

imperialists, that their authors should hide their heads in shame; for surely it is not the part of really brave men to calumniate their victims before sacrificing them. We need not praise the Filipinos as in every way the equals of the "embattled farmers" of Lexington and Concord, and Aguinaldo as the peer of Washington; but there is an overwhelming abundance of testimony, some of it unwilling, that the Filipinos are fully the equals, and even the superiors, of the Cubans and the Mexicans. As to Aguinaldo, Admiral Dewey is credited with saying that he is controlled by men abler than himself. The same could be said of more than one of our Presidents. Moreover, it would prove that those are greatly mistaken who predict that the Filipino uprising would collapse were Aguinaldo captured or killed. The old slander that Aguinaldo had sold out the revolutionary movement for a bribe of \$400,000 has been so thoroughly exploded by the best authority that it required uncommon audacity to repeat it.

Now let us see what has happened. Two months before the beginning of our Spanish war our consul at Manila reported to the State Department: "Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are almost of daily occurrence. The crown forces (Spanish) have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila. A republic is organized here as in Cuba." When two months later our war of liberation and humanity began, Commodore Dewey was at Hongkong with his ships. He received orders to attack and destroy the Spanish fleet in those waters. It was then that our consul-general at Singapore informed our State Department that he had conferred with General Aguinaldo, then at Singapore, as to the co-operation of the Philippine insurgents, and that he had telegraphed to Commodore Dewey

that Aguinaldo was willing to come to Hongkong to arrange with Dewey for "general co-operation, if desired;" whereupon Dewey promptly answered: "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible." The meeting was had. Dewey sailed to Manila to destroy the Spanish fleet, and Aguinaldo was taken to the seat of war on a vessel of the United States. His forces received a supply of arms through Commodore Dewey, and did faithfully and effectively co-operate with our forces against the Spaniards, so effectively, indeed, that soon afterward by their efforts the Spaniards had lost the whole country except a few garrisons in which they were practically blockaded.

Now, what were the relations between the Philippine insurgents and this Republic? There is some dispute as to certain agreements, including a promise of Philippine independence, said to have been made between Aguinaldo and our consul-general at Singapore, before Aguinaldo proceeded to co-operate with Dewey. But I lay no stress upon this point. I will let only the record of facts speak. Of these facts the first, of highest importance, is that Aguinaldo was "desired"—that is, invited—by officers of the United States to co-operate with our forces. The second is that the Filipino junta in Hongkong immediately after these conferences appealed to their countrymen to receive the American fleet about to sail for Manila as friends, by a proclamation which had these words:

"Compatriots, divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach. The Americans, not from any mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country. Where you see the American flag flying assemble in mass. They are our redeemers."



With this faith his followers gave Aguinaldo a rapturous greeting upon his arrival at Cavité, where he proclaimed his government and organized his army under Dewey's eyes.

The arrival of our land forces did not at first change these relations. Brig.-Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, commanding, wrote to Aguinaldo, July 4, as follows: "General, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces," etc. Aguinaldo responded cordially, and an extended correspondence followed, special services being asked for by the party of the first part, being rendered by the second, and duly acknowledged by the first. All this went on pleasantly until the capture of Manila, in which Aguinaldo effectively co-operated by fighting the Spaniards outside, taking many prisoners from them, and hemming them in. The services they rendered by taking thousands of Spanish prisoners, by harassing the Spaniards in the trenches, and by completely blockading Manila on the land side, were amply testified to by our own officers. Aguinaldo was also active on the sea. He had ships, which our commanders permitted to pass in and out of Manila Bay, under the flag of the Philippine republic, on their expeditions against other provinces.

Now, whether there was or not any formal compact of alliance signed and sealed, no candid man who has studied the official documents will deny that in point of fact the Filipinos, having been desired and invited to do so, were, before the capture of Manila, acting, and were practically recognized as

our allies, and that as such they did effective service, which we accepted and profited by. This is an indisputable fact, proved by the record.

It is an equally indisputable fact that during that period the Filipino government constantly and publicly, so that nobody could plead ignorance of it or misunderstand it, informed the world that their object was the achievement of national independence, and that they believed the Americans had come in good faith to help them accomplish that end, as in the case of Cuba. It was weeks after various proclamations and other public utterances of Aguinaldo to that effect that the correspondence between him and General Anderson, which I have quoted, took place, and that the useful services of the Filipinos as our practical allies were accepted. It is, further, an indisputable fact that during this period our government did not inform the Filipinos that their fond expectations as to our recognition of their independence were mistaken.

Our secretary of state did, indeed, on June 16 write to Mr. Pratt, our consul-general at Singapore, that our government knew the Philippine insurgents, not indeed as patriots struggling for liberty, and who, like the Cubans, "are and of right ought to be free and independent," but merely as "discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain," who, if we occupied their country in consequence of the war, would have to yield us due "obedience." And other officers of our government were instructed not to make any promises to the Filipinos as to the future. But the Filipinos themselves were not so informed. They were left to believe that, while fighting in co-operation with the American forces, they were fighting for their own independence. They could not imagine that the government of the great American Republic, while boasting



of having gone to war with Spain under the banner of liberation and humanity in behalf of Cuba, was capable of secretly plotting to turn that war into one for the conquest and subjugation of the Philippines.

Thus the Filipinos went faithfully and bravely on doing for us the service of allies, of brothers-in-arms, far from dreaming that the same troops with whom they had been asked to co-operate would soon be employed by the great apostle of liberation and humanity to slaughter them for no other reason than that they, the Filipinos, continued to stand up for their own freedom and independence.

But just that was to happen. As soon as Manila was taken and we had no further use for our Filipino allies, they were ordered to fall back and back from the city and its suburbs. Our military commanders treated the Filipinos' country as if it were our own. When Aguinaldo sent one of his aides-de-camp to General Merritt with a request for an interview, General Merritt was "too busy." When our peace negotiations with Spain began, and representatives of the Filipinos asked for audience to solicit consideration of the rights and wishes of their people, the doors were slammed in their faces, in Washington as well as in Paris.

And behind those doors the scheme was hatched to deprive the Philippine Islanders of independence from foreign rule and to make them the subjects of another foreign ruler, and that foreign ruler their late ally, this great Republic which had grandly proclaimed to the world that its war against Spain was not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation and humanity.

Behind those doors which were tightly closed to the people of the Philippines a treaty was made with Spain, by the direction of President McKinley, which provided for the cession

of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the United States for a consideration of \$20,000,000. It has been said that this sum was not purchase money, but a compensation for improvements made by Spain, or a *solatium* to sweeten the pill of cession, or what not; but, stripped of all cloudy verbiage, it was really purchase money, the sale being made by Spain under duress. Thus Spain sold, and the United States bought, what was called the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands and their people.

Now look at the circumstances under which that "cession" was made. Spain had lost the possession of the country, except a few isolated and helpless little garrisons, most of which were effectively blockaded by the Filipinos. The American forces occupied Cavité and the harbor and city of Manila, and nothing more. The bulk of the country was occupied and possessed by the people thereof, over whom Spain had, in point of fact, ceased to exercise any sovereignty, the Spanish power having been driven out or destroyed by the Filipino insurrection, while the United States had not acquired, beyond Cavité and Manila, any authority of whatever name by military occupation, nor by recognition on the part of the people. Aguinaldo's army surrounded Manila on the land side, and his government claimed organized control over fifteen provinces. That government was established at Malolos, not far from Manila; and a very respectable government it was. According to Mr. Barrett, our late minister in Siam, himself an ardent imperialist, who had seen it, it had a well-organized executive, divided into several departments, ably conducted, and a popular assembly, a congress, which would favorably compare with the Parliament of Japan — an infinitely better government than the insurrectionary government of Cuba ever was.



It is said that Aguinaldo's government was in operation among only a part of the people of the islands. This is true. But it is also certain that it was recognized and supported by an immeasurably larger part of the people than Spanish sovereignty, which had practically ceased to exist, and than American rule, which was confined to a harbor and a city and which was carried on by the exercise of military force under what was substantially martial law over a people that constituted about one twentieth of the whole population of the islands. Thus, having brought but a very small fraction of the country and its people under our military control, we bought by that treaty the sovereignty over the whole from a power which had practically lost that sovereignty and therefore did no longer possess it; and we contemptuously disdained to consult the existing native government, which actually did control a large part of the country and the people, and which had been our ally in the war with Spain. The sovereignty we thus acquired may well be defined as Abraham Lincoln once defined the "popular sovereignty" of Senator Douglas's doctrine — as being like a soup made by boiling the shadow of the breastbone of a pigeon that had been starved to death.

No wonder that treaty found opposition in the Senate. Virulent abuse was heaped upon the "statesman who would oppose the ratification of a peace treaty." A peace treaty? This was no peace treaty at all. It was a treaty with half a dozen bloody wars in its belly. It was, in the first place, an open and brutal declaration of war against our allies, the Filipinos, who struggled for freedom and independence from foreign rule. Every man not totally blind could see that. For such a treaty the true friends of peace could, of course, not vote.

But more. Even before that treaty had been assented to by the Senate — that is, even before that ghastly shadow of our Philippine sovereignty had obtained any legal sanction — President McKinley assumed of his own motion the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands by his famous "benevolent-assimilation" order of December 21, 1898, through which our military commander at Manila was directed forthwith to extend the military government of the United States over the whole archipelago, and by which the Filipinos were notified that if they refused to submit, they would be compelled by force of arms. Having bravely fought for their freedom and independence from one foreign rule, they did refuse to submit to another foreign rule, and then the slaughter of our late allies began — the slaughter by American arms of a once friendly and confiding people. And this slaughter has been going on ever since.

This is a grim story. Two years ago the prediction of such a possibility would have been regarded as a hideous nightmare, as the offspring of a diseased imagination. But to-day it is a true tale — a plain recital of facts taken from the official records. These things have actually been done in these last two years by and under the administration of William McKinley. This is our Philippine war as it stands. Is it a wonder that the American people should be troubled in their consciences? . . .

I am not here as a partisan, but as an American citizen anxious for the future of the Republic. And I cannot too earnestly admonish the American people, if they value the fundamental principles of their government and their own security and that of their children, for a moment to throw aside all partisan bias and soberly to consider what kind of a precedent they would set if they consented to, and by con-