

ing foreign powers, the language which becomes the sovereign of the French people! Tell them, that every country which continues preparations against France, must be numbered among her enemies; that we will religiously regard our oath of attempting no conquests; that we offer to live with them in brotherly neighbourhood, and to grant them the inviolable friendship of a free and powerful people; that we will respect their laws, their customs, and their constitutions; but that we require in return that ours should be respected! Tell them, lastly, that if the princes of Germany continue to countenance preparations directed against the French, the French will carry into their country, not fire and sword, but liberty! It is for them to calculate what may be the consequence of this awakening of the nations!"

Louis XVI. replied, that he would take into deep consideration the message of the assembly; and a few days afterward he came to announce in person his resolutions on the subject. They were agreeable to the general wish. The king declared, amid general applause, that he would signify to the elector of Trèves, and to the other electors, that if, before the 15th of January, all hostile meetings and all hostile dispositions on the part of the refugee French should not have ceased in their states, he would regard them as enemies. He added, that he would write to the emperor, in order to engage him, as the head of the empire, to interpose his authority to avert the evils which any longer obstinacy on the part of some members of the Germanic body might occasion. "If these declarations, gentlemen, are not attended to," added he, "it only remains for me to propose war; war, in which a people who has solemnly renounced foreign conquest, never engages without necessity; but which a free and generous nation knows how to undertake when its own security and its own honour demand it!"

The steps taken by the king, relative to the princes of the empire, were supported by military preparations. A new minister at war had replaced du Portail. Narbonne, chosen from the party of the Feuillants, young, active, and ambitious of signalizing himself by the triumph of his party, and by his defence of the revolution, immediately marched to the frontiers. A hundred and fifty thousand men were required; the assembly voted on this occasion twenty millions of extraordinary funds; three armies were formed under the command of Rochambeau, of Luckner, and La Fayette; and finally, Monsieur, count of Provence, the count d'Artois, and the prince of Condé were accused and decreed *guilty of attempts and conspiracy against the general security of the state and constitution*. Their properties were sequestered; and the term which had formerly been fixed for the return of Monsieur to France being expired, he was deprived of all right to the regency.

The elector of Trèves, who did not expect the step which was taken, engaged to disperse the meetings, and to allow them no longer to take place. All this, however, was confined to a pretence of disbanding the troops. Austria gave orders to marshal Bender to defend the elector if he was attacked, and ratified the conclusions of the diet of Ratisbon. The latter demanded the restoration of the *possessory princes*; it refused to allow that they should be indemnified in money for the loss of their rights; and left to France the choice only of the re-establishment of feudality in Alsace, or war. These two resolutions of the cabinet of Vienna were of a very hostile nature. Her troops marched upon the French frontiers, and proved clearly that France was not to trust to her inaction. Fifty thousand men were stationed in the Low Countries; six thousand were posted in the Brigaw, and thirty thousand were despatched from Bohemia. This formidable army of observation, could at a moment's notice, be rendered an army of attack.

The assembly felt that there was an urgent necessity of compelling the emperor to decide. It considered the electors but as borrowed names under which he acted, and the emigrants as his instruments; for prince Kaunitz regarded as legitimate the *league of sovereigns united for the security and the honour of their crowns*. The Girondists, therefore, were desirous of anticipating this dangerous adversary, and of preventing him from having time to prepare himself. They required him to explain before the 10th of February,

in a clear and precise manner, his real intentions with regard to France. They attacked, at the same time, those ministers on whom they could not count in case of war; the incapacity of Delessart, and the intrigues of Molleville, especially afforded ground for such attacks. Narbonne was the only one spared. They were seconded by the divisions of the council, which was half aristocratical, by Bertrand de Molleville, Delessart, &c.; and half constitutional, by Narbonne and Cahier de Gerville, minister of the interior. Men, so opposite in intentions and talents, could never be expected to agree. Bertrand de Molleville had lively contests with Narbonne, who wished his colleagues to adopt a frank and decided tone, and to render the assembly the principal support of the throne. Narbonne failed in the struggle, and his fall produced the disorganization of this ministry. The Girondists accused Bertrand de Molleville and Delessart; the former had enough of ingenuity to defend himself; but the latter was carried before the high court of Orleans.

The king, intimidated by the violent conduct of the assembly towards the members of his council, and especially by the decree of accusation against Delessart, had no resource left but to choose his new ministers from the victorious party. An alliance with the actual rulers of the revolution was the only thing which could save at once liberty and the throne. It would restore concord to the assembly, the chief power, and the municipality; and if their union was maintained, the Girondists would perform, with the aid of the court, what they judged, after the rupture, they could only have accomplished without it. The members of the new ministry were Lacoste for the navy; Clavière for the finances, Duranthon for justice, de Grave, who was soon replaced by Servan, minister at war, Dumouriez for foreign affairs, and Roland for the interior. The two latter were the most remarkable and the most important men of the council.

Dumouriez was forty-seven years of age at the commencement of the revolution; up to that time he had lived amid intrigues, which he was too fond of employing at a period when small means ought only to have been used in aid of great ones, and not to supply their place. The first part of his political life was spent in discovering those by whom he might rise, and the second, those who were able to support his elevation. A courtier before 1789, a constitutionalist under the first assembly, a Girondist under the second, a jacobin under the republic, he was eminently the creature of the time. But he had all the resources of great men; an enterprising disposition, indefatigable activity, and prompt, accurate, and extended views; extraordinary impetuosity in action, and unbounded confidence in success: he was besides frank, ingenious, clever, bold, equally fitted for the council and the field; full of expedients, astonishing for the readiness of his invention, and knowing how to submit to the misfortune of a difficult position, until he could change it. It must be admitted, however, that these fine qualities were injured by several defects. He was rash, thoughtless, and extremely capricious both in his opinions and his means, in consequence of his continual thirst for action: but the great fault of Dumouriez was his want of all political principle. In a period of revolution nothing is to be accomplished unless the individual is the man of a party—if a man is ambitious, he must see farther than the object he seeks to attain—and unless his will is stronger than that of his partisans he will fail. It was thus with Cromwell and Buonaparte: while Dumouriez, after having been the servant of parties, believed he should conquer them all by his intrigues. He wanted the passion of his time; it is this which completes a man, and which alone can render him the governing spirit of his age.

Roland was a contrast to Dumouriez. He was a character which liberty found ready made, as if she had herself moulded it. The manners of Roland were simple, his morals severe, and his opinions tried: he loved liberty with enthusiasm, and he was equally capable of disinterestedly consecrating to her cause the whole of his existence, or of perishing for its sake without ostentation and without regret. He was a man worthy of being born in a republic, but misplaced in a revolution; he was ill-fitted for the agitations

patriots of Brabant would favour the attack of the French, as a means of freedom for themselves, he planned a triple invasion for this end. The two generals Dillon and Biron, who commanded in Flanders under Rochambeau, received orders to march, the one with four thousand men from Lille upon Tournay, the other with ten thousand from Valenciennes upon Mons. At the same time La Fayette with a part of his army quitted Metz, and led his army to Namur, by forced marches through Stenai, Sédan, Mézières and Givet. But this plan presupposed in the soldiers habits which they had not yet acquired, and demanded a union of opinion and method very difficult to find among the chiefs. Besides the invading columns were not strong enough for such an enterprise. Scarcely had Dillon left the frontier and met the enemy when a panic terror seized the troops. The cry through all the ranks was *Sauve qui peut!* and he was dragged away by his own troops and massacred. The same thing took place and accompanied by the same circumstances in the army of Biron, who was alike obliged to retire in disorder to his former position. This sudden flight, which had been common to both columns, must either be ascribed to the dread of the enemy experienced by troops who had never been in action, to distrust of their chiefs, or to the suggestions inspired by evil-disposed persons who hinted suspicions of treachery.

La Fayette, on arriving at Bouvines, after having marched fifty leagues in a few days and over bad roads, was informed of the disasters of Valenciennes and Lille: he saw that the object of the invasion had failed, and thought with reason that there was nothing better to be done than to effect a retreat. Rochambeau complained of the *precipitation and irregularity* of the measures which had been prescribed to him in the most absolute manner. As he did not feel disposed to become a passive machine, obliged to act a part at their discretion, which ought to be his own, he resigned his post. From that moment the army resumed the defensive. The force on the frontier was now divided into two armies only; of which the one, under the command of La Fayette, extended from the sea to Longwy, and the other from the Moselle to Jura was under the orders of Luckner. La Fayette put the left wing of his army under the command of Arthur Dillon, and his right joined that of Luckner, who had Biron for his lieutenant on the Rhine. It was in this position that the troops waited for those of the coalition.

These first checks, however, augmented the disunion of the Feuillants and the Girondists. The generals ascribed the failures to the plan of Dumouriez. The ministry threw the blame of them upon the generals, who had all been put in their places by Narbonne, and belonged to the constitutional party. On the other hand the jacobins accused the counter-revolutionists to have occasioned the rout by their cries of *Sauve qui peut!* Their joy, which they did not attempt to conceal, and their hopes of soon seeing their confederates in Paris, the emigrants returned, and the whole régime established, confirmed these suspicions. It was thought that the court, which had raised the mercenary body-guard of the king from eighteen hundred men to six thousand, and who had framed it of chosen counter-revolutionists, was acting in concert with the coalition. A secret committee, of which even the existence was not proved, was denounced as the *Austrian committee*. Public distrust was now at its height.

The assembly immediately adopted party measures: it had entered into the war, and thenceforth was obliged to regulate its conduct much less after the rules of justice than those which seemed to be prescribed by the safety of the state. It established itself permanent: it disbanded the king's mercenary body-guard: the renewal of the religious troubles led it to issue a decree of banishment against the refractory clergy, in order no longer to have at once to combat a revolution and to appease revolts. To repair the late defeats, and that an army of reserve might be stationed near the capital, it adopted, on the motion of Servan, the minister of war, the formation of a camp, of twenty thousand men, selected from the departments, and to be placed below Paris. The assembly endeavoured at the same time to exalt

the general enthusiasm by revolutionary fêtes, and began to enrol the populace by arming them with pikes, judging that no assistance could be superfluous at a moment of such imminent danger.

All these measures were not adopted without some opposition from the constitutionalists. They opposed the establishment of the camp of twenty thousand men, which they regarded as a party-army called in against the national guard and the throne. The staff of the guard protested, and the re-composition of this corps was speedily accomplished to the profit of the ruling party. Into the new national guard there were introduced companies armed with pikes. The constitutionalists were still more discontented with this measure, which introduced the lower classes into their ranks, and appeared to them a plan for annulling the middle classes by the populace. Lastly, they condemned in an open manner the banishment of the priests, which was according to them nothing less than a decree of proscription.

Louis XVI. had behaved for some time in a colder manner to his ministers, who, on their side, appeared to exact more at his hands: they urged him to permit about his person priests who had taken the oaths in order to give an example in favour of the constitutional religion, and to remove a pretext for troubles; but this he constantly refused, being determined to make no concessions in matters of religion. The last decrees put a term to his union with the Girondists; he remained several days without alluding to them, and without declaring his opinion on the point. It was then that Roland wrote to him his famous letter on his constitutional duties, and urged him, for the sake of calming the minds of the people, and of confirming his own authority, to declare himself frankly the king of the revolution. That letter still farther irritated Louis XVI., who was already resolved to break with the Girondists. He was supported by Dumouriez, who abandoned his party, and who had formed with Duranthon and Lacoste, a schism in the ministry against Roland, Servan, and Clavière. But like a man at once ambitious and able, Dumouriez recommended Louis XVI. to dismiss the ministers of whom he had to complain, and to sanction at the same time the decrees in order to confirm his popularity. He represented the one against the priests as a measure of precaution in their favour, as banishment was likely to remove them from a proscription which would probably be more deplorable: and he engaged to prevent the revolutionary consequences of the camp of twenty thousand men, by despatching to the army battalions of them in proportion as they arrived. On these conditions Dumouriez offered to undertake the office of minister at war, and to sustain the attacks of his own party; but Louis XVI. dismissed the ministers and rejected the decrees, and Dumouriez went off to the army, after having rendered himself suspected. The assembly declared that Roland, Servan, and Clavière carried with them the regrets of the nation.

The king chose his new ministry from the ranks of the Feuillants. Scipio Chambonnas took the foreign affairs: Terrier Monteil the interior; Beau-lieu the finances; Lajarre, the war department; and Lacoste and Duranthon remained for the time in charge of justice and of the navy. All these persons were without name or credit, and their party itself was approaching the term of its existence. The state of the constitution, during the existence of which alone it could maintain an ascendancy, was acquiring daily more and more a revolutionary aspect. How could a moderate party maintain itself between two violent and belligerent factions, of which the one was advancing from without to destroy the revolution, while the other was resolved, at all hazards, to defend it? The Feuillants were a superfluous party in this state of things. The king, who saw their weakness, seemed to count no longer on any thing but on the state of Europe; and he despatched Mallet Dupan, charged with a secret mission, to the coalition.

In the mean time, all those whom the tide of popular opinion had gone beyond, and who belonged to the earlier days of the revolution, combined to second this slight retrograde movement. The monarchists, at the head of whom were Lally Tollendal and Malouet, two of the principal members of the

party of Mounier and Necker; the Feuillants, who were headed by the old triumvirate, Dupont, Lameth, and Barnave; lastly, La Fayette, whose constitutional reputation was immense, endeavoured to repress the clubs, to confirm the order of the laws and the power of the king. The jacobins were eagerly in motion at this period: their influence became enormous; and they became the head of the popular party. The ancient party, framed of the middle classes, was the only one which could have opposed or repressed them; but it was quite disorganized, and its power was daily declining. It was to raise this party again that La Fayette wrote, on the 16th of June, from the camp at Maubeuge, a letter to the assembly, in which he denounced the jacobin faction: he demanded that an end should be put to the reign of the clubs; he required the independence and the security of the constitutional throne, and urged the assembly, in his own name, in that of his army, and of all the friends of liberty, to adopt for the safety of the state only such measures as should be sanctioned by the law. This letter excited lively contests between the right and left side of the assembly. Though its motives were only pure and constitutional, it seemed on the part of a young general at the head of his army a step imitative of Cromwell; and from that moment the reputation of La Fayette, which had till then been respected even by his adversaries, began to be attacked. Besides, regarding such a step merely in a political view, it was imprudent. The Girondist party, driven from the ministry, and arrested in its plans for the public welfare, required no farther excitation; and it was quite wrong in La Fayette, even for the interests of his party, to have employed his influence so uselessly.

The Girondist party endeavoured for its own security and that of the revolution to regain its power, without ceasing to employ constitutional means. Its object was not then, as it was at a later period, to dethrone the king, but to make him its own centre. For that purpose it had recourse to the imperious petitions of the multitude. The employment of this kind of popular violence was highly to be condemned: but all parties were placed in so extraordinary a situation, that each adopted an illegitimate means of support: the court the support of Europe, and the Girondists that of the people. The populace was in the greatest agitation. The leaders of the Fauxbourgs, among whom were the deputy Chabot, Santerre, Gouchon, and the marquis of Saint Hurugues, had been for some days preparing the people for a similar revolutionary act to that which had failed at the Champ-de-Mars. The 20th of June, the anniversary of the oath of the *tennis-court*, was approaching. Under pretence of celebrating, by a civic fête, that memorable day, and of planting a May-pole, in honour of liberty, an assemblage of about eight thousand armed men on the 20th of June left the Fauxbourg Saint Antoine, and marched towards the hall of the assembly.

The procurator-syndic, Rœderer, came with the intention of informing the assembly of the meeting; and, in the mean time, the insurgents arrived at the doors of the hall. Their chiefs demanded to be allowed to present a petition, and to file off before the assembly. Violent debates now took place between the members on the right, who refused to receive a petition from men in arms, and those on the left, who thought that according to certain precedents they ought to be admitted. It was difficult to oppose the wishes of an immense and enthusiastic multitude, which were seconded by the majority of the representatives. The deputation was introduced. The speaker who represented it expressed himself in the language of menace. He said that the people was roused, and ready to employ all its powers—powers which were included in the declaration of rights, *resistance to oppression*: he said, that its opposers, if such there were in that assembly, ought to purge the land of freedom of their presence and depart to Coblenz: and then coming at once to the object of the insurrectionary petition, "The executive power," added he, "is not in accordance with you; and of this we ask no other proof than the dismissal of the patriot ministers. It is thus, then, that the happiness of a free people is to depend on the caprice of a king! but ought this king to have any other will than that of the law? The people

think not. Such is its opinion, which may well weigh against that of crowned despots. The opinion of the people is the genealogical tree of the nation: and before that sturdy oak the feeble reed must bend! We complain, gentlemen, of the inactivity of our armies: we insist on your discovering the cause; and if it proceeds from the executive power, we require that it should be annihilated!"

The assembly told the petitioners that its demand should be taken into consideration: it next exhorted them to respect the laws and the constituted authorities, and allowed them to file off through the midst of the members. The crowd, which by this time had swelled to the number of thirty thousand men, mingled with women, children, national guards, and persons armed with pikes, displaying banners and signals of a decidedly revolutionary character, traversed the hall, singing the famous chorus, *ça ira!* and shouting, "The nation for ever! Long live the Sans-culottes! Down with the veto!" The multitude was led by Santerre and the marquis of Saint Hurugues. On leaving the assembly, the crowd marched towards the palace, with the petitioners at its head.

The outer gates were thrown open by order of the king: the crowd then poured into the palace, and entered the apartments. They were demolishing the doors by blows with axes, when Louis XVI. ordered them to be opened, and presented himself to the multitude attended only by a few persons. The stormy wave of the crowd was arrested for an instant by his appearance; but those who were without, continued still to advance, not being withheld by respect for the presence of the king. Louis XVI. was prudently placed in the opening of a window. Never did he discover more courage and true greatness of mind than on that melancholy day. Surrounded by national guards, who served as a barrier to keep off the crowd, and seated on a chair which was placed on a table to allow him to breathe more freely, and be seen more distinctly by the people, he preserved a calm and undaunted countenance: he replied with decision to the loud cries of those who demanded his sanction to the decrees, "This is neither the form in which it ought to be demanded of me, nor the moment to obtain it." Having had the courage to refuse what was the main object of the insurrection, he thought it unnecessary to refuse a token unimportant to him, but which in the eye of the multitude was the signal of liberty: he placed on his head a red cap which was presented to him on the point of a pike. The multitude was highly pleased with this mark of condescension. A few moments after, he was loaded with applauses, when, almost stifled with heat and thirst, he drank without hesitating out of a glass which was handed to him by a half-intoxicated labourer. In the mean time, Vergniaud, Isnard, and several deputies of the Gironde, had hastened to the spot to protect the king, to harangue the people, and to put an end to these disgraceful scenes. The assembly, which had just risen, re-assembled in haste, alarmed at this irruption, and despatched several successive deputations to Louis XVI. to serve as a safeguard to him. At last Péton, the mayor, arrived; and, standing on a chair, harangued the populace, exhorting them to retire without tumult; a command which they obeyed. These singular insurgents, whose only aim was to obtain the decrees and new ministers, withdrew without having transgressed the bounds of their mission, but at the same time without having accomplished it.

The 20th of June excited the constitutional opinion against the authors of it. The violation of the royal residence, the insults offered to Louis XVI., the illegality of a petition presented amid the violence of a multitude and with a show of arms, were grounds of strong reproach against the popular party. The latter found itself for an instant reduced to act on the defensive; for, besides having been guilty of a tumult, it had in reality received a check. The constitutionalists resumed the tone of an offended and ruling party; but this did not last long, for they were not seconded by the court. The national guard offered to assemble for the protection of the person of Louis XVI., and the duke of Rochefoucault Liancourt, who commanded at Rouen, wished to carry him to Rouen, and place him in the midst of the troops who were de-

voted to him. La Fayette proposed to conduct him to Compiègne, and to place him at the head of his army: but Louis XVI. refused all these offers. He imagined that the agitators would be disgusted with the failure of their late attempt: and as he looked for his deliverance to the confederate powers, he was unwilling to avail himself of the constitutionalists, because it would in that case have been necessary to treat with them.

La Fayette, however, made a new attempt in favour of the legitimate monarchy. After having provided for the command of his army, and collected addresses against the late events, he set out for Paris, and presented himself unexpectedly on the 28th of June, at the bar of the assembly. He demanded, in his own name, and in that of the army, the punishment of those who had figured in the attempt of the 20th of June, and the destruction of the sect of the jacobins. This step excited various sensations among the members of the assembly; the right side applauded him greatly, but the left side opposed his sentiments and conduct. Guadet moved an inquiry whether he was not culpable in having quitted his army, and in thus coming to dictate laws to the assembly. Some remains of former respect induced the meeting to reject the motion of Guadet; and after a tumultuous debate, it admitted La Fayette to the honours of the meeting; but this was all the assembly would do. La Fayette's hopes now turned towards the national guard, which had so long been devoted to him; and he trusted, with the aid of its members, to succeed in putting an end to the clubs, dispersing the jacobins, restoring to Louis XVI. all the authority which the law had conferred on him, and giving security to the constitution. The revolutionary party was in a state of stupefaction, and dreaded the worst results, from the boldness and the activity of this redoubtable adversary of the Champ-de-Mars. But the court, which feared that the constitutionalists might triumph, was itself the cause of the failure of La Fayette's projects: he had announced a review, which the court prevented by its influence with the royalist officers. The grenadiers and the chasseurs, select corps, which were still better disposed than the others, were to meet before his house, and from thence to march against the clubs; but not more than thirty men made their appearance. Having thus vainly attempted to rally, in the cause of the constitution and of the general security, the court and the national guard, and finding himself deserted by all those whom he came to succour, La Fayette returned to the army, after losing all the remains which had been left him of popularity and influence. This effort was the last sign of life on the part of the constitutional party.

The assembly then naturally returned to the consideration of the state of France, which had not changed. The extraordinary commission of twelve presented, through Pastoret, a very discouraging picture of the state and the divisions of parties. Jean Debry, in the name of the same commission, proposed to announce, for the sake of maintaining tranquillity in the public mind, which was extremely agitated, that the assembly should declare the moment when the crisis became imminent by the words, "*Our country is in danger!*" and that then measures for the public safety should be adopted. The discussion opened with the consideration of this important proposition. Vergniaud, in a speech which produced a great effect on the assembly, painted all the dangers to which, at that moment, the country was exposed. He stated, that it was *in the name of the king* that the emigrants were assembled, that the sovereigns were leagued, that foreign armies were marching on the frontiers, and that their internal disturbances took place. He accused him of weakening the national energy by his refusals, and of thus delivering up France to the coalition. He quoted that article of the constitution which declared that, "*if the king placed himself at the head of an army, and directed its forces against the nation, or if he did not oppose any similar enterprise which should be attempted in his name, he should be regarded as having abdicated the monarchy.*" He then supposed that Louis XVI. should have voluntarily opposed the true means of defending the country, and "in this case," said he, "should we not have a right to say to him, O king! who doubtless did

believe, like the tyrant Lysander, that truth is no better than a lie, and that men were to be amused with oaths as children are amused with playthings; you who have only feigned a love of the laws, in order to maintain the power of braving them; and love of the constitution, lest you should have been hurled from the throne, where you wish to remain only to destroy it; do you think now to deceive us by any more of your hypocritical protestations? do you think to flatter us into forgetfulness of our misfortunes by your artificial excuses? Was it in order to defend us that you opposed foreign soldiers by troops whose inferiority did not leave a chance of doubt as to their defeat? Was it to defend us that you rejected all the propositions for fortifying the interior? Was it for our defence that you countenanced the act of a general who violated the constitution, and chilled the courage of those who served it? Did the constitution leave you the choice of your ministers for our happiness or for our ruin? Did it appoint you the head of our armies for our glory or our shame? Did she leave you, in short, the right of sanctioning measures, a civil list, and so many prerogatives, in order that you might constitutionally ruin the constitution and the empire? No, no! Man, whom the generosity of Frenchmen has been unable to touch, and whom love of despotism alone can warm—are no longer any part of that constitution you have so unworthily violated—of that people you have so unworthily betrayed!"

In the situation of the Girondist party, it no longer counted on any thing but the deposition of the king. Vergniaud, indeed, expressed himself as yet but in the language of supposition; but all the popular party ascribed to Louis XVI., in reality, the projects which in the mouth of Vergniaud were only assumptions. A few days afterward, Brissot explained himself still more plainly: "The dangers which surround us," said he, "are the most extraordinary which have been known in past ages. Our country is in danger, not for want of troops, not because these troops want courage, because her frontiers are ill fortified, and her resources scanty—No! she is in danger because her forces are paralyzed. And who has paralyzed them? A single individual; the very man whom the constitution raised into its chief, and whom perfidious advisers have rendered its enemy! You have been told to dread the kings of Hungary and Prussia—I tell you, that the main strength of these sovereigns is in your own court; there it is that they must be first conquered. You have been told to give a blow to the refractory priests without the realm—but I tell you, that a blow aimed at the Tuileries will reach at once all these priests. You have been told to attack all intriguers, all conspirators, and all the factious—I tell you, that all these will disappear, if vengeance reaches them through the Tuileries, for that cabinet is the point to which all their machinations tend, where all their plots are concocted, and from whence all impulses spring! The nation is the puppet of this cabinet. This is the secret of your situation, and the source of your evils, and there it is to which the remedy must be applied."

The Gironde in this manner prepared the assembly for the question of despotism. But the great question relative to the dangers of the country was previously decided on. The three united committees declared that it was then time to take measures for the public safety, and the assembly then proclaimed the solemn formula, "*Citizens, the country is in danger!*" Upon this all the civil authorities immediately placed themselves in a state of permanent surveillance; all the citizens fit to bear arms, and who had already performed the functions of national guards, were put on active service; every one was called on to declare the arms and ammunition he had in his possession; pikes were given to those who could not carry guns; battalions of volunteers were enrolled in the public squares, in the midst of which banners were planted, bearing the words, "*Citizens, the country is in danger!*" and a camp was formed at Soissons. All these measures of defence, now become indispensable, carried to its height the excitation of the revolutionary phrensy. An opportunity of remarking it was afforded by the anniversary of the 14th of July, during which the sentiments of the multitude and of the federates of the departments burst forth without disguise. Pétion was the object of

and the struggles of parties; his talents were not great: his disposition was somewhat unbending: he neither knew how to appreciate nor to manage men: and though laborious, intelligent, and active, he would have figured little without the aid of his wife. All that was wanting in him, she supplied; force and elevation of mind, ability, and foresight. Madame Roland was the soul of the Girondists; she was the point round which assembled those brilliant and courageous men, to discuss the wants and the dangers of their country: it was she who roused those whom she knew to be able in action, and directed to the tribune the efforts of those whom she knew to be eloquent.

The court named this ministry the *sans culotte ministry*. The first time that Roland appeared at the palace, with strings in his shoes and a round hat, which were against the rules of etiquette, the master of the ceremonies refused to admit him. But forced at length to allow him to pass, pointing to Roland, he thus addressed Dumouriez: "*What, sir! without buckles in his shoes!*"—"Ay, sir, all is lost!" replied Dumouriez, with the utmost coolness. Such were still the prejudices of the court. The first measure of the new ministry was war. The situation of France was daily becoming more and more dangerous, and she had every thing to fear from the evil dispositions of Europe. Leopold was dead, and that event was likely to hasten the resolutions of the cabinet of Vienna. His young successor Francis II., it was probable, would be less pacific or less prudent than he had been. Austria moreover was assembling troops, tracing camps, and appointing generals: she had violated the territory of Basle, and placed a garrison in Porentruy, to obtain an entrance to the department of Doubs. There remained therefore no doubt with regard to her projects. The meetings of troops at Coblenz had recommenced in greater numbers; the cabinet of Vienna had but momentarily dispersed the emigrants scattered through the Belgian provinces, in order to prevent the invasion of that country, which it was not yet in a state to oppose; but all this was only done to save appearances, for it suffered a staff of general officers to remain at Brussels wearing the royal uniform and mounting the white cockade. The answers of prince Kaunitz to the explanations demanded were by no means satisfactory. He even refused to treat directly, and the baron of Cobenzel was charged with replying that Austria refused to depart from the conditions she had imposed. The re-establishment of the monarchy on the basis of the royal sitting of the 23d of June, the restoration of the property of the clergy, of the lands of Alsace with all their rights to the German princes, and of Avignon and the Venaissin territory to the pope; such was the *ultimatum* of Austria. All possibility of agreement was thus at an end, and the maintenance of peace was no longer to be expected. France was threatened with the fate which Holland had undergone, or perhaps with that of Poland: all that now remained to be decided on was, whether to wait for or commence the war,—to profit by the enthusiasm of the people, or to suffer it to subside into coldness; the real author of a war is not he who declares it, but he who renders it necessary.

Louis XVI. presented himself on the 20th of April to the assembly, accompanied by all his ministers. "I come, gentlemen," said he, "in the midst of the national assembly, on occasion of one of the most important subjects which can occupy the attention of the representatives of the nation. My minister for foreign affairs will read to you the report which he has made in my council on our political situation." Dumouriez then rose: he exposed the causes of complaint which France had against the house of Austria: the object of the conferences of Mantua, Reichenback and Pilnitz: the coalition which Austria had formed against the French revolution: her warlike preparations which continued to assume a more formidable aspect: the undisguised protection which she accorded to bodies of the emigrants: and, finally, the intolerable conditions of her *ultimatum*; and after a long series of considerations, founded on the hostile conduct of the king of Hungary and Bohemia (Francis II. was not yet elected emperor), on the pressing circumstances in which the nation stood, on its formal and pronounced resolution never to suffer any attack or any outrage on its rights, and on the honour and good

faith of Louis XVI. who was the depositary of the dignity and security of France—he advised war against Austria. Louis XVI. then said, with a voice somewhat tremulous with emotion, "You have just heard, gentlemen, the result of the negotiations which I have engaged in with the court of Vienna. The conclusions of that report have been sanctioned by the unanimous voice of all the members of my council, and I have myself adopted them. They are agreeable to the wishes which have been often expressed by the national assembly, and to the sentiments which have been manifested by many of my subjects from various parts of the realm: all prefer war to witnessing the dignity of the French people longer outraged, and the security of the nation threatened. It was my duty, previous to adopting this measure, to exert my utmost efforts for the maintenance of peace. I now come, in the terms of the constitution, to propose to the national assembly war against the king of Hungary and Bohemia." Several marks of applause followed the king's speech; but the solemnity of the circumstance and the weight of the decision had penetrated all the assembly with a deep and silent emotion. As soon as the king retired, the assembly determined on a meeting in the evening, in which the war was resolved on almost unanimously. Thus was begun with the chief of the confederated powers, that war which lasted a quarter of a century, which confirmed the revolution triumphantly, and which changed the whole face of Europe.

## LETTER XXI.

*The French Revolution continued—France prepares for War—Disasters of the Army—Decree of Banishment against the non-juring Clergy—Fall of the Girondists—Duke of Brunswick's Manifesto—Events of the 10th of August—The Prussian Army enters France—Massacre of the 2d of September, 1792—Retreat of the combined Armies.*

THE declaration of war was hailed with enthusiasm in every part of France: it communicated a new excitement to the people, already sufficiently agitated by domestic broils. The districts, the municipalities, and popular societies sent addresses: men were raised, voluntary contributions were offered, pikes were made, and the whole nation seemed to rise up to wait the onset of Europe, to invade her. But enthusiasm, which in the end assures victory, does not at first supply the want of organization. Accordingly, there were no troops at the opening of the campaign but the regular soldiers, until the new levies should have been formed. The following is the state of the French forces in these respects. The vast frontier from Dunkirk to Huningen was separated into three great divisions. On the left, from Dunkirk to Philippeville, the army of the north, consisting of about forty thousand foot and eight thousand horse, was under the command of the marshal de Rochambeau. La Fayette commanded the centre army, composed of forty-five thousand foot and seven thousand horse, and extended from Philippeville to the lines of Weissenbourg. Lastly, the army of the Rhine, consisting of thirty-five thousand foot and eight thousand horse, was led by the marshal Luckner, who occupied the space extending from the lines of Weissenbourg to Basle. The frontier of the Alps and Pyrenees was intrusted to general Montesquiou, whose army was very small; but that portion of France was not yet exposed to danger.

The marshal de Rochambeau was of opinion that the army should remain on the defensive and keep the frontiers. Dumouriez, on the contrary, wished to act on the offensive and to begin the attack, as France had first declared war, in order to profit by the advantage of being first ready. He was very enterprising: and as he directed the military operations, though minister for foreign affairs, he procured the adoption of his plan. It consisted in a rapid invasion of Belgium. That province had attempted, in 1790, to shake off the Austrian yoke, and after having been for a short period victorious, it had been conquered by superior force. Dumouriez imagined that the