

favor. Railways and telegraphs are great preservers of peace. In case of an insurrection it was not long ago that it took months before the Government could reach the insurgents, and in the meantime they could organize and fortify themselves and make considerable headway before they were confronted by an enemy. Now the Government can send troops at once to quell an insurrection.

Peace in Mexico is as assured as it is in any other country, and life and property are as safe there as anywhere else. Public opinion seems to share this view, and capital, especially foreign capital, which is so conservative and timid, is now being freely invested in Mexican enterprises.

Conclusion.—I intend to show that the Mexican revolutions have not been, as many have believed, the result of the turbulent character of the Mexican people and of their incapacity for self-government, but the necessary consequence of sociological laws, which, operating in a community with opposing interests and tendencies, produced in Mexico—as they have produced in almost every country under similar circumstances—serious crises which have been the necessary conditions and the preliminary steps toward the final political organization of the country. In fact, to judge Mexico, which is a young country, by the standard of older ones, like the English nation, for instance, which several centuries ago passed through similar crises, would not be reasonable. Several centuries passed before the Magna Charta could become operative in England. During her reign, Parliament yielded the most abject submission to the arrogant despotism of Queen Elizabeth, and later to the strong will of Cromwell; and Protestant intolerance there showed itself no less fierce than Catholic intolerance did in Spain under Philip II., and yet England has passed through crises similar to those of Mexico, until finally she has reached a normal condition of things, and is now perhaps the country where more real freedom is enjoyed, and where life and property are best protected in the world. To judge Mexico, which has been struggling to attain that condition after many years of war and disturbances, by the standard of England in her present condition, or of any other equally old country, would be unphilosophical and unjust.

RULERS OF MEXICO FROM THE MOST REMOTE PERIOD UP TO THE PRESENT TIME.

First Period.

Before the Conquest; Kingdom of Tula (Tollan).

The Toltecs were 117 years making their journey from Huehuetlapallan to Tollan.

The Toltec monarchy lasted 449 years—from 667 A.D. to 1116 A.D., and the successive sovereigns who reigned during that period were: Chalchihuatlanac, founder of the dynasty; Izacatecatl, Huetzin, Totepeuh, Nacaxoc, Mitl, Queen Xiuhltaltzin, Tecpancaltzin, and Topiltzin.

During the reign of the last king the destruction of the kingdom took place (1116), and the Toltecs were no longer a nation.

Kingdom of the Chichimecans (afterwards of Acolhuacan).

The Chichimecans made their appearance in the plateau of Anahuac in the year 1117 A.D. Their capital was at first Tenayuca, then it was Texcoco.

Their kings reigned as follows:

	Year.
1. Xolotl, the Great	1120
2. Nopaltzin.....	1232
3. Tlotzin—Pochotl.....	1263
4. Quinantzin.....	1298
5. Techotlata.....	1357
6. Ixthlxochitl	1409
7. Tezozomoc (usurper).....	1418
8. Maxtlaton (usurper).....	1427
9. Nezahualcoyotl (legal ruler).....	1431
10. Nezahualpilli.....	1472
11. Cacamatzin	1516
12. Cuicuitzcatzin	1520
13. Coanacotzin	1521
14. Ixthlxochitl.....	1521

The kingdom of Texcoco, or Acolhuacan, ended with this sovereign, who was the most faithful ally of Cortez.

Aztec Kingdom.

The Aztecs settled in Anahuac in 1243 A.D., and after many years of servitude succeeded in establishing the City of Tenochtitlan in 1325. Before they established this city their leaders had been Huitzilihuitl and Xiuhtemoc.

Then their kings succeeded each other as follows:

	Year.
1. Acamapichtly ascended the throne in.....	1376
2. Huitzilihuitl.....	1396
3. Chimalpopoca.....	1417
4. Itzcoatl.....	1425

	Year.
5. Motecutzoma I. (Ilhuicanina).....	1440
6. Axayacatl.....	1469
7. Tizoc.....	1481
8. Ahuitzotl.....	1486
9. Motecutzoma II. (Xocoyotzin).....	1502
10. Cuitlahuatl.....	1520
11. Cuauhtemoc.....	1520

By the taking of the capital by the Spaniards in 1521 and the execution of Cuauhtemoc in 1525, the kingdom of the Aztecs or Mexicans terminated.

Second Period.

From the Conquest until the End of the War of Independence.

1. Hernando Cortez, Governor and Captain-General.....	1521
2. Luis Ponce, Governor.....	1526
3. Marcos de Aguilar, Governor.....	1526
4. Alonso de Estrada and Gonzalo de Sandoval, Governors....	1527
5. Alonso de Estrada, Governor.....	1527
6. { Nuño de Guzman, Juan Ortiz Matienzo, } First Council.....	1528
{ Diego Delgadillo, Sebastian Ramirez de Fuenleal, Vasco de Quiroga, } Second Council.....	1531
7. { Alonso Maldonado, Francisco Ceinos, Juan de Salmeron, }	

VICEROYS

During the Reign of Charles V.

1. Antonio de Mendoza.....	1535
2. Luis de Velasco.....	1550

During the Reign of Philip II.

3. Gaston de Peralta, Marquis of Falces.....	1566
4. Martin Enriquez de Almanza.....	1568
5. Lorenzo de Mendoza, Count of Coruña.....	1580
6. Pedro Moya de Contreras, Archbishop of Mexico.....	1584
7. Alonso Manrique de Zuñiga, Marquis of Villa Manrique ...	1585
8. Luis de Velasco, the second.....	1590
9. Gaspar de Zuñiga y Acevedo, Count of Monterrey.....	1595

During the Reign of Philip III.

	Year.
10. Juan de Mendoza y Luna, Marquis of Montes Claros.....	1603
11. Luis de Velasco, the second, for the second time.....	1607
12. Francisco Garcia Guerra, Archbishop of Mexico.....	1611
13. Diego Fernandez de Cordoba, Marquis of Guadalcazar.....	1612

During the Reign of Philip IV.

14. Diego Carrillo Mendoza, Marquis of Gelves.....	1621
15. Rodrigo Pacheco Osorio, Marquis of Cerralvo.....	1624
16. Lope Diaz de Armendariz, Marquis of Cadereita.....	1635
17. Diego Lopez Pacheco, Duke of Escalona.....	1640
18. Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Archbishop of Mexico.....	1642
19. Garcia Sarmiento de Sotomayor, Count of Salvatierra.....	1642
20. Marcos Torres y Rueda, Bishop of Yucatan.....	1648
21. Luis Enriquez de Guzman, Count of Alba de Liste.....	1650
22. Francisco Fernandez de la Cueva, Duke of Albuquerque...	1653
23. Juan de Leiva y de la Cerda, Marquis of Leiva.....	1660
24. Diego Osorio de Escobar, Bishop of Puebla.....	1664
25. Antonio Sebastian de Toledo, Marquis of Mancera.....	1664

During the Reign of Charles II.

26. Pedro Nuño de Colon, Duke of Veragua.....	1673
27. Francisco Payo de Rivera Enriquez, Archbishop of Mexico.	1673
28. Tomas Antonio de la Cerda, Marquis of Laguna.....	1680
29. Melchor Portocarrero, Count of Monclova.....	1686
30. Gaspar de la Cerda Sandoval, Count of Galvez.....	1688
31. Juan de Ortega Montañez, Bishop of Michoacan.....	1696
32. José Sarmiento Valladares, Count of Montezuma.....	1696

During the Reign of Philip V.

33. Juan de Ortega Montañez, the second time.....	1701
34. Francisco Fernandez de la Cueva, Duke of Albuquerque...	1702
35. Fernando de Alencastre, Duke of Linares.....	1711
36. Baltazar de Zuñiga, Marquis of Valero.....	1716
37. Juan de Acuña, Marquis of Casafuerte.....	1722
38. Juan Antonio Vizarron, Archbishop of Mexico.....	1734
39. Pedro de Castro y Figueroa, Duke of Conquista.....	1740
40. Pedro Cebrian y Agustin, Count of Fuenclara.....	1742

During the Reign of Ferdinand VI.

41. Juan F. de Güemes y Horcasitas, Count of Revillagigedo...	1746
42. Agustin Ahumada y Villalon, Marquis of Amarillas.....	1755

During the Reign of Charles III.

	Year.
43. Francisco Cajigal de la Vega.....	1760
44. Joaquin de Monserrat, Marquis of Cruillas.....	1760
45. Carlos Francisco de Croix, Marquis of Croix.....	1766
46. Antonio Maria de Bucareli.....	1771
47. Martin de Mayorga.....	1779
48. Matias de Galvez, Lieutenant-General.....	1783
49. Bernardo de Galvez, Count of Galvez.....	1785
50. Alonso Nuñez de Haro, Archbishop of Mexico.....	1787
51. Manuel Antonio Flores.....	1787

During the Reign of Charles IV.

52. Juan Vicente Güemes Pacheco, Count of Revillagigedo.....	1789
53. Miguel de la Grúa Salamanca, Marquis of Branceforte.....	1794
54. Miguel José de Azanza.....	1798
55. Felix Berenguer de Marquina.....	1800
56. José de Iturrigaray.....	1803
57. Pedro Garibay, Field-Marshal.....	1808

During the Reign of Ferdinand VII.

58. Francisco Javier de Lizana, Archbishop of Mexico.....	1809
59. Francisco Javier Venegas, Lieutenant-General.....	1810
60. Felix Calleja del Rey, Lieutenant-General.....	1813
61. Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, Lieutenant-General.....	1816
62. Juan O'Donojú.....	1821

Third Period.

After the Independence—The Regency.

1. {	Agustin de Iturbide, President, Juan O'Donojú, Manuel de la Bárcena, José Isidro Yañez, Manuel Velazquez de Leon,	1821
2. {	Agustin de Iturbide, President, Count of Casa de Heras, General Nicolas Bravo, José Isidro Yañez, Doctor Valentin,	1822

Empire.

3. Agustin I. (Iturbide), from May 19, 1822, to end of March..	1823
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Provisional Government.—Executive Power.

	Year.	
4. {	General Nicolas Bravo, General Guadalupe Victoria, General Pedro C. Negrete, General Vicente Guerrero (alternate), General Mariano Michelena (alternate), Miguel Dominguez (alternate),	1823

Federal Republic—Presidents.

5. General Guadalupe Victoria.....	1824	
6. General Vicente Guerrero.....	1829	
7. José Maria Bocanegra.....	1829	
8. {	Pedro Velez, General Luis Quintanar, Lucas Alamán,	1829
9. General Anastasio Bustamante.....	1830	
10. General Melchor Muzquiz, <i>ad interim</i>	1832	
11. General Manuel Gomez Pedraza.....	1832	
12. Valentin Gomez Farias, Vice-President.....	1833	
13. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana.....	1833	

Central Republic.

14. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana.....	1835
15. General Miguel Barragan, <i>ad interim</i>	1835
16. José Justo Corro, <i>ad interim</i>	1835
17. General Anastasio Bustamante.....	1837
18. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana, <i>ad interim</i>	1839
19. Javier Echevarria, <i>ad interim</i>	1841
20. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana, as Provisional President.....	1841
21. General Nicolas Bravo and General Valentin Canalizo, as acting Presidents in place of Santa Ana from 1841 to.....	1843

Federal Republic.

22. General José Joaquin Herrera.....	1844
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Central Republic.

23. General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga.....	1846
24. General Nicolas Bravo, <i>ad interim</i>	1846

Federal Republic.

	Year.
25. General José Mariano Salas, as Provisional President.....	1846
26. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana.....	1846
27. Valentin Gomez Farias, Vice-President.....	1846
28. General Antonio Lopez de Santa-Anna.....	1847
29. General Pedro Maria Anaya, as substitute.....	1847
30. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana.....	1847
31. Manuel de la Peña y Peña, as substitute.....	1847
32. General Pedro Maria Anaya, second time as substitute.....	1847
33. Manuel de la Peña y Peña, second time as substitute.....	1848
34. General José Joaquin de Herrera.....	1848
35. General Mariano Arista.....	1851
36. Juan Bautista Ceballos, <i>ad interim</i>	1853

Central Republic.—Dictatorship.

37. General Manuel Maria Lombardini, President <i>ad interim</i>	1853
38. General Antonio Lopez Santa Ana, dictator, from April 1, 1853, till August 9.....	1855

Federal Republic.

39. General Martin Carrera as President <i>ad interim</i>	1855
40. General Juan Alvarez, <i>ad interim</i>	1855
41. General Ignacio Comonfort, as substitute at first and then as Constitutional President.....	1855
42. { Benito Juarez, <i>ad interim</i> at first.....	1857
{ The same as Constitutional President.....	1861
{ The same as Constitutional President.....	1867
{ The same as Constitutional President in.....	1871
and up to the time of his death, July 18, 1872.	
43. Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, as President <i>ad interim</i> at first and then as Constitutional President.....	1872
44. General Juan N. Mendez, in charge of the Executive Power (November).....	1876
45. General Porfirio Diaz.....	1877
46. General Manuel Gonzalez.....	1880
47. General Porfirio Diaz (re-elected four times).....	1884

Revolutionary leaders who, without legal title, held possession of the City of Mexico during the War of Reform.

1. Felix Zuloaga, from the 23d of January till the end of December.....	1858
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	Year.
2. Manuel Robles Pezuela, towards the end of 1858 and the beginning of.....	1859
3. Counsellor José Ignacio Pavon, a few days in.....	1859
4. Miguel Miramon, from March, 1859, till the 24th of December.	1859

Administrations upheld by the French invaders, and who governed in the places that were in the hands of the foreign army.—Regency.

Pelagio de Labastida y Davalos, Archbishop of Mexico; Juan N. Almonte; Juan B. de Ormachea, Bishop of Tulancingo; Mariano Salas; and José Ignacio Pavon..... 1863
Archduke of Austria, Maximilian Ferdinand, from June, 1864, until May, 1867.

MEXICAN INTERVENTION AND NAPOLEON'S DOWNFALL.¹

I have always thought that the downfall of the Napoleonic dynasty at Sedan in 1870 was due to Louis Napoleon's intervention in Mexico. But further to confirm this opinion I laid my views on the subject before competent persons who knew a great deal more about the events causing the crushing defeat of 1870 than myself. One of these was Señor Don Luis Maneyro, a Mexican gentleman who lived for many years in France; who resided there during the inception, progress, and termination of the intervention, acting both before and after the intervention as Mexican consul at Bordeaux; and who kept himself very well posted about the political affairs of that country. Another gentleman whose opinion I regarded as carrying great weight was Mr. John Bigelow, United States Minister to France during the same period. I received answers from both gentlemen, which I do not feel at liberty to publish, altogether confirming my views. I append here a copy of the memorandum which I submitted to both gentlemen for their criticism.

Memorandum.—The defeat of the French army under General Lorencez at Puebla, on May 5, 1862, and more particularly the complete failure of the French intervention in Mexico, ending with the withdrawal of the French army, and the fall and execution of Maximilian in 1867, were in my opinion, the origin and the principal cause of the humiliation of France in 1870, and the consequent downfall of Louis Napoleon. It seems to me that the French emperor, artfully using the controlling power of France to further his own ends, was always eager and ready to take part in the international troubles

¹ This article was published by the *Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine* of New York, in vol. liv., No. 1, of May, 1897, under the title of "The Fall of the Second Empire as Related to French Intervention in Mexico," and it is reproduced here without any change.

arising in Europe, and very naturally the side to which he allied himself was in every instance the victorious one. Napoleon always made the best use of his victories, which gave him great prestige, thereby increasing proportionately his moral influence. He was considered by Europe as a great political genius who was leading France in the pathway of greatness and prosperity, and who could make no mistakes; and he became in fact the arbiter of the destinies of that continent. His military defeat in Mexico in 1862, the first one he had suffered, and which showed that he did not possess the foresight with which he was credited, and his moral and political defeat in 1867, caused by the fall and execution of Maximilian, showed the thinking men of the world that he also could fall into errors of judgment, and that he was not by any means the great man he had been supposed to be, causing him at once to descend from the high pedestal upon which his former success had placed him.

Men like Prince Bismarck saw that his reputation was usurped, and that he was not greatly above the average mortal, and prepared to strike the decisive blow which was dealt to him by Prussia in 1870. To deal this blow, Prince Bismarck took advantage of the complicated situation which Napoleon had created for himself in Mexico by declaring in 1866 the war against Austria which ended with the battle of Sadowa, thus strengthening Prussia, and putting her at the head of the North German Confederation at a time when Napoleon, engaged in Mexico, and in imminent danger of becoming involved in difficulties with the United States, could not well take part in that contest without running serious risks. The talent of Prince Bismarck consisted in taking advantage of the right moment. If Napoleon had not been engaged with the Mexican intervention, he undoubtedly would have taken the side either of Austria or of Prussia, and the war would have terminated in favor of the power backed by France, with territorial advantages for the latter; and thus he would have increased his reputation as a sagacious statesman. But had Napoleon supported either power, the probabilities are that the matter would have been settled without any war, or, if a war had broken out, it would have ended in favor of the allies of France. All this was swept away by the terrible collapse of 1867, which brought about his humiliation at Sedan and the fall of the empire.

It is true that before declaring war on Austria, Bismarck obtained assurances from Napoleon that he would remain neutral; but the difficulties in which the French emperor had involved himself by his Mexican venture decided his course in this case, and Prince Bismarck knew very well that while the Mexican scheme was pending the Emperor of the French could not well afford to take part in any other undertaking of a serious character.

I believe that future historians, looking at these events without passion or prejudice, and inspired by a desire to present facts as they really are, can reason only in this way. Mexico will have, as a reparation for the injustice done her by the French intervention, the sad satisfaction of having been the prime factor in the emancipation of Europe from the Napoleonic rule.

MATIAS ROMERO.

The foregoing paper caused Señor Don Luis Maneyro, Mexican Consul at Bordeaux, to write a memorandum confirming the assertions contained in the same, and considering the circumstances that Señor Maneyro has lived in France since his infancy, and that his father and himself had been prominently connected with public affairs, the former being a witness of the events connected with the French intervention in Mexico, and has had exceptional opportunities to know what took place there, his opinion has a great deal of weight. I submitted to President Diaz this memorandum with the request that he should examine it and advise me whether it was correct in so far as the reported transactions between himself and Marshal Bazaine, commander of the French army, were concerned, and General Diaz in a letter, dated at the City of Mexico, June 5, 1897, answered me that before leaving the country, Marshal Bazaine offered to sell him, not his transportation material, but his powder, arms, and army clothing that he had in excess, and did not have the means of carrying with him. I give below Señor Maneyro's memorandum.

MEMORANDUM BY SEÑOR DON LUIS MANEYRO, MEXICAN CONSUL
AT BORDEAUX.

In 1866 France was not bound by any treaty or agreement that could have prevented her from taking part in the German struggle for supremacy. She could have made the balance lean on the side she would have preferred, be it in favor of Prussia, be it in favor of the independent States of the German Confederation.

The consequences of such an intervention in the war of 1866, it is plainly to be seen, would have been most important for France and the empire; in fact it is impossible to exaggerate how far the result of events and the condition of affairs would have changed.

Perhaps merely the moral weight of French intervention on one side or the other would have given the final victory to her allies, perhaps Sadowa would not have taken place. All these conjectures are allowable, and the preponderance of France would then have been undeniable.

At that time the French army enjoyed in Europe a well earned reputation, owing to its repeated triumphs after the fall of Napoleon I.

The restoration of Louis Philippe's Government and the Second Empire had been most successful in all their undertakings.

Everybody believed in the perfect organization and the easy mobilization of that most fortunate army, and although the system of Marshal Neil, who created the "Garde mobile" in imitation of the "landwehr," was not yet in existence, public confidence in the success of the French flag was thoroughly established.

The Luxembourg question presented a most plausible pretext for the intervention of France in the conflict. A very powerful party was inducing the Emperor to declare war, and the cabals nearest the two sovereigns at the Palace—those who influenced the Empress unfortunately comprised in their midst some Mexicans whose names are known to all, much to their disadvantage—were pushing them to form an alliance with Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, and against Prussia, then increasing in influence and power.

These courtiers who had had such disastrous influence during the period of hesitancy regarding the war of Mexico were then repaid for their former mistake.

Fate decreed that their unwholesome influence in 1862 should prevent the putting into practise their happy thought in 1866. That was really another of the evil consequences of the war of Mexico on unhappy France, and as determining the fall of the empire.

The following data which have been carefully examined were collected by a Mexican who is well acquainted with Paris, and mingled with the actors and spectators of those dramas of 1862-66 and 1870.

In May, 1866, the war party was very much in the majority at the Tuileries. Every day it was expected that the Luxembourg would be invaded by French troops, or at least that a declaration of war would be issued or some step taken which would admit of no backing out.

The reports of the French military attachés residing in various countries encouraged the hopes of success, and it was not to be supposed that Austria would be utterly defeated, on account of the number of her allies, but rather it could be well imagined that Prussia was about to be annihilated.

France had it in her power to give the victory to either side. The Emperor was determined, and the chiefs of his army corps who were consulted said that all reliance could be placed on their troops.

It was then that the grain of sand was visible, that grain of sand sent by God, as Bossuet terms it, which brings about the downfall of empires when they are most occupied with their glory and their pride.

That grain of sand became the retribution that Fate reserved for the unjust aggression against Mexico, it was the betrayal of the Commissary Department which made it impossible for France to undertake an European war.

When the Commissary Department was consulted, the scaffolding broke down, carrying with it all the combinations then made, and compelling France to remain passive, to paralyze her efforts, to reduce her to a mere spectator of a movement which changed the situation of Europe, built the powerful German nation threatening France at her very doors. Germany was already hostile to France, was cognizant of her superiority, and wished to restore the old frontiers existing before the Palatinate War.

France had 50,000 men in Mexico. Outside of Algiers, she still had 160,000 men distributed in four large military divisions. If half of these troops would cross the Rhine, they might decide the princes who were hesitating to ally themselves to France, since, until the first victories of the Prussians took place and until the affair of Langensalz, many petty sovereigns and principalities were sorely troubled and did not know with what party they should side.

The answer given by the Commissary Department when consulted was as follows :

"It is impossible to undertake a campaign under existing conditions of things. All the train material that could be used is in Mexico. We could not collect nor keep in store the necessary provisions, supplies, rations, ammunition, etc., for an army corps of six thousand men."

And yet the Commissaires Wolf and Friant kept up their urgent demand from Mexico for more train and artillery material!

The army corps of 50,000 men had required and absorbed war material sufficient for an army of 200,000 men in active campaign in Europe.

Everything had been taken away from the various warehouses, everything was in Mexico. The lack of railways, the bad condition of the roads, the immense extent of land that the army had to cross, the army which was greatly subdivided and whose sections were at enormous distances from each other—the difficulty of providing the means of subsistence in a hostile country, where the places actually occupied were under the dominion of the invader, the necessities of an European army, which was not accustomed to the frugality and sobriety of the Mexican soldiers, all the above rendered necessary four times the amount of war material required in European countries.

The condition of the roads and the difficulties encountered in the moving of army trains had at times even brought about the destruction of war material which could not be carried away or had to remain buried in the mud. The large pieces for siege artillery, which had been brought for the investment of Oaxaca, had to be carried on men's shoulders; and portions of them had to be left dismounted and scattered on the trunks of trees. All the military trains were in Mexico, and still they were not sufficient to perform the work assigned to them.