

Washington and Lincoln should stand as proofs forever that our Nation is a great beating heart, capable of many sorrows and a many-colored happiness, a great heart like that of a Jesus, which must embrace millions in its measureless affection, and love all equally. All the struggles and disappointments and labors of Washington, all the similar pains and tears of Lincoln tell us that when we come to the words "our country" we have come to a living soul, that ought to be as omnipotent as the hand of God, as loving and pure as the heart of Jesus, the Son of God and of all humanity.

Washington came up from Virginia, Lincoln down from Illinois; both came in one spotless honor, in one self-denial, in one patience and labor, in one love of man; both came in the name of one simple Christianity; both breathing daily prayers to God; thus came as though to picture a time when Virginia and Illinois, all the South and all the North would be alike one in works, in love, in religion, and in the details of National fame. If any of you young hearts have begun to forget your Nation and its heroes, you would better sit down by her rivers and remember your lost Zion, and weep as the old vision unveils itself, and then pray God to let your right hand forget its cunning rather than permit your soul to empty itself of your country.

COUNT CAPRIVI



GEORG LEO VON CAPRIVI DE CAPRERA, a distinguished German statesman and soldier, and Chancellor of the Empire (1890-94), was born at Charlottenburg, Feb. 24, 1831, and died at Krossen, Prussia, Feb. 6, 1899. Entering the army in 1849 he gained rapid promotion, and served with honor in the campaigns of 1864 and 1866, and in the Franco-Prussian War was chief of staff of the Tenth Corps. In 1883, he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant-general, and in the following year was transferred to the control of the admiralty, on the retirement of Von Stosch. Caprivi exhibited creditable vigor in his new post, as well as a thorough comprehension of naval methods, and not long after the accession of William II had completely reorganized the navy. In recognition of his eminent services, he was transferred back to the army and given command of the Tenth or Hanoverian Army Corps. On March 19, 1890, he succeeded Bismarck as chancellor and president of the Prussian Council, and in 1891 received from the Emperor the title of Count. In March, 1892, he resigned his position as Prussian prime minister, but retained his chancellorship till his resignation of that office also, Oct. 26, 1894. In politics, Count Caprivi was a safe, steady councillor, combining patience and sagacity with firmness and a dash of good humor.

ON COLONIAL POSSESSIONS

[First speech as chancellor in the Reichstag, delivered on May 12, 1890, in answer to Dr. von Bamberger's speech on the relinquishment of all colonial possessions.]

GENTLEMEN,—The gentleman who has just spoken has turned his attention from the question before the House to the important subject of our colonial policy. I wish to state with pleasure that he has expressed his approval of the fact that the government has carried out the intentions of the Reichstag. Such is indeed the fact, and I need not enumerate the long series of resolutions through which this House has acknowledged its willingness to support the measures of the federal government. I am convinced, therefore, like my predecessor,¹ that a colonial

¹ Bismarck.

policy is desirable only in as far as it is approved and supported by the will and—with due respect to Mr. Bamberger—by the feeling of the nation.

The honorable gentleman has intimated that possibly through my entrance into office a change of policy might be effected. That I most emphatically deny. I believe it is very generally known among those who have had the opportunity of an earlier acquaintance with me that I have not been an advocate of the colonial policy. For various reasons I looked upon the introduction of a colonial policy at that time as extremely dangerous. Now however I am convinced, that in view of the situation to-day, we cannot withdraw without stain upon our honor and financial loss; we cannot even stand still; nay, we must push forward.

Mr. Bamberger has declared that if the government would make known its purpose, and if the demands were not exorbitant, both he and his party might give their support. I infer, therefore, with a feeling of satisfaction that even among his associates there will not be found a Hannibal Fischer¹ for the German colonies.

If, however, he expects me to set forth a definite program, or to state on the spot: We shall take so many millions and spend them; and then to say we have reached a position where it is possible to dispense with the support of the empire and leave the colonies to themselves,—if, I repeat, he expects this—he is doomed to disappointment. In matters subjected to so many casualties and sealed, as it were, against penetrating into their inner nature as the beginning of colonies in foreign lands,—territory not only unknown to our-

¹ Hannibal Fischer sold by order of the Federal Diet in 1852 the German fleet lying in Bremerhaven, and thereby aroused the indignation of the German people.

selves but to all other nations as well,—it is simply impossible to predict that twelve months hence such events will happen or we shall need so much money. I can only emphasize—and the fact perhaps will give me more weight with Mr. Bamberger's partisans—that I am not a colonial enthusiast, that even to-day I look upon the matter with perfectly cool judgment, and that with my advice matters will only go as far as the honor and the interests of Germany demand.

The honorable gentleman looks upon the colonial policy as a money question and says: a colonial policy is an economic policy, and in a certain sense he is right, although he draws the line a little too closely. Therefore he has described the economic policy hitherto pursued by the federal government toward the colonies in a light not altogether favorable; he has named sums much too large in my estimation for expenses incurred so far. I have a natural aversion to enter into details with a shrewd financier, but I can state as a fact that he has counted into the expenses quoted by him: subsidies for steamships, appropriations for the maintenance of war-vessels, for salaries of officials, expenses pertaining in a certain measure to other purposes also, and which would have been necessary, even if we had decided upon no colonial policy. According to documents before me the sum hitherto expended by the empire for colonial purposes amounts to not quite 5,500,000 marks, and the money invested by companies—as far as I am able to ascertain—to somewhat less than 15,000,000 marks.

I admit that with the appearance of the colonial policy a great many misconceptions crept in. There was a belief for instance that we had but to stretch out our hands to find in one colony a nugget of gold, in another manufactured cigars, errors easily refuted by those who had seriously

studied the question. The territory left for German colonies was decidedly not of that kind; on the contrary it became clearer day by day that profits could be realized only with great labor and after a considerable lapse of time.

Mr. Bamberger presents to us the example of the English. "Their companies," he says, "colonize without the assistance of the government." We would gladly follow their example, and we admit it to be our aim some day to reach a point where our government will cease to make appropriations and the companies will take upon themselves all responsibility and expense and thereby guarantee a profit to those engaged in the enterprise. But we are absolutely unable to carry out this English system immediately. In the short time that I have been in office I have learned how difficult it is to find a competent man for a comparatively subordinate position in the colonies, to say nothing of a man qualified both by natural ability and experience to fill a high position. But there is another point in which we differ from England. History tells us that English private capital has a tendency to turn to such enterprises; German capital, on the other hand, prefers investment in the doubtful securities of doubtful foreign states.

The reasons for this are well known, and the honorable and experienced gentleman undoubtedly knows them much better than I do.

The federal government cannot—as proved by the measure submitted to us here—state on the first of April of the present year how much they will have spent next year. This is where we would have the nation and the Reichstag believe that we will go no further than is absolutely necessary. We wish to be so far trusted as not to be open to suspicion in case we should spend 4,000,000 instead of 2,500,000; such in-

creased expenditure is sometimes unavoidable. The colonial policy cannot be awarded to the lowest bidder; it must be given to those who are willing to undertake the matter.

In the debate to-day we are principally thinking of East Africa, and this is only natural. But if we wish to draw conclusions for the future from the past, as far as the financial side is concerned, East Africa offers a singularly unfavorable field: first, it is an unbounded territory; secondly, existing conditions are heterogeneous; and thirdly, the insurrection there has interrupted the natural development. Yet, leaving out the expenses of the navy and the officials, I can state that the Protectorates of Togo and Kamerun are self-supporting. We do not therefore—thanks to an able administration—show a deficit everywhere. This happy state of affairs will probably not be brought about so rapidly in East Africa; it will take years, but I have faith and hope that we shall achieve it some day; and in colonial affairs some faith and trust are necessary.

Let us consider the origin of the colonial policy and ask ourselves: What induced the imperial government to enter into what the gentleman is pleased to term "an ill-considered policy"? It is obvious that besides the expectation of financial gain other motives must have co-operated, else so many prudent and sensible men as the members of this House would hardly have embarked on this ship.

The honorable member has touched upon the humane and religious question of anti-slavery! Whatever importance may be attached to it here, I will leave undecided, but I believe it must be admitted even by those who are not inclined to favor this movement that flourishing industry and trade, nay, even well-conducted farming, is impossible without giving the natives some moral and intellectual education.

If we wish to bring them to this condition, we have, in my judgment, the obligation—even for the sake of our own pecuniary interests—to support the missions and to promote the civilization of these people.

It is a well-known fact that the Centre¹ gave its consent to the colonial policy influenced by religious motives and the anti-slavery movement. But as far as I have been able to follow the stenographic reports, the Centre did not object, if incidentally German national interests might be advanced thereby.

Others emphasize the national economic interests, yet accept with gratitude any advance toward christianization and German civilization made through this initiative. Each one must decide for himself how important he considers these matters, but through the Congo acts we are under international obligations to do something toward the advancement of civilization, and shall be still more strongly bound through the conference of Brussels now in session.

It is my opinion that only through the establishment of an organization, approaching to what in Europe we term a state, shall we be enabled effectually to resist slavery. But this is still in the dim future. First of all we must establish stations in the interior from which the missionary, as well as the merchant, may extend the field of their activities; to attain the result desired by the Centre, gun and Bible must work side by side, for without killing the slave-traders we can never put an end to slavery.

But there is one reason which the honorable member considers unimportant, and therefore puts aside—the national feeling! I am convinced, and I know whereof I am speaking, that one of the factors which led us to launch into the

¹ Catholic party.

colonial policy was the endeavor to maintain a tide of national feeling. After the war of 1870 there came a period of inertia in which the national spirit seemed to be paralyzed. It had no particular object to turn to; idealism, so necessary to the German mind, had lost its faculty of manifesting itself in the intellectual sphere. The war had provided it with practical aims, yet there remained an overflow of energy seeking an outlet. Then came the colonial policy, and the feeling for national honor and greatness with all its intensity—in many instances blindness—threw itself into this field.

You know, gentlemen, that the German nature, leaning as it does, strongly toward particularism, needs idealism if it is to be usefully employed. To concentrate itself this idealism needs a focal point; such a focus was found in the colonial policy, and was, as far as I know, gratefully received by the nation. Mr. Bamberger calls this a “romantic” feeling and considers it of little importance. I should like to ask him if he thinks the German Reichstag would be sitting here to-day but for this “romantic” feeling of the people?

I think not. I attach great importance to this national instinct, the “unconscious” in the soul of the people; moreover, should I find evidences of the smoldering of such a fire I should deem it my duty to search for it, foster it, and lead it into useful channels.

I concur however with Mr. Bamberger in his belief that this enthusiasm alone is of little value, since it is difficult to convert it into hard cash, German colonial enthusiasm in particular, which proverbially tightens the purse strings. Nevertheless I am of the opinion that after the pacification of the natives and the establishment of a well-regulated government, East Africa will offer special inducements for the investment of private capital. I sincerely hope that whatever

is left of colonial enthusiasm may overcome this obstacle and manifest itself in the form of ringing coin.

With many people the national question was synonymous with power, and I must confess this question of power in the colonial policy was treated by the majority with a surprising display of ignorance. It was believed we had only to buy colonies, paint the map of Africa the German color and proclaim to all the world: We are a great people!

But not so; in its inception, a colonial policy, as far as power is concerned, operates negatively; its success can be secured only by great sacrifices both of men and money. If it is a policy of faith and hope from the financial and ethical point of view, it is equally so with regard to power, and perhaps in this direction the necessity of faith is even more urgent. I can assure the honorable member that as far as I am concerned not a man shall be sacrificed or a mark spent more than is absolutely necessary to maintain and develop what is ours. I should never consent to send large sums of money or numbers of men to East Africa merely to gratify a desire to display power.

Mr. Bamberger has also touched upon the question of war, saying that in such a calamity colonies are dangerous possessions. I am willing to admit that they are doubtful ones, yet as an old soldier I know that the decision at the principal seat of war is always decisive of the fate of the dependencies. If war should break out in Europe—which heaven forbid—and we be victorious here, it would be immaterial whether some colony or other should find itself in an evil plight, the peace stipulations would fully reinstate us.

Looking into the future, I do not deem it impossible that the progress and development of the world at large will force Germany to enter into closer—and let us hope peaceful rela-

tions—with trans-oceanic states. The Phæacian existence of a small European state must cease, we shall have to deal with powers across the ocean, which are masters of enormous treasures in people and money, unknown to us; and if we realize that the time will come when German spirit and German power must manifest themselves more vigorously than heretofore, we must reach the conclusion that a navy is necessary. It was my aim during the years that I had the honor of being chief of the admiralty to labor for the development of the navy, that we might the better maintain our prestige in the event of our enlarging the sphere of our activities.

If we admit the possibility of our being placed in such a position as to need the display of a naval force in peace and war in foreign waters, we must necessarily ask ourselves: Where shall it take its supplies, the substance without which it is able neither to move nor to fight? Should we now become engaged in a war with a foreign power, we have some few but inadequate means of providing our vessels with coal. On the whole we should have to depend upon the friendliness of neutral powers; yet those who believe in the great future of the navy cannot tolerate such conditions for any length of time. We must therefore gain possession of a few places where German coal may be supplied to German ships by German authorities. The existence of coaling-stations is therefore the prime condition for naval activity in the future wars; and if we are called upon at this moment to vote some insignificant sums for our colonies, I am sanguine that this capital is a good investment and that we shall reap a manifold return.

To sum up then: We shall endeavor to advance step by step (if the Reichstag will support us); we shall not launch out into any risky enterprise; we shall strive to bring the companies to where they originally stood—that is, make them

as independent as possible, although I am not able to state to-day to what extent these companies will feel inclined to work independently. At this time we have in East Africa, created by the Wissmann laws, a body of soldiers belonging to no one knows whom. I do not deem it improbable that in after years, when the dictatorship and state of war shall have ceased, these troops, recruited by Wissmann in the old lansquenet¹ style, may be changed into imperial troops, thus achieving more than now, when we recruit by contract.

It shall be our endeavor to respect foreign rights everywhere, as amplified by the secretary of state, and to protect the German empire. I firmly believe the federal government able to conduct the colonial policy in such a way as not to endanger the German universal policy and not to offend the legitimate development of German national feeling.

[Translated by Helena Nordhoff Gargan.]

¹ From the German "Landsknecht,"—soldier of fortune.

