

of the capital of the colony, for the purpose of opposing the French invasion of Spain, and supporting the rights of the Spanish royal family. It was thought necessary that the colonies should be armed and prepared, not only to repel the invasion of France, but also to assist the mother-country in her efforts to resist the Napoleonic aggression. In Mexico, however, this was not the case. The Viceroy, Iturrigaray, intended, no doubt in good faith, to arm the country for that purpose, but the jealousy of the "Audiencia"<sup>1</sup> and the native Spaniards inspired them with the suspicion that he intended to call a Popular Assembly, with the ultimate object of proclaiming the independence of Mexico; the ground for this supposition being that the Viceroy had refused to recognize the Junta established in Cadiz, Spain, and they accordingly deposed him, and sent him back to Spain, and appointed his successor. This, naturally, destroyed the respect which the Mexican people had for the representative of the Spanish King, and showed them that force, when successful, was justifiable, and could accomplish greater things. The way was thus paved for a series of military revolutions which continued to break out for about sixty years. The popular movement in all the other colonies drifted finally into a proclamation of independence, while in Mexico independence was proclaimed outright and without any semblance of submission to the Spanish Crown; the cry of Hidalgo, the originator of Mexican independence, being "Long live independence! Down with the Spaniards!"

*The War of Independence in South America.*—It will be opportune and interesting to mention briefly when and how the Spanish colonies accomplished their independence.

The independence of South America proper, that is, from the Isthmus of Panama to Cape Horn, was accomplished mainly by two great military geniuses, as great as any the world has ever seen, assisted, of course, by several very able and distinguished lieutenants, among whom occupied the most conspicuous place as a star of the first magnitude General José Antonio Sucre, of Colombia, who achieved some of the most brilliant victories in the war, and who is considered by many as a soldier superior to Bolivar himself.<sup>2</sup> The two great generals were

<sup>1</sup> The Spanish colonies in America were governed by an executive officer, representative of the King, who was called Viceroy, Captain-General, President, etc., according to the importance of the colony, and an Audiencia, of from three to five members, which was a judicial court, acting at the same time as an advisory council to the Executive and intended in fact as a rival body to keep in check the Viceroy, often deposing him.

<sup>2</sup> One of Bolivar's most remarkable lieutenants was General José Antonio Paez, of Venezuela, whose prowess during the war of independence led to his being called the Venezuelan Achilles; but he remained in Venezuela, while Bolivar went to Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

José de San Martín, born on February 25, 1778, in Yapeyú, a small town in the Argentine Republic, on the borders of Paraguay, who operated in the southern part of South America; and Simon Bolívar, born in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, on July 25, 1783, whose field of operations covered the northern part of that continent, both finally meeting in Guayaquil. Both belonged to distinguished families of Spanish descent, both had received a military education in Spain and had served with distinction in the Spanish army, and both flew to their country's assistance when they heard that independence had been proclaimed. Bolívar was of an impulsive and reckless disposition, and suffered in consequence many serious defeats, while San Martín, being a much more cautious man, was only once defeated, at Cancharayada, Chili, on March 19, 1818, in a night sally made by the enemy, while he was changing the position that his army had occupied during the afternoon.

The La Plata Provinces, or the Argentine Republic, as it is now called, had not only practically established its independence in 1813, after the decisive victories of Tucumán, fought on September 24, 1812, and Salta, fought on February 20, 1813, although its independence was not formally declared until July 9, 1816, by a National Congress which met at Tucumán; but had also driven the Spaniards from Uruguay and Paraguay, and had assisted the adjoining provinces of Upper Peru, which had also rebelled against Spain, and before had shown great patriotism and determination in repulsing twice, in 1806 and 1808, the attacks of the English, then at war with Spain, for the purpose of capturing Buenos Ayres. The Argentine Republic was, therefore, the base of operations against the Spanish Government in the southern portion of South America, and her capital, Buenos Ayres, was the only capital on the continent which, once occupied by the patriots, since May 25, 1810, was never recaptured by the Spaniards.

Peru was at the time, after Mexico, the main seat of Spanish power in America. Lima, its capital, was called, for its enervating conditions and dissipations, the Capua<sup>1</sup> of South America. The Viceroy of Peru

<sup>1</sup> Lima is situated in a pleasant valley where rain never falls; scarcely ever, about once in a hundred years, are there any thunder-storms, and the air is never impregnated with electricity. Generally, but more especially so in summer, the clouds temper the rays of the sun, while the soft and damp breezes from the south enervate its inhabitants and render active work irksome.

Unanue, in his *Observations on the Climate of Lima and its Influences*, second edition, p. 83, says: "Owing to the influence of the causes before stated (enervating conditions) the men necessarily lack manly traits of character. On the other hand, the same causes tend to the perfection of women; their features are delicate, their expression soft, their eyes black, with large pupils full of fire and sensibility—the leading traits of a weak but nervous body."

It is a fact already noticed by Humboldt, that a moist, temperate climate prevail-

sent several expeditions, not only to subdue the insurgents of Upper Peru, which was a comparatively easy task, but also against those of Buenos Ayres, who suffered serious defeats in Vilcapujio, on October 1, 1813, and in Ayouma on November 14th of the same year. San Martin was for some months commander of the Argentine army in Upper Peru during 1814, after having obtained an important victory at San Lorenzo on February 3, 1813, and he soon became satisfied that the war could not end until a mortal blow was given to the Spanish power in Peru, and he realized that the only effectual way to accomplish that end was to march from Chili to Peru by the Pacific. He was therefore transferred, at his own request, to the Province of Cuyo, at whose capital, Mendoza, which commanded the main pass of the high cordillera dividing Argentina from Chili, he organized and disciplined his army, which he called the army of the Andes, availing himself of the assistance of the Chilian patriots who flocked to his banner, among whom was O'Higgins, who took such a leading part in the subsequent public events in Chili.

On January 17, 1817, San Martin's army left Mendoza and crossed the high cordillera by the Uspallata Pass, an undertaking accomplished in the face of the enemy, and which may well be compared with the crossing of the Alps by Hannibal, centuries before, when he invaded Italy. While in Chili, San Martin defeated the Spanish army at Chacabuco, on February 12, 1817, which permitted him to occupy Santiago, the capital of that country. The Viceroy sent from Lima another army of Spanish veterans, which joined the defeated Spaniards in Talcahuano, a strongly fortified place, and obtained at Cancharayada a victory on March 19, 1818. When both armies had arrived at the battle-field on the afternoon of that day, and while San Martin was changing during the night the position of his army, it was suddenly attacked by the enemy, dispersing a large portion of the same. San Martin had consequently to withdraw to Santiago, where he was followed by the Spanish general, and sixteen days later, on April 5, 1818, he fought and defeated the Spaniards at Maipo, near the City of Santiago, thus achieving the independence of Chili, and putting the Spanish Viceroy at Lima on the defensive.

The Governments of the La Plata Provinces and of Chili had agreed by a treaty signed at Buenos Ayres, on February 5, 1819, to send a joint expedition to liberate Peru; but before the expedition started a revolution broke out in the Argentine Provinces, requiring the presence of the Argentine army in Chili, and instructions were

ing in a country during the whole year, while very pleasant, does not have the invigorating properties of climates which have extremes of hot and cold weather, which act as a tonic and exercise a very healthy influence upon the body, making men stronger physically and more energetic and inclined to work.

sent to San Martin to return at once. San Martin, realizing that if he went back to Buenos Ayres his army would be demoralized and the cause of independence seriously jeopardized, resolved to disobey his instructions, and he resigned his command, but was recognized as general-in-chief by his army at Rancagua, in Chili, on April 2, 1820, and finally appointed general-in-chief of the joint Chilian-Argentine expeditionary army by the Chilian Government, who assumed the payment of the same. Before San Martin left Chili for Peru, the Argentine Government had been overthrown, and anarchy prevailed there. He found himself, therefore, without a government or nation to back his force, but acted as general-in-chief of the combined army by virtue of appointment of the Chilian Government and by the act of Rancagua, and under such circumstances only his personal worth and influence over the army, with Chili's assistance, could hold it together. San Martin knew that he could not march to Peru overland, and he therefore concentrated all his efforts on the task of providing Chili with a navy which would clear the Spanish Armada from the Pacific.

The geographical position of Chili, which is a long and narrow strip of land bounded by the Cordilleras on the east and bordering on the Pacific Ocean, made it indispensable for her to have a navy, and it is extraordinary how, being the poorest and the last of the Spanish-American Crown colonies, she could, under the able leadership of O'Higgins, a Chilian patriot of Irish descent, and while she was carrying on her war of independence against Spain, improvise a navy, a task in which the Chilian leader was very substantially assisted by San Martin and the Buenos Ayres Government with the man-of-war *Intrepido*, subsequently lost at the capture of Valdivia, by Lord Cochrane, on February 3, 1820. In September, 1818, O'Higgins had procured five men-of-war, manned by raw recruits with little or no naval discipline, and a few English and Americans who could not speak Spanish, which he put under the command of Colonel Manuel Blanco Encalada, born in Buenos Ayres, who had previously served in the Spanish navy, and who became afterwards Vice-President of Chili. Blanco Encalada attacked the frigate *Maria Isabel*, on October 28, 1818, while she was under the protection of the forts at the port of Talcahuano, and captured that vessel, as well as five Spanish transports, with seven hundred Spanish soldiers. The enlarged Chilian navy was placed under the command of the gallant Lord Cochrane, a very distinguished admiral of the British Royal Navy, then under a cloud at home, who took service under the Chilian flag, attacked and defeated the Spanish navy at the port of Callao, capturing the flagship *Esmeralda*, on November 5, 1820, and so established Chilian naval supremacy in the Southern Pacific among the American Republics.

During the year 1814, and before Chili had begun to organize her navy, the Argentine Independent Government had organized one which, under Admiral Brown, a gallant officer of Irish descent, defeated the Spanish navy at Montevideo, and established on the La Plata River the supremacy of the Argentine navy.

With the Chilian navy, consisting of nine men-of-war and sixteen transports, San Martin left Valparaiso for the Peruvian coast on August 20, 1820,<sup>1</sup> with an army of 4118 soldiers, of which 2313 were Argentines and 1805 Chilians. According to Miller, in his *Memoirs*, vol. i., page 243, one third of the Argentine division was composed of Chilians who had replaced the Argentine soldiers killed or disabled during the war, although all the officers were Argentines, and many of the Chilian contingent had the same nationality.

Eighteen days later San Martin landed in Peru, near the city of Pisco, to the south of Lima. The Viceroy had over 23,000 men under his command which he could concentrate against San Martin,

<sup>1</sup> It may be interesting to give a list of the ships which constituted the first Chilian navy, when the squadron left Valparaiso for Peru on August 20, 1820, under Lord Cochrane, and the way in which they were obtained.

Ship of the line *San Martin*, 1300 tons, of 64 guns, previously called *Cumberland*, which belonging to the English East India Company, was bought for \$200,000 at Valparaiso by the Chilian government in 1818. Frigate *O'Higgins*, 1220 tons, 44 guns, formerly called *Maria Isabel*, captured at Talcahuano, October 28, 1818. Frigate *Lautaro*, 850 tons, 50 guns, previously called *Windham*, belonging to English and American merchants of Valparaiso, sold to the Chilian government for \$180,000, June, 1818. Frigate *Independencia*, 580 tons, 28 guns, formerly called *Curacio*, bought in the United States for \$150,000, June, 1819. Brig *Galvarino*, 398 tons, 18 guns, formerly called *Lucia*, bought by the Chilian government in 1818 for \$70,000. Brig *Araucano*, 270 tons, 16 guns, called before *Columbus*, bought in the United States for \$33,000. Brig *Pueyrredon*, 220 tons, 18 guns, called before *Aguila*, belonged to the Spanish navy and entered Valparaiso in February, 1817, without knowing that the port was in the possession of the patriots. Schooner *Montezuma*, 200 tons, 7 guns, captured at Callao in 1819. Sloop *Chacabuco*, 20 guns, called before *Coquimbo*, bought in Valparaiso in 1818. This ship remained to guard the Chilian coast.

The transports captured by the Chilian navy were the *Magdalena*, *Dolores*, *Carlota*, *Rosalía*, and *Helena*, formerly belonging to the Spanish government and captured by Admiral Blanco Encalada, and the merchant ships *Regina*, *Aguila*, *Victoria*, and *Jeresana*, captured by Lord Cochrane. Frigate *Thomas* was captured at Talcahuano, June 8, 1818. Brig *San Miguel* was captured by the *Lautaro* in 1817. *Perla* and *Potrillo* were Chilian vessels which had been captured by the Spanish and recaptured by Lord Cochrane.

Of these transports the *Dolores*, *Perla*, *Aguila*, *Jeresana*, and *Potrillo* accompanied the united expedition to Peru, and the Chilian government obtained in different ways the other transports which served for the same purpose, namely: *Gaditana*, *Consecuencia*, *Emprendedora*, *Santa Rosa*, *Mackenna*, *Peruana*, *Minerva*, *Golondrina*, *Libertad*, *Hercules*, and *Argentina*. The total tonnage of these transports was 7178 tons.

This expedition was manned by 1600 sailors and marines, of whom about 600 were foreigners, the greater portion of them being English and the balance Chilians.

and it required great generalship and fine manœuvring to baffle the Spanish army. After remaining a month and a half at Pisco, and sending a portion of his army, under General Las Heras, to the interior to raise the people in favor of independence, San Martin sailed with the remainder of his force, on October 29, 1820, to Ancon, a port twenty miles north of Lima, and when the Spanish army was being concentrated against him there he moved again, on November 8th, having possession of the sea, to Huacho, about seventy miles north of Lima, thus severing the communication of the Viceroy with his northern provinces. In the meantime the principal towns of Peru began to join the independent cause, and even a portion of the native army of the Viceroy joined San Martin. All this, together with the very able generalship of that great commander, forced the Viceroy to evacuate Lima on July 6, 1821, which was occupied by San Martin on the 10th of the same month. The port of Callao, the strongest fortified Spanish fort on the Pacific, remained in possession of the enemy up to September 21, 1821, when it surrendered to San Martin.

When San Martin arrived at the northern Peruvian coast, Guayaquil, a very important military and naval position on the Pacific, proclaimed its independence, considerably weakening the Spanish cause.

San Martin had several parleys with the Spanish officers and made different armistices with them. No agreement was reached at a conference held at Torre Blanca hacienda in Retes between San Martin's and La Serna's representatives, on February 23, 1821; but an armistice was signed at Punchauca on May 23, 1821, General San Martin having finally an interview with Viceroy La Serna on June 2, 1821, for the purpose that I will mention further on. Their representatives had met before at Miraflores.

The best proof that could be adduced of San Martin's generalship was his occupation of Peru. He arrived there with comparatively a handful of men, when the country was in full possession of the Spaniards, outnumbering him five to one, and without fighting a single battle he caused the enemy to evacuate its capital, Lima; he obtained the retreat of the army, under General Canterac, which the Viceroy had sent to relieve Callao, and the consequent surrender of this port, and he proceeded to proclaim the independence of Peru, on July 15, 1821. And, considering it indispensable for the success of the cause that he should be at the head of the Government, he proclaimed himself Protector, a title which had not been used since Cromwell, with military and civil control over the country, a position which he assumed on August 3, 1821, and which he kept to January, 1822, when he surrendered the authority to Torre Tagle, whom he had appointed before as Governor of Lima, and who remained in such capacity until San Martin's return to Chili in September of the same year.

On September 21, 1821, the strongly fortified port of Callao surrendered, after Admiral Cochrane had captured from inside the harbor, and from under the protection of the Spanish forts, on July 24, 1821, the Spanish war-ship *Resolucion*, of thirty-four guns, and the *San Fernando* and *Milagro*, both merchant vessels armed for war.

Although Cochrane and San Martin were collaborators in the same work, there was some jealousy between them, and they quarrelled at last, although the apparent immediate cause was that the navy had not been punctually paid by San Martin, and Cochrane, as Admiral of the Chilian navy, seized some money that San Martin had placed on board a ship for safe keeping, and distributed it among his men, finally abandoning the coast of Peru. Lord Cochrane blamed San Martin for assuming the government of Peru. He thought San Martin had betrayed the trust of the Chilian Government, under whose orders he was acting, although San Martin's course was fully approved by O'Higgins. He was also blamed for having abandoned Peru when the enemy was still strong, considering that step as equivalent to flight, and in his passion he even accused San Martin of cowardice and dishonesty, while in such matters he was above reproach.

San Martin was in favor of a monarchical form of government as the best way to insure the independence and prosperity of the new nations, while Bolivar was in favor of a republican form of government. Yet when the Civil War distracted Colombia, Bolivar himself was inclined to accept a monarchical government as an effectual way of putting an end to anarchy. Bolivar was the originator of the scheme that all the American Republics should act in concert for their common defence and in other matters affecting their welfare, and this was his object in proposing, in 1826, the meeting of an American Congress at Panama.

San Martin was not destined to complete the work he had undertaken, as that task was reserved for Bolivar. In 1822 San Martin's situation in Peru had become difficult, as his army had been considerably reduced by hard service and sickness, he having only 8500 men, many of them raw recruits, while the Viceroy had in Upper Peru about 19,000 men, which could be easily concentrated in a comparatively short time. That task was made still more difficult by the defeat of a detachment of San Martin's troops under General Tristan, at Ica, by General Canterac, on April 6, 1822, this being the only reverse that his troops suffered, and that when not commanded by himself in person. San Martin thought it necessary, therefore, to have the assistance of Bolivar to give the finishing blow to Spanish dominion in Peru, as otherwise he was afraid the war would be protracted for several years, and he proposed to meet Bolivar in Ecuador. They met in Guayaquil, on July 26 and 27, 1822.

No authentic report of that interview has ever been published, and this has given rise to many surmises about its objects and results. From the events which preceded and followed it, and from a letter written, soon after it took place, by San Martin to Bolivar, on August 29, 1822, and from conversations of the former with friends, there is room to form an idea of what took place in it. San Martin offered Bolivar to serve under his orders, if he would go with his victorious armies to Peru; but his proposal was not accepted, Bolivar saying that he could not leave Colombia without permission from the Colombian Congress, and agreeing only to send 1500 men of his army to aid San Martin. It is well known that San Martin and Bolivar differed greatly in their views on many subjects relating to the work that they had both undertaken. The difference of opinion between the two regarding the government of the new States was another factor which contributed to prevent their acting in accord. One cause of disagreement between them was the question of the port of Guayaquil, which San Martin thought ought either to belong to Peru, or that the question of its possession should have been settled by negotiation between the Colombian and Peruvian Governments, while Bolivar had already annexed it to Colombia. San Martin, believing that he was in Bolivar's way, and sincerely desiring the success of the cause of independence, proved himself a true patriot and a great man, and preferring to sacrifice his future, decided to withdraw from his field of operations, leaving his competitor alone and rendering him entirely responsible for the course of future events.

San Martin consequently returned to Lima, where he had previously, on December 17, 1821, convoked a National Congress to organize the State, and on the very day on which Congress met, September 20, 1822, he resigned his command in Peru, and sailed for Chili.

Bolivar's career was still more eventful. He fought the Spanish both in Venezuela and New Granada with very varying success from 1810 to 1817, being sometimes victorious and sometimes crushed and defeated, and being twice obliged to fly from the country and take refuge in foreign lands, until finally he asserted his supremacy, and at the battle of Boyacá, fought on August 7, 1819, in which he achieved the independence of New Granada and captured Bogotá, its capital, and at that of Carabobo, the Waterloo of the Spaniards in Colombia, which was fought on June 24, 1821, he achieved the independence of his native land, Venezuela, having previously occupied its capital, Caracas.

The most remarkable trait in Bolivar's character was his indomitable will, his unflinching faith in his destiny, and in the final success of his cause, which, under the most adverse circumstances and after the worst defeats, when any one else would have despaired, sustained his

hope and animated him to continue his efforts; his faith, in almost every instance, being justified soon afterwards by a great victory.<sup>1</sup>

Bolívar, like San Martín, realized that his success could not be permanent as long as the Spaniards were in possession of the neighboring countries, and more especially of Peru, the principal Spanish stronghold in South America, which they used as a base from which to assail the new nationalities, and he therefore decided to attack them first in Ecuador and afterwards in Peru. Both armies, each from opposite ends of South America, converged towards Peru with the same object in view, that of putting an end to the Spanish domination. He consequently marched his army to Ecuador, where he met and defeated the enemy in the battle of Bomboná, on April 7, 1822.

The victory of Bomboná was a very costly one to the patriots, on account of the severe losses they sustained, as out of their force of 2000 men they lost over 600, or about 30 per cent., while the Spaniards, having nearly the same number of troops, only lost about 250, or 12½ per cent. The battle was of comparatively little result to the patriots, as immediately after it was gained Bolívar had to withdraw to his base of operations in Southern Colombia, where he remained until the 9th of June, 1822, when he succeeded in obtaining the surrender of the Province of Pasto, which, on account of its topography and the devotion of its inhabitants to the King of Spain, has been compared to La Vendée during the French Revolution.

On May 13, 1821, General Sucre had asked the co-operation of San Martín to march against Quito, and in January, 1822, an agreement was made by which San Martín promised to assist Sucre with 1500 men to be paid by the Colombian Government, which troops he sent under the command of Colonel Lavalle, and so both armies, San Martín's and Bolívar's, met at the Equator on their march from opposite ends of South America.

General Sucre, with his own forces, left Guayaquil, marched against Quito, and after his junction with the Argentine contingent, he achieved, at Pichincha, in sight of Quito, on May 24, 1822, a complete victory over the royalists, which accomplished the independence of Ecuador.

As San Martín had predicted, the patriot army in Peru was defeated after he left the country, both at Torata and Moquegua, on January 20

<sup>1</sup> In General Mitre's opinion, as expressed in his *History of San Martín*, vol. iii., chap. i., p. 761, Buenos Ayres edition of 1887, Bolívar's tactics, if they can be so called, were the result of native warlike instinct, combined with European discipline. He used, indeed, but little tactics and less strategy; his natural military instinct and genius for war prompted his movements, and he gained his victories chiefly by the audacity of his conceptions, the boldness and recklessness of his attacks, and his unflinching persistence after defeat. His military methods resembled in their reckless daring the tactics of Charles XII.

and 21, 1823. During the night of February 4, 1824, the Argentine garrison of the stronghold of Callao rebelled against the Government because they had not been paid, and finally delivered the place to the Spaniards, which was a very great blow to the cause of independence. Callao, like Veracruz, remained in possession of the Spaniards for some time after the independence of Mexico and Peru had been achieved.

After the defeats of Torata and Moquegua and the destruction of the army organized by Peru, under General Santa Cruz, the Peruvian Government made a treaty with Colombia, on April 12, 1823, by which it obtained the aid of 6000 troops; and, finally, after the country had fallen into anarchy, Bolívar made his appearance in Lima, where he was hailed as the liberator of the country, the Peruvian Congress appointing him, by a decree dated at Lima on August 10, 1823, Dictator and Liberator of Peru, thus giving him entire civil and military control over the country, so realizing San Martín's prediction.

General Abascal, Viceroy of Peru, had succeeded in organizing a native Peruvian army to oppose the independent cause, and among the officers who distinguished themselves in that army was General Valdez, who for his bravery and chivalry was called the Peruvian Bayard. The Spaniards had, besides, distinguished generals like General Canterac, famous for his talent to organize cavalry corps, and General La Serna, who became afterwards Viceroy. Generals Canterac and Valdez deprived Viceroy Pezuela of his military command, on January 29, 1821, at Asnapuquio, and appointed General La Serna in his place.

New dissensions broke out among the royalist troops, as most of them favored the Spanish Constitution of 1812, while General Valdez, with 5000 men, was in favor of an absolute monarchy, and hostilities broke out among the royalist troops, which caused them great loss, and assisted materially the patriots. By a strange phenomenon the Spanish officers belonged decidedly to the Liberal party, while the native Peruvian officers were enlisted on the side of the Absolutist party, this difference of opinion producing a rivalry in the army which affected seriously their *morale* and final success.

Bolívar, in full charge of the combined Peruvian, Chilean, and Argentine armies, as well as the whole of the Colombian army, marched against the Spaniards in Upper Peru. At Junín both armies met unexpectedly, on August 6, 1824, and only the cavalry took part in the engagement, the Spaniards having 1300 and the patriots 900 men, the Spanish cavalry being the flower of the Spanish army in Peru, and considered by the Spaniards invincible. The engagement lasted but three quarters of an hour,—no guns but only side arms were used,—but it was a bloody one, the Spaniards losing 250 men and the patriots 150 in killed and wounded. This defeat of the Spanish cavalry demoralized their army.