. The transport ships which carried that material would arrive one after the other, and immediately had to return to France to look for some more freight of a like nature, which could not be obtained.

The stormy passage of some of those vessels had resulted in the throwing overboard of a portion of their cargoes.

The transportation of the wounded, of provisions, and of ammunition was made under contract with the mule drivers of the country. No wagons or carts remained in France.

Upon the eve of abandoning Maximilian, Marshal Bazaine, when he knew that General Porfirio Diaz refused to buy his powder and the mules for his trains, had to drown the latter and burn the former. The French army was compelled to return to France, owing principally to the active influence brought to bear on Mr. Seward by Mr. Romero, Mexican Minister at Washington, which gave rise to the demand made by the United States on France to abandon Mexican territory gradually and at stated periods.

But that army returned to France without any war material and found none awaiting it in its native country.

The war against Germany was impossible, as was well understood by those who knew what an important part the Commissary Department plays in any war.

The Emperor and those who foresaw coming events, much against their will, had to abandon the opportunity that presented itself in the spring of 1866, and which was the only one which could possibly occur. The results of such a step we all know well enough; they were the disasters and fall of the empire, the humiliation of France, and the loss of a portion of her territory.

Mexico had obtained her full revenge.

ADDRESSES ON THE CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTIONS.

I have tried to make it clear in the minds of the people of the United States, availing myself of all the opportunities which have been presented to me, that there were sufficient causes for the revolutions that we had in Mexico, and that such causes having come to an end, there was no danger of any new outbreaks. It would be very long to insert here all the addresses that I have made with that object in view, in the many years of my official residence in this country, and I will therefore only mention such as, considering the occasion on which they were delivered, and the standing and character of the gentlemen participating in the same, I regard of more importance.

Banquet in New York City on March 29, 1864.—On March 29, 1864, after my return from Mexico as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary, a banquet was given to me in the city of New York by prominent citizens, for the purpose of expressing their sympathy for the cause of Mexican independence and liberty.

The proceedings of this banquet were communicated by President Lincoln to the Senate of the United States with his Message of June 16, 1864, concerning Mexican affairs.

The citizens who tendered me that banquet were the following:

WILLIAM C. BRYANT.
WILLIAM H. ASPINWALL.
HAMILTON FISH.
JOHN W. HAMERSLEY.
JONATHAN STURGES.
JAMES W. BEEKMAN,
J. J. ASTOR, JR.
SMITH CLIFT.
W. E. DODGE, JR.
DAVID HOADLEY.

FREDERICK DE PEYSTER.
W. BUTLER DUNCAN.
WILLIAM CURTIS NOYES.
HENRY CLEWS.
FREDERICK C. GEBHARD,
GEORGE T. STRONG.
HENRY DELAFIELD.
HENRY E. PIERREPONT.
GEORGE OPDYKE.
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD.
GEORGE BANCROFT.

C. A. BRISTED.
ALEXANDER VAN RENSSELAER.
GEORGE FOLSOM.
WASHINGTON HUNT.
CHARLES KING.
WILLARD PARKER.
ADRIAN ISELIN.
ROBERT J. LIVINGSTON.
SAMUEL B. RUGGLES.
JAMES T. BRADY.

On that occasion I delivered the following address:

Mr. Chairman—Gentlemen:—I feel entirely unable to express to you in a sufficient manner my sincere thanks for the great honor you have bestowed upon me and my country in this refined and splendid demonstration of your sympathy for struggling Mexico. It is, indeed, particularly gratifying to me that this significant demonstration is made by so many of the most distinguished and most eminent citizens, who are an ornament to this great metropolis, and whose virtues, learning, and enterprise have contributed so much to make your city in so brief a period the first, not only of the broad United States, but of the whole American continent, as well as to make your country one of the most powerful, wealthy, and civilized on the globe.

It is, indeed, another motive which greatly adds to my gratification, and for which, in the name of my country, I beg to express to you my gratitude for the kind words with which our distinguished friend has proposed the health of Benito Juarez, the Constitutional President of the Republic of Mexico, and for the prompt heartiness and cordiality with which that toast has been received. I perceive, with joy and gratitude, gentlemen, that you appreciate the high qualities of that statesman and patriot, and hold a strong and pure sympathy for the noble cause of which he is the leader.

I am rejoiced that I have the opportunity to see with my own eyes the proof that the eminent French statesman, M. Thiers, was somewhat mistaken when, in a speech he recently delivered before the Corps Législatif, of Paris, against the policy pursued by the Emperor Napoleon in Mexican affairs, he stated that the United States would not, under present circumstances, object in any way to that policy; and that, should the Archduke Maximilian come to this city en route to Mexico, he would meet with a cordial reception at your hands. It could scarcely be possible to have a more distinguished, complete, and genuine representation of the patriotism, intelligence, and wealth of the great city of New York—the leading city of the Union—than that I see assembled here this evening; yet, if I can trust my senses, gentlemen, I venture to assert that the sympathies of your great city run in a direction very different from that imagined by M. Thiers.

I am very happy to say that the kind of feeling you express for Mexico is fully reciprocated. In Mexico there are now but the sentiments of regard and admiration

for the United States, and the desire to pursue such a course as will draw more closely all those powerful ties by which both nations should be united.

It has sometimes appeared to me, that the gentlemen who controlled the Government of the United States for thirty-five years previous to 1861, cared for nothing so much as for the acquisition of territory. Those gentlemen thus caused their country to appear in the character of a very covetous man, who, without knowing the boundaries of his own estate, or endeavoring to improve it, constantly exerts himself to enlarge its limits, without being very scrupulous as to the means of its accomplishment.

Just before the war with Mexico commenced, the United States had a boundary question with England, which threatened a rupture between the two countries, and I have been informed that the same documents which were prepared as a declaration of war against Great Britain were used when war was finally declared against Mexico. Thus, while the idea of acquiring domain from Great Britain by a dubious title, to say the least, was relinquished, the same scheme was carried out against Mexico, not only without any plausible reason, but, I must say, in violation of all principles of justice.

I beg of you, gentlemen, to excuse me if I have referred to an unpleasant point in the history of late events. But I wish to forcibly present to your minds the idea that the unfair policy I have alluded to led, in a great measure, to the troubles and complications in which you are now involved, and one of the consequences of which is French intervention in Mexico, as that intervention would never have been but for the civil war in the United States.

Those who have pursued this policy appear to have been, in the main, under the influence of the slave power, and to have had in view their own political influence and personal aggrandizement, rather than the great interests of their country. They very properly thought that, by extending the area of slavery, they would extend in proportion their influence and strength. For that reason they did not insist on increasing the territory of the United States in the far Northwest, where their peculiar institution could not be acclimated, but rather set their eyes toward the sunny regions of Mexico. By that means the institution of human slavery had so large an increase, that a short time afterward it was strong enough to commence a gigantic war against the Government of the United States. In my opinion, the leaders of the slavery party always had in view the separation of their own States from the free States of the North, and to replace the loss of Northern aimed at the acquisition of Southern territory.

I will not conceal from you, gentlemen, the fact that we have looked with deep apprehension upon such an aggressive policy, which threatened to deprive us of our independence and nationality—the highest and most precious rights that man can enjoy on earth. We were, of course, fully determined not to give up this precious inheritance, and we had resolved to fight to the last. In our present war with France, we are giving a proof of our determination. It may appear foolish and unavailing for Mexico, that has been so often exhausted in her struggles to obtain true liberty during the last forty years, to accept war with the greatest military power in Europe; but there are circumstances in the life of nations which cause them to overlook all secondary considerations, and determine to exert themselves to overcome all difficulties. Besides, our situation is not so bad as many think.

Fortunately, the change of policy toward Mexico operated in the United States brought up a consequent change in the feelings of my country in regard to yours. We do not wish now to have any interest antagonistical to yours, because we mean to keep peace with you, and that object could scarcely be accomplished if our respective interests were in opposition. For that reason, among other very material ones that we had, we established a republican form of government and democratic institutions, modeled on the same basis as yours.

The Emperor of the French pretends that the object of his interference in Mexi-

can affairs is to prevent the annexation of Mexico to the United States; and yet that very result would, most likely, be ultimately accomplished if a monarchy were established in Mexico. Fortunately for us, that scheme is by no means a feasible one.

Mexico is most bountifully blessed by nature. She can produce of the best quality and in large quantities all of the principal agricultural staples of the world—cotton, coffee, sugar, tobacco, vanilla, wheat, and corn. Her mines have yielded the largest portion of all the silver which now circulates throughout the world, and there still remain to her mountains of that precious metal, as well as of gold, which only require labor, skill, and capital to make them available and valuable. The wealth of California is nothing when compared with what still remains in Mexico.

My country, therefore, opens a most desirable field for the enterprise of a commercial nation. Far-sighted England discovered this many years ago, and by establishing a line of mail steamers from Southampton to Veracruz and Tampico, and negotiating advantageous treaties of commerce, has, beyond all other nations, enjoyed the best of the Mexican trade. France, seeing this, and wishing to vie with England, has undertaken an enterprise which, besides being ruinous to her, will not produce the desired end, as the means adopted must surely cause the opposite result. The United States are the best situated to avail themselves of the immense wealth of Mexico. Being a neighbor nation, they have more advantages than any other for the frontier and coasting trade; and, furthermore, being a nation second to none in wealth, activity, skill, and enterprise, they are called by nature to speculate in and enjoy the resources of Mexico.

We are willing to grant to the United States every commercial facility that will not be derogatory to our independence and sovereignty. This will give to the United States all possible advantages that could be derived from annexation, without any of its inconveniences. That once done, our common interests, political as well as commercial, will give us a common American continental policy which no European nation would dare disregard.

The bright future which I plainly see for both nations had made me forget for a moment the present troubles in which they are now involved. I consider these troubles of so transitory a nature as not to interfere materially with the common destiny I have foreshadowed; but, as they have the interest of actuality, I beg to be allowed to make a few remarks in regard to them.

Every careful observer of events could not help noticing, when the expedition against Mexico was organized in Europe, that it would, sooner or later, draw the United States into the most serious complications, and involve them in the difficulty. The object of that expedition being no less than a direct and armed interference in the political affairs of an American nation, with a view to overthrow its republican institutions and establish on their ruins a monarchy, with a European prince on the throne,—the only question to be determined by the United States and the other nations concerned, was as to the time when they would be willing or ready to meet the issue thus boldly and openly held out by the antagonistic nations of Europe.

The United States could not be indifferent to this question; just as a man who sees his neighbor's house set on fire by an incendiary, could not remain an unconcerned spectator, while his own house contains his family and all his fortune, and combustible matter lies in the basement. The only alternative left to him should be, whether it would be more convenient to his interests to help his neighbor in putting out the fire from the beginning, and with the same earnestness as if his own house were already caught by that destructive element, or to await inactive until the incendiary has succeeded in making a perfect blaze of his neighbor's property, by which all will inevitably be involved in one common ruin.

This, in my opinion, is the situation in which the United States is placed with

regard to Mexico. Taking into consideration the well-known sagacity of American statesmen, the often-proved devotion of the American people to republican institutions, and the patriotism and zeal of the Administration that presides over the destinies of the country, I cannot entertain the slightest doubt that the United States will act in this emergency as will conduce to the best interests they and mankind at large have at stake in the Mexican question.

In the meantime, however, I consider it of the highest importance that the delusion prevailing throughout Europe that the United States do not oppose, and rather favor, the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico by French bayonets, should be dispelled. The French government has been working steadily in causing that delusion to prevail on the other side of the water, and, so far, has succeeded more than could be expected, considering the absurdity of such an idea. The war against Mexico would be ten times more unpopular in France than it is now-in fact, it could not be maintained any longer-if the French people were made to understand that the people of the United States will never tolerate, much less favor or encourage, the establishment, by force of arms, of a European monarchy upon the ruins of a sister neighboring republic. The French people are friendly to the United States; old traditions, the common love of liberty, and the absence of opposing interests, make them friendly. They would, therefore, be wholly opposed to anything that, without bringing them any real benefit, might, sooner or later, lead to a war with this country. They very well know that such a war could not but be disastrous to France, since France would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by such a war, whatever may be her influence and power in the European comtinental politics.

The United States may find that they are brought squarely to the issue on the Mexican question sooner than they expected, should the report, lately reached here, of any understanding between Maximilian, as so-called Emperor of Mexico, and the insurgents in this country, prove correct. The archduke, it is stated, will inaugurate his administration by acknowledging the independence of the South, and, perhaps, he will go further; and this, of course, by the advice, consent, and support of the French Government, whose satellite, and nothing else, will the archduke be in Mexico.

The French official and semi-official papers assure us that Maximilian will soon depart for Mexico. All present appearances indicate that he is willing to change his high position in Europe for a hazardous one in Mexico. He cannot stay there unless supported by a French army, and he will not, therefore, be anything more than the shadow of the French emperor. Should he ever have a different view or desire from the French government, or even the French general-in-chief, he will be obliged to submit to the humiliating condition of forbearing to do that which he thinks best in a country where he will call himself emperor. As far as the personality of the Austrian duke is concerned, he is nothing. If he goes to Mexico to meddle in our affairs, we shall consider him as our enemy, and deal with him accordingly. We hold that in the political question which is being agitated in Mexico the person of the Austrian duke is not of much account; and whether he does or does not go there, that question can ultimately have only one possible solution—namely, the triumph and maintenance of republican institutions.

As far as I am concerned, I prefer that Maximilian should go to Mexico, so as to give the European dreamers on monarchies a fair chance to realize their dreams of America. As for Mexico, I can say that nothing that has transpired in my country should surprise any one who is familiar with our affairs. It is true that we have been unfortunate during the past year; we have lost nearly all the battles we have fought with the French; they have occupied some of our principal cities; they have blockaded our ports; but all these gains on the part of the French are nothing when compared with the elements of opposition and endurance which remains with the National

Government of Mexico, ruling a people numbering eight millions, determinedly opposed to intervention, ready to fight, and fighting already for their independence; a country that will require half a million soldiers to subdue and possess; naturally strong in defences, possessing inaccessible mountains, impracticable roads, where the patriots will be able to make a perpetual warfare upon the invader, until he is persuaded of the impossibility of accomplishing the conquest, or be compelled to leave for other causes. Such is the prospect before us, and that in case we could do nothing more than make a passive resistance. But we can do better than this.

Among the many events calculated to terminate immediately French intervention in Mexico, the European complications which threaten to cause a general war on that continent should be particularly mentioned. It is certainly wonderful that while Europe is in so insecure and agitated a condition, menaced by revolutions everywhere, and wrestling to recover its own existence and independence, the French emperor should be thinking about arranging other people's affairs, as if his own did not require his immediate and most particular attention.

The only serious support the French intervention had among the Mexicans was that afforded by the Church party, which was, in fact, the promoter and supporter of the intervention. The generals of the Church party have, with the aid of the French army, been conscripting Mexican citizens to make them fight with the foreign invader against their brothers and the independence of their country. The Church party expected, of course, as a small compensation for the services rendered to the intervention, that as soon as the French should take the City of Mexico they would restore the Church property confiscated by the National Government, and the fueros of the clergy, of which they had been deprived. But the French have thus far failed to do this. They discovered that the Church party was the weakest, and that with that party they had no chance of subduing the country. The French now wish to conciliate the Liberal party by sustaining and enforcing all the important measures and laws decreed by the National Government. But the Liberals of Mexico are true patriots, not partisans, and will not be conciliated, so long as the foot of the invader is on Mexican soil. The policy of the French so incensed the Church party that they broke altogether with the French. The Archbishop of Mexico, who was a member of the so-called regency, withdrew at once, and was afterward dismissed by General Bazaine. The so-called supreme tribunal protested against those measures, and shared the fate of the archbishop. All the archbishops and bishops in the republic then joined in signing a protest, in which they declared the condition of the Church to be far worse than it ever was under the rule of the Liberal Government; that now they are not allowed even to issue their pastorals, a right never denied to them while the Liberals were in power in the City of Mexico. The protest concluded by excommunicating the French Government, the French army in Mexico, all Mexicans who take sides with the French, and everybody who supports the French cause in any way. These proceedings have left the French without the support of the only part of the native population they ever had in their favor, and have combined against them all the elements of the country.

I fear that I have already imposed too much upon your kindness, and, in concluding my remarks, I beg to express my earnest and sincere desire that this demonstration may be the beginning of a new era of perpetual peace and cordiality in the relations between the United States and Mexico. (Prolonged cheers.)

Banquet at New York City on October 2, 1867.—When the War of Intervention was over in Mexico, prominent citizens of New York City, desirous of testifying in some public manner their interest in the welfare of that country, and their esteem for my adhering to its cause

believe that Nature has made different sets of rules for each people, or for each family

of peoples, called races. It is, in my opinion, wiser to suppose that Providence con-

trols mankind by the same code of rules, which are equally applicable to the Anglo-

amid the greatest discouragements, tendered me a banquet which took place at the city of New York on October 2, 1867, previous to my return home. The gentlemen who made the invitation and participated at the banquet were the following:

PETER COOPER,
M. H. GRINNELL,
SAM'L G. COURTNEY,
FRANCIS SKIDDY,
WM. R. GARRISON,
WM. C. BRYANT,
WM. E. DODGE, Jr.,
DAN'L BUTTERFIELD,
HENRY A. SMYTHE,
JAS, R. WHITING,

WM. H. ASPINWALL,
H. H. VAN DYCK,
JAMES ROBB,
SHEPARD GANDY,
BENJ. HOLLIDAY,
JAMES W. BEEKMAN
JOHN JAY,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
DAVID HOADLEY,

I. GRANT WILSON,

PAUL SPOFFORD,
HENRY CLEWS,
CHAS. W. SANDFORD,
PARKE GODWIN
ELLICOTT C. COWDIN,
HIRAM BARNEY,
HENRY WARD BEECHER,
JOHN A. STEWART,
RUFUS INGALLS,
WM. G. FARGO.

On that occasion I made the following address:

Mr. CHAIRMAN—GENTLEMEN:—It is nearly eight years since I landed in an official capacity on this hospitable shore. Soon afterward, I became the representative of my country, or at least of such a portion of it, as believing that they had in the United States a great example to imitate, were eager to give Mexico the same advantages that this country enjoyed, by following the same line of policy.

About that very time, the elements of a gigantic political struggle were maturing, which produced soon afterward the great Civil War of the United States. This terrible shock was felt at once in Mexico, in the shape of an European intervention avowedly for the purpose of overthrowing the Republican institutions existing there. All of you, gentlemen, are quite familiar with what followed here as well as there. It pleased Heaven to crown with success the noble efforts of the patriots and philanthropists who, while defending in both countries the independence and integrity of their homes and the institutions of their choice, were also struggling for the advancement of humanity, and the amelioration of the social condition of the masses throughout the world.

I call your attention to this difficult crisis, only to express on this solemn occasion, before this distinguished assembly of representative men, my testimony of the hightoned, enlightened, and disinterested sympathy which the cause of Mexico awakened in the hearts of the people of the United States; a sympathy which, while encouraging the Mexican people in the defense of their outraged rights, made European encroachments more guarded, and thus contributed in a great measure to the final success at which we now all rejoice.

In closing, or at least suspending, temporarily, my official duties at Washington, it behooves me to say that I carry home a very lively and most pleasant recollection of my long sojourn among you; that I take also with me the lasting experience of eight years of political agitation, in which very momentous events have taken place; that, faithful to the political creed of the Liberal national party of Mexico, I will do all I can to contribute in establishing there the same political principles I have been taught to admire and appreciate here, and which, in my opinion, are indispensable to the welfare of Mexico; and it will be my pride as well as my pleasure to be the friend of the United States so long as they entertain no hostile or unfriendly designs against my own country.

On a former occasion, and in this very place, I availed myself of the opportunity to express what I consider to be a philosophical view, based on facts, of the causes and objects of the civil wars in Mexico since the Declaration of its Independence. I do not

Saxon as to the Latin races—to the Indians as to the Africans.

In these modern times, political revolutions seem to have for their object the amelioration of the condition of the masses, by breaking or attempting to break down the old system of the organization of society when this becomes oppressive. Following this theory, it appears to me that in all modern revolutions there have been two sides: the aristocratic side, or the side of the few, who have in the course of time, accumulated wealth, power, and influence, often exercised to the disadvantage of the people; and the popular side, or the side of the many, who lose those advantages in proportion as they are monopolized by their opponents. A point is reached where the exactions of the few become intolerable, and then comes a popular uprising; or

the exactions of the few become intolerable, and then comes a popular uprising; or either the aristocratic element, foreseeing that this result is to happen, precipitates it by taking the initiative with a view to forcing the contest, before their enemies are fully organized and prepared. This was, in my opinion, the cause of the English revolution of the 17th century, which culminated in the establishment of the Commonwealth; of the French revolution of the 18th century, which ended in a similar manner; of the last civil war in the United States, and of the civil wars in Mexico

and other Spanish-American Republics.

Our aristocracy in Mexico has been an ambitious and unscrupulous priesthood, who had wielded for centuries political power, and would rather see their country subjugated by a foreign despot than under the control of their political opponents who desire, in good faith, its advancement and prosperity, and its emancipation from religious intolerance, and from opposition to popular and free education. Fortunately for us, the question at home has been of a mere political character, notwithstanding the efforts of the clergy to make it also a religious one.

Our success against the French once achieved, I have very strong and well-grounded reasons to expect that we shall have peace and tranquillity, and that our

country will be developed and enjoy fully their attending blessings.

Within a brief period we shall hold our election for the functionaries to be chosen by the people, and we shall then enter again into our constitutional existence, somewhat interrupted by the French intervention. Our policy will then be to enforce our laws which allow the free exercise of all religions, and give no preference to any; which provide a perfect separation between Church and State; to establish a system of free schools, which will educate the masses of our people, and make them productive and happy; to encourage the immigration of peaceable and laboring citizens of the United States, which will assist us in developing our resources; to invite the investment of the surplus capital of the United States in Mexican enterprises, and to look up to this privileged country as our eldest sister, affording us an example worthy of imitation. When these objects are attained, when both countries stand in the relation of friendly powers, with a common object and a common destiny, realizing the responsibility they have before the world as the guardians of republican institutions, my life-long ambition and my fondest wishes will have been realized.

The condition of the Mexican people is not fully understood outside of Mexico, and causes very many to distrust their capacity for self-government. It is certainly not so far advanced in civilization as the people of the United States. Education is not so much extended there as here; there is little homogeneousness in the elements of which it is composed; yet they are a peaceful, laborious people, well-meaning and docile, and they only need the establishment of free schools and the consolidation of peace, to become one of the best regulated people upon earth. The greater portion of our population has been purposely kept in the most complete ignorance by the

Spaniards and the Church party, with a view of controlling them more easily, and when we shall have educated them we shall double or treble the working energies of the country.

The conduct of the Mexican people during our late war with France shows, in my opinion, beyond all doubt, that they possess very many of the virtues which constitute a free people; their perseverance under the greatest discouragement, their courage and determination to fight constantly against an enemy vastly superior in resources, their moderation in the hour of success, their well-known endurance, are all facts which speak very clearly in their behalf. I have full confidence in them, and earnestly believe that, if they are not as advanced as it is desirable they should be they are capable and desirous of improvement.

As to their ability for self-government, I will only say that either republican institutions are adaptable to mankind, and calculated to promote their welfare and happiness, or they are not. If they are, I see no reason why the Mexican people should be considered unfit for them. If they are not, I could not explain their development in this country.

I think it is a mistaken view of the case to say that because we have had a civil war in Mexico, or rather a social war, which has lasted for many years, it should be concluded that we are incapable of self-government. None can suppose that we have been fighting all that time merely for the pleasure of it. We have had, to be sure, unscrupulous and designing men, who have ostensibly appeared as fighting to gratify their own ambition and self-aggrandizement; but, in fact, they have only been used by one or the other of the contending political parties; and principles have been involved at the bottom of our troubles.

As for the motives which prompted the late Maximilian to go to Mexico—much as I regret to speak of them, since he is now shielded by the sacred asylum of his grave—I, nevertheless, cannot help saying in defence of my own country, that whatever good intentions he may have entertained towards Mexico, if any, they have little to do with the question of his intervention there.

When he was asked to go to Mexico, it is charitable to suppose that he did not understand the true condition of the country so far removed from his own. But the mere fact that he was asked to go by a foreign state, at war with Mexico, and by a few Mexicans who were accomplices in the crime of overthrowing the institutions of their country by means of a foreign army, it seems to me, ought to have been sufficient to make him very careful before deciding to take part in and increase the political difficulties of Mexico. The inducements held out to him by the French emperor prevailed at last, and he determined to go under French protection and French auspices, notwithstanding that he never received a single vote from any place in Mexico not in possession of the French army of occupation.

The simple case was clearly before him. He may have supposed that if he succeeded in forcing the rule over the Mexican people, he would be the founder of a great European empire in the New World; if he failed, he would return to Europe with the prestige of having attempted to establish one, with the title of Emperor, with a higher position than he had ever had before, and a greater probability to succeed his brother as the ruler of the Austrian Empire, or to be the occupant of any vacant throne in that continent.

On leaving Miramar, and before arriving in Mexico, he went to Rome, to secure, as he said, the benediction of the Pope, and what we cannot understand in America, to consult with the Holy See about the temporal government of an American republic. The result was, that notwithstanding that consultation, he not only failed in establishing his rule in Mexico, but that soon after he arrived there he had almost an open rupture with the Pope and the Mexican clergy.

On arriving in Mexico he began to see that his task was more difficult than he had imagined. In the beginning, however, it was but light, as the French government had taken care to provide him with funds even before he left Europe, making so of this, another inducement for him to go. When these were exhausted, and the French emperor,—satisfied of the impracticability of his task,—made up his mind to withdraw his troops from Mexico, Maximilian thought of returning to Europe as the only alternative left him. I pass over, without comment, the unhappy though not unimportant rôle of the partner of his life. The result of this last and vain effort is well known to all.

Maximilian then determined to carry out his plan of leaving Mexico, and sailing from Veracruz, where an Austrian war vessel had been in readiness, awaiting to convey him to his home. He came almost by stealth from the City of Mexico to Orizaba, having previously shipped all his baggage and effects, which he took from the country.

On arriving at this latter place, he was overtaken by some of his supporters, who came to persuade him to remain, and who, as they were committed to the empire, saw in him at least one guarantee of foreign support. They represented to him, as they had done a few years before to the French emperor, and other European governments, that they controlled the Mexican people; that they could give him the men and money necessary to consolidate his rule in Mexico. They enlarged upon the glory he would achieve by accomplishing this result without the aid of the French, and availing themselves of the difficulties which had arisen between him and his supporters, they urged him, by exciting his wounded pride, to make at least another effort to remain; in this instance they succeeded as well as in the former. Their efforts, however, would not have had this result, in my opinion, had they not been supported by the advice of one of Maximilian's most trusted counsellors-a Belgian-who accompanied him to Mexico, and who, on writing him a letter from Brussels, on the 17th of September, 1866, (the original of which has been in my hands), told him that he ought under no circumstances then to leave Mexico; that the French desired him to do so, to heap upon him the responsibility of their failure, and that he ought not to gratify them, but, by remaining, place this responsibility where it properly belonged. He advised his master furthermore, to call, after the withdrawal of the French, for a popular election to decide whether the Mexican people desired him or not, as the best means of leaving, without dishonor, a difficult position, and to return to Europe without prestige.

Maximilian's subsequent action showed that he undertook to carry out to the very letter this advice, given by a man entirely ignorant of the condition of Mexico. He returned to the City of Mexico, after having promised to call for a National Congress to decide whether the people desired the Republic or the Empire under him.

On arriving there he found that the National troops were closing their lines and carrying everything before them, and, supposing that he could arrest these advances by taking to the interior all the available forces accumulated in the City of Mexico, he marched to Queretaro. It would be unnecessary to say what happened there. Through the want of military ability he allowed our troops to concentrate upon and beseige Queretaro, until he was finally overcome. From the tenor of his communications while he was surrounded at Queretaro, it appears very clearly that he never realized the difficulties of his position, and much less the disastrous end of the campaign; and his letters to President Juarez after he was captured, showed not less plainly that, until then, he had never dreamed of the sad fate which, by invading a harmless and innocent people in their American mountain homes, he had provoked and deserved.

But Maximilian, although a grand duke and heir of empire in Austria, was nothing of a Cæsar, and only a French automaton in the revolutionary drama of my country. Let this unhappy fate be accepted in extenuation of his crime, in consenting to be the automaton of the ambition of the French Cæsar in the revolution of Mexico.