

that time may also take everything away from you; but time is not necessary, negotiation alone is sufficient to undo you; you were not born to be negotiators; the negotiator is a dark, austere, inexorable character; you are soft, open, and persuadable; you have not the detailed knowledge, the systematical procrastination, the suspicious reserve, or the frigid perseverance of a negotiator. When have you negotiated that you have not lost? You negotiated at the restoration, you negotiated at the revolution, you negotiated at the augmentation of your army, you negotiated your free trade, you negotiated the mutiny bill. When have you demanded that you have not succeeded, and when have you negotiated that you have not been deceived?

There never was a time which required more consideration than the present; the national exertion began in the last year of Lord Buckingham's administration, it is now drawing to a period, and whether that shall be glorious or otherwise depends on your wisdom: a short view of what we have done will be a guide to what we should do; we have groaned for a century under an increasing usurpation; the American war broke out, and whilst we were called upon to shed our blood for Great Britain we were insulted with the application of that principle to Ireland which had revolted America; our feelings were exasperated by the application, and our trade was ruined by the war; we saw ourselves beggars in fact and slaves in assertion. The merchants flew to a non-importation agreement, etc., the people flew to arms!

Amidst this perturbation Parliament assembled, and we amended our address by the demand of a free constitution, that is of an exclusive legislature, on which all freedom of trade must depend — and therefore it was that I did originally differ with some gentlemen, for I asserted that they had not

obtained that freedom of trade of which they had boasted, because they had not obtained that freedom of Parliamentary constitution without which a freedom of trade could not exist. We received from England a dilatory answer. We shortened our money grants to the crown — we shortened them to the subject. And the Irish public creditors, to their immortal honor, embarked so fully with the rights of the nation as cheerfully to accept of a six months' security.

This rapid succession of sober and consistent efforts struck like lightning on the ministry and Parliament of England, all obstacles gave way, our demand was to be granted in all its plenitude, all the British statutes restrictive of our foreign commerce were to be repealed, and on that constitutional principle on which alone it would be welcome — a principle, which in that early period of this question I took the first opportunity to lay down in clear, unambiguous, and categorical terms.

What was that principle?

That, having a Parliament of our own, our foreign trade was necessarily free, and subject to no restrictions as to our ports but such as our Parliament might impose. This principle, we were told, was admitted by England as to our foreign trade, and pleaded by her in return as to her own ports and those of her own colonies.

She admitted the principle which we claimed, and she said she would open to us her colony ports on equal regulation of trade. The tidings of this emancipation, as it was idly called, landed in Ireland. The post-office was illuminated by an emissary of the Castle; the college took fire in the next instance by an unhappy contagion, and the city caught the flame in a regular and sympathetic succession. All sober

consideration was lost in an ignorant clamor, and the steady pulse of the public yielded to a fever of exultation.

What was the consequence? England saw that we were surprised at our success — saw that we had asked more than we expected — concluded we would accept of infinitely less — and determined that should be as little as she could. First, then, she determined not to repeal all her laws restrictive of our foreign commerce, yet, whilst an atom of such restriction remains, the total impeachment of your constitution remains; when, therefore, an artful resolution was prepared for this House, on that occasion, expressive of satisfaction in that enlargement of our foreign trade, I exclaimed against that word. If you thank the British Parliament, I said, for the enlargement of your foreign trade, you admit she can restrain it; if you admit she can restrain it, you admit her legislative authority; that is, you gain little in commerce and you lose everything in constitution. I objected to the word foreign, therefore: it belies Ireland and it deceives Great Britain.

The independent gentlemen of the day, however, did not feel, did not take up the principle, yet, though they did not take it up that day, they have felt it since; and though the word was universally admitted then, there is not a man in the nation that would not reject it now. Such was the first of this business. Let us see how much more worse we made it in the progress of negotiation. The language of England was the language of common sense. Ireland must have equal regulations of trade, she said, but equal taxes on home consumption she did not say; equal regulations of trade may subsist between a poor country and a rich one, but equal taxes on consumption cannot.

Now what has your negotiation made of it?

You have made your arrangement a tax-law in part which ought to have been a trade-law in the whole; that is to say, instead of a regulation in trade, you made it a regulation against trade, and a caustic regulation too. What regulation, indeed, can be much more adversary to trade than a heavy tax on a raw material imported for the purpose of trade and for the end of manufacture?

So pernicious are such taxes that the ministers in England, whose profusion has brought them to that country, have endeavored to extenuate their malignity by two regulations; to console the manufacturer, they tell him that they will open to him the foreign market by giving him a drawback on his manufactures exported equal to the tax on the imported material. And they tell him besides that they will shut up from him the home market and give him a monopoly of it. How? By laying a prohibitory duty on the manufacture imported from abroad; and what have they done as to manufactured sugars? They have laid a prohibitory duty upon them when imported into England from any other part of the world, Ireland even not excepted. What have we done? We have laid the same prohibitory duty on manufactured sugars imported into Ireland from any other part of the world; but we have excepted England, whereas she did not except Ireland.

Now, there was much more reason for our excepting England than there was for her excepting Ireland; and why: because Ireland could never, by any possibility, be a rival in sugars to England in the English market, but England is actually a very formidable rival to Ireland in the Irish market.

What is the fact? The Irish manufacturer of sugars has but one rival in the world, and that is the English manufac-

turer of them? And what have we done? We have given him the fullest security against all those that are not his rivals. And we have not given it to him against the only manufacturers that are his rivals; we have given him perfect protection where he is in no danger, and we have not given it to him where he is in all danger.

We have done worse by him, we have not only given him as much security against his only rivals as against those who are not at all his rivals; but we have not left him as much security against his only rivals as he always had before; that is to say, the duty on the imported manufacture now bears a less proportion than ever it did before to the duty on the imported raw materials. By consequence his peril is greater, as his protection is less; and his security being diminished, his danger is enhanced.

But this is not all; you have not done for him what England originally pointed out to you in his favor: she proposed equality as the principle of your regulation of trade; we adopted it religiously in that part to which it was not applicable, and, where it was pernicious, I mean in the tax part; and we only deserted it in the trade part, where alone it was applicable and where alone it was beneficial.

Such was the spirit in which we negotiated our free trade; let us take care how we negotiate our free constitution; but the error of that arrangement does not stop here. Its first principle was erroneous; it set out with this maxim — That you were to pay for this as if it were an enlargement, and that you were to pay for it in tax, as if you had not paid it otherwise before. But what is the truth? The sugars of Spain, Portugal, and France would supply your manufactures as well as the British West India Islands, and generally better; if, whilst you retained those markets, Eng-

land had opened her colony ports too, this would have been a new market, which is always an advantage to the buyer.

But what is the case now? You are suffered to go to the colony market of England, which is the English market in effect, and which is therefore her advantage; but, you give up this for all other and some better markets, which is your advantage. Instead of its being an enlargement, therefore, this is more properly a restriction; and instead of England's granting you a boon in this matter it is you that gave her a monopoly.

Now, a monopoly is so much against the giver, and so much in favor of the obtainer of it, that no nation in its senses ever gives it to another.

And if a part of an empire gives it to the head, it cannot be on a principle of trade, because a principle of trade is a principle of gain, whereas this is a principle of loss. On what principle alone can it be given? On a principle of empire. That is to say, in other words, it is a tax or a tribute, and that of the heaviest nature; but, if you were to pay for it in taxes besides paying for it by monopoly, it would be absurd to pay for it more than it was worth.

Now take the whole West India commerce, take the utmost proportion of that commerce that could ever fall to your lot, take the utmost proportion of clear profit than can be supposed to accrue from that quantity of trade, and then take the utmost proportion of what clear profit that can be afforded to revenue, and I say it would never amount to that sum which you have agreed to pay on the instant for the contingency of this direct trade, with this additional absurdity, that if you should not be able to establish it these additional duties will be equally payable upon your old circuitous trade,

which before was free from them. Will you trust negotiation again?

This arrangement cannot be justified on any commercial principle. Was any constitutional advantage obtained by it? Far from it: the very principle of the arrangement is hostile to the constitution; it gives to the British Parliament a virtual power of taxing you; for what is the principle of it? That when England taxes a colony produce you must tax it equally or give up the trade. Thus this arrangement leaves both your trade and your money at the mercy of the ministry and Parliament of England. Combine this with another law of the same period, the mutiny bill, therefore, and see what the result of both is. You complained that the British Parliament should make even a twelve-months law for your army; and what did you do to remedy it? You made an act, that she should do it forever.

The two greatest powers in the management of human concerns are the power of the purse and the power of the sword. You did by these two laws for so much delegate away both of these great powers from yourselves to the British Parliament; that is to say, in the very moment that you talked of recovering your own authority and denying that of the British legislature you did everything you could to strengthen the power of that Parliament which you meant to overthrow, and to weaken the power of that Parliament which you meant to establish. I do not speak these things in order to say what is disagreeable to any man living, much less to say anything disagreeable to that body in defence of whose privileges I have lived these two-and-twenty years, and in defence of whose privileges I will die. I speak them from a deep conviction of their necessity. You see how you have been negotiated out of everything, and how dangerous it is to negotiate again. You

see how dangerous it is to exult too soon or to imagine that anything of this kind is done while anything remains undone. You see what a miserable end was made of Lord Buckingham's last session of Parliament, though it began with so much splendor; and as a part of this session has trod the steps of its glory I would warn the conclusion of it against the steps of its decline. To put a stop, therefore, to the danger of negotiation, and to accelerate the safety of an immediate repeal, and of a final renunciation, I move the resolution I have before stated to you.