

the commission should consist? Of M. Glarakis and M. Manitaki, the Minister of the Interior. One of these persons was a most remarkable character; and Sir Edward Codrington, speaking of him in a public despatch, said that he was a man who had made himself notorious by fostering and encouraging pirates. The other was a mere creature of the king, and would have acted, if appointed, on the part of the king.

Mr. Finlay therefore objected to this commission. Further communications took place, and no redress could be obtained. This was in 1845. Now a commission thus constituted Mr. Finlay was justified in repudiating. He said very truly, "It is not an inspired tribunal; I can place no confidence in it; I will have nothing to do with it, but will appeal to the government at home." He did so, and the present noble lord, then at the head of foreign affairs, having inquired into the matter, a despatch was sent to Sir Edmund Lyons, instructing him to enforce the claims of Mr. Finlay. The king proposed another commission, which was appointed, and in the end, after all these years of evasion, shuffling, quirks, and chicanery of every description, it was agreed to refer the matter to arbitration. At first the Greek government had the assurance to propose that it should have the nomination of the umpire; but being shamed out of this extravagant proposal, a proper umpire was appointed. What was the next trick they resorted to? Why, they delayed the production of the necessary documents beyond the period of three months within which, by the law of Greece, an arbitration must be concluded or it falls to the ground. The right honorable gentleman [Mr. Gladstone] has stated that the delay had originated with Mr. Finlay; but this is not so; the blue-book proves directly the contrary. It was the government who asked for the delay.

Now, was this fair of the right honorable gentleman? Talk of *nisi prius*, indeed! At least lawyers hold this at *nisi prius*—that though they may use sophistry to induce a jury or a court to adopt their conclusions, it is a sacred duty not to misstate facts.

Well, then, Mr. Finlay could get no redress; but the right honorable gentleman the member for the University of Oxford says he might have gone to the tribunals of the country. The tribunals of the country, indeed! They say, "a little learning is a dangerous thing"; but this is equally the case when applied to law. The right honorable gentleman possesses every quality which would have made a most brilliant advocate. He has eloquence unlimited, subtlety unrivalled, casuistry unexampled; all he wants is a little knowledge of law. If he had not been a great statesman he would have been a great lawyer if he only would have condescended to put on the wig and gown, and acquired a little knowledge of the very first principles of law. I would advise him, if he would accept of my humble advice, to confine himself to that science of which he is so great a master—politics—and not to meddle with law. The right honorable gentleman is ignorant of the fundamental principle of law—that a subject cannot sue a sovereign. That is the rule in every country, with the exception of this. And why is it not the law in England? Simply because, by the established usage and magnanimous practice of this country, the sovereign, upon the petition of a subject complaining of a wrong sustained from the Crown, refers it to the first law officer of the Crown and indorses upon the petition the important and solemn words, "Let right be done." And upon that the sovereign condescends to submit herself to an equality with her subjects before the throne of law, and allow justice to be administered between

her and the meanest of her subjects by the ordinary tribunals of the land. And thank God that we have tribunals and that we have judges who would administer the law between the sovereign and her subjects with so much impartiality, with as even a hand and with as unbiassed a mind as between any two ordinary persons. But is that the case in Greece? No! I ask, then, what becomes of the position that Mr. Finlay could have appealed to the tribunals of the country against the king of Greece? The king of Greece is utterly irresponsible, not only politically, but civilly, to any of his subjects, and you can only seek redress, if you have sustained any injury, against the officers of state. In this case, however, the officers of state were not responsible, because this matter had occurred before the constitution by which alone even they became responsible and were called into power. With respect, therefore, to the claim of Mr. Finlay, I think that case is pretty well disposed of.

I now come to M. Pacifico, and I rejoice that we shall be able to discuss that case on its merits, and not on the ground of M. Pacifico being a Jew or a usurer, or, as it was ungenerously suggested, and when he could not defend himself, a delinquent who had committed an act of forgery. All these questions are utterly beside the one at issue. And here, sir, let me say that I never felt stronger indignation than when I read the observations, as to who and what M. Pacifico was and is, which have been repeated over and over again in that portion of the press devoted to the interests of Russian despotism, and which have been spoken over and over again by certain lords who come forward either for their own behoof or that of Continental tyrants. According to these authorities M. Pacifico is a species of Jew broker, a Jew usurer, a Jew trafficker, a hybrid Jew. And then, sir, forsooth, we

are told in the same breath as that in which such phrases are employed, that they are not used to prejudice the individual to whom they are applied! For what purpose then, I ask, are they used? Why, sir, even at *nisi prius* we should not stoop to such shabby artifices as these. Even lawyers would not resort to such mean and dirty acts as these; they would not think themselves justified in saying that, on a man sustaining a civil wrong and demanding justice, the question was to be tried by his character; yet that has been done again and again to prejudice this case. However, the right honorable gentleman, in taking the place of those who had carried on this accusation against the government elsewhere, thought it necessary to protect himself from being supposed to take any part in such acts as these. But the right honorable gentleman has pursued the course followed elsewhere of making the most of the abused extravagance of M. Pacifico's demand. But I will show the House that the amount of compensation claimed has nothing to do with the question; and for this simple reason, it never was a matter of dispute with the Greek government. The objection which the Greek government took was to the principle of the demand, not to its amount. The dispute never advanced as far as to have anything to do with the amount.

As for the wrongs inflicted on M. Pacifico, I need not dwell upon them. They are known to all the world. The man was outraged in his person, in his family, and in his property. The question then is, Was he entitled to redress? He may be a Jew, a broker, a usurer, a hybrid Jew—he may have committed an act of forgery. It is possible—although God forbid that I should believe such a charge against any man without the opportunity of answering it!—he may have been a forger; it did not lie in the mouth of the Portuguese govern-

ment to say so, after having appointed him consul—first at Morocco, and then at Athens; but for all that he was injured, and therefore entitled to redress. Now, what are the known facts as to his position? He had been living at Athens for many years in comfort and respectability—a substantial citizen, carrying on his business with the Greek people. Well, he was grievously injured. The right honorable gentleman said he ought to have gone before the Greek tribunals. What tribunals? He did go before one. He tried to proceed in a criminal court—with what success we know. A crime had been committed in the broad daylight, at noon, in the midst of Athens. The perpetrators were seen and well known. They were denounced to the police; and the police, in reply, contended that there was no evidence to fix their identity, and so let them loose again. So much for the honor and honesty of Greek tribunals. But the right honorable gentleman says, Why did he not go before a civil tribunal? Why did he not sue the rioters for damages? Good God! Is it possible that the right honorable gentleman can be in earnest? Does he really consider us so weak, so fallible, as to be likely to swallow an obvious, a palable, or gross absurdity such as that? What! seek for compensation from a mob—from a rabble of brigands, vagabonds, and ruffians, in rags and tatters, who wrecked his house and stole his furniture? Is he to proceed for damages against such a horde as this? Let me ask the House—let me ask the right honorable gentleman this question: Suppose that, in some time of trouble and popular excitement, a mob were to sack his house, as the mob sacked M. Pacifico's, would he bring an action against each and every member of that mob? We have had instances of such riots taking place, I think, Nottingham Castle was destroyed. It belonged to the Duke of Newcastle. Did he

prosecute the mob for damages? The Marquis of Londonderry's house in St. James's Square was attacked and damaged. Did he prosecute the mob for damages? The palace of the bishop at Bristol was burnt down, and property to a great extent destroyed. Did he prosecute the mob for damages? No; you don't proceed against paupers. There is nothing to be got out of them.

Observe the difference between Greece and this country. England, with wiser legislation, proceeding on the principle that for injuries done in times of tumult it is idle to leave the people to a remedy by civil action against the parties committing them, provides this wise regulation: that in the case of such injuries the local community, the hundred, should be responsible for the property which has been demolished. If, however, the property fall under a certain category for which the hundred is not liable, the government is nevertheless bound to make the loss good, so that no owner of property need suffer from the lawless violence of mobs, which it is the business of the executive to keep in order.¹ If, then, this state of things had existed in Athens—if M. Pacifico could have claimed redress from the Greek tribunals, he was no doubt bound to go there. But I say he could not. It is idle to assert that he could. The right honorable gentleman tells us that there are courts of law in Greece, that there is a regular bar there, always ready to undertake the case of anybody applying to them. Is there? Stop a minute. M. Pacifico having been attacked a second time, and having made his complaint, the noble lord at the head of the foreign office instructed Sir Edmund Lyons to institute a prosecution against the parties who had committed the outrage. What

¹ A modern instance of the working of this principle was the compensation granted by the government to the sufferers by the Socialist riots in the West End of London in February, 1886.

was the result? The offending parties had actually been apprehended, when M. Pacifico was told that he could not get a lawyer to bring his case on, and that such was the strict compulsion under which the courts were kept that they did not dare to place themselves in opposition to the prime minister of the country.

But, says the right honorable gentleman, the judges at Athens administer justice impartially and fairly; there is a court called the Areopagus, and its judges are perfectly free to act according to the dictates of their conscience. Let me tell the right honorable gentleman that he never labored under a more complete mistake. The constitution undoubtedly provides that the judges shall not be dismissed at the king's pleasure; but they are so dismissed every day. And not only that, but the Greek government have established this system—and it shows their Greek subtlety, as they have a number of courts of equal jurisdiction and authority—they transplant the judges from one to the other, as the purpose of each case may seem to require. When a particular case which the government is interested in bringing to a particular decision occurs in a court, why then they transplant the judge on whom they can depend into that court. Let me cite an instance. An action was brought by M. Piscatori, the French ambassador at Athens, against the editor of a newspaper published there—the “Athena.” This was in 1846. M. Piscatori was, of course, all-powerful with the government. Well, the sentence was against the editor. Two of the judges pronounced for his acquittal; three for his condemnation. One of the former, called, I believe, Disachi, was summarily dismissed in the following curt terms: “The king has been pleased to remove you from the bench.” Well, the editor appealed to the court of the Are-

opagus, and on the eve of his case coming on, two of his judges who were to be were suddenly dismissed, without any reason whatever being assigned. I have these facts from authority upon which I can implicitly rely, and for their exact truth I pledge myself to the House. Again, there was a president of the court of the Areopagus called Cleónares. He was dismissed upon the instant, without any reason assigned, but for causes of which no one who has listened to what I have stated can for a moment doubt.

And after this you tell me that the Greek tribunals are pure. “Oh, but,” says the right honorable gentleman, “I produce Sir Edmund Lyons to prove my case. He says that the press is free, and the tribunals are fair and independent.” True; Sir Edmund Lyons says so; but when? Sir, the reference to Sir Edmund Lyons shows that there are other texts besides those of Scripture which the — which certain persons can quote for their own purposes. The despatch in question was written in 1836, and under what circumstances? King Otho having been advised by his father, as young gentlemen who have lived too fast and extravagantly sometimes are, to go and travel and look out for a wife,—of course, a rich one,—obeyed the paternal injunction, and left his kingdom under the charge of Count Armansperg, who took advantage of the absence of his royal master to set matters a little to rights. Well, he began by reforming the tribunals, by making them independent. He set the press free—he established provincial councils, so as to give the people some sort of means of expressing their opinions on public matters—in short, he set the kingdom so far to rights, hoping, of course, that upon the return of his royal master he would reap the reward of his merits in a rich overflow of royal favors. Notice, however, of what Count Armansperg had

been doing had, it seems, been conveyed to King Otho, who straightway returned in alarm, and before the boat which conveyed him from the ship touched the soil of Greece, Count Armansperg was ignominiously dismissed. Arbitrary dominion resumed its tyrannical rule—injustice, oppression, and wrong were re-established in their old supremacy; and such is the system which has ruled supreme in Greece ever since.

Well, to proceed. The right honorable gentleman dwelt last night on the case of the man Sumachi, who was tortured; and he set out by saying that he did not believe Sumachi's statement, and that Sir Edmund Lyons was just the man ready to receive and record any unauthenticated case bearing against the Greek government. Sir, I say that Sir Edmund Lyons is a man who, after eight or nine years' service as minister of Athens, received, as a token of his sovereign's approbation, the Grand Cross of the Bath; and I hope that a gentleman who has been thus specially and highly honored is at least entitled to have his official assertions believed—at all events until the contrary shall have been shown. But is this case of Sumachi a single instance? No. Torture has over and over again been applied in Greece. Torture, I repeat, is commonly applied in Greece. I can prove innumerable instances of it. One is so disgusting that I cannot mention it; yet I ought to mention it—I will mention it. I feel that it ought to be told, that we may at least know what these people, of whom so much has been said, really are. How do they torture women? They attach cats to their naked persons, and then flog the animals, that in their furious struggles they may lacerate the flesh to which they are tied. Another species of torture is this: a man is tied, hands, feet, and head together, and in this position flung upon the

ground and bastinadoed. And still, sir, the right honorable gentleman is right—perfectly right—in saying that all such atrocities are forbidden by the constitution of Greece. But what is the value of that constitution? I say, sir, not so much as that of the paper on which it is written. It has been set aside, violated, outraged in every respect and in every way. It exists but in name; while oppression and corruption reign in unmitigated horror in its room.

And now, sir, I dismiss the right honorable gentleman and his Greek arguments. I trust I have given him and them satisfactory answers. Transcendent as are the abilities of the right honorable gentleman, I believe that even his talents will not support a case when truth is in the other scale. But truth, if it does not prevail here, will prevail elsewhere. The country is beginning to appreciate what is the truth in this question. The country will fully appreciate, too, the motives which induce you, after four years of silence, now at length to come forward and attack the noble lord at the head of the foreign affairs of this country. But whatever may be the result here, I tell you that the people of England will only rally the more heartily around that government which stands pledged to extend the safeguard of its power to all its subjects, in whatever land their business may have led them; and which is also able and willing, if on any occasion it may be too late to interfere for the purposes of protection, at all events to stand forward and to demand from them reparation and redress.