

possibly can be toward them. To illustrate how this fact bears upon this question: the English say, "Oh! we are going to be neutral; we will not sell you any arms, because to be neutral strictly we should have to sell the same to the Confederates."

To that I answer: You have treaties of amity and commerce with us by which you have agreed to trade with us. You have no treaty of amity and commerce with them by which you agree to trade with them. Why not then trade with us? Why not give us that rightful preference except for reasons of hostility to us that I will state hereafter? I have been thus particular upon this, because in stating my proposition to gentlemen in whose judgment I have great confidence they have said to me, "I agree with your theory, Mr. Butler, but I am afraid you will involve us with other nations by the view that you take of that matter."

But I insist, and I can only state the proposition for want of time—your own minds will carry it out particularly—I insist that there is a higher and closer duty to us—treating the rebels as a strange nation not yet admitted into the family of nations—that there is a higher duty from our old friendship on her part, from our old relations toward Great Britain, than there is to this rebellious, pushing, attempting-to-get-into-place member of the family of nations.

There is still another logical sequence which in my judgment follows from this view of the case. The great question put to me by my friends and the great question which is now agitating this country is, How are we to get these men back? How are we to get this territory back? How are we to reconstruct the nation? I think it is much better answered upon this hypothesis than any other. There are but two ways in which this contest can be ended; one is by re-revolu-

tionizing a portion of this seceding territory and have the people ask to be admitted into the Union; another is, to bring it all back so that if they do not come back in the first way they shall come back bound to our triumphal car of victory. Now when any portion of the South becomes loyal to the North and to the Union, or to express it with more care when any portion of the inhabitants of the South wish to become again a part of the nation and will throw off the government of Jefferson Davis, erect themselves into a State, and come and ask us to take them back with such a State constitution as they ought to be admitted under, there is no difficulty in its being done. There is no witchery about this. This precise thing has been done in the case of Western Virginia. She went out—stayed out for a while.

By the aid of our armies and by the efforts of her citizens she re-revolutionized, threw off the government of the rest of the State of Virginia; threw off the Confederate yoke; erected herself into a State with a constitution such as I believe is quite satisfactory to all of us, especially the amendment. She has asked to come back and has been received back and is the first entering wedge of that series of States who will come back that way.

But suppose they will not come back?

We are bound to subjugate them. What then do they become? Territories of the United States—acquired by force of arms—precisely as we acquired California, precisely as we acquired Nevada, precisely as we acquired—not exactly though—as we acquired Texas—and then is there any difficulty in treating with these men? Was there any difficulty in dealing with the State of California when our men went there and settled in sufficient numbers so as to give that State the benefits of the blessings of a republican form of govern-

ment? Was there any difficulty in obtaining her beyond our transactions with Mexico?

None whatever. Will there be any difficulty in taking to ourselves the new State of Nevada when she is ready to come and ripe to come? Was there any difficulty in taking into the Union any portion of the Louisiana purchase when we bought it first? Will there be any difficulty when her people get ready to come back to the United States of our taking her back again more than perhaps to carry out the parallel a little further, to pay a large sum of money besides, as we did in the case of California after we conquered it from Mexico? These States having gone out without cause, without right, without grievance, and having formed themselves into new States and taken upon themselves new alliances, I am not for having them come back without readmission.

I feel, perhaps, if the ladies will pardon the illustration, like a husband whose wife has run away with another man, and has divorced herself from him; he will not take her to his arms until they have come before the priest and been re-married. I have, I say, the same feeling in the case of these people that have gone out; when they repent and ask to come back I am ready to receive them, and I am not ready until then.

And now, having gone by far too discursively over many of these points which I desired to bring to your attention, let us return to what has been done in the Department of the Gulf, to which you have so flatteringly alluded, and to which I will answer. While I am very much gratified at the kind expression of your regard, whether that expression is justified can be told in a single word. When I left the Department of the Gulf, I sat down and deliberately put in the form

of an address to the people of that Department, the exact acts I had done while in their Department; I said to them, "I have done these things." I have now waited more than three months, and I have yet to hear a denial from that Department that the things therein stated were done.

And to that alone, sir, I can point as a justification of your too flattering eulogy, and to that I point forever as my answer to every slander and every calumny. The ladies of New Orleans knew whether they were safe; has any one of them ever said she was not? The men of New Orleans knew whether life and property were safe; has any man ever said they were not? The poor of New Orleans knew whether the money which was taken from the rich rebels was applied to the alleviation of their wants; has any man denied that it was? To that record I point—and it will be the only answer that I shall ever make; and I only do it now because I desire that you shall have neither doubt nor feeling upon this subject—it is the only answer I can ever make to the thousand calumnies that have been poured upon me and mine, and upon the officers who worked with me for the good of our country.

I desire now to say a single word upon the question, what are the prospects of this war? My simple opinion would be no better than that of another man; but let me show you the reason for the faith that is in me that this war is progressing steadily to a successful termination. Compare the state of the country on January 1, 1863, with the state of the country on January 1, 1862, and tell me whether there has not been progress. At that time the Union armies held no considerable portion of Missouri, of Kentucky, or of Tennessee; none of Virginia, except Fortress Monroe and Arlington Heights; none of North Carolina save Hatteras, and

none of South Carolina save Port Royal. All the rest was ground of struggle at least, and all the rest furnishing supplies to the rebels.

Now they hold none of Missouri, none of Kentucky, none of Tennessee, for any valuable purpose of supplies, because the western portion is in our hands, and the eastern portion has been so run over by the contending armies that the supplies are gone. They hold no portion of Virginia valuable for supplies, for that is eaten out by their armies. We hold one third of Virginia and half of North Carolina. We hold our own in South Carolina, and I hope that before the eleventh of this month we shall hold a little more. We hold two thirds of Louisiana in wealth and population. We hold all Arkansas and all Texas so far as supplies are concerned, so long as Farragut is between Port Hudson and Vicksburg. And I believe the colored troops held Florida at the last accounts.

Now, then, let us see to what the rebellion is reduced. It is reduced to the remainder of Virginia, part of North and South Carolina, all of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, and a small portion of Louisiana and Tennessee; Texas and Arkansas, as I said before, being cut off. Why I draw strong hopes from this is, that their supplies come either from Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, or Texas, and these are now completely beyond their reach. To this fact I look largely for the suppression of this rebellion and the overthrow of this revolution.

They have got to the end of their conscription; we have not begun ours. They have got to the end of their national credit; we have not put ours in any market in the world. And why should any man be desponding? Why should any man say that this great work has gone on too slowly? Why

should men feel impatient? The war of the Revolution was seven years. Why should men be so anxious that nations should march faster than they are prepared to march—faster than the tread of nations has ever been in the Providence of God? Nations in war have ever moved slowly. We are too impatient—we never learn anything, it would seem to me, from reading history—I speak of myself as well as you—I have shared in that impatience myself. I have shared in your various matters of disappointment.

I was saying but the other day to a friend of mine, "It seems strange to me that our navy cannot catch that steamer 'Alabama,' there must be something wrong in the Navy Department, I am afraid," and I got quite impatient. I had hardly got over the wound inflicted by the capture of the "Jacob Bell," when came the piracies of the "Golden Eagle," and the "Olive Jane," and as one was from Boston, it touched me keenly.

He replied: "Don't be impatient; remember that Paul Jones, with a sailing-ship on the coast of England, put the whole British navy at defiance for many months, and wandered up and down that coast, and worked his will upon it, and England had no naval power to contend with, and had not twenty-five hundred miles of sea coast to blockade as we have."

I remember that in the French war, Lord Cochrane, with one vessel, and that was by no means a steamship, held the whole French coast in terror against the French navy. And so it has been done by other nations. Let us have a little patience, and possess our souls with a little patriotism and less politics, and we shall have no difficulty.

But there is one circumstance of this war, I am bound to say in all frankness to you, that I do not like the appearance

of, and that is because we cannot exactly reach it. I refer to the war made upon our commerce, which is not the fault of the navy, nor of any department of the government, but is the fault of our allies. Pardon me a moment, for I am speaking now in the commercial city of New York, where I think it is of interest to you, and of a matter to which I have given some reflection—pardon me a moment, while we examine and see what England has done. She agreed to be neutral—I have tried to demonstrate to you that she ought to have been a little more than neutral—but has she been even that? ["No, no, no."] Let us see the evidences of that "No."

In the first place there has been nothing of the Union cause that her orators and her statesmen have not maligned; there has been nothing of sympathy or encouragement which she has not afforded our enemies; there has been nothing which she could do under the cover of neutrality which she has not done to aid them. Nassau has been a naval arsenal for pirate rebel boats to refit in. Kingston has been their coal depot, and Barbadoes has been the dancing hall to fête pirate chieftains in.

What cause, my friends; what cause, my countrymen, has England so to deal with us? What is the reason she does so deal with us? Is it because we have never shown sympathy toward her or love to her people? And mark me here, that I make a distinction between the English people as a mass and the English government. I think the heart of her people beats responsive to ours—but I know her government and aristocracy hate us with a hate which passeth all understanding. I say, let us see if we have given any cause for this. I know, I think, what the cause is; but let us see what we have done.

You remember that when the famine overtook the Irish in 1847, the "Macedonian" frigate carried out the bread from this country to feed the poor that England was starving. When afterward the heir to her throne arrived here, aye, in this very house, our people assembled to do him welcome in such numbers that the very floor would not uphold them, and to testify our appreciation of the high qualities of his mother and sovereign, and our love of the English people—we gave him such a reception as Northern gentlemen give to their friends, and his present admirers at Richmond gave him such a reception as Southern gentlemen give to their friends. What further has been done by us? No, I have no right to claim any portion of it. What has been done by the merchants of New York? The "George Griswold" goes out to feed the starving poor of Lancashire, to which yourselves all contributed, and it was only God's blessing on that charity that prevented that vessel being overhauled and burned by the "Alabama," fitted out from an English port.

And to-day at Birkenhead the "Sumter" is being fitted out—at Barbadoes the captain of the "Florida" is being fêted—and somewhere the "290," the cabalistic number of the British merchants who contributed to her construction, is preying upon our commerce, while we hear that at Glasgow a steamer is being built for the Emperor of China, and at Liverpool another is about to be launched for the Emperor of China. Pardon me, I don't believe the Emperor of China will buy many ships of Great Britain until they bring back the silk gowns they stole out of his palace at Peking. And even now, I say that our commerce is being preyed upon by ships in the hands of the rebels built by English builders. And I ask the merchants of the city of New York whether it