his liberty, and he went to London to renew his negotiations with Pitt to obtain England's assistance in the independence of the American colonies of Spain. He was the real head and centre of the conspiracy prepared in Europe to emancipate the American colonies of Spain. General Miranda believed that he had secured the assistance of the British Government, and it appears that he had some promises of assistance from Pitt, then the British Premier, which, however, were never carried out.

It seemed natural to suppose that, while Great Britain was waging war against Spain in 1798, the British Government would have been not only willing, but even anxious, to divert her attention by assisting the insurrection of her colonies. That was not exactly the case, however, because England expected that Spain would sever her alliance with France, and so aid England in her war against the French revolutionary government. With that object, England sent an agent to Madrid to give assurances to the Spanish Government that she would not assist in the colonial insurrection, if Spain gave up her alliance with France. At the same time instructions were sent to the English authorities in the island of Trinidad to assist in the South American insurrection and to prepare an expedition for that purpose, as Mr. Rufus King, the United States Minister in London, communicated to Mr. Pickering, the Secretary of State, in a despatch dated on February 26, 1798. Had England assisted directly in securing the independence of the Spanish colonies, that would have defeated her purpose of obtaining the support of Spain in her war against the French Government. This was especially the case after Napoleon obtained the ascendancy in France, and more so after the events of 1808, culminating in the treaty of Bayonne. When the Spanish nation rose against the French troops which occupied its territory, England naturally was not disposed to embarrass Spain, whom she considered and at length found to be a very valuable ally against Napoleon, and therefore all

the efforts of Miranda and of the leaders of the insurrection in South America to obtain material assistance from England were unavailing.

Although the document above referred to seems to be restricted to South America, Central America is also mentioned in connection with a promise "to open to trade the isthmuses of Nicaragua and Panama"; and incidentally Mexico is also mentioned in a statement that "the deputies of the vice royalties of Mexico, Santa Fé, Lima, and Rio de la Plata, and of the Provinces of Caracas, Quito, Chile, etc., assembled in a legislative body, should decide definitively about the commercial advantages to be granted to England and the allies of South America." It is probable, however, that this reference to Mexico was made on the supposition that Mexico, by reason of similarity of race, language, and institutions, would follow the lead of South America. I have no knowledge of any Mexican having taken part in the conference.

It was further stated in that document that "Don José del Poso y Sucre and Don Manuel José de Salas should set out at once for Madrid to report to the Junta the result of their mission to Paris, carrying with them a copy of the same, and that as soon as this was done the Junta should adjourn and its members should go immediately to the American continent to promote simultaneously insurrections in all the towns of South America, to take place as soon as the assistance furnished by the allies should appear." A copy of that paper was given to General Miranda, as his credentials, to represent the Junta before the British and American Governments.

Mr. King, in his despatch to Mr. Pickering already referred to, reported that he had met in London several Jesuits of South America, from whom he learned that they were working for the emancipation of the Spanish colonies in America. They had lived for many years in London in the service and under the pay of the British Government, and they had shown Mr. King the papers that they had prepared for presentation to the British Government. From a letter addressed by ex-President Adams, on March 6, 1815, to Mr. Lloyd, editor of the *Morning Advertiser*, of Boston, explaining his conduct while President of the United States, in connection with the efforts of Miranda to obtain the assistance of the United States to emancipate the American colonies of Spain, it appears that Don José del Poso y Sucre and Don Manuel José de Salas, who signed the document in conjunction with General Miranda, were Jesuits, probably of the number mentioned by Mr. King; and to the fact, Mr. Adams intimated, that the immediate predecessor of Charles IV., who was at the time (1798) King of Spain, had expelled the Jesuits from his American dominions, was due their action in the matter, they being influenced by a desire to take revenge on the Spanish monarch. There is no doubt that Pitt had detained in London some Spanish Jesuits who took a very active part in the con-

spiracy to promote the insurrection, and who wrote several manifestoes and inflammatory documents which were to be distributed in the American colonies.

Expedition of General Miranda to Venezuela in 1806.—General Miranda sent to the United States in November, 1789, his friend and co-worker, Señor Caro, for the purpose of obtaining the assistance of this Government. It appears that the scheme had the good-will of Alexander Hamilton, who was at the time organizing a military force to be used in case of war with France, and that it also had the sympathy of Aaron Burr. President Adams, however, following a conservative policy, and having due regard for the neutrality laws, did not embark in the adventure, and did not receive Señor Caro. In November, 1805, General Miranda came to the United States, and was received both by President Jefferson and by Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State. He organized in New York an expedition of about two hundred men, which left that port on February 3, 1806, on the ship *Leander*, for Jaquemel in the island of Hayti, where he was joined by two transports, the *Bacchus* and the *Abeja*. Mr. William S. Smith, Jr., a grandson of ex-President John Adams, and a son of Colonel William S. Smith, Surveyor of the Port of New York, went in that expedition as aid to General Miranda. In consequence of that, Colonel Smith had to resign and he was indicted, and a noisy trial followed in which he was acquitted.

Miranda reached the coast of Venezuela, at Ocumare, but there he lost his two transports, which were captured by the Spaniards together with sixty-seven men, ten of whom were hanged at Puerto Cabello, the remaining fifty-seven being sent to the military prison of San Felipe el Real, in Cartagena.

Miranda met in the island of Barbadoes Sir Alexander Cochran, Admiral of the British Navy, who addressed him a letter dated June 6, 1806, on board his flagship, the *Northumberland*, in which he stated that Miranda's plan to achieve the independence of South America was advantageous to British interests, and agreed to assist in landing Miranda's forces on the coast of Venezuela, and to provide him with three small vessels and probably one frigate, and to defend Miranda's ships against any attacks from the Spanish naval forces. In exchange for his assistance he demanded certain commercial advantages to be granted when independence should be achieved. Miranda left Granada escorted by the English man-of-war *Lily*, the brig *Empress*, and the merchant schooner *Trimmer*. In Trinidad he had been reinforced, his army consisting of about four hundred men, and he landed at Coro. But nobody joined him, all the natives having fled to the interior on his arrival, and he was forced to leave the mainland and to return to the Antilles. This result showed the futility of the scheme to promote

independence relying only or mainly on foreign aid. Independence did not make any headway until it relied only upon the support of the natives, and with them alone it was achieved.

In 1811, Miranda went again to Venezuela, and succeeded in organizing a force with which he began the war, but he was obliged to surrender, and was sent to a Spanish prison in Cadiz, where he died in 1816, without seeing his country's independence accomplished. But he had been the forerunner of Bolivar.

Origin of Mexican Independence.—What, in my opinion, contributed more than anything else to precipitate the independence of the American colonies were the disgraceful dissensions of the Spanish royal family in 1808 at Aranjuez and their subservience to Napoleon, which culminated in their abdication in favor of the Emperor. This was accomplished by the Treaty of Bayonne, which transferred to the French Emperor all the rights and titles of Charles IV. to the throne of Spain and the Indies, including the American colonies. The Spanish people strenuously resisted the French invasion and established Juntas in Spain and the colonies to rule the country in the name of Ferdinand VII., the heir of the King, whom Bonaparte had compelled to abdicate, the principal Junta acting as a regency.

The Spanish monarch was the head and centre of the government, and when he disappeared the people of Spain considered that the sovereignty had reverted to them, at least during the captivity of the King, and this view determined the organization of the several Juntas established in Spain, to which I have just referred. As a result of this doctrine, the Spanish subjects in America considered themselves entitled to organize Juntas for their own protection and to deny obedience to the Juntas, which without their representation and using the same right as they were now using, had been organized in Spain during the French invasion. In a communication which the City Council of Mexico addressed to the Viceroy on August 5, 1809, it was stated that "under the present circumstances, the monarch being prevented from exercising the government, the sovereignty is represented by the nation, to accomplish in his name what may be most convenient."

It was in this manner that the native Americans acquired for the first time some control over their own affairs and began to realize that they could take care of themselves. Although the principal Spanish Junta, which met at Cadiz, called representatives to the Cortes from the Spanish colonies, the representation allowed to the latter was very meagre, and that step, instead of satisfying the colonists, only demonstrated to them that the Spaniards were determined not to allow them self-government. Thus the idea of independence gradually gained ground all over the American continent.

¹ *History of the Revolution of New Spain*, by José Guerra, vol. i., p. 41.

That such was the case is shown by the remarkable coincidence that the insurrections in all the American colonies of Spain took place within the same year and almost simultaneously, and, I think, without any previous concert among them. The distances were so great and the means of communication so scanty, slow, and difficult, that news of an outbreak in one colony could not have been received in the others for several months, and, in some cases, for nearly a year after it had occurred.

This fact shows, in my opinion, that the colonies were ripe for independence, and that a condition of things had been reached which made independence a necessity that could not be suppressed, postponed, or evaded. Although there had been several attempts at independence in the American colonies of Spain before the year 1810, more particularly the attempt at Chuquisaca, now Sucre, in Bolivia, on May 25, 1809, and some revolutionary movements which broke out in Quito and were easily subdued, independence was not proclaimed until the following year, 1810; on April 19th in Caracas, May 25th in Buenos Ayres, July 20th in Bogotá, on September 16th in Mexico, September 18th in Santiago, Chili, and in the same month of September in most of the other colonies.

It has been said by a distinguished South American historian¹ that ideas do not come without a cause; that they are the natural result of certain conditions, and that just as a plant which appears in an uncultivated soil is the manifestation of a combination of physical, chemical, climatological, and organic causes, so a new idea is a manifestation of a combination of intellectual forces, and appears at the same time in various individuals. In support of this theory he adduces the saying of Emerson that there is a secret door by which ideas of reform enter the hearts of legislators and of the people, and thus the appearance of a new idea is a new hope which indicates that a new light has been kindled in the hearts of millions of persons. This is proven by the fact that an idea will occur simultaneously to several persons living in different localities, and without any previous concert among them.

Without contesting the soundness of this view, what, in my opinion, produced the idea of independence in the American colonies was the common sense and natural reason of the inhabitants of the colonies, who had some education and whose minds were somewhat developed. They could not fail to perceive the injustice of being held in servitude by a comparatively small nation, and this view was strengthened by the example set by the United States when they proclaimed and achieved their independence.

In most of the Spanish colonies the independent movement began in the shape of a popular meeting, presided over by the leading persons

¹ General Bartolomé Mitre, *Historia de San Martín y de la Emancipación Sud-Americana*, vol. i., chap. i., paragraph ix., p. 81, Buenos Ayres edition of 1887.