

or glory? What indefatigable cares!, what exertions and industry, to make them prosper! To what lengths we see you go, to increase your interest or to improve your fortune! If it ever happens that you take blame to yourself, it is always under circumstances which tend to your praise. You censure in yourself only faults which do you honor; and, in confessing your vices, you wish only to recapitulate your virtues. Self-love connects everything with yourself. Love your brother as you love yourself, and everything will recall you to him; you will be incapable of indiscretion where his interest is concerned, and will no longer need our instructions in respect to what you owe to his character and glory.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE



SIR ROBERT WALPOLE, English statesman and financier, chief minister of the era of George II, was born at Houghton, Norfolk, England, Aug. 26, 1676, and died there, Earl of Orford (created 1742), March 18, 1745. Educated at Eton and at Cambridge, he entered Parliament in 1701, and in the following year became member for King's Lynn and a favorite of the Whig leaders. He rose rapidly in Parliament, became a member of the Cabinet and of the council to Prince George, was secretary of war in 1708, though personally a great lover of peace, and manager of the impeachment and prosecution of Dr. Sacheverell for censuring in his sermons the then Whig ministry. On the downfall of the latter, Walpole was accused of corruption (most politicians in his day had their price), and was for six months committed to the Tower. On the impeachment of Bolingbroke (Henry St. John) and the Tories, Walpole became chancellor of the exchequer and first lord of the treasury, and in 1721 he came into almost exclusive power as prime minister, a post he retained for twenty-one years. England at this era owed much to him for his wisdom and good government, and especially for his pacific policy and his untiring efforts to give the nation the benefit of a sound finance. It is moreover to his policy, in defeating the designs of the Jacobites, that the Hanoverian dynasty in great part owe their permanent occupancy of the British throne. Into the war with Spain, Walpole was driven against his will; in other respects, he was, though greedy of power, the greatest statesman of his time, and remarkable for his sound views on finance.

ON A MOTION FOR ADDRESSING THE KING FOR HIS REMOVAL

[The unpopularity of Walpole was greatly increased by the disasters of the Spanish war, all of which were ascribed to his bad management or want of preparation. The Opposition therefore decided, early in 1741, on the extreme measure of proposing an address to the king for his removal. Accordingly Mr. Sandys, who was designated to take the lead, gave notice of a motion to that effect on the 11th of February, 1741. At the end of two days the motion was made. A few days after, Walpole made a speech of four hours, in reply to Sandys and others, by whom he had been attacked. We have only an imperfect outline of his argument in the speech given below, but there is reason to believe that the introductory part and the conclusion are very nearly in his own words.]

IT HAS been observed by several gentlemen, in vindication of this motion, that if it should be carried neither my life, liberty, nor estate will be affected. But do the honorable gentlemen consider my character and reputation as

of no moment? Is it no imputation to be arraigned before this House, in which I have sat forty years, and to have my name transmitted to posterity with disgrace and infamy? I will not conceal my sentiments that to be named in Parliament as a subject of inquiry is to me a matter of great concern. But I have the satisfaction, at the same time, to reflect that the impression to be made depends upon the consistency of the charge and the motives of the prosecutors.

Had the charge been reduced to specific allegations, I should have felt myself called upon for a specific defence. Had I served a weak or wicked master, and implicitly obeyed his dictates, obedience to his commands must have been my only justification. But as it has been my good fortune to serve a master who wants no bad ministers, and would have hearkened to none, my defence must rest on my own conduct. The consciousness of innocence is also a sufficient support against my present prosecutors. A further justification is derived from a consideration of the views and abilities of the prosecutors. Had I been guilty of great enormities, they want neither zeal and inclination to bring them forward, nor ability to place them in the most prominent point of view. But as I am conscious of no crime, my own experience convinces me that none can be justly imputed.

I must therefore ask the gentlemen, from whence does this attack proceed? From the passions and prejudices of the parties combined against me, who may be divided into three classes, the Boys, the riper Patriots, and the Tories. The Tories I can easily forgive. They have unwillingly come into the measure; and they do me honor in thinking it necessary to remove me, as their only obstacle. What, then, is the inference to be drawn from these premises? That demerit with my opponents ought to be considered as merit with others.

But my great and principal crime is my long continuance in office; or, in other words, the long exclusion of those who now complain against me. This is the heinous offence which exceeds all others. I keep from them the possession of that power, those honors, and those emoluments, to which they so ardently and pertinaciously aspire. I will not attempt to deny the reasonableness and necessity of a party war; but in carrying on that war all principles and rules of justice should not be departed from. The Tories must confess that the most obnoxious persons have felt few instances of extra-judicial power. Wherever they have been arraigned, a plain charge has been exhibited against them. They have had an impartial trial and have been permitted to make their defence. And will they, who have experienced this fair and equitable mode of proceeding, act in direct opposition to every principle of justice and establish this fatal precedent of Parliamentary inquisition? Whom would they conciliate by a conduct so contrary to principle and precedent?

Can it be fitting in them [the Tories], who have divided the public opinion of the nation, to share it with those who now appear as their competitors? With the men of yesterday, the boys in politics, who would be absolutely contemptible did not their audacity render them detestable? With the mock patriots, whose practice and professions prove their selfishness and malignity; who threatened to pursue me to destruction, and who have never for a moment lost sight of their object? These men, under the name of Separatists, presume to call themselves exclusively the nation and the people, and under that character assume all power. In their estimation, the king, lords, and commons are a faction, and they are the government.

Upon these principles they threaten the destruction of all

authority and think they have a right to judge, direct, and resist all legal magistrates. They withdraw from Parliament because they succeed in nothing; and then attribute their want of success, not to its true cause, their own want of integrity and importance, but to the effect of places, pensions, and corruption.

May it not be asked on this point, Are the people on the court side more united than on the other? Are not the Tories, Jacobites, and Patriots equally determined? What makes this strict union? What cements this heterogeneous mass? Party engagements and personal attachments. However different their views and principles, they all agree in opposition. The Jacobites distress the government they would subvert; the Tories contend for party prevalence and power. The Patriots, from discontent and disappointment, would change the ministry, that themselves may exclusively succeed. They have labored this point twenty years unsuccessfully. They are impatient of longer delay. They clamor for change of measures, but mean only change of ministers.

In party contests why should not both sides be equally steady? Does not a Whig administration as well deserve the support of the Whigs as the contrary? Why is not principle the cement in one as well as the other; especially when my opponents confess that all is levelled against one man? Why this one man? Because they think, vainly, nobody else could withstand them. All others are treated as tools and vassals. The one is the corrupter; the numbers corrupted.

But whence this cry of corruption, and exclusive claim of honorable distinction? Compare the estates, characters, and fortunes of the Commons on one side with those on the other. Let the matter be fairly investigated. Survey and examine the individuals who usually support the measures of govern-

ment, and those who are in opposition. Let us see to whose side the balance preponderates. Look round both Houses, and see to which side the balance of virtue and talents preponderates! Are all these on one side, and not on the other? Or are all these to be counterbalanced by an affected claim to the exclusive title of patriotism?

Gentlemen have talked a great deal of patriotism. A venerable word, when duly practised. But I am sorry to say that of late it has been so much hackneyed about that it is in danger of falling into disgrace. The very idea of true patriotism is lost, and the term has been prostituted to the very worst of purposes. A patriot, sir! Why, patriots spring up like mushrooms! I could raise fifty of them within the four-and-twenty hours. I have raised many of them in one night. It is but refusing to gratify an unreasonable or an insolent demand, and up starts a patriot. I have never been afraid of making patriots; but I disdain and despise all their efforts. This pretended virtue proceeds from personal malice and disappointed ambition. There is not a man among them whose particular aim I am not able to ascertain, and from what motive they have entered into the lists of opposition.

I shall now consider the articles of accusation which they have brought against me, and which they have not thought fit to reduce to specific charges; and I shall consider these in the same order as that in which they were placed by the honorable member who made the motion. First, in regard to foreign affairs; secondly, to domestic affairs; and, thirdly, to the conduct of the war.

As to foreign affairs, I must take notice of the uncandid manner in which the gentlemen on the other side have managed the question by blending numerous treaties and complicated negotiations into one general mass.

To form a fair and candid judgment of the subject it becomes necessary not to consider the treaties merely insulated, but to advert to the time in which they were made, to the circumstances and situation of Europe when they were made, to the peculiar situation in which I stand, and to the power which I possessed. I am called repeatedly and insidiously prime and sole minister. Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, that I am prime and sole minister in this country, am I, therefore, prime and sole minister of all Europe? Am I answerable for the conduct of other countries as well as for that of my own? Many words are not wanting to show that the particular view of each court occasioned the dangers which affected the public tranquillity; yet the whole is charged to my account. Nor is this sufficient. Whatever was the conduct of England, I am equally arraigned. If we maintained ourselves in peace, and took no share in foreign transactions, we are reproached for tameness and pusillanimity. If, on the contrary, we interfered in these disputes, we are called Don Quixotes, and dupes to all the world. If we contracted guarantees, it was asked why is the nation wantonly burdened? If guarantees were declined, we were reproached with having no allies.

I have, however, sir, this advantage, that all the objections now alleged against the conduct of the administration to which I have the honor to belong have already been answered to the satisfaction of a majority of both houses of Parliament, and I believe to the satisfaction of a majority of the better sort of people in the nation. I need, therefore, only repeat a few of these answers that have been made already, which I shall do in the order of time in which the several transactions happened; and consequently must begin with our refusing to accept of the sole mediation offered us by Spain, on the breach between that court and the court of France occasioned by the dismissal of the Infanta of Spain.

I hope it will not be said we had any reason to quarrel with France upon that account; and therefore, if our accepting of that mediation might have produced a rupture with France, it was not our duty to interfere unless we had something very beneficial to expect from the acceptance. A reconciliation between the courts of Vienna and Madrid, it is true, was desirable to all Europe as well as to us, provided it had been brought about without any design to disturb our tranquillity or the tranquillity of Europe. But both parties were then so high in their demands that we could hope for no success; and if the negotiation had ended without effect we might have expected the common fate of arbitrators, the disobliging of both. Therefore, as it was our interest to keep well with both, I must still think it was the most prudent part we could act to refuse the offered mediation.

The next step of our foreign conduct, exposed to reprehension, is the treaty of Hanover. Sir, if I were to give the true history of that treaty, which no gentleman can desire I should, I am sure I could fully justify my own conduct. But as I do not desire to justify my own without justifying his late Majesty's conduct, I must observe that his late Majesty had such information as convinced not only him, but those of his council, both at home and abroad, that some dangerous designs had been formed between the Emperor and Spain at the time of their concluding the treaty at Vienna, in May, 1725; designs, sir, which were dangerous not only to the liberties of this nation, but to the liberties of Europe. They were not only to wrest Gibraltar and Port Mahon from this nation, and force the Pretender upon us; but they were to have Don Carlos married to the Emperor's eldest daughter, who would thereby have had a probability of uniting in his person, or in the person of some of his successors, the crowns of France and Spain,

with the imperial dignity and the Austrian dominions. It was therefore highly reasonable, both in France and us, to take the alarm at such designs, and to think betimes of preventing their being carried into execution. But with regard to us, it was more particularly our business to take the alarm, because we were to have been immediately attacked. I shall grant, sir, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for Spain and the Emperor, joined together, to have invaded or made themselves masters of any of the British dominions. But will it be said they might not have invaded the King's dominions in Germany, in order to force him to a compliance with what they desired of him as king of Great Britain? And if those dominions had been invaded on account of a quarrel with this nation, should we not have been obliged, both in honor and interest, to defend them? When we were thus threatened, it was therefore absolutely necessary for us to make an alliance with France; and, that we might not trust too much to their assistance, it was likewise necessary to form alliances with the northern powers and with some of the princes in Germany, which we never did, nor ever could do, without granting them immediate subsidies. These measures were, therefore, I still think, not only prudent, but necessary; and by these measures we made it much more dangerous for the Emperor and Spain to attack us than it would otherwise have been.

But still, sir, though by these alliances we put ourselves upon an equal footing with our enemies in case of an attack, yet, in order to preserve the tranquillity of Europe as well as our own, there was something else to be done. We knew that war could not be begun and carried on without money; we knew that the Emperor had no money for that purpose without receiving large remittances from Spain; and we knew that Spain could make no such remittances without receiving

large returns of treasure from the West Indies. The only way, therefore, to render these two powers incapable of disturbing the tranquillity of Europe, was by sending a squadron to the West Indies to stop the return of the Spanish galleons; and this made it necessary, at the same time, to send a squadron to the Mediterranean for the security of our valuable possessions in that part of the world.

By these measures the Emperor saw the impossibility of attacking us in any part of the world, because Spain could give him no assistance either in money or troops; and the attack made by the Spaniards upon Gibraltar was so feeble, that we had no occasion to call upon our allies for assistance. A small squadron of our own prevented their attacking it by sea, and from their attack by land we had nothing to fear. They might have knocked their brains out against inaccessible rocks to this very day without bringing that fortress into any danger.

I do not pretend, sir, to be a great master of foreign affairs. In that post in which I have the honor to serve his Majesty, it is not my business to interfere; and as one of his Majesty's council I have but one voice. But if I had been the sole adviser of the treaty of Hanover and of all the measures which were taken in pursuance of it, from what I have said I hope it will appear that I do not deserve to be censured either as a weak or a wicked minister on that account.

The next measures which incurred censure were the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by the second treaty of Vienna, and the refusal of the cabinet to assist the house of Austria, in conformity with the articles of that guarantee.

As to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, I am really surprised to find that measure objected to. It was so universally approved of, both within doors and without, that till