

There can be nothing finer than that, nobler than a combination like that.

Now let us at the end, just one moment, notice the one solemn utterance of Jesus on this subject. If he be correctly reported, he is setting forth for all time what in his judgment are the conditions of entrance into heaven. Here is this solemn scene of judgment, the sheep on his right hand, the goats on his left. He sends one of them into outer darkness, and the other into eternal felicity.

I am not discussing the question of future punishment now; I simply wish you to fix your attention on the conditions of admission to heaven as Jesus sets them forth.

Now, when he speaks to those on his right hand, that he calls the blessed of his Father and who are to inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world, what does he say?

Does he catechise them as to what they believed? Not one single syllable of belief in any doctrine whatsoever. Nothing about foreordination; nothing about the Bible; nothing about the Trinity; nothing about his own character or authority. Simply as to whether they have been good. Good, that is all! Have they helped, have they tried to lessen the sum of human misery? Have they cared for their fellow-man? Not a word about ceremony, about membership in a church; not a word about any priesthood; not one single thing that all the churches to-day are declaring to be absolutely essential to Christian character and Christian life,—not one word about any of them!

Those who have tried to be good and help their fellow-men are the ones before whose feet the door of eternal felicity opens with welcome. And the others are condemned, not for lack of belief, but simply for lack of character and conduct, nothing else!

AMOS J. CUMMINGS



AMOS JAY CUMMINGS, American congressman and journalist, was born at Conkling, N. Y., May 15, 1841, where his father was a printer. At an early age he began to learn the same trade, and worked at the compositor's case until he joined the army during the Civil War, retiring as sergeant-major from the Twenty-sixth New Jersey Infantry. He then engaged in journalism and filled editorial positions on the New York "Tribune" and New York "Sun." In 1887, he was elected member of Congress from the Tenth New York District and has served continuously since that time. He has written several books, among which are: "Sayings of Uncle Rufus," and "The Ziska Letters." In politics, Mr. Cummings is a Democrat.

ON THE NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MONDAY, APRIL 16, 1900

MR. CHAIRMAN,—I would be untrue to myself if I did not congratulate the gentleman from Illinois who has just taken his seat upon the masterful showing which he has made in his report, and upon the conclusion of the arduous labors in committee that have accompanied the birth of this bill. That the committee itself did not come to a unanimous agreement is to me a matter of regret. I myself agree in some things with the minority and agree in others with the majority. But I believed it to be my duty, if I had any fight to make, to make it upon the floor of this House, as I have heretofore done, and I declined to sign the minority report.

Mr. Chairman, the past shows that a powerful navy for the American nation is a vital necessity. Without it we may become the prey of the robber nations of the earth; without a great navy, I will undertake to say, we to-day might be at

war with Great Britain over the Alaska boundary. Her rapacity toward the Boers is due to her greed for gold; and there is as much gold in Alaska as in the Transvaal. It is the fact that we are prepared for war that saves us from trouble with the powers of Europe. From the days of the battle of Salamis down to the present a strong navy has been the safety of a maritime nation. It was the battle of Salamis that drove Xerxes from Greece, not the fight at the pass of Thermopylæ. It was the battle in the bay that sent him whirling back across the Hellespont into Asia, where he belonged.

When Hannibal invaded Italy and maintained himself there for seventeen years without re-enforcement, it was not the Roman legions that drove him to Africa; it was the Roman ships which conveyed Scipio's army there and forced Hannibal to follow it in a vain effort to defend Carthage. It was the navy that made Venice the supreme mistress of the commerce of the world for centuries. The Mediterranean Sea was practically a Venetian lake because of the Venetian navy.

It was her navy that afterward made Holland the mistress of the sea. And it was not until the English navy had been built to proper proportions that Van Tromp was compelled to pull down his broom and acknowledge its supremacy.

It was our navy that won the most brilliant victory in the Revolution. Admiral Paul Jones, in his fight with the "Serapis" and the "Countess of Scarborough" gave the Revolution an impetus that put behind our forefathers not only the sympathy of Europe, but substantial aid in the way of dollars and of French battle-ships.

Paul Jones, an American admiral, was the only man in either army or navy who had invaded England since the days

of the battle of Hastings. The whole British coast was in alarm. He landed at different places and drew in plunder the same as the English themselves drew it in when they sacked the city of Peking.

It was by the aid of the French navy that we achieved the final triumph of the American Revolution—the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. Without the activity of the French fleet under the Comte de Grasse, Cornwallis would have escaped. A British fleet was hastening to his succor; but when its commander learned that a French fleet of superior force was already in the Chesapeake, it turned back to New York.

It was Nelson, and not Wellington, who was the leading factor in the downfall of Napoleon. The victories of the British navy at Aboukir, Copenhagen, Cape St. Vincent, and Trafalgar destroyed all his hopes. France was practically cut off from the rest of the world. Her commerce was utterly ruined, and she was compelled to feed upon herself until her resources were exhausted.

It was the American navy that gave us peace in the treaty of Ghent in the war of 1812. Hull had surrendered an American army at Detroit. Commodore Perry, within one hundred miles of that city, demolished a British fleet—the first time that American vessels had met an English fleet—and sent to Washington the immortal despatch, "We have met the enemy, and they are ours."

Scott had been driven back at Niagara and Lundy's Lane; Wilkinson had made a fiasco on the northern border; but the guns of the American navy were heard on Lake Champlain, where Commodore McDonough sent the English fleet to the bottom.

Washington, your own proud capital, had been captured by the British, and this building burned, our monuments de-

faced, the White House destroyed, your President became a fugitive in the forests of Virginia; but the victories of Decatur, of Commodore Stewart, of Bainbridge, and of old Isaac Hull in the "Constitution" were a sufficient recompense for the destruction of the city of Washington.

In only one instance in that war did the army achieve a victory, and that was at the Saranac, for the battle of New Orleans, it will be remembered, was fought long after the treaty of peace was signed.

The total destruction of the Turkish navy by the allied fleets at Navarino rescued Greece from the clutches of the followers of the Prophet and restored to her her freedom.

It was the American navy that gave us the victory in the war with Mexico. Taylor had marched across the Nueces, across the Colorado, across the Rio Grande; he had taken Monterey; he had reached the plains of Buena Vista and wiped out Santa Anna's army; but it was Scott who went to the city of Mexico through the aid of the American navy, which bombarded the castle of San Juan de Ulloa and gave him a landing place at Vera Cruz.

It was the American navy that sounded the knell of doom for the Confederacy when gallant old Farragut broke the iron barrier, passed the forts of Jackson and St. Philip, and captured the city of New Orleans. And it was all done before McClellan left the Peninsula. The Confederacy was split in twain when the Mississippi was opened. The fate of the Confederacy was sealed the instant the ports of the South were declared under blockade by President Lincoln. If the Confederacy had had a navy, and if things had been more equal both on sea and on land, we should have had two nations in existence to-day where there is only one.

It was the navy, I may add, that won the Spanish war. I

believe that if Schley and Sampson had been left to their own inspiration, or had received the orders that Dewey received, they would have gone into Santiago harbor without sending an army down there to storm San Juan and El Caney.

It was the navy, under Dewey, that destroyed the Spanish fleet and won the empire in the East; and it was the navy that finally brought proud Spain to her knees with her hands held upward, acknowledging her subjugation.

So, Mr. Chairman, I say that the navy is a vital necessity to the United States as well as to all other maritime nations. This vital necessity is recognized by the people of the country—north and south, east and west. The people to-day are clamoring for an increase of the navy because they know its usefulness, because they know it is a never-failing defender, because they know it is a never-failing aggressor, when war breaks out. In a multiplicity of ships there is safety.

Now, what have we done, and what are we doing, to carry out the wishes of the people? We have three battle-ships on the stocks, and no method of procuring armor for them. We have three more battle-ships and three armored cruisers authorized, and a string attached to each in the shape of a provision that they shall not be even contracted for unless the best armor manufactured can be obtained at \$300 a ton. We propose to authorize in this bill the building of two more battle-ships, three more armored cruisers, and three protected cruisers. Shall there be a string attached to them also? Can men face their constituents after authorizing the construction of these battle-ships and cruisers, and then refusing to provide the money for furnishing the armor for them? Why, sir, it seems to me like voting for a declaration of war and refusing the funds necessary to carry on the war. I believe that the

people demand to-day, not only the prompt construction of the ships already authorized, but also the construction of as many more vessels.

For nearly five years have some of these ships remained without armor. I well remember speeches on this floor in which we were told that we could get armor for \$200 a ton. Very well; we tried it. No ships were built. The man wanted a twenty-year contract, with a pledge that a fleet of ships should be built each year, and went back on his promise; he could not furnish armor at \$200 a ton. Then we reached a point where, after authorizing the construction of ships, we attached a string to the authorization in another manner—this was June 10, 1896:

Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to examine into the actual cost of armor plate and the price for the same which should be equitably paid, and shall report the result of his investigation to Congress at its next session, at a date not later than January 1, 1897; and no contract for armor plate for the vessels authorized by this act shall be made until such report is made to Congress.

That was the condition then, and a similar condition exists to-day. The ships are authorized by you, and then you attach a string and by pulling it get no ships at all. The ships are still unbuilt. We have gone through a war since then, and not one of these ships was built before war was declared, and not one was available during the war. . . .

Mr. Chairman, at the next session of Congress you provided that the price should not exceed \$400 per ton for armor inferior to the Krupp armor, but at the last session of Congress you provided that superior armor should not be obtained unless it could be had at \$300 a ton—an impossible price. If you pay \$400 a ton for the old harveyized armor,

certainly the new Krupp armor is worth at least as much, and yet you limited the price to \$300 a ton. In other words, you provide that the best armor shall be furnished at \$100 per ton less than the sum you have expressed yourselves willing to pay for inferior armor. You practically determined, as I said before, that you would authorize the ships, but you took special care to prevent the building of them. . . .

I think that it is time, Mr. Chairman, that this country understood that the lives of its sailors, its marines, and others connected with the naval service have been endangered and menaced when this government found itself involved in war by the action of Congress in regard to this question of armor plate. I say that the men who fought with Dewey at Manila and with Schley at Santiago are entitled to the best protection the government can give, by placing the best armor on its battle-ships that can be made, by metallic furniture, and by all other life-saving devices.

We authorize two battle-ships here to-day, and six cruisers, and here is the same old story and the same old string over and over again. We will not contract for them, gentlemen say, until we build an armor-plate factory and can manufacture the armor for them ourselves. We will delay the construction three years more, taking in the three battle-ships and three cruisers authorized in the last session, and the three battle-ships under contract, authorized in the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress, thus making a total delay of eight years in the construction of some of these ships. On the score of alleged economy you are opposing expenditure that the world recognizes as an absolute necessity. . . .

Now, Mr. Chairman, I disagreed with the policy of the Naval Committee in some respects, but I propose to stand by it as far as my conscience will allow. I disagreed with the

committee when they refused to provide for the building of gunboats. The Secretary of the Navy had asked for the construction of thirteen gunboats. When Admiral Dewey came before the committee he testified that he thought he would rather have battle-ships than gunboats. We had captured four Spanish gunboats when Manila was taken—that is, Dewey had raised the wrecks. Since then we have bought a lot of little gunboats—some not as large as canal-boats—from the Spanish government. Admiral Dewey, while before the committee, said he thought we did not want any more gunboats, and he would take two or three battle-ships in the place of them. Well, the committee gave him two battle-ships, although the Secretary had not asked for them; but while Secretary Long was before the committee he said he would have asked for them if he had thought he could get them.

Now, I believe in gunboats. I think that boats the size of the "Helena" and vessels of that class are the very thing that the nation needs. We must continue a protectorate over Cuba at least until they form a government, and it looks to me now as though they would not be able to form one for the next five years, and we must have ships for service on the coast of Porto Rico and among the islands of Hawaii. There is nothing so useful in such waters as gunboats. We certainly need them for the Philippines. Those bought and captured from the Spaniards may suffice for the present, as Admiral Dewey suggests. I am in favor of keeping these gunboats in the Philippines just as long as there is a rebel in arms in those islands.

When the islands are conquered, I am in favor of treating them exactly as we treat Cuba. They were both in rebellion against Spain, and of the two possibly the Filipinos were a

little more gallant in fighting the Spaniards—at least fully as gallant as were the Cubans—and they are entitled to the same treatment. Sure it is that Aguinaldo and his Tagals supported Dewey's attack on Manila as heartily as did Garcia the assault of Shafter and Wheeler on Santiago. Gunboats are needed there, and are certainly needed elsewhere. I think it unwise to lop them off entirely in view of the recommendation of Secretary Long. We ought at least to split the difference with him and give him half of what he asked for.

I differed with the committee on the question of sheathed ships. While they took Dewey's word with regard to the battle-ships and gunboats, they refused to take his word as to sheathed ships. He said that a sheathed ship would run two years and maintain her speed without docking, whereas an unsheathed ship had to be docked at least once in every nine months. He acknowledged that the "Charleston" was lost on a sunken reef in the Philippine Islands because she was not sheathed. When asked whether, in his opinion, she could have been saved if she had been sheathed, he replied that at that same time a British war-vessel ran upon an unknown reef and was pulled off in safety because she was sheathed. That seemed to me conclusive evidence that the battle-ships which we were authorizing in this bill should be sheathed.

But I compromised. We agreed to leave the matter to the Secretary of the Navy, and if the Secretary thinks it best to have them in the docks once in nine months instead of once every two years he may sit down upon the project. I am willing to trust John D. Long, and I believe the people are willing to do so. . . .

Now, Mr. Chairman, the committee was unable to agree as to the question of building ships at the navy-yards. Well, there is a great deal to be said on both sides of this question.

I thought that with three battle-ships and three armored cruisers not contracted for, and with two more battle-ships and six more cruisers, armored and protected, but not contracted for, we could afford at least to again try the experiment of building them in the navy-yards. It is a favorable time for doing so.

The Secretary of the Navy, however, is opposed to it. He says they will cost twice as much as vessels built elsewhere and take twice the time for construction. He also thought the yards would be more or less susceptible to political influences.

Possibly he is right. He undoubtedly knows far more about that than I do. I have no doubt that it will cost more to build these ships in the navy-yards than it would to build them under contract, and for this reason: The work of the government is done under the eight-hour system; the contractors work their men from nine to ten, eleven to twelve hours. So that of necessity it must cost more to build the ships in the navy-yards than it would under contract. But I took occasion to get a statement from Captain Sigsbee concerning the construction of vessels in the English, the French, and the German navy-yards. The period covered is approximately five years for France and Germany, and a little less for England, but in all cases the period for dockyard and private construction is the same. The rate of wages was comparatively the same in both the government and private yards. It took much longer to construct the vessels in the government than in the private yards. . . .

My friend from Illinois referred to the German navy. That navy is to-day within 2,700 tons of the strength of the American navy, and that is what made Admiral Diedrich so cocky in the Bay of Manila.

The Emperor of Germany is "some pumpkins;" he "feels his oats." For two years he has been struggling to surpass this country in the size of its navy, and to-day in the German Riechstag a bill is pending, which will undoubtedly pass, doubling the size of the German navy—increasing her tonnage over 400,000 tons. I think that is a strong argument in favor of our building the ships we have already authorized as soon as possible, and of authorizing the building of as many others as we afford to pay for.

I was not unsusceptible to the inquiry made by the chairman of the great Committee on Appropriations, while my friend from Illinois was occupying the floor. He is one of the men who hold the purse-strings of the nation. He takes account of stock in every session of Congress, and in view of the great volume of appropriations made at each session he wants to cut his cloth according to its length. He wants to know where "he is at," and he received the desired information, and in the same breath told you he was not opposed to your bill.

Nor are the people opposed to it. They will tolerate no more delay in this armor-plate matter. You can not take up a newspaper from the St. Croix to the Rio Grande or from Puget Sound to Key Biscayne Bay without finding paragraphs advocating the prompt increase of the navy. They recognize the fact that the bombardment of New York by an enemy would entail treble the cost of our entire navy. . . .

If we are to have an increased navy it is time to stop talking and begin work. Authorizing it will not build it; you must provide armor and do it promptly. Either do this or stop the authorization of vessels. Do one thing or the other. I believe that the people of the country, ten to one, demand a decrease in the army and an increase in the navy; and as long as I remain in this House I intend to voice that demand.