

among themselves. But if we were to admit that hordes of traitorous refugees from Portugal, with Spanish arms, or arms furnished or restored to them by Spanish authorities, in their hands, might put off their country for one purpose and put it on again for another — put it off for the purpose of attack, and put it on again for the purpose of impunity — if, I say, we were to admit this juggle, and either pretend to be deceived by it ourselves, or attempt to deceive Portugal, into a belief that there was nothing of external attack, nothing of foreign hostility, in such a system of aggression — such pretence and attempt would perhaps be only ridiculous and contemptible; if they did not acquire a much more serious character from being employed as an excuse for infidelity to ancient friendship, and as a pretext for getting rid of the positive stipulations of treaties.

This, then, is the case which I lay before the House of Commons. Here is, on the one hand, an undoubted pledge of national faith, not taken in a corner, not kept secret between the parties, but publicly recorded among the annals of history, in the face of the world. Here are, on the other hand, undeniable acts of foreign aggression, perpetrated, indeed, principally through the instrumentality of domestic traitors, but supported with foreign means, instigated by foreign councils, and directed to foreign ends. Putting these facts and this pledge together, it is impossible that his Majesty should refuse the call that has been made upon him; nor can Parliament, I am convinced, refuse to enable his Majesty to fulfill his undoubted obligations. I am willing to rest the whole question of to-night, and to call for the vote of the House of Commons upon this simple case, divested altogether of collateral circumstances from which I especially wish to separate it in the minds of those who hear me, and also in

the minds of others to whom what I now say will find its way. If I were to sit down this moment, without adding another word, I have no doubt but that I should have the concurrence of the House in the address which I mean to propose.

When I state this, it will be obvious to the House that the vote for which I am about to call upon them is a vote for the defense of Portugal, not a vote for war against Spain. I beg the House to keep these two points entirely distinct in their consideration. For the former I think I have said enough. If, in what I have now further to say, I should bear hard upon the Spanish government, I beg that it may be observed that, unjustifiable as I shall show their conduct to have been — contrary to the law of nations, contrary to the law of good neighborhood, contrary, I might say, to the laws of God and man — with respect to Portugal — still I do not mean to preclude a *locus pœnitentiæ*, a possibility of redress and reparation. It is our duty to fly to the defence of Portugal, be the assailant who he may. And be it remembered that in thus fulfilling the stipulation of ancient treaties, of the existence and obligation of which all the world are aware, we, according to the universally admitted construction of the law of nations, neither make war upon that assailant, nor give to that assailant, much less to any other power, just cause of war against ourselves.

Sir, the present situation of Portugal is so anomalous, and the recent years of her history are crowded with events so unusual, that the House will, perhaps, not think that I am unprofitably wasting its time if I take the liberty of calling its attention, shortly and succinctly, to those events, and to their influence on the political relations of Europe. It is known that the consequence of the residence of the king of

Portugal in Brazil was to raise the latter country from a colonial to a metropolitan condition; and that, from the time when the King began to contemplate his return to Portugal, there grew up in Brazil a desire of independence that threatened dissension, if not something like civil contest, between the European and American dominions of the house of Braganza. It is known, also, that Great Britain undertook a mediation between Portugal and Brazil, and induced the King to consent to a separation of the two Crowns — confirming that of Brazil on the head of his eldest son. The ink with which this agreement was written was scarcely dry when the unexpected death of the King of Portugal produced a new state of things which reunited on the same head the two Crowns which it had been the policy of England, as well as of Portugal and of Brazil, to separate. On that occasion Great Britain and another European court closely connected with Brazil tendered advice to the Emperor of Brazil, now become King of Portugal, which advice it cannot be accurately said that his Imperial Majesty followed, because he had decided for himself before it reached Rio de Janeiro; but in conformity with which advice, though not in consequence of it, his Imperial Majesty determined to abdicate the Crown of Portugal in favor of his eldest daughter. But the Emperor of Brazil had done more. What had not been foreseen — what would have been beyond the province of any foreign power to advise — his Imperial Majesty had accompanied his abdication of the Crown of Portugal with the grant of a free constitutional charter for that kingdom. It has been surmised that this measure, as well as the abdication which it accompanied, was the offspring of our advice. No such thing — Great Britain did not suggest this measure. It is not her duty nor her practice to offer suggestions for the internal regulation of foreign

States. She neither approved nor disapproved of the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal; her opinion upon that grant was never required.

True it is that the instrument of the constitutional charter was brought to Europe by a gentleman of high trust in the service of the British government. Sir C. Stuart had gone to Brazil to negotiate the separation between that country and Portugal. In addition to his character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain, as the mediating power, he had also been invested by the King of Portugal with the character of his most faithful Majesty's plenipotentiary for the negotiation with Brazil. That negotiation had been brought to a happy conclusion; and therewith the British part of Sir C. Stuart's commission had terminated.

But Sir C. Stuart was still resident at Rio de Janeiro as the plenipotentiary of the King of Portugal for negotiating commercial arrangements between Portugal and Brazil. In this latter character it was that Sir C. Stuart, on his return to Europe, was requested by the Emperor of Brazil to be the bearer to Portugal of the new constitutional charter.

His Majesty's government found no fault with Sir C. Stuart for executing this commission; but it was immediately felt that if Sir C. Stuart were allowed to remain at Lisbon it might appear in the eyes of Europe that England was the contriver and imposer of the Portuguese constitution. Sir C. Stuart was therefore directed to return home forthwith, in order that the constitution, if carried into effect there, might plainly appear to be adopted by the Portuguese nation itself, not forced upon them by English interference.

As to the merits, sir, of the new constitution of Portugal, I have neither the intention nor the right to offer any opinion. Personally I may have formed one; but as an English min-

ister all I have to say is, "May God prosper this attempt at the establishment of constitutional liberty in Portugal! and may that nation be found as fit to enjoy and to cherish its newborn privileges as it has often proved itself capable of discharging its duties among the nations of the world!"

I, sir, am neither the champion nor the critic of the Portuguese constitution. But it is admitted on all hands to have proceeded from a legitimate source — a consideration which has mainly reconciled continental Europe to its establishment; and to us, as Englishmen, it is recommended by the ready acceptance which it has met with from all orders of the Portuguese people. To that constitution, therefore, thus unquestioned in its origin, even by those who are most jealous of new institutions — to that constitution, thus sanctioned in its outset by the glad and grateful acclamations of those who are destined to live under it — to that constitution, founded on principles in a great degree similar to those of our own, though differently modified — it is impossible that Englishmen should not wish well.

But it would not be for us to force that constitution on the people of Portugal if they were unwilling to receive it, or if any schism should exist among the Portuguese themselves as to its fitness and congeniality to the wants and wishes of the nation. It is no business of ours to fight its battles. We go to Portugal in the discharge of a sacred obligation contracted under ancient and modern treaties.

When there, nothing shall be done by us to enforce the establishment of the constitution; but we must take care that nothing shall be done by others to prevent it from being fairly carried into effect. Internally, let the Portuguese settle their own affairs; but with respect to external force, while Great Britain has an arm to raise, it must be raised against the

efforts of any power that should attempt forcibly to control the choice and fetter the independence of Portugal.

Has such been the intention of Spain? Whether the proceedings which have lately been practised or permitted in Spain were acts of a government exercising the usual power of prudence and foresight (without which a government is, for the good of the people which live under it, no government at all), or whether they were the acts of some secret illegitimate power — of some curious fanatical faction, overriding the counsels of the ostensible government, defying it in the capital, and disobeying it on the frontiers — I will not stop to inquire.

It is indifferent to Portugal, smarting under her wrongs — it is indifferent to England, who is called upon to avenge them — whether the present state of things be the result of the intrigues of a faction, over which, if the Spanish government has no control, it ought to assume one as soon as possible — or of local authorities, over whom it has control, and for whose acts it must therefore be held responsible. It matters not, I say, from which of these sources the evil has arisen. In either case Portugal must be protected; and from England that protection is due.

It would be unjust, however, to the Spanish government, to say that it is only among the members of that government that an unconquerable hatred of liberal institutions exists in Spain. However incredible the phenomenon may appear in this country, I am persuaded that a vast majority of the Spanish nation entertain a decided attachment to arbitrary power and a predilection for absolute government. The more liberal institutions of countries in the neighborhood have not yet extended their influence into Spain, nor awakened any sympathy in the mass of the Spanish people. Whether the public authorities of Spain did or did not partake of the

national sentiment, there would almost necessarily grow up between Portugal and Spain, under present circumstances, an opposition of feelings which it would not require the authority or the suggestions of the government to excite and stimulate into action. Without blame, therefore, to the government of Spain — out of the natural antipathy between the two neighboring nations; the one prizing its recent freedom, the other hugging its traditionary servitude — there might arise mutual provocations and reciprocal injuries which perhaps even the most active and vigilant ministry could not altogether restrain.

I am inclined to believe that such has been, in part at least, the origin of the differences between Spain and Portugal. That in their progress they have been adopted, matured, methodized, combined, and brought into more perfect action, by some authority more united and more efficient than the mere feeling disseminated through the mass of the community, is certain; but I do believe their origin to have been as much in the real sentiment of the Spanish population as in the opinion or contrivance of the government itself.

Whether this be or be not the case is precisely the question between us and Spain. If, though partaking in the general feelings of the Spanish nation, the Spanish government has, nevertheless, done nothing to embody those feelings and to direct them hostilely against Portugal; if all that has occurred on the frontiers has occurred only because the vigilance of the Spanish government has been surprised, its confidence betrayed, and its orders neglected; if its engagements have been repeatedly and shamefully violated, not by its own good will, but against its recommendation and desire — let us see some symptoms of disapprobation, some signs of repentance, some measures indicative of sorrow for the past and of sincerity

for the future. In that case his Majesty's message, to which I propose this night to return an answer of concurrence, will retain the character which I have ascribed to it — that of a measure of defence for Portugal, not a measure of resentment against Spain.

With these explanations and qualifications let us now proceed to the review of facts. Great desertions took place from the Portuguese army into Spain, and some desertions took place from the Spanish army into Portugal. In the first instance the Portuguese authorities were taken by surprise; but in every subsequent instance, where they had an opportunity of exercising a discretion, it is but just to say that they uniformly discouraged the desertions of the Spanish soldiery. There exist between Spain and Portugal specific treaties stipulating the mutual surrender of deserters.

Portugal had, therefore, a right to claim of Spain that every Portuguese deserter should be forthwith sent back. I hardly know whether from its own impulse, or in consequence of our advice, the Portuguese government waived its right under those treaties; very wisely reflecting that it would be highly inconvenient to be placed, by the return of their deserters, in the difficult alternative of either granting a dangerous amnesty or ordering numerous executions.

The Portuguese government, therefore, signified to Spain that it would be entirely satisfied if, instead of surrendering the deserters, Spain would restore their arms, horses, and equipments; and, separating the men from their officers, would remove both from the frontiers into the interior of Spain.

Solemn engagements were entered into by the Spanish government to this effect, first with Portugal, next with France, and afterward with England. Those engagements, concluded one day, were violated the next. The deserters, instead of

being disarmed and dispersed, were allowed to remain congregated together near the frontiers of Portugal, where they were enrolled, trained, and disciplined for the expedition which they have since undertaken. It is plain that in these proceedings there was perfidy somewhere.

It rests with the Spanish government to show that it was not with them. It rests with the Spanish government to prove that, if its engagements have not been fulfilled — if its intentions have been eluded and unexecuted — the fault has not been with the government, and that it is ready to make every reparation in its power.

I have said that these promises were made to France and to Great Britain as well as to Portugal. I should do a great injustice to France if I were not to add that the representations of that government upon this point to the cabinet of Madrid have been as urgent, and, alas! as fruitless, as those of Great Britain. Upon the first irruption into the Portuguese territory, the French government testified its displeasure by instantly recalling its ambassador; and it further directed its *chargé d'affaires* to signify to his Catholic Majesty that Spain was not to look for any support from France against the consequences of this aggression upon Portugal.

I am bound, I repeat, in justice to the French government, to state that it has exerted itself to the utmost in urging Spain to retrace the steps which she has so unfortunately taken. It is not for me to say whether any more efficient course might have been adopted to give effect to their exhortations; but as to the sincerity and good faith of the exertions made by the government of France to press Spain to the execution of her engagements I have not the shadow of a doubt, and I confidently reckon upon their continuance.

It will be for Spain, upon knowledge of the step now taken

by his Majesty, to consider in what way she will meet it. The earnest hope and wish of his Majesty's government is that she may meet it in such a manner as to avert any ill consequences to herself from the measure into which we have been driven by the unjust attack upon Portugal.

Sir, I set out with saying that there were reasons which entirely satisfied my judgment that nothing short of a point of national faith or national honor would justify, at the present moment, any voluntary approximation to the possibility of war.

Let me be understood, however, distinctly as not meaning to say that I dread war in a good cause (and in no other may it be the lot of this country ever to engage!) from a distrust of the strength of the country to commence it, or of her resources to maintain it. I dread it, indeed — but upon far other grounds: I dread it from an apprehension of the tremendous consequences which might arise from any hostilities in which we might now be engaged.

Some years ago, in the discussion of the negotiations respecting the French war against Spain, I took the liberty of adverting to this topic. I then stated that the position of this country in the present state of the world was one of neutrality, not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles; and that it was by neutrality alone that we could maintain that balance, the preservation of which I believed to be essential to the welfare of mankind. I then said that I feared that the next war which should be kindled in Europe would be a war not so much of armies as of opinions.

Not four years have elapsed, and behold my apprehension realized! It is, to be sure, within narrow limits that this war of opinion is at present confined; but it is a war of opinion that Spain (whether as government or as nation) is now waging

against Portugal; it is a war which has commenced in hatred of the new institutions of Portugal. How long is it reasonable to expect that Portugal will abstain from retaliation? If into that war this country shall be compelled to enter, we shall enter into it with a sincere and anxious desire to mitigate rather than exasperate, and to mingle only in the conflict of arms, not in the more fatal conflict of opinions.

But I much fear that this country (however earnestly she may endeavor to avoid it) could not, in such case, avoid seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatisfied of any nation with which she might come in conflict. It is the contemplation of this new power in any future war which excites my most anxious apprehension. It is one thing to have a giant's strength, but it would be another to use it like a giant.

The consciousness of such strength is, undoubtedly, a source of confidence and security; but in the situation in which this country stands our business is not to seek opportunities of displaying it, but to content ourselves with letting the professors of violent and exaggerated doctrines on both sides feel that it is not their interest to convert an umpire into an adversary. The situation of England amid the struggle of political opinions which agitates more or less sensibly different countries of the world may be compared to that of the Ruler of the Winds as described by the poet:

"Celsâ sedet Æolus arce,  
Sceptra tenens; mollitque animos et temperat iras;  
Nî faciat, maria ac terras cœlumque profundum  
Quippe ferant rapidi secum, verrantque per auras."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Æolus sits upon his lofty tower  
And holds the sceptre, calming all their rage:  
Else would they bear sea, earth, and heaven profound  
In rapid flight, and sweep them through the air."

Virgil's *Æneid*, book 1, lines 56-59.

The consequence of letting loose the passions at present chained and confined would be to produce a scene of desolation which no man can contemplate without horror; and I should not sleep easy on my couch if I were conscious that I had contributed to precipitate it by a single moment.

This, then, is the reason — a reason very different from fear — the reverse of a consciousness of disability, why I dread the recurrence of hostilities in any part of Europe; why I would bear much and would forbear long; why I would (as I have said) put up with almost anything that did not touch national faith and national honor rather than let slip the furies of war, the leash of which we hold in our hands — not knowing whom they may reach or how far their ravages may be carried. Such is the love of peace which the British government acknowledges; and such the necessity for peace which the circumstances of the world inculcate. I will push these topics no further.

I return, in conclusion, to the object of the Address. Let us fly to the aid of Portugal, by whomsoever attacked, because it is our duty to do so; and let us cease our interference where that duty ends. We go to Portugal not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions, but to defend and to preserve the independence of an ally. We go to plant the standard of England on the well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign dominion shall not come.