

themselves alone to produce an additional income of £50,000 a year.

Besides the Crown lands, which they do not enjoy, the Royal Family are owners of private lands, which are in fact that which the Crown lands are said to be, but in fact are not,—namely, the private property of the Queen, in the sense in which Belvoir Castle is the property of the Duke of Rutland. Of course, if there were a positive understanding that annuities should be granted to the sons as they came of age, and annuities and dowries to the daughters, that understanding might be held to bind those who had consented to it, although it is questionable how far, after a lapse of five-and-thirty years, it would bind those who had become the voters of the country since that time.

But we deny that any such understanding can be found; and I believe that now it is pretty much given up, and that we have heard the last of it, although Mr. Arthur Peel last week at Warwick spoke of it as a "solemn compact." But the argument that is now relied upon is that the Crown lands should be set off against these grants.

This is a large subject to go into, but I will state briefly my reasons for thinking it a pernicious heresy. These lands are not the lands of the King as an individual, but of the King as king—that is, they are public lands. They do not include the lands which various members of the Family or the present Queen have bought with money saved out of the votes of Parliament, or out of the revenues of the Duchies—such as Sandringham and Osborne, lands which in my opinion it is, for political reasons, most undesirable that the Royal Family should possess.

The Crown lands, if ever they were private property at all, have been confiscated ten times over. If they were not

confiscated at the great Rebellion and only conditionally restored at the Restoration, they were thoroughly confiscated at the time of the flight of James the Second.

Hallam, in writing of the first Parliament of Charles the Second, says that, "they provided various resources," of which one branch was the Crown lands, which he classes with the ordinary revenues, such as customs and excise. The fact is that no one who has examined the tenure of these lands can possibly come to any conclusion except that they are lands wholly within the authority and control of Parliament.

If they are private lands of the Crown, and there is a contract lasting only for the reign; if at the end of this reign they are to be given over to the Prince of Wales, then I want to know why these annuities we are granting now are to be made perpetual. If all is true that is said by the Court about these singular arrangements, then I say that these annuities should be granted only up to a demise of the Crown and no further.

If, indeed, all be true that has been said of late about the private character of the interest of the Crown in these lands, then I say that we should be justified in refusing to plant with oak timber any of those lands that are now in our possession; because those trees cannot in the nature of things grow into value before the next settlement of this question comes to be made.

Those of the Crown Lands which are not used either for the public recreation or for purposes of revenue should in some shape be charged to the Crown—for instance, many of those in London and at Windsor; but I shrink before the difficulties of assessing their money value, and merely name the matter in order that it may be seen that I have by no means exhausted the question of expenditure.



So much as I have said up to the present time has been founded upon public documents which are or may be in everybody's hands. But I have now to go somewhat further, and to inquire into the credibility of statements which have lately been made, which are only partly founded upon proof, and which rest in part upon assertion.

In a pamphlet which has been lately published it is clearly shown that the Civil List was carefully allotted by Parliament to various distinct branches of expenditure, and not fixed as a compensation for any revenues that the Crown has given up, but upon a calculation, derived from the expenditure of the last reign, of the probable future amount of the salaries of the Household and of tradesmen's bills.

The Committee of the House of Commons which sat to settle the amount of the Civil List at the beginning of the reign never took into account the revenues of the Crown lands, and, indeed, never seem to have heard of the doctrine with respect to those lands which has lately been laid down by Liberal Ministers. As is shown by the pamphlet to which I refer, and shown, I know, with accuracy, the Committee considered only the actual past expenditure of former kings, and the probable future expenditure of the present Queen. So much is a matter of fact and capable of proof. The House of Commons went further than to fix the amount as a whole. It divided it under the various heads, and fixed the amount in each division; and so careful was the House of Commons as to put these divisions into the schedule of the Act.

A clause in the Act lays it down that the saving in any one class cannot be carried to any other, and the powers given to the Lords of the Treasury to apply savings at the end of the year clearly contemplate only trifling variations

in the expenditure from year to year, its general character for the reign having been immutably fixed by the House of Commons at the beginning of the reign itself. This, again, is a matter of fact and capable of proof.

Now, in answer to a question by Mr. Dixon, Mr. Gladstone stated, not long ago, that some of the sinecure offices in the Household had been abolished. To whom has the saving gone? Is it to the Privy Purse of the Queen? If not, where else? The amounts are not voted. They go straight, under the Act, out of the Consolidated Fund. The saving, therefore, cannot reach the public. All this again is a matter of fact. But what is only a matter of strong suspicion is of a far more serious character, because the amounts in question are much larger: that is, the saving upon menial offices and upon tradesmen's bills.

The £172,000-and-odd a year, for instance, that used to be spent on tradesmen's bills when the Court kept up great splendor,—how much of that is spent now, when there is no Court at all? Where does the £100,000 a year, or whatever may be the amount, saved under this head—where does that go? Does it go to the Queen for her private use?—that is to say, for her private saving, because the money is not and cannot be spent.

And, if so, looking to the fact that the money was allotted by the House of Commons with the distinct object of maintaining that former state, has there not been a diversion of public moneys for which the advisers of the Crown are responsible, almost amounting to a malversation?

Now, that is the question which rests, not upon absolute proof, but only upon very strong suspicion; and, as it has now been stated with great ability in a pamphlet that has been widely circulated, it is about time that some investigation into



the facts should take place. All that I can say is that I have read the pamphlet with care, having already had considerable acquaintance with the subject of which it treats, and that I am able to declare that the writer has made out a *prima facie* case which requires the most careful and complete answer, if it is not to be held good; and, speaking for myself, I think that he has proved his position, that it was intended that the money allotted by the House of Commons to the Crown should be spent, and that it should not accumulate to form a private fortune for Queen Victoria as an individual.

I think that he has shown that there is the strongest probability, almost amounting to a certainty, that large accumulations have taken place, and that, if so, these accumulations, made by the connivance of the Treasury, are directly in the teeth of the Act of Parliament.

It now becomes my duty to offer to you certain remarks of a more general character, and, indeed, of more moment, as it seems to me, than those to which you have been willing to lend your attention.

It is impossible to discuss this subject without referring to Mr. Disraeli's speech to the inhabitants of the village near his house, made not long ago in proposing the Queen's health. Speaking of the duties of the holder of the Crown, he said that an erroneous impression was prevalent with respect to them. He said that they were "multifarious," that they were "weighty," and that they were "unceasing." Now we know that they were "unceasing," but very few people had any idea that they were "weighty." Weighty means more than laborious.

Mr. Disraeli went on the next moment to call them "laborious," and he never uses two words which mean the same

thing. He explained what he meant by "weighty," and these were his most serious words:

"There is not a despatch received from abroad, nor one sent from this country, which is not submitted to the Queen. The whole internal administration of this country greatly depends upon the sign-manual; and of our present Sovereign it may be said that her signature has never been placed to any public document of which she did not know the purport and of which she did not approve."

Now, I call these most serious words, and I think if you consider them you will say that they are such. They divide themselves into two parts—Foreign and Home—and the statement is much stronger with regard to Home affairs than with regard to Foreign. No despatch received or sent that is not submitted to the Queen! Well, it may be, of course, that this word "submitted" means only here that the Queen is made aware of that which is spoken to the Foreign Minister by Foreign Powers, or by him to them. It may mean this, or it may mean more; but the statement with regard to Home will repeat the words:

"The whole internal administration of the country greatly depends upon the sign-manual, and of our present Sovereign it may be said that her signature has never been placed to any public document of which she did not approve."

Now, what does this mean, if it is true, but personal government? I cannot believe that it is true. I do not believe it is a fact. But here is Mr. Disraeli—a man no doubt of fine imagination, and who may perhaps unconsciously color things in stating them—here is Mr. Disraeli saying that nothing in this country can be done without the Queen's sign-manual, and that the Queen signs nothing she does not approve.



What does the Emperor of Russia do more than that? What occurs if the Queen does not approve? You would answer that, the country being under a constitutional monarchy, the Minister resigns, and that the Queen is forced by the constitution to find a Minister who agrees with her before she can carry out her views; that if the late Minister was backed up by the country she would be unable to do this, and that therefore no harm can be done. No doubt this is very true of all great matters, but how about small? When have we ever heard in modern times of a Minister resigning because of the expression by the "Sovereign," to use Mr. Disraeli's favorite word, of a will adverse to his opinion? Never!

Yet he tells us that the Queen never signs anything that she does not approve, and that nothing can be done without her signature. Does, then, the Minister give way when she does not approve? and are things left undone that would otherwise have been done, and things altered that are done, because of the personal will of the monarch? Or, are we to accept the opposite alternative, that, whatever Minister is in office—Conservative, Whig, or Radical—the Queen's political conscience is of such a nature as to admit of her fully approving of everything that he does?

For the life of me I cannot conceive what Mr. Disraeli means. If we adopt the latter alternative it is one little flattering to the intelligence of the Sovereign whose character Mr. Disraeli has described; and if we adopt the former it affords us a view of constitutional monarchy in which it is impossible to distinguish it from the autocracy that all of us condemn.

Let us consider, again, how greatly Mr. Disraeli's theory of our administrative system, if we are to accept it as a cor-

rect one, increases that waste of time and labor which arises from the circumstance that her Majesty, neglecting the palaces which are maintained for her at the public cost, prefers to dwell at her private residences—Osborne and Balmoral.

At one or the other of these distant places a member of the Government has to be constantly in attendance, and thither every despatch, however pressing, must be sent.

To return for a moment to the considerations of cost with which I began this speech: I have shown that it is enormous, and that the expenditure is chiefly not waste, but mischief. What are the two departments, for instance, over which we have not as yet succeeded in establishing a sound parliamentary control? The Army for one, and the Woods and Forests for another. In both of these cases the influence at work which has hitherto proved too strong for the House of Commons is that of the Court.

In the latter instance, we stand still with folded hands before the profligate waste at Windsor; and speechless in the face of the Minister's declaration of adherence to opinions which were obsolete in the times of the Stuarts. In the former—that of the Army—we have a Royal Duke, not necessarily the fittest man, at the head of it by right of birth, and the Prince of Wales, who would never be allowed a command in time of war, put to lead the cavalry division in the autumn manœuvres, thus robbing working officers of the position and of the training which they had a title to expect.

Now, institutions are not good or bad in themselves, so much as good or bad when judged by their working, and we are told that a limited monarchy works well. I set aside, in this speech, the question of whether in this country a republic would work better; but I confess freely that I doubt



whether, if the charges to which I have to-night alluded are well founded, the monarchy should not set its house in order.

There is a widespread belief that a republic here is only a matter of education and of time. It is said that some day a commonwealth will be our government. Now, history and experience show that you cannot have a republic without you possess at the same time the republican virtues; but you answer, Have we not public spirit? have we not the practice of self-government? are we not gaining general education? Well, if you can show me a fair chance that a republic here will be free from the political corruption that hangs about the monarchy, I say, for my part—and I believe that the middle classes in general will say—let it come.

## EDWARD A. KIMBALL



EDWARD A. KIMBALL, C.S.D., of Chicago, Ill., was born at Buffalo, N. Y., in 1845, and has lived in Chicago since 1865. He was for twenty years a manufacturer, and retired from business in 1888. In that year Mr. Kimball was healed by Christian Science of what was considered an incurable ailment, and in consequence of that healing began to investigate the subject. He studied Christian Science in several of the classes taught by Rev. Mary Baker Eddy, and has been for about fourteen years actively engaged in the study and demonstration of its truths. Mr. Kimball is now normal class teacher in The Massachusetts Metaphysical College of Boston, and is a member of the "Christian Science Board of Lectureship."

### ON CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT CHICAGO, MARCH 1, 1899

**I** ASK you for the moment to let your thought traverse a long stretch of centuries and rest on one of the most dramatic scenes of all history.

In the midst of this scene is a man in bonds and at bay. Having actually communed with God, having felt the very touch of a divine afflatus, this man, taught and impelled by infinite wisdom, stood forth an avowed disciple of the Christ which heals and redeems. His sturdy manhood had been chastened and ennobled by divine revelation, by discipline and experience, and by the descent of the holy Spirit. In  
(491)